Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

On the occasion of the recent full-day series of discussions on the evolving role of Europe as a space power, organized by ELIAMEP in collaboration with the Bertelsmann Foundation and Bertelsmann Stiftung Niki Karamanli, Defence & Security Researcher, AS Prote Maritime Ltd; Dimitris Kollias, ELIAMEP Research Fellow; Leopold Schmertzing, Non-Resident Fellow on Strategic Foresight, ELIAMEP and Varvara Vasilaki, Head of Technology Transfer Office & Programme Manager, Greek NATO DIANA Accelerator Site, NCSR ‘Demokritos’ assess how great-power competition, the commercialization of space, and European strategic priorities will shape the future of Europe as a space power. 

Niki Karamanli, Defence & Security Researcher, AS Prote Maritime Ltd

In an international system undergoing rapid transformation, with the New World Order once again in flux, the space race is intensifying and re-emerging as a critical instrument of power, influence, and strategic competition. The geopolitical landscape of space is increasingly defined by competition between established actors, such as the USA and Russia, and rising powers including China, India and Japan – states that could potentially function both as partners and as competitors for the European Union in exploration, technological development, and commercial exploitation. Yet within the accelerating contest, Europe risks falling short of securing a leading position.

Space has become a central arena of geopolitical and economic competition, shaping EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy amid an increasingly contested global environment. Looking toward 2050, foresight points to a future in which space is highly probable to evolve as a battlefield marked by militarization and anti-satellite capabilities. Great power competition in space has re-politicised space as a domain of power, deterrence, and influence. For Europe this raises a fundamental challenge as regard to whether it remains a largely civilian and normative space actor, or whether strategic autonomy pushes it toward greater security and defence integration in space. Considering that the future operating environment is likely to be more contested, congested, and competitive, making resilience and protection of space assets central concerns seem to be a one-way road for Europe.

Therefore, it is safe to argue that it is the navigation of these uncertainties by shaping a set of interlinked strategic priorities constitute Europe’s strategic challenge. Specifically, technological sovereignty is essential to reduce structural dependencies on non-European launch systems, components, hardware, data infrastructure, especially as space becomes gradually more security-critical. Closely linked to this is also strategic autonomy, which requires Europe not only to access space independently, but to retain decision-making control over critical space service in dual-use and civilian contexts as well. However, to achieve this demands leaner governance and faster decision-making cycles, as current excessive bureaucracy and fragmented institutional processes continue to delay innovation and weaken Europe’s competitiveness vis-à-vis more agile global actors.

At the same time, increased and more targeted investment is needed to scale European space companies and bridge the gap between research, demonstration, and commercial deployment. It is vital for policies to prioritise strengthening the internal European space market, enabling public procurement of innovation, and cross-border collaboration between industry, startups, and research institutions. Supporting resilient and secure supply chain across space technological ecosystems from launch and manufacturing to data and downstream applications will be critical to mitigating geopolitical and economic risks.

As space re-emerges as a key domain of power, security and technological influence, Europe finds itself at a strategic crossroads. Without greater coherence and long-term commitment, the Union risks remaining a spectator in a contest that will shape the future distribution of power in the international system and as the German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has cautioned, space will indeed be Europe’s Achilles heel.

Dimitris Kollias, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

Great-power competition is turning space into a decisive theatre of hard security. The US, China and Russia are developing military and counterspace capabilities, while the war in Ukraine has shown how cyber-attacks on satellites and dependence on foreign commercial constellations can directly shape outcomes on the ground. For the EU, this means that space capabilities and active participation in the space arena are not a luxury but arguably the last chance to build the foundations of strategic autonomy, in what is the next (and probably, literally, final) frontier.

Space commercialisation sharpens this imperative. NewSpace constellations have provided services that Europe could not rapidly supply itself, but they also lock Europeans into strategic dependence on non-EU operators and launchers. In Ukraine, battlefield connectivity and intelligence were influenced not only by national alliances but also by the inclinations of tech executives in California boardrooms. This illustrates a “technopolar age” in which corporate infrastructures wield quasi-sovereign power. The Union’s emerging answer (Galileo and Copernicus, the secure connectivity constellation IRIS², EU Space Surveillance and Tracking, and ESA’s European Resilience from Space) sketches the core of a defence-relevant, dual-use “system of systems” underpinned by an EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence and a prospective EU Space Act.

The real question is integration. Space is geopolitically and geoeconomically bigger than any member state, yet defence remains nationally guarded. Precisely here lies the opportunity: unlike many defence projects, Europe’s space programmes have a history of close cooperation, technical success and very little “bad blood”. If the EU can use this record to move from fragmented assets to an integrated preparedness architecture, space could become the catalyst that finally aligns industrial policy, defence planning and regulation, and with it, Europe’s last realistic window to shape its own strategic destiny.

Leopold Schmertzing, Non-Resident Fellow on Strategic Foresight, ELIAMEP

From my vantage point as a security, defence, and foresight analyst with a keen interest in space, Europe’s role as a space power will be decided by the outcome of two key uncertainties.

The first uncertainty is external. The easiest way to push Europe into becoming a space power would be external attempts to intimidate and isolate it.

If the United States continues to diverge politically and culturally from Europe to a point where Europeans can no longer assume reliable access to U.S. military space assets and launch capabilities, Europe will have little choice but to accelerate its own. Existing “complementary” programmes would need to be transformed into stand-alone systems capable of operating without transatlantic backstopping.

A similar logic applies to Russia and China. While scenarios involving internal collapse or democratic transformation are theoretically possible, they remain highly unlikely. A more plausible trajectory would be continued totalitarian radicalisation. In such a scenario, Europe would face sustained competition in space with actors that possess significant technological capabilities and, in some areas, knowledge advantages.

The second uncertainty is internal. Europe’s ability to act depends on whether it can overcome its deeply fragmented defence and space sectors. Both remain highly nationalised, closely tied to sovereignty, prestige, and domestic industrial bases. As a result, rising demand tends to produce higher prices and duplication rather than scale and output.

Europe does not need to replicate the U.S. model exemplified by SpaceX, nor China’s state-centric approach. In principle, it could build competitive capability through coordinated ecosystems of startups, SMEs, and prime contractors; producing in many places at once while acting strategically as integrated alliances. This path, however, requires politically difficult choices like pooling sovereignty and prioritising collective capability over national visibility.

Varvara Vassilaki, Head of Technology Transfer Office & Programme Manager, Greek NATO DIANA Accelerator Site, NCSR ‘Demokritos’

Europe’s future as a space power will be shaped by its capacity to translate scientific excellence and frontier technologies into deployable, scalable capabilities. Great-power competition is accelerating innovation in sensing, communications, autonomy, cybersecurity, and advanced materials — domains with inherently dual-use potential. In this context, preserving strategic autonomy and ensuring resilient access to critical technologies will strengthen Europe’s position in an increasingly competitive global landscape.

At the same time, the rapid commercialisation of space is transforming how innovation reaches end users. Deep-tech start-ups now play a central role in launch services, satellite systems, advanced components, and in-orbit operations. Test centres and experimentation facilities — including those embedded in research organisations — are becoming essential enablers, providing realistic environments where new technologies can be validated and demonstrated. Europe can further unlock this potential through mission-driven funding instruments and dual-use innovation pipelines such as the European Union Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS) and the NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA). These initiatives illustrate how structured programmes, combined with access to trusted testing and evaluation facilities, can support the transition of promising technologies from research to deployable capabilities.

Europe’s strategic priorities — secure connectivity, space situational awareness, resilient supply chains, climate monitoring, and defence preparedness — call for continued coordination and sustained investment. By fostering an enabling environment that empowers research centres, innovators, test facilities, and industrial partners to scale deep technologies effectively, Europe can reinforce its leadership and actively shape the evolution of the global space ecosystem. Europe’s commitment to excellence, collaboration, and innovation will be a defining factor in its trajectory as a space power.

The Council and the European Parliament reached a provisional deal on the regulation on EU-Mercosur safeguard clauses, ensuring swift and strong action to protect EU farmers.

Pascal Boniface · Les États-Unis face à Israël. Avec Robert Malley | Entretiens géopo

Malgré la reconnaissance de l’État de Palestine par plusieurs États occidentaux depuis septembre dernier et la signature d’un accord de cessez-le-feu dans le cadre du plan de paix porté par Donald Trump, la réalité sur le terrain demeure inchangée. En Cisjordanie, l’occupation israélienne se poursuit et s’intensifie ; à Gaza, la population reste exposée à des bombardements continus. Quant à la solution à deux États, celle-ci ne semble à ce jour plus envisageable dans les termes formulés il y a quelques décennies et demande à être réinventée. Dans ce contexte, les États-Unis et les Occidentaux adoptent un positionnement contradictoire en n’imposant aucune sanction et pression à l’égard d’Israël. Comment interpréter le positionnement étasunien sur la question du conflit au Proche-Orient ? Observe-t-on des changements d’attitude de l’opinion publique face au gouvernement israélien ? Quels leviers réels existent face à un gouvernement israélien qui rejette explicitement le principe même d’un État palestinien ?

Dans ce podcast, Robert Malley, enseignant à l’université de Yale et ancien conseiller des présidents Bill Clinton et Barack Obama sur les affaires du Proche-Orient, revient sur les ambiguïtés régionales et internationales alimentant l’impasse israélo-palestinienne, les limites de la solution à deux États et l’évolution de la position étasunienne face à Israël.

L’article Les États-Unis face à Israël. Avec Robert Malley est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

We need people to understand the holistic value of that natural blue capital and infrastructure. Whilst our countries (in the Pacific) are on the front line of climate change, they are also holding the front line by protecting large swaths of intact marine ecosystems that play a huge role in planetary stability—from biodiversity to climate change. —Coral Pasisi, SPC’s Director of Climate Change and Sustainability

Club governance formats were meant to work around blockages and challenges in the multilateral system. In a system under pressure, these have become more important. Simultaneously, they become embattled themselves in a political climate that has become more ruthless. Just after its presidence, South Africa has declared it would ”pause” its engagement in the G20 for 2026 after intense bullying by the US President. Yet, the existence of the G20 is based on the recognition that (financial) crisis of global scale require close cooperation among countries across the globe, going beyond the G7. That fact remains valid. The G20 is a collection of key countries that have to engage with each other – and that Europe has to engage with – to push for solutions for global challenges. Yet, polarisations are making G20 presidencies increasingly challenging. How did the last four “Southern” presidencies – Indonesia, India, Brazil and South Africa – navigate the increasingly choppy waters? And which elements can we distil from deliberations as communalities?

Club governance formats were meant to work around blockages and challenges in the multilateral system. In a system under pressure, these have become more important. Simultaneously, they become embattled themselves in a political climate that has become more ruthless. Just after its presidence, South Africa has declared it would ”pause” its engagement in the G20 for 2026 after intense bullying by the US President. Yet, the existence of the G20 is based on the recognition that (financial) crisis of global scale require close cooperation among countries across the globe, going beyond the G7. That fact remains valid. The G20 is a collection of key countries that have to engage with each other – and that Europe has to engage with – to push for solutions for global challenges. Yet, polarisations are making G20 presidencies increasingly challenging. How did the last four “Southern” presidencies – Indonesia, India, Brazil and South Africa – navigate the increasingly choppy waters? And which elements can we distil from deliberations as communalities?

Club governance formats were meant to work around blockages and challenges in the multilateral system. In a system under pressure, these have become more important. Simultaneously, they become embattled themselves in a political climate that has become more ruthless. Just after its presidence, South Africa has declared it would ”pause” its engagement in the G20 for 2026 after intense bullying by the US President. Yet, the existence of the G20 is based on the recognition that (financial) crisis of global scale require close cooperation among countries across the globe, going beyond the G7. That fact remains valid. The G20 is a collection of key countries that have to engage with each other – and that Europe has to engage with – to push for solutions for global challenges. Yet, polarisations are making G20 presidencies increasingly challenging. How did the last four “Southern” presidencies – Indonesia, India, Brazil and South Africa – navigate the increasingly choppy waters? And which elements can we distil from deliberations as communalities?

Foreign aid is an important component of international economic exchange and has historically been a central topic in International Relations (IR) scholarship. This phenomenon prompts fundamental questions regarding the motivations behind states’ allocation of resources beyond their national borders and the processes by which donor preferences are shaped at the nexus of power, interests, and ideas. Conventional IR theories concur on the premise that aid is inherently political. Subsequent scholarship has expanded upon this foundation, examining a broad range of systemic and domestic determinants of aid, emphasising how state interests, institutions, and the political economy of donors influence aid allocation. This article provides an overview of the extant literature, including pertinent debates, and presents significant advances in the field of the international political economy of aid. It also highlights how recent geopolitical shifts challenge conventional understandings of aid and concludes by proposing a reversal of the classic question for future research—from why states give aid to why they are increasingly reluctant to do so.

Foreign aid is an important component of international economic exchange and has historically been a central topic in International Relations (IR) scholarship. This phenomenon prompts fundamental questions regarding the motivations behind states’ allocation of resources beyond their national borders and the processes by which donor preferences are shaped at the nexus of power, interests, and ideas. Conventional IR theories concur on the premise that aid is inherently political. Subsequent scholarship has expanded upon this foundation, examining a broad range of systemic and domestic determinants of aid, emphasising how state interests, institutions, and the political economy of donors influence aid allocation. This article provides an overview of the extant literature, including pertinent debates, and presents significant advances in the field of the international political economy of aid. It also highlights how recent geopolitical shifts challenge conventional understandings of aid and concludes by proposing a reversal of the classic question for future research—from why states give aid to why they are increasingly reluctant to do so.

Foreign aid is an important component of international economic exchange and has historically been a central topic in International Relations (IR) scholarship. This phenomenon prompts fundamental questions regarding the motivations behind states’ allocation of resources beyond their national borders and the processes by which donor preferences are shaped at the nexus of power, interests, and ideas. Conventional IR theories concur on the premise that aid is inherently political. Subsequent scholarship has expanded upon this foundation, examining a broad range of systemic and domestic determinants of aid, emphasising how state interests, institutions, and the political economy of donors influence aid allocation. This article provides an overview of the extant literature, including pertinent debates, and presents significant advances in the field of the international political economy of aid. It also highlights how recent geopolitical shifts challenge conventional understandings of aid and concludes by proposing a reversal of the classic question for future research—from why states give aid to why they are increasingly reluctant to do so.

Les entreprises européennes ne sont plus de simples acteurs économiques : elles sont devenues des cibles stratégiques. Cyberattaques, espionnage industriel, pressions réglementaires, désinformation, sabotages logistiques ou prises de contrôle hostiles composent désormais un continuum de menaces dites « hybrides », où les frontières entre guerre, économie et influence s’effacent. Dans un nouveau Briefing, l’Institut Choiseul […]

Immobilienpreise weitgehend stabil, aber erste Anstiege bei Wohnungen – Mieten bundesweit um vier Prozent gestiegen – Zahl der Neubauten geht zurück – Politik sollte Wohnungsbau mit gezielten Investitionen stärken Auf dem deutschen Immobilienmarkt deutet sich eine leichte Trendwende an: Nach zwei ...

It is clear 2026 will not be a routine year for global development cooperation. The US is now a deliberate norm-breaker under Trump 2.0, China is edging into high-income status while insisting it is still “developing”, close to 80 per cent of the population in low- and middle-income countries live under some form of autocracy, and Russia is selling long-term nuclear dependence as a development offer. At the same time middle powers from Brazil to the Gulf states are quietly turning that turmoil into leverage. In a new IDOS Policy Brief we argue that these dynamics are not background noise but the core story that will shape cooperation in the next few years.

It is clear 2026 will not be a routine year for global development cooperation. The US is now a deliberate norm-breaker under Trump 2.0, China is edging into high-income status while insisting it is still “developing”, close to 80 per cent of the population in low- and middle-income countries live under some form of autocracy, and Russia is selling long-term nuclear dependence as a development offer. At the same time middle powers from Brazil to the Gulf states are quietly turning that turmoil into leverage. In a new IDOS Policy Brief we argue that these dynamics are not background noise but the core story that will shape cooperation in the next few years.

It is clear 2026 will not be a routine year for global development cooperation. The US is now a deliberate norm-breaker under Trump 2.0, China is edging into high-income status while insisting it is still “developing”, close to 80 per cent of the population in low- and middle-income countries live under some form of autocracy, and Russia is selling long-term nuclear dependence as a development offer. At the same time middle powers from Brazil to the Gulf states are quietly turning that turmoil into leverage. In a new IDOS Policy Brief we argue that these dynamics are not background noise but the core story that will shape cooperation in the next few years.

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