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Summary: As the pinnacle of naval power, America's aircraft carrier fleet faces increasing threats from advanced missile technology, particularly from near-peer adversaries like China or Russia. With hypersonic, cruise, and ballistic missiles capable of targeting carriers, the sheer force of numbers poses a significant challenge. However, carriers are not defenseless; equipped with formidable aircraft and supported by carrier battle groups, they create a defensive umbrella to mitigate threats. While adversaries aim to penetrate this defensive bubble, historical precedent shows the resilience of carrier battle groups. Through strategic planning and seamanship, US carriers strive to stay ahead in the ever-evolving landscape of modern warfare.

The American aircraft carrier fleet is the strongest in the world. With 11 supercarriers and hundreds of aircraft, the U.S. Navy can project power to any part of the globe and respond to contingencies as they arise.  

These aircraft carriers would be the central actors in any near-peer war with China or Russia. By containing or destroying them, an adversary would neutralize much of America’s expeditionary firepower. But how would they achieve this?

Today, missiles are the most serious danger to aircraft carriers. 

Advances in missile technology have increased the threat to carriers. Hypersonic, cruise, and even ballistic missiles now have the range, speed, and destructive capability to take out a carrier. Nor is the threat limited to a single well-placed, cutting-edge missile. Indeed, the Navy is concerned that a near-peer adversary like China could launch dozens, if not hundreds, of missiles against American supercarriers and destroy or sink them through the sheer force of numbers. The more advanced the incoming munitions, the greater the odds in favor of the attacker. 

But it isn't just about math. It is also about calculated risks. You will not find an aircraft carrier exposed unless something has gone really wrong. To begin with, a carrier’s first line of defense is its aircraft. They can fly thousands of miles away from the mothership and take out incoming threats. 

In addition, aircraft carriers don't fight alone. Supercarriers lead carrier battle groups that can include guided-missile cruisers, guided-missile destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, and support vessels. The smaller warships fan out and create a defensive umbrella around the aircraft carrier, protecting it from aerial, surface, and underwater threats.

During combat, the goal of an adversary is to penetrate that defensive bubble and get to the carrier. If he can damage or sink the leader of the battlegroup and thus restrict or stop its air operations, then the carrier battle group is neutralized. This is easier said than done. 

The last time an aircraft carrier was destroyed or sunk in major combat operations was during World War Two. Since then, the closest a military has come to sinking an enemy carrier was during the Falklands War, when the Argentine Air Force threw dozens of aircraft against a British task force in an attempt to sink two British aircraft carriers and establish air superiority over the battlefield. Although they sank several warships and support ships, the Argentines failed to penetrate the air defense umbrella completely and reach the aircraft carriers. 

The goal of the carrier battle group is to stay out of danger – or limit its exposure to danger as much as possible while it works through the enemy’s capabilities. Numbers might create an advantage, but that advantage can be countered by good seamanship and proper planning. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Last month, rumors that Russia has been developing a space-based nuclear weapon took the media by storm. The technology in question, ominously dubbed a “serious national security threat” by House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Turner, left many in Washington asking how the United States itself is planning to capitalize on the strategic significance of outer space. 

Russia, however, isn’t the most assertive actor in the space domain. That honor belongs to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has a clear plan to dominate outer space—and which is moving ahead with the full backing of the powers that be in Beijing.

China’s outer space strategy involves many things, from asteroid mining to increasing the number of PRC-fielded satellites to developing a rival to the U.S. GPS navigation system. However, its ultimate objective is clear: to bolster the country’s comprehensive national power. As the PRC itself has asserted, “To explore the vast cosmos, develop the space industry, and build China into a space power is our eternal dream.”

Consequently, China’s space program has made massive strides in recent years. The PRC’s Tiangong space station, for instance, initially entered Earth’s orbit in April 2021 and has since hosted six separate astronaut crews. Last year, Zhang Qiao, a researcher from the China Academy of Space Technology, announced that the station will double in size in the future to support the over 100 scientific research projects that have or are currently taking place in orbit. In addition, China successfully collected Lunar material in 2020 with its Chang’e-5 mission, landed its Zhurong rover on Mars in 2022, and completed a record sixty-seven targeted launches in 2023.

Most recently, researchers from the Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT) in northeast China unveiled plans for a manned facility on the Moon. Newly translated video footage from the Third Annual Space Science Conference in October 2023, co-hosted by the Chinese Society of Space Research and Zhejiang Province Science and Technology Association, presents a plan for an expansive Lunar installation. The base features subterranean living quarters, research labs, a greenhouse, a fleet of unmanned vehicles, a photovoltaic system, closed-cycle life support, and more. The purported purpose of the project, led by Chief HIT Engineer Mei Hongyuan, is to study the chemical composition of the Lunar surface.

The proposal in the video draws heavily on research from a 2022 paper published in the Chinese Journal of Deep Space Exploration titled “Research on Building Plans Design for Future China Lunar Base.” The report features several different design possibilities for a Chinese Lunar facility and emphasizes the fact that “the Moon is the Earth’s only natural satellite,” and that “countries must establish Lunar bases in order to take advantage of the Moon’s natural resources.” 

Why should U.S. policymakers care about Chinese plans to build a base on the Moon? First, the plan has a considerable chance of becoming a reality. As many already know, China is no stranger to grand architectural undertakings (The Great Wall, the Grand Canal, Three Gorges Dam, etc.) and is already planning to send its first manned mission to the Moon in 2030, followed by the construction of a permanent base there by 2036. 

Meanwhile, the credentials of the architect of China’s new Lunar Base plan suggest seriousness. Mr. Mei is a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with political ties to China’s leadership and has professional experience designing facilities for the 2022 Winter Olympic Games, for the PRC State Council, and for the Harbin Institute. As such, his design plans for a Lunar base carry substantial credibility.

Second, a Chinese Moon base represents an economic challenge to U.S. interests. The Lunar surface, for one, is home to a variety of critical materials. More specifically, Helium-3—a non-radioactive isotope found in large quantities on the Moon’s surface—has a wide range of uses, most notable in the operation of nuclear fusion reactors. Aluminum and Silicone are also very abundant on the Lunar surface, meaning Chinese engineers will likely use the Moon’s soil to produce solar panels and 3D printed facilities. As Chinese Moon scientist Ouyang Ziyuan has put it, “the Moon could serve as a new and tremendous supplier of energy and resources for human beings…This is crucial to sustainable development of human beings on Earth…Whoever first conquers the Moon will benefit first.” 

Underpinning all this is a key recognition: industrializing the Moon would be a key part of what China envisions as a $10 trillion/year Moon-Earth Economic Zone. Ultimately, a Chinese Lunar base would serve as an important resource deposit and a trampoline to catapult the PRC into deep space. 

If the United States does not confront this fact, it will be edged out of both the tangible and symbolic gains that China is aiming to seize. For the moment, the United States is in danger of precisely that. America’s ambitions remain decidedly modest. For instance, the cornerstone of the country’s space plans, the NASA Artemis program, is far less ambitious than China’s proposal and lacks the proper strategic vision to make the country a space-faring nation.

All of this is liable to come at a high cost. As China has eloquently demonstrated with its Lunar plans, the clock is ticking. For America to actually take advantage of the strategic opportunities presented by Lunar development, it will need to start thinking more about how space serves the long-term national interest.  

Aedan Yohannan is a researcher at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Summary: As Ukraine faces increased pressure from Russian forces, the arrival of F-16 Fighting Falcons offers a significant boost to Kyiv's air defense capabilities. While the process of training Ukrainian pilots on these modern aircraft has been expedited, challenges remain as they adapt to Western tactics and language requirements. Despite Russian efforts to downplay the impact of the F-16s, their deployment marks a strategic move by NATO allies to support Ukraine's defense. With the F-16's combat-proven track record and versatility, its integration into Ukraine's military arsenal could potentially shift the dynamics of the ongoing conflict.

The F-16 Fighting Falcon is already a combat-proven fighter, adopted by dozens of nations around the world. The first Fighting Falcons could also be in the skies over Ukraine as early as this summer, The New York Times reported on Monday.

A dozen pilots have been training on the U.S.-made aircraft in Denmark, the UK and the United States.

While 45 aircraft have been pledged to Kyiv, just six F-16s have been delivered. The additional jets can't come fast enough, as Ukraine is desperate for more weapons, as it runs low on artillery rounds and other ammunition while Republican lawmakers in Congress have held up additional U.S. military aid. The F-16s are expected to arrive in Ukraine armed with short- and medium-range missiles and bombs, partially making up for the shortage of ground-based munitions, the paper of record reported.

"This year, new fighter jets will be in our skies, and we have to make this year an effective one in defending ourselves against Russian guided bombs, Russian aircraft and their missiles," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said earlier this month.

The New York Times further noted that the training of Ukraine's pilots on the F-16 has proceeded at "lightning speed, compressing years of classroom learning, simulations and flight exercises into months."

Yet, the progress has been slower going than Kyiv or its allies had hoped – due to the fact that pilots trained on Soviet-era planes and tactics have had to get up to speed on the English language and Western military practices to make effective use of the Fighting Falcons.

The first Ukrainian pilots began training last August at Skrydstrup Air Base in southern Denmark, but their deficiencies in language skills and knowledge of Western flying techniques slowed the progress down considerably and it wasn't until this past January that the Ukrainian pilots were actually ready to fly.

NATO member Denmark led the European effort last spring to provide Ukraine with F-16s. The F-16s were on the list of Western-made military hardware requested by Zelensky, along with tanks, air defense systems, and artillery.

The Biden administration only reluctantly gave in to Ukraine's demands, last summer by allowing NATO allies to provide the F-16s to Kyiv. Those jets were being phased out in some European militaries in favor of the newer F-35 Lightning II.

As the paper also reported, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Belgium committed to sending around a combined 45 of the jets to Ukraine, enough for three small squadrons. Denmark is on track to send the first six in the late spring, with 13 more due to arrive over the rest of the year and into 2025.

However, American officials have cautioned that the F-16 Fighting Falcon would not be decisive in the war and that the training would take a considerable amount of time. The latter fact has already been the case, but Ukraine has benefited from downing multiple Russian A-50 reconnaissance aircraft, which could make it harder for the Kremlin's forces to monitor the skies over Ukraine.

As previously reported, Russia has downplayed the threat of the F-16, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has even dismissed claims that the F-16s will be able to flip the course of the war in Ukraine.

Putin suggested the F-16s would be as easily destroyed as the German-made Leopard 2 main battle tanks (MBTs). Moscow has even warned that if the F-16 Fighting Falcons take off from the territory of NATO member countries and are used in the Ukrainian conflict, the Kremlin could regard this as a conscious step toward escalation and "de facto direct participation in the armed confrontation."

Since it first entered service in 1979, the Fighting Falcon has engaged in more than 400,000 combat sorties and has more than a combined 19 million flight hours. Moreover, the F-16 has been adapted to complete several missions, including air-to-air fighting, ground attack, and electronic warfare. It has proven to be highly maneuverable while its combat radius exceeds that of its potential threats.

The F-16 is no longer being acquired by the U.S. Air Force, but Lockheed Martin continues to build the F-16 for foreign customers around the world. It remains the world's most successful, combat-proven multi-role jet fighter ever produced.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: The F-35A, Lockheed Martin's advanced stealth fighter, has attained operational certification to carry the B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bomb, marking it as the first 5th generation aircraft with nuclear capabilities. With this milestone achieved ahead of schedule, the F-35A becomes a pivotal component of the US and NATO's extended deterrence commitments. This development highlights the aircraft's versatility as a dual-capable platform, capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear payloads. As NATO-operated jets receive initial certification for the deterrence mission, the integration of the B61-12 further enhances the F-35A's combat capability, solidifying its role in modern warfare.

The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II has been touted as being the most advanced multirole combat aircraft in service in the world today, and according to a new report – it is now a nuclear-capable warbird.

Breaking Defense first reported on Friday that the F-35A, the conventional takeoff and landing variant, has been operationally certified to carry the B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bomb.

In a statement, F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) spokesman Russ Goemaere told Breaking Defense the certification was achieved on October 12, months ahead of a pledge to NATO allies that the process would wrap by January 2024. An undisclosed number of F-35As will now be capable of carrying the B61-12, officially making the stealth fighter a "dual-capable" aircraft that can carry both conventional and nuclear weapons.

"The F-35A is the first 5th generation nuclear-capable aircraft ever, and the first new platform (fighter or bomber) to achieve this status since the early 1990s. This F-35 Nuclear Certification effort culminates 10+ years of intense effort across the nuclear enterprise, which consists of 16 different government and industry stakeholders," said Goemaere. "The F-35A achieved Nuclear Certification ahead of schedule, providing US and NATO with a critical capability that supports US extended deterrence commitments earlier than anticipated. "

As previously reported by Maya Carlin for The National Defense in December, some North Atlantic Treaty Organization-operated jets had received "initial certification for the deterrence mission."

The F-35A is only certified to carry the B61-12 variant, the latest variant of the United States military's B61 family of air-launched nuclear gravity bombs. It is a combination of new and refurbished components from earlier variants including the B61-3, B61-4, B61-7, and B61-10. Moreover, the certification additionally does not extend to the stealth jet's sister variants, the short takeoff and vertical landing F-35B and carrier-launched F-35C.

The B61-12, which is twelve feet long and weighs approximately 825 pounds, is an air-launched nuclear gravity bomb that utilized an inertial navigation system (INS) to make a precision strike on a target. It was first integrated with the U.S. Air Force's F-15E Strike Eagle, where it is carried externally. The weapon will also be certified to be carried on the Air Force’s B-2 Spirit strategic bomber, as well as the F-16C/D fighter.

Analysis from the Federation of American Scientists reports that as of last summer, there are approximately 100 older variants of the B61 bombs housed by NATO forces in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The first of those nations either currently or plan to operate the fifth-generation stealth fighter.

In 2021, the F-35A became the first fifth-generation platform to near certification as a nuclear-capable airframe. The improvements to the already-advanced F-35 will boost the combat capability of the stealth fighter jet. These improvements will allow it to penetrate hostile airspace without warning and possibly be a part of the United States military's nuclear triad.

Unlike with the other fighters, including the F-15 and F-16, the B61-12 will be carried internally in the F-35.

The B61-12 was first successfully flight-tested to carry the B61-12 nuclear bomb at the Sandia National Laboratories' Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, in late 2020. An F-35A carried a mock warhead, which was used in a strike from an altitude of 10,500 feet, as part of a full-weapons systems demonstration that was designed to increase confidence the bomb would “work when needed.”

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: As tensions rise between the U.S. and China, military strategists analyze the growing threat posed by China's anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) like the DF-21D and DF-26B. While the U.S. Navy has successfully countered missile strikes so far, the prospect of facing these advanced weapons in a conflict with China raises concerns about the effectiveness of aircraft carriers, long considered the backbone of U.S. naval power. With both sides possessing formidable arsenals, we must question the role of carriers in modern warfare and whether a potential conflict might escalate beyond conventional naval battles.

Military planning is about considering the numerous hypothetical scenarios – such as how and where an enemy might strike, but more importantly whether and even how a potential foe's weapons systems can be countered. No doubt America's enemies likely have considered how to hit and sink an aircraft carrier – and it is just as likely U.S. Navy officials have been kept up at night worrying about such an unthinkable event.

The sailors of the United States Navy must do everything right absolutely every time, while an enemy only has to get lucky once. That fact is no doubt understood by the sailors who have been serving in the Red Sea, facing missile and drone strikes launched by Houthi rebels operating in Yemen.

So far the United States Navy has a perfect record, countering every missile fired at its warships. Arguably the odds are stacked in favor of the U.S. military, which has the best and most advanced air defense systems in the world operated by highly trained sailors.

In a conflict against China, however, the odds could shift.

As previously reported, three decades ago, China introduced its DF-21D (Dong Feng-21, CSS-5), a medium-range, road-mobile ballistic missile. It has been described as the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) or "carrier killer." Designed to replace the obsolete Dong Feng-2 (CSS-1), it was China's first solid-fuel road-mobile missile to use solid propellant. Able to deploy a 600 kg payload with a minimum range of 500 km (311 miles) and a maximum range of 2,150 km, the DF-21D’s warhead is likely maneuverable and may have an accuracy of 20 m CEP (circular error probable).

Beijing has since developed multiple DF-21 variants, including a dual nuclear/conventional capable version (DF-21C) and another designed as an anti-ship ballistic missile (DF-21D). In 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) also revealed that it believed a new nuclear variant, the DF-21E CSS-5 Mod 6) was also being produced.

Moreover, while the DF-21D could be used near the "home waters" of China, Beijing has also developed another missile that poses a threat to warships operating throughout much of the Indo-Pacific region.

This is the DF-26B (Dong Feng-26), a road-mobile, two-stage solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile that was first unveiled during a military parade in September 2015. It has a reported range of 4,000km (2,485 miles) and it can be used in both conventional and nuclear strikes against ground as well as naval targets.

\The mobile launcher can carry a 1,200 to 1,800 kg nuclear or conventional warhead, and as it could directly strike a target such as the U.S. territory of Guam in the event of war it should be seen as a formidable weapon. More ominously, the DF-26B has been described as a carrier killer due to how it could be used to target the U.S. Navy’s fleet of Nimitz- and Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered supercarriers.

Aircraft carriers were vital during the Second World War in defeating Japan in the Pacific, and the flattops have proven vital in confronting aggression during the Cold War and throughout the Global War on Terror (GWoT). Yet, the number of carriers has actually diminished even as the United States Navy operates 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers – more than any other nation in the world.

Instead of having a large fleet of conventionally powered carriers, the United States relies on a smaller number of massive flattops. The question now is whether the United States Navy could risk such vessels in a conflict against a near-peer adversary, notably China.

Losing a single carrier would be devastating as it couldn't be quickly replaced.

Yet, a war against China wouldn't simply be a replay of World War II. Even if the conflict were to be fought in the Indo-Pacific, it wouldn't be an island-hopping campaign. More importantly, U.S. bombers can already strike any spot on the globe thanks to aerial refueling fly CONUS-to-CONUS missions.

Thus, the hypothetical is whether carriers are now the weapons needed for a war against China. It is unlikely that such a conflict would be decided by even a single decisive naval battle. Rather it would likely be one of stealth bombers, missiles and possibly even nuclear weapons should the conflict escalate to that point.

Yet, the point remains that if an enemy has enough missiles, drones, aircraft, submarines, etc. – a carrier is going to be sunk. But that goes both ways. China can ill afford to lose its capital ships any more than the U.S.

Perhaps that realization is enough that cooler heads will prevail again, and keep any potential Cold War 2.0 from turning hot.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: U.S. Navy Flickr. 

Inter- and transnational formats of cooperation are increasingly contested at a time when both are needed more than ever to address globally shared challenges. This paper focusses on the origins of contested legitimacy in inter- and transnational cooperation. Legitimacy is understood here not as a quality that an actor possesses or not, but one that results from social processes (see also Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). The paper introduces different formats for inter- and transnational cooperation. First, we show that despite an overall shift towards allowing more transnational actor participation in international decision-making, resistance against meaningful and comprehensive participation remains high among a substantial group of states. Also, among transnational actors themselves, questions concerning access and participation remain disputed. Second, the paper argues that different cooperation formats need to take into account the unequal capacities and capabilities of actors in a more extensive way. To enhance the legitimacy – and potentially also the effectiveness – of cooperation formats, these differences should be considered in institutional set-ups, facilitating not only participation but also real contribution. For this, more attention needs to be paid to the differences also among non-state actors, which are often classified according to their types but take different roles depending on the format of cooperation and the governance levels at which they operate.

Inter- and transnational formats of cooperation are increasingly contested at a time when both are needed more than ever to address globally shared challenges. This paper focusses on the origins of contested legitimacy in inter- and transnational cooperation. Legitimacy is understood here not as a quality that an actor possesses or not, but one that results from social processes (see also Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). The paper introduces different formats for inter- and transnational cooperation. First, we show that despite an overall shift towards allowing more transnational actor participation in international decision-making, resistance against meaningful and comprehensive participation remains high among a substantial group of states. Also, among transnational actors themselves, questions concerning access and participation remain disputed. Second, the paper argues that different cooperation formats need to take into account the unequal capacities and capabilities of actors in a more extensive way. To enhance the legitimacy – and potentially also the effectiveness – of cooperation formats, these differences should be considered in institutional set-ups, facilitating not only participation but also real contribution. For this, more attention needs to be paid to the differences also among non-state actors, which are often classified according to their types but take different roles depending on the format of cooperation and the governance levels at which they operate.

Inter- and transnational formats of cooperation are increasingly contested at a time when both are needed more than ever to address globally shared challenges. This paper focusses on the origins of contested legitimacy in inter- and transnational cooperation. Legitimacy is understood here not as a quality that an actor possesses or not, but one that results from social processes (see also Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). The paper introduces different formats for inter- and transnational cooperation. First, we show that despite an overall shift towards allowing more transnational actor participation in international decision-making, resistance against meaningful and comprehensive participation remains high among a substantial group of states. Also, among transnational actors themselves, questions concerning access and participation remain disputed. Second, the paper argues that different cooperation formats need to take into account the unequal capacities and capabilities of actors in a more extensive way. To enhance the legitimacy – and potentially also the effectiveness – of cooperation formats, these differences should be considered in institutional set-ups, facilitating not only participation but also real contribution. For this, more attention needs to be paid to the differences also among non-state actors, which are often classified according to their types but take different roles depending on the format of cooperation and the governance levels at which they operate.

Across the world, media outlets and non-governmental organizations are speaking about the plight of Armenian settler colonialists in Karabakh, who left their homes voluntarily.   For example, the International Crisis Group recently published a report, proclaiming: “Armenia is having problems integrating over 100,000 refugees who fled Nagorno-Karabakh when Azerbaijan took control of the enclave in September 2023. Yerevan has tried to be generous, but it lacks funds and a long-term plan, leaving the displaced people exposed and facing an uncertain future.” 

They discussed the difficulties faced by Armenian settler colonists who left their homes voluntarily upon return to Armenia, while remaining deafly silent about the plight of the West Azerbaijanis, who faced similarly difficulties and who unlike these Armenians were the indigenous inhabitants of the land and not settler colonialists, whose presence in Karabakh violated four UN Security Council resolutions.  Similarly, the European Commission just released a statement, proclaiming: “the Commission is allocating an additional €5.5 million in humanitarian aid to support the Armenians displaced from the Nagorno-Karabakh region.”

Underlining EU’s humanitarian support to Karabakh Armenians, Commissioner for Crisis Management, Janez Lenarčič, said: “This is the first winter for thousands of Karabakh Armenians who fled to Armenia last Autumn. In these challenging times, it is our humanitarian duty to provide protection and assistance to the people most in need. With this new €5.5 million funding, we will aim to further strengthen the existing EU humanitarian response to the displaced people in Armenia, by providing them with access to basic services.”

Interestingly, when Israel evacuated 9,000 Jewish settlers from 22 settlements in the Gush Katif community in the Gaza Strip, the European Union did not provide any of the Israelis who were displaced from their home with financial assistance, including in the winter months.  This remained the case, even though decades onward, not everyone who was evacuated from their homes has been able to establish a new home and a new life.  In fact, the Europeans praised Israel’s evacuation from Gaza, even though it led to this grave humanitarian disaster for the residents of Gush Katif and the brutal Hamas terror organization taking over the coastal strip.    So, why the compassion for the Karabakh Armenians and not the Israeli evacuees? Is this not hypocrisy?   Furthermore, why did the Europeans not raise a finger to help the West Azerbaijanis, whom no one ever argued were settler colonialists?   

Chairman of the Management Board of the Western Azerbaijani Community, MP Aziz Alakbarli, recently stated that today the world speaks about the plight of Karabakh Armenians, even though they are settler colonialists, but not the West Azerbaijani community, who are indigenous to the land: “the Western Azerbaijani Community does not accept the injustice committed against the western Azerbaijanis not only in the last 100 years but also in the last two centuries and rejects the consequences of this injustice. Based on the right of return established in the Convention and other important international acts, it declares as its main goal to create conditions for the return of Azerbaijanis expelled from the territory of Armenia to their homeland and to ensure their individual and collective rights after returning there.”         

Summary: The decline of America's "unipolar moment" and the rise of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems signal a critical juncture for US military strategy. These inexpensive but effective defenses challenge the utility of America's costly offensive platforms, like aircraft carriers, against near-peer adversaries. The proliferation of A2/AD capabilities to smaller states and non-state actors further complicates US power projection globally. As enemies like the Houthis potentially gain access to such technologies through backers like Iran, China, or Russia, the US Navy must innovate or face diminishing operational spheres, highlighting the urgent need for advancements in drone swarms, submarines, and hypersonic weapons to maintain strategic relevance.

It has become trite to say that America’s “unipolar moment” has ended. Sadly, it has ended. Yet, the elites who run US foreign and national security policy have yet to realize this tragic reality. The longer that they continue operating as if it is 1994 as opposed to 2024, the more likely the US military will suffer its greatest defeat since the Battle of Bladensburg during the War of 1812. Understanding the grave threat that relatively inexpensive defensive systems, such as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD), pose to America’s wildly expensive—and complicated—offensive weapons platforms, such as its aircraft carriers, is an important step for US policymakers. 

The longer that US policymakers fail to consider the rise of these A2/AD systems, the more insecure America becomes.

As Steven Stashwick of The Diplomat wrote way back in 2016, “the United States is already paying much more for a proportionally smaller increase in combat performance, a diminishing future operational return on increasing military investments.” Citing both the Ford-class aircraft carrier and the F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation warplane as examples of the diminishing operational return on increasing military investments, Stashwick suggested that US war planners abandon the concept of decisively defeating a near-peer rival in combat. Instead, Stashwick believes the Americans should simply seek to deny their rivals from winning.

Interestingly, America’s greatest rivals—notably China—have so thoroughly perfected their A2/AD capabilities that even attempting to deploy expensive systems, such as the aircraft carriers, into areas that are home to these dangerous A2/AD systems would be wasteful. 

So, if the US cannot use its greatest naval power projector against near-peer rivals due to their A2/AD capabilities, when and where could these assets be used? 

Aircraft carriers would be useful, as they have been over the last 79 years since the end of the Second World War, in regions where the enemies of the United States lack these A2/AD capabilities. However, the problem is that both China and Russia are rapidly proliferating these systems to smaller states and transnational terror organizations because they understand that A2/AD stunts the ability of the US military to project power. 

Take, for example, the situation currently plaguing global shipping around the Middle East. Iranian-backed Houthi rebels operating out of Yemen are increasingly threatening the safety of global shipping through regions, such as the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab El-Mandeb.

Despite having been terrorizing the high seas since last October, the US Navy, which has many assets in the region, has stayed its hand in responding to the Houthi threat directly. Because of its hesitancy to respond, the Houthis have only been more encouraged to continue antagonizing the situation, believing the US Navy will not directly respond to their endless provocations. 

In fact, the Houthis have gotten so bold that they just recently launched a massive attack consisting of 21 advanced offensive drones and directed them to attack nearby US Navy warships. 

The Navy warships dispatched the Houthi drones (which were provided by the Iranians, the chief benefactor for the Houthis) with relative ease. But, as a colleague and expert in military affairs quipped to me shortly after that event, all these attacks against US Navy assets are merely data-gathering missions. 

The Houthis are escalating at every engagement with the Navy. With each engagement, they learn invaluable intelligence about the Navy’s defensive capabilities.

It would not be too difficult for this tiny terrorist organization to suddenly be handed A2/AD capabilities by their Iranian, Chinese, or Russian allies. Such systems would only allow for the Houthis to operate with even more impunity than they’ve already been operating under. And the US Navy seems willing to oblige even these tinier threats by not innovating their own effective countermeasures to the growing global A2/AD threat. 

So, until they do, the world will become smaller and smaller for US forces. Specifically, there will be fewer areas in which US carriers and other capital ships could operate with the kind of impunity they’ve become accustomed to since the end of the Cold War. 

Yes, given A2/AD capabilities being fielded by rivals, like China, US carriers will be increasingly relegated to operating in ancillary areas of interest. But China and its autocratic allies will not be content to simply keep US power projection out of their respective regions. 

Instead, they’ll seek to rollback US power everywhere. Even groups like the Houthis will suddenly become important destinations for A2/AD capabilities. 

The Navy needs to take the development of massive drone swarms, the expansion of its submarine fleet, and hypersonic weapons systems much more seriously than it has. Otherwise, even the Houthis will possess the means to sink US carriers—thereby ensuring that those systems could not be deployed to even places like Yemen.

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: U.S. Navy Flickr. 

Summary: China's People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is rapidly expanding its aircraft carrier fleet, aiming for five to six carriers by the 2030s. Despite the global shift towards sophisticated anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems that challenge naval power projection, China continues to invest heavily in carriers. This strategy underscores China's ambition to dominate the Indo-Pacific, particularly the First Island Chain, leveraging A2/AD systems to create a defensive "bubble" that enables its carriers to operate with impunity. Unlike the US, China’s carriers are not the centerpiece of its maritime power; instead, its A2/AD capabilities are, facilitating regional dominance and deterring US intervention.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been building a fleet of increasingly sophisticated aircraft carriers. What began as the butt of all jokes in the naval community—China’s Russian-built aircraft carrier called the Liaoning—has helped the PLAN develop into a robust (though untested and still limited) carrier force. Possessing three total aircraft carriers, with a fourth on the way, China is churning out their aircraft carriers like sausages (thanks to the mass production capabilities that Wall Street handed over to China during the deindustrialization craze that befell America in the middle of the last century). The fourth carrier in China’s growing fleet is rumored to be nuclear (the other three are non-nuclear).

China’s naval planners desire to have five or six aircraft carriers in their fleet by the 2030s, according to Wang Yunfei, a retired PLAN officer with knowledge about Beijing’s carrier plans. 

This begs the question, though, how many carriers does China really need? 

And that gets us to the underlying problem facing most great powers today, which is that the advent of sophisticated anti-area/access-denial (A2/AD) systems has complicated the ability of navies everywhere to project power beyond their shores. 

At least that’s the case for the US Navy. 

So, if A2/AD has seriously stunted the ability of surface fleets to move their assets within striking range of distant targets—and China’s military has led the way in this revolution—why is Beijing dumping so much money and resources into developing their own aircraft carrier capability? 

It's because, despite their awful human rights record and authoritarian regime, China is led by actual military strategists not politicians. 

For China, they have a multi-step strategy for dominating the Indo-Pacific—starting with the First Island Chain. There are three island chains, each radiating out from the previous one. The First Island Chain runs from Japan through Taiwan all the way down to the Philippines. The Second Island Chain consists of the tiny South Pacific Islands that track from the Japanese island of Okinawa all the way out to U.S.-controlled Guam. The third and final chain comprises Alaska’s Aleutian Islands and jogs down to the Hawaiian Islands. 

For China to dominate the Indo-Pacific it must ultimately come to control all three chains. Their main priority now, however, is to dominate the First Island Chain. That’s where China’s sprawling A2/AD constellation throughout the South China Sea, for instance, comes into play. From these forward-deployed positions, China’s A2/AD systems can rebuff most attempts by US Navy surface warships to come within range of Chinese forces that may be engaged in an invasion—or even a blockade—of Taiwan or some other hostile action against another US ally, such as the Philippines. 

Without the ability to reliably project power against Chinese forces in the First Island Chain, Beijing’s forces suddenly have a strategic freehand in what they view as their sphere of influence.

In essence, A2/AD systems create a nearly impenetrable “bubble” to shield Chinese military forces from American military retaliation. Underneath the protective A2/AD bubble is where Chinese carriers will operate—presumably out of range from American offensive systems. With the US Navy’s biggest power projectors, aircraft carriers, kept away, China’s carriers will have free reign to operate and intimidate. 

This, of course, is the purpose behind China’s robust arsenal of A2/AD systems. 

Unlike the US Navy, China’s aircraft carriers are not the center of gravity for their fleet. These systems are ancillary. The lynchpin of China’s offensive maritime strategy is oddly in their defensive A2/AD systems. 

These systems are specifically tailored to keep the bulk of US naval power back, giving China’s other naval assets—like their less sophisticated aircraft carriers—the room to enhance their national interest in the First Island Chain and keep US power back over-the-horizon. 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Summary: The US Navy faces significant challenges in missile defense against the complex anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems of adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Despite possessing advanced defensive systems, the sheer volume of potential missile attacks can overwhelm US warships, especially aircraft carriers, rendering them liabilities. The theft of classified defense system designs by Chinese cyber spies exacerbates this vulnerability. To counter this growing threat, experts argue for a strategic shift towards long-range warfare, including the development of offensive drones, enhanced submarine capabilities, and US hypersonic weapons, to bypass A2/AD defenses and ensure effective power projection.

The US Navy (indeed, Washington in general) seems to be averse to basic arithmetic.

Whether it be the massive deficit spending or even something as simple as protecting US warships from massive numbers of Chinese, Russian, Iranian, or North Korean missiles and hypersonic weapons associated with their increasingly complex arsenal of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems. 

For example, US Navy warships have some of the world’s most sophisticated defense systems meant to protect the ship from incoming antiship missiles. 

These systems are some of the most expensive and complex in the world. Yet, no amount of complexity can provide the kind of consistent and comprehensive shield that US warships require in the face of the growing A2/AD threat to their safety. This is especially true of US aircraft carriers which, if lost or seriously damaged, would quickly go from the Navy’s greatest power projection weapons platform to its greatest—most expensive—liability. 

Basically, it’s a simple math equation.

US warships can only defend themselves from a certain number of incoming missiles at once. American rivals, notably China, understand this fact. That’s why they’ve tailored their A2/AD systems to being able to overwhelm the Navy’s most sophisticated defensive systems.

While the Navy certainly has defenses against a certain number of incoming ballistic missiles, there are no known defensive countermeasures available to Navy warships that will protect against Chinese or Russian hypersonic weapons. 

Staying with the mundane mathematics of missile defense, the Navy does not have limitless capabilities to defend their warships against attack once within range of A2/AD systems. What’s more, in 2013, the Washington Post revealed that the Pentagon had suffered a serious breach of its cybersecurity. Chinese cyber spies hacked into the Pentagon’s supposedly secure network and stole the classified designs for more than two dozen key US weapons systems. 

Among those systems were the designs behind the Navy’s Aegis-class Destroyer’s ballistic missile defense system. This system is one of the most advanced ballistic missile defense systems in the world. Aircraft carriers operate a similar, though, different system known as the Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS). China’s hacking of the schematics for the Navy’s Aegis defense system not only means that China can build their own versions of this system. It also means that they can develop capabilities to overcome the systems employed on countless American warships. China has likely already tested their A2/AD systems against the data they stole from the Pentagon on the Navy’s shipborne missile defense systems and believe that they can overcome whatever defenses US warships employ.

If the enemy can overwhelm your missile defenses by simply throwing too many missiles in one barrage, then your ship is sunk. At the very least, in the case of aircraft carriers, the flight deck is badly damaged basically making the flat top a wasting asset on the battlefield. At that point, it’d become a race to both keep the ship from getting more damaged and taking it out of the battlespace before it was sunk. 

The Navy has known for over a decade that China and its autocratic allies have had their number when it comes to stunting American power projection. Despite this fact, the Navy and the political class that oversees them have decided to continue operating as if the threat is nonexistent. Meanwhile, China and its autocratic allies have continued enhancing their ability to deny large portions of the world map to the US Navy when the inevitable great power war erupts. 

What should have been—and must now—be done is for the Navy and the rest of Washington to fundamentally rethink its force structure. Looking at China’s threat to the US Navy in places like the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, the current paradigm will not yield victory for the US Navy. It will lead only to mass carnage, humiliation, and a bitter defeat at the hands of China’s advanced antiship and hypersonic missile forces. 

If the Navy is one of the key components of America’s power projection into contested environments, and America’s enemies have developed effective ways of stunting that power projection, then the Navy and the rest of the military must invest in new technologies and capabilities that circumvent these A2/AD defenses.

Notably, the US should expand its commitment to building large swarms of offensive drones, it must enhance its submarine fleet, and it needs to develop effective hypersonic weapons systems of its own. Warfare among great powers will increasingly be fought at a distance. The Navy and other branches could develop these long-range strike capabilities that could knock out known A2/AD emplacements. 

Once those are taken care of, then more conventional power projection methods can be resorted to. 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: U.S. Navy. 

How to align research and innovation with values, needs and expectations of society? During the past ten years, researchers, policy-makers and funders in Europe have developed and supported the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) approach to address societal aspects of research and innovation early on. This approach aims to go beyond risk management and have a broader focus on the purpose of research and innovation. It involves a range of anticipation, reflection, engagement, and action mechanisms to involve society and foster interdisciplinary collaborations to shape research and innovation towards socially beneficial goals. Importantly, in the RRI approach responsibility does not just refer to responsible conduct of individual researchers but aims to facilitate responsible processes and governance arrangements across the whole research and innovation system.

To build such a system, it is important to provide relevant training opportunities for researchers and stakeholders. Some of the major research funders such as the EU Framework programme and UK research councils have supported the development and delivery of RRI training activities, which play a crucial role in raising awareness and developing culture that puts societal aspects at the core of research and innovation. Two recent collaborative publications in the Journal of Responsible Technology share a number of good practices of RRI training.

Researchers in the EU-funded Human Brain Project (HBP) have developed a dedicated RRI capacity development programme (Ogoh et al 2023). The HBP (2013-2023) was one of the largest international collaborations ever that brought together around 500 researchers from over 100 universities and research centres from some 20 countries. Over ten years, the project received approximately half a billion Euros from the EU Framework Programmes. An integrated RRI team of social scientists and humanities researchers in the HBP worked alongside neuroscientists, computer scientists and engineers.

Continuous collaboration in this case allowed the development of the RRI capacity development programme in close consultation with researchers and stakeholders. The programme included 17 modules on a range of topics such as data governance, dual use, and diversity. Moreover, it developed online training resources, lectures, and videos.

Many participants of online and in-person training were eager to learn about and reflect on societal aspects of their work. Often, they told us that this much needed training has been missing during their university education, which typically had covered ethical aspects rather narrowly in terms of ethics approvals. However, assessing the impact of RRI training is far from straightforward. Counting training sessions and participants as well as reading evaluation forms gives some indication of interest and satisfaction. At the same time, it is much more challenging to assess some of the core aspects of RRI such as reflexivity, changing culture and increased sensitivity towards societal expectations.

In the UK, RRI training is integrated in the centres for doctoral training. A recent editorial (Stahl et al 2023) presents a variety of examples of how RRI training is organized and assessed in the context of these centres. This collaborative publication provides rich information and reflection on aims, content, and challenges of teaching RRI. It addresses questions such as: What kind of skills, attitudes and competencies do researchers need in the context of RRI? Should they be required to have a relatively detailed understanding of methodologies of foresight or public engagement? Or should they rather be willing and able to continuously reflect on and address social and ethical aspects of their own research?

The editorial demonstrates a broad range of approaches and methods to RRI training and assessment across diverse disciplines and universities. While having RRI as part of doctoral training is an important step towards its institutionalization, it is rather limited on its own. To be impactful, it needs to be part of a broader transformation of the research and innovation system including policy, reward system and funding.

Ogoh, G., Akintoye, S., Eke, D., Farisco, M., Fernow, J., Grasenick, K., Guerrero, M., Rosemann, A., Salles, A. & Ulnicane, I. (2023). Developing capabilities for responsible research and innovation (RRI). Journal of Responsible Technology, 15, 100065. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrt.2023.100065

Stahl, B. C., Aicardi, C., Brooks, L., Craigon, P. J., Cunden, M., Burton, S. D., De Heaver, M., De Saille, S., Dolby, S., Dowthwaite, L., Eke, D., Hughes, S., Keene, P., Kuh, V., Portillo, V., Shanley, D., Smallman, M., Smith, M., Stilgoe, J., Ulnicane, I., Wagner, C., & Webb, H. (2023). Assessing responsible innovation training. Journal of Responsible Technology, 16, 100063. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrt.2023.100063

The post Responsible Research and Innovation training appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

(B2) L'idée d'avoir un commissaire européen dans le prochain collège spécifiquement en charge de la Défense a refait surface. Critiquée immédiatement. À tort...

Un débat ouvert

L'idée d'un commissaire défense est défendue ardemment par Ursula von der Leyen, l'actuelle présidente de la Commission européenne, les chrétiens-démocrates du PPE (le parti populaire européen) mais aussi plusieurs autres responsables européens d'autres tendances (telle la ministre néerlandaise de la défense, libérale de gauche, Kajsa Ollongren). Elle est combattue par certains autres. A l'image du commissaire Thierry Breton qui a cette compétence, parmi d'autres, au sein de la Commission européenne, voire par Josep Borrell, le Haut représentant de l'UE chargé (aussi) de la politique de défense et de sécurité.

Une certaine logique

Premièrement, la défense européenne est devenue une priorité, une évidence, même pour ceux qui ne le croyaient pas jusqu'ici... Certes des nuances s'expriment. Mais on est plutôt dans un débat classique sur la répartition de compétences. Est-ce au niveau communautaire ou au niveau national ? Qu'est-ce qui doit être fait au niveau communautaire ? La compétence communautaire est-elle juste une instance de débat, ou d'encouragement, de soutien, ou davantage ? Deuxièmement, il y aujourd'hui une série d'instruments à gérer (fonds européen de défense pour la recherche, programme d'investissement pour les acquisitions, etc.) et une direction générale chargée de les gérer (la DG DEFI). Troisièmement, il y a nécessité pour les Européens d'affirmer haut et fort que leur défense leur appartient. Une nécessité vis-à-vis d'alliés prompts à les critiquer (cf. Trump) comme d'adversaires (Russie, Chine) qui n'ont qu'idée : réduire le poids des Européens dans le monde.

Une terminologie assez claire

Le terme de "commissaire défense" est un raccourci. Tous ceux qui l'utilisent — que ce soit pour le souhaiter ou le critiquer —, le savent. Par ce terme, on entend surtout la politique industrielle de défense, le soutien au monde de la défense par tout ce qui de près ou de loin touche aux compétences communautaires (TVA, recherche, mobilité et transport, politique maritime, etc.). Il ne s'agit en aucune façon de toucher aux prérogatives des États membres : alliances internationales (OTAN) ou neutralité, taille et format de l'armée, conscription, puissance nucléaire ou classique, volonté expéditionnaire ou intégration dans une structure internationale (ONU, OTAN, UE). Il ne s'agit pas non plus de toucher à la compétence dévolue (de par le traité) au Haut représentant de l'UE. Celui-ci ayant surtout la compétence "défense", de par le traité, dans son volet externe (PESC).

Un partage des tâches

Le partage des tâches entre un éventuel commissaire et le Haut représentant est en effet assez clairement fixé : à l'un la partie extérieure de la défense (notamment les opérations, mais aussi les contacts avec les pays tiers), à l'autre la partie intérieure de la défense. On pourrait bien évidemment imaginer que le Haut représentant, par ailleurs vice-président de la Commission européenne puisse aussi s'occuper des questions intérieures et industrielles de la défense. Mais ce serait lui confier un portfolio au-delà de ce qui a été conçu dans les traités. Et surtout le Haut représentant a déjà une mégacompétence, assurant toute la représentation extérieure et la diplomatie européenne, présidant les conseils des ministres, etc. Une tâche qui, à elle seule, mobilise une attention à 100% (lire : Les pouvoirs du Haut représentant, d’après le Traité de Lisbonne ?).

Une réforme du traité ?

C'est l'argument défendu par l'équipe du commissaire Thierry Breton. Il n'est pas exact. En aucune façon, le traité prévoit une quelconque répartition des portefeuilles au sein de la Commission européenne ou même des interdictions. En aucune façon le traité — contrairement à certaines croyances — n'interdit d'ailleurs à l'Union européenne de s'occuper de défense. Au contraire... Il l'encadre, définit certaines limites, notamment la préservation de l'autonomie de chaque État de définir sa politique de défense, mais rien de plus (lire : Principales dispositions du Traité de Lisbonne sur la PSDC, la PESC, la Défense et le Haut représentant ? - extraits). Il n'interdit même pas d'utiliser le budget communautaire pour certains aspects de la défense, notamment l'aspect industriel. Seul est interdit le financement sur le budget des opérations militaires (lire : Comment financer en commun l’achat d’armements ? Ce que dit le Traité).

Un portfolio pérenne ... ou non

La répartition des portefeuilles au sein de la Commission européenne fluctue au cours des législatures. Elle dépend en bonne partie de la volonté de la présidence de la Commission mais aussi de celles de chaque État membre qui indique, lors de la constitution du collègue des commissaires, leur préférence pour tel ou tel portefeuille. Libre ensuite à la présidence de la Commission d'inviter une répartition, voire de scissionner des portfolios ou d'en inventer, à l'image de ce commissaire au multilinguisme, constitué de toutes sortes.

Des intitulés très variables

Certains portefolios sont directement issus des compétences historiques pleines et entières (agriculture, pêche, budget, concurrence, économie, marché intérieur, transport, commerce extérieur etc.) ; d'autres viennent de compétences plus récentes davantage d'appui (éducation, santé, environnement, justice et affaires intérieures...). Enfin d'autres viennent de nouvelles terminologies. Souvent les intitulés varient. On a ainsi aujourd'hui un vice-président chargé du Mode de vie, un autre chargé du Pacte vert pour l’Europe, un troisième des Valeurs et transparence. Autant de termes qui ne recouvrent pas systématiquement une compétence communautaire ou sont mêmes par le traité.

Une obligation de coopération

Alors pourquoi pas un commissaire défense. Tout aussi nécessaire. Ce découpage oblige cependant à une bonne coopération entre le Haut représentant et le commissaire Défense. Mais c'est déjà une nécessité aujourd'hui entre un haut représentant et un commissaire chargé du marché intérieur. Ceux qui ont de la mémoire se souviennent du débat "défense" au sein de cette Commission, long et difficile (lire : La cohérence, à la Commission et ailleurs, c’est moi ! Josep Borrell)

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

Bonn, 11. März 2024. Das German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) wurde am 2. März 1964 gegründet. Es war die Zeit, in der das deutsche Engagement in der internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit der Gründung des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) im Jahr 1961 an Fahrt aufnahm.

Das IDOS, damals noch unter dem Namen Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), wurde gegründet, um Hochschulabsolvent*innen für die Arbeit im neuen Feld der Entwicklungspolitik und Internationalen Zusammenarbeit vorzubereiten und die deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit durch Forschung und Politikberatung zu unterstützen. Der erste Ausbildungskurs wurde am 27. April 1965 feierlich durch Bundespräsident Lübke und Bundesminister Scheel eröffnet.

Wir blicken zurück auf sechs Dekaden intensiven Forschens, Beratens, Ausbildens und gemeinsamen Lernens, immer mit dem Ziel, innovative und umsetzungsorientierte Lösungen für aktuelle Entwicklungsherausforderungen zu finden. Hierbei steht die Weiterentwicklung internationaler Kooperation im Kontext geopolitischer Verschiebungen im Fokus, aber auch die Ausgestaltung des klimastabilisierenden Umbaus von Wirtschafts- und Sozialsystemen, und die sozialgerechte und nachhaltige Integration von Ländern niedrigen und mittleren Einkommens in globale Wertschöpfungsketten. Wir forschen zu den Auswirkungen des Klimawandels und der Ausgestaltung von Politikinstrumenten zur Klimaanpassung oder der Kompensation von Klimaschäden und -Verlusten. Wir stellen Indizes zur Verfügung, mit denen multidimensionale und geschlechtsspezifische Armut oder staatliche Fragilität gemessen und Kooperationsinstrumente entsprechend überprüft werden können. Vor dem Hintergrund zunehmender sozialer Polarisierung und politischer Autokratisierung in Ländern aller Einkommensgruppen und auf allen Kontinenten arbeiten und beraten wir zu Politiken und Instrumenten für Demokratieschutz und -förderung.

Im September dieses Jahres freuen wir uns, den 60. Kurs unseres Postgraduierten-Programms zu begrüßen. Das Managing Global Governance (MGG) Programm mit Entscheidungsträger*innen von morgen aus Brasilien, China, Indien, Indonesien, Mexiko und Südafrika, befindet sich bereits im 18 Jahr. Zugleich startet in wenigen Wochen der vierte Kurs der Shaping Futures Academy, unseres Fortbildungs- und Dialogprogramms für Nachwuchsführungskräfte aus neun afrikanischen Ländern und Europa.

Unsere Umbenennung – aus dem Deutschen Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) wurde im Jahr 2022 das German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) – ist ein Zeichen für die Weiterentwicklung unseres Instituts, sowie für die Veränderung des Umfelds, in dem wir seit sechs Dekaden wissenschaftlich forschen, politische Akteure beraten und Nachwuchs- und Führungskräfte ausbilden. Das IDOS hat sich internationalisiert, sowohl hinsichtlich unseres Teams als auch unsere Arbeitsstile: Wir arbeiten in internationalen Partnernetzwerken, um mittels transformativer Forschung und Wissenskooperationen nachhaltige Zukünfte mit zu ermöglichen.  

Der Fokus unserer Arbeit liegt auf der Interdependenz und gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit von Entwicklung und Nachhaltigkeit. Menschenwürdiges Leben weltweit und für alle gesellschaftlichen Gruppen ist heute und insbesondere in Zukunft nur möglich, wenn planetare Leitplanken eingehalten werden, wenn also wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklung mit dem Schutz biologischer Vielfalt, sauberer Böden und Meere und einer radikalen Reduktion klimaschädlicher Emissionen einhergeht. Hierfür ist die Gestaltung nachhaltiger Entwicklungspfade in Ländern aller Einkommensgruppen, aber mit gezielter Förderung in Niedrig- und Mitteleinkommensländern, notwendig. Es bedarf einer regelbasierten internationalen Ordnung unter Anerkennung der Menschenrechte und des Internationalen Völkerrechts und konstruktiver multilateraler Kooperation auch in einer multipolaren Welt.

Es ist unser Anspruch, auch in Zukunft und vor dem Hintergrund voranschreitenden Klimawandels und Artensterbens, sozialer Polarisierung und politischer Autokratisierung, demographischer Umverteilung und geopolitischer Spannungen, durch Forschung, Nachwuchsförderung für Wissenschaft und Praxis, Politikberatung und transregionale Wissenskooperation die zunehmend multipolar geprägte Welt konstruktiv und kooperativ zu gestalten und gemeinsam nachhaltige und sozialgerechte Zukünfte zu ermöglichen. Hierfür müssen wir uns als international orientiertes Forschungsinstitut und Think Tank stets weiterentwickeln.

Es ist somit unabdingbar, koloniale und hegemoniale Kontinuitäten zwischen und innerhalb von Gesellschaften und Regionen zu erkennen und aufzubrechen. Es gilt, Forschungsagenden gemeinsam mit Partnern zu entwerfen und umzusetzen, strukturelle Machtungleichgewichte zu erkennen und kontext-spezifische und immer wieder gesellschaftliche Kompromisse ermöglichende Formen der Umverteilung zu entwickeln. Dies ist unser Beitrag, um Entscheidungsträger*innen in Deutschland, Europa und weltweit in der Gestaltung von nachhaltigen Zukünften zu unterstützen. Politikberatung begreifen wir nicht als einseitigen Wissenstransfer, sondern als die Ermöglichung gemeinsamer Lernprozesse, auch gemeinsam mit unseren internationalen Wissenschaftspartner*innen.

Unabhängige, transformative und kollaborative Wissenschaft ist gerade vor dem Hintergrund geopolitischer Spannungen und populistischer Tendenzen notwendiger denn je, um tragfähige Lösungen für die globalen Herausforderungen unserer Zeit zu entwickeln. Hierfür stehen wir als IDOS: für nachhaltige Zukünfte in einer von transregionalen Spannungen geprägten Welt.  

Bonn, 11. März 2024. Das German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) wurde am 2. März 1964 gegründet. Es war die Zeit, in der das deutsche Engagement in der internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit der Gründung des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) im Jahr 1961 an Fahrt aufnahm.

Das IDOS, damals noch unter dem Namen Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), wurde gegründet, um Hochschulabsolvent*innen für die Arbeit im neuen Feld der Entwicklungspolitik und Internationalen Zusammenarbeit vorzubereiten und die deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit durch Forschung und Politikberatung zu unterstützen. Der erste Ausbildungskurs wurde am 27. April 1965 feierlich durch Bundespräsident Lübke und Bundesminister Scheel eröffnet.

Wir blicken zurück auf sechs Dekaden intensiven Forschens, Beratens, Ausbildens und gemeinsamen Lernens, immer mit dem Ziel, innovative und umsetzungsorientierte Lösungen für aktuelle Entwicklungsherausforderungen zu finden. Hierbei steht die Weiterentwicklung internationaler Kooperation im Kontext geopolitischer Verschiebungen im Fokus, aber auch die Ausgestaltung des klimastabilisierenden Umbaus von Wirtschafts- und Sozialsystemen, und die sozialgerechte und nachhaltige Integration von Ländern niedrigen und mittleren Einkommens in globale Wertschöpfungsketten. Wir forschen zu den Auswirkungen des Klimawandels und der Ausgestaltung von Politikinstrumenten zur Klimaanpassung oder der Kompensation von Klimaschäden und -Verlusten. Wir stellen Indizes zur Verfügung, mit denen multidimensionale und geschlechtsspezifische Armut oder staatliche Fragilität gemessen und Kooperationsinstrumente entsprechend überprüft werden können. Vor dem Hintergrund zunehmender sozialer Polarisierung und politischer Autokratisierung in Ländern aller Einkommensgruppen und auf allen Kontinenten arbeiten und beraten wir zu Politiken und Instrumenten für Demokratieschutz und -förderung.

Im September dieses Jahres freuen wir uns, den 60. Kurs unseres Postgraduierten-Programms zu begrüßen. Das Managing Global Governance (MGG) Programm mit Entscheidungsträger*innen von morgen aus Brasilien, China, Indien, Indonesien, Mexiko und Südafrika, befindet sich bereits im 18 Jahr. Zugleich startet in wenigen Wochen der vierte Kurs der Shaping Futures Academy, unseres Fortbildungs- und Dialogprogramms für Nachwuchsführungskräfte aus neun afrikanischen Ländern und Europa.

Unsere Umbenennung – aus dem Deutschen Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) wurde im Jahr 2022 das German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) – ist ein Zeichen für die Weiterentwicklung unseres Instituts, sowie für die Veränderung des Umfelds, in dem wir seit sechs Dekaden wissenschaftlich forschen, politische Akteure beraten und Nachwuchs- und Führungskräfte ausbilden. Das IDOS hat sich internationalisiert, sowohl hinsichtlich unseres Teams als auch unsere Arbeitsstile: Wir arbeiten in internationalen Partnernetzwerken, um mittels transformativer Forschung und Wissenskooperationen nachhaltige Zukünfte mit zu ermöglichen.  

Der Fokus unserer Arbeit liegt auf der Interdependenz und gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit von Entwicklung und Nachhaltigkeit. Menschenwürdiges Leben weltweit und für alle gesellschaftlichen Gruppen ist heute und insbesondere in Zukunft nur möglich, wenn planetare Leitplanken eingehalten werden, wenn also wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklung mit dem Schutz biologischer Vielfalt, sauberer Böden und Meere und einer radikalen Reduktion klimaschädlicher Emissionen einhergeht. Hierfür ist die Gestaltung nachhaltiger Entwicklungspfade in Ländern aller Einkommensgruppen, aber mit gezielter Förderung in Niedrig- und Mitteleinkommensländern, notwendig. Es bedarf einer regelbasierten internationalen Ordnung unter Anerkennung der Menschenrechte und des Internationalen Völkerrechts und konstruktiver multilateraler Kooperation auch in einer multipolaren Welt.

Es ist unser Anspruch, auch in Zukunft und vor dem Hintergrund voranschreitenden Klimawandels und Artensterbens, sozialer Polarisierung und politischer Autokratisierung, demographischer Umverteilung und geopolitischer Spannungen, durch Forschung, Nachwuchsförderung für Wissenschaft und Praxis, Politikberatung und transregionale Wissenskooperation die zunehmend multipolar geprägte Welt konstruktiv und kooperativ zu gestalten und gemeinsam nachhaltige und sozialgerechte Zukünfte zu ermöglichen. Hierfür müssen wir uns als international orientiertes Forschungsinstitut und Think Tank stets weiterentwickeln.

Es ist somit unabdingbar, koloniale und hegemoniale Kontinuitäten zwischen und innerhalb von Gesellschaften und Regionen zu erkennen und aufzubrechen. Es gilt, Forschungsagenden gemeinsam mit Partnern zu entwerfen und umzusetzen, strukturelle Machtungleichgewichte zu erkennen und kontext-spezifische und immer wieder gesellschaftliche Kompromisse ermöglichende Formen der Umverteilung zu entwickeln. Dies ist unser Beitrag, um Entscheidungsträger*innen in Deutschland, Europa und weltweit in der Gestaltung von nachhaltigen Zukünften zu unterstützen. Politikberatung begreifen wir nicht als einseitigen Wissenstransfer, sondern als die Ermöglichung gemeinsamer Lernprozesse, auch gemeinsam mit unseren internationalen Wissenschaftspartner*innen.

Unabhängige, transformative und kollaborative Wissenschaft ist gerade vor dem Hintergrund geopolitischer Spannungen und populistischer Tendenzen notwendiger denn je, um tragfähige Lösungen für die globalen Herausforderungen unserer Zeit zu entwickeln. Hierfür stehen wir als IDOS: für nachhaltige Zukünfte in einer von transregionalen Spannungen geprägten Welt.  

Bonn, 11. März 2024. Das German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) wurde am 2. März 1964 gegründet. Es war die Zeit, in der das deutsche Engagement in der internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit der Gründung des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) im Jahr 1961 an Fahrt aufnahm.

Das IDOS, damals noch unter dem Namen Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), wurde gegründet, um Hochschulabsolvent*innen für die Arbeit im neuen Feld der Entwicklungspolitik und Internationalen Zusammenarbeit vorzubereiten und die deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit durch Forschung und Politikberatung zu unterstützen. Der erste Ausbildungskurs wurde am 27. April 1965 feierlich durch Bundespräsident Lübke und Bundesminister Scheel eröffnet.

Wir blicken zurück auf sechs Dekaden intensiven Forschens, Beratens, Ausbildens und gemeinsamen Lernens, immer mit dem Ziel, innovative und umsetzungsorientierte Lösungen für aktuelle Entwicklungsherausforderungen zu finden. Hierbei steht die Weiterentwicklung internationaler Kooperation im Kontext geopolitischer Verschiebungen im Fokus, aber auch die Ausgestaltung des klimastabilisierenden Umbaus von Wirtschafts- und Sozialsystemen, und die sozialgerechte und nachhaltige Integration von Ländern niedrigen und mittleren Einkommens in globale Wertschöpfungsketten. Wir forschen zu den Auswirkungen des Klimawandels und der Ausgestaltung von Politikinstrumenten zur Klimaanpassung oder der Kompensation von Klimaschäden und -Verlusten. Wir stellen Indizes zur Verfügung, mit denen multidimensionale und geschlechtsspezifische Armut oder staatliche Fragilität gemessen und Kooperationsinstrumente entsprechend überprüft werden können. Vor dem Hintergrund zunehmender sozialer Polarisierung und politischer Autokratisierung in Ländern aller Einkommensgruppen und auf allen Kontinenten arbeiten und beraten wir zu Politiken und Instrumenten für Demokratieschutz und -förderung.

Im September dieses Jahres freuen wir uns, den 60. Kurs unseres Postgraduierten-Programms zu begrüßen. Das Managing Global Governance (MGG) Programm mit Entscheidungsträger*innen von morgen aus Brasilien, China, Indien, Indonesien, Mexiko und Südafrika, befindet sich bereits im 18 Jahr. Zugleich startet in wenigen Wochen der vierte Kurs der Shaping Futures Academy, unseres Fortbildungs- und Dialogprogramms für Nachwuchsführungskräfte aus neun afrikanischen Ländern und Europa.

Unsere Umbenennung – aus dem Deutschen Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) wurde im Jahr 2022 das German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) – ist ein Zeichen für die Weiterentwicklung unseres Instituts, sowie für die Veränderung des Umfelds, in dem wir seit sechs Dekaden wissenschaftlich forschen, politische Akteure beraten und Nachwuchs- und Führungskräfte ausbilden. Das IDOS hat sich internationalisiert, sowohl hinsichtlich unseres Teams als auch unsere Arbeitsstile: Wir arbeiten in internationalen Partnernetzwerken, um mittels transformativer Forschung und Wissenskooperationen nachhaltige Zukünfte mit zu ermöglichen.  

Der Fokus unserer Arbeit liegt auf der Interdependenz und gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit von Entwicklung und Nachhaltigkeit. Menschenwürdiges Leben weltweit und für alle gesellschaftlichen Gruppen ist heute und insbesondere in Zukunft nur möglich, wenn planetare Leitplanken eingehalten werden, wenn also wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklung mit dem Schutz biologischer Vielfalt, sauberer Böden und Meere und einer radikalen Reduktion klimaschädlicher Emissionen einhergeht. Hierfür ist die Gestaltung nachhaltiger Entwicklungspfade in Ländern aller Einkommensgruppen, aber mit gezielter Förderung in Niedrig- und Mitteleinkommensländern, notwendig. Es bedarf einer regelbasierten internationalen Ordnung unter Anerkennung der Menschenrechte und des Internationalen Völkerrechts und konstruktiver multilateraler Kooperation auch in einer multipolaren Welt.

Es ist unser Anspruch, auch in Zukunft und vor dem Hintergrund voranschreitenden Klimawandels und Artensterbens, sozialer Polarisierung und politischer Autokratisierung, demographischer Umverteilung und geopolitischer Spannungen, durch Forschung, Nachwuchsförderung für Wissenschaft und Praxis, Politikberatung und transregionale Wissenskooperation die zunehmend multipolar geprägte Welt konstruktiv und kooperativ zu gestalten und gemeinsam nachhaltige und sozialgerechte Zukünfte zu ermöglichen. Hierfür müssen wir uns als international orientiertes Forschungsinstitut und Think Tank stets weiterentwickeln.

Es ist somit unabdingbar, koloniale und hegemoniale Kontinuitäten zwischen und innerhalb von Gesellschaften und Regionen zu erkennen und aufzubrechen. Es gilt, Forschungsagenden gemeinsam mit Partnern zu entwerfen und umzusetzen, strukturelle Machtungleichgewichte zu erkennen und kontext-spezifische und immer wieder gesellschaftliche Kompromisse ermöglichende Formen der Umverteilung zu entwickeln. Dies ist unser Beitrag, um Entscheidungsträger*innen in Deutschland, Europa und weltweit in der Gestaltung von nachhaltigen Zukünften zu unterstützen. Politikberatung begreifen wir nicht als einseitigen Wissenstransfer, sondern als die Ermöglichung gemeinsamer Lernprozesse, auch gemeinsam mit unseren internationalen Wissenschaftspartner*innen.

Unabhängige, transformative und kollaborative Wissenschaft ist gerade vor dem Hintergrund geopolitischer Spannungen und populistischer Tendenzen notwendiger denn je, um tragfähige Lösungen für die globalen Herausforderungen unserer Zeit zu entwickeln. Hierfür stehen wir als IDOS: für nachhaltige Zukünfte in einer von transregionalen Spannungen geprägten Welt.  

Networks are becoming more important as a tool to facilitate the cooperation of like-minded actors in increasingly complex settings, within and beyond borders as well as between and across scales. Transnational and transdisciplinary knowledge  networks can provide a structure that enables cooperation and offers promises of flexibility and adaptability. This paper focusses on transnational and transdisciplinary knowledge networks formed by alumni – people who have engaged in collective  learning experiences. The paper shares five lessons on how multi-stakeholder interactions in transnational networks can be fostered to unfold transformative potential and create societal impact. From a network member’s perspective, the network  needs to be relevant to the current stage of his or her professional life – while also contributing to the greater common good that the respective group is aiming for. Investing in trust, a shared vision and values as well as providing structures of self-organisation are especially effective instruments for increasing cooperation to work on complex challenges.

Networks are becoming more important as a tool to facilitate the cooperation of like-minded actors in increasingly complex settings, within and beyond borders as well as between and across scales. Transnational and transdisciplinary knowledge  networks can provide a structure that enables cooperation and offers promises of flexibility and adaptability. This paper focusses on transnational and transdisciplinary knowledge networks formed by alumni – people who have engaged in collective  learning experiences. The paper shares five lessons on how multi-stakeholder interactions in transnational networks can be fostered to unfold transformative potential and create societal impact. From a network member’s perspective, the network  needs to be relevant to the current stage of his or her professional life – while also contributing to the greater common good that the respective group is aiming for. Investing in trust, a shared vision and values as well as providing structures of self-organisation are especially effective instruments for increasing cooperation to work on complex challenges.

Networks are becoming more important as a tool to facilitate the cooperation of like-minded actors in increasingly complex settings, within and beyond borders as well as between and across scales. Transnational and transdisciplinary knowledge  networks can provide a structure that enables cooperation and offers promises of flexibility and adaptability. This paper focusses on transnational and transdisciplinary knowledge networks formed by alumni – people who have engaged in collective  learning experiences. The paper shares five lessons on how multi-stakeholder interactions in transnational networks can be fostered to unfold transformative potential and create societal impact. From a network member’s perspective, the network  needs to be relevant to the current stage of his or her professional life – while also contributing to the greater common good that the respective group is aiming for. Investing in trust, a shared vision and values as well as providing structures of self-organisation are especially effective instruments for increasing cooperation to work on complex challenges.