Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Latest News

Innovative financing for development can contribute to closing the financial gap by mobilising new funds for sustainable development and leveraging existing scarce public concessional resources (ODA). In addition to domestic resources and traditional external financial resources, innovative financing mechanisms can mobilise further financial resources for LDCs. In view of the LDCs’ enormous sustainable investment needs, mobilising private financial resources is both crucial and inescapable. Blended finance represents an important instrument to combine ODA with private finance, thereby leveraging scarce concessional public financial resources. The G20 should consider promoting the adoption and implementation of the OECD Blended Finance Principles in LICs to enhance blended finance in these countries. As many LDCs do not have sufficient institutional capacity. To adopt blended finance instruments the G20 should support LDC in developing institutional capacity to effectively implement blended finance tools and to lower risks associated with blended finance. An additional instrument to enhance external financial resources to LDCs is to allocate the recently approved new SDR allocation to LDCs exceeding LDCs quota. The G20 should take on a leading by example/frontrunner role and donate as well as lend a percentage of their allocations, discuss establishing a special purpose fund (i.e. a green or health fund), support allocating a large amount of SDRs to LDCs exceeding their quota and discuss proposals how to allocate them among LICs and discuss how these financial instruments can be used to ensure a sustainable and inclusive recovery from the covid-19 crisis. As the fragmented architecture of sustainable bond standards represent one main challenge in mobilising financial resources for attaining the SDGs by issuing sustainable bonds the G20 should discuss and promote harmonisation of sustainable bond standards. Moreover, the G20 countries should provide capacity building for LDCs for developing the sustainable bond market in these countries.

Megatrends such as climate change, digitalisation, and urbanisation are transforming all aspects of politics, economics and society in Africa. Consequently, they are also affecting conflict dynamics. This Working Paper focuses specifically on how megatrends are altering patterns of foreign intervention in African conflicts. Two aspects stand out: the range of intervening powers is widening, and they are intervening increasingly at arm’s length by delegating to human or technical surrogates.

In a dialogue with Martin Kochan (GIZ), Anna Pegels outlines a step by step process to develop a recycling system which enables and motivates households to contribute, for example by separating their waste.

Recent protests following the death of people in a blaze in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital raise questions about Beijing’s claimed efficacy of China’s zero-Covid strategy three years into the pandemic. According to many, recent lockdowns in Urumqi led to rescue delays to save the lives of people trapped in a building on fire. This sad event under strict lockdown measures combined with stress, anxiety, fear, insecurity, and unsafety among the majority of the population in China has led to protests across the country. Beijing’s continuous repressive and drastic zero-Covid strategy anytime new cases are declared in Chinese cities has contributed to the ire of the population vis-à-vis the Chinese government as families are disrupted, jobs are lost, and social contacts are broken, without forgetting the psychological impacts of lockdown measures to confine people in barricaded districts. This piece explores China’s zero-Covid strategy, its causes for recent public protests in major Chinese cities and its consequences for the world economy.

The worldwide wave of autocratization is doing away with many of the democratic achievements made since 1989. Scholarship on international democracy promotion is yet to theorise how democracy can be protected from autocratization. Such a theory must account for different democratic and autocratic trajectories as well as integrate theoretical approaches from international relations and comparative politics in the study of democracy promotion. However, such a combined perspective is still missing. One reason for this is that the field lacks a clear concept of “protection” and does not yet systematically integrate evidence from democratization research. This paper addresses this research gap. It is the first attempt to develop a concept theory of democracy promotion, which includes support and protection of democracy. Coupling this with a depiction of six phases of regime change, this paper makes a second contribution: based on the proposed conceptual and theoretical integration, it generates a series of testable anchor points for further empirical analysis on what strategies are most likely to be effective during the various phases of regime change.

This empirical analysis investigates whether and to what extent social cohesion and the coverage of social protection schemes influence governments’ decisions about the stringency of COVID-19 containment policies during the first and second waves in 2020 in Africa. Our results indicate that societal and social factors influenced the stringency of containment policies. Social cohesion has a negative effect on the stringency of containment policies in response to COVID-19 over time. Social protection coverage has a positive effect on the stringency of containment policies in response to COVID-19 over time. States implemented more stringent containment policies in less cohesive societies if they already had social protection schemes in place before the pandemic. Contextual factors mediated these effects. While stringency of containment policies softened over time where levels of democracy, poverty, and inequality were higher, social protection made a mediating difference only in autocratic states and societies with higher poverty. Three contributions of the empirical analysis stand out. First, the conceptual integration of societal and social factors (“societal triangle”) provides a novel basis from which to analyse policy responses during external shocks like a global pandemic. Second, to overcome the limitations of current measurements of social cohesion, we use a novel measurement to determine pre-pandemic levels of social cohesion. Third, this is the first cross-national study that addresses a world region, Africa, which has gained little attention in the study of policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Nucleus-outgrower schemes (NOSs) are supposed to be a particularly effective private-sector mechanism to support smallholder farmers and contribute towards mitigating the problematic aspects of pure large-scale agricultural investments. This discussion paper uses panel household survey data collected in two rounds in Zambia to analyse some agro-ecological and socio-economic impacts of the outgrower programme of one of the largest agricultural investments in Zambia: Amatheon Agri Zambia (AAZ) Limited. The descriptive results show that the type of participation in the programme varies across participants and components, with most participating in trainings. Econometric results suggest the following key findings. First, although the overall impact of the AAZ outgrower programme on the uptake of conservation agriculture practices is robust and promising, impacts on the adoption of other agricultural technologies is less obvious and the effect depends on the type of support provided. Second, the programme has had a significant impact on maize productivity promoted in the initial phase but not on the other crops – mainly oilseeds – promoted later. Third, the initially less productive farmers seem to benefit slightly more than already better performing ones. Fourth, although the impact on overall household security was insignificant, there is some suggestive evidence (although the effect is weak) that the programme has a positive effect on improving women’s uptake of micronutrients. Finally, our findings show that the three components of the programme (trainings, seed loans and output purchases) have different effects on the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices and productivity, and to some extent on food security. Overall, the results suggest that NOSs, with all their risks, can play a role in the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices, improving farm-level agricultural technologies, providing input credit, and thereby improving productivity and smallholder livelihoods. However, this is not automatically the case, as it crucially depends on the design and management of the project; the availability of good policies and institutions governing the rules of operation; the types of crops promoted; the duration of the project; and the political commitment of host countries, among others.

Recently, awareness about climate change has increased. Behavioural changes and micro-level and macro-level actions towards low-carbon economies are becoming more widespread, propelled by increasing scientific evidence and climate activism. As individuals continue to become more climate-conscious, climate-mitigation legislation has also gained traction. In 2019, the European Commission agreed on the European Green Deal, which included a recommendation to phase out new financing for fossil fuel projects in third countries. This recommendation was reiterated at the COP26 in Glasgow, by the European Investment Bank, and more recently by the European Commission in preparation for the COP27 in Cairo. Against this background, the European Parliament recently adopted resolution 2022/2826(RSP), broadly condemning alleged human rights violations linked with the planned construction of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP). Alongside the human rights questions, the European Parliamentarians also argue that the project will both increase emissions and cause ecological damage—and so, in line with European climate policies, they argue that the project should close.
In this essay, I use the example of EU resolution 2022/2826(RSP) and the debates surrounding it to argue that whilst debates following this and similar resolutions supporting blanket bans on fossil fuel investments in low-income countries might be well-intentioned, a more differentiated view of the implications of these resolutions is necessary, especially considering developing countries’ needs and preferences. Blanket application of climate strategies developed in the Global North (such as stopping funding fossil fuel extractions in low-income countries) can be deeply unfair and unjust, and entrench more poverty than they hope to reduce. Moreover, these debates tend to focus on the policy needs of the Global North, with limited regard to Global South contexts and needs. This is especially significant in the context of aiming for just energy transitions, in which low-income countries are not left worse off without fossil fuel extraction.

In several African regions, economic integration has successfully reduced tariff protection by freezing the opportunity to raise applied tariffs against fellow integration partners above those promised. We examine whether these regional tariff commitments have come at the expense of adverse side-effects on the prevalence of non-tariff trade barriers. Comparing the effects of applied tariff overhangs – the difference between MFN bound tariffs and effectively applied tariffs – towards all vis-à-vis African trading partners on SPS and TBT notifications of 35 African WTO members from 2001-2017, we find no general relationship between tariff overhangs and import regulation in our preferred model setting. Larger tariff overhangs specific to intra-African trade relations, however, increase the probability of SPS measures and TBT and thereby contrast with the common assumption of the former functioning as a flexible policy valve. We see the nature of Africa’s formal trade relations as an explanation for these findings. While regional tariff commitments have not only significantly moved African countries away from multilateral commitments, they have also sharply reduced their tariff policy space within Africa, thus seemingly leaving regulatory policy as one of the few legitimate options to level the playing field with the by far closest market competitors.

Noting that few studies to date have investigated the determinants of social cohesion in a comprehensive and systematic manner, this paper examines the macro-level determinants of social cohesion using a panel of up to 92 developing and developed countries for the period 1990–2020. Employing the system GMM dynamic panel data estimator, which addresses endogeneity concerns by means of internal instruments, I find that the levels of education, government size, globalisation, and economic development have significantly positive effects on most dimensions of a country’s social cohesion. In contrast, inflation, corruption and income inequality are detrimental to social cohesion.

To bridge the telecom gap between people in rural and urban areas, and between landlocked and coastal countries, African governments and the African Union have supported the continent’s infrastructure development in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector. At the same time, China has increasingly shown an interest in investing in ICT in Africa in order to export its manufacturing products, develop its technology and acquire foreign technology, as well as contributing to its global influence in ICT as stipulated in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) and 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025). China’s increasing interest in ICT and the growing presence of Chinese telecom companies in Africa have contributed to a resurgence of the European Union’s motivation to re-engage in Africa’s ICT sector. This Policy Brief discusses whether, in the development of the African ICT sector, there is an alignment between Chinese telecom companies’ engagement in Africa and the interests of African countries. It argues that while Chinese investment interests meet Africa’s need for the development of its ICT sector, help bridge the telecom gap and contribute to connectivity across the continent, there are risks, challenges and concerns surrounding China’s engagement in African countries’ ICT sector.

To bridge the telecom gap between people in rural and urban areas, and between landlocked and coastal countries, African governments and the African Union have supported the continent’s infrastructure development in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector. At the same time, China has increasingly shown an interest in investing in ICT in Africa in order to export its manufacturing products, develop its technology and acquire foreign technology, as well as contributing to its global influence in ICT as stipulated in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) and 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025). China’s increasing interest in ICT and the growing presence of Chinese telecom companies in Africa have contributed to a resurgence of the European Union’s motivation to re-engage in Africa’s ICT sector. This Policy Brief discusses whether, in the development of the African ICT sector, there is an alignment between Chinese telecom companies’ engagement in Africa and the interests of African countries. It argues that while Chinese investment interests meet Africa’s need for the development of its ICT sector, help bridge the telecom gap and contribute to connectivity across the continent, there are risks, challenges and concerns surrounding China’s engagement in African countries’ ICT sector.

The literature suggests that a first barrier towards accessing benefits of health insurance in low- and middle-income countries is lack of awareness of one’s benefits. Yet, across settings and emerging schemes, limited scientific evidence is available on levels of awareness and their determinants. To fill this gap, we assessed socio-demographic and economic determinants of beneficiaries’ awareness of the Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PM-JAY), the national health insurance scheme launched in India in 2018, and their awareness of own eligibility. We relied on cross-sectional household survey data collected in six Indian states between 2019 and 2020. Representative data of households eligible for PM-JAY from 11 618 respondents (an adult representative from each surveyed household) were used. We used descriptive statistics and multivariable logistic regression models to explore the association between awareness of PM-JAY and of one’s own eligibility, and socio-economic and demographic characteristics. About 62% of respondents were aware of PM-JAY, and among the aware, 78% knew that they were eligible for the scheme. Regression analysis confirmed that older respondents with higher educational level and salaried jobs were more likely to know about PM-JAY. Awareness was lower among respondents from Meghalaya and Tamil Nadu. Respondents from other backward classes, of wealthier socio-economic status, or from Meghalaya or Gujarat were more likely to be aware of their eligibility status. Respondents from Chhattisgarh were less likely to know about their eligibility. Our study confirms that while more than half the eligible population was aware of PM-JAY, considerable efforts are needed to achieve universal awareness. Socio-economic gradients confirm that the more marginalized are still less aware. We recommend implementing tailored, state-specific information dissemination approaches focusing on knowledge of specific scheme features to empower beneficiaries to demand their entitled services.

In early 2022, Germany’s development minister Svenja Schulze announced the adoption of a feminist development policy. With this announcement, Germany joins a growing group of governments that have adopted or declared the adoption of an explicitly feminist perspective in their external policies. Drawing on these governments’ policies and the observations and recommendations by civil society and researchers, this Discussion Paper outlines ten key recommendations for Germany’s first feminist development policy. The first three recommendations focus on the conceptual foundation of the policy and lay out the importance of 1) an inclusive definition of gender, 2) a clarification of the feminist approach and the policy’s overall goal as well as 3) the need for an intersectional approach. The second set of recommendations concerns the implementation of the policy and stresses the importance of 4) a permanent cooperation with gender-focused and feminist organisations and 5) the necessity to increase funding for gender-related objectives in general and 6) for feminist organisations in particular. Further recommendations include 7) widening the range of sectors that target gender equality through a transformative approach and context-sensitive programming and by providing mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the strategy’s goals, objectives and activities. The last three recommendations emphasise institutional aspects and the importance of 8) creating an institutional environment that best supports gender equality within the development ministry and its main implementing organisations, 9) the necessity of a coherent feminist approach between the different ministries, and 10) the importance of addressing possible challenges the ministry might face in the implementation of its feminist development policy.

Inequality is bad per se and has adverse effects, among other things, on economic development and the environment. It is also often argued that high and increasing inequalities put societies under stress, which increases the likelihood of social conflicts. However, the literature on this topic is scarce and some of the conclusions are not adequately supported by empirical evidence. This is mainly because there are different definitions and measurements of social cohesion. Moreover, some definitions of social cohesion incorporate inequality, thus making it impossible to examine how these two phenomena interact with one another.
This paper analyses both theoretically and empirically, the relationship between inequality and social cohesion. To do so, it employs a recent definition of social cohesion provided by Leininger et al. (2021). According to this definition, social cohesion is composed of three core attributes, namely trust, inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good. These attributes are examined in two dimensions, namely the horizontal (relationship among individuals) and vertical (relationship between individuals and state institutions) dimensions of social cohesion.
This paper provides an overview of the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between inequality and the three attributes of social cohesion. We find that while inequality is likely to have a negative effect on all three attributes, the intensity of the relationship may depend on some key mediating factors. Moreover, we highlight the main pathways through which inequality could affect each of the three key attributes.
The empirical analysis focuses on Africa. While there is some work in this field in Europe and Asia, to the best of our knowledge, there has not been any related empirical work thus far that has focused on African countries. To measure the three attributes of social cohesion, we use a database generated by Leininger et al. (2021), which is based on data from Afrobarometer and the V-Dem Institute. Inequality is mainly measured by the Gini coefficient and data are sourced from the World Income Distribution dataset. As expected, our analysis shows that countries with higher inequality usually have lower levels of social cohesion, which is measured by an aggregate index. This negative correlation holds when we analyse the relationship between the Gini coefficient and the three attributes separately; however, the intensity varies. It is stronger for trust (rho=0.25) compared with the other two attributes (both of which have a rho equal to approximately 0.1). Additional investigations point to substantially different results for the horizontal and vertical dimensions of social cohesion. Higher levels of inequality are associated with lower levels of horizontal trust and horizontal cooperation. On the other hand, higher levels of inequality are associated with higher levels of vertical trust and are essentially uncorrelated with vertical cooperation. These relationships remain substantially unchanged when we use measures of income inequality other than the Gini coefficient. Further analyses that aim to explain the puzzling results for the vertical dimension of social cohesion reveal that our findings are not clearly driven by trust in a specific institution and are also not an artefact of the specific data we used. Indeed, we obtain similar results using data from the World Values Survey. At the same time, it appears that the positive relationship between inequality and vertical trust is visible only among African countries, whereas it is not observed at the global level or for other regions. Further research is needed to confirm whether Africa is truly exceptional in this regard, and if so, why that may be the case.

Während die Ziele der Agenda 2030 für nachhaltige Entwicklung universell sind, sind die Wege, die zu ihnen führen, vielfältig. Länder haben aufgrund ihrer unterschiedlichen biophysischen, sozio-ökonomischen und politisch-kulturellen Ausgangsbedingungen unterschiedliche Leitvorstellungen davon, wie die Ziele einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung (Sustainable Development Goals – SDGs) erreicht werden sollen, und sie verfügen über unterschiedliche Ansatzpunkte und Hebel hierfür. Nachhaltige Entwicklungspfade, die machbare und aus Sicht unterschiedlicher Akteure erstrebenswerte Wege zur Erreichung der Agenda 2030 und der Pariser Klimaziele beschreiben, müssen diese Faktoren und deren Vielfalt berücksichtigen. Es reicht daher nicht aus, nur eine einzige Pfadoption vorzuschlagen und deren potenzielle Wirkungen zu analysieren. Jeder dieser „nachhaltigen Entwicklungspfade“ erfordert zudem Transformationsprozesse, die einen disruptiven Paradigmenwechsel und einen tiefgreifenden gesellschaftlichen Wandel mit sich bringen. Es bedarf daher positiver, an unterschiedliche Gegebenheiten anknüpfende Leitvorstellungen (“Visionen”). Diese sind am ehesten in einer Kombination aus qualitativen Erzählungen oder Narrativen sowie darauf aufbauender, quantitativer Szenarien zu vermitteln. Analysen können dann die positiven Wechselwirkungen sowie mögliche Zielkonflikte zwischen den einzelnen SDGs und hierfür vorgesehenen Maßnahmen beschreiben und dazu beitragen, Synergien zu verstärken sowie wechselseitige Beeinträchtigungen oder Blockaden zu vermeiden oder zu minimieren.

In September 2015, the international community adopted the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In doing so, all 193 UN member states signed off on 17 goals to promote socioeconomic prosperity and environmental sustainability. Earlier that same year, the Addis Ababa Action agenda for financing development had been adopted, while the close of the year saw the conclusion of the Paris Climate Agreement. Yet seven years on, the world is significantly off-track to achieving most of these goals, and multiple crises have led to a reversal of SDG progress. From the outset, Heads of State agreed that a number of countries each year (around 40) should present reports on their progress towards the SDGs, in so called ‘voluntary national reviews’ (VNRs) and that leaders would meet every four years to review global SDG progress and agree on a path forward. In July 2023, the EU is to present its first Union-wide voluntary review at the United Nations. This presents a good opportunity for the EU to send a strong message to the international community and to demonstrate its commitment to and leadership on the SDGs. A few months later, in September 2023, Heads of State will again meet under the auspices of the UN General Assembly in New York for the second SDG Summit (the first was held in 2019). Following the SDG Summit, the Summit of the Future, in September 2024, will debate and hopefully lead to the adoption of a Pact for the Future to include major reforms of multilateral institutions and sustainable development finance. This year’s Europe Sustainable Development Report (ESDR 2022) aims to support both of these processes and contribute to strengthening the EU’s SDG leadership at home and internationally.

Bonn, 5. Dezember 2022. Vom 7. bis zum 19. Dezember 2022 wird die 15. Vertragsstaatenkonferenz (COP) des Übereinkommens über die biologische Vielfalt (CBD) im kanadischen Montreal unter dem Vorsitz von China stattfinden. Trotz der schwierigen geopolitischen Weltlage wird erwartet, dass sich die Regierungen auf ein neues „globales Rahmenabkommen für Biodiversität“ (GBF) einigen werden. Viele Beobachter*innen hoffen auf eine bahnbrechende Vereinbarung zum Schutz der biologischen Vielfalt. Manche sprechen gar von der „letzten Chance für die Natur“.

Der aktuelle Entwurf des GBF steht ganz im Zeichen der Agenda 2030 und des Pariser Abkommens, fordert er doch einen Wandel in den „Beziehungen der Gesellschaften zur biologischen Vielfalt“. Die zugehörige Erklärung von Kunming, die auf der ersten Sitzung der COP15 im Oktober 2021 in China verabschiedet wurde, betont die Notwendigkeit eines „transformativen Wandels in allen Wirtschaftssektoren und allen Teilen der Gesellschaft“ und die „Sicherstellung von Nachhaltigkeit in Produktion und Konsum“. Es scheint, dass Regierungen zunehmend anerkennen, was Wissenschaftler*innen und Umweltaktivist*innen schon seit Jahrzehnten fordern: Wir müssen aus nicht nachhaltigen Formen der Produktion und des Konsums aussteigen.

Viele politische Entscheidungsträger*innen, NGOs und Naturschützer*innen sind sich zwar einig, dass tiefgreifender Wandel notwendig ist – doch der Entwurf des GBFs spiegelt dies nur in Teilen wieder. Das GBF zeichnet sich überwiegend, wie viele multilaterale UN-Dokumente auch, durch technokratische Vorgaben und Zielen aus. Das mag viele Experten*innen nicht überraschen, doch ist dies eine der wesentlichen Schwächen des künftigen GBF. Die politische Ökonomie des Naturschutzes bleibt weitestgehend außen vor. Regierungen sollten aus unserer Sicht die progressiven Elemente der Erklärung von Kunming ernst nehmen und anerkennen, dass wir eine sozial-ökologische Transformation benötigen, um den Verlust von Biodiversität zu stoppen. Wenn wir unser aktuelles Wirtschaftssystem nicht grundsätzlich infrage stellen, bleibt der Erfolg des neuen GBF höchst unwahrscheinlich.

Die wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse sind eindeutig, alarmierend und enttäuschend. Trotz einer wachsenden Zahl von Schutzgebieten und marktorientierter Naturschutzinstrumente ist die biologische Vielfalt seit 1970 weltweit um 68 Prozent zurückgegangen. Dennoch bleibt unendliches Wirtschaftswachstum das vorherrschende Paradigma – den verheerenden Auswirkungen auf die Ökosysteme zum Trotz. Darüber hinaus machen komplexe Wertschöpfungsketten und die damit verbundene Trennung der Produktion (z.B. Holzeinschlag im Regenwald) vom Konsum, das Artensterben in unserem täglichen Leben schwer greifbar. Die Verluste finden anderswo statt und bleiben für uns unsichtbar.

Nichtmenschliche Lebewesen sind nicht Teil unserer „communities of justice“ (Gerechtigkeitsgemeinschaften). Sie sind meist nur dann relevant, wenn sie unseren Interessen dienen (z.B. als Nahrung oder zur Bestäubung), als Faktoren von Kosten-Nutzen-Rechnungen und im Rahmen von vorgeschriebenen Kompensationsmaßnahmen, etwa bei großen Infrastrukturprojekten. So warf eine große deutsche Tageszeitung Gegner*innen der Elbvertiefung und des Ausbaus der Fahrrinne einst vor, dass sie gefährdeten Arten wie dem Schierlings Wasserfenchel mehr Wert beimessen würden als Arbeitsplätzen und Steuereinnahmen. Der Schutz der Artenvielfalt scheint also nur solange erwünscht, wenn er sich nicht auf unsere Volkswirtschaften auswirkt. Hier stellt sich folglich die Frage: Wie viele Arbeitsplätze ist uns das Aussterben von Arten wert?

Was ist nötig, um den Verlust der biologischen Vielfalt zu stoppen und den Trend umzukehren? Was müssen wir tun, um das neue GBF erfolgreich umzusetzen? Zunächst müssen wir anerkennen, dass unser Wirtschaftssystem und sein inhärentes und permanentes Streben nach Expansion zu einer verstärkten Ressourcennutzung, zur Zerstörung von Lebensräumen und zum Verlust der biologischen Vielfalt führt. Folglich erfordert das GBF eine sozial-ökologische Transformation hin zu einer Wirtschaft, die ohne permanentes Wachstum von Produktion und Konsum auskommt. Das Wirtschaften in einer solchen Gesellschaft sollte nicht der Kapitalakkumulation dienen, sondern einen Zustand anstreben, in dem Wohlstand und eine intakte biologische Vielfalt vereinbar sind. Dies erfordert eine durchschnittliche Verringerung der Produktion und des Konsums in einigen Wirtschaftssektoren, während es in Bereichen wie erneuerbare Energien, Bildung, Gesundheit und Pflege Wachstum erfordert. Ein solcher Wandel würde dem Wohlergehen der Menschen, dem Bewahren der biologischen Vielfalt, Vorrang vor Kapitalakkumulation und Profit einräumen. So könnten wir einige der Ursachen für den Verlust der Artenvielfalt aus dem Weg räumen.

Zweitens müssen wir beim Schutz der Biodiversität neue Ansätze verfolgen, die über marktorientierte Instrumente, Kosten-Nutzen-Ansätze und Schutzgebiete, die den Menschen getrennt von der Natur betrachten, hinausgehen. Schutzstrategien sollten die Rolle indigener Gruppen und lokaler Gemeinschaften anerkennen und jene Akteur*innen unterstützen, die seit Jahrhunderten zur Erhaltung der biologischen Vielfalt beitragen. Ein bedingungsloses Grundeinkommen für den Naturschutz ist hier ein vielversprechendes Instrument. Es würde Menschen zugutekommen, die in Gebieten leben, in denen dem Erhalt der Biodiversität eine große Rolle zukommt. Die Zahlungen würden die Grundbedürfnisse indigener Gruppen und lokaler Gemeinschaften (IPLC) decken. Sie können außerdem als eine Form der „Wiedergutmachung“ für IPLCs angesehen werden, da sie im Zuge der Einrichtung neuer Schutzgebiete häufig von ihrem traditionellen Land vertrieben wurden.

This paper offers a comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese partnerships with the United Nations (UN) as a mechanism and channel for policy transfer. In international policy travel flows, China and Brazil currently hold privileged places as hubs from which development-related policies travel and through which they circulate. Both countries have invested in systematising their development experience and transferring development policies within their regions and beyond – often through triangular cooperation, i.e. South–South cooperation supported by third actors such as UN entities. So far, however, this variegated engagement has remained under the radar of scholarly attention. To address this gap, we examine 35 policy transfer partnerships – 17 for Brazil and 18 for China – forged with different parts of the UN system over the last two decades. In order to offer a first systematic account of partnership trajectories, we provide an overview of partnership types (namely projects, programmes and policy centres) and transfer dimensions (including the policies themselves, transfer agents and governance arrangements). Our comparative mapping presents an evolving landscape: while Brazil was first in institutionalising robust policy transfer partnerships with numerous UN entities and then slowed down, China started more cautiously but has significantly expanded its collaboration with the UN system since 2015. The partnerships analysed cover a substantial range of sectors, with a particular focus – for both Brazil and China – on agricultural policies. While Brazilian partnerships with the UN primarily engage with linkages between agriculture and social protection, however, China–UN partnerships focus more on productivity and market linkages. As the first comprehensive mapping and comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese policy transfer partnerships with the UN, this paper contributes to a better understanding of (triangular) cooperation schemes between international organisations and their member states, as well as debates about how policies deemed as successful travel around the globe.

As the EU repositions itself in a multipolar world, it should strengthen its strategic autonomy by forging cooperative alliances with a diverse range of partners and aligning its external policies to the global common good. Already in 2016, The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (European External Action Service, 2017) spoke of ‘times of existential crisis’ and set out to navigate a ‘difficult, more connected, contested and complex world‘. While nurturing ‘the ambition of strategic autonomy’ and calling to strengthen the Union on security and defense, the strategy also recognised that Europe ‘cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats’: the EU needed to ‘invest in win-win solutions, and move beyond the illusion that international politics can be a zero-sum game‘. The Strategy not only noted that ‘our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders’ but also that ‘prosperity must be shared and requires fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals worldwide, including in Europe‘. In 2022, for most of Europe the world looks quite different from that of 2016. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been acknowledged as a ‘watershed moment in global politics’ (von der Leyen, 2022), but this and its political ramifications should also be seen as part of a broader and long-term global sea change that was already becoming palpable when the Global Strategy was conceptualised.