Written by Costica Dumbrava.
Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine has already pushed over a million people to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. The EU and its Member States have strongly condemned the aggression and mobilised to aid Ukraine. The EU has also adopted measures to help people, mostly women and children, fleeing Russian aggression, while ensuring proper management of the EU’s external borders. These measures include a proposal to grant EU-wide temporary protection to people arriving from Ukraine, guidelines to assist border guards carrying out checks at the EU-Ukraine borders, and support from specialised EU agencies.
Situation at the EU borders with UkraineAs of 3 March 2022, the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, estimated that about 1 million people had fled Ukraine to neighbouring countries, mainly Poland, Hungary, Moldova, Slovakia and Romania. The European Commission estimates that up to 6.5 million persons may be displaced by the conflict, leading to as many as 3.5 million people seeking international protection in the EU in the next two years. With 4 million people expected to seek protection in neighbouring countries and further 12 million people inside Ukraine in need of relief and protection, this is rapidly unfolding into a major humanitarian crisis.
EU responseThe EU and its Member States have strongly condemned the ‘unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine’ and swiftly agreed on sanctions against the Russian Federation. They also stepped-up assistance to Ukraine and increased humanitarian aid to refugees in Moldova (in cooperation with UN humanitarian agencies). On 24 February 2022, the European Council called for progress on preparedness and readiness at all levels and invited the Commission to put forward contingency measures. On 27 February, the Presidency of the Council decided to activate fully the EU integrated political crisis response arrangements for monitoring and operational coordination.
Temporary protection for people fleeing UkraineAs requested by the Council, on 2 March 2022, the Commission proposed to activate the application of the Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC) to grant immediate temporary protection in the EU to people fleeing the war in Ukraine. This will allow displaced persons to enjoy harmonised rights across the EU, including a resident permit, the possibility to work, housing, and access to social welfare, medical assistance and means of subsistence. Temporary protection does not equal refugee status, but it will not prevent the people concerned from applying for international protection. The measures will also allow Member States to manage the influx of people efficiently, coordinate with the other Member States (through the EU Migration Preparedness and Crisis Management Mechanism Network), and reduce the immediate impact on their asylum systems.
The Temporary Protection Directive enables Member States to provide protection and rights to people in need of immediate protection (for two years maximum). The Council can establish the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons by Council decision, adopted by a qualified majority, upon a proposal from the Commission. The European Parliament must be informed of the decision. Although the directive was invoked several times in the past (e.g., in 2011 and 2015), it has never been activated. Under the new pact on migration and asylum, the Commission proposed to replace the Temporary Protection Directive with a regulation addressing broader situations of force majeure in the field of migration and asylum. The proposal has yet to be adopted. Management of EU external bordersAs beneficiaries of EU visa-free travel, Ukrainian nationals can enter and stay in the EU for 90 days without a visa. On 2 March, the Commission put forward operational guidelines on external border management at EU-Ukraine borders, to help Member States’ border guards to manage arrivals efficiently and assist people in need, whilst maintaining a high level of security checks. The guidelines clarify the facilitation available to border guards under the Schengen Borders Code, in particular:
The Commission emphasised that this facilitation at the external borders should not come at the expense of Member States’ internal security and public policy. For example, whereas Member States may suspend the application of entry bans (alerts in the Schengen Information System) based on migratory grounds, they should not disregard entry bans issued on the basis of security reasons.
The Schengen Borders Code allows border guards to temporarily relax border checks at external borders ‘as a result of exceptional and unforeseen circumstances’ (Article 9). Member States can authorise non-EU nationals to enter their territory on humanitarian grounds (Article 6(5)(c)), even if they do not fulfil all entry conditions (e.g. people unable to present a valid passport or visa). They can also decide to perform border checks during or after the transport of the travellers to a safe location, and not at the border crossing point. Support from EU agenciesAs emphasised by the Commission’s border guidelines, Member States can benefit from European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) support, including through the deployment of standing corps to assist with border checks (e.g. registration in Eurodac), and providing border monitoring (e.g. satellite imagery and aerial surveillance). Frontex has activated crisis response teams to coordinate its support for Member States in the event of increasing numbers of people fleeing Ukraine. As of 2 March 2022, it has already responded to a request for support from Romania. Member States can also request help from migration management support teams, made up of staff from Frontex, the EU Agency for Asylum (EASO), Europol and other agencies.
The European Border and Coast Guard Regulation enables a Member State facing disproportionate migratory challenges at EU external borders to request technical and operational reinforcement from migration management support teams composed of experts from Union bodies, offices and agencies (Article 40). Position of the European ParliamentIn its resolution of 1 March 2022, the European Parliament strongly condemned ‘the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against and invasion of Ukraine’ and called on the Commission and the Member States to provide further emergency humanitarian assistance for Ukraine. Parliament welcomed the Council’s commitment to activate the Temporary Protection Directive, having previously called for the Temporary Protection Directive to be triggered in relation to the mass influx of refugees from Syria and other conflict areas (e.g. in 2013 and 2015).
Parliament urged the Council to divide responsibility for the reception of the refugees who arrive at the EU’s external borders equally among the Member States. It called on the Council and the Commission to provide extra funding for the frontline countries, as they are the primary points of entry for Ukrainian refugees. It also urged the Commission to establish a solidarity mechanism to relocate Ukrainian refugees from frontline EU countries to other Member States. Parliament reminded all Member States of their responsibility to uphold the fundamental rights of all asylum seekers. Parliament also called for the EU institutions to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine, in line with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union.
Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Assisting Ukrainians at the EU’s borders‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Martin Russell.
Outraged by Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, EU countries have adopted unprecedentedly tough sanctions, in cooperation with partners such as the US, Canada and the UK. Although Russia will partially adapt, these measures are expected to cause major disruption and isolate the country from the global economy.
Pre-2022 EU Ukraine-related sanctions against RussiaAfter Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea and support for Donbas separatists, the EU adopted numerous sanctions against Russia. These include targeted measures (asset freezes, visa bans) against some 160 individuals (including Russian politicians and military officers) and 40 organisations responsible for violations of Ukrainian sovereignty. There are also sectoral sanctions: severe restrictions on EU lending to five major Russian state-owned banks, three oil companies and three arms manufacturers; an arms embargo, and a ban on exports of dual-use (civilian/military) items to Russian defence companies; and a ban on providing innovative extractive technology and services, used by Russian companies to develop deep-water, Arctic and shale oil reserves.
New sanctions triggered by Russia’s attack on UkraineOn 24 February 2022, Russia launched an unprovoked attack on Ukraine. Earlier in February, US officials predicted that an invasion could claim up to 50 000 Ukrainian civilian lives, together with 25 000 military casualties on the Ukrainian side and 10 000 for Russia, while displacing up to 5 million people. According to the United Nations, as of 1 March 2022, at least 136 civilians had been killed and 400 injured, with the real toll probably much higher. At the time of writing one million refugees have left the country.
The invasion was preceded by months of debate on Europe’s response to expected Russian aggression. Given the damage that further sanctions would cause to their own economies, there were some doubts as to how far EU leaders were prepared to go. However, the scale and the brutality of the attack, as well as its worrying implications for European security, have highlighted the need for harsher measures.
Four new sanctions packagesThe EU adopted sanctions on 23 February after Russia’s decision to recognise the two ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states, followed by three packages of much harsher measures after the start of the invasion, on 25 February, 28 February and 2 March. These include:
Like the previous sanctions of 2014, these measures have been coordinated with the USA, Canada, and the UK. Together with the EU, the latter three countries have frozen Russian international reserves, banned Russian planes, restricted technology exports, and adopted targeted sanctions against elite figures. The four partners have committed to ending ‘golden passports’ for wealthy Russians connected to the Russian government. Following the example of the UK and Canada, the EU and USA are considering a ban on Russian ships. Czechia is one of the EU countries that have already stopped issuing visas to Russian citizens, and there are calls for other Member States to follow suit.
Western companies have taken some initiatives of their own that go beyond sanctions compliance. Shell and BP have announced that they will sell off their Russian assets. Apple and Jaguar Land Rover will stop selling products in Russia, while MSC and Maersk will no longer ship containers to Russia.
Consequences of new sanctionsPrevious EU and Western sanctions adopted in 2014 were targeted at a narrow group of strategic companies and sectors. Their objective was not to cripple the Russian economy but to slow down long-term growth. After an initial shock, Russian banks and energy companies adapted to the new situation; energy production and exports have now reached record levels. Nevertheless, there are signs that sanctions have imposed significant costs: foreign investment is down, and according to some estimates, Russia may be losing around 1 % of GDP growth per year.
The latest sanctions are more similar to Washington’s post-2018 ‘maximum pressure‘ campaign against Iran, in that they aim at a much broader impact. Without access to SWIFT, Russian traders will find it difficult to send and receive international financial transfers, obstructing the oil and gas exports on which the Russian economy so crucially depends (however, it is still unclear whether this ban will include energy exports). Whereas previous sanctions targeted elites rather than ordinary Russians, the new measures, such as the ban on Russian flights and heavy restrictions on visas, could make travel almost impossible for everyone in the country. With the ban on aviation exports, Russia could run out of spare parts for its commercial air fleet, three quarters of which originate from Western countries, in just a few months. Technology export restrictions will hold back economic modernisation, and financial restrictions will isolate Moscow from international markets.
Since the invasion, the Russian rouble has lost 30 % of its value against the euro and share markets have crashed, forcing Moscow’s stock exchange to close. In a bid to prop up the rouble, Russia’s Central Bank raised interest rates sharply, from 9.5 to 20 %; the latter move will hurt heavily indebted Russian households, which had already seen disposable incomes decline to a 12-year low even before the conflict. Moscow has US$630 billion in international reserves, giving it some scope for cushioning the impact of economic shocks, but around half of these reserves are now frozen by Western sanctions.
The longer-term impact is less clear. Russia proved more resilient to previous sanctions than expected, and there is a limit to how far EU countries are prepared to go in restricting energy trade, given that many of them depend on Russian supplies. For the time being, gas exports continue to flow, including via Ukraine. In 2014, to overcome Western restrictions on exports of dual use goods for the defence sector, Russia looked to domestic manufacturers and Chinese imports for replacements. Yet such alternatives are often of inferior quality and can take years to develop. Furthermore, it is not clear whether Chinese producers will want to risk secondary sanctions from the USA, which is by far their biggest export market.
In the short term, EU countries are unlikely to stop buying gas from Russia, which supplies over 40 % of their imports. However, in the long term, sanctions could spur more determined diversification efforts; Germany, which is currently the biggest importer, has already put the Nord Stream 2 pipeline on hold and announced plans to build two LNG terminals.
European Parliament: in its 1 March 2022 resolution on Russian aggression against Ukraine, Parliament welcomes the EU’s swift adoption of sanctions, but calls for further measures against Russia and Belarus, including total exclusion from SWIFT, a ban on exports of all high-tech products, and a ban on Russian shipping.Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: New EU sanctions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.