European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for secondary school students.

How many years young people spend in school, the subjects they study, the exams they take – all of this varies from country to country, and sometimes even from region to region. In some countries, pupils wear school uniforms while in others, they don’t; in some, everyone has the same basic education, while in others, there’s a choice between grammar schools and vocational schools. There can be no question of replacing this diversity with a standardised European school system – after all, every country has its own traditions.

Having said that, there are many challenges that schools from different parts of Europe share. The EU is bringing together teachers and other people involved in education to discuss how to deal with problems like pupils dropping out of school early, or ensuring that school leavers are equipped with the right skills to find work. For example, the EU is supporting initiatives to teach programming skills in schools.

© pressmaster / Fotolia

Most people have heard of Erasmus, the EU’s successful university exchange programme. The programme also offers exchanges for secondary school pupils lasting up to a year. In 2016 around 100 000 took part – a relatively small number compared to the EU’s 40 million secondary pupils, but a growing one. And, for those who don’t take part in an exchange, the EU has set up websites such as eTwinning enabling schools from different countries to organise joint projects; these can be a great opportunity for teenagers from all over Europe to get to know one another by working together on joint tasks.

Further information

• E twinning portal 1, https://www.etwinning.net/en/pub/index.htm
• Erasmus+ report, https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/resources/documents/erasmus-annual-report-2016_en
• Coding – the 21st century skill: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/coding-21st-century-skill

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© lermont51 / Fotolia

In June, the Heads of State or Government of the countries sharing the euro currency will discuss ways to improve the functioning of the euro area. French President Emmanuel Macron has proposed an ambitious reform plan, but Germany, the euro area’s economic powerhouse, is more cautious. Despite continued growth, after years of stagnation, the euro area needs better governance to meet future challenges, economic analysts say. They add that recent political developments in Italy may complicate the drive for reform, as could unstable political situations elsewhere.

This note brings together commentaries, analyses and studies by major international think tanks and research institutes on challenges facing the euro area and related issues. Earlier publications on the topic can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ published in December 2017.

Why Italy will confront the EU, but stay in the euro
Centre for European Reform, June 2018

Italy’s hazardous new experiment: Genetically modified populism
Brookings Institution, June 2018

The EU must realize that populism is a symptom of real policy failure
Chatham House, May 2018

How to exit the euro in a nutshell ‘Il Piano Savona’
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2018

Mattarella’s line in the sand
Bruegel, June 2018

Italy heads for confrontation with itself, financial markets, and Europe
Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2018

Quit kicking the can down the road: A Spanish view of EMU reforms
Real Instituto Elcano, May 2018

Turmoil in euro area spreads as Rajoy’s government is ousted in Spain
Atlantic Council, May 2018

Italy is too big to fail
Atlantic Council, May 2018

Does the euro area need a safe or a diversified asset?
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2018

Are SBBS really the safe asset the euro area is looking for?
Bruegel, May 2018

Capital position of banks in the EMU: An analysis of Banking Union scenarios
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, May 2018

Fiscal rules and the role of the Commission
Bruegel, May 2018

Tackling non-performing loans in the euro area
Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, May 2018

Completing Europe’s Banking Union means breaking the bank-sovereign vicious circle
Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2018

EFN report: Economic outlook for the euro area in 2018 and 2019
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, April 2018

Macron, Merkel and the new European sovereignties
Real Instituto Elcano, April 2018

Convergence in the European Union: Inside and outside the euro
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2018

Should Bulgaria join the euro now?
Jacques Delors Institut Berlin, April 2018

Une finance au service du développement de long terme en Europe
Confrontations Europe, April 2018

Quelles perspectives pour renforcer la zone euro?
Confrontations Europe, April 2018

The European ETF market: What can be done better?
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2018

Making a reality of Europe’s capital markets union
Bruegel, April 2018

State contingent debt as insurance for euro-area sovereigns
Bruegel, April 2018

Economic recovery and inflation
Center for Social and Economic Research, April 2018

Reforming the European Monetary Union: The challenge of reconciling risk sharing with market discipline
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2018

How to solve the Greek debt problem
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2018

Debt mutualisation, inflation and populism in the euro zone
Real Instituto Elcano, April 2018

Market discipline and liquidity key issues in the EMU reform
Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, April 2018

The fallacy of fiscal discipline
LUISS School of European Political Economy, April 2018

No escape from politics: Four tests for a successful fiscal instrument in the euro area
Notre Europe, Bertelsmann Stiftung, March 2018

Cash outflows in crisis scenarios: Do liquidity requirements and reporting obligations give the SRB sufficient time to react?
Bruegel, March 2018

Domestic banks as lightning rods? Home bias during the euro zone crisis
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2018

Is the bank-sovereign link truly severed?
College of Europe, March 2018

The search for a euro area safe asset
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2018

Enhancing credibility and commitment to fiscal rules
Center for Social and Economic Research, March 2018

The new global economic governance: Can Europe help win the peace?
LUISS School of European Political Economy, March 2018

Macron’s plans for the euro
Centre for European Reform, February 2018

The missing third leg of the euro architecture: National wage negotiations
Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2018

ECB interventions in distressed sovereign debt markets: The case of Greek bonds
Institut für Weltwirtschaft Kiel, February 2018

The effects of unconventional monetary policy in the euro area
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, February 2018

The euro paradox: Explaining the resilience of the single currency
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2018

Tales from a crisis: Diverging narratives of the euro area
Bruegel, February 2018

Some unpleasant euro arithmetic
Centre d’études prospectives et d’informations internationales, January 2018

Bank liquidation in the European Union: Clarification needed
Bruegel, January 2018

Risk reduction through Europe’s distressed debt market
Bruegel, January 2018

Reconciling risk sharing with market discipline: A constructive approach to euro area reform
Centre for Economic Policy Research, January 2018

Reconciling risk sharing with market discipline
LUISS School of European Political Economy, January 2018

Oil price shocks, monetary policy and current account imbalances within a currency union
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2018

Low interest rate environment amplifies negative effects of austerity policy
Deutsche Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, January 2018

Read this briefing on ‘Challenges for the euro area‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Union, EP

In the latest in a series of discussions on the future of Europe, a highlight of Parliament’s agenda for June is the debate planned for Wednesday morning with the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte. A number of important statements are expected; on Tuesday afternoon from the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, on the Iran nuclear agreement; from the Council and Commission on the independence of the judiciary in Poland on Wednesday, and on the preparation for the European Council meeting of 28 and 29 June 2018 on Tuesday morning, where the negotiations on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal are likely to be discussed.

Crucially, for Parliament, the number of Members of the European Parliament is limited to 751 under the Lisbon Treaty. The United Kingdom withdrawal means the seats left vacant by British Members must be redistributed, a situation complicated by the withdrawal date falling just before the next European elections. The composition of the European Parliament will therefore change after ‘Brexit’, providing an opportunity for Parliament to correct the current flawed application of the degressive proportionality principle, (minimum of 6 seats per Member State, maximum 96; with each Member elected in more populous states representing more electors than those elected in less populous states, and vice versa), without reopening the Treaties. Parliament will vote on Wednesday on whether to consent to a European Council decision on a partial redistribution of seats for the next term, involving no loss of seats for any Member State, reserving 46 seats for future enlargements, and reducing the overall number of Members to 705. The decision is based on a proposal made by Parliament following a vote in the February plenary session.

On Tuesday afternoon Parliament will consider whether further macro-financial assistance to Ukraine will continue to be paid, in view of the lack of progress on fighting corruption in the country. Despite the priority accorded to Ukraine under the Eastern Partnership, the EU has already cancelled assistance payments due in the previous programme, due to the country’s failure to meet the conditions regarding governance and economic reforms. Parliament and Council positions to date indicate that any further assistance will be conditional on progress in the fight against corruption, with a proposed Memorandum of Understanding to be signed covering institutional and administrative capacities, including an anti-corruption court. An oral question addressing the issue of corruption closer to home is scheduled for Thursday morning.

Turning to transport, Europe remains the safest air space in the world and the EU intends to ensure it stays that way. On Monday evening, Parliament will discuss a provisional agreement on common rules in the field of civil aviation. Parliament’s focus in the proposals has been on adapting the rules to heavier air traffic and emerging technologies in aviation, such as drones. The new rules have already been approved by the Committee on Transport and Tourism, and are ready for formal adoption during this month’s session, with debate scheduled for Monday evening. Free movement of goods in the EU is also essential to the success of the internal market. However, the large-scale use of heavy-duty vehicles in transport has consequences for our environment, as they emit around a quarter of all road transport CO2. Parliament proposals extend EU targets to reduce these emissions, to encompass new administrative fines on manufacturers who fail to comply, and introduce new on-road verification tests. On Monday evening, Parliament will consider the final agreed text on monitoring and reporting of CO2 emissions and fuel consumption of heavy-duty vehicles that seeks to stimulate market uptake of cleaner, fuel-efficient, heavy-duty vehicles.

A proposal to amend and simplify the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), which deals with the regulation of OTC derivatives in the EU, will be debated on Monday evening. The 2017 Commission proposal covers issues with the clearing obligation, reporting requirements, risk-mitigation techniques and trade repositories in the ‘over-the-counter’ (OTC) derivatives market. Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs is proposing further amendments that would boost transparency, compliance with reporting requirements, and access to clearing, including the principle that clearing services be provided under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (‘FRAND’) commercial terms.

On Wednesday evening, Parliament will consider a compromise text on a proposed directive introducing a proportionality test for new national regulations for professions, which affect employment in areas such as medicine and architecture. Public concern has been expressed regarding the inconsistent application of proportionality principles and a lack of transparency in the access to such professions, which is decided by Member States individually. Parliament’s Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection obtained a compromise between addressing unnecessary national requirements and allowing a specific status for healthcare services, and Council’s desire to limit obligations regarding the transparency of the national regulatory process.

EU citizens have a huge range of cultural heritage sites, museums, exhibitions, films, and live performances to choose from, and digital access to cultural services makes it even easier to get a ‘culture fix’. However, participation in cultural activities remains low. While the EU offers support for Member States in promoting cultural life, on Wednesday evening, Parliament will discuss a report on the barriers to accessing culture in the EU, which include public funding levels, access, and the role of education.

Tuesday afternoon’s statement by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presenting the annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2017 and the EU’s policy on the matter is followed on Thursday with debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Russia, Bahrain and on the situation of Rohingya refugees.

A list of all material prepared for this Plenary Session: Common rules in the field of civil aviation (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Monitoring and reporting of CO2 emissions and fuel consumption of heavy duty vehicles (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Proportionality test for new national regulations for professions (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Further macro-financial assistance to Ukraine (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Regulation of OTC derivatives in the EU (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Barriers to accessing culture (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Composition of the European Parliament (available in EN)

Written by Elena Lazarou,

On 8 and 9 June 2018, the leaders of the G7 will meet for the 44th G7 Summit in Charlevoix, Quebec, for the annual summit of the informal grouping of seven of the world’s major advanced economies. The summit takes place amidst growing tensions between the US and other G7 countries over security and multilateralism.

Background

© Rawf8 / Fotolia

The Group of Seven (G7) is an international forum of the seven leading industrialised nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the European Union). Decisions within the G7 are made on the basis of consensus. The outcomes of summits are not legally binding, but compliance is high and their impact is substantial, as the G7 members represent a significant share of global gross domestic product (GDP) and global influence. The commitments from summits are implemented by means of measures carried out by the individual member countries, and through their respective relations with other countries and influence in multilateral organisations. Compliance within the G7 is particularly high in regard to agreements on international trade and energy. The summit communiqué is politically binding on all G7 members.

As the G7 does not have a permanent secretariat, the annual summit is organised by the G7 country which holds the rotating presidency for that year. The presidency is currently held by Canada, to be followed by France in 2019. Traditionally, the presidency country also determines the agenda of the summit, which includes a mix of fixed topics (discussed each time), such as the global economic climate, foreign and security policy, and current topics for which a coordinated G7 approach appears particularly appropriate or urgent. Preparatory and follow-up work, including the preparation of the final declarations which contain the key outcomes of each summit, is carried out by the governments’ chief negotiators, known as sherpas.

The G7 has developed a network of supporting ministerial meetings, which allow ministers to meet regularly to continue and prepare the work set out at each summit. G7 ministers and officials also meet on an ad hoc basis to deal with pressing issues, such as terrorism. From time to time, the leaders also create task forces or working groups to focus on specific issues of concern. The 2018 Canadian Presidency has identified five themes, namely: investing in growth that works for everyone; preparing for jobs of the future; advancing gender equality and women’s empowerment; working together on climate change, oceans and clean energy; and building a more peaceful and secure world.

The 2017 summit was held in Taormina, Italy, with outcomes in the areas of foreign policy, the global economy, trade, gender equality, human mobility, food security and nutrition, climate and energy, Africa and health as well as skills and labour. At the summit, the leaders also issued a statement on the fight against terrorism and violent extremism, which among other things called for closer cooperation among border control agencies, targeting terrorist financing as well as fighting terrorism on the internet.

Themes for the 2018 summit

The priorities set by the Canadian Presidency focus on five themes, namely:

1. Investing in growth that works for everyone, which includes the state of the economy, fiscal and monetary policy, tax, trade, investment and infrastructure.
2. Preparing for jobs of the future, which includes issues such as generating good jobs for all, including youth, and redesigning education to foster innovation, creativity and entrepreneurship in a digital age.
3. Advancing gender equality and women’s empowerment, by ‘ensuring that gender equality and gender-based analysis are integrated across all themes, activities and outcomes of Canada’s G7 Presidency’.
4. Working together on climate change, oceans and clean energy, which includes controlling climate change as a current compelling threat, protecting the natural environment, enhancing the environment and the economy together through clean technology and in other ways, and protecting the oceans from plastic and other pollutants.
5. Building a more peaceful and secure world, by addressing threats ranging from the use of chemical weapons in Europe and Syria, nuclear and missile proliferation in North Korea, regional security risks in Ukraine and the Baltic States, the Middle East and North Africa, Venezuela, and Asia, to terrorism, crime and corruption, and violations of democracy and human rights throughout the world, including via the internet.

Security and multilateralism at the centre: the G6 vs the US?

According to an analysis by the G7 Research Group, expectations regarding the success of the summit vary. However, most agree that, given the current global geopolitical climate, security will form a major part of the summit’s concerns. Since the 2017 Taormina Summit, G7 leaders have issued key statements on North Korea and Syria. Following the presidential elections in Venezuela in May 2018, the G7 issued a statement rejecting the electoral process and denouncing its result, namely the re-election of Nicolas Maduro. Yet, there are reasonable expectations that the withdrawal of the US from the Iran Nuclear Agreement (often referred to as JCPOA, for Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) will constitute a topic for disagreement. All of the other G7 members regret the US decision and support the implementation of the agreement. Apart from the EU, which has committed to uphold the deal in spite of the US withdrawal, both the Japanese and Canadian governments have expressed their support for the JCPOA as recently as early May 2018.

The G7 Summit also comes at a time of heightened tension between the USA and its G7 partners, following US President Donald Trump’s decision to impose tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium from some of its closest partners, including the EU and Canada. Several analyses posit that the issue of tariffs, alongside disagreement over other multilateral deals such as the JCPOA and the Paris Climate Agreement, will see a rift between the US and the remaining G7 parties, jeopardising the chances of a productive summit with constructive conclusions. G7 members, including the EU and Canada, are already considering retaliatory tariffs; following the meeting of G7 finance ministers in early June, the Canadian Finance Minister issued a statement expressing the ‘concern and disappointment’ of the other six members of the G7 over the US trade actions.

The G7 was formed in 1975. Since then, the heads of state or government of the seven have convened annual meetings to discuss key global issues. There are no formal criteria for membership, but participants are all highly developed liberal democracies. Its members are all committed to the shared values of peace and security, freedom and human rights, democracy and the rule of law, prosperity and sustainable development. The group deals with such issues as global economic outlook and macroeconomic management, international trade, energy, climate change, and relations with developing countries. Recently, the summit agenda has broadened considerably to include a host of political-security issues. The original group (without Canada, which joined in 1976) held its first summit in Rambouillet, France, in November 1975. As of 1994, the G7 began to meet with Russia at each summit in an outfit referred to as the Political Eight (P8) and, in 1998, Russia joined the G7 to form the G8. In March 2014, the G7 called for the G8 format to be suspended in response to Russia’s conduct vis-à-vis Ukraine, which was considered to be inconsistent with the group’s ‘shared beliefs and responsibilities’. In 2017, the G7 represented approximately 10.3 % of the global population and 32.2 % of the world’s GDP, as well as providing close to 70 % of all official development assistance (ODA).

The EU in the G7

The European Community (later EU) became a full participant of the G7 in 1981. It takes part in discussions on all topics and sessions, but does not hold the presidency or host summits. The EU G7/G20 Sherpa (currently Piotr Serafin) informs the EU Member States about the state of preparation for summits, which are attended by the Presidents of the Commission and of the European Council.

The President of the European Parliament attends the G7 speakers’ meeting, held annually by the G7 Presidency. In 2017, EP President Antonio Tajani participated in the 15th G7 speakers meeting, where he called for global responses to terrorism and to nuclear threats.

Read this At a glance on ‘The 2018 G7 Summit: Issues to watch‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

© Maksim Kabakou / Shutterstock.com

Εxploring the relationship between law, technological innovation and regulatory governance has always been a challenging task for policy-makers. Technologies are often seen as ordinary objects of formal law that can fit into traditional doctrinal classification. But what if technologies questioned and challenged the traditional boundaries of legal thought? Some scholars even argue that technology is law, given that the employment of technology for control purposes in regulation provides opportunities to directly or indirectly shape human behaviour in legal terms. However, it is difficult to determine whether it is technology that challenges the law or the law that shapes, or even predefines, the development paths of new and emerging technologies.

Technology and regulation are often portrayed as adversaries. In a traditional legal setting, their relationship is limited to the grounding of legal reasoning in expert knowledge and scientific evidence. This is frequently the case in the domains of criminal, patent, consumer safety and environmental law. However, as law becomes more and more involved in regulating technological processes and products, it may inhibit or stimulate technological change as such.

Listen to podcast ‘What if technologies shaped the law?‘

In fact, on various occasions the normative influence of regulation upon the shaping of entire technological trajectories depends on the technology of regulation, namely the design and choice of regulatory policy instrument. That has been the case with the contentious development of crop biotechnology in Europe, attributed, among other things, to the centralised and expert-driven regulatory framework adopted for the release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the environment and the European market.

Besides being an object of regulatory action, technology can also have an influential impact not only on the nature, content and type of regulation chosen to control technological developments, but also on the fulfilment of traditional legal objectives. For instance, science-based risk assessments have become the cornerstone of all EU legal rules that regulate the commercial authorisation of medicinal, plant protection and food products. Profiling technologies exert an influential role upon the shaping and interpretation of criminal rules, while internet content filters can protect minors from accessing harmful media content.

The employment of technology as a regulatory actor (appearing in the form of techno-regulation) indicates a shift from a ‘traditional legal order to a technologically managed order’. The development of regulatory technology, commonly known as RegTech, which refers to the use of technology to provide improved financial regulatory solutions, will be crucial to enable more efficient and effective regulation and compliance. In his famous book, Code and other laws of cyberspace, Lawrence Lessig argues that computer code (or ‘West Coast Code’, referring to Silicon Valley) regulates conduct in much the same way as legal code (or ‘East Coast Code’, referring to Washington, DC).

More specifically, code can determine behavioural options and the limits of interaction in virtual spaces, and the level of privacy protection required, as well as defining the terms of access to information in cyberspace. The normative influence of technology is mostly evident in those domains where algorithms are used. Algorithms, as currently understood, are formal rules, usually expressed in computer code as a set of instructions for a computer to follow, that make predictions on future events based on historical patterns. They are a self-contained step-by-step set of operations that computers and other ‘smart’ devices carry out to perform calculations, data processing and automated reasoning tasks.

Algorithms are widely employed to make decisions that have increasingly far-reaching impacts on individuals and society, not least in their applications for access to credit, healthcare, human welfare and employment. They are regulating more and more aspects of our lives by implementing institutional decision-making based on analytics, which involves the discovery, interpretation and communication of meaningful patterns in data, illustrating an increasing tendency to rely on technology as a substitute for other forms of regulation. In fact, self-running and self-enforcing technological applications could challenge traditional notions of legal personality, individual agency and responsibility.

The advent of blockchain technology and the transposition of contractual relationships into smart contract code that simulates the function of legal contracts through technology, or the adjustment of the software codes for autonomous vehicles to traffic regulations may also signal a shift from the traditional notion of ‘code is law’ (i.e. code having the effect of law) to the new conception of law is code. According to this narrative, the law is progressively starting to assume the characteristics of code, given the inclination to replace current laws and regulations with technical regulation – which can be enforced ex ante through code. This can be clearly seen in the case of smart cars that could simply refuse to start the engine if the sensors indicated that the driver had not fastened their seat belt properly, or of the programming of ‘no fly zones’ in drones.

What does the legal conceptualisation of technology mean for European policy-making?

The clear-cut division between law and technology has faded away, on account of the fact that scientific notions and technological concepts such as gene editing and autonomous machines have penetrated legal categories, and triggered the reconsideration of traditional legal terms such as autonomy and privacy. Some scholars have argued that mutual acknowledgment of the boundaries between law and technology has been replaced by a ‘co-production’ regime, where technology and policy are inter-related. The prospect of automated legal governance through the development of digital technologies may also lead to the weakening of centralised structures of law at EU level, in terms of their ability to control and supervise multiple aspects of citizens’ public and private lives.

Examination of the multiple facets of the interface between law and technology and of the increasingly influential role of technology in the shaping of legal rules and reasoning triggers a series of questions. Does EU law have the capacity to strike the right balance between technology as a regulatory object or category and technology as a regulatory agenda-setter? Can law, regulation and technology engage in meaningful conversations that cross doctrinal and technological categories? Should the technical code approached through Lessig’s lens be the most significant form of law? Will EU legislators acknowledge that codes codify values and cannot be treated as a mere question of engineering? A public debate on the aforementioned issues is urgently required given the intrusive potential of code as an enforcement mechanism and/or source of legal obligations that could lead to a Foucauldian networked governmentality and a self-regulated panopticon, whereby the decline of state powers is reinforced, and responsibilities and liabilities are increasingly passed down from the state to the individual technology user.

Read this At a glance on ‘What if technologies shaped the law?‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Christian Scheinert (1st edition),

© DeStagge / Fotolia

The European Union is facing new security threats amid growing uncertainty about the reliability of some of its allies. As a consequence, it has embarked on a general scaling-up of its defence capabilities. A European defence action plan has been agreed and a European Defence Fund created to provide financial support, ranging from the research phase to the acquisition phase of military equipment and technologies. The present legislative proposal for EDIDP, which would be part of that fund, is destined to provide the European defence industry with financial support during the development phase of new products and technologies in areas selected at European level. Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) decided to open trilogue negotiations; these have been ongoing since 15 March 2018.

Versions

• June 2018: ‘European defence industrial development programme (EDIDP)‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industrial Development Programme aiming at supporting the competitiveness and innovation capacity of the EU defence industry Committee responsible: Committee on Industry, Research and Industry (ITRE) COM(2017) 294
7.6.2017 Rapporteur: Françoise Grossetête (EPP, France) 2017/0125(COD) Shadow rapporteurs:

 

  Miroslav Poche (S&D, Czech Republic)
Zdzisław Krasnodębski (ECR, Poland)
Dominique Riquet (ALDE, France)
Neoklis Sylikiotis (GUE/NGL, Cyprus)
Reinhard Bütikofer (Greens/EFA, Germany)
David Borrelli (EFDD, Italy)
Christelle Lechevalier (ENF, France) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Finalisation of trilogue negotiations

Listen to podcast ‘European defence industrial development programme (EDIDP)‘

Written by Angelos Delivorias (1st edition),

© Andrey Popov / Fotolia

Crowdfunding, an open call to the wider public for raising money online, can help ensure that both individuals and companies get access to finance, especially in the seed and early growth stages of their projects or business. Member States with a developed crowdfunding market have designed bespoke regulatory regimes that differ from each other with regard to the conditions under which platforms can operate, their scope of permitted activities and the licensing requirements applicable to them. As a result of this diversity, cross-border flows remain limited and crowdfunding service providers face challenges in scaling up their operations. To remedy this, the Commission has proposed a regulation providing for uniform, proportionate and directly applicable requirements for the authorisation and supervision of crowdfunding platforms, together with a single point of supervision, and a directive exempting crowdfunding service providers from the scope of MiFID II.

Versions

• June 2018: ‘Establishing a basis for European crowdfunding service providers‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Crowdfunding Service Providers for Business
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) COM(2018) 99
COM(2018) 113
27.9.2017 Rapporteur: Not yet appointed 2018/0047(COD)
2018/0048(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Initial consideration in committee

 

Read also ‘European crowdfunding service providers for business‘.

Listen to podcast ‘Establishing a basis for European crowdfunding service providers‘

Written by Damiano Scordamaglia (1st edition),

© Monkey Business / Fotolia

In 2007, the EU established a set of basic rights for rail passengers, which became applicable at the end of 2009. These rights provided for all passengers, including those with reduced mobility, a harmonised minimum level of protection, information and assistance. While the implementation of these rights has generally been smooth, recent reports have concluded that this is not done uniformly across the EU. Moreover, other shortcomings have prevented these rights from being used to their full potential.

On 27 September 2017, the European Commission presented a new proposal to address these shortcomings. In its work on this legislative proposal, the EU is seeking to strike a new balance between keeping rail operators competitive and providing adequate passenger protection.

Versions

• June 2018: ‘Rail passengers’ rights and obligations in the EU‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on rail passengers’ rights and obligations Committee responsible: Transport and Tourism (TRAN) COM(2017) 548
27.9.2017 Rapporteur: Bogusław Liberadzki (S&D, Poland) 2017/0237(COD) Shadow rapporteurs:

  Renaud Muselier (EPP, France)
Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR, Poland)
Jens Rohde (ALDE, Denmark)
Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL, Spain)
Michael Cramer (Greens/EFA, Germany) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in TRAN committee on draft report

Written by James McEldowney,

© Springfield Gallery / Fotolia

The Commission announced its proposals for the common agricultural policy post-2020 at the end of November 2017 in the form of a communication on the future of food and farming. They include proposals for: greater simplification to be achieved through increased subsidiarity involving a new delivery model, more effective targeting of direct payments, a shift towards a more results-based approach, and higher ambitions in respect of resource efficiency, environmental care and climate action. Other elements will involve addressing issues such as generational renewal, the investment gap in agriculture, the role of research, innovation and training, risk management and a new green architecture. Under the new delivery model, Member States will have responsibility for establishing a common agricultural policy (CAP) strategic plan; this would be subject to approval by the Commission and would continue to set the basic policy parameters for the CAP.

The proposals have generated a range of responses and have been the subject of discussion within the European Parliament’s Committee for Agriculture and Rural Development. The Council has discussed the content of the communications and they have also been the subject of discussion by the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC).

Looking to the future, some reflections on the Commission’s proposals are considered in light of the views expressed by a number of stakeholder groups. The Bulgarian Presidency has indicated that the future of the common agricultural policy will be discussed at the informal meeting of Ministers of Agriculture in Sofia in June 2018.

Read this briefing on ‘CAP reform post-2020 – Setting the scene‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© jpldesigns / Fotolia

The US President, Donald Trump, and North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, are preparing for a high-stakes summit on the latter country’s nuclear programme, following Trump’s decision on 1 June to revive the meeting after having cancelled it the previous week. At the summit, due to take place on 12 June in Singapore, Trump is expected to press for denuclearisation of North Korea in exchange for easing economic sanctions and, possibly some aid. The main sticking point lies on the meaning the two countries attribute to the word ‘denuclearisation’. Pyongyang, after years of isolation, is engaged in an unprecedented series of high-level meetings with South Korea, China and Russia.

This note offers links to reports and commentaries from some major international think-tanks and research institutes on the North Korean nuclear programme. More reports on the topic can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are thinking’, published in September 2017.

Birds of different feathers: Why the North Korea and Iran problems require distinct solutions
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2018

The Trump–Kim summit and the future of US strategy in Asia
International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2018

Can the Trump-Kim summit be rescheduled?
Council on Foreign Relations, May 2018

Canceled summit doesn’t spell end to U.S.-North Korea nuclear diplomacy
Rand Corporation, May 2018

Back to the future: North Korea policy returns to business as usual
Center for a New American Security, May 2018

Not quite back to the drawing board with North Korea
Cato Institute, May 2018

A historic moment
China Institute of International Studies, May 2018

With summit off, United States needs to think through its North Korea strategy
Atlantic Council, May 2018

What’s next for nuclear negotiations with North Korea?
United States Institute of Peace, May 2018

Trumps Lehrstunde
Leibniz-Institut Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, May 2018

Why Trump’s cancellation of the North Korea summit may undermine the US-South Korea alliance
Chicago Council on Global Affairs, May 2018

Putin and North Korea: Exploring Russian interests around the peninsula
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 2018

Kim Jong Un is better off now than he was before Trump agreed to a summit
German Marshall Fund, May 2018

Korea summitry: Avoiding catastrophic failure and catastrophic success
Council on Foreign Relations, May 2018

On-again, off-again Korean summit
International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2018

A step-by-step plan for denuclearizing North Korea
Brookings Institution, May 2018

Cognitive bias and diplomacy with North Korea
Council on Foreign Relations, May 2018

What if North Korea makes an offer Trump can’t refuse?
Cato Institute, May 2018

The inter-Korean summit: Peace is not, yet, at hand
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2018

Why North Korea is not Libya
Atlantic Council, May 2018

Trump should stay strong on North Korea, but be wary
Hoover Institution, May 2018

Making the most of North Korea’s mixed motives
Council on Foreign Relations, May 2018

Are the stakes higher now for the U.S.–North Korea summit?
Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2018

China’s clear and present conundrum on the Korean peninsula: Stuck between the past and the future
Chatham House, May 2018

The Korean civil-military balance
Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2018

Who wants a deal more: North Korea or the United States?
Center for American Progress, May 2018

U.S. decision on Iran unlikely to affect North Korea talks
Brookings Institution, May 2018

U.S. trade, North Korea policies bring Asia’s biggest economies to table
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 2018

To make history at North Korea summit, Trump should prepare like Reagan did for Gorbachev
Hoover Institution, May 2018

With Kim Jong Un, there’s no ‘win-win’
American Enterprise Institute, May 2018

Historic summit at Panmunjom
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, May 2018

The gathering health storm inside North Korea
Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2018

North Korea’s nuclear weapons and Australia’s national security
Australian Institute for International Affairs, May 2018

North Korea’s military capabilities
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2018

Neutralizing a nuclear-armed North Korea
Heritage Foundation, April 2018

North Korea and the ANZUS Treaty
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 2018

Summit showcases the diplomatic agility of both Korean leaders
Chatham House, April 2018

Avoiding a Korean Calamity: Why resolving the dispute with Pyongyang requires keeping the peace
Cato Institute, April 2018

Preparing for U.S.-North Korea talks
Rand Corporation, April 2018

Crisis and new political agenda for the Korean peninsula and the regional powers
Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Science, March 2018

The other side of the North Korean threat: looking beyond its nuclear weapons and ICBMs
Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2018

More than a nuclear threat: North Korea’s chemical, biological, and conventional weapons
Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2018

The China–North Korea relationship
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2018

Centripetal and centrifugal forces of North Korean threat on the U.S.-Japan-ROK Cooperation
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, March 2018

What will Kim Jong Un want and what he might give
Rand Corporation, March 2018

Low-cost options for airborne delivery of contraband into North Korea
Rand Corporation, March 2018

Japan’s view of the North Korean threat
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2018

Flagging down North Korea on the High Seas
Royal United Services Institute, March 2018

John Bolton: Surrender is not an option
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2018

Read this briefing on ‘North Korea’s nuclear summitry‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for people who worry about fake news.

Do you avoid the news, perhaps because you feel you cannot rely on the news to be true? A March 2018 Eurobarometer poll suggested there is great concern among internet users in Europe about fake news: 85 % of respondents see fake news as a problem in their country and 83 % perceive it as a problem for democracy.

© Feodora / Fotolia

The European Union has stepped up its response to this challenge in recent years. In 2015, High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini set up a small team to collect and debunk pro-Kremlin anti-EU disinformation. In June 2017, the European Parliament asked the European Commission to take a closer look at fake news and online disinformation.

The EU’s Digital Commissioner, Mariya Gabriel, asked experts from academia, online platforms, news media and civil society for their advice on fake news and online disinformation in October 2017. Gabriel also asked for feedback from the public. According to this public consultation, disinformation aiming to influence elections and migration policies were the top categories where most respondents thought fake news were likely to harm society. The high level expert group advises improvements to: media and information literacy; tools for users and journalists to tackle disinformation; and securing a diverse and sustainable European news media. The EU already supports a number of initiatives to enable all citizens to understand and engage with digital media.

Further information

• Questions and Answers about the East StratCom Task Force, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/2116/questions-and-answers-about-east-stratcom-task-force_en
• EPRS publication ‘How to spot when news is fake’, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_ATA%282017%29599386
• European Commission, Digital Single Market policy, Fake news, 26 October 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/fake-news

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for ferry passengers.

If you’ve taken a ferry journey this year, chances are you weren’t alone. There are 400 million passenger journeys to or from EU ports every year. The next time you hop on board a ferry in an EU port, think of how many aspects of your crossing are backed up with EU rules.

Your passage through the port should have gone smoothly thanks to established security standards. If your ship flies a flag of an EU country, it is regularly inspected by a specialised authority checking all the aspects necessary to its safe navigation – including water-tightness, fire safety and lack of wear and tear. The equipment on board, such as lifeboats, also has to meet safety requirements and be certified. EU rules also require that the crew receive quality training and that their working conditions do not compromise the ship’s safety. While most of these rules are based on international standards, the EU has incorporated them into its laws so that they are applied in a harmonised way in all EU countries and can be legally enforced.

© Christopher Dodge / Fotolia

As a passenger travelling by sea you enjoy the same rights wherever you travel in the EU. These include the right to information or compensation in case of delay or cancellation. And your shipping company must be sufficiently insured to cover the risks of possible damage not only to your person, but also to your luggage and vehicle.

On leaving the port, everyone on board has to have been counted and registered. To help potential search and rescue operations, new EU rules mean that the relevant passenger data will soon be digitalised and registered electronically.

Further information

• EPRS publication on Inspection of ro-ro ferries and high-speed passenger craft
• EPRS publication on Registration of persons on board passenger ships
• EPRS publication on Safety rules and standards for passenger ships
• European Commission’s Directorate General for mobility and transport website, https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/safety-and-environment/safety-passenger-ships_en

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for antibiotic users.

Antibiotics are a very useful drug when you are sick and the doctor tells you that you need to take them. However, antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a growing global threat to public health. It occurs when bacteria and other microbes, like viruses and fungi, develop resistance to drugs, especially antibiotics, used to treat the infections they cause. Although resistance appears naturally over time, it is accelerated by factors like overuse of antimicrobial medicines on humans and animals. In the EU alone it is estimated that infections caused by resistant microbes are responsible for 25 000 deaths a year. Some forecasts say that by 2050, drug-resistant infections could cause more deaths than cancer.

© Kenishirotie / Fotolia

For almost two decades, the European Union has been working on a solution to AMR. It strives to strengthen existing good practices and to support countries fighting AMR in both humans and animals. For instance, the EU promotes prudent use of antimicrobials and improved infection prevention. Every November, European Antibiotic Awareness Day promotes the responsible use of antibiotics, as many people are not aware of the risks of misusing antibiotics. The EU also aims to improve cooperation related to activities on AMR across the EU, targeting all actors who play a role in antimicrobial drug usage, such as the pharmaceutical industry. EU funds have been invested in, for example, common research efforts to develop new effective antibiotics. Moreover, the EU has reinforced cooperation with international organisations and third countries on surveillance and research.

Further information

• European Commission’s Directorate General for Health and Food Safety website, https://ec.europa.eu/health/amr/antimicrobial-resistance_en
• European Commission’s Directorate General for Research and Innovation website, https://ec.europa.eu/research/health/index.cfm?pg=area&areaname=amdr
• European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control’s website, https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/antimicrobial-resistance

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for beekeepers.

If you are one of the EU’s 600 000 professional or amateur beekeepers, offering consumers the much loved product that is honey, you are also undoubtedly well aware of the vital contribution that your activity makes to environmental conservation and food production. Indeed, your bees help to produce more than 200 000 tonnes of honey a year and, in doing so, ensure natural pollination for over 80 % of Europe’s cultivated crops and wild plants. Nevertheless, you may find it hard to keep your activity economically profitable in the face of threats to bee health and strong competition on the honey market. EU policies can play an important role in helping you cope with these challenges.

© Jaroslav Moravcik / Fotolia

For example, EU funds can cover up to half the cost of measures to address major issues such as bee health, hive management and product quality. Also, beekeeping products can benefit from promotional campaigns co-financed by the EU and from EU quality labels that can increase their economic potential on the market. More than 30 types of honey have already received an EU label of protected designation of origin (PDO) or protected geographical indication (PGI).

Furthermore, the EU policy-makers’ dialogue with stakeholders helps to define policies to support beekeeping indirectly, for example by promoting agricultural and environmental policies that prevent the deterioration of bees’ habitats, by fighting cases of food fraud, such as honey adulteration, and by funding research projects to study bee health problems and the high mortality rate registered in recent decades.

Further information

• EPRS publication ‘The EU’s beekeeping sector’, www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/608786/EPRS_ATA(2017)608786_EN.pdf
• EPRS publication ‘Les abeilles dans l’UE: un bilan de santé inquiétant’, www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/140792/LDM_BRI(2014)140792_REV1_FR.pdf
• European Commission’s website on honey bees, www.ec.europa.eu/food/animals/live_animals/bees_en

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

Xavier BETTEL, Prime Minister of Luxembourg

The May II plenary session highlights were the debate on the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework and own resources in the context of the publication of individual proposals for spending programmes, and the debate on the future of Europe with the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Xavier Bettel. Alpha Condé, President of Guinea and the President of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, also addressed Parliament. VP/HR Federica Mogherini’s statements on the situation in the Gaza Strip, the status of Jerusalem, and the situation in Nicaragua were also discussed. Debates followed on US tariffs in the steel and aluminium sector, the use of pre-accession funds in Turkey and the impact of delocalisation on workers and regions. Parliament approved the revision of the Posting of Workers Directive, and the modernisation of the Trade Defence Instruments Regulation (at second reading), and a multiannual plan for demersal stocks in the North Sea. Parliament voted, inter alia, on a number of own-initiative reports on implementation of the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making, odometer manipulation in motor vehicles, gender equality and women’s empowerment, and minimum standards on rights, support and protection for victims of crime.

MFF and own resources

Many Members expressed disappointment following statements from the Council and Commission on the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021‑2027 and own resources, for which the Commission adopted overarching proposals on 2 May, and a first set of individual proposals for spending programmes this week. Parliament opposed any budget cuts over the 2021-2027 period that would change EU agricultural and cohesion policy objectives, in a resolution deploring the lack of an ambitious scale of appropriations, and opposing 15 % and 10 % reductions in the appropriations for agriculture and cohesion respectively. Parliament stresses the overall total in percentage of GNI terms is lower than the current MFF in real terms and underlines the need for the Parliament and Council to agree a clear methodology.

Multiannual plan for demersal stocks in the North Sea

Over 70 % of fish caught by EU fishermen in the North Sea, worth more than €850 million, are species that live close to the seabed, such as cod and haddock. Parliament is particularly concerned that fisheries measures should be taken based on the best available scientific advice, with a view to managing fishing stocks to secure the long-term sustainability of the North Sea fisheries, including joint management with third countries in the region. Members approved at first reading a text agreed with Council on a multi-annual plan for demersal stocks in the North Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks.

Posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services

Parliament debated the agreement reached with the Council on the revision of the Posting of Workers Directive, which was adopted with a majority that exceeded expectations (456 votes for, 147 votes against and 49 abstentions). Posting of workers is increasingly common in the internal market, particularly in the services sector, but such workers often find themselves at a disadvantage compared to their peers in their host country, through receiving lower wages and in a lack of legal protection. The Commission’s proposed revisions to the 1996 directive that currently governs the treatment of posted workers, aim at adapting them to today’s labour market and the needs of firms, while ensuring fair social protection for workers.

Modernisation of Trade Defence Instruments

Parliament approved the International Trade Committee’s recommendation for a second reading of the new regulation on the protection against dumped and subsidised imports from countries not members of the EU. Modernising trade defence instruments, which allow countries to counter unfair trade practices under World Trade Organization rules, is needed to ensure Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Regulations are fit for the fast evolving global trade environment. Key issues are the proposal for partial waiver of the ‘lesser duty rule’ (LDR) for vulnerable countries, and the introduction of interested party status for trade unions.

South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation

Members voted at first reading on a text on the transposition of management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Convention Area of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation, making the measures applicable to EU fishing vessels that fish in the area, to, among other things, control the types of nets used, reduce seabird capture, and manage fishing affecting the sea bottom.

Proliferation of corruption and crime through golden visas

Members discussed EU values and the proliferation of corruption and crime through ‘golden visas’, a practice whereby some EU countries offer citizenship or residence to persons who bring funding into their country. As the former also automatically confers EU citizenship, the equity of such schemes, and their possible links to corruption and crime, as well as the effect on other Member States, cause concern.

Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making

Parliament adopted its report on the interpretation and implementation of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, in force since 2016. Through their commitment to greater simplicity, clarity and consistency in Union legislation, and better coordination and transparency in the legislative process, the EU institutions have issued annual joint declarations on legislative priorities and improved access to information in the preparation of delegated acts. However, the report deems progress on other issues, such as information flow from the Council, and lack of transparency in Member States regarding their ‘gold-plating’ of EU law to be unsatisfactory.

Minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime

Members debated and adopted a report assessing the implementation of the Victims’ Rights Directive – legislation ensuring EU-wide protection and support for victims of crime. Parliament has long supported ensuring minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime throughout the EU, aiming at better protection against domestic violence and crimes such as stalking. However, some Member States have delayed introduction of the legislation, leading to differences in the treatment of victims.

EU solidarity fund amendment to the EU budget

Parliament amended the EU budget in order to provide €97.6 million in EU Solidarity Fund assistance for Greece, Spain, France and Portugal to help with the recovery from natural disasters, earthquakes, hurricanes, and catastrophic fires suffered in the course of 2017.

Odometer manipulation in motor vehicles

Parliament adopted a report on revising the EU legal framework on odometer manipulation in motor vehicles – or tampering with the mileage gauge in cars – on Thursday. The practice is particularly prevalent in the very large EU second-hand car market and poses risks to consumers, who are often unaware of the fraud, and to road safety. The report proposes that hardware solutions are introduced to protect new vehicles, that mileage recordings are made mandatory, and that long-term solutions are explored, as well as making odometer fraud an offence.

Gender equality and women’s empowerment

Members adopted a resolution concerning the implementation of the Gender Action Plan, and particularly transforming the lives of girls and women through EU external relations in the development sphere, by ensuring gender equality and women’s empowerment, including within the EU institutions themselves.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Parliamentary committees’ decisions to enter into interinstitutional (trilogue) negotiations were confirmed on a common procedure for international protection in the Union (Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee); on EMIR and ESMA regulations (Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee); and on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (Transport and Tourism Committee).

This ‘at a glance’ note is intended to review some of the highlights of the plenary part-session, and notably to follow up on key dossiers identified by EPRS. It does not aim to be exhaustive. For more detailed information on specific files, please see other EPRS products, notably our ‘EU legislation in progress’ briefings, and the plenary minutes.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – Strasbourg, May II 2018‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Angelos Delivorias (1st edition),

© Björn Wylezich / Fotolia

Covered bonds are debt securities issued by credit institutions and secured by a pool of mortgage loans or credit towards the public sector. They are characterised further by the double protection offered to bondholders, the segregation of assets in their cover pool, over-collateralisation, and their strict supervisory frameworks. Currently, their issuance is concentrated in five Member States. National regulatory regimes vary widely in terms of supervision and composition of the cover pool. Lastly, despite benefiting from preferential treatment under the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), they share no common definition, which can lead to different securities benefiting from this treatment. To remedy this, the Commission has adopted proposals for, on the one hand, a directive, which would lay down investor protection rules and provide common definitions, and on the other, a regulation, which would amend the CRR with regard to covered bond exposures.

Versions

• May 2018: ‘Covered bonds – Issue and supervision, exposures‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the issue of covered bonds and covered bond public supervision and amending Directive 2009/65/EC and Directive 2014/59/EU
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards exposures in the form of covered bonds Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) COM(2018) 94
COM(2018) 93
12.3.2018

2018/0042 (COD)
2018/0043 (COD)

Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Rapporteur:

To be appointed.

Shadow rapporteurs:

To be appointed.

Next steps expected: Initial discussion in committee

Written by Cécile Remeur (1st edition),

© Art_Photo / Fotolia

Value added tax (VAT) is a consumption tax borne by the final consumers and collected by businesses as taxable persons. Businesses have VAT administrative obligations and act as VAT collectors. This generates compliance costs that are higher for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) than for bigger businesses, in spite of the small business exemption, especially in the case of cross-border activities.

The proposal for a revision of the VAT Directive relating to the common system of value added tax as regards the special scheme for small enterprises simplifies the rules, so as to reduce VAT compliance costs for SMEs by introducing simpler measures regarding invoicing, VAT registration, accounting and returns for SMEs, whether they operate in wholly domestic markets only or also across borders in the EU.

The legislative proposal falls under the consultation procedure.

Interactive PDF

• VAT for small enterprises

Proposal for a Council directive amending directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax as regards the special scheme for small enterprises Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) COM(2018) 21 of 18.1.2018

procedure ref.: 2018/0006(CNS)

Consultation Procedure Rapporteur: Tom Vandenkendelaere (EPP, Belgium) Shadow rapporteurs:

  Alfred Sant (S&D, Malta)
Stanisław Ożóg (ECR, Poland)
Caroline Nagtegaal (ALDE, the Netherlands)
Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL, Spain)
Molly Scott Cato (Greens/EFA, United Kingdom) Next steps expected: Discussion of the draft report

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for non-smokers.

Do you suffer from having to breathe second-hand smoke from someone else’s cigarette? Even if protection for passive smokers has improved considerably in the EU, one in five citizens is still exposed to second-hand smoke.

Smoking is the largest preventable cause of death in Europe, responsible for about 90 % of lung cancers, and causes other forms of cancer, including of the mouth and throat. It raises the risk of cardiovascular diseases and can lead to lung conditions, such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.

Inhaling second-hand smoke raises non-smokers’ risk of developing the same health issues as smokers. Babies and children are particularly vulnerable.

© vchalup / Fotolia

In the EU one in every four citizens aged 15 or over is a smoker. True to the saying ‘the best way to quit is never to start’, the EU aims to deter people, especially the young, from taking it up. Measures to protect Europeans against the harmful effects of smoking range from laws on packaging, labelling and the ingredients in tobacco products; restrictions on tobacco advertising; tax measures and combating illicit trade; to anti-tobacco campaigns (‘Ex-Smokers are Unstoppable’ targeted EU smokers aged 25-34, with over 480 000 benefitting from the iCoach tool).

Laws on smoke-free environments, such as indoor workplaces, public transport, and restaurants and bars, are the responsibility of national governments; the EU’s simply coordinates. All EU countries have national rules in place, even though they vary in scope. Overall results show the positive, and immediate, health effects of indoor smoking bans.

Further information

• European Commission’s Directorate General for Health and Food Safety website, https://ec.europa.eu/health/tobacco/policy_en
• European Commission’s Eurostat website, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Tobacco_consumption_statistics
• EPRS publication on ‘Technological innovation strategies in substance use disorders’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2017)581942

Written by Enrico D’Ambrogio,

© beebright / Fotolia

Following fears in 2017 of an escalation of the North Korean crisis, an unexpected detente has come in early 2018. North Korean athletes took part in the Winter Olympics in South Korea, and Pyongyang undertook a charm offensive followed by a successful historic inter-Korean summit in late April, which may prompt long-awaited peace talks. A summit between US President Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong‑un had been scheduled for 12 June in Singapore, but Trump called it off on 24 May. The main issue is the extent to which Pyongyang’s leadership is ready to agree on denuclearisation on the Korean Peninsula.

An unexpected detente

The events of 2017 triggered fears around the world that the North Korean crisis could develop into a larger-scale conflict. Instead, in his New Year speech, Kim, though not renouncing his bellicose language towards the USA, held out an olive branch to Seoul, calling for peace on the Korean peninsula and offering talks on sending a delegation to the February 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang (South Korea). The USA and South Korea announced the postponement of their annual Foal Eagle military exercises. On 17 January 2018, the two Koreas reached an agreement: North Korea would participate in the Olympics, the athletes of both sides would march together under the blue Korean Reunification Flag and form a joint women’s ice hockey team. Kim’s younger sister Kim Yo-jong was a member of the North Korean delegation and her handshake with South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in during the opening ceremony, together with an all-female North Korean squad of cheerleaders, upstaged the Olympic athletes. Kim Yo‑jong delivered her brother’s invitation to President Moon to visit Pyongyang. On 5 March in Pyongyang, Kim met a delegation of South Korean officials for the first time. On 6 March, Seoul announced that the two Koreas had agreed to hold a summit at the end of April at the truce village of Panmunjeom. This was followed by the 9 March announcement that US President Trump had accepted Kim’s proposal for a bilateral summit. Kim then made a secret trip to China to meet Xi Jinping, his first trip abroad since becoming leader. On 21 April, North Korea reaffirmed that it would suspend nuclear and missile tests immediately and dismantle its nuclear site in Punggye-ri, where Pyongyang’s six nuclear tests had taken place. On 28 April, Seoul officials said that the dismantlement would be done in the presence of experts and media representatives.

The inter-Korean summit

On 27 April, Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in met at the Peace House in the truce village of Panmunjeom, in the Korean demilitarised zone. This was the first inter-Korean summit to take place outside North Korea (the previous two in 2000 and 2007 were held in Pyongyang) and the first visit by a Northern leader to Southern territory. Many elements of this highly mediatised summit were expressly designed to be symbolic.

The two leaders issued the Panmunjeom Declaration. They agreed to pursue trilateral or quadrilateral meetings in the course of 2018 ─ involving the two Koreas and the USA, and/or China too ─ to declare the end of the Korean War and to sign a peace treaty. They ‘confirmed the common goal of realising, through complete denuclearisation, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’. They agreed to carry out disarmament in a phased manner and to transform the demilitarised zone into a ‘peace zone’ and to cease all hostile acts against each other, such as for instance broadcasting through loudspeakers and distributing leaflets. The Northern Limit Line in the West Sea (also known as the Yellow Sea) would be turned into a maritime peace zone. The two countries have already re-established a hotline and will hold dialogues, negotiations and establish a joint liaison office with representatives of both sides. Cross-border railways and roads are to be built, as agreed in 2007. Reunion programmes for separated families are to be planned for 15 August, National Liberation Day, the two countries’ only common public holiday, and there will be joint participation in the 2018 Asian Games. Later Pyongyang reset its time zone to match Seoul’s time, moving back from its 2015 decision. Whereas only one year ago, South Korea appeared side-lined in the context of the North Korean crisis, Moon Jae-in, elected on a programme to engage with North Korea, is now reaping the benefits of his work on diplomatic rapprochement between Pyongyang, Seoul and Washington. Not only is he enjoying record support, but he has also convinced a previously reluctant South Korean public of the merits of engaging with Pyongyang. Moon has also underlined that the issue of the US armed forces presence in South Korea (28 500 personnel) is unrelated to the peace agreement ─ although some allege that Washington may consider downsizing or even removing them.

A US-North Korea summit would be on denuclearisation, not on human rights

A US-North Korea summit had been announced as taking place in Singapore on 12 June 2018. It would have been the first ever meeting between a sitting US president and a North Korean leader. Washington has claimed that its intransigent policy ─ which led it to walk away from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, despite EU and UN opposition ─ is paying off. Internationally backed UN sanctions may have convinced Pyongyang’s regime to come to terms, especially after Beijing, frustrated by its lack of leverage to prevent North Korea from escalating regional tensions, began adopting a tougher line. This is a critical issue for Pyongyang as trade with China is crucial to its survival. This also explains why Kim has met Xi Jinping twice in two months ─ a second surprise summit took place on 7 and 8 May. In turn, China is concerned about being outflanked by Washington in peace talks (as is Japan, owing to the security implications) and is successfully reasserting its influence. Kim Jong‑un, meanwhile, has gained confidence since completing the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles able to strike the US mainland: he may feel able to negotiate from a position of strength. His focus now has shifted towards economic development: on 21 April, Kim proclaimed that the ruling Workers’ Party’s ‘new strategic line’ should be socialist economic construction.

On 17 April, it was revealed that, while he still was CIA director – shortly after being nominated (but before being confirmed) as secretary of state – Mike Pompeo had travelled to North Korea to meet with Kim Jong-un. Pompeo said that Kim is ‘serious’ about denuclearisation. The parties may look at the issue in different ways however. Washington’s position can be summed up in the acronym CVID: complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of the North Korean facilities, carried out under the inspection of independent observers. Only once these conditions have been met, would US policy towards Pyongyang be ready to change. Pyongyang may however advocate denuclearisation of the whole Korean Peninsula in a wider sense, that would include the US military presence ─ despite Moon’s recent reassurances ─ and in an incremental approach under which concessions would be synchronised. North Korea threatened to pull out of the Singapore summit following US National Security Adviser, John Bolton‘s, and Vice-President, Mike Pence‘s, references to the Libyan model, and insulted the latter. This prompted Trump to cancel the summit on 24 May, citing ‘tremendous anger and open hostility in North Korea’s most recent statement.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres is optimistic that the negotiations on denuclearisation would be meaningful. A compromise between the two positions will however need to be found if a deal is to be achieved. Should a summit take place, its agenda ─ as was the case for the inter-Korean summit ─ may not include North Korean human rights abuses, despite the ‘egregious human rights violations’ ascertained in the 2017 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices published on 20 April by the US Department of State. However, following a second surprise visit by Pompeo to Pyongyang on 9 May, three US citizens imprisoned in North Korea since 2015 and 2017, were released ─ a goodwill gesture from Kim.

EU and European Parliament on recent North Korean crisis developments

On 9 March, High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini welcomed the announce­ment of the two summits. She reaffirmed that the EU supports ‘the objective of the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula’. On 13 March, during a debate at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, she praised President Moon’s efforts and underlined the power of multilateral diplomacy and the unity of the international community. A delegation from Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs visited South Korea, including the demilitarised zone near the North Korean border, on 5 and 6 April. The delegation advocated a new boost to peace talks and the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, urging that pressure on North Korea should be maintained, until it delivers in a concrete manner. On 6 April, the EU Council aligned its restrictive measures with the latest UN sanctions against North Korea, and on 19 April it added four people involved in financing the nuclear programme to the sanctions list. On 21 April, the HR/VP welcomed Kim’s announcement that nuclear tests and missiles launches were being halted and the nuclear test site closed. She offered to share the EU’s experience of negotiations on denuclearisation, while maintaining its policy of critical engagement.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘North Korea: No summit for the moment‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Wouter van Ballegooij and Piotr Bakowski,

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In the wake of recent attacks, surveys show that combatting terrorism while respecting individual freedom, remains one of the key concerns of EU citizens. The EU fights terrorism through supporting various national measures and exchanges, including those preventing radicalisation and recruitment, measures addressing terrorist financing and regulating the possession and acquisition of weapons and explosives, as well as instruments aimed at strengthening security at the Union’s external borders. Moreover, the EU supports operational cooperation between national law enforcement authorities, as well as harmonising terrorism-related provisions in criminal law and procedure. This includes active cooperation with third countries and international organisations.

Gaps and barriers

Nevertheless, this Cost of Non-Europe report identifies a number of gaps and barriers in EU counterterrorism action, notably regarding:

• The accountability and oversight of – and the evidence-base for – policy and law making;
• The evidence base for – and fundamental rights compliance of – counter-radicalisation programmes;
• The scope of action related to the disruption of terrorist financing;
• Information sharing between Member States through various EU and national databases, in part due to the complex architecture of these databases and the lack of their interconnection due to legal and technical limitations and a degree of unwillingness among national authorities to share information;
• The awareness and use made of judicial cooperation tools; and
• The use made of the (analytical) support and coordination possibilities by EU agencies.

Impact of terrorism and counterterrorism measures

Further EU action in the area is imperative since, besides the impact on victims and their families, terrorism has a negative effect on the wellbeing of the population as a whole, affecting people’s life satisfaction, happiness, health and trust within communities and in national political institutions. Since 2004, terrorism has cost the EU about €185 billion in lost Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and around €5.6 billion in lost lives, injuries and damages to infrastructure. It is argued that terrorism also harms trade, foreign direct investment, tourism (where the consequences are immediate, but often short-lived) and transport. Inversely, the defence sector has benefited from increased investments. Moreover, in recent years, the EU counterterrorism budget has risen significantly, as illustrated by the €4 billion in commitments and €3 billion in payments towards the Commission’s Security and Citizenship programme in 2016. Finally, certain measures and practices under the guise of the fight against terrorism have had a disproportionate impact on suspects and wider groups within the society: not only have they violated fundamental rights, but they were also counterproductive. Examples include the rendition, unlawful detention and torture of terrorism suspects in secret locations, anti-radicalisation programmes conflating the Muslim faith with violent extremism (and thus further ostracising a community which already faces severe discrimination), as well as blanket mass surveillance by intelligence services.

Policy options

Significant benefits could be achieved by the EU and its Member States by addressing the gaps and barriers described above, notably by:

• Making sure we know what works and what does not and ensuring people’s fundamental rights are respected in the fight against terrorism. This can be achieved through the development of an evidence-based EU criminal policy cycle involving the European Parliament and national parliaments. In this context EU institutions should conduct proper ex-ante assessments and ex-post evaluations of counterterrorism measures in line with better law making principles;
• In the same vein, monitoring the effectiveness and fundamental rights compliance of counter-radicalisation programmes;
• Depriving terrorists from their funding by further refining the framework for countering terrorism financing; and
• Fostering a European law enforcement culture with full respect for fundamental rights, in which relevant information is shared and analysed, judicial cooperation tools are properly used and seeking the support of EU agencies becomes a natural thing to do. This also requires the allocation of significant resources aimed at training and exchanges.

Beyond resulting in a more relevant, coherent, effective and efficient action in the fight against terrorism, such measures could increase the wellbeing of the population, reduce the material and immaterial impacts of terrorism, and ensure protection of fundamental rights when impacted by counterterrorism measures.

Read this study on ‘The fight against terrorism‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.