Lockheed Martin won a $6.1 billion contract for incidental services, hardware, facilities, equipment and all technical, planning, management, manufacturing and testing efforts to produce Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target (PATRIOT) Advanced Capability-3 missiles, missile segment enhancement configuration and associated ground support equipment and spares. The PATRIOTs in question, commonly known as “PATRIOT PAC-3,” comprise only the missile portion of the PATRIOT air defense system. Lockheed peer Raytheon produces the missile’s launcher system and its radar tracker. In addition to the US military, nine allied nations, including Bahrain, Germany, Japan, Korea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Sweden, and the United Arab Emirates have signed agreements to procure PAC-3 MSE interceptors from Lockheed. Work will take place in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Massachusetts, Texas and Pennsylvania. Estimated completion date is June 30, 2027.
Honeywell International won a $11 million contract for the purchase and repair of one spare part supporting the AN/TPQ-50 Counterfire Target Acquisition Radar System. The AN/TPQ-50 is a US Army Program of Record that provides early warning for indirect fire and counterfire target acquisition support. The system has proven to be exceptionally effective at providing early warning and location of rocket and mortar threats facing the warfighter. The AN/TPQ-50 is part of the LCMR family of radars that SRC produces for counterfire missions. Work will take place in Florida. Estimated completion date is April 29, 2025.
Middle East & AfricaKratos Technology & Training Solutions won a $16.1 million contract supporting all levels of In-Kingdom Royal Saudi Naval Forces training, logistical and advisory services in support of the Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity. Kratos Technology & Training Solutions, Inc. provides information technology services. The Company delivers management software products, as well as offers implementation and consultative services. The contract will include a six-month base period with an additional three-month period option and a 15-day period for demobilization which, if exercised, will bring the total value to $25.6 million. Saudi Arabian funds in the amount of $16.1 million will be obligated at the time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Saudi Arabian funds will be used under the Foreign Military Sales program. Work will take place in Saudi Arabia and California. The base period of performance is expected to be complete by November 2020; if options are exercised, work will be complete by February 2021.
EuropeLockheed Martin won a $129.2 million contract modification, which procures the kits required for modification and retrofit activities of delivered Air Force and government of Norway F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. In November 2008, the Norwegian government selected the F-35 as the replacement for the F-16 fleet. And in September 2015, the first F-35A was unveiled before Norwegian and US government officials and Lockheed Martin leadership at a formal ceremony at the Lockheed Martin production facility in Fort Worth, Texas. Work will take place in Nashua, New Hampshire; Fort Worth, Texas; and Baltimore, Maryland. Work is expected to be complete by April 2025.
Asia-PacificThe DoS approved a possible Foreign Military Sale for six AH-64E Apache attack helicopters and related equipment for an estimated cost of $1.5 billion.The AH-64E Apache is a twin-seat, twin-turboshaft attack helicopter. The E variant is a recent upgrade, expanding the engine, armament, and on-board connectivity capabilities. The E variant is capable of controlling unmanned aerial vehicles and has a greater payload capacity along with more sophisticated datalinks. The Philippines is considering either the AH-1Z or the AH-64E to modernize its attack helicopter capabilities. The proposed sale will assist the Philippines in developing and maintaining strong self-defense, counterterrorism, and critical infrastructure protection capabilities. The Philippines will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and support into its armed forces.
The DoS also approved a Foreign Military Sale to the Philippines of six AH-1Z attack helicopters and related equipment for an estimated cost of $450 million. The AH-1Z Viper is a twin-engine attack helicopter that is smaller than the Apache and a lower payload capacity. The Philippines armed forces would incorporate the proposed attack helicopters for use in counterterrorism and critical infrastructure protection missions. The United States has supported the Philippines in counterterrorism in recent years, including with logistical and intelligence support. Both proposed sales “will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country that continues to be an important force for political stability, peace, and economic progress in South-East Asia,” the DSCA noted in its releases.
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Physical Optics won a $17.8 million order, which provides non-recurring engineering for the production, test, integration and delivery of the T-45 Head-Up Display (HUD) and its associated internal software. The T-45A/C Goshawk is the US Navy’s two-seat advanced jet trainer. The aircraft is jointly manufactured by Boeing and BAE Systems. The T-45A was selected to meet the US Navy requirement for an undergraduate jet pilot trainer to replace the TA-4J Skyhawk and T-2C Buckeye. The TA-4J was retired in 2003 and the T-2C in August 2008. Work will take place in Torrance, California. Estimated completion date is in April 2022.
An initial report by the US Air Force into the use of contractor-operated boom-type tankers has found legal, regulatory, and financial challenges. Thus, Air Force Secretary Barbara Barrett has given Air Mobility Command another 60 days to better understand those legal and financial issues. The service was keen to have a contractor-operated boom-type tanker support aerial refueling for test and training missions. Private companies are supposed to supply one aircraft equipped with boom and hose and drogue refueling for refueling duties at around 1,100 sorties a year.
Middle East & AfricaThe US Army has named FN America LLC and Colt’s Manufacturing Co. LLC as competitors in its $383.3 million contract to supply M16 rifles to Afghanistan, Iraq, Grenada, Lebanon and Nepal. The M16A4 is the fourth generation of the M16 series of military rifles. The US has approved the sale of 80000 and 4400 M16A4 rifles to Iraq in 2008 and 2017, and 891 of them to Afghanistan in 2016. Bids were solicited via the internet with three received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of April 28, 2025. Starting 2015, the US military began replacing the M16 with a shorter and lighter version, the M4 carbine.
EuropeCFM International won a $13.6 million contract modification, which exercises an option to procure one CFM56-7B27AE commercial-off-the-shelf engine for the government of the United Kingdom. CFM International is a joint venture between GE Aviation and Safran Aircraft Engines. The joint venture has delivered 30,700 engines to more than 570 operators and has 13,700 engines in backlog. Work will take place in France, North Carolina and is expected to be complete by April 2021. Foreign Military Sales funds in the amount of $13,582,486 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.
Saab has successfully completed the first air trials with its new fighter X-band Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, which will be offered as a new addition to Saab’s PS-05/A radar family. Saab continues to develop core AESA technology and has now successfully completed the first air trials with the new X-band AESA radar. The trials were flown successfully, collecting data while detecting and tracking objects. The radar is designed for fighter aircraft and can be adapted to a variety of platforms. As Saab previously announced, a version of the new AESA antenna has been sold to the US. Government customer. “This is an important step in the development of our new fighter AESA radar. We see great possibilities for the radar, and its modular, adaptable and scalable design means it can also be used for a range of other applications”, says Anders Carp, SVP and head of Saab’s business area Surveillance.
Asia-PacificSouth Korean shipbuilder Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) has launched the fourth of eight Daegu (FFX-II) Class guided-missile frigates on order for the Republic of Korea Navy. Named Donghae, the 122.1 m-long warship entered the water during a ceremony held on April 29 at HHI’s facilities in the southeastern coastal city of Ulsan, and is expected to be handed over to the service in late 2021. The Daegu class is a larger variant of South Korea’s six Incheon (FFX-I) Class ships, the first of which entered service in 2013. The class has an overall beam of 14 m, a standard displacement of 2,800 tonnes, and a full-loaded displacement of 3,650 tonnes. Each FFX-II ship is powered by one Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbine engine and two Leonardo DRS permanent magnet motors driven by MTU 12 V 4000 diesel-generator sets in a combined diesel-electric or gas (CODLOG) configuration. Each of the ships can attain a maximum speed of 30 kt.
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Lockheed Martin won a $13.1 million to provide engineering and management services for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)-19 Post Shakedown Availability (PSA). LCS-19 is a Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship. The Freedom Class are small and fast vessels, intended to operate in littoral zones, for example close to the shore. These are designed to combat with small craft, rather than equal warships. These ships are designed to have a shallow draft and operate at high speed. Work will take place in New Jersey, Florida, Virginia, Washington DC. Work is scheduled to be finished by September 2021.
Boeing won a $9.7 million contract modification provides engineering, manufacturing and development support to integrate BRR3.1 software to the Next Generation Jammer on Boeing EA-18G Growler carrier-based electronic warfare aircraft, resulting in BRR3.1 software initial operating capability. EA-18G Growler is an airborne electronic attack (AEA) aircraft, which operates from either an aircraft carrier or from land-bases. The Growler was developed as a replacement for the United States Navy EA-6B Prowler aircraft that entered service in 1971 and is approaching the end of operational life. Work will take place in St. Louis, Missouri, and is expected to be complete by December 2020.
Middle East & AfricaThe United Arab Emirates’ first of potentially five GlobalEye swing-role surveillance aircraft has touched down in Abu Dhabi following a delivery flight from Linkoping, Sweden. Saab said that it had commenced deliveries of the Bombardier Global 6000 business jet-based platform that were contracted to the UAE Air Force and Defense (AF&D) under the Swing Role Surveillance System award from late 2015. Deliveries of the remaining two aircraft are set to run through to the end of 2021, while an anticipated contract for two additional platforms has not yet been signed. The ground systems had already been handed over to the UAE AF&D, ahead of the aircraft arrival. The GlobalEye is built around the Saab Erieye Extended Range (ER) radar that is housed in the same external dorsal ‘plank’ as the company’s original Erieye system. Equipped with Gallium Nitride (GaN) and other technologies, the Erieye ER is an active electronically scanned array (AESA) system that doubles the radar’s power efficiency compared with previous Erieye iterations. It has a range in excess of 650 km that can be extended by focusing the radar’s energy.
EuropeGeneral Electric has won $707.3 million to supply F110 engines to power F-16 fighter jets of Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Taiwan. The contract includes F110-GE-129 engine production, provision of installs and spares and modernized engine management system computers. According to GE, the F110 powers more than 70 percent of the Air Force’s F-16C/D aircraft, and the 129 variant offers significant mission advantages, including significant additional thrust, for F-15 and F-16 aircraft. For Qatar, the engines will power the twin-engined Boeing F-15QT. Work will take place in Cincinnati and is expected to be finished by December 31.
German defense minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer and her French counterpart, Florence Parly, have signed a framework agreement on the Franco-German Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), Germany’s Federal Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on its website on April 28, describing this as “an important signal for European defense co-operation”. The system will replace German Leopard 2 and French Leclerc main battle tanks (MBTs) starting in the mid-2030s.
Asia-PacificThe delivery of KM-SAM Block I, developed by South Korea’s Agency of the Defense Development, to the Republic of Korea Air Force (RoKAF) has been completed. The KM-SAM, which is also known as the Cheongung, the first indigenously developed mid-range surface-to-air guided missile, is capable of striking a hostile aircraft at an altitude of up to 40 kilometers. Dubbed the “Korean Patriot,” the system has been deployed since 2015, after the Agency of the Defense Development completed its development in 2011, according to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration.
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One more policy brief from the series on Russian strategic culture and leadership decision-making, written for a collaborative project organized by the Marshall Center with support from the Russia Strategy Initiative. This one is on Russia-China military cooperation. Several sections of this brief are based on previous work on Russia-China cooperation that was co-authored with Michael Kofman, Paul Schwartz, and Katherine Baughman.
As with the previous ones, I am posting the full text here with permission from the Marshall Center. Please go to the newly updated Marshall Center website if you would prefer to read a PDF version.
Executive SummaryThere is widespread consensus among scholars that, although Russia and China have been moving toward closer cooperation through the entire post-Soviet era, the trend has accelerated rapidly since 2014.1 The relationship was boosted by Russian leaders’ belief that Russia could survive its sudden confrontation with the West only by finding an alternative external partner. China was the obvious candidate because it had a suitably large economy, was not openly hostile to Russia, and was not planning to impose sanctions in response to the Ukraine crisis.
Since 2014, the bilateral relationship has been focused on increased military cooperation, closer economic ties, and an increase in coordination on responses to various issues in international politics. Although some advances have occurred in all three areas, military cooperation has advanced the most. As discussed in more detail later in this paper, Russia and China have institutionalized a comprehensive mechanism for military consultation, expanded military technical cooperation initiatives and military personnel exchanges, and expanded regular joint military exercises. In the diplomatic sphere, Russia and China have supported each other in various international organizations and worked to establish new international institutions that could act as alternatives to existing Western-dominated institutions.2
Although economic cooperation is the weakest aspect of the Russia-China alignment, it has progressed a great deal, particularly in the energy field. “China is eager to increase energy relations with Russian companies,… [while] Russian concern over its increased dependence on China in the East is deemed secondary to expanding Russia’s customer base beyond the still dominant European market.”3 At the same time, there have been limits to this cooperation, particularly in the economic and financial sectors outside of the energy sphere. China refused to help Russia overcome the effects of Western economic sanctions and bilateral trade and trade in national currencies has remained limited, with little diversification of trade and investments. On the political side, neither country has shown itself to be prepared to support the other’s geopolitical interests if doing so would hurt its own interests.4
This policy brief focuses primarily on strategic and military cooperation, where the two sides have made the greatest progress. After briefly discussing the prospects for a strategic partnership between Russia and China, I examine the progress in and remaining constraints on expanding bilateral military cooperation, outline three scenarios for future cooperation in this sphere, and conclude with a discussion of how the United States should respond.
Strategic Partnership?As bilateral cooperation has progressed, analysts have increasingly examined whether the Russia-China relationship has reached a level of strategic partnership. The growing consensus is that it has.5 According to Alexander Korolev, the partnership is neither ad hoc nor temporary and provides clear benefits for both sides: “Through this partnership, Russia can gain access to more instruments for promoting its agenda of balancing the United States and enhancing its version of multi-polarity in Europe. China, in turn, receives Russia’s political backing and access to Russia’s energy resources and military technologies, which are essential assets for China in its growing tensions with the U.S. in Asia.”6 Some Russian scholars are even more optimistic about the trajectory of the relationship, suggesting that, over time, the two states might even develop an alliance.7
At the same time, there is a similar consensus forming that the current upward trend in Russia-China strategic cooperation should not be viewed as irreversible. In particular, scholars note that, should Russia’s challenge to the United States start to destabilize the international system, it may also jeopardize China’s peaceful rise. This would lead to a divergence in the countries’ interests and potentially cause a rift between the two powers to emerge.8 Some scholars argue that the geopolitical and economic factors that have hindered Russia’s past Asian pivots could have a similar effect again, although this is distinctly a minority position. One possibility proposed by analysts who hold this view is that a future leadership transition in Russia might result in a policy shift back toward a preference for closer relations with Europe, undermining the long-term prospects of Russia’s partnership with China.9
Central Asia represents one potential area of tension between Russia and China, because the two states have formulated competing regional influence projects for the region. As a result, some analysts believe that the two countries may be heading toward a strategic rivalry caused by China’s increasing desire to play a role in Central Asian security and by competition over energy export routes and trade connectivity in general.10 A more likely scenario, however, is that the two countries will maintain a division of responsibilities that allows them to continue to cooperate in the region, with Russia taking primary responsibility for security issues while China focuses on economic development.11
The global coronavirus pandemic initially introduced another source of tension into the Russia-China relationship, especially since Russia moved quickly in late January to close its borders with China. This move was seen by some observers as an indicator of a lack of trust in Chinese information, since China at the time was still making an effort to minimize the scope and threat of the epidemic. At the same time, the almost immediate decision to reopen the border to commercial traffic highlighted Russia’s dependence on Chinese goods.12 As it turned out, even this partial closure proved to be economically damaging, especially in the Russian Far East.13 However, any residual tension was overcome once China largely ended community spread of the virus. Once the threat of spread was over, the two countries developed complementary information campaigns designed to highlight their mutual assistance in the crisis and the superiority of authoritarian systems over democratic ones in marshalling resources to fight the pandemic.14
Future of Bilateral Military CooperationRussian senior officials have highlighted the special nature of Russia’s defense relationship with China by characterizing the ties in terms of a strategic partnership. As the two countries have expanded the number of military exercises and consultations while deepening military technical cooperation, analysts have suggested a growing alignment between the two countries at a political level that allows for stronger defense ties. This does not mean that Russia and China are about to enter a military alliance. As cogently argued by Michael Kofman, Russian and Chinese leaders have labeled the relationship a strategic alliance because a military alliance is not needed, given that the two countries do not need each other for security guarantees or extended nuclear deterrence. That said, they have sought to make their ties more formal, as shown by the 2017 agreement on a three-year road map to establish a legal framework to govern military cooperation. This framework is expected to be completed and signed later in 2020, further codifying various aspects of defense ties, including the option of conducting joint long-range aviation patrols.15
Military Technical CooperationAlthough China was Russia’s leading client for military hardware in the 1990s and early 2000s, the arms sales relationship sharply declined after 2006 because of a combination of Chinese unhappiness with Russian pricing policies and the poor maintenance record of Russian equipment, as well as Russian concerns about China’s tendency to reverse-engineer Russian equipment for both its own use and export abroad. Russian arms sales to China saw a modest revival post-2011 but expanded most substantially after the Ukraine crisis, with agreements for the sale of S-400 air defense systems and Su-35 combat aircraft signaling the end of Russia’s informal ban on sales of advanced weapon systems to China.16 In October 2019, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was helping China develop its own ballistic missile early warning system. Russia’s new willingness to share information related to strategic nuclear weapons highlights the extent to which old sensitivities about sharing advanced military technology with China has dissipated in recent years.17 Russia has also turned to China for electronic components and naval diesel engines that it could no longer obtain from the West. Most significantly, military cooperation and defense ties improved as defense sales declined, making clear that such ties are driven at the senior political level and not tied to arms sales.
However, Russia faces a difficult choice this decade in either providing advanced technology to China, knowing that the technology will most likely be copied, or forgoing arms sales but with the expectation that China’s defense sector will develop comparable systems in the near future. The previous Russian arms export strategy of selling the “second-best” technology available while staying a generation ahead is no longer viable. China’s defense industry has sufficiently caught up with or worked around Russia via defense-cooperation deals with other countries that it is now only interested in the most-advanced Russian weapons available. China’s advances in weapon design and general goal of self-sufficiency in military production suggest that Russian arms sales will never reach the peak achieved in the early 2000s and that China will emerge as a stronger arms market competitor to Russia over time.
Military ExercisesMilitary exercises are a central pillar of bilateral military relations. Moscow and Beijing have recently been rapidly expanding the scale and pace of their joint exercise activity far beyond the two traditional programs, the Peace Mission ground forces exercises in Central Asia and the Joint Sea naval exercises. Both of the long-standing exercise programs have had an anti-U.S. character, with gradually increasing levels of complexity and joint activity. However, the exercises have been criticized for being overly scripted and poorly coordinated, as well as for continuing to lack a joint command structure.18 These criticisms are not necessarily warranted, as the purposes of the exercises are primarily to build military ties at the senior level and to signal political intentions rather than to establish interoperability. There has been no evidence that Russia and China intend to operate in a joint command structure; such a structure would not make sense for two countries that have not entered a formal military alliance.
The naval exercises between Russia and China have been more effective in terms of providing realistic operational experience, although they have not focused particularly on interoperability between the two navies. Naval exercises are not only becoming more frequent but also are being held in new geographical areas. Before the Ukraine crisis, Russia refused to hold bilateral exercises in such controversial territories as southern China near Taiwan. Since 2015, however, naval exercises have been held in areas such as the Baltic and South China Seas as a way of signaling the two countries’ growing power, expanding military ties, and mutual displeasure with the United States.19 Recent trilateral exercises with Iran represent another example of this steady expansion in the use of exercises for political signaling, now including third nations.20 Given China’s desire to be more visible in the European maritime theater, one can expect an increase in exercises that serve the Chinese desire to show its flag in distant waters.
Since 2015, the two countries have expanded their repertoire of exercises, including adding joint missile defense exercises in response to the U.S. deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. Most observers are aware of growing Chinese participation in Russian strategic exercises, including Vostok-2018 and Tsentr-2019. A joint Russian-Chinese bomber patrol in July 2019 demonstrated that Moscow is increasingly willing to disregard the interests of other states in the Asia-Pacific region in its pursuit of a closer military relationship with China.21
These exercises are primarily focused on setting a positive tone for military-to-military ties at the highest levels, rather than increasing interoperability at the tactical level. The exercises suggest that Russian-Chinese military cooperation in the air domain, which lags naval exercises, will increase. Stronger participation of Chinese air assets in Tsentr-2019 further substantiates this observed trend.22 Space is the next likely frontier for expanding cooperation, although it may be limited given sensitivities about the technologies involved in this domain.
Limitations on Bilateral Military CooperationDespite steady progress over the past decade, there remain significant geopolitical and technical constraints on military cooperation between Russia and China. Although senior Chinese and Russian officials repeatedly and publicly affirm that their relationship is characterized by great trust, in reality, a lack of mutual trust remains an obstacle to more robust cooperation. Although Russia and China formally settled the last of their border disputes in 2008, there are still regions where the two sides’ geopolitical interests may not align in the long term. Russia remains concerned over potential Chinese encroachment into the Russian Far East. Russia’s concerns are fueled by a combination of past Chinese claims to territory Russia annexed in the 1800s and the contrast between the sparsely populated Russian Far East and the densely populated Chinese border regions, which have generated ongoing Chinese immigration. A military incursion is seen as unlikely by Moscow relative to the more insidious problem of what Russian leaders fear could prove to be (1) a creeping annexation, in which China projects influence into parts of the Russian Far East on a de facto basis through a large influx of illegal Chinese immigrants, and (2) a steady reorientation of the Russian Far East toward more economically attractive Chinese markets and away from the distant center of power in Moscow.
As the relative balance of influence in Central Asia continues to shift more in favor of China, the potential for the two sides to clash over interests in the region remains significant. Beijing has steadily supplanted Russia as the principal economic power in Central Asia in terms of investment and lending. Still, countries in the region continue to look primarily to Russia to defend their security interests; additionally, Russia remains the principal labor market for this region.
Thus far, this de facto division of labor has enabled Russia and China to maintain a reasonably stable working relationship in Central Asia, such that they do not step on each other’s vital national interests or security concerns. However, as China’s Belt and Road Initiative develops, its economic footprint in Central Asia is likely to grow larger, which could lead to tensions between Beijing and Moscow.
Russia has sought to play a key role in the development of the Arctic region; in particular, it plans to capitalize on new energy sources, as well as the opening of the Northern Sea Route. While Moscow has been willing to work with other members of the Arctic Council, Russia has been reluctant to allow non-Arctic powers, such as China, to play a major role in the region. By contrast, a resource-hungry China has plans to extend its presence to the Arctic and is building its first domestically-produced icebreaker. Although none of these geopolitical concerns are currently likely to cause tensions that could limit military cooperation between Russia and China, they could be factors in the long term.
The asymmetry in economic power between the two countries, including their potential regional influence and global heft, has grown more visible. Furthermore, Russian strategic culture, long having seen itself as superior to China, is visibly struggling with the new realities of this power balance. As a result, Russian political elites have yet to come to terms with China’s rise. Finally, both countries are deeply nationalistic and prestige-seeking, which means neither would be particularly willing to subordinate its military to the leadership of the other. Russian leaders’ desire to maintain an independent foreign policy means that they will not accept Chinese leadership or impose limitations on their relationships with other countries for the sake of Chinese foreign policy. Although the two countries seek to manage conflict over core interests, most international competition is seen as fair game, whether it is arms sales or foreign direct investment.
Russia and China have placed a low priority on achieving greater interoperability during joint military exercises, reflecting an enduring lack of interest on the part of both sides in developing the kind of integrated military capability needed to conduct effective joint military operations.23 At the tactical level, issues such as language and communication highlight that these are decidedly different military structures, with different planning processes and organizational cultures. This limits what the Chinese are able to learn from their counterparts.
China is seen as a predatory power by many Russian experts, so there is a natural degree of apprehension among the Russian military. General Staffs plan contingencies around capabilities, because intent can change. This is especially so when dealing with another great power that is self-admittedly revisionist in its ambitions. Despite the positive outlook of Russia’s national leadership on the benefits of a growing Sino-Russian alignment, the military establishment will always see the Chinese military as a potential adversary and plan accordingly.
Scenarios for Future Russia-China Military CooperationThe impact of various scenarios for the development of Russia-China military cooperation on U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region is inversely correlated with their likelihood. That is, the most likely scenarios are relatively low impact, while the highest-impact scenarios are very unlikely to develop. In this section, I outline three scenarios for future military cooperation between Russia and China.
Low Impact, High Probability
In a low-impact, high-probability scenario, Russia and China expand their military cooperation by holding additional joint naval exercises with countries that are seen as adversarial to the United States and expanding the visibility of their maritime presence both in the Pacific and the Mediterranean regions. As noted earlier, previous joint naval exercises have been conducted in the South China Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Baltic Sea, and future theaters could include other areas within the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. Expanded exercises in these regions would serve the two countries’ respective purposes, as Russia seeks greater visibility in the Asia-Pacific and China seeks greater visibility in the European maritime theater.
Both countries seek to reciprocate U.S. freedom-of-navigation operations to the extent possible by visiting the Western Hemisphere. Russia and China could agree to hold a naval exercise in the Caribbean Sea, hosted by Venezuela or Cuba. Such an exercise would have little long-term impact on either Russia’s or China’s geopolitical influence in Latin America and it would not do much to improve their military capabilities or naval interoperability. It would, however, generate a great deal of media attention, highlighting the countries’ ostensible global reach and potential strategic partnership. In other words, both countries could feel that they had scored a propaganda win at relatively low cost, but the actual impact on regional security would be negligible.
Medium Impact, Medium Probability
A medium-impact, medium-probability scenario might focus on additional sales of Russian advanced military equipment. The most interesting systems for China would include diesel-electric submarines, over-the-horizon radar systems, early warning systems, space-related technology for satellites, microchips, and next-generation aircraft engines. In return, Russia might accelerate the purchase of Chinese defense-industrial components, such as heavy-lift cranes, machine tools, and circuitry board components and parts. Although Russia would benefit substantially from procuring Chinese surface combatant vessels, given the shortcomings in those parts of the Russian defense-industrial complex, the financial interests of Russia’s domestic defense industry would likely prevent such deals from being made.
The two countries could also build on Russia’s recent sale to China of S-400 long-range air defense systems to agree to the sale of Russian S-500 air defense systems once those come online. S-500 systems would have a longer range than existing systems owned by China and may have the capability of defending against a wider range of missile types. These capabilities would lead to a significant improvement in Chinese air defense capabilities versus the United States and its allies. China would seek to acquire the 40N6 extended-range (400-km) missile, which has reached initial operating capability with the S-400, either as part of an S-500 deal or on its own for China’s existing S-400 systems.
High Impact, Low Probability
A number of highly unlikely but potentially very damaging scenarios present themselves. One such area would involve greater Russian-Chinese defense industrial cooperation on sensitive technology, such as theater hypersonic weapons or submarine quieting. Although military establishments on both sides would almost certainly resist allowing the other side access to such technology, if such cooperation did develop, it would substantially affect the ability of the United States to maintain a favorable regional military balance and retain a technological edge in certain domains over China. One possibility for enhanced defense cooperation that has been discussed in recent years, though with little progress to date, is a potential technology transfer deal in which Moscow would provide Beijing with the RD-180 rocket engine in exchange for space-grade microelectronic components.24 Past discussion centered on trading finished equipment, but a closer relationship between Russia and China may result in consideration of exchanging production technology in the future. Such a deal would increase China’s lift capacity and Russia’s ability to produce advanced guidance and control systems.
Another scenario in this category is a joint military intervention, most likely in a Central Asian country in the event of a political crisis or instability, because Russia and China have previously conducted exercises to deconflict areas of responsibility in this type of scenario. However, one should not exclude the possibility of a joint Russian-Chinese intervention in Africa or the Middle East. While the countries lack core interests in these regions, the cost and risk of intervention is also dramatically lower and the barrier for entry in such operations is not especially high. Both countries have the expeditionary capacity to conduct relatively small force deployments around much of the world and might well seek to do so together in response to a contingency where their interests align.
The least likely, but nonetheless possible, scenario is a military crisis with the United States in which one country takes advantage of a situation to press for geopolitical gains. For example, in the event of a standoff between the United States and China, Russia would seek to leverage the distraction of the United States to make opportunistic gains. Russia could deploy forces to Asia or provide military assistance via deniable means to China in order to raise costs to the United States. Because China is quite remote from Europe, the likelihood of Chinese involvement in a crisis between Russia and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe is too low to be worth considering.
How Should the United States Respond?There is a general perception among experts that greater cooperation between Russia and China is inevitable, given the core precepts of present-day U.S. foreign policy. Scholars focused on relative power suggest that the two countries will inevitably balance against the most powerful country in the international system.25 Furthermore, U.S. efforts to pursue a hard line against either Russia or China, and especially against both at the same time, have the effect of driving the two countries closer together. For some scholars, this suggests that accommodating them within the existing international order would be a more effective response.26 Scholars focused on the role played by ideas highlight the perceived threat of liberal ideology and suggest that if the United States reduces its emphasis on democracy promotion and regime change, this would reduce the impetus to Russian-Chinese cooperation.27
In this geopolitical environment, actions by the United States that threaten Russia and China in a similar manner or present a common security challenge will have the effect of driving the two countries closer together. This is especially true if the actions are strategic in nature. Examples of such actions include the deployment of missile defense systems or freedom-of-navigation operations near the shores of either Russia or China. Both of these actions create a perception among Russian and Chinese leaders that they share a common global security challenge from the United States—and one that is serious enough that they would be best served by facing it together.
On the other hand, actions that disaggregate the nature of the threat perceived by Russian and Chinese leaders would help create divergence in their interests and thereby slow the trend toward a closer bilateral relationship. For example, the United States could challenge Russia in ways that are exclusive to the European theater, such as by pulsing additional troops to NATO member states for exercises. Similarly, China could be challenged in the regions of Taiwan and Southeast Asia rather than in East Asia or maritime territories adjacent to Russian territory. Russian relations with such countries as Vietnam and India could be exploited to highlight potential tensions between Russia and China.
Notes1 Alexander Gabuev, Friends with Benefits? Russian-Chinese Relations After the Ukraine Crisis, Carnegie Moscow Center, June 29 2016, https://carnegie.ru/2016/06/29/friends-with-benefits-russian-chinese-relations-after-ukraine-crisis-pub-63953.
2 Alexander Korolev, “How Closely Aligned Are China and Russia? Measuring Strategic Cooperation in IR,” International Politics, May 2019.
3 Tom Røseth, “Russia’s Energy Relations with China: Passing the Strategic Threshold?” Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2017, pp. 23–55.
4 Mikhail Korostikov, Дружба на расстоянии руки: Как Москва и Пекин определили границы допустимого [“Friendship at Arms’ Length: How Moscow and Beijing Determined the Boundaries of the Permissible”], Kommersant, May 31, 2019, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3984186.
5 Tom Røseth, “Moscow’s Response to a Rising China: Russia’s Partnership Policies in Its Military Relations with Beijing,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 66, No. 4, 2019, pp. 268–286.
6 Korolev, 2019, p. 29.
7 Vassily Kashin, “Is the Conflict Inevitable? Not at All. How Reasonable Are Western Expectations of a Russia-China Confrontation?” Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2017
8 Andrej Krickovic, “The Symbiotic China-Russia Partnership: Cautious Riser and Desperate Challenger,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2017, pp. 299–329.
9 Chris Miller, “Will Russia’s Pivot to Asia Last?” Orbis, Winter 2020. See also Mikhail Karpov, “The Grandeur and Miseries of Russia’s ‘Turn to the East’: Russian-Chinese ‘Strategic Partnership’ in the Wake of the Ukraine Crisis and Western Sanctions,” Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2018.
10 Carla P. Freeman, “New Strategies for an Old Rivalry? China–Russia Relations in Central Asia After the Energy Boom,” Pacific Review, Vol. 31, No. 5, 2018, pp. 635–654.
11 Liselotte Odgaard, “Beijing’s Quest for Stability in Its Neighborhood: China’s Relations with Russia in Central Asia,” Asian Security, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2017, pp. 41–58.
12 Jake Rudnitsky and Evgenia Pismennaya, “Russia Closes Border With China to People, Not Goods,” Bloomberg News, January 30, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-30/russia-closing-border-with-china-to-affect-people-not-goods.
13 Andrew Higgins, “Businesses Getting Killed on Russian Border as Coronavirus Fears Rise,” New York Times, February 24, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/24/world/europe/coronavirus-russia-china-commerce.html.
14 Van Ivej, “Выход из Кризиса и Преимущества Китая, [Exit from Crisis and China’s Advantages],” Russia in Global Affairs, April 1, 2020, https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/vyhod-iz-krizisa-i-preimushhestva-kitaya/; Fyodor Lukyanov, “Вирус Разнообразия [Virus of Diversity],” Russia in Global Affairs, March 25, 2020, https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/virus-raznoobraziya/.
15 Michael Kofman, “Towards a Sino-Russian Entente?” Riddle, November 29, 2019, https://www.ridl.io/en/towards-a-sino-russian-entente.
16 Siemon Wezeman, “China, Russia and the Shifting Landscape of Arms Sales,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, July 5, 2017, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/china-russia-and-shifting-landscape-arms-sales.
17 Dmitry Stefanovich, “Russia to Help China Develop an Early Warning System,” The Diplomat, October 25, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/russia-to-help-china-develop-an-early-warning-system.
18 Daniel Urchik, “What We Learned from Peace Mission 2018,” Small Wars Journalundated, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-we-learned-peace-mission-2018.
19 Chris Buckley, “Russia to Join China in Naval Exercise in Disputed South China Sea,” New York Times, July 29, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/world/asia/russia-china-south-china-sea-naval-exercise.html and Andrew Higgins, “China and Russia Hold First Joint Naval Drill in the Baltic Sea,” New York Times, July 25, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/world/europe/china-russia-baltic-navy-exercises.html.
20 Andrew Osborn, “Russia, China, Iran Start Joint Naval Drills in Indian Ocean,” Reuters, December 27, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-military-russia-china/russia-china-iran-start-joint-naval-drills-in-indian-ocean-idUSKBN1YV0IB.
21 Franz-Stefan Gady, “The Significance of the First Ever China-Russia Strategic Bomber Patrol,” The Diplomat, July 25, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/the-significance-of-the-first-ever-china-russia-strategic-bomber-patrol/.
22 “China to Send 1,600 Troops, About 30 Aircraft to Russia’s Strategic Military Drills,” TASS, August 29, 2019, https://tass.com/defense/1075535.
23 Paul Schwartz, “The Military Dimension in Sino-Russian Relations,” in Jo Inge Bekkevold and Bobo Lo, eds. Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st Century, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), p. 105.
24 Eric Berger, “Russia Now Looking to Sell Its Prized Rocket Engines to China,” Ars Technica, January 18, 2018, https://arstechnica.com/science/2018/01/russia-now-looking-to-sell-its-prized-rocket-engines-to-china.
25 Robert S. Ross, “Sino‑Russian Relations: The False Promise of Russian Balancing,” International Politics, September 2019.
26 Krickovic, 2017.
27 John M. Owen IV, “Sino‑Russian Cooperation Against Liberal Hegemony,” International Politics, January 2020.
Bell Boeing Joint Program Office won an $8.1 million contract modification, which adds non-recurring baseline performance rig test efforts in support of the Improved Inlet Solution/Engine Air Particle Separator preliminary design on MV-22 and CV-22 Tiltrotor aircraft. The V-22 Osprey is a joint-service, medium-lift, multimission tilt-rotor aircraft developed by Boeing and Bell Helicopters. The tiltrotor aircraft is available in three configurations: the Combat Assault and Assault Support MV-22 for the USMC and the US Army; the long-range special operations CV-22 for US Special Operations Command (US SOCOM); and the US Navy HV-22, for combat search and rescue, special warfare and fleet logistic support. Work will take place in Indiana, Texas, Pennsylvania and Mississippi.
The Omaha World Herald reports that L3Harris will start converting the first of three KC-135R refueling tankers into WC-135R nuclear radiation sniffing aircraft starting from next month. A US Air Force spokesperson said the first jet is expected to be delivered to the 55th Wing at Offutt Air Force Base in 2022. Maj. Malinda Singleton added that besides removing the refueling boom from the tail of the aircraft, the flight deck will be modernized to the same standard as RC-135S and V/W.
Middle East & AfricaThe Boeing AGM-84L Harpoon Block II missiles that the United States approved for Morocco’s Royal Air Force to purchase are the „non-coastal target suppression“ version, the US Federal Register revealed on Monday. This reduction in capability was not mentioned when the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on April 14 that the US State Department had approved the sale of 10 AGM-84Ls for an estimated USD62 million for use by the RMAF’s F-16 multirole fighters. The AGM-84L was designed to have a substantially improved ability to find target ships sailing close to shore or in congested waters.
EuropeA court in Vienna has stopped an Austrian investigation into alleged fraud by Airbus and Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH in connection with a $2 billion Eurofighter jet purchase in 2003, it said on April 27. The investigation was linked to accusations brought by Austria’s defense ministry in 2017, and its closure does not affect a broader criminal investigation of suspected bribery in the same deal that has been going on since 2011, a court spokeswoman said. The ministry triggered a new probe into Airbus and the Eurofighter consortium – which also includes Britain’s BAE Systems and Italy’s Leonardo in February 2017, alleging that they had misled the state about the price, deliverability and equipment of the planes. Among other things, the ministry accused Airbus and the consortium of illegally charging nearly 10% of the purchase price for so-called offset deals, which involve work being given to local companies.
The Royal Air Force is testing an NHS smartphone app that could help prevent the spread of COVID-19. According to the RAF website, personnel at RAF Leeming are trialling the software, led by the station’s digital unit, RAF eXperimental (RAFX), who have been working closely with NHSX and partners. he app uses Bluetooth software to determine a user’s proximity to other devices. If a person shows symptoms or tests positive for the virus, they can choose to share this information with the NHS via the app. An alert will then be sent to other devices they have been near, whose users can then be tested or self-isolate. It is understood that RAFX set up a scenario which simulated people’s experience of shopping. To adhere to social-distancing rules, phones were placed on tables to simulate people clustering in a shopping area.
Asia-PacificAirbus pulled out of a joint venture with Thai Airways, the country’s national airline, to provide maintenance, repair, and overhaul services at a civil-military airport near the country’s eastern seaboard. Speaking at a press conference officials from Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor office said in comments reported by the state-owned Thai News Agency that Airbus’ decision was prompted by the economic impact of Covid-19.
Today’s VideoWatch: USS VERMONT BLOCK 4 VIRGINIA CLASS SUBMARINE COMMISSIONED BY U.S NAVY !
Boeing won a $75.1 million deal in support of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter aircraft Service Life Assessment Program and Service Life Extension Program, Phase C follow-on effort. The Service Life Modification program started in 2018 and is expected to continue until 2040. The production rate is anticipated to peak at 40 aircraft annually. Boeing also won a contract from the USN in March 2019 to manufacture 78 new-build F/A-18E/F Super Hornets with service-life extensions and Block III upgrades incorporated. Work will take place in St. Louis, Missouri and El Segundo, California. The deal provides non-recurring engineering to assess the fatigue life of the aircraft as well as its subsystems and structures to extend the service life of the F/A-18E/F beyond the original design of the 6,000 flight hour service life. Work is expected to be finished by April 2025.
Hydroid Inc. won a $39.4 million modification to exercise Option Year One for production support for the MK-18 Family of Systems – Unmanned Underwater Vehicle systems. Based on the REMUS 100, the Swordfish MK-18 is designed to Search, Classify, and Map (SCM) the Very Shallow Water Region (10?40 ft). The Navy has a total of 24 Swordfish vehicles: EOD Mobile Unit 1 San Diego, CA : 4 Systems (12 Block A Vehicles), Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit 2 (MDSU?2), Norfolk, VA: 1 System (3 Block A Vehicles), Naval Oceanographic and Mine Warfare Command (NOMWC), Stennis, MS: 3 Systems (9 Block B vehicles). The Mk 18 Mod 1 Swordfish UUV is capable of performing low-visible exploration and reconnaissance in support of amphibious landing; MCM operations (including search, classification and mapping; and reacquire and identification); and hydrographic mapping in the VSW zone (10 to 40 feet depth) and the seaward approaches. It is capable of navigating via acoustic transponders in long-baseline or ultra-short-baseline mode or via P-coded GPS. Work will take place Pocasset, Massachusetts and is expected to be complete by April 2024.
Middle East & AfricaA senior commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Force says the corps will soon take delivery of the Fotros unmanned air vehicle. Fotros is the largest UAV built by Iran so far and was unveiled in 2013. Following extensive meetings with the Defense Ministry and evaluation of features of the homegrown drone, the IRGC Ground Force’s Drone Division has decided to utilize Fotros in operational zones.
EuropeHensoldt has revealed a new airborne jammer that forms part of a wider family of electronic warfare (EW) systems it is developing for the NATO electronic attack requirement that the Luftwaffe has committed itself to deliver. The Kalaetron Attack jammerr is billed as a modular system that Hensoldt hopes will be adopted by the Luftwaffe to deliver its wider Luftgestützte Wirkung im Elektromagnetischen Spektrum capability to NATO from 2025. As noted by the German electronics house, the Kalaetron Attack jammer is a new addition to the Kalaetron EW product family that uses fully digitalised hardware and artificial intelligence to detect radar-based threats and neutralize them with targeted electronic countermeasures.
Asia-PacificLockheed Martin won a $67.6 million modification to a Foreign Military Sales contract to India and Taiwan. The deal provides for modernized target acquisition designation sight/pilot night vision sensors and its subcomponents on the Apache 64D/E helicopter. The M-TADS/PNVS is a long-range, precision engagement and pilotage solution for day, night and adverse weather missions. The electro-optical sensor provides Apache aircrews with situational awareness. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of April 24, 2023.
China has recently commissioned a “new strategic nuclear-powered submarine”, according to a report by the state-owned Global Times newspaper. Written to reflect recent achievements of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in celebration of the 71st anniversary of the establishment of the naval service, the report refers to “new weapons” entering service including the Type 055 destroyer, the first domestically built aircraft carrier, and new anti-submarine patrol aircraft (the KQ-200), as well as the new submarine. Written to reflect recent achievements of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in celebration of the 71st anniversary of the establishment of the naval service, the report refers to “new weapons” entering service including the Type 055 destroyer, the first domestically built aircraft carrier, and new anti-submarine patrol aircraft (the KQ-200), as well as the new submarine.
Today’s VideoWatch: DEFENSE UPDATES WEEKLY NEWS ROUND-UP 26th APRIL-TRUMP TELLS NAVY TO DESTROY IRAN’s GUNBOATS & MORE!
The French Navy’s new nuclear attack submarine made its first sea trip on April 28
Tag: SuffrenAviation Training Consulting won a $7.3 million contract modification for B-52 training system contractor logistics support and training system support center sustainment. The contract modification is for the third increment of the seven year basic contract. The B-52 Stratofortress is capable of dropping or launching a significant array of weapons including gravity bombs, cluster bombs and precision guided missiles. It is a long-range, subsonic, jet-powered strategic bomber. It has been operated by the US Air Force since the 50s. Work under the contract modification will take place at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana; and Minot AFB, North Dakota. Estimated completion date is October 31, 2020.
Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems won a $147.6 million contract action modification for the procurement of MK 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS) vertical launcher module electronic components. The electronic components are installed on USN Ticonderoga Class guided missile cruisers and Arleigh Burke Class guided missile destroyers, as well as vessels operated by allied navies. The purchases are for the USN as well as including purchases via FMS for Finland, Germany and South Korea. The contracting activity is the Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC. This agreement will be financed using the FY2018 and FY2019 shipbuilding and conversion (Navy) funds as well as $29.53 million of FMS funding which was obligated at the time of award. Work is expected to be completed by March 2025.
Middle East & AfricaThe US State Department has approved a possible Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on April 23. The Government of the United Arab Emirates had earlier requested a Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement for common spares/repair parts to support the UAE’ fleet of AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Black Hawk, and CH-47 Chinook helicopters, additional support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $150 million. The proposed sale will allow the UAE Joint Aviation Command to continue to purchase needed spare/repair parts to maintain its fleet of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters, and CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopters as part of the Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement program.
A Israeli Air Force F-4 #022 that was neglected in the Air Force Museum has been restored to pristine condition by 201 Squadron and shipped back home to Ramon Air Force Base. 201 Squadron was the first and last operator of the Phantom in the Israeli Air Force. The F-4 Phantom aircraft and the 201 (“The One”) squadron, which currently operates the “Sufa” (F-16I) fighter jet, share a historic route. The squadron was the first and last to operate the aircraft that has since participated in countless IAF wars and operations. Recently, Ramon AFB received a newly renovated Phantom from the IAF museum located in Hatzerim AFB.
EuropeSaab has signed a three-year contract with the British Ministry of Defense for the provision of support and services to the Direct Fire Weapon Effects Simulator (DFWES) capability. The contract came into effect on April 1, 2020. DFWES is a laser-based Tactical Engagement Simulation (TES) system, that allows dismounted and mounted soldiers to simulate the effects of direct and indirect fire. This order includes support and maintenance for the British Army’s DFWES capability.
Asia-PacificSouth Korea will incorporate a Hanwha Systems-developed, medium-range multifunction radar (MFR) system on the new type of frigates referred to locally as the FFX-III class, Jane’s reports. The class, which is also known as the Ulsan Batch III in official Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) documents, will be the first warships to feature the Gallium Nitride-based sensor. The active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar will form the apex of the frigate’s integrated mast system. The Incheon Class frigates also known as the Future Frigate eXperimental or FFX during development, are coastal defense frigates of the Republic of Korea Navy.
Today’s VideoWatch: RAYTHEON TO BUILD 1000 NEXT GENERATION NUCLEAR ARMED AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE FOR U.S AIR FORCE !
Clark Construction Group won a $78.2 million contract modification, which provides for the construction of the VC-25B hangar complex at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland. The VC-25B, the next Air Force One, is a program to design, test and deliver two aircraft replacing the current VC-25A. The V-25B is to be retrofitted so that the president of the USA can run the federal government, including commanding and controlling the US military, while in flight. As such, detailed information about the aircraft’s components and capabilities are classified or tightly controlled. The aircraft also is likely to include missile warning systems and defensive technologies, such as chaff dispensing systems and directional infrared countermeasures. Work will be performed in Camp Springs, Maryland, and provides for the construction of a hangar complex, an aircraft access taxiway/parking apron, associated lighting, engine run-up pads and a hydrant refueling system with storage tanks. Additional requirements include, but are not limited to, site preparation, wetland/stream mitigation, storm water management, a parking lot, and a fire detection and suppression system. Expected completion will be by April 2022.
Raytheon won a $10.1 million delivery order for the repair of the ALE-50 towed decoy system used in support of the F/A-18 Super Hornet warfare air craft. The AN/ALE-50 towed decoy system was developed by Raytheon to protect multiple US military aircraft from radar-guided-missiles. The ALE-50 consists of a launch controller, launcher and towed decoy. It can be used on a variety of platforms without modification. When deployed, the ALE-50’s expendable aerial decoy is towed behind the aircraft. The decoy protects the host aircraft providing a more attractive target and steering the radar-guided missile away from the aircraft and right to the decoy. ALE-50 has countered both surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles. Work will take place in Forest, Mississippi. Expected completion will be by October 2022.
Middle East & AfricaIran has apparently lofted its first military satellite into orbit, ending a series of setbacks for the nation’s space program. The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) announced that the Noor-1, the country’s first military satellite, was launched from a location in the Dasht-e Kavir desert and successfully put into a 425 km orbit. The United States did not immediately confirm the launch’s success, but General John Hyten, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, left little doubt that Iran had put a satellite into orbit. “The first satellite of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been successfully launched into orbit by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC],” said the elite forces’ official website on Wednesday. It said the satellite – dubbed the Nour – was deployed from the Qassed two-stage launcher from the Markazi desert, a vast expanse in Iran’s central plateau.
EuropeLockheed Martin won a $519.1 million contract for the procurement of international Aegis fire control loop development, Solid State S-Band Radar Processing Group, tools and test equipment and spares for five new multi-mission frigates supporting the Aegis combat system (Baseline 9C.2). The deal funds procurement of international Aegis fire control loop development, Solid State S-Band Radar Processing Group as well as tools, test equipment and spares for five new multi-mission frigates supporting the Aegis combat system. The Aegis Weapon System is a centralized, automated, command-and-control and weapons control system used by the US Navy, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Spanish Navy, Royal Norwegian Navy, Republic of Korea Navy and Royal Australian Navy on a variety of vessel types. Work will take place in New jersey, Wisconsin, Spain, Massachusetts, Washington DC and California. Work is expected by April 2030.
The Dutch Defense Materiel Organization ordered 127 mm guns for the four Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) De Zeven Provinciën Class air defense and command frigates (LCFs). Leonardo has contracted Thales Nederland to install the former’s 127/64 LW-Vulcano system by 2026. The MoD said that the medium gun system would be used mainly for surface fire and naval gunfire support, as well as for air defense. Leonardo’s website lists the system’s four subsystems as the 127/64 LW Gun assembly, a modular automated ammunition handling system, the Naval Fire Control Support mission planning system, and the Vulcano ammunition family. The 127/64 LW-Vulcano has a modular feeding system composed of four drums with 14 ready-to-fire rounds each that can be reloaded during firing, and that can be selected independently from their position in the drums. The gun can fire standard 127 mm rounds and precision-guided munitions, the latter with a range of up to 100 km, according to the MoD.
Asia-PacificThe Wall Street Journal reported on April 20 that a Chinese airborne early warning aircraft has been operating out of Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea. The paper quoted anonymous US officials as saying that the reef is being used as a “forward operating base’ for various military aircraft.
Today’s VideoWatch: Indian Defence Updates : 1st F/A-18 Block-3 Ready,PAK CM-400 v/s BrahMos,100 VT4 Tanks,Exports Boost
The USA’s fleet of 2 “VC-25” 747-200 derivatives is unique in several respects. It’s more popularly known as the latest incarnation of the “Air Force One” fleet that transports the President of the United States around the world, though the planes themselves only acquire the “Air Force One” call sign when the President is on board. The VC-25 can also serve as a secondary command post, thanks to a suite of advanced communications and electronics gear that’s both highly encrypted, and protected from the Electro-Magnetic Pulse effects of nuclear detonations. The 89th Airlift Wing operates them from Andrews AFB, MD.
During the Cold War, if humanity’s time on earth had been cut short, at least one of the orders would almost certainly have come from a 707-based “VC-137” predecessor. The 747-based VC-25s were ordered in 1985, and added to the fleet in 1990, where they continue to serve in the same roles, flying an average of nearly 200,000 miles per year. Of course, maintenance and upgrades are still required, such as the 2002/2003 upgrades that let the President address the nation from on board, new defensive systems, etc…
Wichita plant closure; USAF considers replacement; Various R&D and upgrades.
NG on Air Force OneThe 89th Airlift Wing at Joint Base Andrews, MD flies the VC-25s. Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by the 727th ACSG/PKB at Tinker Air Force Base, OK to Boeing in Wichita, KS. Eventually, Boeing’s move out of Wichita also moved these services to Oklahoma City, OK.
April 24/20: Hangar Complex Clark Construction Group won a $78.2 million contract modification, which provides for the construction of the VC-25B hangar complex at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland. The VC-25B, the next Air Force One, is a program to design, test and deliver two aircraft replacing the current VC-25A. The V-25B is to be retrofitted so that the president of the USA can run the federal government, including commanding and controlling the US military, while in flight. As such, detailed information about the aircraft’s components and capabilities are classified or tightly controlled. The aircraft also is likely to include missile warning systems and defensive technologies, such as chaff dispensing systems and directional infrared countermeasures. Work will be performed in Camp Springs, Maryland, and provides for the construction of a hangar complex, an aircraft access taxiway/parking apron, associated lighting, engine run-up pads and a hydrant refueling system with storage tanks. Additional requirements include, but are not limited to, site preparation, wetland/stream mitigation, storm water management, a parking lot, and a fire detection and suppression system. Expected completion will be by April 2022.
Oct 31/14: R&D. Boeing Aerospace Operations in Oklahoma City, OK receives a $9.3 million cost-plus-incentive-fee modification under the VC-25 Avionics Modernization Program. Boeing will actually subcontract the support necessary to provide one-time engineering services, and associated hardware, in support of this research and development effort.
Work will be performed at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and San Antonio, Texas, and is expected to be completed by May 30, 2018. Fiscal 2014 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $9,261,602 are being re-aligned at the time of award from funding previously obligated under the contract. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, is the contracting activity (FA8106-07-C-0001, PO 0212).
Aug 14/14: R&D. A $6.666 million contract modification for a VC-25 fuel tank Nitrogen Generation System Study, in order to comply with FAA Final Rule FAA-2005-22997 concerning fuel tank flammability. The total cumulative face value of the contract, including the referenced modification is now $316.9 million. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2014 USAF O&M funds.
Work will be performed at Oklahoma City, OK, and Long Beach, CA, and is expected to be complete by May 11/15. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WLKLA at Tinker AFB, OK manages the contract (FA8106-07-C-0001, PO 0148).
Sept 13/13: Upgrades. Boeing Aerospace Operations Inc. in Oklahoma City, OK receives an $8.5 million contract modification to work on upgrading 1 of the 2 VC-25As, in order to bring it into compliance with Federal Aviation Agency Airworthiness Directive 2008-23-09. All funds are committed immediately.
Basically, they’re going to replace the aircraft body’s AN-26 thermal/acoustic insulation layer, which falls short of fire resistance requirements in the FAA’s judgement. This contract involves any design and manufacture of the replacement. Installation will happen concurrently with heavy maintenance efforts under a separate contract.
Work will be performed at Oklahoma City, OK and San Antonio, TX, with an expected completion date of Oct 31/16 (FA8106-07-C-0001, P00135). See also: FAA Airworthiness Directive 2008-23-09.
Sept 9/13: Replacement. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center releases a sources sought survey regarding potential replacements for the VC-25.
It isn’t the first time. Back in 2007, USAF Air Mobility Command issued a similar solicitation, which included Airbus’ A380. The difference is time. The VC-25s are expected to hit their planned flight hour service life figures in 2017, and so the question is becoming more urgent. The USAF’s goal at this stage is a new plane in service by 2021, but they’ll need to issue the development contract within a couple of years if they want to make that happen. Sources: Gannett’s Air Force Times, Sept 9/13.
Jan 31/12: Support. Boeing in Wichita, KS receives a $47.9 million firm-fixed-price, time-and-material cost reimbursable and cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification for VC-25 Option Year III support. The work was performed in Wichita, KS until Dec 21/11 (FA8106-09-C-0005, PO 0039).
Jan 4/12: Wichita lineman, farewell. Boeing confirmed it’s going to close its Wichita, KS plant by the end of 2013. Some of the 2,160+ Wichita jobs will be moved; others will be cut, beginning in Q3 2012. Future aircraft maintenance, modification and support work will be placed at the Boeing facility in San Antonio, TX, which currently handles KC-135 and KC-10 maintenance and upgrade work. Boeing | NY Times | Congressman Mike Pompeo [R-KS-4, not happy].
Wichita closure
FY 2010 – 2011How much to upgrade 1 aircraft? Support contracts; Dept. of ‘Don’t do this again’.
VC-25: Oops.Sept 30/11: Support. L-3 Link Simulation & Training in Arlington, TX receives an $8.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for the for the option III, IV, and V periods in support of the C-20B (Learjet III) and VC-25A Mission Communication System (MCS), which allows for ground and airborne, secure and non-secure communications between aircraft and ground stations.
Work will include program management, systems engineering, technical support for configuration management, review of service reports, requests for technical information, preliminary engineering investigations, field technical representatives, systems integration lab support and operation, and the requirement to maintain drawings and technical data files. This contract also provides for a 24-hour contact for in-flight emergencies, emergency inquiries, on-site support and operation of the test benches located at Andrews AFB including requests for software, firmware, and hardware changes including development and test, engineering feasibility studies, analysis and investigations of Material Deficiency Reports and mishaps; and requirements for technical orders, preliminary engineering change proposals, modifications, upgrades and enhancements including design, testing, integration, kit purchases and spares. The OC-ALCIGKSKB at Tinker AFB, OK manages this contract (FA8106-08-C-0005, PO 0065).
Jan 31/11: Deep maintenance. A $134 million contract modification for the heavy maintenance for 2011 VC-25 aircraft 9000 at Andrews AFB, MD. At this time, $86.8 million has been committed. This announcement has a different modification number, but looked like it could be a duplicate or revision of the Nov 30/10 award. On Feb 23/11, the USAF got back to DID with a clarification:
“We checked this question with the contracting folks — These are two modifications to the base-line contract. Each happen to be valued $134M. When combined, these two modifications are valued at $268M.”
Plus the initial $35.6 million award (q.v. Oct 29/10), makes $303.6 million for in-depth work on 1 aircraft. That’s slightly more than an airline would pay for a new 747-8 (FA8106-09-C-0005, PO 0023).
Jan 25/11: Support. A $13.2 million contract modification to provide Option Year II support for 1 of 2 VC-25 special air mission aircraft at Joint Base Andrews, MD. At this time, the entire amount has been committed (FA8106-09-C-0005, PO 0022).
Nov 30/10: Deep maintenance. A $134 million contract modification, covering the 2011 heavy maintenance effort scheduled for VC-25 tail number 92-9000. At this time, $19.4 million has been committed (FA8106-09-C-0005, PO 0020).
Oct 29/10: Deep maintenance. A $35.6 million contract to provide “heavy maintenance for the 2011 VC-25 aircraft 9000,” with all funds committed (FA8106-09-C-0005, PO 0019).
Jan 28/10: Support. A $35.4 million contract to continue providing contractor support for the USAF’s fleet of 2 VC-25A aircraft. At this time, $8.2 million has been committed (FA8106-09-C-0005, PO 0005).
May 27/09: Bad idea. Well, that didn’t go as planned. The White House wanted an updated picture of a VC-25, with New York in the background. They told some local officials – but not the mayor, or the citizens. Who saw a jumbo jet flying low with fighter jets behind it, and thought it was another 9/11 style terrorist attack. NBC New York:
“A Pentagon official confirmed that while the Presidential Airlift Group, which is based out of Andrews Air Force Base, did inform the FAA and New York City officials about this morning’s aerial photo op, they also told both agencies not to inform the public about it.The NYPD confirmed that statement.”
Louis Caldera, Director of the White House Military Office, ends up losing his job over the flyby. Cost for the photo shoot? $328,835. See also CNN Politics.
NY State of Mind
Additional ReadingsReaders with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.
EDA’s Steering Board has green-lit the launch of a new research project aimed at studying ways and means of improving the operational outfit and equipment of Armed Forces operating in extreme cold and icy weather conditions.
Picture : Austrian Armed Forces
Military missions and operations in cold climate are particularly challenging as they demand from the troops a great deal of physical, operational and mental resilience. Experience from exercises in extreme cold has shown that a considerable number of the soldiers suffer from cold weather injuries (e.g. frostbite, hypothermia, chilblains, immersion foot) and negative energy balance which can highly compromise their performances. An in-depth knowledge of the risk factors for developing cold-related injuries and their impact on the troops’ safety and effectiveness is thus critical to sustain operations in the north.
Against this backdrop, EDA has just launched a new R&T project to study this problem in greater detail to ascertain consequences and possible countermoves. Under the lead of the Netherlands, three more countries are participating: France, Sweden and Norway (the latter is no formal EDA Member State but has concluded an Administrative Agreement with the Agency). The overall objective is to contribute to improving the European capability of operating in arctic/cold environments by developing tools to reduce the risk of soldiers developing cold-weather-related injuries and enhance war fighter performance.
The project has a duration of three to four years.
It is the first R&T project in EDA to study Cold Weather Operations on a European level. It will be important to identify the standards and procedures are currently being applied in the various Member States. The project will therefore identify national variations in the regulations and threshold values for body temperature, safe working duration and respective garment requirements and develop an interpretation guide to translate the generic advice of the main existing standard in this field, ISO-11079, and its extension to national clothing & equipment items. It will also review and measure individual variation in thermal stress response and nutritional demands in cold environments. Finally, the intention is also to identify the added value of wearable sensor technologies for improved personalised advice.
The Cold Weather Operations project is one of several R&T activities under the CapTech CBRN and Human Factors.
The 354th Fighter Wing has taken delivery of its first two F-35A fighters at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska on April 21. The jets flew non-stop from Forth Worth, Texas with mid-air refueling from two KC-135s from the 168th Wing. “This first aircraft is a milestone,” said Col. Benjamin Bishop, the 354th Fighter Wing commander. “Making the first aircraft arrival possible has been a long path, but it’s also just the first step in a journey that will continue at Eielson Air Force Base for decades to come.” By the end of 2021, 54 F-35s will make up two squadrons at Eielson, which is near Fairbanks.
The Pentagon announced that it is awarding $133 million to increase domestic production of N95 masks by over 39 million over the next 90 days. Under the contract, 3M will receive $76 million, O&M Halyward will receive $29 million and Honeywell will receive $27.4 million to make the masks, which have been in short supply since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic. According to the Department of Defense, the investment is intended to ensure the United States government “gets dedicated long term industrial capacity to meet the needs of the nation.” 3M is contracted to provide 78 million units within six months, with an additional 13 million units per month by June, where O&M Halyward will add 25 million units within 6 months and an additional 12.5 million masks every month after. Under the contract Honeywell will add 38 million units within six months and 12 million units per month after.
Middle East & AfricaII Corps Consultants won a $68.7 deal for the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning program. The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning ensures Marines deploy with an operational understanding of the local military and partner cultures and regional dynamics relevant to the mission, with select Marines being language-enabled, in order to facilitate mission success. CAOCL’s designs, delivers, and manages programming throughout the education and training continuum, conducts research and assessments, and provides scientific, policy, and subject matter advising. It also serves as one of the three proponents for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC)-related doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) issues throughout the Marine Corps as directed by the LREC Operational Advisory Group (OAG) Charter and the Marine Corps LREC Strategy. Work will take place in Virginia, Bahrain and Afghanistan. Expected completion date will be by April 2025.
EuropeThree Orion Unmanned Aerial Vehicles have been accepted by the Russian Ministry of Defense, JSC Kronshtadt Group said. General Designer of Kronshtadt, Nikolay Dolzhenkov, added that the aircraft will be modified for additional requirements that were not specified in the original contract. Orion is a Russian unmanned combat aerial vehicle developed by Kronshtadt Group. It can carry four bombs and four missiles and has maximum payload of 200 kg.
As health services across the world battle Coronavirus, NHS Wales is stepping up its defense against viruses of the technological kind. A new agreement with Thales will enable the NHS Wales Informatics Services (NWIS) team to protect vital systems from a surge in cyber-attacks by accessing Thales’s technical threat analysis service, a global centre of knowledge about the latest and emerging threats. According to Thales, the company will be providing the service to NHS Wales free of charge. Thales’s intelligence service makes available its intelligence, identification, computer virus spread monitoring, threat analysis and rapid response skills to healthcare systems across the world, now including NHS Wales.
Asia-PacificGuizhou Aviation Industry Corporation is expecting to fly a new variant of its JL-9 advanced jet trainer that is capable of operating from China’s aircraft carriers soon. The company announced recently that assembly is finished and the jet is being prepared for its maiden flight. It has been suggested that the new variant has removed the drag chute. While the Guizhou company did not elaborate on the project, it said in a separate statement in March that the goal was to “win a new victory in developing and producing the Naval Mountain Eagle,” and the statement came with a picture showing an aircraft carrier at sea, with a Naval Mountain Eagle flying above the carrier and J-15 fighter jets parked on the carrier’s flight deck.
Today’s VideoWatch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5wK9jQsWcsU
Here’s my latest policy brief from the series on Russian strategic culture and leadership decision-making, written for a collaborative project organized by the Marshall Center with support from the Russia Strategy Initiative. This one is on stability in Russia’s political elite during Vladimir Putin’s rule. As with the previous ones, I am posting the full text here with permission from the Marshall Center. Please go to the newly updated Marshall Center website if you would prefer to read a PDF version.
Executive SummaryFor most of the post-Soviet period, the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta has conducted a monthly survey of Russian political experts. This survey asks its respondents to rank the 100 most politically influential Russians in the previous month. Throughout this period, the newspaper has also published an annual ranking,1 based on the average rank of those mentioned during the previous calendar year. These data can be used to identify the most politically influential members of the Russian elite during the twenty years of Vladimir Putin’s rule.2
Characteristics of the Data SetThe dataset used includes all individuals identified in Nezavisimaya Gazeta’s survey who ranked at least twentieth at some point during the period from 2000 to 2019. Since the annual rankings run through 2019, they do not include changes in elite composition resulting from the government reshuffle that took place in January 2020. Such changes will be reflected in the next annual ranking, which is expected to be published in early 2021. This group is composed of just sixty individuals. Although most of those named are politicians or senior government officials, eight are well-connected businessmen or executives of state corporations. Only six individuals came to power through electoral politics. Two are religious leaders. Only three are women. Almost all built their careers in Moscow or St. Petersburg, with only three originally coming from the regions.
The dataset shows each individual’s average annual ranking if they were in the top 100 that year. In the graphs below, gaps indicate periods when the individual in question fell out of the top 100. The primary characteristic of the list is the extraordinary longevity of the people on it. Eighteen people have appeared in the top 100 every year from 2000 through 2019. Nine of them also appeared in the 1999 list, indicating that their political careers extend at least to the late Yeltsin period.3 Only four people have returned to the top 100 after spending more than a year off the list.
Members of the Putin-era political elite can be characterized in various ways. Many analysts have divided them according to their background, as having emerged from the security services or from Vladimir Putin’s circles in St. Petersburg or from private businesses established in the 1990s.4 Others have divided them according to the nature of their position.5 These are very useful ways to categorize, therefore both background and position are mentioned in the discussion below. However, I take a different starting point and categorize the elite on the basis of when they attracted the notice of expert analysts of the Russian political scene as being influential in that scene. This undoubtedly creates some artifacts. Some individuals undoubtedly flew under the radar for some period of time before attracting the notice of experts. Most importantly, individuals who may be influential advisors to senior leaders but stay in the shadows may be undervalued or missed entirely. Nevertheless, given that the main goal of this study is to examine elite stability and change, a primary focus on the chronology of the subjects’ appearance on the scene is more appropriate than one that puts the main focus on the subjects’ background or role in the political system.
Survivors of the Yeltsin EraTen members of the political elite can be characterized as long-term survivors of the Yeltsin era. These are individuals who have appeared on the list since at least 1999, which is the earliest year for which data is currently available. Strikingly, half of the group is still considered among the top thirty most politically influential people in Russia in 2019, twenty years later. This group of Council and former Governor of St. Petersburg Valentina Matvienko; and current Presidential Envoy of to the North Caucasus region and former Prosecutor General, Yuri Chaika. With the exception of Putin and Matvienko, these are people who have made careers as appointed senior officials rather than elected politicians.
The group of survivors also includes a number of people who have made their careers primarily in the business world, including such prominent oligarchs as Roman Abramovich and Vagit Alekperov. Vladimir Potanin is also included in the graphic as an oligarch known for his ability to maneuver through changes in Russia’s political scene and remain influential, although he is not part of the dataset, having never reached the top twenty in influence in any year measured. Although Anatolii Chubais was a prominent government official earlier in his career, during the period being analyzed here he has made his career in the world of state corporations, first as head of Russia’s electricity monopoly and then as head of the Rosnanotech state corporation. All four of these individuals have seen a decline in their influence in recent years, reflecting a general decline in influence among oligarchs in favor of bureaucratic officials.The two other members of this group deserve a brief mention. Aleksandr Zhukov is a survivor who has played a variety of roles in government, including as a leading member of the State Duma, as the head of the Russian Olympic committee that organized the Sochi Winter Olympics, and as a deputy prime minister. Like the oligarchs, his influence has declined sharply in recent years. Finally, there is the case of Aleksandr Voloshin. Throughout Putin’s first term as President, Voloshin was the head of the presidential administration and considered one of the most powerful people in Russia. More interestingly, unlike other holdovers from the Yeltsin team described in the following section, he has consistently remained on the list of politically influential Russians since his resignation in 2003, albeit in relatively low positions.
Yeltsin-Era Politicians Who Did Not LastA second group of members of the political elite were also survivors of the Yeltsin era, but have not retained their influence. These nine individuals are a fairly diverse group. Five of the nine were senior officials in the central government who stepped down at various points between 2001 and 2011 and thereafter disappeared from political life in Russia. These include Viktor Gerashchenko, who headed the Russian Central Bank until 2002; Aleksandr Veshniakov, who headed Russia’s Central Election Commission until 2007; and Mikhail Kasianov, who served as prime minister during Putin’s first term as president. There are also two former government ministers: Mikhail Zurabov, who headed the pension fund from 1999 to 2004 and was thereafter health minister until 2007 and Viktor Khristenko, who was deputy prime minister in both Yeltsin’s last year as president and in Putin’s first term and thereafter the minister of industry until 2012.
The other four members of this group can be described as more eclectic. Aleksei II’s influence came from his position as the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church. As we will see below, after his death in 2008, his successor retained a roughly similar level of influence. Yuri Luzhkov rapidly lost influence after his removal from his post as mayor of Moscow in 2010. The two businessmen in this group had very different trajectories. Mikhail Khodorkovsky was, for a time, the most influential private businessman in Russia and remained influential even after his arrest in 2003, but he disappears from the list after his trial and imprisonment in 2005. Finally, Mikhail Fridman is somewhat different from the rest of this group. He is a businessman whose influence has gradually faded over time. In this, he is most similar to Vladimir Potanin in the previous group (the “survivors”), with the main difference being that the degree of his fade has taken him out of not only the top twenty, but the top 100, in recent years. Other than Fridman, the members of this group are all notable for having derived their influence from their positions, rather than their personal power. Unlike several people in the survivor group, their influence did not outlast their dismissal from their government positions.
Putin’s Original TeamWhen Vladimir Putin became Russia’s president in 2000, he quickly installed his own team of loyalists. With only one exception, these twelve individuals who first appeared on the list in 2000 have remained highly influential players in Russian politics over the next twenty years. The majority of the team are connected to Putin, either through their work in the security services or from Putin’s time working in the St. Petersburg mayor’s office in the 1990s.
The security service contingent includes Sergei Ivanov, Igor Sechin, Nikolai Patrushev, and Vladimir Ustinov. The first three people on this list have been among the core members of Putin’s inner circle throughout his time in power. One key difference when compared with the group of individuals that did not last is that the security service contingent’s influence has remained high regardless of the various positions they have held. Thus, Igor Sechin has variously served as deputy head of the presidential administration, deputy prime minister (while Putin was prime minister), and head of the Rosneft state oil corporation. His influence did not decrease when he departed from his government position in 2012 and he remains one of the ten most politically influential people in Russia to the present day.
Similarly, Nikolai Patrushev has been highly influential, both as FSB director and as secretary of the Security Council, despite the latter organization’s relatively limited formal power. Sergei Ivanov was highly influential first as defense minister, then as deputy prime minister, and finally as head of the presidential administration. His influence has faded in the last three years after his departure from the presidential administration, but the fact that he remains on the list despite having virtually no significant official role in Russian politics speaks to his personal connection to the president. Vladimir Ustinov is a somewhat different case. Although he played a powerful role in Russian politics while serving as prosecutor general, his removal from that position in 2006 was interpreted as a political defeat and resulted in a sharp decline in his perceived influence, even while he was still serving as Minister of Justice. After his dismissal from that position in 2008 and his transfer to the role of presidential representative to the Southern Federal District, he disappeared from the rankings entirely.
The St. Petersburg team includes Dmitry Medvedev, Aleksei Kudrin, German Gref, Dmitry Kozak, and Boris Gryzlov. These are also figures who have exhibited political influence regardless of the position they held. Medvedev served variously as deputy head and then head of the presidential administration, first deputy prime minister, president, and prime minister, retaining a position among the ten most influential Russian political figures since his appointment as head of the presidential administration in late 2003. Gref and Kudrin survived their departures from positions as minister for economic development and trade and minister of finance, respectively. Gref has retained influence in his role as head of Sberbank, while Kudrin remained highly influential despite having no major government or business position from 2011 until his appointment as head of the Accounts Chamber in 2018. Boris Gryzlov was highly influential as minister of internal affairs and as speaker of the State Duma, but disappeared from the list after stepping down as speaker in 2011. He returned in 2017, however, despite having a fairly low-level position as the president’s representative to the contact group on the Ukraine conflict.
Dmitry Kozak has held a wide variety of positions over the last twenty years, both in Moscow and in the regions, while remaining highly influential. His peak of influence was in Putin’s first two terms in office, when he held senior positions in the presidential administration and as presidential representative to the Southern Federal District. Note that his high level of influence in the latter position contrasts with the case of Vladimir Ustinov, who dropped off the influence list after replacing Kozak in this position. This strongly suggests that Kozak’s influence during this period was related to his personal connections, rather than the office he held.
Three other members of the team are not connected to Putin through prior service. Vladislav Surkov and Aleksei Gromov were already working in the central government in the 1990s but first rose to positions of prominence under Putin. Surkov served in the presidential administration until 2011, then briefly as head of the government executive office before becoming a personal advisor to Putin. Although his influence declined in the latter position and he is likely to drop out of the rankings entirely in 2020 after his very public resignation in February, he remained on the list throughout the period of the study. Gromov was the president’s press secretary in his first two terms, followed by twelve years in the presidential administration as deputy and first deputy chief of staff. His influence has steadily increased over the years, especially once he moved into the presidential administration. Finally, Oleg Deripaska is an outlier among this group, as his role is in business rather than government. Although he is linked more closely to Putin than some of the businessmen who appeared in the other groups, his influence has declined in the last decade as power has shifted away from people in business and toward government officials. People Who Became Influential During Putin’s First TermIndividuals who joined the list of politically influential figures between 2001 and 2004 fall into very similar categories as Putin’s original team. Once again, the majority are figures whose background is in the security services or in the St. Petersburg government, while a few rose through other channels. Unlike Putin’s original team, few of these individuals have the political capital to have influence separate from their positions.
Siloviki, political figures who rose to power in the security services, such as Mikhail Fradkov, Rashid Nurgaliev, and Viktor Ivanov, are good examples of this tendency. Fradkov, for example, appeared in relatively low positions on the list as head of the tax police in 2001 and 2002, then disappeared from the list entirely while serving as Russia’s representative to the European Union in 2003. He then spent four years as one of the most politically influential people in Russia while serving as prime minister, before again disappearing from the list entirely after losing that position. He returned to the list in 2013 while serving as head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, but disappeared after being dismissed from that position in 2016. Similarly, Rashid Nurgaliev was highly influential while serving as minister of internal affairs from 2004 to 2011, but disappeared from the list immediately after stepping down from that position. Viktor Ivanov spent several years as an assistant to President Putin and then several more as director of the Federal Narcotics Service. He disappeared from the list after being dismissed from the latter position in early 2016.
The political figures who came out of St. Petersburg are a relatively diverse group. Among them are two who have remained on the list throughout the period since their initial appearance in 2001–2002. Sergei Mironov served for many years as the speaker of the Federation Council, although he retained a certain amount of influence after moving to the State Duma in 2012. Aleksei Miller has remained among the twenty-five most politically influential Russians continuously since 2003 while serving as the head of Gazprom, Russia’s natural gas monopoly. Vladimir Iakunin was on the list only during the period from 2005 to 2015, when he headed the Russian Railroad state corporation. His immediate disappearance after his departure from that position in 2015 suggests that his influence derived from his position, rather than his personal power. Viktor Zubkov first made the list while running the Financial Monitoring Committee and reached higher positions on it, having served as prime minister and first deputy prime minister. He dropped off the list after losing the latter position in 2012.
The remaining four people in this group have had highly varied careers. Igor Shuvalov has served in a variety of roles in the government, including as the government’s chief of staff, as an assistant to the president, and as first deputy prime minister. He was most highly ranked on Nezavisimaya Gazeta’s list in the latter period, although he retained some influence even after departing that position in 2018. Aleksandr Khloponin is one of the few people on the overall list who appeared on the list while holding a position outside of Moscow. He was, for many years, the governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai and then served as deputy prime minister. The peak of his influence was in the period 2010–2014, when he concurrently served as deputy prime minister and presidential envoy to the North Caucasus Federal District. Even during this period, his highest position in the survey was twentieth in 2010, highlighting the extent to which Moscowbased political figures dominate the rankings.
Dmitry Rogozin first came to prominence as one of the few elected national-level politicians on this list. He was one of the leaders of the right-wing Rodina party until 2005 and was thus one of the few influential politicians with an independent power base. However, he dropped off the list after departing the party due to conflicts with other leaders. He returned to a position of influence in 2012 after being appointed deputy prime minister in charge of the defense and space industries. Finally, Sergei Pugachev is unique, in that he only appeared on the list for two years, but in very high positions. He was a businessman with close ties to Putin, but quickly fell out of favor after refusing to reinvest his capital in Russia. He has since renounced his Russian citizenship and now lives in France.
People Who Became Influential During Putin’s Second TermA fairly large group—thirteen people—became politically influential during Putin’s second term. Although a few of these people appeared on the list early in the term, most joined or rose to high rankings in 2007 or 2008. Individuals who joined the political elite during this period fall into two major categories, with a few outliers.
Five people in this set had close ties with Putin, mostly dating to their schooling in the 1970s and 1980s or through working together in the security services in the 1980s and 1990s. All five of these individuals rose to highly influential positions at around the same time and have remained near the top of the list throughout Putin’s presidency. Aleksandr Bastrykin was a university classmate of Putin. He worked at the Ministry of Justice and in the Prosecutor-General’s office before being appointed in 2007 as head of the Investigative Committee (IC), an anti-corruption agency within the Prosecutor-General’s office. His influence increased further in 2011, when the IC became an independent agency directly subordinate to the president.
Sergei Naryshkin has served in a variety of roles over the years, including chief of staff to the prime minister, deputy prime minister, head of the presidential administration, chair of the State Duma and, most recently, director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. His influence has always come less from his position and more from his close ties to Vladimir Putin, whom he has known since the early 1980s, when they studied together in the Soviet security service (KGB) schools in Leningrad. He was perceived as having been appointed head of the presidential administration under Dmitry Medvedev in order to ensure Medvedev’s loyalty to Putin.6 Aleksandr Bortnikov spent his entire career in the KGB or its successor agency, the Federal Security Service (FSB), primarily in the Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) office. He was appointed deputy director of the FSB in 2004 and became its head in 2008. Although all three are influential because of their positions, they achieved these positions through a combination of their previous work and their connections to Vladimir Putin.
On the other hand, Sergei Chemezov and Yuri Kovalchuk have attained their positions almost entirely through their connections to Putin. Chemezov worked with Putin in the KGB in East Germany in the 1980s and again in the Presidential Property Office in Moscow in the late 1990s. Since Putin became president, Chemezov has held senior positions in a variety of state corporations, beginning with Rosoboronexport (the state defense export company) and since 2007 as general director of Rostec, which, under his leadership, has become the dominant player in Russia’s defense industry. Although Yuri Kovalchuk did not go to school or work with Putin, he has had close ties to the president dating back to the 1990s. Like Chemezov, he has never worked in the Russian government, having instead used his personal ties to Putin to amass a large fortune as the head of Bank Rossiia, a position that has led him to be labeled as “Putin’s personal banker.”
A second set of five people rose to political influence by rising through the ranks of their agencies. Sergei Lavrov is perhaps the archetype of this figure. He has served as foreign minister since 2004, having previously served as a deputy foreign minister and as Russia’s representative to the United Nations. Although he was, for many years, described as someone who is a civil servant and chief implementer rather than a member of Putin’s inner circle, his longevity in his post has gradually translated into greater influence on decision-making.
Tatiana Golikova rose through the ranks of the Ministry of Finance, becoming Deputy Finance Minister in the late 1990s. She was then appointed as Minister of Health and Social Development in 2007, going from that role to the position of Chair of the Accounts Chamber in 2013 and then becoming Deputy Prime Minister for Social Policy in 2018. Similarly, Elvira Nabiullina rose through the ranks at the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade, becoming the head of the ministry in 2007. She has retained influence since transitioning to her current position as head of Russia’s Central Bank in 2013.
Arkady Dvorkovich rose through the Finance Ministry and the Ministry for Economic Development, having developed close ties to German Gref in the latter ministry. He first rose to prominence as then-President Dmitry Medvedev’s chief economic advisor and then as deputy prime minister once Medvedev assumed the position of Prime Minister in 2012. He dropped off the list of politically influential Russians after losing that position in 2018, and now serves as president of the World Chess Federation. Finally, Patriarch Kirill rose through the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church and headed the Church’s Department for External Church Relations from 1989 until his election as Patriarch in 2009, following Patriarch Aleksei’s death.
He first appeared on the list of influential people in 2007, when it became increasingly clear that he was likely to become the next patriarch, even as Aleksei’s health was declining. All five of these individuals are influential because of their positions, rather than through personal ties.
Only two members of this group attained their positions through the political process, both initially in regions outside of Moscow. Sergei Sobianin has had a long career in electoral politics at the regional level, first winning election in 1991 as mayor of a small town in Siberia, gradually rising to higher positions in the region, including a five-year stint as governor of Tiumen. He moved to Moscow in 2005 to serve as head of the presidential administration, and has remained a fixture in the top twenty most influential Russians since 2007. He has been the mayor of Moscow since 2010.
Viacheslav Volodin won his first election even earlier, serving on the Saratov city council beginning in 1990. He represented Saratov in the State Duma beginning in 1999, serving as the Duma’s deputy speaker. He succeeded Sobianin as head of the government executive office in 2010 and has remained on the top twenty list since then, serving as deputy head of the presidential administration and, since 2016, as chair of the State Duma.
Finally, Anatoly Serdiukov is unique among this group in that he achieved his influence by virtue of his ties to someone in the top elite other than Putin. He appears on the list in 2007, when he moved from his previous position as head of the Federal Tax Service to Defense Minister. He dropped off the list in 2012, when he was dismissed from that position. His appointment was linked to his connection to Viktor Zubkov, as he was married to Zubkov’s daughter. Despite constant criticism from members of the military, he remained in the position until his wife filed for divorce in 2012, at which point he was quickly accused of corruption and removed from his position.
People Who Became Influential in the Last 12 YearsAlthough much has been written about efforts by Russia’s senior leadership to renew Russia’s political elite, very few people have joined the ranks of the most influential Russians since 2008. In fact, only one person who joined the list while Dmitry Medvedev was president has become highly influential, while another four rose to top positions between Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 and the end of 2019. As we saw in the previous section, a few others appeared on the list earlier, but only became highly influential after 2012. The five people in this group come from a variety of backgrounds, though most share the characteristic of rising to positions of influence through the ranks of the organizations they now lead, rather than achieving that position through personal connections to Putin or members of Putin’s inner circle. Dmitry Peskov rose through the diplomatic service and then through the presidential press office before becoming Putin’s press secretary in 2008. Anton Siluanov rose through the finance ministry, replacing the previous minister in late 2011. Anton Vaino rose through the presidential administration and has headed it since 2016. Vladimir Kolokoltsev served in various positions in the interior ministry, followed by a term as the Moscow police commissioner, before being appointed to head the interior ministry in 2012. Viktor Zolotov is the one exception in this group because he has been personally close to Putin since serving as a bodyguard to St. Petersburg mayor Anatolii Sobchak in the 1990s. Although he only appeared on the list of influential Russians in 2016, he headed the presidential security service from the start of Putin’s tenure in 2000 until his appointment as head of the newly established National Guard in 2016. He thus serves as a good example of the type of individual who was missed by expert rankings because of his tendency to keep out of the limelight.
Inflection PointsAlthough Russia’s political elite has experienced relatively little change over the last twenty years, there have been a few key moments of substantial renewal, most immediately before or after presidential elections. After the initial introduction of Putin’s team in 2000–2001, an initial shift took place in 2003–2004. This was a period of consolidation, during which holdovers from the Yeltsin administration such as Kasyanov and Voloshin left their positions and the influence of independent businessmen was largely eliminated after the arrest of Khodorkovsky. These figures’ residual influence meant that they remained on the list, though in relatively low positions, for some time thereafter. However, starting at this point, all senior officials were either members of Putin’s circle or technocrats.
A much bigger elite transition took place in 2007, with the departure of Veshniakov, Fradkov, and Zurabov and the decline in influence of Chubais, Gref, Zhukov, and Viktor Ivanov. At the same time, a large number of new people appeared on the list, including Chemezov, Bortnikov, Bastrykin, Kovalchuk, Golikova, Nabiullina, Dvorkovich, and Serdiukov. In addition, Naryshkin, Zubkov, Iakunin, and Shuvalov, who had all been on the list previously, first attained high levels of influence in 2007 or 2008. These changes occurred as part of the transition to what became known as the “tandemocracy,” a period during which Medvedev served as president while Putin was prime minister.
There was a second major transition around the 2012 presidential election, with the departures of Zubkov, Gryzlov, Khristenko, Nurgaliev, and Serdiukov and the decline of Kudrin and Surkov. At the same time, Shoigu, Bastrykin, Volodin, and Peskov became highly influential for the first time while Siluanov, Rogozin, and Kolokoltsev either first appeared on the list or returned after a lengthy absence. This date marked the consolidation of the conservative turn in Russian politics, with security officials in the ascendance and economic modernizers relegated to secondary roles.
Putin’s third term was characterized largely by stability, with only a few significant shifts in influence. There were early signs of a generational shift, although few younger officials had yet reached positions of highest influence by the end of 2019, as highlighted by the dearth of people in the final group discussed above. Although a big government shakeup took place in January 2020, initial monthly polling suggests that this will result primarily in a reshuffling, with potentially limited impact on the composition of the top elite beyond the addition of the new prime minister. The shift to a new generation is coming, but the highest level still consists primarily of the people who have been with Putin since the early days of his rule. This will likely remain the case at least until the next presidential election in 2024.
ConclusionThe small number of people represented in the elite suggests a high level of elite continuity, which has allowed the regime to remain remarkably stable over a twenty-year period. Regime stability can be fleeting and authoritarian regimes, in particular, can shift from the appearance of eternal stability to collapse in a brief period. Nevertheless, the level of elite continuity in Putin’s Russia has allowed for relatively high level of policy consistency. While Putin’s team certainly has its share of tensions, everyone in his inner circle understands how the others operate.
The expert survey data clearly show that Russia’s Putin-era political elite includes two types of officials. Members of the first group have influence because of their roles or positions in government, while members of the second group have influence independently of their positions because of their ties to Vladimir Putin. Those in the second group tend to remain influential even when they are no longer in positions of power, while those in the first group drop out of the rankings as soon as they step down from their official role. This finding suggests that the number of people with real power may be even smaller than the sixty people represented in the data set, as only the second group has lasting influence at the highest levels. It also suggests that the members of the elite who were displaced in the government turnover of January 2020 will have different fates. People who have close ties to Putin, such as Dmitry Medvedev, will remain influential, while those who have had power because of their roles in government, such as Surkov, are likely to disappear.
Notes1 The most recent annual rankings were published in Dmitri Orlov, “100 ведущих политиков России в 2019 году,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 1, 2020, http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2020-01-13/7_7766_people.html.
2 The question of how well an expert survey of this type reflects actual power dynamics in Russia is a valid one. Because the main goal of this study is to examine political influence, ratings by Russian experts on domestic politics are likely to be a fairly accurate representation, especially because the survey used a consistent methodology throughout the period under study.
3 “1999 год. 100 ведущих политиков России.” https://ru.telegram.one/CorruptionTV/1499.
4 Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “Putin’s Militocracy,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 19(4):289-306, 2003.
5 Tatiana Stanovaya, “Пять путинских элит на фоне транзита,” Carnegie Moscow Center, February 27, 2020. https://carnegie.ru/2020/02/27/ru-pub-81158.
6 Guy Faulconbridge, Michael Stott, “Medvedev’s Kremlin chiefs are Putin men,” Reuters, May 13, 2008. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-cabinet-kremlin/medvedevs-kremlin-chiefs-are-putin-men-idUSL1323497720080513.
BPC Mistral (Antilles et Guyane), BPC Dixmude (Réunion) et BPC Tonnerre (Corse) sont mobilisés.
Tag: BPCOpération RésilienceTimken Gears and Services won a $76.2 million contract modification to exercise options for main reduction gear shipsets for DDG-51 or Arleigh Burke Class guided-missile destroyers. The DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class is a multi-mission warship. It features an advanced anti-submarine warfare system, the AEGIS combat system, the Vertical Launching System, two embarked SH-60 helicopters along with advanced anti-aircraft missiles and land-attack missiles. The main reduction gears transmit the power from two main propulsion gas turbines to the propulsion shaft. Each DDG 51 Class destroyer has two gear assemblies, one for each propulsion shaft. The DDG 51-Class guided-missile destroyer is a multi-mission surface combatant with 67 delivered ships, and 21 more are currently under contract. Work will take place in Missouri, California, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Delaware and Wisconsin. Work is expected to be finished by November 2023.
The US Air Force has decided to focus on Raytheon’s design for the Long-Range Standoff Weapon program. Elizabeth Thorn, LRSO’s program manager said the decision is not a down-select. Lockheed Martin and Raytheon were given Technology Maturation and Risk contracts for the program in 2017. “We are reframing our relationship with Lockheed Martin to focus on specific technology maturation we believe either has future applicability for the final LRSO design or will reduce overall program risk,” Thorn said. The LRSO is designed to be a nuclear-armed cruise missile to replace the AGM-86.
Middle East & AfricaIraq became the latest country to consider acquiring the Russian-made S-400 Triumf, local news reports. The country’s Parliamentary Security and Defense committee had submitted a report to the Iraqi prime minister’s office recommending the acquisition of the S-400. The country had previously announced in January that it would be examining potential offerings from China, Russia, and Ukraine. The acquisition will have to await approval of the country’s prime minister, with the post currently vacant. Former director of the country’s National Intelligence Service Mustafa al-Khadimi is currently the prime minister designate and is negotiating with other parties to form a coalition government.
Iran now has armed versions of its Ababil-3 UAV. This was revealed during a ceremony held to mark the delivery of three types of unmanned aircraft to the military. The Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics released photographs showing a hangar at the Aerospace Industries Organization facility in Isfahan with 11 Ababil-3s, one of which was carrying a television-guided munition on a hardpoint under a wing. This appeared to be a member of the Ghaem family of small-guided bombs that has previously been seen on Mohajer-6 UAVs. Iranian television showed an Ababil-3 with a different livery apparently carrying out a precision air strike against an old tank using a munition labelled as a Ghaem. The MODAFL cited Defense Minister Amir Hatami as saying the Ababil-3 has a range of 150 km.
EuropeThe German government has approved the procurement of the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler to partially satisfy its Tornado replacement requirement, national media has reported. German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer has told the US government that Berlin has given clearance for the Luftwaffe to acquire 45 Super Hornet and Growler aircraft as part of its wider plans to replace 90 Panavia Tornado Interdiction and Strike (IDS)/Electronic Combat Reconnaissance (ECR) aircraft with 85 new platforms from 2025. The 30 Super Hornet multirole and 15 Growler electronic attack (EA) jets would enable the Luftwaffe to fulfil its airborne nuclear strike and EA requirements within the required timeframe,
Asia-PacificThe Turkish defense company Aselsan announced that it had signed a new contract with Kazakhstan to supply its Stabilized Advanced Remote Weapon Platform (SARP)-Dual remote-controlled weapon station (RCWS). The Turkish company has strong links with Kazakhstan via its Kazakhstan Aselsan Engineering subsidiary, which was established to increase ‘manufacturing capacity in order to meet Kazakhstan’s military and civilian needs’. No details were provided about the delivery schedule, the size of the order, the value of the contract or the platforms the RWCSs are set to be installed upon. In November 2016 Kazakhstan had awarded the company a contract for an undisclosed number of SARP RWCSs, deliveries of which began the following year. However, these are believed to have been single weapon systems.
Today’s VideoWatch: NEW SORYU SUBMARINES ARE THE FIRST TO HAVE LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES MAKING THEM DEADLY SILENT !
Huntington Ingalls Industries won a $108 million contract modification to exercise options for the accomplishment of the planning yard services for the littoral combat in-service ships. The LCS is a high speed, agile, shallow draft, mission-focused surface combatant of the US Navy designed for operations in the littoral environment, yet fully capable of open ocean operations. It is a modular, reconfigurable ship designed to meet validated fleet requirements for anti-surface warfare (ASuW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and mine countermeasures (MCM) missions. The requirements under this contract include, but are not limited to ship installation drawings development; ship change document updates; operating cycle integration program management; work integration package engineering; type commander response; ship configuration logistics support information system support; configuration data management; research engineering and modeling; provisioned items order; cost and feasibility studies; integrated planning yard material support; provisioning technical documentation; naval ships engineering drawing repository system input and data management; interface and coordination with regional maintenance centers and fleet entities; design alteration and modification development; review and tracing; managing related class ship selected record documents; and hull, mechanical and electrical engineering standardization efforts.Work will take place in Virginia, Mississippi,California and Florida. Estimated completion will be by April 2021.
General Dynamics Electric Boat announced that it has delivered the nuclear-powered attack submarine Vermont to the Navy. The Vermont is the 19th submarine of the Virginia Class, which displace 7,835 tons, with a hull length of 377 feet and a diameter of 34 feet, and can carry eight masts, including a snorkel mast and high-data-rate satellite communication masts as well as a radar mast. The submarine is valued at $3 billion. “I am pleased to report that the Vermont has received some of the highest quality ratings in the history of the Virginia program. We wish Vermont and her crew a long and distinguished career in defense of our nation“, said Kevin Graney, President, General Dynamics Electric Boat, in a press release. Back in December the Navy awarded Electric Boat $22.2 billion for delivery of nine Virginia-class subs, and in January Lockheed Martin received $19.3 million to deliver masts for the boats.
Middle East & AfricaThe first of 12 Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC)-Embraer A-29 Super Tucano light attack turboprops for Nigeria made its maiden flight at the Florida production facility on April 17. With the successful first flight completed, the aircraft will now be fitted with its mission systems by SNC in Colorado ahead of final trials and the commencement of deliveries to the Nigerian Air Force in 2021. The milestone comes about 30 months after the US Department of Defense (DoD) contracted SNC to deliver the 12 aircraft to Nigeria for use in the fight against the Boko Haram Islamist group. With weapons, the total value of the deal was estimated to be approximately $600 million. Powered by a single 1,600 SHP Pratt & Whitney PT6A-68/3 turboprop engine, the Super Tucano carries two 12.7 mm machine guns (200 rounds each) in the wings and can be configured with additional underwing weaponry such as 20 mm cannon pods, additional 12.7 mm machine guns, rockets pods, precision-guided munitions, and/or ‘dumb’ bombs of up to 1,500 kg.
EuropeThe Italian Army has placed an order with Leonardo for 15 AW169 helicopters. This is the second successful sale of the military variant. Italy’s Guardia di Finanza police agency was the first to order this variant back in 2018 with an order for 22. The procurement, disclosed by the country’s Ministry of Defense solidifies an earlier announcement made in January that the AW169M was to be bought to replace the army’s Bell AB 205, AB 212, and AB 412 LUHs, and to augment its Boeing CH-47F Chinook, NHIndustries NH90, AgustaWestland A129 helicopters. According to the procurement document, the deal with Leonardo, which is valued at $301 million, comprises delivery of two helicopters in a ‘commercial basic trainer’ configuration, as well as approval for the start of development of 15 new ‘advanced multirole’ configuration helicopters for the Italian Army.
Asia-PacificAmid the COVID-19 pandemic, the Indian Navy emphasized that it remains combat-ready, mission-capable, and in full readiness, after 26 of its personnel were quarantined after testing positive for the coronavirus. “All missions for coastal and offshore security continue as before. Operational units are being maintained in readiness by following a 14-day quarantine routine to meet immediate contingencies, including assistance to civil authorities and friendly maritime neighbors“, said India’s Press Information Bureau. “Our naval assets continue to be mission-deployed in three dimensions, with all the networks and space assets functioning optimally,” it added.
Sankei News reports that Japan has created a working group of local and US aerospace companies for the development of the successor to the F-2 fighter. The report added that Britain lost the race for the joint development program as it wants to have the lead and Japan is unwilling to participate in joint development with other countries in the Tempest program. The F-2 is one of the main fighter jets used by the Air Self-Defense Force. According to government officials, about 10 Japanese companies, including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., IHI Corp. and Toshiba Corp., will join the conference. Japan will ask three US companies, including Lockheed Martin Corp. and Boeing Co., to join the conference.
Today’s VideoWatch: Indian Defence Updates : Tejas Locked 1.6 Mach,Armata FRCV Offer,A330 MRTT,Chinese Marines In IOR
In December 2011, Japan picked Lockheed Martin’s new F-35A stealth fighter as its next fighter aircraft, to replace its aging F-4 “Kai” Phantom fleet. The F-35 was actually their 2nd choice.
Back in February 2006, Inside The Air Force (ITAF) reported that momentum was building within the USAF to sell the ultra-advanced F-22A Raptor abroad to trusted US allies, as a way of increasing numbers and production. Japan clearly wanted them, and the Raptor was a topic of diplomatic discussions in several venues, including a 2007 summit meeting. In the end, however, US politics denied export permission for downgraded export variants of the F-22, and its production line was terminated. That left Japan looking at other foreign “F-X” fighter options in the short term, while they considered a domestic stealth fighter design as their long-term project.
In the ensuing F-X competition, the F-35 Lightning II beat BAE’s Eurofighter Typhoon, as well as an upgraded F/A-18E Super Hornet from Boeing. Now Lockheed Martin has to deliver, and so will its Japanese partners. Will the F-35A’s price and program delays create problems in Japan? This article looks at the JASDF’s current force, its future options, and ongoing F-X developments.
The Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) currently has 3 fighter jet models in its fleet: F-15J/F-15DJ Eagles, its F-4EJ “Kai” and RF-4EJ reconnaissance Phantom IIs, and the Mitsubishi F-2 – a larger, longer-range variant on the F-16C. The Mitsubishi F-1 entered service in 1978 and is still listed on the JASDF web site, but it has now been replaced by F-2s [1]. Now, 42 F-35As will begin to replace the 80-plane F-4 fleet, but that won’t be the end for Japan.
The JASDF introduced the F-4EJ in 1973. It currently serves mostly in anti-shipping and other “permitted” strike roles, though it can also be used for air defense and policing. The RF-4EJ reconnaissance version will be replaced by F-15Js with special pods, and Japan has indicated that they will begin retiring the rest of the F-4 fleet early in the 2010s.
Japan has top-tier manufacturing experience, but they also had a qualitative and quantitative problem. Japanese firms have already produced F-15Js under license, and designed and produced the Mitsubishi F-2 in conjunction with Lockheed Martin. The F-2 is larger than an F-16 and has more range, but its performance doesn’t compare to an F-15, and it costs nearly as much. The F-2s won’t be built in expected numbers, which means they cannot replace the F-4EJs and RF-4EJs.
J-20 PrototypeThe Japanese had important choices to make, and the 2010 tsunami sharpened that urgency by destroying 18 of Japan’s F-2 fighters. Then China pushed things to the next level, unveiling its J-20 twin-engine stealth fighter prototype.
The Phase 1 plan was for Japan to choose a future F-X fighter by the end of 2011, buy about 50, and begin receiving them in 2016. Meanwhile, Japanese industry is trying to figure out how to keep itself busy now that license production of F-15 components and F-2s is ending. The Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies’ proposal involves producing F-X fighters and their F-XX follow-on buy until 2028, and having some of those 100-120 planes replace existing F-15Js as well. That would be followed by a Japanese fighter design, to begin development by 2017 based in part on lessons learned from their ongoing ATD-X stealth technology demonstrator. Japan hopes to fly ATD-X in 2014-2016, and the SJAC’s idea was that its successor could enter production around 2028, as the foreign-designed F-X fighter line closed down.
When choosing their initial F-X buy, the Japanese had several options.
The Winner: F-35 Lightning II F-35A test flightIf stealth is desired, Lockheed Martin’s plane is considered a “second best” option to the F-22. While other contenders have sharply reduced their radar signature when compared to planes like the F-16, the F-35 is significantly ahead because it’s designed for stealth from the outset, including internal weapon bays. As China moved to introduce its own J-20 stealth fighter, that criterion seemed to eclipse all others in Japan’s thinking. “Joint Strike Fighters” also offer exceptional performance in the reconnaissance role, while its set partnership model smooths technology transfer issues. That transferred technology is very important to the Japanese, who are quietly working on stealth fighter concepts of their own. Finally, the F-35 will be widely used, offering commonality with key allies and ensuring a steady stream of upgrades without requiring steady Japanese investment.
On the negative side, the F-35’s single-engine design would be a concern during maritime combat air patrols, as it increases the odds of having an engine issue cause the complete loss of the fighter. Beyond that, the F-35’s industrial structure is largely set, its development delays could make on-time deliveries a problem, any early deliveries will cost well over $100 million per plane, and its declared status as a strike fighter clashes somewhat with Japan’s avowedly defensive posture.
Rising tensions in the area led Japan to conclude that it needed good ground-attack capabilities as an explicit requirement, and based on their mathematical analysis of submitted information, Japan concluded that the F-35A was more capable all around than other fighters with proven records. The choice was announced in December 2011, and agreement to buy up to 42 fighters was signed in June 2012.
Media reports aren’t completely precise, but they seem to suggest that Japanese F-35As could eventually fly with up to 40% Japanese manufactured content. Reports and documents indicate that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. will be involved in work on aircraft bodies, Mitsubishi Electric Corp. on mission-related avionics, and IHI Corp. on engines.
DDH-181 Hyuga & USN’sThe F-35B’s STOVL (Short Take Off, Vertical Landing) capabilities might make it an especially valuable future option, as a defensive aircraft that could operate from dispersed land locations, rather than bases that are easily targeted by enemy missiles.
It has a shorter range than other variants, but Japan is also fielding 18DDH Hyuga Class helicopter carriers for roles like disaster response, and will soon field larger 22DDH Izumo Class ships. They’re called “helicopter destroyers,” because Japan is currently prohibited from operating aircraft carriers, but it should be noted that other countries are planning to operate F-35Bs from comparably-sized ships. This very fact may inhibit Japan from ordering the F-35B, despite its potential usefulness as a land-based fighter.
Japan had other options, too. They included:
Boeing: The Traditional Supplier F-15JsBoeing and its predecessor firm McDonnell Douglas supplies the JASDF’s F-4s and F-15s. Their next-generation choices included:
Upgraded F-15s Japan could have chosen to go ahead and buy “kaizen” F-15Js at a comparable cost, possibly with the AESA APG-63v3 radar being fielded by Singapore. Additional capability boosts would come from attached pods like ReeceLight or SHARP for reconnaissance, or combination recon/targeting pods like LITENING or Lockheed’s Sniper ATP.
The concern in Japan is that this option could leave them without an air-to-air advantage against current PLAAF SU-30MKK aircraft, let alone potential future upgrades like the SU-35, or China’s J-20.
Boeing’s new F-15SE “Silent Eagle” appeared to be aimed directly at these concerns. It adds a number of important advances that will help it hold its own with currently-fielded fighters, and is optimized for the kinds of long-range, over-water combat patrols the JASDF requires. In full-stealth mode, its strike capability is sufficiently secondary that it need not raise alarm bells, but it’s still present.
While a combined F-15 Kai/ F-15SE buy appeared to be the easiest move, things did not work out that way. Boeing did not submit the F-15SE, and F-15 upgrades will have to be a separate, future issue for Japan. Instead, it submitted…
Super Hornet Int’lF/A-18Ei Super Hornet. The base for Boeing’s submission was the AN/APG-79 AESA radar equipped Block II model, and the F/A-18F model has already been sold to Australia. The “Super Hornet International Roadmap” is on the drawing board, adding improved radar signature, the ability to carry weapons in low-RCS underwing pods, better defensive systems, an advanced wide screen cockpit display, and more fuel capacity without increasing drag.
The other Super Hornet option for Japan would be even more exotic. Some of Australia’s Super Hornets are being fitted to receive electronic warfare equipment, which would allow conversion to EA-18G signals intercept and jamming fighters. That’s a unique capability, but Japan’s avowedly defensive posture makes it much less useful to them than it is to other countries.
Even with the EA-18G option, the Super Hornet was an odd bid choice. Beyond the electronic attack role, it’s less capable than the most current F-15 models, such as Singapore’s F-15SGs. Its main benefits relative to the F-35 and European options involved a low price in the $60 million range, the potential for significant license-production in Japan, and future commonality with Japan’s main defense partner, the US Navy.
Buy European Eurofighter: Rising sun?The Eurofighter Typhoon or Dassault Rafale were seen as possibilities, and coupling them with the MBDA Meteor long-range air-air missile might have been very attractive, given Japan’s needs. Price is likely to be close to the F-35, and similar to the option of buying more F-15s.
Dassault Aviation declined to participate with its Rafale, and Saab’s single-engine JAS-39 Gripen NG wasn’t a contender, but Eurofighter campaigned hard. Their plane is a very capable twin-engine air superiority aircraft. Tranche 1 versions have very limited ground-attack capabilities that would satisfy “defensive-only” criteria, while the latest “Tranche 3” offers a good set of multi-role capabilities. The plane’s carriage of the long-range Meteor missile, and integrated IRST system that can find even stealth aircraft by their heat signatures, offer another pair of advantages over American contenders.
The Super Hornet raised questions of comparative capability relative to China’s new fighters, while industrial and technology sharing remain issues for the F-35, so the Eurofighter had a chance. Their platform did well, but Japan rated theoretical capability very highly, and their desk-bound mathematical analysis hurt Eurofighter. The Typhoon was seen as the most fuel-efficient plane, and its bid had the best industrial benefits for Japan. On the other hand, EADS and BAE had trouble meeting Japan’s purchase cost targets while giving Japanese firms all of that work, and picking it would have meant deviating from Japan’s strongly American industrial links and equipment infrastructure. That’s no small move, in a society that sets such store by deep industrial relationships.
What They Really Wanted: F-22s No climbing Mt. FujiF-22J-EX. The F-22 was at the top of Japan’s wish list, due to its unmatched aerial performance, high level of stealth, and twin-engine design. In February 2006, a Lockheed Martin official confirmed that a proposal to sell Japan F-22s in some form of downgraded “international variant” was working its way through the Air Force with the support of the Japanese government. At the time, it was “at the three- or four-star level” and among civilian decision-makers. The request was pursued at the highest levels of government, but the USA killed the fighter by refusing to export it.
Japan’s combination of long sea zones and growing rivalry with China make a long-range, twin-engine, supercruising andunprecedented stealthy interceptor with reconnaissance capabilities a natural choice. Leveraging existing Japanese partnerships with Lockheed and Boeing made it nearly irresistible. With it, Japan would have had unquestioned air superiority over its territory for the foreseeable future.
There were clear American advantages to a sale. The USAF originally intended to buy 700-800 F-22 fighters, but that was cut to 442, then 381, and finally to just over 180. That left USAF planners concerned, even as foreign projects like Russia & India’s PAK-FA/SU-50, and China’s J-20, prepared to challenge US air superiority. If upgrades and proliferation led to confirmed fighter overmatch against US aircraft within the next decade, an active F-22 production line would have had considerable strategic and financial value.
On the negative side, the F-22’s extensive capabilities made many in the USA very nervous risking security breaches of its electronic architecture, stealth aspects, or next-generation data links. Licensed Japanese production, a standard requirement for other Japanese fighter deals, would be unlikely – or extremely limited if allowed. The aircraft’s $137-160 million base flyaway cost also gives pause, since a Japanese buy would require significant and expensive changes to the plane’s electronics. Some estimates placed the cost of an F-22J at around $250 million per plane.
Japan never had a chance to find out, as political moves within the USA blocked all F-22 Raptor exports. The USA was left to support its shrunken fleet all by itself, which includes financing a very expensive set of electronics upgrades over the next several years.
Japan’s F-X: Contracts and Key Events 2015 – 2020NG completes center fuselage
Getting ready…April 21/20: Successor Sankei News reports that Japan has created a working group of local and US aerospace companies for the development of the successor to the F-2 fighter. The report added that Britain lost the race for the joint development program as it wants to have the lead and Japan is unwilling to participate in joint development with other countries in the Tempest program. The F-2 is one of the main fighter jets used by the Air Self-Defense Force. According to government officials, about 10 Japanese companies, including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., IHI Corp. and Toshiba Corp., will join the conference. Japan will ask three US companies, including Lockheed Martin Corp. and Boeing Co., to join the conference.
December 4/17: Program News Japan will conclude its Mitsubishi X-2 technology demonstrator aircraft program in March 2018. First flown in April 2016, the first two flights were conducted by manufacturer Mitsubishi before being handed over to the Future Fighter Program (FFP) at Japan’s Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA). Manger at the FFP, Hirofumi Doi, confirmed that 34 sorties have so far been conducted, and all issues regarding propulsion, the fuel system, and integration had been ironed out prior to the maiden flight. Doi did not confirm if the demonstrator aircraft will complete the 50 test flights originally scheduled, or what will happen to the aircraft once the program concludes. Tokyo will then assess the merits of its future fighter acquisition strategy. Options included developing a new fighter called the F-3 on its own, or developing a fighter with a foreign partner.
September 18/17: Issues among the Japanese consortium involved in F-35 Joint Strike Fighter production for Tokyo has led to aircraft assembly falling behind schedule. The industry team chosen—Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. was picked for final assembly and checkups, IHI Corp. for engine parts production and Mitsubishi Electric Corp. for radar parts production—was expected to have joined production of F-35s to be delivered to Japan in fiscal 2017 under the fiscal 2013 contract. However, both IHI Corp. and Mitsubishi Electric Corp. have yet to sign parts production subcontracts with the original equipment manufacturer, Pratt & Whitney and Northrop Grumman respectively. The board added that checks by the Defense Ministry’s Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency found the local companies’ manufacturing processes to be lacking.
June 29/17: Japan is considering a procurement of Kongsberg’s Joint Strike Missile (JSM) for its fleet of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters in what is being considered by analysts as “a big step forward in stand-off capability”. At present, Tokyo’s fighters are only equipped with anti-ship missiles, so an added air-to-surface missile strike capability would be welcomed as tensions in the region rise amid North Korean ballistic weapons testing and the controversial deployment of the THAAD missile defense system by the US in South Korea. However, Japan had previously resisted the purchase of air-to-ground munitions, in part not to offend sensibilities in Beijing and Pyongyang, and may now face further accusations of looking to pursue renewed imperial ambitions.
June 7/17: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) has completed the first assembly of a F-35A in Japan. Unveiled at the firm’s Komaki South Final Assembly and Checkout (FACO) facility on Monday, the ceremony was attended by government officials from the US Department of Defense and Japanese Ministry of Defense as well as members from Mitsubishi and Lockheed Martin. F-35 Program Executive Officer. Adm. Mat Winter said the assembly of the first Japanese built F-35A “is a testament to the global nature of this program.” 38 of Japan’s 42 ordered F-35s will be assembled at MHI’s FACO facility.
August 23/16: With a national-record breaking defense budget on the cards for Japan next year, upgrades to increase the country’s air-superiority capabilities are being rolled out by the government. With Japan’s F-35 deployment not due until the end of 2017, plans are underway to upgrade and upgun its current F-15J fleet. Among the changes are plans to double the number of air-to-air missiles the F-15J can carry to 16 as well as an expansion of the jet’s lifespan.
July 1/16: Japan is to launch a tender in mid-July for its $40 billion fighter acquisition program which has been dubbed the F-3 fighter jet program. Sources close to the program have revealed that US giants Boeing and Lockheed Martin have already been invited to take part in the project alongside local manufacturer Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Adding to this, analysts say Japan’s preference for an aircraft that can operate closely with the US military, given close Washington-Tokyo ties, makes a non-US option a long-shot. Regardless, Saab AB and the Eurofighter consortium will none the less be looking for any opportunities to involve themselves in this mega bucks project.
April 25/16: Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $73.8 million contract for long lead materials, parts, components, and effort to maintain the planned production schedule for six low-rate initial production Lot 12 F-35A Lightning II aircraft as part of Japan’s procurement of the aircraft under the Foreign Military Sales program. Work is expected to be completed by December 2020. The first four of Japan’s planned 42 planes are in various stages of production at Lockheed Martin’s F-35 facility in Forth Worth, Texas while the remaining 38 Japanese aircraft will be assembled and delivered in Japan from Mitsubishi’s Nagoya factory.
February 18/16: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) has started final assembly of their first domestically produced F-35A. Assembly has entered its final stages at the Komaki Minami plant, and it is expected they will have begun work on two of the fighters by the end of fiscal 2017. By 2020, this production will have increased to 16, and a total number to be manufactured in Japan is 38 out a fleet of 42. MHI will also be responsible for testing the jets stealth against radar. The experience gained by Mitsubishi in the development and manufacturing of the F-35 will help toward the development of Japan’s own next-generation stealth fighter, currently under development as part of the X-2 program.
December 11/15: Northrop Grumman has completed delivery of the center fuselage for Japan’s F-35 fighter, known as the AX-1. The center fuselage serves as the core structure for the 5th generation multi-role jet. Japan’s AX-1 is an F-35A jet which uses conventional take-off and landing. Japan has ordered 42 F-35s from Lockheed Martin. Three more center fuselages will be manufactured in the US, while the final 38 will be manufactured and assembled in Nagoya, Japan.
October 6/15: Northrop Grumman has completed the center fuselage for the Japanese Self Defense Forces’ first Joint Strike Fighter, forming the skeleton for the country’s first F-35A. The company manufactured the fuselage in California before shipping it to Japan for Final Check Out and Assembly. In total Japan has ordered 42 F-35As, with an initial order for six aircraft this year coming with a price tag of $827.4 million. The country selected the F-35 in December 2011, beating the Eurofighter Typhoon and an upgraded Super Hornet bid.
2013 – 2014Expected costs keep rising; FACO agreement; MHI’s industrial deal goes sideways.
Aug 19/14: FY15. Japan’s Ministry of Defense intends to order 6 F-35As in FY 2015, and they’re asking for a YEN 124.9 billion ($1.21 billion) budget to do it.
Other major priority items include 3 long-range surveillance UAVs (YEN 54 billion) and new AEW planes (E-2D or E-737, YEN 58.8 billion). Sources: Reuters, “Japan looking to buy more stealth fighters in 2015: Nikkei”.
Aug 4/14: Industrial. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) was supposed to begin supplying F-35 rear fuselage sections for Japan and for other F-35 partners, but the government says that they’ll only subsidize Japanese production. Japan has already given MHI the YEN 63.9 billion yen ($623 million), as MHI is responsible for Japan’s Final Assembly and Check Out line (q.v. June 21/13), but the firm is worried that their lack of experience in competitive global aerospace markets will cause them to lose money on parts supplied for export. MHI wants another YEN 10 billion ($97.4 million) in subsidies, the government says “no,” and the parties remain deadlocked.
BAE was supposed to begin receiving MHI parts by 2015, but that isn’t going to happen. Japan’s F-35 deal may need to be amended, though one of Reuters’ unnamed sources say that “…if BAE can wait something could be worked out.” Meanwhile, IHI Corp. is building engine parts for Japanese F-35s and with Mitsubishi Electric Corp. is supplying electric components. Sources: Asahi Shimbun, “Mitsubishi Heavy Won’t Supply Parts for F-35 Fighter Project” | Reuters, “Mitsubishi Heavy’s F-35 Deal with BAE Caught In Japan Funding Spat – Sources.”
July 17/14: Weapons. In the wake of recent changes that allow Japan to export some defense items to certain customers, and engage in multinational collaborations with allied countries, Japan is becoming involved with MBDA’s Meteor long-range air-to-air missile:
“Separately, the government also gave a green light to Japan’s joint research with Britain using Japanese seeker technology. It’s a simulation-based project linked to a Meteor missile development among European countries. Defense Ministry official Toru Hotchi said Japanese officials are hoping the research can lead to a technology that can be used for F-35 stealth fighter jets that Japan plans to purchase for its Air Self-Defense Forces.”
Meteor is about to enter service on the JAS-39C/D Gripen, with Eurofighter and Rafale qualification to follow by 2018. MBDA has previously stated that they plan to field a variant for internal carriage in the F-35, and have taken some design-related steps, but there’s no definite program or timeframe yet. Could interest be picking up? Sources: DID, “Meteor Missile Will Make Changes to Accommodate F-35” | (USA) ABC, “Japan Approves Joint Missile Study, Export to US” | NY Times 2014-04, “Japan Ends Decades-Long Ban on Export of Weapons”.
Feb 4/14: Bottakuri. Costs continue to rise for Japan, and F-35Js could end up costing YEN 300 billion each. Meanwhile, Japan’s new 5-year Mid-Term Defense Plan will buy just 28 F-35s by 2018, of a 42 plane order that would see 38 assembled in Japan under a final assembly and checkout deal. At that rate, they won’t make the target of completed deployment by 2021 without a high 2019 order surge. Meanwhile, prices have already climbed from the original YEN 9.6 – 9.9 billion agreement to YEN 14.95 billion each for 2 jets in FY 2013, and YEN 15.4 billion each for 4 more in FY 2014.
“Added to this are plant and tooling up costs of [YEN] 83 billion for 2013 and [YEN] 42.4 billion for 2014 as Japanese companies Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Electric and IHI establish assembly and production lines…. Sources here have privately begun to refer to the F-35 deal as a “bottakuri bar,” referring to establishments that lure customers… and force them to pay exorbitant bills through a range of excess charges for items not mentioned explicitly on the menu….. locally produced versions of US kit generally cost double their US prices…. Kiyotani said the F-35’s costs could climb to more than [YEN] 300 billion a fighter.”
Abe’s decision to print money at astronomical rates (q.v. Aug 22/13) is going to worsen this problem by dropping the exchange rate. The Yen has lost 28% of its value vs. the US dollar since June 29/12. Defense analyst Shinichi Kiyotani is quoted as saying that lack of specifics in Japan’s 10-year plan reflects uncertainty over the country’s ability to afford the F-35, and its 200 F-15Js and 90 or so F-2s will eventually need replacement. What to do? Sources: Defense News, “Future of F-35 Unclear as Costs Mount in Japan”.
Aug 22/13: Local non-discount. The Asahi Shimbun reports that Japan’s F-35As will be noticeably more expensive than their American counterparts, due to the cost of incorporating Japanese-made parts. They’re correct in general, but their figure is misleading.
The US government has reportedly authorized 24 engine and radar components to be produced in Japan, accounting for about 10% of the plane’s value, and that number is expected to grow with additional approvals. Overall, IHI Corp. will manufacture 17 engine fan and turbine parts, while Mitsubishi Electric Corp. will produce 7 radar system components that include signal receivers. Parts for the rear fuselage, wings, and undercarriage will come from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. and other Japanese contractors. That will help Japan gain important experience for its own stealth fighters, and build on the composites manufacturing expertise gained in its F-16-derived F-2 program. The government has reportedly budgeted YEN 83 billion (about $844.1 million) in FY 2013 for F-35 related industrial infrastructure, including new facilities at an MHI factory in Aichi Prefecture.
The problem is that Japanese firms will be manufacturing only for JASDF F-35s, sharply raising per-part costs. The 2 aircraft ordered in 2013 will be the first with Japanese parts, and are now budgeted at YEN 15 billion (see also Sept 6/12, now about $153.5 million) each. Japanese sources cite it as a jump from YEN 10.2 billion (+47%), but sources when the contract was signed cited YEN 9.6 billion. Which makes the new figure seem like an even bigger jump of 56.3%. The real jump? Just 27%. On June 29/12, the equivalent dollar value for YEN 9.6 billion was $120.9 million per plane. A jump to $153.5 million is only 27% in real terms.
Abe may be more hawkish than his predecessor, but running the money printing presses full-bore will make it much more expensive for him to execute on those promises. Sources: Asahi Shimbun, “Japan-made parts to push up price of F-35 fighter jets for ASDF” | New Pacific Institute, “Japanese Companies to Manufacture 10 percent of each of Japan’s F-35As”.
Aug 13/13: 22DDH & F-35. A New Pacific Institute blog post looks at the new 22DDH/ Izumo Class “helicopter destroyer,” and its suitability for F-35s. The author doesn’t believe the ship is very suitable, as it would require expensive modifications that include a new landing surface, much greater munitions storage, greater aircraft fuel capacity, and possibly even new aircraft elevators. A ski jump isn’t 100% necessary, but would be important for good performance. Even after all of those expensive modifications, F-35 carrying and servicing capacity would be very limited, and the pilots would need expensive naval aviation training. It might be a good “lily pad” to extend air defense range in the southern sectors if Japan ever buys (very expensive) F-35Bs, but that’s about it.
Bottom line? The ship’s design makes it better suited to the helicopter and disaster operations it’s publicly touted for, and those needs alone are likely to keep the ship busy. NPI, “Does the Izumo Represent Japan Crossing the “Offensive” Rubicon?”
June 21/13: Industrial. Lockheed Martin has signed an agreement with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. to begin work on a final assembly and check out (FACO) plant. Per Japan’s weapon export restrictions, it would only be used for Japanese orders, and Japan’s agreement will see the first 4 F-35As produced entirely at Lockheed Martin in the USA. Sources: Defense News, “Lockheed, Mitsubishi Sign F-35 FACO Deal”.
FACO
March 25/13: Long-lead. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $40.2 million fixed-price-incentive (firm-target), contract to provide long lead-time parts, materials and components required for the delivery of 4 Japanese F-35As, as part of Low Rate Initial Production Lot 8. See also June 29/12 entry.
Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, and is expected to be complete in February 2014. All funds are committed immediately, and this contract was not competitively procured by US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD, who is acting as Japan’s agent through the FMS process (N00019-13-C-0014).
Feb 15/13: Industrial. Jane’s reports that Mitsubishi Electric Corporation is no longer banned from bidding on Japanese military contracts, now that they’ve finished paying the National Treasury back for previous overcharges in defense and space contracts. The ban could have affected MEC’s planned involvement in providing avionics and other products to Japan’s F-35A fighter program.
2012F-35A DSCA request and contract; How the F-35A won; The future of stealth debated.
White PaperNov 9/12: Industrial. Japan may begin receiving F-35As by 2016, but local industrial participation faces a number of barriers, due to Japan’s 1967 arms export guidelines. Media reports say that current plans to allow participation in the multinational project, under amended arms export guidelines, wouldn’t lead to deliveries of Japanese F-35A avionics, or of exportable parts for the main wings and tails, before FY 2017.
Media reports are vague, but seem to indicate that Japanese F-35As might eventually reach 40% domestically manufactured content. Japan Today | Yomiuri Shinbun.
Sept 6/12: Bottakuri. More cost hikes for Japan, as defense officials Defense Ministry officials cite “lower production efficiency” as the reason its next 2 F-35As will be YEN 15.4 billion (about $195 million) per plane and initial spares. The initial budget was YEN 13.775 billion per plane for the first 4, which works out to an 11.8% increase.
The ministry is trying to find the full YEN 30.8 billion for the FY 2013 budget request, in order to cover the 2 fighters in it. The Japan Times.
July 2012: Why the F-35 won. The Japanese Ministry of Defense releases its “Defense of Japan 2012” White Paper. Among other things, it explains exactly why the F-35 won. All 3 contenders fulfilled all mandatory requirements, but the F-35 was rated as the overall winner based on the 2nd stage evaluation of capability, industrial participation, cost, and support. It’s difficult to tell whether the F-35A’s subsequent cost jumps would have changed this evaluation, if they had been admitted at the time. Based on what the government says it knew…
The F-35A was deemed to have the highest capability. This may seem odd for a plane with no exercise experiences or operational history, but the rating was done as a mathematical analysis, not a flyoff. Within the inputs that Japan received and believed, the F-35A scored highest overall, with a good balance of high scores across air interdiction, weapons and targeting, electronic warfare capability, and stealth target detection capability.
Eurofighter won the industrial participation segment with the highest level of domestic participation, but had a harder time keeping its local manufacturing proposals within Japan’s prescribed cost bracket. The clear inference is that Japanese Eurofighters would have cost more than other customers have paid.
The F/A-18E+ Super Hornet International was best for purchase cost, while the Eurofighter Typhoon had the lowest expected fuel expenses. The F-35A eked out a “Gilligan win” here by placing 2nd in both sub-categories, and by avoiding the need for “renovation expenses.” Japanese KC-767s don’t mount pod and drogue refueling systems, which is what the Eurofighter and Super Hornet require. The Lightning II uses the same dorsal aerial refueling system as existing JASDF fighters, which avoids the need for KC-767 or C-130H refits.
In terms of support and maintenance costs, the F-35A was given the highest score, due to its in-depth, fleet-wide ALIS maintenance and diagnostic system. Having said that, all 3 contenders proposed performance-based logistics (PBL) based on delivered availability, so all 3 scored the same.
June 29/12: Buy 4, for more. Officials from Japan’s defense ministry say that they have agreed to terms for their first 4 F-35As, despite a 9.1% price increase. The price hike was caused by American cuts, which have shifted 179 aircraft out of the order book over the next 5 years. The planes will reportedly cost 9.6 billion yen (about $120 million) each over the entire buy, up from the original plan of $110 million. American officials said they could not offer the Japanese a lower price than other partnership nations. That makes the Japanese contract a good bellwether for the real base cost of an F-35A in the near future.
Fortunately for the Japanese, the overall contract remained at the expected YEN 60 billion (about $752.4 million). The cost of the 2 simulators and other equipment dropped to YEN 19.1 billion ($240.83 million) from the expected YEN 20.5 billion. Defense News | Fort Worth Star Telegram | Reuters.
42 F-35As
May 1/12: F-35A DSCA request. May 1/12: The US DSCA formally announces Japan’s official request for an initial set of 4 Lockheed Martin F-35As, with an option to buy another 38 and bring the deal to 42 aircraft. “The Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s F-4 aircraft will be decommissioned as F-35’s [sic] are added to the inventory.”
The aircraft would come with Pratt & Whitney’s F135 engines, and Japan would also want up to 5 spare engines. Other components of the deal would include Electronic Warfare Systems, Reprogramming Center support to keep those EW systems current, additional software development and integration, a fight trainer system for the F-35, other forms for personnel training & equipment, transport to Japan, ALIS (Autonomic Logistics Information System) maintenance support systems, US government & contractor support that includes ALGS (Autonomic Logistics Global Support); and initial spare parts, technical data, tools & test equipment.
Implementation of this proposed sale will require multiple trips to Japan involving U.S. Government and contractor representatives for technical reviews/support, programs management, and training over a period of 15 years to conduct Contractor Engineering Technical Services (CETS) and ALGS for after-aircraft delivery.
The estimated cost is $10 billion, which works out to $238.1 million per plane. Until a set of contracts are signed, it’s hard to split that accurately between purchase and support costs, and long support deals can add a lot to costs. Japan is also interested in considerably more local assembly than most of F-35 buyers, which is likely to add a number of unique costs of its own. Even so, the announcement has a ripple effect in Canada, where its huge cost per fighter draws a new round of questions about the plane. US DSCA [PDF] | Canada’s Postmedia.
F-35 request
April 2/12: Stealth’s future? A Japan Today article goes straight to the main military point at stake: the future effectiveness of stealth technologies:
“As more nations develop stealth fighters, then the use of radar as the main target acquisition device will be taken over by infrared, wake tracking, electro-optics, and radio/electronic chatter detection – thereby side-stepping radar stealth features – in short order.”
It’s a bit more complex than that, especially given the fact that stealth tends to be optimized for certain frequencies, so radars will still play a role. Still, the falling cost of high-bandwidth networking, and the need for a counter to stealth technologies, does suggest a range of countermeasures over the coming decades.
Feb 22/12: Negotiations. Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura conveys Japan’s determination to stick to agreed prices and supply schedules for Japan’s F-35s, after Japan’s Sankei newspaper cites unidentified US government officials as saying that Japan had threatened to cancel its orders if prices climbed.
“When we were selecting the fighter, we asked those making the proposals to strictly observe their proposed prices and supply schedules. Japan has conveyed this to the US from time to time…”
The question is whether this matters. Once a contract is signed, backing out becomes so difficult that for practical purposes, it’s impossible unless the price increases are wildly egregious. The time to back out is before any contract is signed. After that, the contract’s own structure and penalties must serve as a government’s insurance. Reuters UK.
2011F-35A chosen as F-X; F-35 technical issues; China unveils J-20 stealth fighter prototype.
F-35A: Winner.Dec 20/11: Winner! Japan’s Ministry of Defense announces that Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II has won the F-X competitive bid process for 42 planes. The initial contract will be for 4 F-35A jets in Japan Fiscal Year 2012, which begins April 1/12. Deliveries are expected to begin in 2016. Japan’s Defense Minister Yasuo Ichikawa reportedly said at a news conference that:
“…of the four parameters [performance, cost, industrial, and support], the most important was performance. When we think about our national security needs for our future fighters, we have to consider various security environments, and the movements and changes by various countries. In view of this we need to have a fighter that is capable of responding to these changing needs.”
The reported budget for Japan’s initial 4 planes is YEN 55.1 billion (about $706 million, or $176.5 million per plane and initial spares). Overall, the cost is expected to be YEN 9.9 billion (about $127 million) per plane, with spares. On the industrial side, a final assembly and checkout facility is expected in Japan, as well as work on components. Reports and documents indicate that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. will be involved in work on aircraft bodies, Mitsubishi Electric Corp. on mission-related avionics, and IHI Corp. on engines.
As F-4 replacements, the F-35As will have an air defense role, but Japan does have a large cadre of dedicated F-15Js to perform that mission. Note that there’s still an F-XX program in the future, aimed at replacing Japan’s F-15Js. Numbers as high as 100+ planes have been floated, but that will depend on both economic straits, and local geopolitical threats. Japan Ministry of Defense [ in Japanese] | Lockheed Martin | Pentagon | AFA Magazine | BBC | Bloomberg | The Diplomat: interview, and Flashpoints blog | Defense News | Gannett’s Navy Times | Reuters | UK’s Telegraph | Wahington Post | Yahoo!
F-35A wins
Dec 13/11: F-35 problems. The Fort Worth Star-Telegram and POGO obtain an internal Pentagon “Quick Look Review” dated Nov. 29, which says the F-35 is headed for serious technical troubles. The overlap between testing and production has been a sore point for the US GAO in particular, as significant changes due to failures revealed in testing will require expensive retrofits of produced fighters, along with the extra costs of changing future production. Even as operational aircraft were being bought, from June 2010 – November 2011 there were 725 change requests for the fighter, of which 577 are still not yet available to implement.
Major issues issues raised included unexpectedly severe shaking (“buffet”) during high-speed maneuvers, problems with the helmet system’s night vision display, and frequent failures of an important electrical component that can knock out power and affect both oxygen and cockpit pressurization. The team also expressed concern at the slow progress in developing and testing the plane’s combat roles, including “certain classified issues” that especially affect air defense performance. Star-Telegram | POGO.org, incl. full Quick Look Review | Australia’s Herald Sun | The Hill.
Nov 4/11: Super Hornet International. Boeing continues to discuss Super Hornet International designs. Not much has changed beyond earlier releases that noted improved F414 EPE engines, a large touch-screen panel, warning systems with 360 degree spherical coverage, and conformal fuel tanks to extend range. They do mention that the dorsal conformal fuel tanks will have a similar center of gravity to the aircraft, and that up to 3 weapon pods would be able to carry 4 x AMRAAM/ 2 x 500 pound/ 1 x 2,000 pound bomb each, while keeping the plane’s radar signature low. That’s in line with earlier reports, which touted 2 x AMRAAMs and 2 x 500 pound JDAMs per pod, but the 2,000 pound JDAM is new. So, too, is confirmation that the new design would have additional radar shaping to lower its cross section further.
With the Super Hornet out of contention in India, Japan appears to be the main target, though the Super Hornet is also being marketed to Brazil, Greece, Denmark, Kuwait, and Qatar, among others. Aviation Week.
Sept 26/11: F-X RFP submission deadline. Boeing confirms that it’s offering the F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet, which has also been exported to Australia. Boeing also makes the stealth-enhanced F-15SE design, but appears to have decided not to offer it.
Eurofighter GmbH submits the Eurofighter Typhoon, with BAE acting in a lead role. While the submission is described as “cost effective,” the firm is not explicit regarding the status of the submitted aircraft: new, or used.
Lockheed Martin is expected to submit the F-35A, but has made no announcement. Boeing | Eurofighter.
Mitsubishi F-2sApril 13/11: RFP. Japan issues the Request for Proposal for its F-X fighter competition. Source.
F-X RFP
March 2/11: Eurofighter. During high level visits, British officials continue to press the case for the Eurofighter as Japan’s future F-X fighter, over offerings from Boeing (F/A-18E/F Super Hornet or F-15SE Silent Eagle) or Lockheed Martin (F-35A/B/C). One interesting wrinkle is that reconnaissance capabilities could become an important requirement, a move that would give the F-35 family an edge. BAE et. al. are fighting an uphill fight, but they’re not alone: in January 2011, the European Business Council in Japan launched a defense and security committee to promote defense-related business cooperation. Asahi Shimbun | Japan Times | L.A. Times.
Jan 18/11: China’s J-20. The Wall Street Journal reports that China’s unveiling of its J-20 stealth fighter has creates ripples in the region:
“Tom Burbage, general manager of the F-35 program for Lockheed Martin Corp., said Beijing’s progress in developing the J-20 has created a “stronger sense of urgency” throughout the Asian-Pacific region about air-force modernization. He said Japan, South Korea and Singapore are now engaged in bilateral discussions with U.S. government officials over the F-35… Mr. Burbage said the U.S. government has asked Lockheed to provide preliminary information on how it could build the Joint Strike Fighter with Japanese industrial input, building either major subcomponents or completing final assembly in Japan… on aircraft for its own military inventory.”
2008 – 2009Efforts to buy the F-22 fail, Japan looks at other options.
F/A-18F over CV-63Nov 23/09: F-35. In the wake of a FY 2010 American defense budget that ended F-22 production, while maintaining the ban on exporting the aircraft, Japan has been forced to look at other options. Kyodo news agency reports that Japan is considering buying 40 F-35s, and that the Japanese defense ministry is seeking fiscal allocation in the 2011 budget. According to media reports, the plane beat the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, F-15 Eagle variants, and EADS’ Eurofighter. The acquisition plan is likely to be incorporated in new defense policy guidelines and a medium-term defense plan to be adopted in December 2010.
The F-35s are estimated to cost YEN 9 billion (about $104 million) each; that’s a rather low figure, when compared to actual expenditures by the USA and Australia. If the reports are true, the critical question would become: what model of F-35? The F-35C’s longer range might suit Japan very well, while the F-35B’s ability to make use of highways and helicopter carriers would add a very interesting wrinkle indeed. Japan Today | Agence France Presse | domain-b | Times of India.
Oct 4-7/09: F-35. The Japan Times reports, and Jane’s confirms, that Japan is negotiating a requested payment of about YEN 1 billion (around $11 million), in order to receive “sensitive” information about the F-35’s capabilities. Japan wanted the F-22, and is reportedly still considering it; the government is also reportedly looking at the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault’s Rafale, Boeing’s stealth-enhanced F-15SE, and its F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The Japan Times adds that:
“It is rare for a country to be charged such a large sum for information on potential imports of defense equipment. The U.S. also told Japan that Washington will not provide information on the F-35’s radar-evading capabilities until Tokyo makes a decision to purchase it, the sources said.”
One wonders about the wisdom of that sales approach, if true.
July 31/09: F-22. The US House passes “H.R. 3326: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010” by a 400-30 vote. The final version strips out F-22 funding. As House members prepare for negotiations with the Senate on a single, final bill to send to the President, the amendment vote, and subsequent passage of HR 3326, effectively marks the end of the F-22 program. F-22 production will continue through remaining funded orders, and cease in 2011.
Both the House and Senate versions of the 2010 defense authorization bill require a report to study the potential for F-22A exports. The House version listed only Japan, while the Senate bill did not restrict the countries involved. Development work would be required before production, however, which creates real problems. While it’s theoretically possible to bridge that time gap by resurrecting the American program in future defense bills, the aircraft’s supply chain will stop producing certain parts, and begin losing the people associated with them, long before the final delivery in 2011. That makes a production line restart in 2013 or beyond a very difficult and expensive proposition for potential export customers like Japan. See also: Aero News.
F-22 program ended
June 5/09: F-22. Reuters reports that US Senate Appropriations Committee chair Senator Daniel Inouye [D-HI], has sent sent letters on the F-22 issue to Japanese ambassador Ichiro Fujisaki, and to American Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Inouye reportedly supports repeal of the 1998 “Obey Amendment” that bans F-22 exports, and the USAF is also said to have decided to support exports to select countries. Reuters adds that there is even growing Congressional support to repeal the Obey Amendment in the face of North Korea’s stepped-up belligerence, and the prospect of significant job losses if F-22 production is closed per Gates’ FY 2010 budget. The exact quote from one of their sources is “…decent support, but it’s not a slam-dunk.”
The senator confirmed sending the letter, but would not discuss its contents. Reuters claims that the letter conveyed some conclusions from a recent USAF study, which placed the estimated cost of developing an F-22 Export version at about $250 million per plane, assuming a production run of 40-60 planes. The USAF study also reportedly assumed that production of an F-22EX would begin in 4-5 years, with delivery beginning in 7-9 years following a re-start of the F-22 production line.
That price tag is about $80-100 million above the cost of a more-capable F-22A. It factors in average costs per plane for production line restart, and for substituting and integrating replacements for components that the USA still does not wish to export. The final cost per plane could certainly end up being higher, if the development and integration program runs over budget. It could also be lower, but only if the substitution program meets projections and one of 2 things happens: (1) The production line is not shut down, due to Congressional appropriations over the next 3 years; and/or (2) More F-22EXs are bought to spread out the F-22EX program’s development and restart costs, via additional Japanese buys or by adding other countries as F-22EX customers.
May 19/09: F-22. A Japan Times article looks at the barriers to F-22 fielding on the Japanese side of the equation, and concludes:
“In sum, Japan’s acquisition of the F-22 would involve significantly increasing defense spending, rethinking the domestic production of weapons platforms and implementing a more robust legal and enforcement framework to protect classified information. Under current circumstances, these developments are not in the cards.”
Given that some of the F-22’s material/manufacturing methods are considered to be among its more sensitive technologies, domestic manufacturing in Japan is unlikely to be an option at all.
April 6/09: F-22. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announces his recommendation to terminate F-22 orders at the end of FY 2009, leaving the USA with a fleet of 187 aircraft.
F-15SE unveiledMarch 17/09: F-15SE. Boeing unveils the F-15SE “Silent Eagle,” which appears to be aimed directly at Japan. The aircraft has slightly canted vertical tails to improve aerodynamics and reduce weight, minimal additional radar shaping, the addition of coatings to improve radar signature further, and a pair of conformal fuel tanks with cut-in chambers for 2 air-to-air missiles each, or air-to-ground weapons like the 500 pound JDAM and 250 pound GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb. The tanks would be swappable for traditional conformal tanks if desired, and weapons could also be carried externally. BAE’s DEWS electronic self-protection system would be fitted, along with Raytheon’s AN/APG-63v3 radar that will equip all Singaporean F-15s and be retrofitted to the American fleet.
The intent appears to be to offer a “budget Raptor” in the $120 million range, with a basic radar signature that’s competitive with newer fighters like the similarly-priced Eurofighter Typhoon. Advantages would include better radar signature when internal carriage is used for long combat air patrols or limited precision strikes, a superior and proven AESA radar, longer range, and more total carriage capacity if necessary. On the flip side, it would not provide the same maneuverability options as canard equipped contenders like EADS’ Eurofighter or Dassault’s Rafale. The total package would come closer to parity with the SU-30MKI/M and subsequent versions of Sukhoi’s offerings, but may or may not measure up against longer-term opponents like Sukhoi’s PAK-FA or China’s J-XX. From Boeing’s release:
“Boeing has completed a conceptual prototype of the CFT internal-carriage concept, and plans to flight-test a prototype by the first quarter of 2010, including a live missile launch. The design, development, and test of this internal carriage system are available as a collaborative project with an international aerospace partner.”
That partner could also be Israel, which has now expressed interest in the F-15SE, and also made its own requests for F-22s.
Dec 28/08: F-22. Japan’s Daily Yomiuri newspaper reports that the country is likely to drop its attempts to buy F-22s, amid signs that U.S. President-elect Barack Obama’s new administration may halt production of the aircraft.
Congress has yet to weigh in, however, and a consensus for continued production could easily change the odds for exports as well. Defense News report.
Oct 10/08: Eurofighter. Flight International’s “Eurofighter gets serious about Japan’s F-X contest” discusses political developments:
“If you had asked me a year ago, I would have said that the Typhoon did not have a chance due to the close US-Japan ties. I am no longer sure of that,” says a Tokyo-based industry source close to the Japanese defence ministry. “Washington’s continued refusal to release information on the [Lockheed Martin] F-22 has strained bilateral defence ties, and Japanese politicians and bureaucrats are eyeing the Typhoon as a viable alternative to the other American fighters that are on offer.”
Flight International’s sources indicate that Japan will make one more push in 2009, after the American elections. If that fails, it is likely to abandon efforts to secure the F-22, and move to buy other options.
July 16/08: Eurofighter. BAE executives interviewed at Farnborough discuss the Eurofighter’s opportunities with Japan if the USA refuses to sell that country F-22EX fighters. BAE says that is willing to share more of its technology with Japanese companies, establishing Japan as a so-called home market where it manufactures and sells products. Current BAE home markets include the U.K., the USA, Australia, South Africa, Sweden, Saudi Arabia.
The executive also mentions that BAE is looking hard at India and South Korea for future growth, adding that Defense spending in Korea will be greater than in the U.K. within 5 years. Bloomberg News.
2006 – 2007Japan pushes for F-22, but is undermined by pro-China interests; USAF F-22As deploy to Kadena, Japan.
F-22: Off to Kadena…Nov 15/07: F-22. The Lexington Institute’s quick brief “Asian Security: Japan Needs Better Tools To Do Its Part” weighs in, in favor of Japan’s case:
“The F-22 is the Air Force’s new top-of-the-line fighter, far superior to any other fighter in the world in its agility, survivability and versatility. It’s so capable that policymakers aren’t inclined to export it, even to trusted allies like Japan. But does that really make sense if Raptor is the plane best suited to protecting the Japanese home islands against cruise-missile attack or preempting a ballistic-missile launch by North Korea? It sounds like Washington is saying it wants Japan to play a bigger role in regional security, but with inferior weapons — or that the Japanese will have to depend forever on America to do the really tough missions… if we really want the Japanese to be partners in regional security, we should be willing to trust them with other top systems too — especially since they’re the one ally we have that isn’t inclined to export weapons.”
July 24/07: F-22. Adm. Timothy Keating, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, said he has recommended that the F-22 Raptor not be sold to Japan. His comments came during a briefing at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and concern a new U.S. “capabilities assessment group” of Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Office of the Secretary of Defense and industry officials who are reviewing Japan’s fighter requirement. Defense News.
June 28/07: CRS on F-22. The US Congressional Research Service issues its report re: selling F-22EX aircraft to Japan (last revised: July 2/07). The report itself is completely non-committal, as it sketches out the options. While the USAF and defense industry are solidly behind the idea as a way to keep the F-22 production line alive, there is some opposition in Congress. Key paragraph:
“The executive branch proposes and Congress reviews arms sales on a case-by-case basis. The sale of F-22s to Japan raises both broad questions about the security environment in East Asia and questions that are specific to domestic interests. Factors that argue for a transfer include potential benefits to U.S. industry, contribution to the defense of allied countries, and promoting U.S. interoperability with those countries. Factors that argue against a particular arms transfer include the likelihood of technology proliferation and the potential for undermining regional stability.”
Increased Chinese capabilities and the need for a longer-range, twin-engine jet with the ability to take on modern SU-30 family jets is mentioned in the report body, but the military capability drivers are sidestepped and this is not highlighted as a key issue in favor. Japan’s policy of domestic production and license-building is mentioned in the document as a potential stumbling block, but it, too, is absent from the summary paragraph. CRS reports also tend not to present counter-arguments or responses to objections/contentions, as an attempt to remain “above” political debate. That tendency is also present here, and weakens the report as an analytical document. In a particularly interesting side note, however, the CRS report adds:
“A final industrial base issue pertains to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Although originally intended to be complementary aircraft, F-22 and JSF capabilities, development, and production have converged. Implicitly if not explicitly, these aircraft are competing for scarce procurement funds. Extension of F-22 production would likely bring these aircraft into even sharper competition.”
May 23/07: Given the Raptor’s top secret status, American trust in the purchasing country’s security levels and intentions is a significant part of any export decision. Israel’s past defense cooperation with China, for instance, which included sales like “Harpy” anti-radar drones without timely US notification, has created serious issues. It led to temporary suspension from Israel’s observer status in the F-35 program, and is also widely seen as a serious impediment to its current request for an export version of the F-22.
International espionage is a constant of international relations, and victimization is assessed differently; but sufficiently serious leaks can also have repercussions if they indicate a systemic problem, or happen at a high enough level.
Details are sparse, so it’s difficult to assess the true importance of recent developments in Japan. Reuters reports that classified data on the USA’s AEGIS naval radar/combat system, SM-3 missiles, and Link 16 tactical data net had been “leaked” in Japan. Local media said authorities believe that computer disks containing the classified data were illegally copied and circulated among dozens of students and instructors at a naval college in western Japan. The reports follow a police raid on Saturday of a naval college in western Japan over a “leak of data” in March 2007 when police found one of the disks at the home of a Japanese naval officer in Kanagawa during a separate investigation of his Chinese wife over her immigration status. AEGIS, SM-3 missiles, and Link 16 are all key nodes in Japan’s outer layer of its initial ABM defense system. Link from Taiwan’s China Post | Associated Press.
May 18/07: F-22. Bill Gertz, Washington Times: “Pro-China officials in the White House and Pentagon are quietly undermining Japan’s request to buy 50 advanced F-22 jet fighter-bombers, to avoid upsetting Beijing’s government, according to U.S. officials familiar with the dispute… Both the Air Force and the F-22 manufacturer, Lockheed Martin Corp., favor building an export version… The F-22 export is a major test of U.S. support for Japan and is being watched closely by Japanese government officials who are worried Washington will not back Tokyo and instead kow-tow to Beijing on the sale.”
April 30/07: F-22. Japan applies to buy fighter Australia rejects. The USA’s stated willingness to consider Japan’s F-22EX request re-ignites controversy in Australia, in the wake of the Australian government’s attempt to defuse the issue by maintaining that the USA will not sell the F-22 abroad.
April 27/07: F-22. Japan has yet to receive clearance for F-22EX fighters, but discussions are progressing. South Korea’s Yonhap news agency: “Seoul eyes advanced jets beyond F-15K” contends that the issue of F-22 exports to Japan will be under discussion during the imminent summit between U.S. President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The decision will be watched closely by South Korea, which also wants 5th generation fighter jets for its 3rd phase F-X purchase. An excerpt:
“China is modernizing its air force at a rapid pace,” said Dennis Wilder, senior director for East Asian Affairs at the White House National Security Council. “And so we are very positively disposed to talking to the Japanese about future-generation fighter aircraft.”
Japan has worked to improve its diplomatic and military relations with the USA, stressing its reliability as an ally and collaborating on sensitive technologies like missile defense. Hence the current situation, in which exports of the F-22 can be discussed with some odds of success. South Korea, which has made a very different set of choices, is unlikely to be received as positively.
April 20/07: F-22. Flight International reports that Israel has approached the USA about acquiring Lockheed Martin F-22s, as concern mounts about new threats to the IAF’s regional air superiority from proposed sales of advanced US weapons to the Gulf states, and Israeli assessments of a growing threat from Iran. Sources say that the issue was raised during a recent one-day trip by US defense secretary Robert Gates to Israel.
While unrelated to the Japanese request, and very uncertain for reasons of its own, the Israeli request raises both the pressure to create an F-22EX version, and the perceived market & benefits from doing so.
Feb 17-18/07: F-22. Kadena Air Force Base (AFB), Japan received 10 F-22A Raptors in the aircraft’s first overseas deployment. The F-22As are assigned to the 27th Fighter Squadron at Langley AFB, VA, and are under the command of Lt. Col. Wade Tolliver. The aircraft started their deployment with a stop at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, but a software issue affecting the aircraft’s navigation system was discovered on February 11th, causing the aircraft to return to Hickam. The issue was corrected and the aircraft continued on to Kadena.
The 27th FS deployed more than 250 Airmen to Kadena for the 90-120 day deployment, which is part of a regularly-scheduled U.S. Pacific Command rotational assignment of aircraft to the Pacific. See USAF release.
Feb 11/07: F-22. The F-22A’s first foreign deployment, to Kadena Air Force Base (AFB) in Japan, runs into a serious problem. The aircraft started their deployment with a stop at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, but a software issue affecting the aircraft’s navigation system was discovered on February 11th, forcing the aircraft to return to Hickam without navigation or communications.
October 2006: wide spectrum of opinion in Australia (including the opposition Labor Party) is also pushing for an F-22EX request, based on arguments and strategic needs that are very similar to Japan’s. At the moment, however, the current Liberal Party government remains absolutely committed to the F-35A as its only future fighter force option.
September 2006: DID’s “Japan Looking to Expand Missile Defense & Military Spending” report looks at Japan’s current security situation, and political-economic shifts that may be very consequential for its defense market.
Feb 18/06: F-22. Inside Defense’s Air Force Plans to Sell F-22As to Allies offers a fuller discussion and analysis of Japan’s F-22 bid.
Footnotesfn1. Reader Keith Jacobs informs DID that despite the JASDF listing of 7 F-1s in service, “The JASDF marked retirement of the F.1 with a six-aircraft flypast at Tsuiki Air Base (Kyushu) in 2006 (forgot actual date – but Feb or March if I remember correctly. They were aircraft of the 6th Hiko-tai (the final squadron unit). 6th Hiko-tai has now transitioned to F-2A and has its full complement of aircraft of the new fighter. JASDF also retired the last Fuji T-1B, assigned to the 5th Technical Training School and dispersed them to museums (as they did the T.3) from Komaki Air Base. “ The date of that retirement at Tsuiki was March 6/06.
Additional Readings Background: Japan’s PlansMy colleagues at CNA’s Russian Studies Program — Michael Kofman, Anya Fink and Jeff Edmonds — have written two excellent reports on Russian deterrence and escalation management. I contributed a bit to the research. The summary and links to the reports below is taken from Michael Kofman’s description of the research on his blog:
CNA’s Russia Studies Program recently produced two reports that discuss in depth the main concepts comprising Russia’s strategy for escalation management or intrawar deterrence, their origins in military thought, and the current state of concept development. The first is titled Evolution of Key Concepts, covering essential deterrence concepts, current stratagems for escalation management, the role of nuclear and nonnuclear weapons, types of damage, views on targeting, etc. The second key debates and the players within Russian military thought provides an intellectual road map to the conversation among Russian military analysts, strategists, and the players involved. To better socialize the findings from these research products I’ve decided to post their respective abstracts here, though I suggest those interested download the reports from the CNA Research site.
The first report on evolution of key concepts assesses the evolution in Russian military strategy on the question of escalation management, or intra-war deterrence, across the conflict spectrum from peacetime to nuclear war. Russia’s overarching approach to deterrence, called “strategic deterrence,” represents a holistic concept for shaping adversary decision making by integrating military and non-military measures. Key concepts in Russian military thinking on deterrence include deterrence by fear inducement, deterrence through the limited use of military force, and deterrence by defense. These approaches integrate a mix of strategic nonnuclear and nuclear capabilities, depending on the context and conflict scope. In a conflict, Russian escalation management concepts can be roughly divided into periods of demonstration, adequate damage infliction, and retaliation. Russian strategic culture emphasizes cost imposition over denial for deterrence purposes, believing in forms of calibrated damage as a vehicle by which to manage escalation. This so-called deterrent damage is meant to be dosed, applied in an iterative manner, with associated targeting and damage levels. Despite acquiring nonnuclear means of deterrence, Russia continues to rely on nuclear weapons to deter and prosecute regional and large-scale conflicts, seeing these as complementary means within a comprehensive strategic deterrence system. The paper summarizes debates across authoritative Russian military-analytical literature beginning in 1991 and incorporates translated graphics and tables. The concluding section discusses implications for US and allied forces.
The second report on key debates and players offers an overview of the main debates in Russian military thought on deterrence and escalation management in the post-Cold War period, based on authoritative publications. It explores discussions by Russian military analysts and strategists on “regional nuclear deterrence,” namely the structure of a two-level deterrence system (regional and global); debates on “nonnuclear deterrence” and the role of strategic conventional weapons in escalation management; as well as writings on the evolution of damage concepts toward ones that reflect damage that is tailored to the adversary. Russian military thinking on damage informs the broader discourse on ways and means to shift an opponent’s calculus in an escalating conflict. The report concludes with summaries of recent articles that reflect ongoing discourse on the evolution of Russia’s strategic deterrence system and key trends in Russian military thought on escalation management.
Boeing won a $14.6 million contract modification, which exercises options to procure 85 additional primary bleed air regulator parts kits and 439 new valves in support of F/A-18 Hornet combat jets (Series E/F/G) and their modifications. The US Navy F/A-18 E and F Super Hornet maritime strike attack aircraft was manufactured by Boeing, and flew for the first time on 29 November 1995. The Super Hornet is equipped with the APG-73 radar manufactured by Raytheon. The primary and secondary bleed air regulator valves control the flow of air coming from the engine back into the Environmental Control System (ECS), the Onboard Oxygen Generation System (OBOGS) and other systems. Work will take place in St. Louis, Missouri. Expected completion will be by August 2021.
The US Army has issued a request for information (RFI) to arm its Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) with a 20mm cannon. The RFI states that the cannon should be capable of providing a maximum of 360 degrees of azimuthal coverage and 60 degrees of elevation coverage, military.com reports. The program office is also keen to equip the FARA with optionally-manned flight capability. FVL is one of the Army’s top modernization priorities under a new strategy the service launched in 2017, with the goal of replacing most major combat platforms beginning in 2028.
Middle East & AfricaElbit Systems’ Seagull autonomous unmanned surface vehicle has completed integration and initial sea trials with a compact version of the Towed Reelable Active Passive Sonar variable depth sonar system developed by Elbit’s Canadian-based subsidiary GeoSpectrum Technologies. In-water testing of the TRAPS-USV system was performed off Haifa, Israel, in March. The company is claiming a world first for the launch and recovery of an active towed array sonar from a small USV under remote control. Developed by Elbit’s naval systems business, Seagull is a modular 12 m aluminum-hulled USV capable of operation from either a mother ship or shore station. The TRAPS-USV system is intended to provide an alternative ASW sonar option for customers with mission profiles, such as ASW escort or convoy protection, requiring a sensing capability while operating at speed.
EuropeThe United Kingdom Armed Forces ordered four Mission Master-Cargo unmanned ground vehicles from Rheinmetall Canada for its Robotic Platoon Vehicle (RPV) program. The contract includes training, service support, and spare parts. Rheinmetall Canada is to supply the platforms, while Rheinmetall BAE Land Systems will provide on-location support services. The Mission Master UGV is an all-terrain, multipurpose vehicle based on an 8×8 platform. It has a top speed of 40 km/h and is ruggedized and fully amphibious, with the option of being fitted with tracks or chains for additional mobility. The vehicle is air-transportable by external sling load or internally by a CH-53 or CH-46 heavy lift helicopter or a C-130 transport aircraft. None of the parts are subject to International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), facilitating export.
Finland’s Ministry of Defense announced that Minister of Defense Antti Kaikkonen, following on from discussions with the country’s president Sauli Niinistö, had decided that bidders for the country’s HX fighter replacement were no longer allowed to utilize external consultants. Furthermore, the MoD has appealed for external consultants not to be used by bidders in formal negotiations. According to the MoD, the justification for the move comes as the competition moves into its final phases, following the submission of second-round requests for quotations at the end of January. Therefore, a statement said, the MoD is wanting to make a clear distinction between the bidding companies and the consultants that represent them.
Asia-PacificChairman of Guizhou Aircraft Industry Corporation, Wang Wenfei, revealed that the company had secured an order for the FTC-2000G advanced jet trainer this year. The company’s wechat channel said the order was place in January and delivery will start in two years time. Wang added that it was a South East Asian customer that placed the order. Referring to the FTC-2000G ‘s first export order, Wang Wenfei said that earlier this year, GAIC won the first batch of aircraft export orders which will be delivered in batches, with a delivery time of 2 years. He did not disclose the number of aircraft or its price. Also called ‘Mountain Eagle,’ FTC-2000G is a “multi-purpose” aircraft. As an attack aircraft, it has a large combat radius and strong penetration ability, and can perform close air support, battlefield interception, and depth. Combat other air-ground combat missions. As a fighter, it has good maneuverability, strong situational awareness and self-defense capabilities, and high survivability on the battlefield. It can perform air-to-air combat tasks such as air fighting, combat escort, and air patrol. As a trainer, it has a wide coverage, good training efficiency, high safety and reliability, and has outstanding mid / low altitude sub / transonic maneuverability. It can complete intermediate, advanced, combat entry and tactical confrontation training tasks, and combat force pilots. Technology keeps training.
Today’s VideoWatch: HEAD OF THE SUKHOI DESIGN BUREAU CLAIMS SU 57 IS SUPERIOR TO F22 & F 35 – 3 REASONS WHY HE IS WRONG!
Huntington Ingalls won a $23.4 million modification to exercise options for accomplishment of follow yard class services (FYS) for the DDG-51 class destroyer program. The DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class is a multimission warship. It features an advanced antiSubmarine warfare system, the AEGIS combat system, the vertical launching system, two embarked SH-60 helicopters along with advanced anti-aircraft missiles and land attack missiles. Huntington Ingalls’ business segment, Ingalls, has in-depth experience in manufacturing amphibious assault and expeditionary ships for the US Navy. Being the US Navy’s primary surface combatant, the Aegis-equipped Arleigh Burke Class destroyers enjoy solid demand, indicating the possibility of increased revenue recognition for the company in the coming days. Work will take place in Mississippi, Washington DC and Maine. Estimated completion will be by April 2021.
The US Air Force is progressing electronic warfare (EW) testing of the Eagle Passive/Active Warning and Survivability System upgrade for the Boeing F-15 combat aircraft. An F-15E Strike Eagle fitted with the BAE Systems EPAWSS electronic defensive aids system began the first phase of critical EW testing at the Benefield Anechoic Facility on Edwards Air Force Base, California, in May 2019. Testing is currently continuing at the same facility, the air force said. “The ongoing tests are required to collect the data to establish the integration of the EPAWSS radar and missile warning capabilities and the electronic countermeasures onto the F-15E platform,” Ed Sabat, Project Development Lead and Civilian Director of Operations with the 772nd Test Squadron was quoted as saying.
Middle East & AfricaThe Nigerian Army received a consignment of Chinese armored vehicles and artillery systems that included Norinco VT4 main battle tanks, ST1 tank destroyers, and self-propelled howitzers. Nigerian Army Chief of Policy and Plans Lieutenant General Lamidi Adeosun told local TV news during the unloading of the equipment at Lagos docks on 8 April that it was part of a large consignment ordered from China that included two types of “artillery heavy guns”. He added that the initial consignment included 15 40-ft containers of spares and accessories. The Nigerian Army did not identify the type or numbers of platforms being procured, although the media reported that 17 were delivered in this consignment, which is the first under a $152 million contract signed in 2019 that also includes support and training.
The Egyptian Navy’s third Class 209/1400mod (Type 209) submarine is now heading to Egypt after it was formally handed over by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. The German company said the handover of S43 took place at its Kiel yard, but that only a small number of people were present because of the Covid-19 pandemic. “Given the global corona pandemic, this handover marks a very special milestone for us,” TKMS CEO Dr Rolf Wirtz said. “We are extremely proud of our employees, who completed the boat on time and in line with our comprehensive health protection measures.”
EuropeThe French Navy says 668 sailors from the Charles de Gaulle battle group have been tested positive for COVID-19. Thirty-one have been hospitalized with one in intensive care unit. Last week, it was decided to bring the Charles-de-Gaulle home 10 days early from a deployment in the Atlantic after some crew members showed symptoms. The carrier, which had helicopters and fighter jets on board, was accompanied by two frigates. Sailors from the Charles-de-Gaulle, one of the frigates and the pilots who returned the aircraft to their respective bases, are all placed in isolation for 14 days, the ministry said.
Asia-PacificNorthrop Grumman delivers two more E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (AHE) aircraft to the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF). Following assembly and some test flights at Iwakuni, the two aircraft, which belong to an initial batch of four, are set to be transferred to Misawa Air Base in Aomori Prefecture in northern Japan where the JASDF’s 601st Squadron, which operates both E-2C and E-2D aircraft, is based. The US Department of Defense announced in September 2019 that the US Naval Air Systems Command had awarded Northrop Grumman a $1.36 billion contract modification for the production and delivery of nine additional aircraft to Japan, bringing to the number of E-2Ds under contract for the JASDF to 13.
Today’s VideoWatch: USS BARRY OF U.S NAVY SAILS THROUGH TAIWAN STRAIT UNCHALLENGED IN SUPPORT OF TAIWAN!