Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Latest News

This year, 2023, offers political momentum for strengthening the global climate finance architecture under and outside the United Nations climate change regime. In November 2022, the 27th Conference of the Parties (COP27) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) marked a breakthrough on loss and damage with an agreement for establishing new funding arrangements, including a fund. Parties also recognized the need for rethinking development finance and endorsed a plea to reform multilateral development banks (MDBs). In addition, parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement are currently negotiating a new collective quantified goal on climate finance, which is to be agreed by 2024. Japan, holding the 2023 Group of Seven (G7) presidency, carries a key responsibility for initiating relevant processes to revive the climate finance agenda together with the G7 partner countries. As the G7 countries are the main providers of adaptation finance, as well as the major shareholders having voting power to enable reforms of the MDBs, the G7 Hiroshima Summit must catalyze a debate for a systemic transformation and chart a long-term strategic outlook for the G7 states as global leaders on climate action. This policy brief makes three proposals to that end: (i) strengthen multilateral funding under the United Nations climate change regime; (ii) reinforce efforts to balance climate finance flows; and (iii) push for reforming the MDBs to strengthen their role and effectiveness in providing finance for adaptation and loss and damage.

As the number of refugees has continued to grow in post-independence Africa, host governments across the continent have developed stringent refugee policies that are detached from historical transborder relationships in which refugees and host communities interact. The stringent policies are underpinned by the assumption that host communities view refugees from the state-centric perspective of non-citizens as undesirable foreigners or outsiders. Host governments’ insistence that the solution lies in refugees eventually repatriating to their countries of origin drives refugee policies that undermine solutions instead of building and capitalizing on solutions generated at the level of host communities. The exclusion of local histories and social dynamics in host regions has led to policies that neither hold up to humanitarian standards nor serve their intended non-integration objectives. Some host governments are reluctant to implement local integration and have maintained exclusionary policies for a long period of time when the realities in the host communities show that refugees are included and participate in various community activities. Host governments perpetuate this disjuncture between policy and local practice by assuming or pretending that refugees will wait for repatriation instead of finding solutions in the host countries where some of them have lived for decades. Contrary to the non-integration objectives of official encampment policies and scholarship that assumes that the absence of official integration policies deters integration, many refugees have defied the stereotypical portrayal of refugees as “bare life” which denotes prioritization of mere survival as opposed to the quality of life. They have managed to find solutions and live their lives as active and productive members of their host countries. This article specifically addresses the situation of Somali refugees in Ethiopia and Kenya. It argues that the absence of local integration policies or reluctance by host governments to implement them where they exist does not automatically mean that refugees are unable to integrate in their host countries. Host government policies against integration are mediated by refugees’ self-initiative and resourcefulness.

Green hydrogen – produced with renewable energy – is indispensable for the decarbonisation of economies, especially concerning “hard-to-abate” activities such as the production of steel, cement and fertilisers as well as maritime transport and aviation. The demand for green hydrogen is therefore booming. Currently, green hydrogen is far more expensive than fossil fuel-based alternatives, but major initiatives are underway to develop a global green hydrogen market and bring costs down. Green hydrogen is expected to become cost-competitive in the mid-2030s.
Given their endowment with solar and wind energy, many countries in the Global South are well-positioned to produce low-cost green hydrogen and are therefore attracting investments. Whether and to what extent these investments will create value and employment for – and improve environmental conditions in – the host economies depends on policies. This discussion paper analyses the potential industrial development spillovers of green hydrogen production, distinguishing seven clusters of upstream and downstream industries that might receive a stimulus from green hydrogen. Yet, it also underlines that there is no automatism. Unless accompanied by industrial and innovation policies, and unless there are explicit provisions for using revenues for a Just Transition, hydrogen investments may lead to the formation of socially exclusive enclaves.
The paper consists of two parts. Part A provides basic information on the emerging green hydrogen market and its technological ramifications, the opportunities for countries with abundant resources for renewable energy, how national policies can maximise the effects in terms of sustainable national development and how this can be supported by international cooperation. Part B delves into the specific case of South Africa, which is one of the countries that has an advanced hydrogen roadmap and hosts several German and international development projects. The country case shows how a national hydrogen strategy can be tailored to specific country conditions and how international cooperation can support its design and implementation.

This paper proposes the establishment of an “Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform for Water Sustainability (ISPWAS)” to undertake a science-based global water assessment to forge a new relationship between science and policy-making. Thus it would bring evidence-based knowledge and rigorous analysis to policy-making sustainably addressing increasingly complex interconnected water challenges across sectors and bridge the growing science-policy gap that exists in many  countries. ISPWAS would share world-class, science-based, solution-oriented knowledge to support Member States in their decision and innovative policy-making that underpins and addresses the complexities of sustainably managing water  resources. It would help to identify and address the severe deficiencies in human capacity and water governance that hinder effective water management. ISPWAS would undertake the global assessment implemented through national entities with an intergovernmental validation mechanism. Governments need to base their policy and decision-making on sound scientific evidence. The widening science-policy gap must be closed to ensure that policies and regulations are more relevant and based on state-of-the-art science. ISPWAS would assist Member States in improving their knowledge of available tools and information for tackling water issues and their use in policy-making. It would facilitate coordination and exchanges among water-related efforts within  and between countries and aid Member States in monitoring national or global initiatives. Finally, ISPWAS would help to position water issues at the forefront of global sustainability agendas and processes. In short, it would significantly transform  water management and potentially be a major “game-changer” for accelerating implementation of Agenda 2030 and beyond.

Die Weltbank hat einen längst überfälligen Reformprozess eingeleitet. Angesichts erheblicher Finanzierungslücken bei der Verwirklichung der Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung (SDGs) und des Pariser Abkommens haben Akteur*innen weltweit eine rasche und umfassende Reform der internationalen Finanzarchitektur gefordert. Das ist essentiell, damit das Finanzsystem zur Lösung der vielfältigen Krisen des 21. Jahrhunderts beitragen kann. Forderungen für Reformen finden sich beispielsweise im Independent Review of Multilateral Development Banks Capital Adequacy Frameworks (2022) der G20, in der Bridgetown-Initiative 2022 und in Erklärungen führender Entscheidungsträger*innen, darunter der Premierministerin von Barbados, Mia Mottley, und der deutschen Entwicklungsministerin Svenja Schulze.

Die kürzlich von der Weltbank veröffentlichte Evolution Roadmap ist ein positiver Schritt in die richtige Richtung. Zwar sind die Pläne der Bank für eine erweiterte Mission – mit neuem Schwerpunkt auf Resilienz und Nachhaltigkeit – zu begrüßen, sie bedürfen jedoch einer erheblichen Aufstockung ihrer Finanzierungskapazitäten. Auf der Frühjahrstagung 2023 (10.–16. April) sind die Anteilseigner der Weltbank dabei allerdings nicht viel weitergekommen.

Die Reform der Weltbank zielt maßgeblich darauf ab, der Finanzierung von Lösungen für globale Herausforderungen Priorität einzuräumen. Bisher hat sich die Bank vor allem auf die Unterstützung einzelner Länder konzentriert und weniger auf globale, grenzüberschreitende öffentliche Güter, wie der Reduzierung von Kohlenstoffemissionen, der Pandemievorsorge oder dem Schutz der Regenwälder. Im Rahmen der Evolution Roadmap könnte die Bank nationalen Regierungen zusätzliche und billigere Darlehen anbieten, um Anreize für die Bereitstellung solcher globalen öffentlichen Güter zu schaffen und so über den traditionellen Schwerpunkt auf Armutsbekämpfung hinauszugehen.

Die erweiterte Mission der Bank ist ein hehres Ziel, das jedoch einer massiven Aufstockung der Mittel bedarf. Im Wesentlichen gibt es drei Wege, die Handlungsfähigkeit der Bank zu stärken: eine Kapitalerhöhung durch die Anteilseigner, eine bessere Hebelwirkung der Weltbank-Bilanzen und die Mobilisierung von Privatkapital. Zwar haben sich die Anteilseigner auf der Frühjahrstagung nicht zu einer Kapitalerhöhung verpflichtet, allerdings stimmten sie einer Senkung des Verhältnisses zwischen Eigenkapital und Krediten von 20 Prozent auf 19 Prozent zu. Dieses Verhältnis gibt an, wie viele Schulden die Weltbank im Verhältnis zum Wert ihrer Aktiva aufnehmen kann. Dieser Schritt und andere damit zusammenhängende Änderungen bei der Verwendung des Bankkapitals werden die Finanzkraft der Bank in den nächsten zehn Jahren voraussichtlich um bis zu 50 Mrd. USD erhöhen.

Dieser Betrag ist jedoch weitaus geringer als für die Umsetzung der ambitionierten Reformagenda der Bank erforderlich wäre. In einem Bericht von 2022 schätzen die Ökonom*innen Vera Songwe und Nicholas Stern, dass die Entwicklungsländer bis 2030 jährlich 1 Billion US-Dollar an externer Infrastrukturfinanzierung benötigen, um ihre Emissionen im Einklang mit dem 1,5°C-Ziel zu reduzieren. Folglich wird die Finanzierung der Reformagenda der Weltbank stark vom dritten Weg abhängen: der Mobilisierung von Privatkapital.

Eine solche Konzentration auf privates Kapital birgt jedoch Risiken. Bisherige Erfahrungen haben gezeigt, dass Mischfinanzierungen, d. h. der strategische Einsatz öffentlicher Entwicklungsfinanzierung zur Mobilisierung zusätzlicher Privatmittel, mit jährlichen Beträgen von durchschnittlich gerade einmal 10,7 Mrd. USD für den Zeitraum 2011–2022 nur schwer in Gang kommt. Daher ist die Strategie der Weltbank vorrangig einem bisher weitgehend erfolglosen Ansatz zu folgen äußerst riskant. Darüber hinaus ist bei Mischfinanzierungen immer zwischen privater Rendite und öffentlichem Nutzen abzuwägen. Ein verstärkter Rückgriff auf Mischfinanzierungen ohne erweiterte Transparenzmechanismen, die sicherstellen, dass die versprochenen Wirkungen für nachhaltige Entwicklung und globale öffentliche Güter tatsächlich eintreten, kann die Fähigkeit der Bank untergraben, ihre erweiterte Mission zu erfüllen.

Es ist besorgniserregend, dass die Weltbank nicht mit einer überzeugenden Strategie zur Erhöhung ihrer Finanzierungskapazitäten aufwartet. Knappe konzessionäre Mittel sollten nicht von der Armutsbekämpfung auf die Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter umgelenkt werden. Wachstum und Armutsbekämpfung sind bereits durch die COVID-19-Pandemie, die wachsende Schuldenkrise und die dem russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine geschuldete Krise der Lebenshaltungskosten ins Stocken geraten. Darüber hinaus besteht die Gefahr, dass die Weltbank ihren geografischen Schwerpunkt von Ländern mit niedrigem Einkommen (LIC) auf Länder mit mittlerem Einkommen (MIC) verlagert, sollte sie ihre Mission um die Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter erweitern. Das Nachsehen hätten dann womöglich ärmere Länder.

Zusammenfassend erklärt die Weltbank in ihrer Roadmap zu Recht, dass „die konzessionäre Finanzierung für MICs ein zusätzlicher Posten sein sollte, um die dringendsten globalen Herausforderungen zu bewältigen, jedoch nicht zulasten ärmerer Länder gehen darf“. Um diese Verpflichtung einzuhalten, sind jedoch erhebliche Kapitalerhöhungen seitens der Anteilseigner sowie weitreichende Entscheidungen für eine verbesserte Hebelwirkung der Bankbilanzen erforderlich.

Responsible consumption and production are key to sustainable development, and are therefore a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 12) in their own right. Consumption and production patterns also need to be socially responsible and economically viable. Private-sector requirements and state supply chain regulations, which have become more widespread in recent years, are designed to ensure that products consumed in high-income countries but manufactured (at least partially) in low-income countries are produced in line with certain social and environmental standards. Although progress has been made, many questions remain, particularly regarding whether the local social and economic impacts are sufficient.
Cotton made in Africa (CmiA) is a certification initiative within the textile industry. Established 18 years ago as part of one of the largest public-private partnerships of German Development Cooperation with private foundations and private companies around an agriculture-based supply chain, CmiA – like its sister scheme the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) – seeks to ensure compliance with specific environmental and social conditions in the cotton production process. Wherever it is implemented and monitored, the CmiA-standard provides retailers and consumers with the assurance that the cotton in the textiles and garments in question has been produced in line with CmiA-requirements. Up to now, about one million smallholder households with six to seven million family members in Africa produce under the label. This Policy Brief reflects on the impact that the introduction of CmiA has had on certified farmers, as well as on the challenges facing this standard following its successful market launch, and draws broader lessons learned for sustainability standards. The key findings are as follows:
• CmiA shows that sustainability standards do not only work for high-priced niche markets but can also be implemented in the mass market.
• While cotton is a non-food cash crop, the revenues it generates can boost food security among smallholders via the income channel and can also promote local food production through a number of other impact channels.
• Standard-setting must be accompanied by support for farmers so that they are able to comply and activate impact channels. It remains a huge challenge not only to guarantee social and ecological standards but also to achieve a “living income” for smallholder farmers.
• For all the benefits of publicly funding the start-up phase of implementing sustainability standards, it must be ensured that these standards are subsequently financed from the value chain itself. Textile retailers and consumers ultimately have to pay for the goods they consume and which have been manufactured under sustainable conditions.
• As the mass-market implementation of sustainability standards takes time and patience, we cannot expect to see dramatic improvements in the local living conditions and incomes of the farmers in the short to medium term. Instead, this will require continuous investment in smallholder production and in the local environments over many years.
• Transitioning from pesticide-intensive production to a system that does not use such products without major productivity losses is challenging but seems feasible.
• In order to determine whether, and to what extent, the wellbeing of smallholder farmers is increased by complying with sustainability standards, good and continuous impact assessment is needed and this must be adapted to the especially complex conditions of African smallholder agriculture.

Vertreter*innen der Europäischen Union (EU), wie Kommissionspräsidentin Ursula von der Leyen und der Präsident desEuropäischen Rates Charles Michel haben sich frühzeitig dafür ausgesprochen, dass die EU einen gewichtigen finanziellen Beitrag zum Wiederaufbau des Landes leisten sollte. Durch den Beschluss des Europäischen Rates vom 23. Juni 2022, der Ukraine den Status eines Beitrittskandidaten zu gewähren, ist die EU-Mitgliedschaft der Ukraine zum wichtigen Zielhorizont für den Prozess des Wiederaufbaus geworden. Um die Planungen für den langfristigen EU-Beitrag zum Wiederaufbau der Ukraine voranzutreiben, sollten die EU-Institutionen und Mitgliedstaaten möglichst schnell folgende drei Herausforderungen angehen: die Klärung der Finanzierung des EU-Beitrags zum Wiederaufbau, die Reform des EU-Beitrittsprozesses, und eine transparente und proaktive Kommunikation der Aufgabe des Wiederaufbaus an die europäische Öffentlichkeit.

We examine the effect of corruption control on the volatility of economic growth using cross-country data that cover 131 economies worldwide for the period 1985–2018. To estimate the growth volatility model, we employ the system generalized method-of-moments estimator for dynamic panel data, which addresses potential endogeneity concerns using internal instruments. Our results show that corruption control significantly reduces growth volatility. This effect is robust to controlling for other measures of institutional quality. Moreover, we find some evidence for an indirect impact of corruption control on growth volatility through its role in reinforcing the volatility-dampening effect of financial development

Bereits 2016 ist Deutschland zum zweitgrößten Geber der UN-Entwicklungsarbeit nach den USA aufgestiegen. Etwa fünf Milliarden US-Dollar betragen heute die jährlichen Zuwendungen, davon 3,3 für humanitäre Hilfe. Dieser Wandel und die damit einhergehenden Gestaltungsspielräume kommen nur langsam im politischen Bewusstsein an. Dabei kann die UN-Entwicklungsarbeit eine wichtige Rolle spielen in der globalen Governance für einen sozialverträglichen, klimastabilisierenden und gemeinsamen Umgang mit den großen Herausforderungen unserer Zeit. Doch es müssen mehr als bislang ihre multilateralen Vorzüge, die Fähigkeit als Plattform für Vermittlung, Austausch und Interessensaushandlung, in Wert gesetzt werden.

Bonn, 17. April 2023. Die USA, China und die EU setzen zunehmend auf industriepolitische Subventionen für Umwelttechnologien. China subventioniert seine Industrien seit langem. Nun zogen die USA mit dem Inflations Reduction Act (IRA) nach. Dessen Ziele: die Marktführerschaft für Umwelttechnologien zu erlangen, Industriearbeitsplätze zu schaffen, CO2-Emissionen bis 2030 um 40% zu senken. Das Anreizpaket beläuft sich auf rund 400 Milliarden US$. Damit die Arbeitsplätze in den USA entstehen, sind die Subventionen an Wertschöpfung innerhalb der Landesgrenzen geknüpft und es werden hohe Beihilfen für die Ansiedlung internationaler Unternehmen angeboten. Als Antwort auf den IRA legte die EU-Kommission nun den Green Deal Industrial Plan vor und plant die Lockerung der EU-Beihilfevorschiften sowie einen neuen EU Sovereignty Fund, durch den die europäische Industrie massiv subventioniert werden soll.

Für den globalen Klimaschutz ist das auf den ersten Blick eine gute Nachricht. Wenn die großen Industrienationen ihren Subventionswettlauf auf grüne Schlüsseltechnologien fokussieren, beschleunigt das die dringend benötigte Entwicklung sauberer Technologien. Der Ansatz, der hier verfolgt wird, hat allerdings eine Reihe von Nachteilen – und könnte einer sozialgerechten und grünen Transformation im Wege stehen:

Erstens bewirkt der Ansatz eine Umverteilung hin zu Unternehmen, indem Steuerzahler*innen die Privatwirtschaft subventionieren. Sinnvoller wäre es, Unternehmen über Preismechanismen und Regulierung dazu zu bewegen, Umweltkosten einzupreisen und außerdem Forschung und Innovation zu fördern. Die direkte Subventionierung von Einzelunternehmen führt häufig zu Mitnahmeeffekten und dazu, dass andere Länder mit Subventionen nachziehen und knappe Ressourcen ineffizient eingesetzt werden.

Zweitens führen immer großzügigere Subventionsprogramme dazu, dass Großkonzerne eine zu starke Verhandlungsposition erringen: Wenn Europa „nur“ ein Drittel der Inventionen für ein neues Werk bezahlt, gehen Unternehmen eher in die USA, die zwei Drittel anbieten – das ist die Größenordnung, in der die USA zum Beispiel ein neues Werk des deutschen Chemiekonzerns Evonik bezuschussen. Es gibt eine lange Liste europäischer Unternehmen, die jetzt erwägen, neue Werke in den USA zu bauen anstatt in Europa, u.a. VW, BMW oder Siemens Energy.

Drittens setzen hier die stärksten Volkswirtschaften der Welt massive Subventionen ein, mit denen sie den Rest der Welt aus dem Markt für Umwelttechnologien katapultieren. Wenn die USA ein Subventionsprogramm auflegen, um Chinas Vorsprung bei grünen Industrien aufzuholen, dann ziehen andere mit Subventionen nach – sofern sie können. Innerhalb der EU sind das vor allem Frankreich und Deutschland, was wiederum Wettbewerbsverzerrungen im EU-Raum zur Folge haben könnte. Die EU bemüht sich um Ausnahmen von den protektionistischen US-Maßnahmen – für die eigenen Unternehmen. Länder jenseits der drei hoch subventionierenden Wirtschaftspole (USA, China, Kerneuropa) werden es sehr viel schwerer haben, sich in Zukunftsbranchen wie grünem Stahl, Elektroautos, Batteriefertigung oder Wasserstoff-Elektrolyse zu industrialisieren.

Viertens unterhöhlt der Subventionswettlauf der führenden Wirtschaftsnationen die Reste eines regelbasierten Handelssystems, das Chancengleichheit gewähren soll. Die Subventionsregeln der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) sollten dringend angepasst werden, um der Klimakrise besser begegnen zu können. Doch das Aushöhlen der bestehenden Regeln, z.B. durch den IRA, erschwert eine solche Reform. Die WTO ist ein zahnloser Tiger geworden und Länder, die im Subventionswettlauf unter die Räder kommen, haben kaum noch eine Handhabe, um sich gegen den wachsenden Protektionismus der USA, Chinas und der EU zur Wehr zu setzen.  Und die Nutzung von Subventionen untergräbt die politische Akzeptanz für den geplanten Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) der EU, der CO2-intensive Importe aus Ländern ohne vergleichbare CO2 -Bepreisung mit Abgaben belegt. Es ist anderen Ländern kaum vermittelbar, an einer Stelle „Fairness“ für die heimische Industrie bei der CO2-Bepreisung zu fordern und an anderer Stelle den Wettbewerb durch massive Industriesubventionen zu verzerren.

Was wäre die Alternative? Schließlich brauchen wir für die ökologische Transformation eine massive Beschleunigung der Entwicklung und Markteinführung von Umwelttechnologien. Besser als Industriesubventionen wäre eine Mischung aus Umweltsteuern, regulatorischen Vorgaben und Innovationsförderung. Der ökologische Umbau des Steuersystems könnte Verschmutzer stärker belasten und Subventionen für fossile Brennstoffe abbauen. Das lenkt Investitionen in eine klimastabilisierende Richtung. Ein Teil der zusätzlichen Einnahmen könnte in soziale Sicherung, ein anderer in Forschung und Entwicklung investiert werden. Auch sinkende Emissionsgrenzwerte würden Umweltinvestitionen fördern, ohne dabei einzelne Großkonzerne zu begünstigen.

Die Förderung von Umwelttechnologien ist eine weltweite Gemeinschaftsaufgabe, die es allen Ländern ermöglichen sollte, ihre Volkswirtschaften zu transformieren und von neuen Wirtschaftsimpulsen zu profitieren. Es ist daher wichtig, dass die Industrieländer ihren Verpflichtungen im Rahmen des Pariser Klimaschutzabkommens für gemeinschaftliche Klimatechnologieentwicklung und Technologietransfers nachkommen. Sie sollten beispielsweise mehr in den Global Innovation Hub einzahlen, anstatt ein Vielfaches an Industriesubventionen im nationalen Eigeninteresse zu verteilen.

This policy brief outlines how feminist development policy can be locally enacted by taking an intersectional approach to the provision of assistance to refugees and displaced persons. Refugee-led organisations (RLOs) play a key role in providing collective services, particularly in contexts where the host government is unlikely or unwilling to provide access to local social services. This is especially true in non-camp settings, and as global refugee policy moves away from encampment as a response to refugees the role of RLOs in refugees’ daily lives will only increase.
While RLOs are an important part of life in a refugee community, they can be especially useful in supporting the needs of women, children, LGBTIQ refugees, ethnic minorities and diverse-ability refugees across multiple refugee communities city- or region-wide. Taking an inter¬sectional approach to understanding the role of RLOs, in particular RLOs led by women, can help policy-makers identify networks of local actors who can effective¬ly meet the social needs of all members of a local refugee community, including those who face particular marginali¬sation due to gender, sexual, religious or ethnic identity.
The intersectional approach to working with RLOs focuses on meeting the needs of marginalised identity groups across the entire refugee population in a city or region. For example, refugees representing multiple ethnic groups or nationalities might have their own ethnic or national RLO, but that RLO may not be able to meet the unique needs of women, children, LGBTIQ and reli¬gious minorities within the community. An inter-sectional approach means engaging all the RLOs in a city or region to meet the social, health and protection needs of margin¬alised community members, with the under¬standing that in doing so the wider needs of all community members will be met.
RLOs are part of a wider ecosystem of services and organisations that support refugees, and while they play a unique role in enacting feminist development policy for refugees, they have limitations. Policy-makers should engage them alongside official authorities from the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and the host country govern¬ment when possible. Given the challenges and opportuni¬ties that come with taking an intersectional approach to meeting refugees’ needs through engage¬ment with women-led RLOs, we offer the following recommendations to policy-makers:
• Funding RLOs in situations where refugees have no legal status is challenging. In many cases, RLOs can provide intersectional social services, but often need funding to do so. Donors can localise their programming by funding NGOs that collaborate with RLOs, and allowing NGOs to redistribute funding to their RLO partners.
• Trusting RLOs as a mediator for connecting refugees to official protection and legal services. Refugees living in situations where they may not have legal status often trust RLOs more than they do official agencies such as UNHCR. Donors can therefore support RLOs in providing protection against hostile legal environments for asylum seekers.
• Mitigating risks associated with RLOs’ ethnic, national, and religious biases. RLOs come with their own limitations and problems. They are often informal institutions, and in many cases lack UNHCR’s legal status. Since they are community-based, they can also at times replicate existing biases within an ethnic or national community. Donors should be aware of this risk when working with RLOs.

As world leaders are packing their bags to travel to Washington for the Spring meetings of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund, these discussions will offer the first opportunity of the year to collectively deliver on some of the propositions to reform the WB and the international financial architecture for sustainable development to make them fit for the polycrises of the 21st century. The May G7 Summit in Japan, the June Summit for a New Financial Pact in Paris, the September Finance in Common Summit in Colombia, the SDG Summit in New York, the G20 Summit in India, the WB and IMF annual meetings in the autumn, and the COP28 in Dubai at the end of the year, are other opportunities to move the reform agenda forward.

Non-Migration Amidst Zimbabwe’s Economic Meltdown addresses the complexities surrounding non-migration in Zimbabwe within the context of protracted political and economic uncertainty. Rose Jaji discusses how individual subjectivities mediate macroeconomic factors and critiques simplistic explanations of non-migration, paying particular attention the complexities and contradictions involved in the decision not to migrate. The book ends with a discussion of the synergistic relationship between non-migration and migration, demonstrating how one can morph into the other in response to evolving individual circumstances and macroeconomic factors.

It is estimated that the Turkish economy gained about $168.9 billion from hosting Syrian refugees during the period 2012-2021, which greatly exceeds the $100 billion of (alleged) Turkish government spending on refugees. Therefore, it was possible to use hosting Syrian refugees positively in the election campaign in Turkey, but the Turkish opposition and government are manipulating refugee issues in a very irresponsible and opportunistic way to win the votes of the voters (only arabic version available).

This research attempted to approach the conditions of oil production and marketing in northeastern Syria from the perspective of institutional economics, which considers that the formal and informal rules that regulate the economic game are the determinants of economic performance. Within the institutional economics, the institutional analysis framework called SSP was used. Secondary data, available in government documents, press reports، and reports of international organizations, were relied upon, in addition to interviews with some Autonomous Administration of North East Syrian’s officials and some expert. We tried to answer the following question: What is the impact of the institutional arrangements of the Autonomous Administration in Northern and eastern Syria in the performance of the oil sector? As a result, we found that the formal and informal institutional structure of the Autonomous Administration is full of gaps with a clientelist nature that focuses on achieving political loyalty to the Autonomous Administration at the expense of the efficient economic use of such a precious and depleted resource. This structure serves the interests of oil extractor, marketing brokers and owners of refineries at the expense of the general public. Accordingly, a number suggestions, that are expected to improve the performance of the oil sector, presented.

Große Teile der medialen Öffentlichkeit verwenden den Begriff der Zeitenwende als Synonym für die Notwendigkeit, die militärischen Verteidigungsmittel des Westens, insbesondere Deutschlands, aufzustocken. Diese gedankliche Engführung verkennt die Dimension des Problems. Und sie verkennt die Dimension der erforderlichen Lösung. Die Welt ist mit einer akuten „Polykrise“ konfrontiert, der nur mit einer politischen Transformation zu begegnen ist, bei der der Westen die Initiative ergreifen muss. Die wahre Zeitenwende, um die es geht, erfordert weitaus mehr als Waffenlieferungen und militärische Abwehrbereitschaft. Es geht darum, das Teilhabeversprechen der liberalen Demokratie durch eine sozial und ökologisch transformative Politik in den Demokratien des Westens neuerlich einzulösen und global auszudehnen.

The transition towards a more sustainable world economy is a fact, as the internationally community has realized that business as usual practices will lead to ecological disasters, from global warming, loss of bio-diversity to the contamination of  maritime water bodies. Research, development and innovations are powerful tools to align the needs of a growing world population with the necessities of keeping global development within the planetary boundaries. There is, however, a huge and  growing - rather than diminishing - divide in both inputs and outputs to the science and innovation systems. Developing countries, which are most severely affected by the multiple ecological crises cannot invest very high financial and human  resources to address their specific challenges though research and development. This calls for determined international action and North-South cooperation in science, technology and innovation. The paper analyses the North-South divide in research  and development and discusses, how international cooperation may strengthen the capabilities of the Global South to respond to the challenges and, wherever possible, take advantage of new economic opportunities in a world transitioning towards  more sustainable growth patterns.

The transition towards a more sustainable world economy is a fact, as the internationally community has realized that business as usual practices will lead to ecological disasters, from global warming, loss of bio-diversity to the contamination of  maritime water bodies. Research, development and innovations are powerful tools to align the needs of a growing world population with the necessities of keeping global development within the planetary boundaries. There is, however, a huge and  growing - rather than diminishing - divide in both inputs and outputs to the science and innovation systems. Developing countries, which are most severely affected by the multiple ecological crises cannot invest very high financial and human  resources to address their specific challenges though research and development. This calls for determined international action and North-South cooperation in science, technology and innovation. The paper analyses the North-South divide in research  and development and discusses, how international cooperation may strengthen the capabilities of the Global South to respond to the challenges and, wherever possible, take advantage of new economic opportunities in a world transitioning towards  more sustainable growth patterns.

In recent years, global production of plastics has surged and is expected to increase further over the following years, with over a quarter being attributed to plastic packaging. Plastic packaging poses environmental risks due to the fossil fuels consumed in its production and the impact on eco-systems due to its inappropriate disposal. A large share of mismanaged plastic waste can be attributed to a few developing and emerging countries (DECs) in Asia. Their expected income and population growth, as well as associated increase in consumption and urbanisation, is expected to further strain inadequate waste management systems. In response, young ventures offering circular business models in packaging have emerged to tackle plastic packaging pollution. These ventures are embedded in an entrepreneurial ecosystem in which policies are, among others, determining enablers, and policy-makers have a key role in setting optimal framework conditions for circular business models in packaging to succeed. At the same time, policy agendas that address resource efficiency and the circular economy are on the rise in multiple DECs. For this reason, this paper addresses the question of the extent to which existing policies are supporting and enabling circular business models. This paper first discusses opportunities, risks, and challenges of existing circular business models in packaging in terms of waste hierarchy levels – reducing and dematerialising, reusing and refilling, replacing, and recycling – before examining the entrepreneurial ecosystems in which they operate. With a focus on policy as an enabler for circular business models in packaging, a holistic overview of possible policies in the circular packaging context is provided. Against this conceptual background, India is examined as a case-study. In recent years, multiple Indian start-ups have emerged, offering reusable packaging solutions or bio-based packaging alternatives, while other ventures seek to improve waste management and recycling. India’s previously introduced policies, including the Plastic Waste Management Rules, Swacch Bharat Mission, extended producer responsibility and a ban on single-use plastic, are the first stepping stones towards an enabling ecosystem for circular business models in packaging. However, this paper points out further opportunities – so far, India’s key policies have been addressing the downstream on the macro level. This study showed that macro-level policies need further enforcement and should be complemented by upstream policies. Meanwhile, meso-level and micro-level policies have been rather neglected. Policy-makers and development cooperation are encouraged to take action now, given the limited window of opportunity to establish a supporting framework for circular economies in development policy.