European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Rosamund Shreeves,

© frikota / Fotolia

The European Union (EU) is committed to working collectively to eradicate female genital mutilation (FGM) as part of broader efforts to combat all forms of violence against women and girls, and to support EU countries’ efforts in this field. The European Commission has undertaken to assess EU efforts to combat FGM every year, on or around the United Nations International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation on 6 February.

Here too, as in so many other areas of our lives, the coronavirus pandemic is having a significant impact, threatening to undermine global progress towards eliminating FGM. Before the pandemic, FGM was declining in some, but not all, of the regions where the practice is most widespread. It was already clear that efforts needed to be scaled up to keep pace with population growth, the fact that girls were undergoing FGM at a younger age and the spread of the practice caused by population movement. In July 2020, the Secretary-General of the United Nations reported on the emerging evidence that the coronavirus pandemic is a further obstacle to progress. There are multiple reasons why the pandemic is putting more girls at risk of FGM and disrupting prevention efforts. On the one hand, girls are more likely to be out of education due to school closures and lockdowns, at a time when many families are under financial pressure. This contributes to girls being married off at a younger age and to FGM as a prelude to these marriages. There are also reports that traditional cutters are approaching families directly in search of work as a result of the economic downturn caused by the pandemic. On the other hand, services involved in outreach, support, awareness-raising, and pursuit of perpetrators are also facing pressures as a result of social distancing, lockdowns and the diversion of resources to frontline health services. The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) estimates that the pandemic could result in two million cases of female genital mutilation that would otherwise have been averted, or a 33 % reduction in progress towards the target under the Sustainable Development Goal of eliminating FGM by 2030.

The pandemic is not only having an impact in the countries outside the EU where FGM is most prevalent. The civil society organisation, End FGM EU, warns that risks to girls and pressures on services are also being experienced in Europe. Although travel restrictions make it more difficult to take girls abroad in order for FGM to be performed, this may be counterbalanced by the disruption of protection measures and pressures on the frontline organisations that provide support. End FGM EU has made a number of recommendations for action to ensure that the needs of girls at risk of FGM and survivors of FGM are not forgotten in immediate crisis responses and long-term recovery planning. It is calling specifically for services and funding to be boosted or, at the least, maintained.

At EU level, combating gender-based violence, including FGM, is one of the priorities in the new EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020‑2025. The European Commission is envisaging new EU legislation on gender-based violence and a specific recommendation on measures to prevent FGM. Funding for combating FGM will be available under the joint EU‑UN Spotlight initiative, for external action, and under the new Rights and Values programme for action within the EU.

For its part, the European Parliament has set out its own recommendations for an EU strategy to put an end to FGM around the world. It has also called for action to address the increased risks of FGM resulting from the coronavirus pandemic.

Related EPRS publications:

• At a glance briefing, Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation, February 2021
• At a glance briefing The Istanbul Convention: A tool to tackle violence against women and girls, November 2020
• Briefing, Violence against Women in the EU: State of Play, November 2020

What do people write about when contacting the European Parliament and its President?

People from across the EU and elsewhere in the world turn to the European Parliament and its President, David Maria Sassoli, to request information, call for action to be taken, express their opinions or suggest ideas on a wide range of topics. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP) at the European Parliament answers in any of the official EU languages – from Swedish to Slovak and Polish to Portuguese!

In 2020, Ask EP received no less than 9 373 individual messages and 82 680 campaign enquiries. Citizens wrote to us on the topics that defined 2020, such as the coronavirus pandemic and the implementation of the rule of law mechanism, as well as on a wide range of other topics.

Which topics were most addressed in individual enquiries in 2020?

The most frequently addressed topic in 2020 was matters concerning the European Parliament itself. We received over 2 100 enquiries, in which citizens expressed interest in Members of European Parliament and their activities, enquired about visits to the European Parliament, and requested information on topics such as committee meetings and the right to petition. Any EU citizen or resident has the right to address a petition to the European Parliament on a matter related to EU powers and which affects the citizen directly. People turn to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit asking questions about submitting petitions or requesting an update on their ongoing petition, information, which is also available on the Petitions Portal webpage.

The second most frequent topic on which citizens contacted Ask EP last year related to civil liberties, justice and home affairs, with came close to 1 600 enquiries. People voiced their concerns about, for instance, fundamental rights matters or respect for the rule of law in EU countries – and requested action from the Parliament on these topics. The judicial system in Bulgaria, the rule of law in Poland and Hungary as well as women’s right to abortion in Poland were some of the focal points of these controversial topics. The European Parliament adopted a new resolution on 7 October 2020, emphasising once more the urgent need for creation of an EU mechanism to protect and strengthen democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights.

Issues concerning foreign affairs were another key focus for citizens in the past year, counting over 800 enquiries. People expressed their opinion on the situation in third countries, for example on the death of George Floyd in the USA, the political situation in Russia or EU‑Turkey relations. One prominent topic was the presidential elections in Belarus, for which EU and Belarussian citizens reached out to the Parliament, requesting support for Belarussian democracy. In a resolution adopted in September 2020, the European Parliament expressed its unequivocal support for the people of Belarus in their legitimate demands and aspirations for free and fair elections, fundamental freedoms and human rights.

Finally, the European Parliament received over 800 different suggestions, questions and requests from citizens in 2020 regarding the coronavirus pandemic, including about the EU’s approach to tackling the coronavirus, travel restrictions, the closing of borders, confinement measures, or management of the crisis by individual EU countries. Many citizens requested coordinated EU action with respect to the coronavirus and commented on how the EU was handling the situation. In a resolution adopted in April 2020, the European Parliament called for a united response, solidarity in the health sector and European solutions to overcoming the pandemic’s economic and social consequences.

Campaign messages sent to the European Parliament in 2020

As a response to political, humanitarian and economic events, citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament, expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. These messages may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

In October 2020, for instance, the European Parliament received over 15 500 messages calling on the President of the European Parliament to intervene against the possible introduction of a digital euro by the European Central Bank. After the European Central Bank announced in a 2 October 2020 press release that it would launch a public consultation on the potential implementation of a digital euro, citizens voiced concerns that a purely digital euro could increase the ability of authorities to control and monitor them, thereby potentially restricting their civil liberties and financial independence. However, as the European Central Bank indicated, a digital euro would be intended to complement, but not replace, cash. The full answer given by the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit is available on this EPRS blog.

Due to the situation at the EU’s external borders with Turkey in March 2020, over 17 000 citizens wrote to Parliament’s President to press the EU to urgently adopt a clear and humane migration and external borders policy. They also called on the EU to assist Greece and Bulgaria in managing the situation on their borders with Turkey, after the Turkish government had stated that it would allow thousands of migrants to cross into the EU. Ask EP’s answer to this campaign can be found here.

Finally, the biggest campaign in 2020, with over 36 000 enquiries, addressed the termination of the mandate of Oriol Junqueras i Vies. The President of the European Parliament received a large number of messages in January 2020 following the judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union in case C-502/19, Junqueras Vies, of 19 December 2019. The President of the European Parliament, announced in plenary on 13 January 2020 that, following the judgement of the EU Court, Oriol Junqueras i Vies’ mandate began on 2 July 2019, on the basis of the official declaration of the results of the European elections by the competent Spanish authorities. However, taking into account the decision of the Junta Electoral Central of 3 January 2020, and pursuant to the decision of the Tribunal Supremo of 9 January 2020, his mandate was terminated, with effect from 3 January 2020. More information on this campaign is available on this website.

All replies to campaigns totalling over 50 enquiries are published on the EPRS blog. Are you curious about our answers to other campaign messages in 2020? Find out more here.

Continue to put your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP), using our contact form, the Citizens’ app, or post! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us and are looking forward to your enquiries in 2021!

Your Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)

Written by Martin Russell,

Alexey Navalny is one of Vladimir Putin’s most outspoken critics. After surviving an assassination attempt and recovering in Germany, he returned to Russia in January 2021 to face arrest and imprisonment. Mass protests over his detention and revelations of high-level corruption show that an increasingly repressive Kremlin has not succeeded in crushing opposition to Putin’s rule.

Who is Alexey Navalny?

© Jonathan Stutz / Adobe Stock

Alexey Navalny is one of Vladimir Putin’s most outspoken opponents, a thorn in the Kremlin’s side for over a decade. In Russia, he is best known as a campaigner against deep-rooted corruption in the ruling elite; investigations by his Anti-Corruption Foundation have focused on figures such as former Prosecutor-General, Yury Chaika, and Putin ally, Yevgeny Prigozhin, a millionaire businessman linked to Kremlin disinformation operations such as the infamous St Petersburg ‘troll factory’. In 2017, the Foundation’s video on then Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s private assets was watched nearly 40 million times. In July 2020, the foundation closed after a Moscow court ordered it to pay €1 million in damages to one of Prigozhin’s companies for libel over a food-poisoning scandal in Moscow schools; it has since resumed its activities.

Navalny stood in the 2013 Moscow mayoral election, and did unexpectedly well, capturing 27 % of the vote, almost enough to force Putin ally and incumbent Sergey Sobyanin into a second round. In 2014, he was convicted of embezzlement, and received a three-and-a-half year suspended sentence in a judgment later described by the European Court of Human Rights as ‘arbitrary’. Electoral authorities refused to register Navalny as a candidate in the 2018 presidential election. Since 2011, Navalny has spent hundreds of days in detention for a variety of offences; in 2016 he was assaulted by Cossacks, and in 2017 temporarily lost part of his eyesight after being doused by unknown assailants with a caustic green dye.

Latest developments: Poisoning, arrest, and protests

On 20 August 2020, Navalny collapsed on a flight from the Siberian city of Tomsk. After an emergency landing, he was taken to a hospital in Omsk, and from there for treatment in Berlin. Tests from independent laboratories showed that he had been poisoned by a Novichok-type nerve agent similar to the substance used against former Russian spy Sergey Skripal in 2018. Given that private actors would find it difficult to access Novichok, and that Federal Security Service (FSB) agents were shadowing Navalny at the time, it is probable that the attack was carried out by Russian security forces on orders from Putin or his entourage. In December 2020, Navalny released a recording of a phone call to an FSB agent who he tricked into revealing that the poison (which was spread onto his underpants) was intended to kill.

In an apparent attempt to discourage Navalny from returning to Russia after his recovery, in December 2020 the Prisons Service threatened him with jail for violating the conditions of his suspended sentence. Nevertheless, in January 2021 he arrived back in Moscow and was immediately arrested. On 2 February, a Moscow court ordered him to serve the rest of his sentence (2 years and 8 months) in prison.

Two days after Navalny’s arrest, his foundation released a video exposing an opulent Black Sea palace allegedly built for Putin. Like the 2017 video on Medvedev, the documentary has attracted enormous interest, with over 100 million views. Putin denies flatly that the palace has anything to do with him. On 30 January, Putin friend and oligarch Arkady Rotenberg came forward, claiming to be the real owner.

To discourage protests, the Russian authorities banned public gatherings and ordered social media to take down organisers’ posts. Angered by Navalny’s detention and the revelations of high-level corruption, protestors were undeterred; an estimated 20 000 took to the streets of Moscow on 24 January, with further large rallies in over 100 cities across the country bringing the nationwide total to over 100 000 – possibly the largest turnout since the post-election protests of 2011-2012. A second round of protests on 31 January drew even bigger crowds in some cities, although in Moscow they were smaller. The police response to the latter protests was unusually forceful, with over 5 000 arrests (a ten-year record), batons and tasers.

Political implications

Navalny receives only minimal coverage in state media, and Putin famously refuses to mention his name in public. However, the popularity of the ‘Putin palace’ video shows that corruption is an issue that resonates far beyond the relatively limited circle of Navalny supporters; in 2020, 77 % of Russians saw government corruption as a serious problem. The scale of the rallies shows that a decade of increasing repression has not lessened the capacity of Putin’s opponents to mobilise large-scale protests.

Protests also reflect rising dissatisfaction with problems such as persistent poverty, declining incomes, and profound inequality, which the pandemic has only exacerbated. In 2019, 59 % wanted ‘decisive, large-scale’ changes, up from 42 % two years earlier, according to independent pollsters Levada Centre. Charismatic, bold, media-savvy, and backed by a network of loyal supporters, Navalny has become perhaps the most prominent figure in Russia’s ‘non-system’ opposition (so-called to distinguish it from officially tolerated tame ‘system’ parties such as the Communists). The Kremlin might prefer to ignore Navalny, but its apparent attempt to eliminate a difficult opponent has only put him in the spotlight.

Previous waves of discontent came in 2011-2012 (after allegedly rigged parliamentary elections), 2017 (triggered by the Medvedev video) and 2019 (over the exclusion of ‘non-system’ candidates from regional elections). Recurrent mass protests show that the Kremlin is failing to silence dissent. The latest protests come at an awkward time, with Russia struggling to recover from the pandemic and preparing for crucial parliamentary elections in September 2021. There are signs that support for Navalny is growing; in September 2020, 20 % approved of his actions, compared to just 6 % in 2013, while the 24 January demonstrations were some of the largest ever, despite forceful police action and harsh winter weather.

Nevertheless, these protests seem unlikely to be more of a game-changer than the previous ones. Non‑system opposition politicians have scored a few electoral victories in recent years (in 2019 and 2020, partly due to a ‘smart’ tactical voting strategy promoted by Navalny), but such successes are isolated. The non‑system opposition remains weak and fragmented, and it lacks a positive agenda other than getting rid of Putin. Few in Russia see it as a credible alternative to the established political parties. Public opinion remains mostly favourable to Putin, whose approval rating is stable at around 60-65 %, according to Levada Centre. Surveys suggest that most Russians do not see any alternative to him; in October 2020, he was still by far the nation’s most trusted politician (34 % of respondents), compared to just 4 % for Navalny. Although most have heard of Navalny, in December 2020 just 17 % claimed to have followed his poisoning with any interest, and a similarly low percentage believed that the authorities were to blame. Few doubt that United Russia, the ruling party, will win another sweeping victory in the September 2021 elections.

Russian and international reactions

The Russian authorities are sticking to denials of state involvement in Navalny’s poisoning, and have not launched an investigation, as they claim to have seen no evidence of criminal activity. Official statements blame the current unrest on Western efforts to destabilise Russia; Presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has denounced Navalny as a CIA collaborator, while the Foreign Ministry suggests that the US Embassy may have actively helped to organise Moscow rallies. Pro-Kremlin media describe protest organisers as ‘political paedophiles’ playing on young people’s naivety. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mariya Zakharova warns Western critics not to ‘meddle in the internal affairs of a sovereign state’.

On 3 February, EU High Representative Josep Borrell condemned the ‘politically motivated’ sentencing of Navalny, and called on Russia to immediately release him and those who demonstrated in support of him. Borrell will also raise the issue at his meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on 5 February.

In October 2020, the EU adopted chemical weapons sanctions against Russian officials linked to Navalny’s poisoning. EU foreign ministers are expected to discuss possible further measures (possibly under the new human rights sanctions mechanism) at the next Foreign Affairs Council meeting, scheduled for 22 February.

European Parliament position
In its resolutions on Navalny’s arrest (21 January 2021) and on his poisoning (17 September 2020), the European Parliament denounced the shrinking space in Russia for human rights, and called for tougher EU sanctions against Putin’s inner circle, oligarchs and media propagandists, a new and more critical approach to cooperation with Russia, and an immediate end to construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Navalny vs Kremlin: Latest developments‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

With the coronavirus continuing to rage throughout Europe, Parliament’s plenary agenda focuses firmly on getting beyond the crisis. However, Parliament sees a balance to strike between measures to recover socially and economically, with opportunities to seize to do more to mitigate climate change and to ensure that the recovery benefits everyone.

It is clear that current use of the earth’s resources is unsustainable, leading to biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas emissions that threaten the natural world and accelerate climate change. Parliament has already called for an ambitious circular economy action plan to tackle the lack of re-use in the EU (the share of recycled materials in the economy was only 12 % in 2019). On Monday evening, Members are due to debate an own-initiative report on the European Commission’s proposed new circular economy action plan. The Environment, Public Health & Food Safety (ENVI) Committee report proposes more robust and binding targets for reducing the use of primary raw materials, and highlights the opportunities inherent in optimising the use of products over a longer lifecycle.

Climate action is a major focus of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, designed to raise the necessary funding to revive the economy post-coronavirus, and the main element of the Next Generation EU package. On Tuesday, Members will debate a joint report adopted by the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), scrutinising the text agreed with the Council, which, if plenary confirms, would come into effect this month. Under the agreement, Member States would be able to submit recovery and resilience plans that earmark at least 37 % of their budget to climate and 20 % to digital measures, with up to 13 % pre-financing available upon approval. Parliament will scrutinise progress via a recovery and resilience scoreboard.

Rebooting the economy after the ravages of the coronavirus epidemic will also demand robust measures to encourage investment in EU businesses. Parliament is expected to vote following a joint debate on Wednesday afternoon, on provisional agreements on two proposals, resulting from interinstitutional negotiations, on the capital markets recovery package (MiFID and EU recovery prospectus). The proposals revise the legal framework on investment services set out in MiFID governing their provision in financial instruments, in a package of targeted amendments to the Prospectus Regulation, MiFID II and securitisation rules. The amendments aim at reducing the administrative burden for experienced investors, while preserving protection for retail investors and maintaining requirements for transparency.

ECB President, Christine Lagarde will be present in the plenary on Monday afternoon, for a debate on the own-initiative report on the European Central Bank’s annual report, which considers ECB monetary policy in the context of the coronavirus crisis, on financial stability measures, and on actions against climate change. In response to a projected decrease of 7.3 % in real GDP for the euro area, and increased unemployment to 8.0 % in 2020, the ECB has implemented monetary stimulus, non-standard monetary policy measures, and temporary capital and operational relief to increase banks’ lending capacity. The ECON committee report considers that the ECB has acted decisively to mitigate the impact of the crisis. However, it also calls for accompanying reforms to strengthen competitiveness and social cohesion, and underlines the need to tackle climate change-related risks. A secret vote will also take place on Monday on the appointment of the Vice-Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board – where Parliament would like to see greater effort made to respect gender equality.

Equality between women and men is a core EU value and objective. On Wednesday afternoon, the Council and Commission are expected to make statements on the challenges ahead for women’s rights, 25 years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and in the current difficult climate. The coronavirus pandemic has delayed review of the initiative by a year, and has a heavy impact on gender equality in a number of areas. Furthermore, the European Institute for Gender Equality reports that substantial gender inequalities persist across all twelve areas of concern identified for action. Parliament has already called for EU Member States to do more to ensure gender equality, and recently adopted three resolutions on the subject.

A grave violation of fundamental rights with a strongly gendered impact, which not only causes long-term harm to its victims (largely women), but also significant economic, social and human costs to society, Parliament is due to debate an own-initiative report on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings on Monday evening. The joint report, adopted by the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) committees recommends several measures to identify victims and improve prevention and prosecution of those who profit from trafficking in human beings.

Social media platforms have become a major source of information for many people, but also amplify mis- and disinformation. Their role and power in moderating online content has attracted increasing criticism, particularly in light of recent events around the United States elections. The Council and the European Commission are expected to make statements in plenary on Wednesday afternoon on democratic scrutiny of social media platforms and protection of fundamental rights, in particular on freedom of expression. While the EU has favoured self-regulation to date, in 2020, Parliament stressed that the responsibility for law enforcement in digital services must remain with public authorities in the EU, not with private commercial entities, and called for adequate oversight and judicial redress mechanisms.

The High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission will make statements on several current issues on Tuesday afternoon, including on his visit to Russia to meet Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, on Friday 5 February 2021. This meeting comes in the context of the crackdown by Russian authorities on large-scale demonstrations in response to the arrest and jailing of opposition leader Alexei Navalny.

Finally, on Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to vote on an own-initiative report on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine, which commends the country’s efforts in implementing its commitments under the Agreement. The wide-ranging Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) report recommends that Ukraine authorities focus on a limited number of priorities and suggests completion of reforms now, to secure the advances on the rule of law, governance and combating corruption.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© New Africa / Adobe Stock

As the latest wave of the coronavirus pandemic intensifies and some highly infectious new mutations of the virus spread, a growing number of countries have increased restrictions on travel and some lockdowns have been intensified. Whilst a series of vaccines are progressively gaining official approval, and their roll-out has started, pharmaceutical companies struggle with production capacity issues, the effectiveness of the vaccines on mutations is still uncertain, and a broader debate is opening up on the global fairness of vaccine distribution beyond the ‘first’ world.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the coronavirus and related issues. More studies on the topics can be found in a previous edition in this series, published in December 2020.

How to increase vaccination and mask-wearing to defeat Covid-19
Brookings Institution, January 2021

The secret sauce behind Israel’s successful Covid-19 vaccination program
Brookings Institution, January 2021

The human costs of the pandemic: Is it time to prioritize well-being?
Brookings Institution, November 2020

Covid-19: How can we get it under control in 2021?
Friends of Europe, January 2021

Same storm: Different boats – The impact of Covid-19 on Europe’s shadow economy
Friends of Europe, December 2020

Dossier d’actualité sur la Covid-19
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, January 2021

Corporate insolvencies during Covid-19: Keeping calm before the storm
Bruegel, January 2021

When the future changes the past: Fiscal indicator revisions
Bruegel, January 2021

Happy New Year?
Bruegel, December 2020

Monetary policy in the times of corona: Many unknown unknowns
Bruegel, December 2020

Covid-19 has widened the income gap in Europe
Bruegel, December 2020

With European unity and empathy against Covid-19
Bertelsmann Stiftung, December 2020

Deadly coronavirus, domineering China and divided America: What the new geopolitics means for Europe
Centre for European Reform, December 2020

Europe needs a strong Africa, but will it work to achieve one?
Centre for European Reform, December 2020

The recovery triangle must include social investment if it is to succeed
European Policy Centre, December 2020

The European Semester must acknowledge that the EU recovery fund is not a stimulus package
European Policy Centre, December 2020

Russia’s relative resilience: Why Putin feels vindicated by the pandemic
European Centre on Foreign Relations, December 2020

Coronavirus as a catalyst for global civil society
Carnegie Europe, December 2020

The Coronavirus crisis as an opportunity in Ukraine
Carnegie Europe, December 2020

Bubble trouble: Estonia and the coronavirus crisis
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2020

Loyal at once? The EU’s global health awakening in the pandemic
Clingendael, January 2021

Europeanising health policy in times of coronationalism
Clingendael, November 2020

Covid-19 vaccine: Reaching people in areas controlled by armed groups
Chatham House, November 2020

Six aspects of daily life rapidly changed by Covid-19
Chatham House, November 2020

The skill challenges posed by Covid-19
Centre for European Political Studies, November 2020

The effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on us and European commitment to the multilateral economic order
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus: Uncertainty and discontent‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vitalba Crivello,

© Adobe Stock

The debate about sound and evidence-based science communication, effective in engaging the public and countering mis- and disinformation, was already quite lively long before the Covid‑19 pandemic hit. The coronavirus outbreak has caused a high level of uncertainty in the public health sphere and enabled a flow of inaccurate news and rumours about different aspects of the crisis: the ‘infodemic’. The European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) sees this as both a challenge and an opportunity for resolute and effective action.

The ESMH was created three years ago by the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA), as a platform to promote networking, training and knowledge sharing between the Parliament, the scientific community and the media.

The ESMH project ‘Tackling the infodemic’

Aware of the need to help the public navigate the massive information flow and find answers to their questions in knowledge-based science news, the ESMH responded to the coronavirus crisis by turning to the ‘guardians of the expertise’ – the scientists – with the ‘

‘Listening to the experts, interviews with scientists on coronavirus’ project. The ESMH also publishes articles on aspects of the health crisis, including treatments for Covid‑19 and vaccines.

However, providing sound communication on Covid‑19 to tackle the infodemic is only one of the pieces of a bigger puzzle that need to be put together. Eager to better understand the inner dynamics of the infodemic, the ESMH developed a specific project to tackle mis- and disinformation. Drawing up a list of initiatives tackling the enormous spread of false information on various aspects of the health crisis, the ESMH began publishing a series of interviews with experts on dis- and misinformation, together with thematic news articles. The experts share their opinions on aspects of the infodemic, offering take-away messages for reflection.

Trust is crucial – Cary Funk: ‘We need to address lower levels of trust among some segments of the public’

Indeed, the findings of a global report conducted by the PEW Research Centre (‘Science and Scientists Held in High Esteem Across Global Publics’), show that ‘people’s ideology and education do have an impact on their trust in scientists’, explains Cary Funk, PEW Director of Science and Society Research.

‘What drives public trust?‘ is also the question that the new EU-funded TRESCA project tries to answer. It does make a difference if the relation between political actors, health authorities and the experts is based on trust, or not. In the words of Stephan Lewandowsky, cognitive scientist at the University of Bristol, ‘the more the culture of a country is condoning the dismissal of expertise and evidence, the easier it is for conspiracy theories to find a foothold, there is no question about that’.

Along similar lines, Renée di Resta, Technical Research Manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory, notes that ‘the media sources that people choose to follow are so integral to this particular problem, because, depending on who they trust, they’re either going to get good information or bad information’ and ‘a high degree of trust in the media is usually accompanied by a high degree of trust in the government’.

Trust in the media – Rasmus Kleis Nielsen: ‘Journalistic standards work successfully in the crisis’

Moving on to the role of the media, the crisis shows the importance of independent fact-checkers and science journalists, who collect and critically evaluate a huge amount of information and make sure that the public receive trustworthy news.

In one of the first interviews conducted by the ESMH, Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, Director of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, pointed out that ‘a classic finding from media and communications research is that essentially a rumour is a form of improvised news. When there is an information vacuum it tends to be filled by improvisation’.

Nielsen also spoke at the first ESMH webinar ‘Corona: is misinformation more contagious than the virus?‘. The event offered some interesting take-away messages. Traditional media play an important role in providing people with reliable health information during the pandemic. At the same time, vulnerable sections of society may be more likely to turn to media platforms to look for news than to traditional media – when social media are actually seen as the main source of misinformation.

Research carried out by the Oxford Internet Institute on social media platforms shows that ‘people who seek junk content, because they find it entertaining or are simply curious, will always find it, as long as they know how to look for it’. (Nahema Marchal).

It is indeed true that ‘in a setting of uncertainty and high stakes, people tend to trust the ‘old’ media’ – as Michael Hameleers of the Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) argues – and that ‘the distinction between mis- and disinformation perceptions is mainly a matter of trust in the honesty and transparency of the press’. Media literacy interventions could play a key role in empowering citizens to develop those critical skills they need to recognise mis- and disinformation themselves.

In his interview with the ESMH, Philipp Schmid of the University of Erfurt, pointed out that weight-of-evidence reporting is a good example of how psychologists and journalists can work together to tackle critical challenges such as climate change and health issues. Journalists can effectively reduce the negative impact of messages of science denialism by simply warning the public about the impact of the ‘balancing of viewpoints’, which are highly important for democratic discussions of different opinions, but potentially misleading in discussions about scientific facts.

The ‘Age of misinformation’ conference

In the attempt to tackle the infodemic, various initiatives have been launched, especially workshops and conferences – gathering experts from different scientific fields, media representatives and policy-makers – to look at the phenomenon, offering a ‘trans-disciplinary’ perspective, and possibly some ‘recommendations’.

One of these was the online conference on the ‘Age of misinformation: an interdisciplinary look at fake news‘ This event took place on Thursday, 17 December 2020, and was organised by the Centro per l’Eccellenza e gli Studi Transdisciplinary (CEST) – a network of researchers from Italian universities, created in 2013 to strengthen the relationship between academia and civil society. The webinar obtained the patronage of the European Parliament and STOA/ESMH were actively involved.

Lina Gálvez Muñoz (S&D, Spain), Vice-Chair of the European Parliament Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, and member of the STOA Panel, opened the conference with a heartfelt intervention on the key role played by public trust in the current political context, strictly interconnected with the health crisis. She highlighted the European institutions’ increasing engagement in countering disinformation via targeted initiatives and specific action. She also introduced the ESMH as an emerging institutional actor in countering scientific disinformation.

Vitalba Crivello presented the ESMH ‘infodemic’ project during the session ‘Countering online disinformation: roots and causes’, organised by the Horizon 2020 Provenance project, and chaired by Eileen Culloty from Dublin City University’s Institute for Future Media and Journalism. The panel’s speakers represented experts active in countering mis- and disinformation. Stephan Lewandowsky, Thomas Zerback, Rachel Hermitage and Stella Giuffreda brought in the scholars’ point of view, while Thomas Grandjouan spoke about the experience of the EU Disinfo Lab just before the ESMH closing intervention.

Further developments

As part of the ‘Tackling the infodemic’ project, the ESMH is also producing – with the help with external provider Athens Technology Center (ATC) – monthly reports, collecting the main deceptive narratives on Covid‑19 trending on selected social media.

The ESMH is further developing complementary activities in this direction, confident that trust and an open dialogue between scientists, media producers and policy-makers is the key to success in effectively countering disinformation, especially in times of emergency.

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition),

© Aerial Mike / Adobe Stock

The European Union is party to the Aarhus Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters. The Aarhus Regulation applies the Convention’s provisions to EU institutions and bodies. In 2017, the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, reviewing implementation by the parties, found that the EU fails to comply with its obligations under Article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the convention concerning access to justice by members of the public. To address this non-compliance issue, on 14 October 2020 the European Commission put forward a legislative proposal to amend the Aarhus Regulation, triggering mixed reactions from stakeholders. The legislative process is ongoing. In Parliament, the file is being examined by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The Council reached a general approach on the file on 17 December 2020.

Complete version

• Access to justice in environmental matters: Amending the Aarhus Regulation (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on amending Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies Committee responsible: Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) COM(2020) 642 final
14.10.2020 Rapporteur: Christian Doleschal (EPP, Germany) 2020/0289(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Milan Brglez (S&D, Slovenia)
Martin Hojsík (Renew Europe, Slovakia)
Marie Toussaint (Greens/EFA, France)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Mick Wallace (The Left, Ireland) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of the draft report

Written by Naja Bentzen,

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The deadly insurrection at the US Capitol on 6 January 2021 was a significant cautionary example of the offline effects of online disinformation and conspiracy theories. The historic democratic crisis this has sparked − adding to a number of other historic crises the US is currently battling − provides valuable lessons not only for the United States, but also for Europe and the democratic world.

The US presidential election and its aftermath saw domestic disinformation emerging as a more visible immediate threat than disinformation by third countries. While political violence has been the most tangible physical effect of manipulative information, corrosive conspiracy theories have moved from the fringes to the heart of political debate, normalising extremist rhetoric.

At the same time, recent developments have confirmed that the lines between domestic and foreign attempts to undermine democracy are increasingly blurred. While the perceived weaknesses in democratic systems are − unsurprisingly − celebrated as a victory for authoritarian state actors, links between foreign interference and domestic terrorism are under growing scrutiny.

The question of how to depolarise US society − one of a long list of challenges facing the Biden Administration − is tied to the polarised media environment. The crackdown by major social media platforms on Donald Trump and his supporters has prompted far-right groups to abandon the established information ecosystem to join right-wing social media. This could further accelerate the ongoing fragmentation of the US infosphere, cementing the trend towards separate realities.

Ahead of the proposed Democracy Summit − a key objective of the Biden Administration − tempering the ‘sword of democracy’ has risen to the top of the agenda on both sides of the Atlantic. Against this backdrop, and in line with the EU-US Agenda for Global Change, EU initiatives to counter disinformation − including the recent democracy action plan and the Digital Services Act − may provide a basis for EU-US cooperation on boosting democracy at home and abroad.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Trump’s disinformation ‘magaphone’: Consequences, first lessons and outlook‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anja Radjenovic,

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International law imposes an obligation to render assistance to persons and ships in distress at sea, which must be provided regardless of the persons’ nationality or status or the circumstances in which they are found. These rules have to be applied without prejudice to the obligations deriving from international humanitarian law and international human rights law, including in particular the prohibition of refoulement.

Search and rescue (SAR) and disembarkation activities of EU Member States are currently not covered by a common EU legal framework, except for those activities carried out in the context of Frontex-led joint operations at sea.

In recent years, a significant proportion of migrants and asylum-seekers in distress at sea have been rescued by EU naval operations, EU agencies and non-governmental organisations in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, over the last couple of years, the Mediterranean Sea has also been the backdrop for the largest number of casualties and missing people.

Lack of coordination in search and rescue activities, solitary action by individual countries and criminalisation of non-governmental organisations active in SAR in the Mediterranean lead to migrants being forced to stay for several days and sometimes weeks on boats. EU Member States and EU agencies (Frontex) have also been accused of pushbacks of asylum-seekers and other migrants to the high seas and towards Libya and Turkey.

Individual actors dealing with boats of migrants have been a subject of strong criticism and legal action. Their accountability is, however, not always clear, the reason being varied application and interpretation of different bodies of international law. One solution, proposed by academics, could be the harmonisation of the fragmented legal regime for maritime interceptions.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Search and rescue in the Mediterranean‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Search and rescue in the Mediterranean’ on YouTube.

Written by Marcin Szczepański,

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The pandemic has highlighted the risk involved, including for the EU, in relying heavily on external suppliers. The EU’s 30 critical raw materials (CRMs) combine two characteristics: they are strategically important for its industry and economy, and there are high risks associated with securing their supply. The notion of strategic autonomy, which has been gaining track recently, calls for a more autonomous and independent EU policy, also in the area of CRMs. Importantly, the core of the EU’s response to the pandemic has been to use it to transform its economy and society. The twin transition to a green and digital future relies particularly on the safe and diverse supply of CRMs. In its journey to a low-carbon economy, the EU should however make sure it does not replace its reliance on fossil fuels with a reliance on CRMs.

While secure access to CRMs has been on the EU agenda for many years, the European Commission has eagerly stepped up its policy in this area since the beginning of its current term, and in September 2020 delivered a new package of measures. These included a new action plan for CRMs that supports initiatives in four main areas: i) developing resilient value chains for EU industrial ecosystems; ii) supporting sustainable and environmentally friendly domestic mining and processing of raw materials in the EU extraction (with priority given to former coal-mining regions); iii) weakening dependency on primary CRMs through better circular use of resources, environmentally friendly products and innovation; and iv) diversifying supply with sustainable and responsible sourcing from third countries. The EU has also launched the European Raw Materials Alliance, joining together the industry, researchers, Member States and civil society to close the main gaps in the value chains.

The European Parliament has been a long-standing supporter of boosting all the elements of CRMs value chains to ensure the security of supply and weaken unwanted dependencies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Critical raw materials for the EU: Enablers of the green and digital recovery‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Critical raw materials for the EU: Enablers of the green and digital recovery’ on YouTube.

Written by Issam Hallak, Carmen-Cristina Cìrlig , Alessandro D’Alfonso , Hendrik Mildebrath, Jana Titievskaia, Frederik Scholaert, Jaan Soone, Carla Stamegna and Alex Wilson,

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On 30 December 2020, the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) signed a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), concluding nearly ten months of negotiations. Since 1 January 2021, the TCA has been provisionally applied. Should the European Parliament agree to consent to the Council decision concluding the agreement, the TCA will constitute the cornerstone for a new future relationship between the EU and the UK, as it creates a single framework covering a wide range of areas of economic activity and cooperation, and allows for the broadening of those areas.

A large part of the TCA is made up of chapters touching upon economic activity. First and foremost, these envisage that trade in goods will take place under conditions of zero tariffs and quotas, although trade will now be subject to non-tariff barriers such as rules of origin. On digital trade, the TCA safeguards the primacy of data protection and privacy rules, and provides for a ban on customs duties on electronic transmission, as well as on data localisation requirements. The energy chapters grant access to wholesale markets and provide a framework for developing rules on the management of electricity and gas interconnectors; key principles of EU law will continue to apply. In air and road transport, the TCA allows operators to provide services from points in the EU to points in the UK and vice versa, with a limited number of road haulage operations allowed in each other’s territories. Regarding the movement of people, the TCA grants visa-free short-term tourism, and facilitates temporary migration for business purposes; it also provides for social security coordination for pensions, among other things. On fisheries, the TCA provides for a gradual shift of quota shares from the EU to the UK, worth a quarter of the EU’s catch value in UK waters, beyond which they can only be changed by mutual consent. The TCA also provides for compensatory measures in case of a reduction in access to waters, for example through tariffs. Finally, the negotiations dealt only marginally with financial services.

The level playing field provisions constrain the parties to maintain at least the same level of standards as prevailed on 1 January 2021, in the social, labour, and environmental areas (non-regression), and establish rebalancing mechanisms whenever significant divergences in these areas lead to ‘material impacts’ on trade or investment. These non-regression and rebalancing principles were a major source of divergence during the negotiations, and were strongly supported by the EU.

In a separate part, the TCA provides for continued cooperation in law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Among other things, it provides for the exchange of data between the parties – but without granting the UK direct access to the EU’s databases and information systems – and introduces a new surrender mechanism for those accused or convicted of crimes. The UK will also continue to cooperate with the EU agencies in this field (Europol and Eurojust), under the third-country model. The TCA also sets the general framework for UK participation in EU programmes. Based on draft protocols, still to be adopted, the UK is expected to participate in a number of programmes in the areas of research, innovation and space, including Horizon Europe. The UK will participate as a third country, subject to making a financial contribution.

The core governance component of the TCA is the Partnership Council, co-chaired by a member of the European Commission and of the UK government, and assisted by 19 specialised committees; it will oversee the attainment of the TCA objectives, and supervise its implementation and application. The TCA also provides a horizontal, as well as field-specific, dispute-settlement mechanisms, which involve decisions by arbitration tribunals or panels of experts. The format of a single agreement, coupled with a horizontal dispute-settlement mechanism linking various fields within the TCA, was another major source of divergence during the negotiations, with the EU strongly supporting this single agreement approach.

Read this complete ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement: An analytical overview‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig,

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National parliaments organise their security in a variety of ways. Whereas in some cases the principles of separation of powers or of parliamentary autonomy prevent police forces from entering parliamentary premises − meaning that these legislative chambers rely on in-house security services – in others the security of parliaments is ensured exclusively by the police or other state forces with responsibilities in the area of security, defence or civil protection. Other national parliaments exhibit a mixed model, whereby parliamentary security departments are supplemented by national police or military units.

This briefing provides an overview of the structures responsible for maintaining security and order in and around the parliaments of 11 EU Member States, namely Belgium, Germany, Spain, Estonia, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Finland, and also 3 non-EU countries − Canada, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). It focuses on the competences and tasks assigned to the services responsible for the security of each national parliament and highlights modes of cooperation with other external state forces. Furthermore, the briefing indicates, for each parliament, the ultimate authority in charge of the services responsible for maintaining order and security on and off the premises.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Policing in national parliaments: How parliaments organise their security‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nicole Scholz,

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The arrival of the Covid-19 vaccines marks a turning point in the fight against the coronavirus pandemic. For European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, vaccination is about self‑protection and solidarity. For many people, it is also about trust. Some are hesitant to get vaccinated, while others are against vaccination on principle. According to estimates, coverage of at least 60 % to 75 % is needed to establish population immunity through vaccination.

Polls show that sizeable numbers of people in the EU are hesitant − or even opposed − to vaccination in general. As regards Covid-19 vaccination, surveys suggest that Europeans are among the most sceptical in the world. According to the World Health Organization, vaccine hesitancy is complex and context-specific, varying across time, place and vaccine. Science has identified several behavioural factors underpinning vaccine uptake. Vaccine scepticism can also be linked to trust in government and is associated with certain political mindsets.

Many commentators agree that Covid-19 vaccine communication is a collective endeavour that should ideally involve institutional actors, healthcare professionals, scientists, journalists and people with standing in communities. There is a need to engage with the wider public, in particular with groups that have a low level of trust in scientists and are less favourable to vaccines. It is considered key to move towards an open dialogue that respects people’s emotions, and to understand the individual values behind doubters’ fears. Reaching diverse populations is deemed instrumental, as is involving political and community leaders in communication strategies.

The December 2020 European Council conclusions stressed the importance of providing clear factual information on Covid-19 vaccines and countering disinformation. The European Commission is set to roll out a two-phase vaccine communication campaign complementing the Member States’ efforts. The European Parliament has insisted on the need to counter the spread of unreliable, misleading and unscientific information on vaccination, and Members have repeatedly called for more transparency on the EU advance purchase agreements with vaccine developers.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Covid-19 vaccination campaigns: The public dimension‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Figure 1 Tips for professional reporting on Covid-19 (World Health Organization)

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Angelos Delivorias, Nora Milotay and Magdalena Sapała,

© European Union, 2021

Growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in Europe collapsed in 2020 as a result of the economic crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Moreover, in contrast with previous recessions, the uncertainty caused by the pandemic also caused a shift in consumption and investment patterns. In great part thanks to the discovery of effective vaccines against the virus, GDP growth is expected to rebound in the coming two years. This forecast depends on several variables, however, including the length and size of the support programmes put in place by governments and central banks, geopolitical tensions, and the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom.

When it comes to employment, the positive trends observed in previous years were reversed in 2020 as a result of the economic crisis. The picture would have been bleaker had it not been for various support schemes and policy measures at national level, supported by a number of measures at EU level, and the EU’s new SURE instrument for temporary support to unemployment schemes. Nevertheless, interpretation of the numbers must be nuanced, given that many unemployed people were pushed out of the labour force in 2020, hiding the full effect of the economic crisis. Moreover, future unemployment figures will depend on the timing and pace of the withdrawal of policy support schemes and on whether the economic recovery has materialised by then. Taking these factors into consideration, unemployment is expected to increase in 2021, and then decrease slightly in 2022.

General government deficits are expected to have increased significantly, as a result of the various fiscal measures put in place to counter the economic crisis. Deficits are expected to decrease from those highs in the next two years, but still remain over the 3 % limit set by the Maastricht Treaty. Similarly, the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to increase significantly in 2020, both for the euro area and for the EU as a whole, and to continue increasing slightly in 2021 and 2022.

Lastly, in 2020, inflation for the euro area was slightly above zero and, despite picking up in the next two years, is still expected to remain below the target of 2 % set by the European Central Bank. In this context, but also to support the Member States, the ECB maintained its asset purchase programme (APP), launched a new one for the duration of the pandemic, and extended its accommodative measures.

The coronavirus pandemic influenced the negotiations on the medium-term architecture of EU finances, which resulted in the adoption of an unprecedented budgetary package in December 2020. This combines the €1 074.3 billion multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the years 2021 to 2027 with the €750 billion Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument. The agreement brought new momentum to the EU budget, assigning it a major role in the Union’s strategy to relaunch the economy. The launch of NGEU, a temporary recovery instrument (2021-2023), to be financed through resources borrowed on the markets by the European Commission on behalf of the Union, is a major innovation.

The 2021 budget is of a transitional nature. As the first under the new MFF, it shows the amounts needed to launch the new generation of EU actions and programmes, but also provides the payment appropriations needed for the closure of the programmes relating to the 2014-2020 MFF. Furthermore, NGEU will significantly increase the resources channelled through the 2021 EU budget, adding an estimated €285.15 billion in commitments and €75.93 billion in payments to selected programmes. As a result, in 2021, total commitments will almost triple the usual annual expenditure of the EU budget. While investment in recovery and resilience measures is the overarching priority of EU spending in 2021, the EU budget will continue contributing to the achievement of other objectives, in such areas as the green and digital transition, cohesion and agriculture, security and defence, migration and border management, and the EU’s role in the world.

Social and employment policies are strongly interlinked with other major policy fields, most importantly the economy, the public health system and education. Social considerations are also part and parcel of all policy fields – also set out in Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – and are woven into the fabric of society, directly affecting people’s everyday lives. The coronavirus outbreak and lockdown measures have caused major disruption, and exacerbated existing social risks and challenges, such as: an ageing population; rising inequalities between socio-economic groups, generations, genders and regions; new forms of work; and greater polarisation of wages between higher and lower paid workers. This situation is threatening to increase the divergence between Member States, and regions, making achievement of one of the main EU objectives, (upward) social and economic convergence, more difficult. Moreover, it again raises issues around the sustainability of public finances. Therefore, there is an even greater need than before to update the EU’s welfare states and labour markets, which implies structural changes in many instances.

Given the complexity of the issues that social and employment policies have to tackle, the EU has a broad range of tools available to design and support the implementation of policies in the Member States. These range from setting minimum standards and targets, and providing policy guidance and funding, to the EU’s economic governance mechanism. Beyond the immediate response to the crisis, the EU intends to contribute to nurturing more systemic resilience across the board, to enable Member States to bounce back, or even forward, from shocks in a sustainable way, to preserve the well-being of all of the EU’s population.

Close to three quarters of the funding programmes within the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021-2027 and most of the investments through the new instrument, NGEU, can be used to support the implementation of policies that could contribute to the update of welfare states and labour markets. However, due to the relatively small size of the MFF compared to national budgets, its main function is to incentivise transformation and innovation on the ground that – in the longer term – can lead to systemic change. For that reason, the way the MFF, combined with other EU policy tools, shapes both the quantity and quality of spending (i.e. governance mechanisms and institutions on the ground) matters equally. This time, NGEU is designed to give an additional boost to the resources channelled through EU budgetary instruments and strengthen their pull for investment into relevant fields. Both new and old instruments seek to open avenues for increased solidarity among Member States based on common borrowing, and to promote a social investment approach to financing. In addition, through its other policy tools, including setting objectives and targets, the EU can help Member States to develop the necessary structures and institutions that in turn can help them absorb the increased funds more efficiently.

Read the complete study on ‘Economic and Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass,

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This year, 27 January, International Holocaust Remembrance Day, marks the 76th anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration and extermination camp. One focus of this annual day of commemoration is the responsibility borne by those who remain indifferent in the face of intolerance and discrimination. This places the Holocaust in the context of human rights, broadening Holocaust education to issues of tolerance, respect for human dignity, and democracy.

Holocaust education, which traditionally centres on the human and historical dimension, is also a vehicle for reflection on ethical and legal issues, and promotes critical thinking and open-mindedness. In contrast with ethical aspects and critical thinking, the legal dimension adds a new perspective to school education that can put additional pressure on the teachers responsible for Holocaust education, extending beyond their usual subject areas. Moreover, many European countries host immigrant populations whose collective history does not include this particular experience. Pupils and students meanwhile use social media, a potential source of conspiracy theories, Holocaust denial, antisemitism and xenophobia. In this context, teachers need to be ready to deal with this subject in a difficult social environment. They also need adequate resources and tools to address inconvenient truths of the period.

International institutions, and the European Union and its bodies, encourage dialogue and research on these issues, recognising the importance of Holocaust education and its human rights aspects for democracy and tolerant societies. The European Union provides funds, expert bodies and agencies to address the history, education, pedagogy and rights aspects of Holocaust education in all its dimensions of discrimination, persecution and extermination of Jewish, Roma and Sinti populations, as well as other minorities.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Holocaust education: ‘Never, never be a bystander‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Izabela Bacian and Suzana Anghel,

© Adobe Stock

Discussions at the 21 January video-conference meeting of EU leaders largely focused on a coordinated response to the coronavirus pandemic, including the evolving public health situation with the spread of new virus variants coming from the UK and South Africa, vaccination strategies and international solidarity. While agreeing to further restrictive measures to limit non-essential travel, keeping borders open to ensure the functioning of the EU’s single market was emphasised as essential. At the meeting, EU leaders also raised the issue of the detention of Alexei Navalny, condemning it and calling on the Russian authorities to release him.

Video-conference of the members of the European Council

For the ninth time since the outbreak of the pandemic, the European Council’s members met by video-conference to coordinate the coronavirus-crisis response. Unlike previous video-meetings of the Heads of State or Government, the conclusions presented by President of the European Council, Charles Michel, were labelled as ‘oral conclusions,’ and not as conclusions by the President of the European Council.

Response to coronavirus pandemic

In light of the new variants of the virus already present in a majority of Member States, EU leaders’ discussions largely focused on vaccination, testing and possible restrictions to non-essential travel. Regarding vaccination, President Charles Michel recalled that two vaccines had been approved, with more expected to follow. The EU has secured up to 2.3 billion doses of vaccines to date. Charles Michel stressed that vaccination needed to be accelerated, and therefore urged the delivery of the vaccines in the timeframe agreed with the pharmaceutical companies. He stressed that all means should be used to avoid delays in distribution, including early supply of doses. Following a Commission communication issued ahead of the video-conference meeting, EU leaders agreed that Member States should aim at vaccinating at least 80 % of people over 80 years old and 80 % of health and social service professionals by March 2021, and at least 70 % of the adult population by summer 2021. President Michel underlined that the EU needed to act on two fronts at the same time: accelerating vaccination capacity but also limiting the spread of the new variants, notably by restricting non-essential travel.

The issue of ‘vaccination certification’, with certificates showing the vaccination status of an individual, was an important element in the discussions. No concrete decisions were taken at this stage. Leaders agreed that the Commission should work with the Member States on common elements for such a certificate, which would solely have a medical purpose. At a later stage, it should be determined, if, and under what conditions, such certification could be used for other purposes. A number of Member States have recently called for the development of such a vaccination ‘passport’ or ‘certificate’. The European Commission agreed in principle that a vaccination certification could be useful from a medical point of view, as it would allow for better surveillance of vaccination uptake as well as of any reported secondary effects across the population. While a global standard exists, the yellow World Health Organization international certification, the use of any future certificate must be carefully considered given the many unanswered questions surrounding immunity levels. It is still unknown whether vaccination inhibits transmission of the virus and for how long it provides effective protection. Moreover, any vaccine certification would need to ensure the respect of the rights of those without access to the vaccine, as well as of those who may have legitimate reasons not to be vaccinated. Moreover, data privacy experts have already warned against the risk of improper storage and sharing of data. Consensus will thus be needed among the Member States on the future uses of vaccination certification.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasised that more predictability and stability was necessary in the delivery process of the vaccines; she said the Commission would work together with the companies and the European Medicines Agency to this effect. Moreover, testing and specifically sequencing of the new variants needed to be increased. Given the low rate of sequencing across the Member States (<1%), the European Centre for Disease Control would be able to support the Member States in enhancing their sequencing capacity to reach at least 5 % of all positive tests.

While maintaining borders open remains crucial for the functioning of the single market, including for cross-border workers, the spread of the new variants requires Member States to refine their testing and quarantine criteria for both EU and non-EU travellers. Within the EU, the areas with a high circulation of the virus would in future be classified as ‘dark red’, and travellers from these areas would be required to undertake a test prior to departure. Travellers from third countries, on essential travel to Europe, would have to comply with the same requirement. The Council was therefore invited to review its previous recommendations on intra-EU travel and non-essential travel into the EU, in light of the risks posed by the new virus variants.

International cooperation on vaccines: Delivering on ‘a public global good’

International solidarity on vaccine distribution has been a key element of the EU’s crisis response from the early moments of the coronavirus outbreak. The European Council has on several occasions (most recently at its November 2020 and December 2020 meetings) stated that vaccines should be treated as ‘a public global good’, to which countries around the world should have timely and equitable access. To deliver on this commitment the European Commission has played, along with the World Health Organization and France, a central role in establishing COVAX, a global vaccine procurement facility. To date, the European Commission has pledged €500 million to COVAX in support to low- and medium-income countries. President Michel stressed that EU leaders remained committed to COVAX, and that the fight against Covid‑19 would only be successful if the pandemic was fought simultaneously in Europe and worldwide.

President von der Leyen confirmed that COVAX remained the main instrument for international solidarity on vaccines. She stressed that, in the current context, in which there is a ‘rush’ to vaccines, and partner countries face problems in securing supply, the EU is considering the establishment of a mechanism allowing the sharing of access to some of the vaccines procured by the Union; until COVAX is able to deliver large quantities of vaccines. The Team Europe mechanism will be used for that purpose, whilst vaccines will be channelled to partners through COVAX. The EU has set up Team Europe, a mechanism benefiting from a financial envelope of over €20 billion. This mechanism enables support to partner countries, including countries in the EU’s neighbourhood, to respond to the immediate needs of the health crisis.

External affairs Alexey Navalny

President Michel stressed that the EU leaders condemned the detention of Alexei Navalny, underlined that ‘Mr Navalny’s rights must be fully and unconditionally respected’, and called on the Russian authorities to release him and ensure his safety. EU leaders also called on Russia ‘to urgently proceed with an independent and transparent investigation’ on the poisoning attempt on Mr Navalny, and to fully cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to facilitate a fair international investigation.

EU-US relations

Speaking prior to the European Council meeting at the European Parliament, President Michel invited the new US President, Joe Biden, to work together to ‘build a new founding pact. For a stronger Europe. For a stronger America. For a better world.’ He has also extended an invitation to President Biden to attend an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in Brussels in parallel to the NATO summit. On both sides of the Atlantic there is political will to support multilateral action. In his inaugural speech, President Biden committed to ‘repair [US] alliances, and engage with the world once again’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Outcome of the European Council video conference of 21 January 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Isabelle Gaudeul-Ehrhart,

© Daniel Schludi on Unsplash; JFL Photography, 1STunningART, gustavofrazao, stasnds, Inna, Björn Wylezich, Olena, muratart, Premium Collection, and max dallocco on ©Adobe Stock; Wikimedia Commons | US Embassy Tel Aviv Creative Commons license

This year again, for the fifth consecutive time, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) held its first event of the year on ten key issues to watch in the year ahead. The goal of the event, which took place on 12 January 2021, was to set the scene and present major issues that are in every mind, such as the race to vaccinate against coronavirus, the EU recovery plan, or the new United States administration. It also aimed at highlighting longer-term developments, such as the fight against inequality, the twin (green and digital) transition and digital boost for the circular economy, migration and asylum including a new procedure to manage Europe’s borders, or EU neighbourhood policy, including relations with Turkey and stormy waters in the eastern Mediterranean. Finally, the event shone a spotlight on research issues that may lack the momentum to make the front pages, yet are nonetheless important, such as access to food for all, culture in crisis, or critical raw materials.

Opening the event, EPRS Director-General Anthony Teasdale, highlighted the continuity between past events, and particularly the last one, which focused on the significance of 2020 – ‘a year we are all going to remember’ – and future EPRS events.

The European Parliament Vice-President responsible for EPRS, Othmar Karas (EPP, Austria)

The European Parliament Vice-President responsible for EPRS, Othmar Karas (EPP, Austria) then invited us to see the current situation not as a crisis but as an opportunity. His positive take is based on the lessons we have learnt (cooperation, investment, comprehensive solutions), the progress we have achieved (the deal on the recovery plan, the ambitious green objectives, the agreement on the rule of law) and the opportunities ahead of us. He found this attitude best captured by the words of the German poet Friederich Hölderlin: ‘But where the danger is, grows the saving power also’.

Event moderator, EPRS Members’ Research Service Director Etienne Bassot, highlighted the importance of this event. First as a researcher-driven exercise; second for its collective dimension and the many interactions between the authors, their managers and editors; and third as a way to connect with the public and to launch a year of events – the audience hailed from Brussels to Athens.

After ten quickfire presentations given by EPRS researchers and analysts, Etienne Bassot opened the floor to questions. These covered all ten issues, illustrating the audience’s interest in EPRS policy analysts’ expertise. Towards the end of the discussion, the chair announced the results of a quick audience poll. Participants were asked to choose which of the ten issues they considered the most important. While the vaccine race and EU recovery plan – unsurprisingly – tied for first place, access to food for all ranked next, confirming the relevance of the selection of issues.

Readers can read the publication here and watch the recording of the event here.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2021 – Source : EP / Eric VIDAL

The main debates of the January 2021 plenary session were on the inauguration of the new President of the United States, and the presentation of the Portuguese EU Council Presidency. Members also debated the humanitarian situation of refugees and migrants at the EU’s external borders, as well as the EU global strategy on Covid‑19 vaccinations, and the social and employment crisis caused by the pandemic and the EU’s response. Lack of transparency in Council appointments to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the consequences of earthquakes in Croatia were also discussed. Members discussed the Court of Auditors’ annual report, and Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borell made statements on the arrest of Aleksei Navalny, on enhancing EU external action in Latin America and the Caribbean, and on the latest developments in the National Assembly of Venezuela.

Enforcement of international trade rules

As the EU seeks to modify the Enforcement Regulation that protects its commercial interests in trade agreements, Members approved the text agreed between the EU institutions that extends EU counter-measures to cover trade in services and intellectual property rights, shortens the deadline for the review of the current EU regulation, and allows for provisional measures.

Right to disconnect

Members voted to approve a legislative initiative dealing with an issue exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic – the blurring of the work/home boundary and the need for a right to disconnect. While the digital transformation has meant that working schedules have become more flexible, workers’ rights to be able to disengage from work are under considerable strain. Although workers are protected in some EU countries, there is no legislation at EU level. The European Commission should now make a legislative proposal for a directive on the right to disconnect, to reaffirm the right to no professional solicitation outside working time.

European arrest warrant

Members debated an own-initiative report on the implementation of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant (EAW). Parliament has regularly called for a revision of this instrument (the first to allow judicial mutual recognition), due to issues regarding proportionality, judicial independence, prison conditions, and other problems. To date, the European Commission has declined to take up this invitation. While Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee recognises that the EAW is an effective instrument in combating serious cross-border crime and bringing perpetrators to justice, it nevertheless reiterates Parliament’s calls for a number of improvements

Common foreign, security and defence policy and human rights

Following a joint debate on Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee annual reports on the implementation of the common security and defence policy (CSDP), the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and democracy and human rights in the world, Members adopted resolutions on all three, with a large majority in the case of the third. While common EU positions on foreign policy are increasingly the rule rather than the exception, the coronavirus pandemic and a new, sometimes confrontational, geopolitical situation led to a more challenging global environment in 2020. The report on the implementation of EU CFSP reiterates that basic EU principles must be respected, and calls for greater ambition in CFSP. The committee notes that the EU’s credibility is in play and calls for debate on the question of qualified majority voting in some areas of foreign policy. An integral part of EU CFSP and the main instrument for intergovernmental defence cooperation between Member States, the second report debated looks at implementation of the common security and defence policy (CSDP). The report considers the EU’s global presence favourably in general, but also calls for further development of capabilities, greater cooperation with strategic partners, and underlines the need for democratic oversight, notably through consultation with Parliament. Members also adopted a resolution on the annual report on human rights and democracy in the world, which notes that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms has been considerably strained by the pandemic – exacerbating anti-democratic measures, discrimination, violence and hate speech. Climate change and environmental destruction have also increased threats to human rights, particularly for refugees and human rights defenders. The report urges the EU to streamline and monitor human rights and democratic standards in all its policies, including in international agreements. Parliament also seeks greater powers of scrutiny, notably of measures proposed under the 2020-2024 EU action plan on human rights and democracy.

Gender equality

Following a joint debate on the effects of the coronavirus pandemic and other challenges (such as the digital gender gap) on gender equality., Members adopted resolutions based on three Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) Committee reports, each by an overwhelming majority. The reports welcome the new EU strategy for gender equality for 2020‑2025, but underscore the need to tackle a recent backlash on equality with clear timescales, monitoring, and indicators of success, and set out specific recommendations for responding to the effects of the coronavirus crisis and for promoting women’s and girl’s participation in the digital economy.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed the mandate for negotiations from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee on the proposal for a directive on credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – January 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape,

© metamorworks / Adobe Stock

Transport is the backbone of the EU economy, connecting people and businesses across various EU regions and countries. The coronavirus pandemic has shown the impact of mobility restrictions on the free movement of people, goods and services and, at the same time, confirmed the essential role of transport in safeguarding the functioning of vital supply chains. However, transport also generates significant costs to society, in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, environmental pollution, accidents, congestion and loss of biodiversity.

EU ambitions to address these negative impacts have increased over the years. In December 2019, the European Commission put forward the European Green Deal that aims to make the EU carbon neutral by 2050. This goal was subsequently endorsed by the European Parliament and EU Member States. To achieve climate neutrality, the EU transport sector has to cut its CO2 emissions by 90 %. This requirement is in stark contrast with the past trend: despite previously adopted measures, transport is the only sector in which greenhouse gas emissions have kept growing.

The Commission has therefore proposed a strategy outlining how it wants to transform the EU transport sector and align it with the European Green Deal, by making it green, digital and resilient.

While transport stakeholders have welcomed parts of the strategy as steps in the right direction, concerns about the text’s high ambitions and lack of concrete elements have been voiced.

The Commission is to start proposing the measures envisaged in 2021. It remains to be seen to what extent, with what modifications and how fast they will be adopted and then implemented by EU Member States, shaping transport transformation for the years to come.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Sustainable and smart mobility strategy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tania Latici,

© assetseller / Adobe Stock

In her first State of the Union speech, and in the section of the speech most applauded by the European Parliament, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called for the use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in areas such as sanctions and human rights. The crises and security challenges accumulating in and around the European Union have added to the urgency of having a more effective and rapid decision-making process in areas pertaining to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The core encumbrance against unanimous EU agreement on foreign policy is argued to be the absence of a common strategic culture among EU Member States.

The Lisbon Treaty’s architects have equipped the EU Treaties with ‘passerelle clauses’ – provisions usually aimed at modifying the decision-making of the Council of the EU. The passerelle clause for CFSP is Article 31(3) of the Treaty on European Union, which empowers the European Council to, by unanimous agreement, allow the Council of the EU to take decisions by QMV in some areas of the CFSP. Another option is an emergency brake – cancelling a vote for vital reasons of national policy – while constructive abstention is an option which allows a Member State to abstain from a unanimous vote without blocking it.

Since 2016, the EU has witnessed growing momentum to shape its identity as a security provider and peace promoter. From 2020 and until 2022, it is undertaking a strategic reflection process taking the form of a ‘strategic compass’, whereby the threats, challenges and objectives for the Union in security and defence will be better defined. It is in this context that the debate about QMV in foreign and security policy has resurfaced and continues to be the subject of policy discussions. Nevertheless, recent efforts to innovate in the EU’s methods for adopting sanctions in the field of human rights abuses (the European Magnitsky Act) have been unsuccessful in their attempt to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Qualified majority voting in foreign and security policy: Pros and Cons‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Figure 1 – The pros and cons of QMV in foreign and security policy