European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for EU nationals held as political prisoners in third countries.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

EU citizens are sometimes imprisoned without due process or sentenced after a politically motivated trial in non-EU countries that do not uphold the rule of law or human rights standards. These include journalists reporting from difficult situations, human rights defenders, and people visiting for personal reasons.

© vchalup / Fotolia

The EU is committed to promoting human rights and freedoms all over the world and has robust mechanisms in place to protect human rights defenders. It also aims to protect its citizens abroad as far as possible. EU diplomacy, coupled with individual EU countries’ efforts, can really make a difference. The EU monitors situations closely and often puts pressure on governments, either confidentially or publicly, to find a solution. Its diplomatic service sometimes issues statements calling for a fair trial or for the presumption of innocence to be upheld in line with international human rights norms.

The European Parliament also champions the causes of political prisoners with EU citizenship, highlighting their cases in its urgency resolutions and addressing their ordeals during MEP delegations’ visits to the countries concerned. Groups of EU parliamentarians can, meanwhile, issue statements or address letters to the national authorities in question. Finally, Parliament does its best to make sure that these people and their struggles are not forgotten. For instance, the Swedish-Eritrean citizen Dawit Isaak, a journalist detained in Eritrea since 2001, has twice been nominated – in 2009 and 2017 – as one of the three finalists for the Sakharov Prize.

Further information

• EPRS briefing EU support for human rights defenders around the world, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614626/EPRS_BRI(2017)614626_EN.pdf
• European Commission webpage on Consular protection for European Union citizens abroad, https://ec.europa.eu/consularprotection/content/about-consular_en

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© Rawf8 / Fotolia

China is a major strategic partner for the European Union, despite divergences on human rights issues, as well as on some economic and foreign policies. At their 20th EU-China summit in July, the two sides agreed to further develop their partnership and to seek to avoid global trade wars, which many analysts fear could be triggered by US President Donald Trump’s protectionist policies. They agreed, in principle, to support reform of the World Trade Organization, which has been snubbed by President Trump. However, China’s increasingly close military ties with Russia cause concern in the EU. Trade, security and connectivity will be important topics of the 12th ASEM (EU-Asia) summit in October, which will gather heads of state or government of 51 European and Asian countries.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from major international think tanks on China, its ties with the EU and related issues. More studies on the topics can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are thinking’, published in March 2018. One of the forthcoming publications in this series will be devoted to wider EU-Asia relations.

EU-China relations

China and the EU: The contradictions of exercising joint trade leadership
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2018

‘Tell China’s stories well’: Implications for the Western narrative
Polish Institute of International Affairs, September 2018

Europe’s China vetoes
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2018

US-China trade war: What’s in it for Europe?
Bruegel, August 2018

Europe’s dependence on critical raw materials: Implications for the competitiveness and independence of strategic industries
Istituto Affari Internazionali, August 2018

Trading places: How the EU-China summit underlined U.S. isolationism in trade under Trump
Council on Foreign Relations, July 2018

Europe, China and a changed global order
Friends of Europe, July 2018

Trump provides China an opening in Europe
Carnegie Europe, July 2018

Big in Asia: Behind the rhetoric of EU relations with China and Japan
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2018

With “strategic partners” like this, Who needs competitors? Europe needs to change its military to military relations with China
German Marshall Fund, July 2018

Trump cannot bring Europe and China together
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2018

China’s strategic investments in Europe: The case of maritime ports
Bruegel, June 2018

Reciprocity and mutual benefits: EU-China cooperation on and protection of geographical indications
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2018

The strategic rationale for European engagement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, June 2018

European and Chinese trade competition in third markets: The case of Latin America
Bruegel, June 2018

Tomorrow’s silk road: Assessing an EU-China Free Trade Agreement
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2018

EU–China innovation relations: From zero-sum to global networks
Chatham House, May 2018

How China approaches international law: Implications for Europe
European Institute for Asian Studies, May 2018

Blue China: Navigating the maritime silk road to Europe
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2018

China’s international relations in the new era of Xi Jinping: Implications for Europe
European Institute for Asian Studies, March 2018

Foreign relations and security

Why Russia and China are strengthening security ties
Carnegie Moscow, September 2018

China is filling the void at the United Nations
Observer Research Fundation, September 2018

China: Zwischen Schlüsselrolle und Marginalisierung
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2018

Chinese strategy, military forces, and economics
Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2018

Russia and China have a message for the West
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, September 2018

Dispelling the dominant myths of China in Africa
Atlantic Council, September 2018

China’s summer of discontent
German Marshall Fund, August 2018

Beijing’s ultimate goal: The military-civilian fusion
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, August 2018

Fear and loathing on the new silk road: Chinese security in Afghanistan and beyond
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2018

The South China Sea needs ASEAN more than ever
International Crisis Group, July 2018

China-Vatican talks: Covert negotiations aim to end decades of severed relations
Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2018

The Rise of China’s security-industrial complex
Council on Foreign Relations, July 2018

China und der Kampf gegen die drei üblen Kräfte
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2018

The security strategies of the US, China, Russia and the EU: Living in different worlds
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 2018

China’s strength is in making the West doubt the value of doubt
Chatham House, June 2018

China-Taiwan relations
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2018

China and the international order
Rand Europe, May 2018

Economy and trade

Rule of law in China: A priority for businesses and Western Governments
Foreign Policy Centre, September 2018

Inequality in China
Bruegel, September 2018

China’s greater bay area has real economic power
Chatham House, September 2018

The unlikely, obvious solution to the trade war
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2018

The 21st century maritime silk road
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, September 2018

China’s Belt and Road Initiative turns five
Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2018

The power of China’s energy efficiency policies
Institut français des relations internationales, September 2018

More shots fired in US-China trade war
Atlantic Council, September 2018

How did China manage its currency over the summer?
Council on Foreign Relations, September 2018

Trump and China formalize tariffs on $260 billion of imports and look ahead to next phase
Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 2018

China’s peaking emissions and the future of global climate policy
Brookings Institution, September 2018

How Chinese cybersecurity standards impact doing business in China
Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2018

How the United States should confront China without threatening the global trading system
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2018

Goodbye deleveraging: Fiscal and monetary expansion to support growth in China
Bruegel, August 2018

Weaker renminbi is more than a snub to Trump
Chatham House, August 2018

The Chinese race to artificial intelligence
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, August 2018

China’s new investment rules
Brookings Institution, August 2018

Managing risk to build a better belt and road
Chatham House, July 2018

The global innovation sweepstakes: A quest to win the future
Atlantic Council, June 2018

What would happen if China started selling off its treasury portfolio?
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2018

It is America’s move in its competition with China
German Marshall Fund, June 2018

China’s new role in the global economy
Bruegel, May 2018

On Chinese investment and influence in Europe
Carnegie Europe, May 2018

The invisible silk road: Enter the digital dragon
European Institute for Asian Studies, May 2018

Game of institutional balancing: China, the AIIB, and the future of global governance
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, May 2018

The role of investors in promoting sustainable infrastructure under the belt and road Initiative
Chatham House, May 2018

The future of nuclear power in China
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2018

How big is China’s digital economy?
Bruegel, May 2018

China’s financial opening: Will it be different this time?
Bruegel, May 2018

EU-China FDI: Working towards more reciprocity in investment relations
Mercator Institute for China Studies, April 2018

China a look behind the wall
Observer Research Foundation, April 2018

Beijing’s ambitions in the South China Sea: How should Europe respond?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2018

China’s global connectivity politics: On confidently dealing with Chinese initiatives
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2018

High on the party, low on the state: A quantum leap in the process of China’s reconstruction
Centre for Eastern Studies, April 2018

China, the world and the next decade: Better growth, better climate
Grantham Research Institute on climate change, April 2018

Read this briefing on ‘China‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

© Beautyimage / Shutterstock.com

Technological systems, once introduced in a particular socio-economic context, often evolve in unforeseen ways and may fall prey to unexpected power relations. Blockchain, as a technology that relies on decentralisation to enable storing and securing data-based transactions without central administration, is currently facing significant centralisation pressures that may undermine the purpose of operating a decentralised blockchain network. But what if blockchain fulfilled its promise to be truly decentralised?

Decentralisation, namely the notion that not one single entity has control over all the process, is often viewed as blockchain’s key innovation, and even its raison d’être. The fully decentralised, self-sufficient and self-contained character of blockchain, in which there is no central body or trusted third party to authorise transactions, has made this technology extremely popular worldwide, as it enables millions of previously excluded people to participate in the next wave of economic change. Blockchain could support new forms of fully decentralised infrastructure, for applications as varied as finance, cloud databases and the management of common assets and resources.

Because blockchain has no central authority, it relies on miners to maintain these decentralised services/databases collectively. Anyone can be a miner, respectively storing the blockchain and determining the transaction records. The value of decentralised control is that it removes intermediaries, increases transaction transparency, reshapes value chains, democratises data, improves trust and reduces the risk of cyber-attacks.

Centralisation tendencies

While decentralisation cannot be absolute, given that blockchain itself is a software developed in a centralised way as a public key infrastructure, there are strong indications that blockchain, despite its open source nature, has evolved into a highly centralised structure that can undermine the wider blockchain ecosystem. Oen of the best known blockhains is that of the currency, bitcoin. Now, it is largely in the hands of major holders, known as ‘whales’, who have the power to manipulate the bitcoin network. First of all, the process of verifying transactions and securing a blockchain ledger against attack, called mining, has become a capital-intensive industry which requires a large amount of capital to purchase the most advanced hardware and fast processing power. The control of manufacturing of mining equipment, and of a large proportion of the network’s hashing power – i.e. the amount of computing power the bitcoin network consumes in order to be continuously operational and generate new cryptocurrencies – by huge mining farms with strong mining resources, especially in China, has resulted in the top four bitcoin-mining operations holding more than 53 % of the system’s average mining capacity. In the case of Ethereum, 61 % of the system’s average weekly capacity is in the hands of only three miners.

It should however be noted that, as bitcoin miners depend entirely on the value of bitcoin for their revenues, dominating mining may have a negative effect on the price and integrity of bitcoin. BitInfoCharts found that only 1 000 of the 11 million bitcoin holders in the world control 35.4 % of all bitcoins in circulation. One of the main factors that reinforce centralisation tendencies is also the lack of ‘scalability’, meaning that blockchains are currently unable to deal with large numbers of users and, as the block size increases over time, only a few institutions will have the means to maintain blockchains. Moreover, while anyone is entitled to submit changes to the software (such as bug fixes, or incremental improvements), only a small number of individuals (the core developers) have the power to decide which changes will be incorporated into the main branch of the software.

Although originally designed as disintermediation tools, blockchain ecosystems are currently characterised by a number of third parties and profitable businesses offering intermediation services, with resilient asymmetries of information and power between developers and users. As a result of these centralisation tendencies, system vulnerabilities are emerging, and centralised failures may occur in the form of the threat of a ‘51% attack’. The emergence of a dominant player is a point of failure of the whole system: eliminating that player destroys the system. Given that whoever controls mining also controls the protocol, this decides which transactions are to be deemed valid, increasing the risk of abuse of a dominant position. Additionally, if the majority of the hashing power decides for or against a change, it is nearly impossible for other users of the network to oppose this decision. All these factors call into question the egalitarian potential of current distributed networks, their accessibility and their libertarian nature.

What do the centralisation trends of blockchain mean for European policy-making?

To prevent the above-mentioned centralisation tendencies in blockchain innovation, co-evolutionary design and democratised knowledge of the technical considerations behind protocol upgrades are needed. Some newer blockchain projects are planning to hardcode their decision-making processes into the software, in the form of smart contracts, a method known as ‘on-chain governance’, e.g. Tezos, Polkadot and Steemit.

Furthermore, authentication protocols should be designed in a way that minimises the risk of centralisation, through the introduction of the proof of stake mechanism. This is an innovative consensus algorithm that provides for mining opportunities in proportion to the amount of tokens held by a user on the network and facilitates voting for the approval of new blocks on the basis of the coins a user holds, rather than in accordance with their computing power. Pursuing innovative scaling solutions that provide alternative ways for businesses to offer lower fees and an efficient platform for users may also strengthen the decentralised nature and censorship resistance of blockchain. The introduction of open-sourcing patents such as the Blockchain Defensive Patent Licence (BDPL) is expected to encourage mining entities to grant their respective mining patents under a mutually defensive patent licence. Such a system will prevent any single mining consortium from obtaining the ability to launch majority (or near-majority) attacks, given that there is currently fierce competition amongst miners to obtain ‘killer’ patents that would essentially allow them to perform blockchain-related mining faster and in a more efficient manner, and address the relevant vulnerabilities.

Beyond these technical developments, the EU has adopted a series of institutional initiatives aimed at strengthening the decentralised character of this disruptive technology. The recent launch of the EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum in February 2018 has enriched the discussion on the opportunities and challenges of the decentralised character of the blockchain ecosystem. Recently, 24 European countries signed a declaration on the establishment of a European Blockchain Partnership, with a view to developing a blockchain infrastructure that can enhance value-based, trusted, user-centric digital services across borders within the digital single market. The partnership will be a vehicle for cooperation amongst Member States to exchange experience and expertise in the technical and regulatory fields, and prepare for the launch of EU-wide blockchain applications across the digital single market for the benefit of the public and private sectors. The European Parliament’s Industry Committee recently agreed a motion for a resolution on ‘Distributed ledger technologies and blockchains: building trust with disintermediation‘. The resolution, due to be voted by the full Parliament in October, emphasises the need to safeguard trustworthy blockchain decentralisation, and calls upon the European Commission to explore the possibility of creating an EU-wide, highly scalable and interoperable network that makes use of the technology possible for European citizens. The main challenge associated with all these EU-level initiatives is to create a framework of legal and institutional certainty that would facilitate the development of scalable, efficient and high-impact decentralised solutions to social innovation challenges arising from blockchain applications.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘What if blockchain were to be truly decentralised?‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Parliament (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

On the Parliament’s agenda for this first October session, the Council and Commission will make statements on Tuesday morning on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 18 and 19 October 2018, which is due to focus on the issues of migration and internal security, most recently discussed by EU leaders at their informal meeting in Salzburg in September. The future partnership with the UK, following its withdrawal from the EU, is also likely to be discussed by the 27 leaders, as they push for agreement on the framework for that future relationship. Looking to the future of Europe, on Wednesday, the plenary will hold the next in the series of debates on the future of Europe, this time with the Prime Minister of Estonia, Jüri Ratas.

On Monday evening, the Commission is set to answer an oral question on the issue of blockchains and distributed ledger technologies, which have reached a point where great claims are made of their potential applications across a wide range of fields, but the regulatory environment remains uncertain. Parliament’s Industry Committee thus wants to know the Commission’s plans to bring legal certainty to the sector and what it is going to do to support a competitive blockchain ecosystem in Europe.

Tuesday morning features a formal sitting, with an address by Milo Đukanović, President of Montenegro, a candidate country for EU membership. Later that day, Members will vote on draft amending budget No 5/2018, which cancels the reserve set aside to support Turkey under the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA II), due to the country not fulfilling the conditions for its disbursement. The funds will be reallocated to reinforce the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and to humanitarian aid for other urgent actions.

Few could have predicted the rapid changes in the audiovisual market just a few short years ago. There is a pressing need to update the rules to provide a more flexible and future-proof framework for the provision of audiovisual media services, and one that protects vulnerable viewers, such as children, limits advertising and regulates what can be shown on our screens. On Tuesday, Parliament is also due to vote on an overhaul of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. While co-regulation and self-regulation will remain important, the proposals as agreed in trilogue with the Council expect VOD and VSP platforms to share responsibility for ensuring that harmful audiovisual content is controlled.

Two proposals from the Commission will be debated on Tuesday evening on updating the VAT framework (which dates back to the 1960s), taking the next steps towards a definitive VAT system for the EU. The first proposal concerns the harmonisation of VAT rates, which can distort the single market when, because of VAT charges, goods are more expensive in one country than in a neighbouring EU state. Countries would still be able to apply some VAT reductions in certain circumstances, and some goods be exempted, but the proposed minimum would be 12-15 %, with Parliament suggesting a maximum of 25 %. An EU VAT Web Information Portal would also be set up to provide information on EU VAT rates, and Parliament expects the benefits of reduced rates to be transferred to consumers. The second proposal concerns the proposed VAT regime for cross-border trade; which aims to tackle VAT fraud, as well as simplifying the rules for e-commerce and for SMEs.

Two more pieces of the law enforcement puzzle should fall into place on Wednesday afternoon when the proposals to reinforce and enhance the role of the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) are debated. This EU agency has seen its activities in fighting terrorism, cybercrime, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings increase in recent years, and Parliament is ready to support its increased workload through a new governance model, now that the equally necessary and connected function of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office has been decided. On Wednesday, Parliament will also debate a new regulation, aimed at improving the legal framework governing the freezing and confiscation of criminal assets in cross-border cases. The proposed regulation would improve mutual recognition in criminal matters in the EU, and improve the procedures recognising, freezing and confiscating criminal gains. Importantly, the proposals also prioritise the victims of such crime and their rights to compensation and restitution.

The issue of data is also on the agenda for Wednesday evening, but in this case, the debate will cover the free flow of non-personal data within the EU, allowing businesses to stock and process non-personal data (personal data, meaning that which can identify an individual, are already covered by the General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR) anywhere in the EU without unjustified restriction (except for public security). The proposal could enable data such as accounting and financial information to flow across borders in the EU, giving companies more choice in the location of their data services.

A list of all material prepared for this Plenary Session: The Audiovisual Media Services Directive (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Steps towards a definitive VAT system (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Freezing and confiscation orders (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Free flow of non-personal data in the EU (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL)

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig,

© 008melisa / Fotolia

In order to respond more effectively to the challenge of criminals and terrorists hiding assets in other Member States, in 2016 the European Commission proposed a regulation on the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders in criminal matters. The directly applicable instrument removes the need for national transposition, broadens the scope of the current rules to cover new types of confiscation and includes provisions on victims’ rights to restitution and compensation.

Provisional agreement having been reached in interinstitutional negotiations in June 2018, the European Parliament is due to vote on the agreed text of the regulation in October 2018. The Council should follow suit shortly. The regulation will apply 24 months after its entry into force.

Versions

• September 2018: ‘Mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders Committee responsible: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) COM(2016) 819
21.12.2016 Rapporteur: Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE, France) 2016/0412 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs:

 

 

  Salvatore Domenico Pogliese (EPP, Italy)
Emilian Pavel (S&D, Romania)
Monica Macovei (ECR, Romania)
Barbara Spinelli (GUE/NGL, Italy)
Eva Joly (Greens/EFA, France)
Ignazio Corrao (EFDD, Italy)
Lorenzo Fontana (ENF, Italy) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: First-reading vote in plenary

Written by Tarja Laaninen,

© Sergey Ryzhov / Fotolia

Eight EU Member States have launched, or are about to launch, national mandatory labelling schemes for certain food products, mainly for milk and milk used in dairy products, but also meat used in processed foods.

The regulatory basis for these national measures is the Regulation on the provision of food information to consumers, which allows Member States to adopt additional national measures concerning the mandatory labelling of foodstuffs, as long as these are justified by reasons specifically defined in the regulation.

The European Parliament has been supporting origin labelling in several resolutions. Consumer organisations have advocated it as well, while many industry stakeholders have highlighted the practical difficulties and costs it would bring. The European Commission has reiterated its position, based on its reports exploring the issue, that voluntary origin labelling is the best option at European level.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Mandatory origin-labelling schemes in Member States‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Enrico D’Ambrogio,

The 10th Asia-Europe Parliamentary Meeting (ASEP10) will take place at the European Parliament in Brussels on 27 and 28 September 2018. The meeting will focus on climate change and environmental challenges. The final declaration will be transmitted to the 12th ASEM Summit, to be held in Brussels on 18 and 19 October 2018.

ASEM

© European Union, 2018

The first Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit was held in Bangkok, Thailand, in 1996. At that time it involved 26 partners. Since then, summits have been held every two years, alternately in the EU and Asia. After several rounds of enlargement, ASEM today consists of 53 members, including: 30 European countries (28 EU Member States, plus Norway and Switzerland); 18 Asian countries (the 10 members of ASEAN plus Bangladesh, China, Japan, India, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Mongolia and Pakistan); as well as Australia, Russia and New Zealand, together with the ASEAN secretariat and the EU. ASEM partners represent 60 % of the global population, 65 % of the global economy, 55 % of global trade and 75 % of global tourism.

ASEM is an informal and flexible inter-regional process of dialogue and cooperation that is based on equal partnership and aimed at enhancing mutual understanding. ASEM represents a forum for sharing information, and building confidence, rather than a tool for negotiation and problem-solving. Because of its informality, no formal or structured agenda is set out. The Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework (AECF), which ASEM established in 2000, defines its working methods. ASEM has no secretariat, and the Singapore-based Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) is its only institution, set up with the aim to promote mutual understanding through intellectual, cultural and people-to-people exchanges. The ASEM dialogue addresses issues of mutual interest, divided into three pillars: political; economic and financial; and social, cultural and educational. Besides the ASEM summits, numerous meetings take place among ministers and senior officials, as well as regular dialogues.

From ASEM to ASEP

The Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership (ASEP) meeting gives a democratic input to this process. It is the parliamentary dimension of the Asia-Europe Meeting and assembles parliamentarians from the ASEM countries and the European Parliament (EP). It is normally convened on a regular bi-annual basis alternately in Asia and in Europe before ASEM summits (it did not take place in 1998 and 2000). ASEP 10 is scheduled for 27-28 September 2018, when, for the first time, it will take place at the European Parliament in Brussels.

ASEP10 is to focus on climate change and environmental challenges as a priority for the planet, and on multilateralism as a fair methodology to shape advanced and equitable international relationships. The programme includes three discussion panels on climate change and the environment’s impact on economy, migration and security. The final declaration will be transmitted to the 12th ASEM summit, scheduled to take place in Brussels on 18-19 October 2018, which should also discuss the Commission and the Vice President/High Representative’s joint communication on ‘Connecting Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an EU Strategy‘ adopted on 19 September 2018.

Climate change: a challenge for Europe, Asia and the world

In the summer of 2018, both Asia and Europe experienced the consequences of extreme weather, in countries such as Greece, India, Japan and Sweden. Cooperation between the EU and Asia on addressing climate change challenges is of increasing importance, especially after the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Asia’s rapid economic expansion is expected to increase its contribution to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, projected to rise from 40 % in 2016 to 48 % in 2030. A 6oC temperature rise above pre-industrial levels is projected for the Asian landmass by the end of the century, which may even pose an existential threat to some countries. Asia is the most disaster-prone region in the world and 10 Asian countries are among the top 20 in the Global Climate Risk Index. Climate change impacts may slash up to 9 % off south Asia’s economy every year by the end of this century.

The European Union is committed to climate action and has been in the front line of setting ambitious climate and energy targets, with a view to assisting the shift towards a low-carbon economy. The EU is working towards cutting domestic GHG emissions by at least 40 % by 2030, compared to 1990 levels, with a medium-term goal of achieving a 20 % reduction by 2020. The long-term objective for 2050 is a reduction of GHG emissions of 80-95% compared to 1990. To meet the 20% target for 2020, the EU has set up an Emissions Trading System (ETS), the world’s biggest scheme for trading greenhouse gas emissions allowances. It has been reviewed in line with the EU’s 2030 climate and energy targets. EU climate legislation includes the ETS (reformed with the introduction of a future market stability reserve), eco-design and energy labelling, the Effort-Sharing Decision/Regulation, the Renewable Energy Directive, the Energy Efficiency Directive, CO2 limits for cars and vans, and legislation on fluorinated greenhouse gases.

The EU is also actively engaged in the international efforts to reduce GHG emissions under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. The EU is the world’s largest contributor of climate finance to developing countries: together with its Member States and the European Investment Bank, it contributed €20.2 billion in public climate finance to developing countries in 2016. The EU’s flagship initiative is the Global Climate Change Alliance Plus (GCCA+). It also works closely with other countries and regions to advance dialogue and cooperation on climate change, for instance during the annual climate diplomacy weeks – in June and September 2018 – where EU delegations around the world reach out to communities and partner organisations.

European Parliament’s position ASEM and ASEP

Since 2002, the EP has been represented through ad hoc delegations at ASEP meetings. In 2018, the Parliament’s delegation is composed of up to 11 MEPs, including the president, the vice-president in charge of relations with Asia and the chairs of the ASEP-related delegations. In a resolution of 15 January 2014 on the future of EU-ASEAN relations, the EP stressed that ‘the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership (ASEP), as the existing channels for dialogue between the EU and ASEAN, should be upgraded at governmental and parliamentary level and further extended’. In a resolution of 15 February 2017, MEPs welcomed the proposal from Mongolia (host of ASEP9 in 2016) to set up an ASEM centre, including a virtual/online facility. The Parliament also urged the Commission and the Vice President/High Representative to use ASEM summits or meetings to raise issues such as the situation of the Rohingya people, the freedom of expression in Vietnam and the situation of human rights in Laos.

Climate change

The EP advocates an ambitious EU climate policy with ambitious binding targets on climate and energy: a reduction by at least 40 % in domestic GHG emissions from 1990 levels; a 30 % share for renewable energy sources in energy consumption; and a 40 % increase in energy efficiency. Before the 23rd UNFCCC climate change conference (COP23), the Parliament voiced disappointment that, when introducing CORSIA, ICAO did not agree on emissions reductions in international aviation, but instead focused mainly on offsets. MEPs regretted that the quality of the offsets is not guaranteed, that the application of CORSIA is only legally binding from 2027 onward, and that there is a lack of commitment by major ICAO members. The EP voiced support for broad-based carbon pricing and the allocation of emissions-trading revenues to climate-related investments. It asked to phase out all fossil fuel subsidies by 2020. MEPs backed environmentally and socially sustainable biofuel production that does not lead to deforestation and rising food prices.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘ASEP10 gives priority to climate change‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Visit the European Parliament homepage on climate change.

Written by Nikolina Šajn (1st edition),

© disq / Fotolia

As part of the third ‘Europe on the move’ package of measures, on 27 May 2018, the European Commission presented a proposal for a regulation on type-approval requirements for motor vehicles and their trailers, as regards their general safety and the protection of vehicle occupants and vulnerable road users. The regulation is part of the EU’s efforts to halve the number of fatal and serious injuries in road crashes between 2020 and 2030. It would introduce a number of advanced vehicle safety features that passenger cars, vans, buses and trucks would have to have as standard equipment in order to be sold on the internal market. It would replace three current type-approval regulations: the General Vehicle Safety Regulation, the Pedestrian Protection Regulation and the Hydrogen-Powered Motor Vehicles Regulation. In the European Parliament, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection is in charge of the file.

Versions

• September 2018: ‘General safety of vehicles and protection of vulnerable road users‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on type-approval requirements for motor vehicles and their trailers, and systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles, as regards their general safety and the protection of vehicle occupants and vulnerable road users, amending Regulation (EU) 2018/… and repealing Regulations (EC) No 78/2009, (EC) No 79/2009 and (EC) No 661/2009 Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) COM(2018) 286
17.5.2018 Rapporteur: Róża Gräfin von Thun und Hohenstein (EPP, Poland) 2018/0145 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs:

  Olga Sehnalová (S&D, Czech Republic)
Daniel Dalton (ECR, United Kingdom)
Dita Charanzová (ALDE, Czech Republic)
Pascal Durand (Greens/EFA, France) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Timeline

Written by Ivana Katsarova,

© Lorelyn Medina / Fotolia

The diversity underpinning the European project is embodied in the harmonious co-existence of 24 official languages. Following the success of the European Year of Languages (2001), the Council of Europe designated 26 September as the European Day of Languages. The European Parliament has consistently acted to support endangered languages and linguistic diversity in the EU, calling on the EU and the Member States to commit resources to their protection and promotion. In May 2018, the European Commission put forward a proposal aimed at improving the teaching and learning of languages.

Global linguistic diversity

Between 6 000 and 7 000 languages are spoken in the world today. Giving a precise figure is impossible, since the borderline between a language and a dialect is not well defined. Strikingly, 97 % of the world’s population speak about 4 % of the world’s languages, while only about 3 % speak the roughly 96 % of languages remaining. Half of the world’s 7.6 billion inhabitants share just 13 native languages. Just over 3 % of the world’s languages – 255 – are indigenous to Europe. The highest number of living languages – 2 165 – is found in Asia.

Did you know that…There are 68 different indigenous languages in Mexico, further subdivided into 364 variations. Ayapaneco is one of them, and after having survived the Spanish conquest, wars, revolutions, famines and floods, it is now at risk of extinction. Indeed, there are just two persons left who can speak it fluently, but they refuse to talk to each other…

Source: The Guardian, Language at risk of dying out – the last two speakers aren’t talking, 2011.

According to forecasts, some 90 % of all languages may be replaced by dominant languages by the end of the 21st century. The Unesco Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger reveals that 40 % of languages spoken in the world are endangered (see Figures 1 and 2). Worryingly, at least 2 000 of the world’s endangered languages have fewer than 1 000 speakers, and 4 % have disappeared in the past 70 years.

Linguistic diversity in the EU

The EU has three alphabets and 24 official languages, which are listed in Article 55(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Respect for linguistic diversity is rooted in Article 3(3) TEU and Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Mirroring population figures, the most widely spoken mother tongue in the EU is German (16 %), followed by Italian and English (13 % each), French (12 %), then Spanish and Polish (8 % each). According to a 2013 study, regional languages are spoken by between 40 and 50 million people in the EU. Among them, Catalan is the most widely used, with over 10 million speakers, mainly in the Spanish region of Catalonia, but also in the French Pyrenees and the Italian region of Sardinia.

Safeguarding diversity

The critical threshold for the survival of a language is estimated at 300 000 speakers. According to Unesco, there are 221 endangered regional and minority languages in the EU (see Figure 3). While indigenous to Europe, these are not state languages within a particular state. They are protected and promoted by the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992) adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe, and signed and ratified by 17 EU Member States. The EU is committed to safeguarding linguistic diversity, and it promotes knowledge of languages through Erasmus+. However, it has limited influence, because educational and language policies are the responsibility of the individual EU countries.

Language learning in the EU

The results of a 2012 poll suggest that the majority of Europeans (54 %) are able to hold a conversation in at least one additional language, a quarter (25 %) can speak at least two and one in ten (10 %) are conversant in at least three. The five most widely spoken foreign languages remain English (38 %), French (12 %), and German (11 %), followed by Spanish (7 %) and Russian (5 %). Two-thirds of Europeans (67 %) find that English is the most useful foreign language, followed by German (17 %), French (16 %), Spanish (14 %) and Chinese (6 %). The majority of Europeans do not describe themselves as active learners of languages and around a quarter (23 %) have never learnt a second language. The most widespread method used to learn a foreign language is through lessons at school. Over two-thirds of Europeans (68 %) have learnt a foreign language in this way. Interestingly, a 2018 survey shows that while 80 % of respondents (with wide differences among countries) can read and write in more than one language, only 66 % say they would be able to follow a (higher education) course in more than one language (see Figure 4).

Multilingualism in the European Parliament

The European Parliament is committed to ensuring the highest possible degree of multilingualism. In the European assembly, all parliamentary documents are published in all of the EU’s official languages, which are considered equally important. The right of each Member of the Parliament to read and write parliamentary documents, follow debates and speak in his or her own official language is expressly recognised in the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure. Parliament also has an Intergroup focused on protecting traditional minorities and national communities and languages.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Remaining ‘united in diversity’ thanks to multilingualism‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass,

© Zubada / Fotolia

The citizens of the European Union communicate in its 24 official languages, approximately 60 regional and minority languages, and 31 national and regional sign languages. Some of these have many millions of native and foreign speakers, whereas others are spoken by just a few thousand people each.

Dominant languages can threaten the survival of ‘smaller’ ones with many fewer native speakers and which thus need protection. Multilingualism policy in areas such as language teaching and learning, and translation and interpretation, is necessary to facilitate communication among various language communities and for supporting languages with fewer speakers. Moreover, unaddressed language barriers hinder the economy of individual Member States and the EU in general.

The digital shift and ICT technologies open rich possibilities of expression and business, yet these are not spread equally across language communities. Smaller languages are under-represented in digital environments, which could entail their digital extinction. New technologies can facilitate language learning, translation and interpretation. However, paradoxically, the smaller languages, which could benefit the most from these technologies, are the least resourced in data, in researchers specialising in both language and technology, and in human and financial means.

Some solutions to these challenges could emerge from EU-supported and coordinated projects, a clear focus on language technologies in EU policies, and dedicated funding, provided in the clear awareness that these challenges not only have a human dimension but also economic implications for the digital single market and the economy of the EU as a whole.

Read this briefing on ‘Languages and the Digital Single Market‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig and Laura Puccio,

© momius / Fotolia

Following the European Council’s additional guidelines of March 2018, the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) have begun discussions on their future relations, after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU (Brexit). Negotiations continue, in parallel, to agree the terms of a Withdrawal Agreement, the purpose of which is to sort out the main issues regarding the UK’s separation from the EU, in accordance with Article 50 TEU on the procedure for the withdrawal of a Member State from the EU. The negotiating teams currently aim at identifying a political framework for the future partnership, to be annexed to the Withdrawal Agreement and adopted simultaneously. The treaty or treaties governing the future relations between the UK and the EU would only be concluded once the UK leaves the Union and becomes a third country – after the currently scheduled Brexit date of 30 March 2019. At EU level, the treaty or treaties would be subject to the ratification procedure for international agreements under Article 218 TFEU.

Both the EU and the UK have stated their desire for a close partnership in the future. However, a fundamental difference has surfaced in the talks. Whereas the UK has consistently called for a special status, going further and deeper than any existing third-country relationship, the EU has instead based its approach on existing models underpinning its relations with third countries. In particular, the EU assessed the various models used in previous EU agreements against the ‘red lines’ originally set by the UK government: no membership of the customs union or the internal market, no free movement of persons; no jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU); and the regaining of regulatory autonomy. In line with those red lines, the EU has explored what could be offered, in the area of trade, within the framework of a free-trade agreement (FTA) comparable to the EU-South Korea and the EU-Canada agreements. Similarly, the EU is looking at possible arrangements in the fields of justice and home affairs, and foreign policy and defence, based on how the EU cooperates with other third countries. Furthermore, several aspects of the special treatment that were requested by the UK either clash with the above-mentioned UK red lines or with the guiding principles set down in the European Council guidelines for the negotiations. These include: protection of the EU’s interests; preserving the integrity of the internal market and customs union; safeguarding the EU’s decision-making autonomy, including the role of the CJEU; ensuring a balance of rights and obligations and a level playing field; respecting the principle that a third country cannot have the same rights and benefits as a Member State; and safeguarding the EU’s financial stability, as well as its regulatory and supervisory regime and standards. While the objectives of the negotiations might be similar on both sides, the EU and UK perspectives remain divergent, and their positions differ in many areas on the means to achieve those objectives in the context of the future partnership.

In trade and economics, the parties seem to agree on maintaining duty- and quota-free market access in goods, even though for the EU preferential rules of origin would need to be introduced as a result of the UK leaving the customs union. Instead, the UK advocates a facilitated customs arrangement, whereby the UK would apply UK or EU tariff duties at its external border depending on the destination intended for the good (UK or EU internal market) and a common rulebook for goods’ standards checked at the borders, which would eliminate the need for an internal border for goods (including the need for preferential rules of origin) between the EU and the UK. However, the Commission has repeatedly indicated it considers these proposals to be unrealistic. Different approaches have also been suggested with regard to access to fishing waters and sustainable fisheries. Other controversial areas for negotiation will include access to the services market and regulatory cooperation. Greater market access is permitted in some sectors only if regulatory alignment is achieved. Whenever alignment to EU law is required, agreements also entail a role for the CJEU. Further market access in an FTA can only be granted within the constraints of other EU FTAs (most favoured nation (MFN) clauses in previously concluded EU agreements, which may require extending the benefits to other EU partners), and within the constraints of EU law (preserving the integrity of the internal market and the EU decision-making system, including CJEU jurisdiction). Finally, the EU is adamant that strong provisions are introduced to ensure the maintenance of a level playing field (LPF), such as in the areas of competition and state-aid, taxation and environmental and labour standards. Violations of these LPF measures should be subject to a dispute settlement mechanism and sanctions.

In the area of justice and home affairs, the UK has proposed to conclude an internal security treaty with the EU. Such a treaty would be based on the existing EU measures regarding: exchange of information, including access to EU databases; operational cooperation through mutual recognition tools, such as the European arrest warrant; and multilateral cooperation through the EU agencies, Europol and Eurojust. This would avoid any operational gaps post-Brexit and take account of the important contribution the UK has made to date in providing intelligence and analysis under current EU tools. The EU, however, although agreeing to the main areas of future cooperation with the UK – exchange of information; operational police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters – is offering the UK a relationship based on the model of third countries that do not participate in Schengen, rather than a special status. The UK would thereby lose direct access to the EU’s databases and participation rights in the managing bodies of the EU agencies, Europol and Eurojust. Furthermore, the EU mutual recognition instruments recognised as extremely valuable for UK law enforcement – such as the European arrest warrant – would cease to apply. Moreover, data sharing and protection arrangements would need to be agreed to allow the exchange of information to continue in the future.

In addition, in foreign policy and defence, the UK is seeking a special status, including some influence in the EU decision-making process, proportional to its contribution to CFSP and CSDP. However, here again, the EU takes the third-country model of cooperation as a starting point in the talks, although some special arrangements may be possible, inter alia, in light of the UK’s status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and as a significant European military power. The negotiations on the framework for future dialogue, cooperation and coordination in CFSP/CSDP aim at agreeing arrangements as soon as possible after Brexit.

The European Council meeting of 29 June 2018 evaluated the progress made both with respect to the legal provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement, in particular the contentious issue of the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, and with regard to the framework for future relations. The conclusions adopted on that occasion stated that further efforts were needed on both issues.

The European Parliament has already provided essential input to the European Council discussions and guidelines, through its March 2018 resolution on the EU-UK future framework for relations. In particular, it suggested the form of an association agreement for the future treaty with the UK that would be based on four pillars: trade and economic relations; foreign policy, security and defence, and development cooperation; internal security; and thematic cooperation (fisheries, aviation, etc.). A single governance structure and dispute resolution mechanism established by the association agreement would cover the entire EU-UK relationship. On many of the issues under discussion, the European Parliament has to give consent (meaning it has the right of veto) for the conclusion of the EU-UK future relationship agreement(s). However, should the parties conclude an agreement relating exclusively to CFSP/CSDP matters, then the Parliament would not have to give consent nor would it have formal consultation rights on that specific agreement.

Read the complete study on ‘The future partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom: Negotiating a framework for relations after Brexit’ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nikolai Atanassov and Anja Radjenovic,

© aalutcenko / Fotolia

The unprecedented arrival of refugees and irregular migrants in the EU, which peaked in 2015, exposed a series of deficiencies and gaps in EU policies on asylum, external borders and migration. It put pressure on the common European asylum system (CEAS) and affected the functioning of the Schengen rules, leading to a temporary suspension of the Dublin system and the introduction of border checks by several Member States. In response to these challenges, the EU has embarked on a broader process of reform aimed at rebuilding its common asylum policies on fairer and more solid ground, strengthening its external borders by reinforcing the links between border controls and security, and renewing cooperation with third countries on migration issues.

In May and June 2016, the Commission presented two packages of proposals to strengthen and adapt the CEAS. Almost two years after their introduction, the proposals have reached different stages of progress within the legislative process. The Parliament and the Council have already reached partial provisional agreement on the proposal on the establishment of the European Union Agency for Asylum, the Qualifications Regulation, the Reception Conditions Directive and the reform of Eurodac (the EU’s migrant fingerprint database). While trilogues are also progressing on the Union Resettlement Framework, the co-legislators still have considerable work to do as regards the reform of the Dublin Regulation and the proposal for an asylum procedures regulation. A political agreement on the overall reform of the CEAS was sought by June 2018, however, at the European Council meeting that month, EU leaders failed to achieve a breakthrough in the negotiations.

As emphasised in the European agendas on migration and on security, addressing current EU migration and security challenges means improving the management of the external borders, including by making better use of the opportunities offered by IT systems and technologies. In this respect, a revision of the Schengen Borders Code as regards the reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external borders was adopted in March 2016. The transformation of Frontex into the European Border and Coast Guard Agency was finalised in October 2016, and the legal bases for the new Entry/Exit System and the new European travel information and authorisation system (ETIAS) were established in November 2017 and September 2018 respectively. Work is ongoing on the revision and expansion of the Schengen Information System, an upgrade of the eu-LISA mandate, and frameworks for interoperability between EU information systems in the area of borders and security.

The EU’s external migration policy is part of the general EU approach on migration, and is complementary to EU foreign policy and development cooperation. It is based on common goals set by the Member States and is reflected in the CEAS. Cooperation with third countries is covered under the global approach to migration and mobility (GAMM), through which the EU has engaged in political dialogue and has established partnerships with third countries. In line with the 2015 ‘European agenda on migration’ and the 2016 ‘partnership framework’, the EU pursues external migration policies aimed at tackling challenges along the main migratory routes. One of the aims is to provide more legal pathways for the admission of people in need of international protection, through resettlement measures and migration compacts. Furthermore, various EU funding instruments support migration-related projects in third countries, particularly in key countries of origin and transit such as Syria, Iraq, Turkey and African countries.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on “EU asylum, borders and external cooperation on migration: Recent developments“.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Denise Chircop and Eulalia Claros,

Did you know:

• a really good way of improving your child’s chances of success at school is to continue your own education? Yet only 4 % of adults with a low level of education attend any training.
• that children from disadvantaged backgrounds who attend pre-school reap even greater benefits than other children later on at school? Yet the participation rate of young children is on average 7 % lower if parents have not received tertiary education and 13 % lower if children came from migrant families.
• that as an eighteen-year-old woman, you are more likely to be studying than a young man of your age?

Duration of full time compulsory education

As ‘that time of the year’ comes round for many young people in the EU, the time is right to take an in-depth look at the state of education in the Union. As the basis of a level playing field in the labour market, how can we make sure that all EU citizens can benefit from the opportunities provided by education? Do people make full use of learning opportunities in the work place? Do greater educational opportunities really increase a woman’s chance of success in the labour market?

This European Parliamentary Research Service interactive infographic explores the learning universe from early childhood through to adulthood. The interactive infographic ‘Lifelong learning in the EU‘ does not just stop at our formal systems of education but looks at all forms of learning for a comprehensive insight into what is happening in each of the Member States inside and out of schools.

Do you know what qualifications you need to become a teacher in Europe? Who benefits from education and training and who is left behind? Is the European Parliament a real actor in education and training?

Our interactive infographic allows you to view graphs according to the variable that interests you most, or to find out more about individual Member States and compare them with others. Links to the original sources are provided, most of which were financed by the European Union as a means to obtain comprehensive data upon which to formulate its policies.

Puzzled by the jargon? Read on!

© oraziopuccio / Fotolia

Written by Magdalena Sapała,

If you are looking for a comprehensive source of information, analysis and infographics on the preparation of the EU’s post-2020 multiannual financial plan, you are in the right place. This blog post will lead you through a collection of publications, prepared by researchers at the European Parliamentary Research Service, covering the proposals on the EU multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027 and own resources as well as all proposed sector-specific acts for new and continued programmes and funds. 

The future multiannual financial framework (MFF) is high on the EU agenda once more. With the current MFF for 2014-2020 entering its final stretch, the EU has started preparing the post-2020 plan. The MFF sets the annual limits on EU commitments in different policy areas and on overall annual payments. It must cover at least five years. In practice, in most cases its duration has been set at seven years. This multiannual plan of spending is usually negotiated as a package, together with proposals for own resources and for new and continued programmes and funds. Formally, these elements are adopted in different legislative procedures, with different roles for the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. However, reaching an overall agreement on the MFF depends largely on the European Council and usually takes about two years. Negotiating the next MFF thus means debating the financial aspects as well as the vision for the EU’s action for the next decade.

MFF 2021-2027: Total

The preparation of the next MFF is taking place amid a broader debate on the future of Europe. The new political priorities, set out by the Member States in the Bratislava Declaration in September 2016 and the Rome Declaration in March 2017, must be translated into concrete measures, which require financial means. Therefore, one of the key questions of the debate is how to ensure the financing of the EU’s new priorities in the areas of security and defence, protection of external borders, asylum and migration policy, and climate policy. While new financial needs emerge, existing, long-standing budgetary priorities remain relevant, and some have even gained in importance. Increased resources are needed for instance for EU programmes for youth, and research and innovation. In addition, the future MFF will be the EU’s first ‘post-Brexit’ financial plan. With the United Kingdom’s withdrawal, the EU is losing a net contributor to the budget and negotiations on a future relationship between the UK and EU, which might lead to payments from the UK for participation in specific programmes, have yet to commence.

MFF: Next steps

Furthermore, the discussion on the next MFF is an opportunity to reform EU finances and re-emphasise some of the underpinning principles upon which they are built. The future EU budget, as often pointed out by the European Commission, must focus on the European added value to a greater extent, meaning that pooling resources at European level delivers results that spending at national level cannot. It has to be focused on delivering European public goods, designed and implemented with a view to enhanced performance, efficiency, agility and simplification. The other issues include extending existing links between the EU budget and the EU’s economic governance framework, as well as links between the disbursement of EU funds and respect for the rule of law.

Changes are also needed on the revenue side of the EU budget. There is broad consensus that the current own resources system needs to be reformed. It is seen as complex and opaque and encouraging Member States to focus on securing ‘fair return’, from the EU budget, rather than thinking strategically about how best to finance European public goods. However, while there is no shortage of ideas for alternative own resources that would radically simplify the system and endow the EU budget with greater financial autonomy, achieving significant reform has proven notoriously difficult.

Commission proposal for the 2021-2027 MFF, individual programmes as share of total (2018 prices)

On 2 May 2018, the Commission presented a package of legislative proposals on the 2021-2027 MFF, on own resources to finance the EU budget and on linking the EU budget with the rule of law. The proposals were followed by a series of further legislative proposals for new and continued spending programmes and funds under the next MFF. The European Parliament has presented its expectations on the post-2020 MFF and the reform of own resources and given its first reaction to the Commission’s proposals (declaration of 2 May and resolution of 30 May 2018).

Both Parliament and the Commission have signalled that they are ready to make an effort to reach agreement on the package before the May 2019 European elections. Meeting this deadline would help allow the new programmes to start on 1 January 2021, and avoid the delays that hindered the implementation of previous financial frameworks. However, recent European Council and Council meetings have not brought any clarity regarding the calendar. For now, the Parliament is sticking with its ambitious timeframe and plans to vote an interim report on the MFF package in November 2018.

Key EPRS publications Publications on the proposal for the 2021-2027 MFF and Own Resources

• M. Parry, M. Sapala, Post-2020 MFF and own resources: Ahead of the Commission’s proposal
• A. Dobreva, Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027: Commission’s proposal. Initial comparison with the current MFF
• M. Parry, M. Sapala, 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework and new own resources. Analysis of the Commission’s proposal

Publications on the sector-specific proposals (new and continued programmes and funds)

• A. Widuto, European Regional Development Fund and Cohesion Fund 2021-2027
• V. Margaras, Common Provisions regulation. New rules for cohesion policy for 2021-2027
• A. Widuto, Reform Support Programme 2021-2027
• F. Scholaert, European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 2021-2027

Initial appraisals of European Commission impact assessments accompanying the MFF proposals

• E. Kramer, European Regional Development Fund, Cohesion Fund, a cross-border mechanism and Interreg. Initial Appraisal of a European Commission Impact Assessment

 

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for football fans.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

Following your team for their away matches this season? EU law on free movement of people makes it easy for football fans to travel to watch their national or club team play live.

© Monkey Business / Fotolia

If you want to watch a match from your living room, European Commission decisions made the procedures for selling media rights more open, transparent and non-discriminatory. This made some national leagues commitments concerning the sale of media rights legally binding ─ a move that benefits football fans. The EU Court of Justice has also ruled that licences for the retransmission of football matches, granting broadcasters national exclusivity, that stop you watching the match with a decoder card in another EU country, are illegal. The Court also confirmed that EU countries can halt exclusive broadcasts of all World Cup and EURO football matches on pay TV, so that everyone gets a chance to watch.

The EU has also tackled other aspects of the beautiful game. A 1995 EU Court of Justice decision (known as the Bosman ruling) means players can leave a club on a free transfer as soon as their contract expires. The EU adopted a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation to tackle hooliganism, and put measures in place to prevent and control violence connected to international football matches, as well as match-fixing. And for football fans who want to stay fit, the ‘Eurofit‘ project engages fans in health-promoting lifestyle changes.

Further information

• Eurofit,
  http://eurofitfp7.eu/
• EU Football handbook,
  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016G1129%2801%29
• EPRS publication on ‘Match-fixing: Issues and policy responses’, 2016,
  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI%282016%29580891

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for football players.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

Whether you’re a fan or a player, you will know that EU football clubs play under the supervision of the UEFA – the Union of European Football Associations. In 2014, UEFA estimated the total number of EU players to be close to 18 million, competing under the watchful eyes of more than a quarter of a million referees. Meanwhile, total European football market revenues keep growing, and reached almost €25 billion in 2015/2016.

© Bits and Splits / Fotolia

Much of what modern football looks like today is a result of the landmark 1995 Bosman case, in which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) upheld the principle of free movement of EU workers. The court allowed football players to move to another club once their contracts expired, without a transfer fee or the consent of the releasing club. This enabled players to demand sign-on fees and pay rises from their current club. Apart from making the transfer system more flexible, the ruling also ended any discrimination on grounds of nationality. Pre-Bosman the UEFA ‘3+2’ rule permitted a maximum of three foreign players and two ‘assimilated players’ to play in European competitions. The ECJ ended these quotas and any limit on the number of foreign players that can play for a team. Other cases extended these rules to players from non-EU countries who already play in a Member State.

To protect players from investors controlling their sporting career, the European Commission upheld FIFA’s ban on third party ownership. The Commission also supports making football governance more transparent and fights corruption and match fixing, hooliganism and doping.

Further information

• EPRS publication on EU sport policy,
  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/565908/EPRS_IDA(2015)565908_EN.pdf
• EPRS publication on third party ownership of football players,
  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/573940/EPRS_ATA%282016%29573940_EN.pdf
• EPRS publication on match fixing,
  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/603971/EPRS_BRI(2017)603971_EN.pdf

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass,

© wckiw / Fotolia

European Languages Day on 26 September is devoted to the variety of languages spoken by EU citizens. However, not all people can speak, or hear others speaking. Some use sign languages, which policy-makers consider in the context of the rights of people with disabilities, or as a linguistic minority right. The United Nations has launched International Day of Sign Languages, to be celebrated for the first time on 23 September 2018.

Sign languages and their users

Sign languages (SL) are not modelled on spoken languages, yet are languages in their own right, with equally complex rules, grammatical structures and vocabulary that evolve and vary by region, social and age groups; convey meanings and emotions; create social and family bonds; and meet artistic and identity needs.

Varieties

There is no universal SL, and the EU has a large variety of SLs, including a French SL in France, (a different) French and Flemish SLs in Belgium, as well as, for example, Catalan and Galician ones besides the Spanish SL in Spain. The United Kingdom, the United States and Ireland do not use the same SL; Ireland uses its indigenous SL, while the US SL, having been introduced by the French, has a lot in common with the French SL.

Nevertheless, there is an international system called the International Sign, a sort of lingua franca used at international conferences and meetings where participants do not share a common SL. It does not have a fixed grammar or vocabulary and relies heavily on gestures and context.

The users

One in a thousand persons in the EU (approximately half a million deaf or hard-of-hearing persons) communicates in one of 31 national or regional sign language as their first language. SLs have many more users, since people without hearing problems use them to communicate with deaf family members or friends.

Sign languages in the EU

Interpretation into and between SLs is necessary in communication between deaf and hard-of-hearing persons and other communities, or among themselves. Debates in the European Parliament are rendered in sign language for those Members who need it. Since the ratio of sign language users to interpreters varies among Member States, as does the quality of interpretation, in 2016 the EP adopted a resolution on professional SL interpreters, and backed the introduction of international sign language interpretation for all plenary debates.

The Erasmus+ programme has supported training sessions on SL interpreting and a course in quality in educational interpreting, co-organised by the European Forum of Sign Language Interpreters. An Insign pilot project, ‘Real-Time Sign Language Application and Service’ (on communication between the deaf or hard-of-hearing and the EU institutions, funded by the Commission), and a research SignSpeak project have investigated the potential of ICT in providing real-time interpretation into sign languages.

A study for the Scientific Foresight Unit of EPRS – ‘Language equality in the digital era. Human Language Project’ – analysed language technologies applied to human languages and their contribution to language teaching, learning, translation and interpretation. It identified the lack of multilingual data on sign language as a significant barrier for researchers in sign language technologies and for progress in this area.

In September 2018, in a recital to an own initiative resolution, the EP recognised that sign languages, being an element of Europe’s linguistic diversity, need to be supported by language technology. ICT solutions could be helpful in providing sign language interpretation. ICT is also seen as a factor for accessibility to audiovisual media services, in a recital of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive due to be adopted in plenary in October.

Download this at a glance note on ‘Sign languages in the EU‘ in PDF.

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for skiers.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

Your ski holiday in Europe is becoming safer, more accessible, affordable, and environmentally friendly, thanks to the EU. The EU strategy for the Alpine region helps protect the fragile Alpine ecosystem, to help avoid natural risks like avalanches. It also makes access to ski resorts easier and safer by supporting local transport and mobility projects. Skiers can now easily identify the resorts best suited to their financial and family requirements, thanks to a 2011 EU survey comparing ski resorts. When you take the ski lift, it’s also reassuring to know that they have to meet with EU legislation on the safety of cableways carrying persons.

© blende64 / Fotolia

Ski resorts are improving their skiing infrastructure throughout the EU, from Slovenia and Slovakia to countries further south, such as Greece, thanks to EU structural funds. This means more EU citizens can ski safely and with modern infrastructure in their own countries, rather than having to travel abroad. New airports closer to the slopes (e.g. in the Scandinavian mountains) are also being constructed with EU funding.

Good snow conditions are a must for skiers. Research on snow production, such as a new snow-gun which uses 15 % less energy, produces 8 % more snow, and makes much less noise is being funded by the EU Horizon 2020 programme. Encouraging artificial snow production in more areas is of great importance to winter destinations that have seen less snow in recent years. To predict snow quantity from one week to several months ahead, another EU project aims to build a meteorological prediction system for the ski industry.

Further information

• EU Strategy for the Alpine Region,https://www.alpine-region.eu/
• European Commission webpage on cableways, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/mechanical-engineering/cableways_en

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for sportspeople.

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While responsibility for sports policy lies primarily with national governments and sports organisations, decisions taken by the EU institutions can have a major impact on your career as a professional sportsperson, helping to change rules that are detrimental to you. The best-known case is the European Court of Justice’s ‘Bosman ruling’, which eliminated transfer fees for footballers whose contracts had ended and banned restrictions on foreign EU players signed by European clubs. Another example is the decision by the European Commission against the severe penalties imposed by the International Skating Union on athletes participating in competitions not approved by the federation.

© full image / Fotolia

The EU, which has a dedicated budget line for sport under the Erasmus+ programme, also finances numerous projects that can support you and improve your training and working conditions. Examples include initiatives to enhance the well-being of young athletes; help sportspeople combine their sporting careers with work or education; promote quality coaching; raise youth awareness on the dangers of doping; or improve the governance of sports organisations.

Raising the number of sports enthusiasts is a priority for the EU, given the positive health effects of physical activity. The European Week of Sport, held every September across Europe, aims to engage more Europeans, from children to pensioners, in sports and physical exercise. Your own discipline might well be in the spotlight on that occasion, as part of the general bid to persuade more people to get involved.

Further information

• European Commission’s website on sport, https://ec.europa.eu/sport/
• EPRS publication on EU sport policy, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/565908/EPRS_IDA(2015)565908_EN.pdf
• European Week of Sport, https://ec.europa.eu/sport/week_en

Written by Ivana Katsarova,
Graphics: Samy Chahri, Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova,

© yoshi5 / Fotolia

The low levels of physical activity among both children and adults in the European Union (EU) are alarming, and have become a matter of great concern to policy-makers. To raise awareness of the role and benefits of sport and physical activity, the European Commission launched the European Week of Sport back in 2015. The fourth annual round of the event will officially kick off in Vienna’s Prater Park on 22 September this year.

Physical inactivity and obesity: a global epidemic

The World Health Organization (WHO) identifies physical inactivity as one of the leading factors for global mortality, provoking 6 % of cases of coronary heart disease, 7 % of type 2 diabetes, 10 % of breast cancer, and 10 % of colon cancer. If inactivity decreased by 10 % to 25 %, it would be possible to avoid between 533 000 and 1.3 million deaths every year. Similarly, research shows that the cost of obesity worldwide stands at €1.8 trillion – equivalent to the GDP of Italy or Russia – and has the same impact on the global economy as armed violence, war and terrorism.

Physical activity guidelines

There is a strong and growing body of evidence indicating that regular physical activity is one of the fundamentals of adult health. The WHO recommends a minimum of 150 minutes of physical activity a week for adults, and 60 minutes a day for children.

Physical (in)activity in the EU

Map of physical inactivity in the EU

Worryingly, the results of the 2018 Eurobarometer survey on sport and physical activity show that nearly half of respondents (46 %) never exercise or play sport – up 7 % from 2009 – (see Figure 1). Moreover, the WHO estimates that a quarter of European adults and four-fifths of European adolescents are insufficiently active. It also reveals that each year, physical inactivity claims over 500 000 lives across Europe and generates €80.4 billion in economic costs for the EU-28. This amount represents 6.2 % of all European health spending, €5 billion more than the annual global spend on cancer drugs, and half of Ireland or Portugal’s annual GDP. Conservative estimates put the annual cost of physical inactivity in 2030 at over €125 billion (in 2012 prices).

An early start is key

Introducing physical activity in the daily routine from an early age is essential for children, since it allows them to grow, learn and develop. More importantly, it helps them remain physically active as they get older, because physical activity will already be an important part of their life. Outside school, children have fewer opportunities to be active, due to the increasing popularity of the car as a mode of transport and the computer or the TV as a mode of recreation. Given that children spend extensive periods of time at school and that up to 80 % of them only practice sport there, schools become instrumental in promoting physical activity.

Being physically active at school

Recommended annual minimum number of hours of compulsory physical education in primary and secondary schools

Physical education is included in all school curricula in the EU, and is compulsory in primary and secondary (see Figure 2). However, on average, less than 70 hours a year are dedicated to this subject, which is roughly a third of the time dedicated to the language of instruction and around half of that for maths. While some believe more sport will leave children with less time to achieve better marks, this does not seem to be the case. A number of researchers have found a positive link between children’s physical activity and academic achievement. Indeed, various studies indicate that increased participation in physical activity leads to enhanced learning and better grades.

EU support and involvement The fourth round of the European Week of Sport kicks off in September

The idea for a European Week of Sport originated in a 2011 European Parliament resolution on the European dimension in sport, which recommended setting up an annual large-scale event to raise awareness of the role and benefits of sport and physical activity. The event is an EU‑wide initiative, led by the European Commission and implemented at EU, national, regional and local level, with the help of national coordinators and in partnership with sports organisations and stakeholders. The first edition of the European Week of Sport took place in 2015 and received a positive appraisal. Since then, nearly 15 million Europeans have taken part in over 37 000 events organised as part of the initiative in the 32 participating countries across Europe. On 29 September 2017, a spin-off of the sports event – the European School Sport Day® – engaged more than 2 million students from 26 countries in 7 000 events.

Erasmus+: creating opportunities for children and adults

In July 2017, the Council adopted a new three-year EU work plan for sport. Furthermore, financial support was for the first time allocated for sport in Erasmus+ – the EU programme for education, training, youth and sport for the 2014-2020 period. The allocation amounts to around €266 million over the entire period and serves to fund various projects (see Figures 3 and 4).

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Ready, steady, go: European Week of Sport 2018‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Click to view slideshow.