Central Europe

404147 Multilingual education: Creating equal chances for everyone In Uzbekistan, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities welcomes recent steps to strengthen regional co-operation and inter-ethnic relations in Central Asia OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and Government of Kyrgyzstan to intensify co-operation on inter-ethnic policy and multilingual education

The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Lamberto Zannier, during his visit to Ashgabat and the Dashoguz Region from 20 to 23 November 2018, agreed with the authorities of Turkmenistan to strengthen their co-operation on matters of education and integration of society.  Over the course of the visit, Zannier met the country’s leadership, including President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov and Speaker of the Mejlis (parliament) Gulshat Mammedova. 

“There is a positive dynamic towards intensifying regional co-operation among the Central Asian states. During my visits to the region this year, I saw that this can also prove beneficial for national minorities,” said Zannier. “For example, I am glad that Turkmenistan is interested in playing a more prominent role in the HCNM Central Asia Education Programme, which brings together educational officials from the region to share experiences on multilingual education.” 

The HCNM and the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat co-hosted a seminar to familiarize the authorities of Turkmenistan with the HCNM’s Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies. “Turkmenistan has explicitly included measures to protect and promote minority languages and cultures in its National Human Rights Action Plan,” said Ambassador Natalya Drozd, the Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat. “By drawing on the thematic work of the HCNM, the OSCE supports the authorities with its implementation.” 

In the country’s north-eastern region of Dashoguz, which borders Uzbekistan, Zannier met with the regional authorities and visited two schools specialized in the teaching of foreign languages. He noted that more investment could be made in mother tongue-based multilingual education and the promotion of cultural heritage of all communities of Turkmenistan: “Successful integration requires both respect for minority identities and the removal of obstacles to the full participation of minorities. Education is the key to achieving this balance.”

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission followed up on a civilian injured by small-arms fire in Olenivka.
• It observed fresh damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Zolote-5/ Mykhailivka.
• The SMM observed military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area and recorded ceasefire violations while positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted at a compound in Starohnativka.*
• It monitored delays for civilians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line.
• The Mission observed a convoy of trucks labelled “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation” in Luhansk city.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 20 explosions). About one-third of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east of Mariupol.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including three explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (four explosions).

Civilian injured from small-arms fire

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian injured by small-arms fire in Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). At the hospital in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a man (62 years old) with a bandaged upper right leg. He told the SMM that on 21 November, he had been walking from a shop on Chapaieva Street to his home when he had felt pain in his right hip and then collapsed after hearing small-arms fire. Medical staff at the hospital told the SMM that the man had been admitted on 21 November with a wound to his right hip that they had assessed was caused by a 7.62mm bullet.

Fresh damage caused by shelling in a residential area

At 8 Lizy Chaikinoi Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), on 20 November, the SMM saw a broken north-facing window and at least four holes about 10-15cm in diameter in three other north-facing windows on the second floor of a two-storey apartment building. The SMM assessed this damage as fresh and caused by shelling. Two local residents (man, about 30 years old and woman, about 50 years old) told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the area on the evening of 19 November and had damaged the abovementioned property.   

Disengagement areas[2]

Inside the disengagement area near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), on 21 November, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) about 300m east of road T1316 and about 50m south of the railway tracks, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (see SMM Daily Report 20 November 2018).  On 22 November, the SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers in a military truck travelling west inside the Zolote disengagement area on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

On 21 November, positioned on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south-south-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On 22 November, positioned near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. 

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas:

21 November:

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in firing position near Petrivka (43km north of Donetsk); and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas:

21 November:

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted five armoured combat vehicles (undetermined variants), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), two combat engineer vehicles (an IMR-2 and a BAT-2), a mine layer (GMZ-3) and two mine clearing vehicles (UR-77 Meteorit) near Loskutivka (72km west of Luhansk); and

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1), an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on the rear of two military trucks near Leonidivka (41km north of Donetsk);
• an APC (MT-LB), a probable IFV (undetermined variant) and an armoured combat vehicle (undetermined variant) near the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-70) near Svitlodarsk;
• nine IFVs (seven BMP-2 and two BMP-1), five APCs (MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in a residential area of Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and two IFVs (a BMP-1 and a BMP-2) near Troitske.

22 November:

• three IFVs (BMP-1) in Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk)
• an APC (BTR-70) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk)
• six amphibious armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM variants) in Umanske (25km north-west of Donetsk)
• an IFV (BRDM-2) near Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk)
• an self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZU 23-4 Shilka) and one APC (MT-LB) in Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)
• three IFVs (BMP-1) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk)
• eight IFVs (BMP-2) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas:

21 November:

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• three IFVs (BMP-1) near Nyzhnie Lozove (59km north-east of Donetsk); and
• an APC (MT-LB) near Shumy (41km north of Donetsk).

New mine hazard signs

The SMM saw two new mine hazard signs placed on trees, one on each side of road H20, near previously observed signs near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk). The signs were red and had “danger mines” written on them in white lettering in Ukrainian and English.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to enable an assessment of a water pipeline near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw four buses (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) 12 cars (seven with Russian Federation and one with Ukrainian licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates), three tanker trucks (one with Russian Federation and one with Ukrainian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and 16 covered cargo trucks (eight with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 43 covered cargo trucks (19 with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation, seven with Belorussian and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and ten with “DPR” plates), two civilian busses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), 34 civilian vehicles (nine with Ukrainian, 15 with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, and nine with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM observed a woman entering Ukraine and a man and a woman exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 19 civilian vehicles (six with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and nine with “DPR” plates), a truck with Ukrainian licence plates with no cargo, three vans with “DPR” plates and a bus with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw eight vehicles (three with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates), five mini vans (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates and one with “LPR” plates) and a pedestrian entering Ukraine.

Monitoring the situation of civilians at checkpoints along the contact line

At the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, six women (65-80 years old) told the SMM that the waiting time to enter government-controlled areas was up to four hours. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw a high number of people (about 1,000) queuing to enter government-controlled areas. The SMM continued to observe hazardous snow and ice on the bridge and wooden ramps. 

At a checkpoint on road H15, east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk),  five women (30-80 years old) in a group told the SMM that they had been waiting almost ten hours to pass the checkpoint into government-controlled areas. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that 20 vehicles could be processed per hour at the checkpoint. The SMM saw about 150 civilian vehicles queueing at the checkpoint to travel to government-controlled areas.

Other observations

In non-government-controlled Luhansk city, the SMM saw ten white cargo trucks with Russian Federation licence plates, five of which had banners with “Humanitarian Aid from Russian Federation” written on the side in Russian. The SMM observed the convoy entering a compound, escorted by three vehicles with Russian Federation licence plates and two cars with “Rapid Operational Group” written on them in Russian.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint near Valuiky (government-controlled, 70km north-west of Luhansk), saying that his commander could not be reached to obtain permission for the SMM to pass.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM continued to be restricted in its access to the three disengagement areas, as well as in the ability to travel on certain roads identified by the Mission as important for effective monitoring due to the presence of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a compound in Starohnativka, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier told the SMM that he had been ordered by his superiors not to allow anyone to enter. The SMM informed the JCCC and after about two hours, following the intervention of the JCCC, the Mission was allowed to enter the compound.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 21 November, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming,[4] near Troitske and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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404039

Developing women’s entrepreneurship through innovation and investment was the focus of an international conference organized by the Association of Business Women of Uzbekistan, Tadbirkor Ayol, with support from the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan and several other domestic and international organizations on 23 November 2018 in Tashkent.

Held on the occasion of the internationally recognized Women’s Entrepreneurship Day and serving as the culminating event of Women’s Entrepreneurship Week, the conference gathered over 150 participants from across the OSCE region, the overwhelming majority of whom were female.

The aim of the conference was to share experiences in promoting women entrepreneurship in different countries and sectors, and the attendees reflected this by including representatives from both the public and private sector as well as the international and diplomatic community.

During the event, participants discussed such topics as the role of women’s entrepreneurship in sustainable development, the role of women in public-private partnerships and the development of women’s business associations in different OSCE countries including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Belarus. A strong emphasis was placed on the need for co-operation between women in order to promote women’s entrepreneurship; this was stressed by every female speaker (75% of the speakers).

The Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan has been active in the field of women’s entrepreneurship since 2007 and is currently supporting the female business community through the extra-budgetary project Support to Managerial Capacity Building of Female Managers, funded by Germany and the Netherlands.

404069 Communication and Media Relations Section

How to enhance the implementation of the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security - a landmark document adopted in 1994 highlighting the governance of the security sector and the role of armed and security forces in democratic societies – was the focus of a symposium held on 22 and 23 November 2018 at the German Federal Foreign Office in Berlin.

The discussion, initiated by Germany, Switzerland, Austria and supported by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, gathered 35 officials and representatives from across the OSCE region, including representatives of foreign, defence and interior ministries, members of the armed forces and other representatives involved in the normative work and in the Annual Exchange of Information on the Politico-Military Aspects of Security as stipulated by the Code.

The participants discussed suggestions that were compiled during the Annual Discussion on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security which took place on 13 June 2018. The suggestions point the way ahead for the Code of Conduct, concerning in particular ways to improve its implementation. In the working sessions, participants discussed their experiences and best practices in implementing the inter- and intra-state level commitments and principles enshrined in the Code.  

Addressing the symposium, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Special Representative Andreas Nothelle underlined the Assembly’s strong involvement in the Code of Conduct’s creation. “It is easy to understand that an agreement on what is good conduct and subsequent mutual adherence to the principles can be a powerful confidence-building principle,” he said.

The OSCE Code of Conduct contains key principles and commitments agreed by the 57 OSCE participating States related to security relations between states and to the democratic control of all armed and security forces within a state.

The symposium, which was funded with donations from Germany and Switzerland, served to promote the Code and helped to strengthen its implementation in accordance with the suggestions made by OSCE participating States. 

404102

More than 90 representatives of a wide range of initiative groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from both sides of the Dniester/Nistru River and development partners gathered for the annual Donors Forum organized by the OSCE Mission to Moldova on 22 November in Chisinau.

The participants discussed their experiences of working in partnerships across the river and laid out plans for future co-operation in the interest of their beneficiaries, including people with disabilities, victims of domestic violence, youth and civil society. 

Civil society representatives presented past activities, lessons learned and successful examples of partnerships across the river, and outlined the areas where they intend to work in the upcoming years. Donors shared lessons learned and highlighted grant opportunities that will be available in 2019.

“The Forum brings together the widest audience of donors and NGOs. It offers two unique opportunities – networking and discussion of topics of shared interest – both of which have been used very efficiently,” said Evghenii Dunaev of the Tiraspol-based Apriori Legal Information  Centre.

The Donors Forum has been organized by the Mission since 2013. This year’s event was held jointly with the Apriori Legal Information Centre as part of a project seeking to contribute to the overall development of civil society organizations in Transdniestria and consolidate confidence among civil society organizations on both sides of the river.

SAMARKAND, 23 November 2018 – Addressing the Asian Forum on Human Rights yesterday, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) and human rights committee Chair Margareta Kiener Nellen (MP, Switzerland) stressed the central role that parliaments play in upholding human rights commitments domestically and internationally.

Organized by the Government of Uzbekistan together with international partners, the two-day Asian Forum on Human Rights brings together some 400 participants to reaffirm commitments to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 70 years ago, as well as the OSCE’s human dimension commitments.

Noting that no country can boast a perfect human rights record, in his remarks to the opening session of the forum President Tsereteli highlighted that the international community no longer simply reacts and condemns human rights violations.

“Today, it has become ingrained in our societies that we should do our utmost to prevent human rights violations from ever happening,” said Tsereteli. “It should not come as a surprise that the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development follows a human-rights based approach. We now agree globally not only that development should improve the situation of human rights, we furthermore say that human rights standards should guide all our efforts. This has long been the OSCE approach, which puts the human dimension at the heart of our collective security."

Tsereteli also highlighted the key role which parliamentarians can play in upholding human rights. “The particular position which we occupy in our societies – as a link between our citizens and our governments – makes of us, parliamentarians, key partners in the global efforts to ensure the protection of human rights.”

Addressing a working session focused on the role of state bodies, Kiener Nellen, Chair of the OSCE PA’s General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions, highlighted the importance of effective human rights education, as a key tool to embed respect for human rights in society.

In the OSCE PA’s Berlin Declaration, adopted earlier this year, the OSCE PA formally called on OSCE countries “to integrate education about human rights into primary and secondary school curricula, based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, under the oversight of national Parliaments, in the interests of long-term understanding and implementation of human rights commitments”.

“While the importance of parliamentary oversight and legislation on human rights issues cannot be overstated, as a long-time member of the Swiss Parliament and a lawyer, I would argue that human rights education is even more important than legislation; whereas laws ensures that human rights approaches are a part of our governance, education works to make human rights a part of our citizenry’s social thinking. Pursuing both of these tracks is the best way to ensure that respect for human rights becomes truly sustainable” said Kiener Nellen.

The OSCE PA delegation’s participation in the forum in Samarkand follows a series of high-level meetings in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan earlier this week.

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404105 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Ensuring the protection of human rights when conducting investigations in the counter-terrorism context was the topic of two training workshops for law enforcement officers held in Tirana on 22 and 23 November and in Madrid on 13 and 14 November 2018. The courses were jointly delivered by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threat Department/Strategic Police Matters Unit (TNTD/SPMU).

The participants were 24 male and six female officers engaged in investigating terrorism-related offences in their countries.

The participants analyzed a real-life case scenario of how human rights violations may de-legitimize and jeopardize the effectiveness of law enforcement actions in different phases of a counter-terrorism investigation. The courses provided the officers with tools for analysis and decision-making in conducting terrorism-related investigations in a human rights-compliant way. The discussion focused on international human rights standards in the counter-terrorism context, the adverse effects of implicit biases on counter-terrorism investigations and the formulation and analysis of competing hypotheses to mitigate human rights-related risks in such investigations.

“Human rights standards provide a solid framework for effective action to counter terrorism,” said Johannes Heiler, ODIHR Adviser on Anti-Terrorism. “A lack of respect for human rights puts the successful outcome of a counter-terrorism investigation directly at risk, while human rights-compliant tools and means to conduct investigations can actually increase operational effectiveness in this area.”

“For good and effective counter-terrorism policing it is essential to reflect on the human rights implications in all steps of terrorism-related investigations,” said Mona Nordberg, TNTD/SPMU Police Affairs Officer. “The training provides officers who are involved in investigating or analyzing potential terrorist crimes with practical tools, which we hope will prove useful for them in the exercise of their professional duties.”

Two law enforcement experts with a counter-terrorism background from the United Kingdom and the United States facilitated the courses together with OSCE staff. The training sessions were delivered on the basis of the OSCE’s manual Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism Investigations and built upon the outcomes of similar exercises previously organized by ODIHR and TNTD/SPMU in the two countries.

404027 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Some 20 representatives from the Financial Monitoring Committee and Academy of Law Enforcement Agencies under the Office of the Prosecutor General completed a five-day course on strategic analysis on 23 November in Astana. The event was jointly organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, Kazakhstan’s Financial Monitoring Committee and the United States Embassy in Astana.

The course was led by international experts from Moldova and Ukraine acting on behalf of the Egmont Group, and aimed to enhance participants’ skills in carrying out strategic analysis of available and accessible data/information related to money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF). During the course, the participants were familiarized with various tools and techniques to help  analyse data provided by competent public authorities and reporting entities, implement the intelligence cycle, apply advanced critical thinking skills, as well as to establish policies combatting ML/TF.

The Egmont Group is a united body of 159 Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) that provides a platform for the exchange of expertise and financial intelligence to combat money laundering and terrorist financing in line with the resolutions and statements by the United Nations Security Council, the G20 Finance Ministers, and the Financial Action Task Force. International standards provide the framework for FIUs around the world  to exchange information and engage in international cooperation. As an international financial intelligence forum, the Egmont Group both facilitates and prompts this amongst its member FIUs.

The course is a component of the Office’s multi-year project to promote good governance and combat money laundering and terrorism financing.

404018 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

A five-day OSCE-supported training seminar on the detection of forged travel documents and identification techniques concluded on 23 November 2018 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Twenty-three border guards from Kazakhstan’s Border Guard Service under the National Security Committee took part in the course. It was led by experts from the Document Advisors Team of Austria’s Federal Interior Ministry. The seminar aimed to build capacity in ensuring international document security and identifying falsified travel documents at border checkpoints.

The participants, representing Almaty International Airport and different land border-crossing points, were trained on the processes of security paper production, the use of paper and polymer substrates in document security, conventional printing techniques, photo protection and secondary verification.

The curriculum included practical exercises with confiscated falsified documents and genuine travel documents from a multitude of countries. This provided the participants with an opportunity to apply their newly learned skills.

The seminar was organized within the Travel Document Security Programme of the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department. It was conducted by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in co-operation with the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Office of the United States Embassy in Kazakhstan and the Border Guard Service under the National Security Committee.

The activity was part of the Programme Office’s long-term effort to promote the OSCE border security concept in Kazakhstan. 

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Challenges and good practices in safeguarding the judicial independence of administrative courts and tribunals across the OSCE region were the focus of an expert meeting organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw on 22 November 2018.

The meeting brought together a group of practitioners and independent experts (seven women and seven men). They discussed the key challenges and good practices in safeguarding the independence of judges in the context of various institutional frameworks for judicial review of administrative decisions across the OSCE region. The challenges and good practices were reviewed in relation to judicial self-governance and the separation of powers.

“Judicial independence, especially in the field of administrative justice, is a pre-requisite for holding governments accountable for acts and decisions against private persons which might affect their enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms,” said Marta Achler, Acting Deputy Head of ODIHR’s Democratization Department. “It is important for the rule of law that the reform of institutional frameworks with respect to administrative justice adequately safeguards judicial independence.”

Edith Zeller, President of the Association of European Administrative Judges, said: “Today’s discussions between administrative judges, experts from academia and ODIHR, as an expert institution, are extremely important. They shed light on basic requirements for independent judicial systems in a very structured way and fundamentally support the aims and the work of our Association.”

Both administrative justice and judicial independence are core areas of focus for ODIHR as part of its mandate to support participating States in upholding their rule of law-related commitments.

Previous ODIHR work in the area of administrative justice has included the publication of the Handbook on Monitoring Administrative Justice in partnership with the Folke Bernadotte Academy and the training of rule of law professionals engaged in monitoring judicial review of administrative decisions.

403949 Communication and Media Relations Section

Six members of participating States’  delegations to the OSCE were presented with the White Ribbon Award by OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, in recognition of their personal commitment and achievements in promoting gender equality. The award ceremony took place at the Hofburg Congress Centre on 22 November 2018 in Vienna.

Secretary General Greminger awarded white ribbons to Ambassador Ulrika Funered of Sweden; Ambassador Alena Kupchyna of Belarus; Ambassador Victoria Gonzalez Román of Spain; Ambassador Claude Wilde of Switzerland; Jürgen Heissel of the Austrian Delegation and Commander Graham Townsend of the United Kingdom.  

As he presented the ribbons, the Secretary General praised the recipients for leading by example and demonstrating their strong dedication to gender equality. “You serve as an inspiration to all of us,” he said.

The White Ribbon Awards were presented for the fifth time this year. The recipients were nominated by permanent delegations to the OSCE and chosen by a selection committee. The award recognizes the work of diplomats and military attachés who went beyond the minimum standards and demonstrated exceptional efforts in promoting gender equality.

MINSK, 22 November 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 22 November 2018:

“First of all, on behalf of the TСG and on my own behalf, I would like to congratulate Evgenii Marchuk on his appointment as head of the Ukrainian delegation in the Trilateral Contact Group.

We are very pleased to work with Mr. Marchuk, former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Ukraine. He is a person of immense professional and personal experience.

Until now, Mr. Marchuk was the head of the Ukrainian delegation in the Working Group on Security Issues. He knows our work very well, and this will definitely be instrumental for him in his new capacity.

And now, about our work today. In the focus of the TCG discussions were the so-called “elections” in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR) held on 11 November 2018. The sides have once again expressed their points of view on the issue.

My position on this question, as confirmed by the statement of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, is already known to you and remains unchanged.

Next week, the implementation of the Minsk agreements will be discussed in Berlin and Vienna. I welcome these upcoming discussions.

On Monday, the Normandy Four will meet in Berlin as part of the control mechanism stipulated by the Declaration of the leaders of the Normandy Four of 12 February 2015. I welcome this meeting, as it demonstrates the interaction between the Normandy and Minsk formats. Further, on Thursday, the OSCE Permanent Council will convene in Vienna. This meeting will be dedicated to Ukraine, with participation of Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan and myself.

Today, the Security Working Group focused on additional measures to ensure sustainable cessation of fire and the implementation of "humanitarian demining". The issues of disengagement of forces and hardware were duly considered, too.

The Economic Working Group paid particular attention to water deliveries in the "Karbonyt" and "Voda Donbasa" supply systems. Besides, the issues of pension payments were duly discussed.

The Humanitarian Working Group continued its discussion on questions related to the exchange of detainees and the crossing conditions at the contact line via entry-exit checkpoints.

The participants of the Political Working Group further exchanged views on the modalities of the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’ in light of the already mentioned so-called “elections”.

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403994 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The security needs of Jewish communities were at the centre of an event organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Sofia on 22 November 2018. The event, organized in partnership with Bulgaria’s Foreign Ministry, the “Shalom” Organization of Jews in Bulgaria and the World Jewish Congress, raised awareness about issues concerning the security needs of Jewish communities and related heritage sites in Bulgaria.

The event, held as part of ODIHR’s Words into Action to Address Anti-Semitism project, brought together 30 government representatives, law enforcement officials and Jewish community representatives, including 22 men and 8 women.

As part of the event, representatives of the Bulgarian government, "Shalom" and the World Jewish Congress signed an agreement to promote sustainable co-operation in addressing anti-Semitism in Bulgaria. The agreement includes exchanging data about hate crimes, as well as educational and cultural activities.

“Building trust between governments and Jewish communities is an important step towards addressing anti-Semitism,” said Ilan Cohn, the project manager. “This is why this agreement, which is designed to enable lasting co-operation in meeting the security needs of Jewish communities in Bulgaria, is so important. It is just one example of good practice in co-operation between governments and civil society in this area, which ODIHR promotes.”

Georg Georgiev, Bulgaria’s Deputy Foreign Minister, said: “Co-operating with ODIHR on the issue of hate crime helps raise awareness of the problem among our law enforcement officials. By signing this agreement, our government is stating not only that anti-Semitism will not be tolerated, but also that we are willing to take concrete steps to guarantee that Jewish and other minority communities feel safe in Bulgaria.”

The event also featured a presentation of ODIHR's practical guide Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crime and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities and a discussion on how it can be applied in Bulgaria.

This report is for the general public and the media. 

SUMMARY

On 22 November at 06:44 (Moscow time), the eighty-first[1] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk Border Crossing Point (BCP). A total of 19 vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to their crossing into Ukraine. All 19 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 15:07 on 22 November.

DETAIL

Leaving the Russian Federation

On 22 November at 06:44, the Observer Mission observed the arrival of a Russian convoy at the gate of the Donetsk BCP. A Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) team co-ordinated and led the movements of the convoy. The convoy consisted of 13 cargo trucks and six support vehicles, including one ambulance. Only four cargo trucks bore the inscription “Humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation” (in Russian). Support vehicles had the sign of MES on the side doors and one of them also bore the inscription “Don Rescue Center” (in Russian). On board all trucks, a driver and a co-driver in MES uniform were observed.

At 06:44, the vehicles entered the customs control area and queued in three lines. Once the convoy arrived, the vehicles were visually checked from the outside by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers. The Russian MES staff rolled up/opened the tarpaulins of the trucks and the border guards and customs officials performed a visual observation from the outside.

Three Ukrainian border guards and two customs officers were observed accompanying their Russian counterparts; they also performed a visual observation of the vehicles from the outside (without entering the trucks’ cargo space). They had clipboards in their hands and were taking notes. One service dog was present during the procedure. By 07:14, all of the vehicles had left the BCP towards Ukraine.

Returning to the Russian Federation

At 14:49, the convoy returned and queued in the customs area. The tarpaulins of the trucks were opened and Russian Federation border guards and customs officers visually checked the returning convoy from the outside. Ukrainian representatives – three border guards and two customs officers – were present during this check. The Ukrainian officials also performed visual checks of the opened trucks from the outside. By 15:07, all 19 vehicles had returned to the Russian Federation.

[1]According to the statement of the Russian Federation officials, this convoy is considered to be the eighty-third Russian convoy which was sent to Ukraine. As two of these convoys did not cross through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” BCPs, the Observer Mission did not record them. Hence, based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this convoy is considered the eighty-first convoy that has crossed into Ukraine.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
• It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines, mostly in non-government-controlled areas.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema and to the Donetsk Filtration Station as well as assessments of a water pipeline near Pervomaisk.
• The Mission visited three border areas not under government control.
• The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted at compounds in Novoselivka and near Siedove, an area close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). About one-third of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east and south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (34 explosions).

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 21 November, positioned about 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-4km north-north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

The same day, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and in the vicinity of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.  

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas:

21 November:

• a mortar (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) in Kalynove (31km north-west of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas:

20 November:

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• 16 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 19 November 2018);
• eight MLRS (BM-21) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk);
• six MLRS (BM-21) near Zelenyi Hai (49km south-west of Luhansk); and
• four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas:

21 November:

• three self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) loaded on flatbed trucks heading east near Dachenske (49km north-west of Donetsk)
• four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at a compound in Pavlivka (51km south-west of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas:

20 November:

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 18 towed howitzers (eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Zelenyi Hai and
• nine tanks (T-72) at a training area near Ternove.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas:

21 November:

• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk)
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM2) near Netailove (22km north-west of Donetsk)
• an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk)
• fresh tracks assessed as those of a tank (T-72) chassis originating from a compound in Novoselivka (37km north-east of Mariupol) (see below)

Demining

At two locations near Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled, 67km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw demining activity conducted by an international demining organization. At the first location, about 2km south-east of the village, the Mission saw five de-miners constructing a makeshift tent, which they said was used to temporarily deposit detected explosive objects. At the second location, about 2km east of the village, the SMM saw ten de-miners clearing a field with detectors and other demining equipment.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the electrical substation in the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), as well as to enable assessments of a water pipeline between Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw nine cars (three with Russian Federation, one with Ukrainian and one with Polish licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and six cars (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for 15 minutes, the SMM observed no traffic in either direction.

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for 20 minutes, the SMM saw 20 cars (five with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and 11 with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and two cars (one with Ukrainian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks (with Russian Federation licence plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw three cars with rectangular white plates (with a red stripe dividing the plates in half and “NK” in Cyrillic letters on the right side) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM access to two compounds in Novoselivka. The SMM observed fresh tracks assessed as those of a tank (T-72) chassis originating from one of the compounds (see above).
• Five armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint west of Siedove (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM continued be restricted in its access to the three disengagement areas, as well as in the ability to travel on certain roads identified by the Mission as important for effective monitoring due to the presence of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 20-21 November, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming,[4] while flying near non-government-controlled areas of Verkhnii Naholchyk (56km south of Luhansk) and Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk).

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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403832 Željka Šulc

A Security Policy Course supported by the OSCE, that gathered some 30 participants from government institutions, law enforcement agencies and armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) concluded today, 22 November 2018, in Sarajevo.

The two-week course, organized by the OSCE Mission to BiH and the Council of Minister’s Inter-ministerial Working Group on Monitoring the Implementation of BiH Security Policy, aims to provide civilian and military personnel in managerial positions with knowledge on the Security Policy and security system of the country. It also promotes co-operation and networking of key personnel in different sectors within the security policy framework. Participants gained practical insight into the work of the institutions in charge of implementing the country’s security policy.

This year, particular focus was placed on contemporary security challenges which encompass the traditional politico-military security dimension, but equally extend to matters of environment, economy and human rights, thereby requiring a multi-dimensional approach and the sharing of necessary resources.

In his opening remarks, Mijo Krešić, Deputy Minister of Security of BiH, emphasized the necessity of a multi-disciplinary approach and co-operation among a wide variety of governmental and non-governmental institutions, agencies, and the private sector. “The principal value of this course is that it helps establish necessary contacts across ministerial, institutional, and governmental lines, as the response to security challenges necessitates team work, good communication and prompt exchange of information,” said Krešić.

“The diverse group that has gathered to participate in this course illustrates the complexity of the security challenges we face today.  Contemporary responsibility for security can no longer be assigned to any one institution or ministry,” said Željka Šulc, Spokesperson of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. “Courses such as this one help co-ordinate and enhance collective efforts to translate this country’s security policy into practical application.”

The course, which began in 2007, has evolved into a permanent security policy training programme with the aim to raise understanding of BiH’s Security Policy and to exchange information in this area. The course is accredited by the BiH Civil Service Agency and serves for the professional development and career advancement of civil servants.  

403820 Marina Živaljević

Aims and principles of performance management processes and steps to define key performance indicators was a focus of a two-day OSCE Mission to Montenegro workshop for officials from Montenegro’s parliamentary services, held on 19 and 20 November 2018 in Podgorica.

“This workshop is the result of the Mission’s longstanding co-operation with the parliament and aims at further supporting the parliamentary services by introducing modern performance management approaches,” said Lia Magnaguagno, OSCE Democratization Program Manager. “We will continue our co-operation in order to deliver efficiency gains across their operations.”

Performance management expert Julia Mager presented her experiences and facilitated interactive discussions on cross-cutting themes linking performance management to key performance indicators. “Managing performance is essential in improving institutions and will be extremely beneficial in fostering the effectiveness and efficiency of parliamentary services,” said  Mager.

Twelve participants engaged in group work and interactive tasks that helped them to learn about best performance management practices. Challenges to traditional performance management practices, as well as different purposes of modern performance management systems, were also discussed. The participants will continue to work with the expert in order to develop further key performance indicators in their respective areas. 

403802 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana Communication and Media Relations Section

From 20 to 22 November 2018, the OSCE Mobile Training Team delivered an interactive national course on identifying foreign terrorist fighters at the borders for 25 first- and second-line border and security officers, including four female participants, in Astana.

The deployment of the Training Team, the ninth of its kind, was organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department. The event was supported by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in close co-operation with the Border Service of Kazakhstan.

The training course focused on international, regional and national legal frameworks and the effective use of Interpol databases. Risk analysis and management in the identification of potential foreign terrorist fighters at borders in compliance with international human rights standards were also discussed.

“In response to geopolitical changes in the region, the OSCE has implemented effective measures to support the Border Service of the Republic of Kazakhstan through organizing training seminars for border personnel on the methods used by criminals to cross the borders illegally and tools for cognitive behavioral analysis.  As a result, the number of interdictions of criminals at the border has increased. This proves the effectiveness of these trainings and international co-operation,” said Talgat Bayandinov, Deputy Head of the Regional Division of Kazakhstan’s Border Services.

The importance of risk analysis models applied to identify potential foreign terrorist fighters at the borders as well as background, trends and current cases were discussed during the course. The participants engaged in practical exercises on the detection of forged documents and impostors as well as in interactive exercises for understanding behavioral indicators of foreign terrorist fighters.

The Mobile Training Team members from Georgia, Poland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom as well as experts from INTERPOL, the OSCE and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization delivered presentations. They shared their knowledge and expertise in the identification of foreign terrorist fighters at the borders.

The OSCE Mobile Training Team was established by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department in 2016. It is composed of 17 selected border and counter-terrorism experts from OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation.

Communication and Media Relations Section

A three-day training course aimed at further strengthening the capacity of Tajikistan to counter terrorist financing was organized in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, from 19 to 21 November 2018.

The training seminar was delivered to Tajik experts and practitioners from the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Financial Monitoring Department of the National Bank of Tajikistan, the Ministry of the Interior, and the State Committee for National Security of the Republic of Tajikistan.

The course was organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s Global Programme against Money Laundering. The training was delivered by international experts from UNODC, the Western Union and the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring of the Russian Federation.

The aim of the training course was to assist Tajikistan in the implementation of international standards, in particular UN Security Council Resolutions, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)’s recommendations and OSCE commitments.

Based on country- and region-specific scenarios, the training course included sessions on national, regional and transnational threats, sources of information and money flows, including hawala (a traditional system of transferring money). More than half of the course was devoted to practical exercises highlighting specific instruments and techniques that play an important role in countering the financing of terrorism. The course emphasized the key role of inter-agency co-operation in countering terrorist financing. 

The course was organized with the financial support of Germany, Norway and the Russian Federation, as part of a comprehensive multiannual capacity-building programme to support national efforts to counter terrorist financing in Central Asia.  

This report is for the media and the general public.

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission followed up on reports of a grenade explosion in Khartsyzk in which a woman was injured and a man died.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure near Artema and Holmivskyi, as well as repairs to houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Access for the SMM remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, near Syvash and near Novoazovsk, an area close to the border with the Russian Federation.*
• The Mission monitored protests in Kyiv, Lviv and Chernivtsi.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 34 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) and south-west of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk).

Reports of a woman injured and a man killed in a grenade explosion

The SMM followed up on reports of a grenade explosion in Khartsyzk (non-government-controlled, 26km east of Donetsk) on 6 November in which a man died and a woman suffered injuries. On 20 November, in Novoamvrosiivske (non-government-controlled, 56km east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a woman (in her thirties) with two scars: one on the right side of her chest and the other one on the left temple. The woman said that she had been injured in an accidental explosion of a grenade brought home to their apartment in Khartsyzk on 6 November by her partner (male, in his thirties). Medical staff at a municipal hospital in Khartsyzk told the SMM that a woman with shrapnel wounds had been admitted on 6 November and the body of a man had been brought to the hospital’s morgue.

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 20 November, positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard eight shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-north-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On the same day, positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.  

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas:

19 November:

• an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika,122mm) north-west of Smolianynove (61km north-west of Luhansk).

20 November:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas:

20 November:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk);
• an APC (BTR-80) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk);
• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (undetermined variant) south of Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas:

17 November:

• an SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-2) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

Presence of mines

On 19 November, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 31 newly laid anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in three rows in a field about 1.7km north-east of Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), near 11 previously observed anti-tank mines (TM-62).

 

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to power lines and a water tower near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) and repairs to houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Public gatherings in Kyiv, Lviv and Chernivtsi

The SMM monitored two public gatherings in Kyiv. In front of the Cabinet of Ministers building at 12/2 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street, the Mission saw about 70 people (all women, aged 40-50) carrying banners with messages demanding the dismissal of a senior government official, flags of Ukraine and various Ukrainian cities, as well as banners reading “Women for Peace”. On the site, the SMM saw 40 law enforcement officers and observed a peaceful situation.

In front of the Parliament building at 5 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street, the Mission again saw a protest related to import taxes on vehicles. It observed about 300 cars with foreign licence plates blocking off a section of Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street to traffic, about 300 people (mostly men, mixed ages) holding yellow and blue flags of “Auto Euro Power” and posters criticising import taxes on vehicles, as well as a burned car on a parked flat-bed truck. At the site, the SMM saw about 400 law enforcement officers, many of them in riot gear, and observed no incidents. The Mission also monitored two protests related to import taxes on vehicles in Lviv on 19 and 20 November and a protest in Chernivtsi on 20 November where it also observed a peaceful situation.

In Lviv, the SMM also monitored a public gathering outside the city hall building at 1 Rynok Square. The Mission saw about 50 persons wearing white face masks and chanting “Glory to Ukraine”, some of them holding lit smoke flares and carrying banners with messages denouncing corruption in the local government (all in Ukrainian language). After the public gathering ended, when the participants removed their masks, the SMM saw they were all young males.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Dnipro.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from proceeding towards Novoazovsk, citing ongoing “special operations”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The SMM continued be restricted in its access to the three disengagement areas, as well as in the ability to travel on certain roads identified by the Mission as important for effective monitoring due to the presence of mines and UXO.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Hranitne, Krasnohorivka and Shyrokyne were not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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