Feed aggregator

The launch of China's mysterious TJS-11 spy satellite on 23 February, whose capacities and objectives were unknown at the time, has given Washington a scare. Since the launch, Intelligence Online has followed the trajectory of the satellite which was finally

The Ukrainian creators of the DeepStateMap.live open source interactive online intelligence map are currently testing the beta version of their

The historic US defence and intelligence community service provider Mission Essential has recently hired Scott Murray, a former senior executive

On 4 March, MPs from Germany's far-right AfD party tabled a parliamentary question calling on the federal government to clarify

New York - JPMorgan hires ESG investigator to boost reputation protectionTo improve the management of reputational risk in its investment

A top congressional staffer who was reported to be under investigation on February 24 for delivering military equipment to Ukraine's armed

The French diplomat Luis Vassy is slated to replace Nicolas de Rivière as the United Nation's Permanent Representative of France in New York, according to Intelligence Online sources.

Summary: As the Russo-Ukraine War extends into its third year, Russia's military shortcomings are increasingly evident, particularly in its failure to dominate the airspace over Ukraine. This situation highlights the limitations of Russia's air force and its reliance on the Sukhoi Su-57, a fifth-generation fighter jet with significant potential but plagued by production delays and technical issues. Despite its advanced capabilities and potential role in enhancing Russian air superiority, only a small number have been deployed. The Su-57's struggles reflect broader challenges in Russia's military operations, even as it gains pop culture prominence in films like "Top Gun: Maverick."

The Sukhoi Su-57: Behind Russia's Struggle for Air Superiority in Ukraine

With the Russo-Ukraine War entering its third year, Russia’s military struggles are clear to see. 

The war has become a conflict of attrition. Russia is not gaining meaningful amounts of territory, and surprisingly, it is failing to control the airspace above Ukraine. That failure emphasizes the shortcomings of Russia’s air force. It draws attention to the jets at Russia’s disposal – and the jets not at Russia’s disposal, namely, the fifth-generation Sukhoi Su-57.

Introducing the Su-57

The Su-57 is a fifth-generation multirole fighter. The jet’s first flight took place in 2010, yet all these years later, only 32 have been built. (Production began in 2019.)

Consistent setbacks and delays have hampered the Su-57s production, but even the completed aircraft often fail to impress, as Alex Hollings of Sandboxx News wrote: 

“Radar cross-sections (RCS) are subject to a great deal of debate online and should always be taken with a grain of salt, but expert assessments of the Su-57 suggest that it boasts an RCS of about .5 square meters – which is about the same as a 4th generation F/A-18 Super Hornet when flying without ordnance and 5,000 times bigger than the F-22 Raptor.”

Hollings continued, “Stealthy woes aren’t the Su-57s only problem – delays in Russia’s 5th generation engine program have left its Felon fleet operating the same AL-41F1 engines found in Russia’s non-stealth but highly capable 4th generation Su-35S. A Rand Corporation analysis of the aircraft’s advanced 360-degree sensor suite posits that the system itself remains incomplete as well, likely hindered by international sanctions placed on Russia following its 2014 invasion of Ukraine.”

Still, the Su-57 is a capable aircraft, as defense expert Christian Orr writes: 

“All of these woes plaguing the Su-57 doesn’t mean the F-22 or F-35 pilots – or especially pilots of the 4th generation fighter planes – can afford to take [the Su-57] lightly.” 

Indeed, the Su-57 is still an advanced fighter jet with a 360-degree thrust vectoring control that facilitates nuanced maneuverability. The Su-57 also has impressive speed, maxing out around Mach 2. 

Despite the flaws, the Su-57 would likely make a positive contribution to Russian objectives in the skies over Ukraine – if the Russians could only bring it to the fight.

The Su-57 Felon in Film

While the Su-57 has not appeared regularly in Russian force structures, the jet did appear in the top grossing film of 2022, Top Gun: Maverick. Well, technically the jet featured was not acknowledged as the Su-57, and the operator remained unidentified. But the jet depicted was clearly the Su-57, albeit in CGI form. 

In Top Gun, the Su-57 appears menacingly at the film’s climax, flying over Tom Cruise’s shoulder as he pilots a resurrected F-14 Tomcat. The Su-57 is depicted as lethal and advanced, earning the respect of Cruise’s character. Cruise manages, of course, to defeat two Su-57s when they both come in for a close look at Cruise.

Keep an eye out for the Su-57 in the Top Gun 3, if not over the skies of Ukraine.

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

China’s economy is in a grim place these days, far from the past when many journalists and politicians praised Beijing’s policies and spoke of that economy’s imminent dominance. Beijing just released a 5 percent real growth target for 2024, the same pace as last year. Much of the forecasting community is rightfully skeptical of whether that kind of growth is possible. A lot of skepticism remains over last year’s figure. Whether China hits the target or not hardly makes a difference. The important point is that 5 percent is only about half the growth pace averaged in past years. Something clearly has gone wrong.

Very little in Chinese economics has looked good since the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020. The nation’s population and, critically, its labor force are shrinking. A property crisis continues to weigh on building, home buying, and real estate values, and hence on the consumer as well as business confidence. China’s once-exuberant consumers remain reluctant to spend. Private businesses have reduced their levels of investment, expansion, and hiring. A huge overhang of questionable debt—from defunct developers as well as local governments that have long depended for revenues on real estate development—has hamstrung the ability of Chinese finance to support economic growth. Meanwhile, Western and Japanese businesses continue to diversify supply chains away from China, slowing the growth of buying and the flow of investment money into the country. Accordingly, Chinese exports—the economy’s mainstay—have suffered, and though shipments rose in the opening months of 2024, they remain anemic compared with past years. Meanwhile, governments in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo have replaced their former support for Chinese development with open hostility.

In this sorry picture, there is plenty of blame to go around. China’s property developers were less than prudent in their use of debt and the locations for some of their projects. If American, European, and Japanese businesses had shown good judgment, they would never have created such a heavy dependence on China in the first place and would not have had to engineer a withdrawal. Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo should have known from the start that once China achieved sufficient development, Beijing would pursue its interests more aggressively. However, for all the mistakes of others, most of the blame for China’s problems belongs to the nation’s leadership in Beijing.

Take China’s demographic problem. Birth rates have been so low for so long that China lacks a sufficient flow of young people into the workforce to replace the large numbers now retiring. A limited workforce has already constrained production potentials and will do so increasingly for some time to come. This is very different from China’s gloried economic past. When China first opened its economy in the late 1970s, the country had an abundance of working-age people eager for gainful employment. In no small respect, this demographic reality powered the economy’s astounding growth of almost 10 percent a year, year after year. But with this age cohort retiring and few replacements, the older, favorable demographic has turned on its head.

Though much of the developed world faces the same problem, China’s situation is especially severe, largely because of Beijing’s policies. When the country first opened to the world, then-President Deng Xiaoping wanted to free up as much of the labor force as possible. To relieve potential workers from family obligations, he promulgated the “one-child policy,” effectively making it a crime for a family to have more than one child. It worked for economic growth for a long while, but Deng failed to consider its long-term implications. His policy lies at the root of today’s severe shortage of young workers. In recent years, Beijing has recognized the problem and rescinded the one-child rule. However, after years of dominating family decisionmaking, it has become part of Chinese culture. The recent change in the law has produced no increase in Chinese fertility rates, which continue to fall. Even if it did raise fertility rates, it would take fifteen to twenty years to make a difference in China’s available workforce.

Another policy error has compounded this demographic problem. Since the future of high technology demands a highly educated workforce, China has poured funds into higher education for years. It graduated engineers and scientists at such a rapid rate that American commentators routinely point to the figures with quavering voices and fearful eyes. Had China also adjusted its economy toward services, it would have worked well. But that did not happen. Instead, China’s economy continues to depend in no small measure on lower-skilled and low-technology products. Assembling iPads does not require a degree in electronic engineering, and certainly, neither does making shirts for the American market. Because of this, China, while suffering a labor shortage in manufacturing, also faces a surplus of college graduates. Today in China, factory owners go begging for workers, while the country records a nearly 20 percent youth unemployment rate. The rate is so embarrassing that Beijing has discontinued publishing such statistics.

Policy failures also surround the severity of the country’s property crisis. These began quite some time ago when Beijing enthusiastically encouraged residential development, pushing local governments to get involved and providing easy credit for developers and homebuyers. Because China had a housing shortage in the late twentieth century, this policy seemed well-founded. But Beijing carried on with it even after the housing stock had caught up with the nation’s needs. At its height, residential real estate development amounted to an astronomical 30 percent of the economy. Developers, following Beijing’s lead, became ever more leveraged and pursued projects in dubious locations. Then, in 2020, Beijing abruptly removed the support, so fast, in fact, that neither developers nor homebuyers had time to adjust. Failures were inevitable. They began in 2021, with the announcement by the giant developer Evergrande that it could not service its some $300 billion in liabilities.

In response to this emergency, Beijing did nothing, and so the crisis metastasized. The growing overhang of questionable debt left Chinese banks and other financial institutions unable to support new investments in any area of the economy. With millions of homebuyers who had prepaid apartments that were never constructed, more bankruptcies ensued. Confidence throughout the household sector cratered. Few were willing to put money at risk, buying rates fell, and with the drop in demand, so did real estate prices. The damage that declining property values did to household wealth depressed confidence and, with it, anyone’s willingness to spend. By the time Beijing finally acted late last year, some twenty-four months after the problems first became evident, the remedies they offered were far from sufficient to address a problem that had already festered for years.

Nor are these policy mistakes, severe as they are, all that Beijing has done to screw up China’s economy. Its zero-COVID policy exacerbated much that was already wrong. That policy kept China under lockdowns and quarantines long after the rest of the world began its recovery from the pandemic. Indeed, Beijing waited until early 2023 before it lifted severe restrictions on productive activity and on the movement of people and goods. These restrictions’ legacy has left households less confident than ever in the security of their finances and incomes and made them even more reluctant to consume than they were, much less make an investment in a new home. Private Chinese businesses, too, have lost confidence in the future and cut back on any expansion plans. It did not help that Xi Jinping, during the lockdowns, went out of his way to denigrate private business owners for following the interests of their firms instead of those of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi, now desperate to get the economy moving, has since changed his tune, referring to these business owners as “our own people,” but the damage was done.

The shutdowns also disillusioned Japanese, American, and European businesses about sourcing from and investing in China. Earlier in China’s development, businesspeople all around the world not only saw the attraction of low Chinese wages but also the reliability of Chinese operations. They met the terms of the contracts and delivered on time. Attitudes had begun to change even before the pandemic. Beijing’s insistence that foreign firms operating in China had to have a Chinese partner to whom they had to transfer technologies and trade secrets began to chafe increasingly. Chinese production and sourcing also lost appeal due to its reputation for bullying. Beijing has resorted to punitive tariffs on unrelated issues. It imposed severe duties on Australian goods in retaliation for Canberra’s questions about the origins of COVID-19. It Beijing threatened to cut off supplies of rare earth elements to Japan over a sovereignty dispute in the East China Sea. On top of these irritants, the seemingly arbitrary shipping interruptions greatly reinforced doubts about the once-revered reliability of Chinese sourcing.

Beijing also played its cards wrong with Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo. Not too long ago, China had considerable goodwill with all these nations. There was widespread support for Chinese development. It was thought that it would bring China into the community of nations as a positive economic and diplomatic influence. Had Beijing resisted the impulse to bully and use its blunt power at every turn, it might have kept that goodwill for longer. However, having reached for its guns and shown no interest in compromise with any of its trading partners, China has generated considerable hostility in all these capitals. Tokyo is leading a joint effort of G-7 nations to procure rare earth elements outside China. Brussels is seeking penalties against China for dumping underpriced products on European markets. Washington has blocked China’s trade in high-technology items and has forbidden American investments in Chinese technology. None of this helps China’s economic prospects.

China’s leadership seems to have awakened to the need to help the economy. It has recently announced a one trillion yuan ($139 billion) program to stimulate economic activity. It is far from certain that this program will get the economy back on track. Its focus on the kinds of huge infrastructure projects China has previously promoted suggests that Beijing is not yet aware of the roots of the economy’s problems. Nor is it apparent that such projects will pay off as they once did. Massive infrastructure projects in less developed economies tend to have huge returns, but that is not as certain in the more fully developed economy China has become. A “tell” that Beijing may be aware of these constraints lies in its decision to use what it describes as “ultralong” bonds to finance the infrastructure spending. Long financing maturities announce that Beijing does not expect a payoff any time soon.

It is not a pretty picture. Although there is no indication that China will implode or cease to be a major economic and diplomatic power, these facts should nonetheless force a major rethink of all forecasts of imminent Chinese dominance.

Milton Ezrati is a contributing editor at The National Interest, an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Human Capital at the University at Buffalo (SUNY), and chief economist for Vested, the New York-based communications firm. His latest books are Thirty Tomorrows: The Next Three Decades of Globalization, Demographics, and How We Will Live and Bite-Sized Investing.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

No Russian election since Soviet times has been manipulated to the extent we are seeing in the 2024 “presidential election”. The political context is dictatorial, the regime’s power grab comprehensive. The media are subject to wartime censorship, and there is not even a pretence of political competition. The death of Alexei Navalny has only heightened the atmosphere of fear. Yet although the vote is an authoritarian plebi­scite, a rubber stamp, signs of popular criticism of the regime and the war should not be overlooked. Germany and Europe should unequivocally state that this election is undemocratic and illegitimate. But even more importantly, contacts with critics of the war inside Russia must be maintained.

Ecuador is in the midst of a dire security crisis as violent drug gangs wreak havoc on the once-peaceful Andean country, prompting a spike in migrant outflows to the United States as well as the consolidation of a new illicit narcotics hub in South America. The United States has responded to Ecuador’s rapid decline in stability by ramping up coordination and engagement with the government of President Daniel Noboa. However, a decision by the Biden administration to explicitly link support for Ecuador to the war in Ukraine has put Ecuador in an even more vulnerable position.

What happens in Ecuador does not stay in Ecuador. Drug trafficking organizations from across the globe have worked to solidify their hold in Ecuador and create a new narcotics trafficking center in South America, ramping up the flow of deadly illegal drugs into the United States. At the same time, the wave of violence in Ecuador is exacerbating the region’s migratory crisis, with a 368 percent increase in Ecuadorians arriving at the U.S. border from 2022 to 2023. Additionally, over the past several years, China and Russia have turned Ecuador into a critical political and economic foothold, making the country’s current crisis a unique opportunity for the United States to regain dwindling influence in its hemisphere.

All of this led the United States to rightly offer support to Ecuador in recent months as it engages in a perilous fight against violent drug traffickers. A planned weapons swap was a key pillar of the renewed effort by the United States to support Ecuador by empowering its underequipped security forces. Under the deal, the United States would have sent Ecuador $200 million in modern weaponry in exchange for Ecuador’s aging Soviet-era equipment, including Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters, BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, and Strela-2 and Igla man-portable air defense systems.

The Biden administration planned to send these weapons to Ukraine and support the fight against Russia’s invasion. It is unclear how useful Soviet-era equipment dubbed as “junk” by Noboa would be to Ukraine. Ecuador was reportedly aware that the United States would send its weapons to Ukraine, but Noboa says he was caught off guard when this was made public by the Biden administration.

The Biden administration’s diplomatic missteps and tunnel vision have now put Ecuador in an even more precarious position as its government struggles to regain control from violent drug gangs. Predictably, Russia, a top trading partner for Ecuador, has retaliated against the small South American country by imposing a painful ban on a series of key agricultural imports from the small South American nation. Ecuador’s fragile economy cannot afford to sustain such a blow, particularly as Noboa works to fund a needed increase in security spending for the country. Unsurprisingly, Ecuador has called off the weapons swap with the United States, leaving it to contend with Russia’s punishing trade restrictions and a lack of new U.S. equipment.

In short, the Biden administration’s handling of this situation has been an unmitigated disaster. The effort has displayed a lack of seriousness from the Biden administration that plays into negative stereotypes about inconstant U.S. engagement in Latin America. The entire episode, from the country’s security crisis to the collapse of the weapons deal, exhibits the troubling consequences of U.S. inattention to its hemisphere. As conflicts much further away absorb Washington’s attention, the Biden administration has stood by as counternarcotics capabilities are actively dismantled by governments from Mexico to Colombia, flooding our hemisphere and countries like Ecuador with criminality.

Ecuador’s decision to call off the weapons deal also shows how a lack of U.S. engagement has given Moscow the power to set the terms of U.S. cooperation with its neighbors and otherwise willing partners. Ecuador remains economically beholden to Russia in part because the United States has refused to move on a trade agreement with the country in recent years. And Russia’s influence in the region dwindles in comparison to China’s. Washington’s number one adversary has taken full advantage of the U.S. absence from Latin America. If U.S.-China tensions do boil over on the other side of the Pacific, Beijing will leverage its regional influence in much the same way Moscow has done in Ecuador, but on a much larger and more dangerous level.  

It is not too late to enact a course correction. Washington should handle crises in the Western Hemisphere with the seriousness and attention they deserve. In the case of Ecuador, the United States must ensure that its support for Ukraine does not come at the cost of confronting threats to security and stability in its own hemisphere. To this end, congressional oversight and pressure should be brought to bear. Going forward, a new U.S. administration must work to ensure that neither Moscow nor Beijing are in a position to veto U.S. engagement with our neighbors.

Andres Martinez-Fernandez is a senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for National Security. Follow him on X @AndresMartFern.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Last month, the European Union introduced its thirteenth sanctions package against Moscow. In 2021, before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia ranked among Europe’s top trading partners. Two-way commerce in goods and services totaled €257 billion. By December 2023, sanctions had reduced these trade flows by more than two-thirds. As the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion has passed, it’s worth asking what can actually be achieved by further constricting two-way commerce.

History may already have answers to this important question. Over the past century (and stretching back to the Napoleonic era), economic sanctions have sought objectives echoing criminal law: deterrence, rehabilitation, deprivation, and retribution. How do these objectives stack up in the current case of Russia? Deterrence has been elusive. In 1960, there were twenty active sanctions cases worldwide. By 2014, that number had reached 170. This sharp escalation indicates that past episodes did not seriously deter new offenders—neither countries that abused human rights, staged military coups, sought nuclear weapons, nor invaded their neighbors. After Russia seized Crimea in 2014, the tepid U.S.-EU sanctions package hurt individual Russian firms and a few oligarchs but did not deter Putin’s massive assault against Ukraine in February 2022. Threats President Biden and European leaders voiced in the weeks before the invasion likewise had no impact on Putin’s war plans.

The rehabilitation record since 1914 shows instances of success through economic sanctions but seldom in cases against major or even middle-sized powers. Analysis by the Peterson Institute indicates that sanctions achieved some (rarely all) of the enactors’ foreign policy goals in just a third of cases since the First World War. However, successes are concentrated in sanctions against small countries with weak governments:. Regime change in Chile in 1973 and the reversal of the Ivory Coast coup in 2000 are illustrative.

Contrary to those successes, strong sanctions against Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the ayatollahs in Iran did not change their territorial or nuclear objectives. Even against small autocratic countries, notably Cuba and North Korea, decades of sanctions have not yielded rehabilitation. Venezuela, under the grip of dictator Nicolas Maduro, now threatens neighboring Guyana despite a multitude of U.S. sanctions. For Ukraine, history records no instances where economic sanctions have rehabilitated the military goals of a major power—not Germany and its allies in the First World War, not Germany and Japan in the Second World War, not China in the Korean War, not the USSR in the Cold War, and not Russia in the Ukraine War.

That leaves deprivation and retribution as reasonable objectives for sanctions against Russia. Consider deprivation. Russia has lost direct access to European, American, and other allied markets for a wide range of military components. In turn, Russia has repurposed domestic factories to produce military rather than civilian goods—tanks rather than autos—while seeking transshipments through friendly or neutral intermediaries such as Kazakhstan, China, and Turkey. Russia has also purchased substitute drones and artillery shells from Iran and North Korea and basic semiconductors from China. While deprivation is a worthy goal and accompanies all wartime sanctions, troublesome leakages must be expected for a target with the geographic and economic magnitude of Russia.

The remaining objective is retribution—punishment for its own sake. At the outset of the invasion, the United States and EU imposed far stronger sanctions on finance and trade than Russia ever expected. It was widely predicted that the Russian economy would suffer a double-digit decline. To be sure, the Moscow stock market and the ruble both collapsed, but they soon recovered. As the IMF recently reported, the Russian economy contracted only 1.2 percent in 2022 and even grew 3.6 percent in 2023. This reflected both Russia’s ability to sell huge volumes of oil at discounted rates to its friends and the stimulus of war production.

But it would be wrong to conclude that ordinary Russians escaped Western retribution. Shortages are widespread, and as the war drags on, they are getting worse. Retribution seeks to punish officials and oligarchs. However, elites can always provide for themselves and pass on the suffering to lesser mortals. This is the experience of multiple sanctions episodes. During the First World War, some 300,000 persons in Central Europe died from the Allied naval blockade. In contemporary times, the sad story finds echoes in North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and today Russia.

U.S. and EU sanctions have clearly inflicted misery on ordinary citizens. It must be asked whether retribution for its own sake accomplishes the military and economic aims of Washington and Brussels. Working-class people have no political power, and yet political elites threaten their livelihoods as part of a broader global power struggle. Russian, European, and American workers all have practically no say in the trade actions their leaders choose to enact, yet they bear the eventual consequences. Decades of research and historical insight attest to the harm inflicted by punitive sanctions. National leaders should put time and effort into designing alternative policies to punish international wrongdoing.

Gary Hufbauer is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Summary: The U.S. Navy's Fiscal Year 2025 budget request highlights a strategic shift towards prioritizing current operations, personnel, and innovative technologies like unmanned systems. With a modest 0.7% increase to $257.6 billion, the plan reduces the research and development budget by 2.7% and military construction by over 26%. The Navy will request funding for six new warships, down from seven, emphasizing readiness and adaptability to immediate threats, particularly from China. Major programs like the F/A-XX next-generation strike fighter see funding cuts, while investments in current aircraft and a focus on the Virginia-class submarine program reflect a balanced approach to maintaining naval dominance.

U.S. Navy 2025 Budget: Strategic Cuts and Priorities Shift Toward Immediate Readiness

The U.S. Navy in its latest budget request moved several modernization programs to the proverbial backburner. The service will trim its research and development budget by 2.7% while cutting its military construction spending by more than one-quarter (26.1%). 

According to its Fiscal Year 2025 budget request, the Navy will only request six new warships, down from a previously planned seven.

The request calls for $257.6 billion in FY25 for the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps. That figure is up 0.7% from the FY24 request, which Congress has yet to pass more than five months into the fiscal year. The Department of Defense's overall spending plan has also been capped at a 1% increase compared to FY24 under the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which dictates FY24 and FY25 spending levels.

Navy officials intend to prioritize current operations and personnel, along with small unmanned systems and the Pentagon-led Replicator program, which could yield faster results for the fleet, Defense News reported. The service remains focused on the near-term. It considers the 2020s a decade of concern, especially due to the potential for China to invade Taiwan.

"Our request prioritizes readiness and people in a constrained topline. The DON strategically allocates resources to our operations and readiness accounts to position the Nation's Naval Force forward in defense of our interests today,” the Department of the Navy announced March 11. “It enables our Naval and Marine forces to respond to contingencies, enhance interoperability with allied navies, and adapt to the emerging threats and opportunities in the maritime domain. 

“Our request continues to show we are developing strong warfighting teams, recruiting/retaining talented people, and ensuring our quality of service meets the highest standards." 

F/A-XX: Cutting Back R&D For the Next Generation Strike Fighter

About $1 billion in funding for the development of the U.S. Navy's next-generation strike fighter has been delayed – a move senior leadership said was necessary to maintain readiness.

The FY25 budget requests include $16.2 billion for the procurement of 75 aircraft along with modifications, spares, and support equipment. These include thirteen F-35Cs, thirteen F-35Bs, and fifteen CH-53Ks. 

The figure is down from the requested $17.3 billion in FY24 that covered 88 aircraft, including nineteen F-35Cs and sixteen F-35Bs.

More significantly, the Navy will "rephase" the development of the F/A-XX across the Future Years Defense Plan, budget documents show. The FY24 budget sought $1.5 billion to develop and design the future aircraft and its enabling technology, but for FY25, the U.S. Navy has only called for a third of that.

"We're still committed to the F/A-XX," Rear Adm. Ben Reynolds, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for budget and director of the USN Fiscal Management Division, said on March 8, Janes reported. "We're rephasing as the technology matures."

The F/A-XX is intended to replace the F/A-18 Super Hornet. The scaled-back budget is likely to be unwelcome news to top aerospace contractors, but Lockheed Martin might be pleased that the U.S. Navy remains on track to acquire eighty-two F-35Cs and eighty-two F-35Bs across the Future Years Defense Program.

"We're absolutely committed to the capacity and lethality of the carrier wing," Reynolds also told reporters last week. "The capacity [and] the firepower of the air wing is orders of magnitude above anything else that [the Defense Department] has."

That Sinking Feeling 

The U.S. Navy's FY25 budget request includes money for just one Virginia-class attack submarine instead of the planned two. The service has been buying attack subs at a rate of two per year since FY11, but industry has not kept up in recent years, delivering closer to an average of 1.2 boats annually. The boats set to be delivered this year are arriving on average 30 months late, and the Navy has delayed several major shipbuilding and modernization efforts. In that context, the sea service opted to save some $4 billion in the FY25 spending plan by nixing the second Virginia-class sub.

"We did reduce the funding to one Virginia-class submarine in FY25. But we maintain the funding for nine out of the planned 10 Virginia class [during the five-year FYDP]," Under Secretary Erik Raven told reporters.

The one FY25 Virginia-class boat delivered this year will be the first of the new Block VI design.

The Navy also requested $586.9 million for its SSN(X) next-generation attack submarine design and development efforts. That is up from the $544.7 million it requested in FY24. 

The service requested $102.7 million for its DDG(X) next-generation destroyer concept, down from FY24's $187.4 million request.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: The U.S. Navy's recent decision to reallocate about $1 billion in funds earmarked for the development of the F/A-XX, a sixth-generation strike fighter, highlights the ongoing tension between maintaining current military readiness and investing in future capabilities. This move, driven by budgetary constraints and the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, delays significant progress on the F/A-XX, impacting the timelines for potential contracts with major aerospace contractors like Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman. The Navy's prioritization of current operational readiness over long-term modernization efforts, despite a defense spending cap that significantly exceeds that of its nearest competitors, China and Russia, underscores the strategic challenges faced in balancing immediate needs with future threats.

F/A-XX Has a Money Challenge 

The U.S. Navy announced yesterday that it will withhold about $1 billion in funds that were earmarked for the F/A-XX project. Navy leadership said the decision to reallocate funds away from the effort to develop a sixth-generation strike fighter reflects the priority of current readiness levels over modernization efforts.

“The funding delay means any major decisions about awarding a contract on the program will be kicked down the road,” Breaking Defense reported, “unwelcome news to the country’s top three aerospace prime contractors – Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman – which have all signaled their intent to fight for a production contract.”

“We’re absolutely committed to the capacity and lethality of the carrier wing,” said Rear Adm. Ben Reynolds, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for budget. “The capacity, the firepower of the air wing is orders of magnitude above anything else that [the Defense Department] has.”

Reassessing the FY25 Budget

The F/A-XX was originally projected to receive about $1.5 billion in Fiscal Year 2025, but constraints from the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 “forced the Navy to disperse much of that money into future budgets,” so the F/A-XX was slashed. 

“The FRA, signed into law last June, provides an FY25 defense spending cap of $895 billion, and the Navy and Marine Corps’ share of that topline under the newly-released budget is $257.6 billion,” Breaking Defense added in its report. 

For perspective, consider that the $895 billion defense spending cap is about three times higher than the military spending of second-place China, and ten times as much as the world’s third-biggest defense spender, Russia. 

“In terms of what comes at the top of the list, it is readiness. It is people. It is the today issues that we have to get on top of,” Under Secretary of the Navy Erik Raven told reporters. “Where our guidance directs us to take risks is in future modernization.”

What is the F/A-XX?

The F/A-XX is a next-generation strike fighter project that will eventually phase out the F/A-18 Super Hornet. Details about the F/A-XX’s specifications have not been made public. Pentagon officials have suggested that the Navy and Air Force will not collaborate on a joint design as they did with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Last summer, a spokesperson said the Navy had “identified operational reach, capacity, long range kill chains, autonomy, and next generation survivability as key enablers in the Air Wing of the Future and supporting Family of Systems.” That’s a lot of military-industrial marketing-speak, but we can expect the F/A-XX to be significantly more advanced than the F-22 or F-35. 

The Navy has pared down its F/A-18 purchases with the expectation that the F/A-XX will come online soon. With F/A-XX development delayed, the decision to stop buying new F/A-18s will probably face renewed scrutiny.

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Summary: The U.S. Navy is at a pivotal juncture, facing the dual challenge of maintaining current operational capabilities while preparing for future warfare dominance through the development of the F/A-XX, a sixth-generation stealth fighter jet. With the strategic imperative to ensure the carrier air wing's capacity and lethality, the Navy acknowledges the critical role of aircraft carriers and their complement of fighter jets in potential conflict scenarios, particularly in the Indo-Pacific against a backdrop of rising tensions with China. However, constrained by budgetary limits, the Navy is compelled to delay $1 billion in funding for the F/A-XX program, reallocating these funds to future budgets. This decision underscores the harsh realities of defense spending, where immediate readiness and personnel needs take precedence over long-term modernization efforts.

The Navy Has Big Choices to Make 

Widespread technological innovations are pushing forward the global defense industry, with militaries funding cutting-edge projects in all domains. When it comes to next-generation aircraft, the U.S. Navy is looking to ensure its future superiority on the battlefield through the F/A-XX sixth-generation stealth fighter jet. 

However, budgetary constraints are forcing the Navy to make tough decisions about its next fighter jet.

F/A-XX: Funds Pushed Down the Line 

The Navy is delaying $1 billion in funding for the F/A-XX program for future budgets. 

Budgetary constraints and specific limits force the Navy to reallocate funds intended for the development of the F/A-XX into future budgets, thus likely delaying the introduction of the sixth-generation fighter jet. 

“We’re absolutely committed to the capacity and lethality of the of the carrier wing,” Rear Adm. Ben Reynolds, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for budget, said during a press event last week. 

Reynolds highlighted that the capacity and firepower of the carrier air wing are at the top of the priorities for the Department of Defense. The reason for that is that the aircraft carrier remains the primary tool for power projection. In a potential conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, aircraft carriers would be at the center of the fighting. As such, the fighter jets would determine much of the fighting and potentially a whole conflict. 

Although Navy officials acknowledge the importance of future programs like the F/A-XX, in the absence of unlimited funding, they have to make tough decisions to ensure current operational readiness remains high. 

Budgetary constraints and specific limits force the Navy to reallocate funds intended for the development of the F/A-XX into future budgets, thus likely delaying the introduction of the sixth-generation fighter jet. 

“In terms of what comes at the top of the list, it is readiness. It is people. It is the today issues that we have to get on top of,” Navy Under Secretary Erik Raven told reporters while speaking alongside Reynolds. “Where our guidance directs us to take risk is in future modernization.”

The F/A-XX 6th Generation Stealth Fighter, Explained

Alongside the Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, the F/A-XX will be a sixth-generation fighter jet with manned and unmanned capabilities. 

The Navy is looking for an aircraft that would be able to operate from aircraft carriers—it will require a stronger structure and landing gear compared to aircraft designed for conventional operations. In terms of capabilities, from what it is known, the Navy is looking for a fighter jet that would have directed energy kinetic capabilities (laser weapons) and the ability to operate with and control drone swarms. As for mission sets, the Navy is looking for an aircraft that would be able to operate in permissive or semi-permissive environments with potent adversary air defense systems and establish air superiority through long-range kill chains. 

Right now, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrup Grumman are the three companies vying for the F/A-XX contract, with Pratt & Whitney and GE Aerospace competing for the stealth fighter jet’s engine. 

About the Author 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro recently barnstormed Northeast Asian shipyards in hopes of enlisting investment from allied nations to help revivify the U.S. shipbuilding sector. The secretary entreated the leaderships of such industrial heavyweights as South Korea’s HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and Hanwha Ocean and Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to reopen one or more mothballed U.S. yards. 

And not a moment too soon. Adding marine industrial capacity is a must if the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are to keep pace with the challenges of our time—chiefly Chinese sea power. China, the world’s biggest shipbuilding nation, reputedly boasts over 200 times the United States’ capacity. It is flourishing in the nautical realm while America struggles. Because Chinese yards are outbuilding their U.S. counterparts at a helter-skelter rate, China will go to war with a larger navy than the U.S. Navy and it will be able to repair or replace battle losses more swiftly. 

That is a big deal. The arithmetic of war is stern. A force that can speedily regenerate combat power after taking a punch, as all forces do, is resilient; one that cannot is fragile. The People’s Liberation Army Navy may not measure up to the U.S. Navy on a ship-for-ship, airframe-for-airframe, missile-for-missile basis. But the balance of resiliency yaws the PLA Navy’s way to an alarming degree. China has a bigger fleet and can replenish it faster. 

Manufacturing supremacy bestows an advantage of worrisome import on Beijing. 

So the strategic rationale for soliciting foreign investment is impeccable: America needs more hulls and more capacity to maintain and overhaul them. It should amass that capacity wherever it may and in a hurry. And there is precedent for what Del Toro is asking. Australian shipbuilding firm Austal already constructs warships in Alabama, for instance, as does Italy’s Fincantieri in Wisconsin. It only makes sense to add the world’s second- and third-largest shipbuilding nations to the mix. 

But. What about the business rationale? 

That’s less compelling, and the Navy Department needs to figure out how to burnish its case by the numbers. Look at Del Toro’s appeal through the eyes of Asian business magnates. One imagines they will evaluate any North American venture by the closely interconnected standards of profit, risk, and time. First, profit. Shipbuilders are not philanthropies. Show them the money! Company officers will crave assurances that there will be enough demand for their wares to repay their investments on these shores, plus enough more to make it worth their while. That chiefly means would-be suppliers want to know there will be sufficient demand from the U.S. government, by definition the United States’ sole customer for ships of war and merchantmen that support the fight. 

Convincing Asian shipbuilders that the United States actually means to build a much larger fleet, as laid out in the navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plans, will be pivotal in negotiations. This will be a tough sell. The U.S. Navy’s inventory is still dawdling below 300 ships years after Congress mandated a 355-ship fleet. Shipbuilding budgets have fallen well short of paying for those extra 60-odd ships, remain in limbo under a continuing resolution almost halfway through the fiscal year, and are set to remain stagnant. This is a recurring pattern within the Beltway. Recalls former acting Secretary of the Navy Tom Modly: “Everyone seemed to talk a good game to each other about the requirement for the 355-ship navy, but there was no commitment, no plan, and no money to actually build one.” 

Sea power is a conscious political choice, and it’s far from clear that American society as a whole has resolved to bulk up the sea services. Washington has some ‘splaining to do if it covets Asian investment. 

Second, risk. Firm leaders will want assurances that the demand signal for military and mercantile shipping will remain vibrant. Otherwise they may balk at what promises to be a capital-intensive enterprise. How many resources it will take remains to be determined. Presumably naval shipyards in such ports as Long Beach and Philadelphia were laid up with an eye toward preserving and perhaps recommissioning them in some future time of crisis. But chronological age matters even if crews did their preservation job to perfection. Machinery decays. Long Beach Naval Shipyard was shuttered in 1997, Philadelphia in 1995. The degree to which buildings and hardware remain in good order after sitting idle for so long is unclear, and is sure to come up when U.S. officialdom parleys with shipbuilders. (It also appears the Philly site has undergone partial redevelopment—adding another wrinkle.) 

Answering questions about the scope of the project will help HD Hyundai, Mitsubishi & Co. gauge and manage risk—making it easier to get to yes in talks. Candor pays. 

If not reassured decisionmakers could blanch at the risk. Think about the politics of naval shipbuilding. To all appearances Congress has elected not to meet the martial challenges of our time. Peacetime strategy is about designing and fielding forces fit for war. That being the case, lawmakers make strategy through the budgetary process all the time. They make strategy by what they fund—and by what they don’t. As Admiral J. C. Wylie points out: “The Congressman voting on an military appropriation is, in a very real sense indeed, making a fundamental strategic decision . . . .” 

And how. Refusing to approve military appropriations for this fiscal year marks a fundamental strategic decision that stasis shall prevail in naval and military affairs. Given the highly visible budgetary impasse in Washington, it’s unclear what kind of assurances U.S. naval and military leaders could concoct to show that demand for South Korean- and Japanese-built ships will remain strong and steady. Recent history says just the opposite. But the effort must be made. 

And third, time. Shipbuilders will want assurances not only that an American venture will be profitable at reasonable risk, but that U.S. government orders for warships will remain robust enough to sustain yard operations for a long, long time. Constancy is a virtue on the demand side when courting the supply side. Assuming one were forthcoming, an initial burst of new-construction dollars would do little for builders if demand dwindled over the long term, leaving them operating at a loss with a wasting asset on their hands. 

They might rebuff a transpacific partnership rather than risk eventual ruin. 

In short, Secretary Del Toro has taken on an unenviable task: persuading Asian business leaders to invest in the U.S. shipbuilding complex at a time when domestic political headwinds are fierce. Profit, risk, time. Let’s wish him well. 

About the Author: Dr. James Holmes 

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views voiced here are his alone.

Image: Creative Commons. 

For years, I have argued that America’s legislative branch has failed to live up to its obligations in guiding U.S. foreign policy. Trends dating back before the turn of the millennium reveal that the Legislative branch has spent an increasingly small amount of time discussing and researching important foreign policy questions. Beyond that, when important foreign policy topics are discussed, individual legislators are increasingly likely to grandstand or fundraise instead of work towards policy solutions for major issues. 

For most of my life, this dereliction of duty has resulted in American involvement in unguided and near-unending conflicts across the Middle East and North Africa. Two pieces of legislation (the 2001 and 2002 Authorization(s) for the Use of Military Force) passed the House and Senate in the turbulent months following the September 11th terror attacks. Those two bills combined to serve as justification for roughly two decades of continued fighting across almost 80 nations, resulting in 8,000,000,000,000 dollars in expenses, over 7,000 American casualties alongside 230,000 civilian casualties. Most all, including President Obama when he unsuccessfully petitioned Congress to vote on military action in Syria, agree that many of the conflicts funded through the AUMFs extend well beyond the legeslation’s original intent. 

As a consequence of making the  purposeful choice to remain on the foreign policy sidelines, the members of the House and Senate ignore the combined wisdom of their 535 duly elected members in favor of the President and their small band of advisors. This is an obvious mistake. 

In response to this embarrassing state of affairs, and before the Biden administration’s top-down withdrawal from Afghanistan, I wrote advocating that both chambers of the Legislature adopt the following rule-

Before the end of each congressional cycle, each representative must vote for or against continued funding for each of America’s ongoing military conflicts. In the event that neither branch of the legislature votes in support for continued funding for any individual conflict, funding for that conflict is assigned a sunset date one year from the day of the vote.

While the language of the proposal would likely benefit from some fine-tuning, the driving force behind the proposal -the idea that the legislative branch should be held responsible for completing its constitutionally assigned foreign policy responsibilities- remains as relevant today as it was years ago.

In the current moment, and in defiance of recent historical precedent, both chambers of the Legislature appear primed to express their views on key foreign policy issues ranging from the ongoing invasion of Ukraine to the continued tragedy taking place in Gaza. If media predictions can be believed there is sufficient support in both chambers to pass additional funding for the defense of Ukraine- so long as that funding can receive a clean vote. This support is mirrored in the general American public. Why then has no vote taken place? 

This is the case because leadership in the House of Representatives has decided to make it so. Congressional leaders are using their agenda setting authority to thwart both the will of the institutions in which they serve and the citizens that they represent. This trend is not new, nor is it the sole responsibility of the current speaker- past speakers were unwilling to bring votes to the floor during other modern military romps.  Some have suggested that this is due to electoral considerations, others have pointed to internal politics, others still have highlighted personal considerations. Few have suggested that the lack of a vote is in pursuit of sound foreign policy. 

Regardless of the reason, the fact that Congressional leaders would appropriate House rules as an excuse to ignore their constitutionally assigned responsibilities is shameful. It is, for a moment, unimportant  where we might personally stand regarding continued funding for Ukraine or the IDF, each of us has a right to know where our representatives stand on these critical questions. Current leadership in the House is working to make sure that their band is shielded from the sanitizing light of a public ballot. 

This brings me back once more to the rule I propose requiring representatives to take timely votes for or against continued funding for military missions. The original intent with the institutional rule was to push for a vote and end funding for the wars in the Middle East. Today, the rule would likely result in additional funding for the defense of Ukraine. The goal of the proposal is not inherently “more peace” or “more war” but instead “more thoughtfulness” to replace today’s willful rudderlessness. Who can argue with that?

Perhaps it should come as little surprise that as conflicts spring up in hotspots around the world and the risks begin to feel closer to home, many in the Legislature would like to have their voices heard. Perhaps it should also come as little surprise that decades of ignoring foreign policy questions has brought about conditions in which dealing with foreign policy questions is increasingly urgent. Adopting the proposed rule would both help guide the United States through today’s turbulent moment, and it would also help maintain thoughtful foreign policy moving forwards. 

—

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association. The views expressed here are his, and not necessarily those of the FPA. 

Vous souhaitez servir votre pays en rejoignant les forces armées ? Que vous soyez intéressé par l’armée de terre, l’armée de l’air, la marine ou la gendarmerie, il existe de nombreuses options pour réaliser votre rêve. Que vous optiez pour des études supérieures ou que vous souhaitiez vous engager rapidement, l’armée offre de nombreuses opportunités.