European Union

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Following Parliament’s extraordinary plenary session on Ukraine on 1 March 2022, Members return to Strasbourg for the March plenary session, with a number of related issues on the agenda, including a debate with the Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas on the security situation, scheduled for Wednesday. In the meantime, the EU has pressed ahead with new sanctions and certain banks are now cut from SWIFT. The EU is also moving fast to counter the implications for energy and agricultural trade. Parliament is due to hear Council and Commission statements on the deterioration of the refugee situation as a consequence of the uneven military balance of power in the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Parliament expects that all measures will be underpinned by a robust EU budgetary response.

The European Parliament resolution on the Russian aggression against Ukraine called for an end to ‘golden visas’ for wealthy Russians. The invasion has highlighted the problematic consequences of issuing ‘golden visas’ (residence in return for investment) or ‘golden passports’ (nationality in return for financial investment). However, a considerable number of EU countries offer these schemes to those (estimated at over 132 000 people between 2011 and 2019) who are wealthy enough to pay. While investment received is estimated at €21.4 billion, the schemes bear obvious risks to sincere cooperation between EU countries, and commodify EU rights, as well as posing security, corruption, money laundering, and tax avoidance risks. Parliament has expressed concern regarding these schemes since 2014, and Members return to the issue on Monday evening when they are expected to consider a legislative-initiative report from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). The committee demands that the Commission come up with proposals to phase out citizenship by investment schemes completely, and propose new laws to harmonise and govern the rules on residence by investment schemes.

Parliament has also long criticised countries who attempt to influence elections and other democratic processes in EU countries. Russia and China are among best-known sources of foreign interference, but over 80 countries spread disinformation online. In a debate scheduled for Tuesday morning, Members will hear the conclusions of a report on external attempts to influence elections and other democratic processes in EU countries from Parliament’s Special Committee on Foreign Interference (INGE). The committee’s report summarises the EU’s main vulnerabilities to foreign interference, witnessed in several recent elections, and recommends a comprehensive EU strategy to develop resilience. Greater awareness of the problem should be encouraged through media literacy, by closing loopholes that allow foreign financing of political parties, and through stronger sanctions for foreign actors who interfere with our democracies.

A political, economic, social and cultural life, where freedom of expression and of association are respected, is one guarantee of a resilient civic society. Parliament is concerned that the EU civic space has deteriorated, particularly since the pandemic, with some governments hindering civil society organisations’ participation in democratic life. On Monday, Members are expected to debate a LIBE committee own-initiative report, advocating new measures, including a specific EU strategy, to protect and boost civil society organisations in the EU. The report underlines that the strategy should align with EU action in other fields, including on racism. Members are then scheduled to consider a Culture and Education Committee own-initiative report on the role of culture, education, media and sport in the fight against racism. Considering the 2020 EU action plan on racism, the committee underlines the action still needed to combat stereotypes, develop inclusive education, raise awareness of the history of racism and ensure fair representation of ethnic minorities in the media. The committee insists that adequate resources be made available to ensure that the ambitions can be realised, and calls for the Commission to act on discrimination in sport. The committee also urges EU countries to take effective measures to prevent the media from spreading hate speech and false narratives about particular ethnic groups.

The world celebrates international women’s day on 8 March, and Ukrainian writer Oksana Zaboujko is due to address Parliament on Tuesday lunchtime. Fittingly – given the consequences of war for women – Parliament is then scheduled to debate elements driving gender parity in EU external policy. Members are scheduled to consider a report prepared by the Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and the Development (DEVE) Committees, on the third EU gender action plan, which seeks to mainstream gender equality in external policy. The report welcomes integration of the EU action plan on women, peace and security into GAP III, as well as the inclusion of climate change considerations, among other things. However, regretting the Council’s failure to endorse GAP III, it also criticises the omission of issues including women’s access to natural resources; sexual exploitation and violence; and the inclusion of women in mediation processes. Finally, it calls for more EU action to counter the effects of the pandemic on women, and greater focus on gender equality in trade and investment policy.

On Wednesday afternoon, Members turn to the EU’s climate ambitions and the eighth environment action programme – the framework for EU environmental policy to 2030. Parliament is expected to vote on a draft agreement reached between the co-legislators, setting the priorities for EU objectives targeting a sustainable economy. While the aim is to ensure that environmental measures do not perpetuate social and gender inequalities, and to phase out fossil fuel and other harmful subsidies, the agreement does not set the specific 2025 and 2027 deadlines requested by Parliament. A key issue in attaining climate goals and energy independence is coping with uneven wind and solar power generation. Here, Parliament supports the introduction of a legislative framework to ensure that the batteries we turn to in support of renewable energy are themselves sustainable. Members are also scheduled to consider Parliament’s position at first reading on Wednesday afternoon, on European Commission proposals for a regulation concerning batteries and waste batteries. The Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) Committee’s report calls for higher ambition, with a wider scope to include e-bike and other light transport batteries, and greater diligence throughout the battery lifecycle, from manufacture to recycling. The vote in plenary should set Parliament’s negotiating position and open the way for interinstitutional negotiations to begin.

Finally, Members return to the subject of agricultural statistics on Tuesday afternoon, to consider adoption at first reading of the agreed text on the proposed overhaul of the regulation on economic accounts for agriculture, formalising regional agricultural data reporting. During the negotiations, Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) underlined the need to ensure cost efficient data collection and avoid redundancy in data reporting.

Amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, the European Parliament President Roberta Metsola (EPP) convened a meeting of national parliament speakers to coordinate the European response, telling them that “Kyiv is under siege and so is democracy”.

Russia's media watchdog is threatening to block access to online encyclopedia Wikipedia because of its entry on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This is the latest in a series of crackdowns on free media coverage since the war broke out.

Written by Costica Dumbrava.

Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine has already pushed over a million people to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. The EU and its Member States have strongly condemned the aggression and mobilised to aid Ukraine. The EU has also adopted measures to help people, mostly women and children, fleeing Russian aggression, while ensuring proper management of the EU’s external borders. These measures include a proposal to grant EU-wide temporary protection to people arriving from Ukraine, guidelines to assist border guards carrying out checks at the EU-Ukraine borders, and support from specialised EU agencies.

Situation at the EU borders with Ukraine

As of 3 March 2022, the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, estimated that about 1 million people had fled Ukraine to neighbouring countries, mainly Poland, Hungary, Moldova, Slovakia and Romania. The European Commission estimates that up to 6.5 million persons may be displaced by the conflict, leading to as many as 3.5 million people seeking international protection in the EU in the next two years. With 4 million people expected to seek protection in neighbouring countries and further 12 million people inside Ukraine in need of relief and protection, this is rapidly unfolding into a major humanitarian crisis.

EU response

The EU and its Member States have strongly condemned the ‘unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine’ and swiftly agreed on sanctions against the Russian Federation. They also stepped-up assistance to Ukraine and increased humanitarian aid to refugees in Moldova (in cooperation with UN humanitarian agencies). On 24 February 2022, the European Council called for progress on preparedness and readiness at all levels and invited the Commission to put forward contingency measures. On 27 February, the Presidency of the Council decided to activate fully the EU integrated political crisis response arrangements for monitoring and operational coordination.

Temporary protection for people fleeing Ukraine

As requested by the Council, on 2 March 2022, the Commission proposed to activate the application of the Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC) to grant immediate temporary protection in the EU to people fleeing the war in Ukraine. This will allow displaced persons to enjoy harmonised rights across the EU, including a resident permit, the possibility to work, housing, and access to social welfare, medical assistance and means of subsistence. Temporary protection does not equal refugee status, but it will not prevent the people concerned from applying for international protection. The measures will also allow Member States to manage the influx of people efficiently, coordinate with the other Member States (through the EU Migration Preparedness and Crisis Management Mechanism Network), and reduce the immediate impact on their asylum systems.

The Temporary Protection Directive enables Member States to provide protection and rights to people in need of immediate protection (for two years maximum). The Council can establish the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons by Council decision, adopted by a qualified majority, upon a proposal from the Commission. The European Parliament must be informed of the decision. Although the directive was invoked several times in the past (e.g., in 2011 and 2015), it has never been activated. Under the new pact on migration and asylum, the Commission proposed to replace the Temporary Protection Directive with a regulation addressing broader situations of force majeure in the field of migration and asylum. The proposal has yet to be adopted. Management of EU external borders

As beneficiaries of EU visa-free travel, Ukrainian nationals can enter and stay in the EU for 90 days without a visa. On 2 March, the Commission put forward operational guidelines on external border management at EU-Ukraine borders, to help Member States’ border guards to manage arrivals efficiently and assist people in need, whilst maintaining a high level of security checks. The guidelines clarify the facilitation available to border guards under the Schengen Borders Code, in particular:

• simplification of border controls for certain categories of persons (e.g., vulnerable persons);
• the possibility to organise border controls outside border crossing points;
• special derogation from the fulfilment of entry conditions based on humanitarian grounds;
• special arrangements for rescue services, police, fire brigades, border guards and seafarers to cross the borders, regardless of their nationality;
• the establishment of emergency support lanes to ensure access and return of organisations providing humanitarian aid for people in Ukraine.

The Commission emphasised that this facilitation at the external borders should not come at the expense of Member States’ internal security and public policy. For example, whereas Member States may suspend the application of entry bans (alerts in the Schengen Information System) based on migratory grounds, they should not disregard entry bans issued on the basis of security reasons.

The Schengen Borders Code allows border guards to temporarily relax border checks at external borders ‘as a result of exceptional and unforeseen circumstances’ (Article 9). Member States can authorise non-EU nationals to enter their territory on humanitarian grounds (Article 6(5)(c)), even if they do not fulfil all entry conditions (e.g. people unable to present a valid passport or visa). They can also decide to perform border checks during or after the transport of the travellers to a safe location, and not at the border crossing point. Support from EU agencies

As emphasised by the Commission’s border guidelines, Member States can benefit from European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) support, including through the deployment of standing corps to assist with border checks (e.g. registration in Eurodac), and providing border monitoring (e.g. satellite imagery and aerial surveillance). Frontex has activated crisis response teams to coordinate its support for Member States in the event of increasing numbers of people fleeing Ukraine. As of 2 March 2022, it has already responded to a request for support from Romania. Member States can also request help from migration management support teams, made up of staff from Frontex, the EU Agency for Asylum (EASO), Europol and other agencies.

The European Border and Coast Guard Regulation enables a Member State facing disproportionate migratory challenges at EU external borders to request technical and operational reinforcement from migration management support teams composed of experts from Union bodies, offices and agencies (Article 40). Position of the European Parliament

In its resolution of 1 March 2022, the European Parliament strongly condemned ‘the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against and invasion of Ukraine’ and called on the Commission and the Member States to provide further emergency humanitarian assistance for Ukraine. Parliament welcomed the Council’s commitment to activate the Temporary Protection Directive, having previously called for the Temporary Protection Directive to be triggered in relation to the mass influx of refugees from Syria and other conflict areas (e.g. in 2013 and 2015).

Parliament urged the Council to divide responsibility for the reception of the refugees who arrive at the EU’s external borders equally among the Member States. It called on the Council and the Commission to provide extra funding for the frontline countries, as they are the primary points of entry for Ukrainian refugees. It also urged the Commission to establish a solidarity mechanism to relocate Ukrainian refugees from frontline EU countries to other Member States. Parliament reminded all Member States of their responsibility to uphold the fundamental rights of all asylum seekers. Parliament also called for the EU institutions to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine, in line with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Assisting Ukrainians at the EU’s borders‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Cyberattacks are hardly limited to one country in an interconnected world. We discuss the impact of Russian cyberattacks against Ukraine on European companies.

The European Commission is considering a new, separate communication on the impact of the energy crisis focused specifically on the agriculture sector alongside a broader communication on the energy crisis, according to sources. 

Sanctions and accession bids amid ongoing fears, Zelenskyy reduces European Parliament to tears, and the world has been speaking, football finally hears.    

Written by Martin Russell.

Outraged by Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, EU countries have adopted unprecedentedly tough sanctions, in cooperation with partners such as the US, Canada and the UK. Although Russia will partially adapt, these measures are expected to cause major disruption and isolate the country from the global economy.

Pre-2022 EU Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia

After Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea and support for Donbas separatists, the EU adopted numerous sanctions against Russia. These include targeted measures (asset freezes, visa bans) against some 160 individuals (including Russian politicians and military officers) and 40 organisations responsible for violations of Ukrainian sovereignty. There are also sectoral sanctions: severe restrictions on EU lending to five major Russian state-owned banks, three oil companies and three arms manufacturers; an arms embargo, and a ban on exports of dual-use (civilian/military) items to Russian defence companies; and a ban on providing innovative extractive technology and services, used by Russian companies to develop deep-water, Arctic and shale oil reserves.

New sanctions triggered by Russia’s attack on Ukraine

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an unprovoked attack on Ukraine. Earlier in February, US officials predicted that an invasion could claim up to 50 000 Ukrainian civilian lives, together with 25 000 military casualties on the Ukrainian side and 10 000 for Russia, while displacing up to 5 million people. According to the United Nations, as of 1 March 2022, at least 136 civilians had been killed and 400 injured, with the real toll probably much higher. At the time of writing one million refugees have left the country.

The invasion was preceded by months of debate on Europe’s response to expected Russian aggression. Given the damage that further sanctions would cause to their own economies, there were some doubts as to how far EU leaders were prepared to go. However, the scale and the brutality of the attack, as well as its worrying implications for European security, have highlighted the need for harsher measures.

Four new sanctions packages

The EU adopted sanctions on 23 February after Russia’s decision to recognise the two ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states, followed by three packages of much harsher measures after the start of the invasion, on 25 February, 28 February and 2 March. These include:

• targeted individual sanctions against Russian President Vladimir Putin, senior government ministers including defence minister Sergey Shoigu and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, members of the National Security Council, oligarchs in the oil, banking and finance sectors, propagandists such as Margarita Simonyan, head of the RT news channel, and all 351 Russian parliamentarians (out of 450) who voted for recognition of the two territories;
• bans on: financial transactions with all state-controlled banks (70 % of Russia’s banking sector); trading in shares of Russian state-owned companies; financial deposits from Russia in EU banks exceeding €100 000; accounts belonging to Russian clients in EU banks; the sale of euro-denominated securities to Russian clients; transactions with the Russian Central Bank; supply of euro banknotes to Russia; participation in Russian Direct Investment Fund projects;
• exclusion of seven banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system. However, the list includes only one of Russia’s top five banks (VTB, the second largest by total assets);
• energy sector: a ban on exports of services and technology used by Russian oil refineries;
• aviation sector: a ban on the sale of all aircraft, spare parts and equipment to Russian airlines. Russian planes, including private jets, are banned from EU airspace and EU airports;
• restrictions on exports of high-tech goods with potential military applications, such as electronics, computers, information security, telecoms, sensors and lasers, navigation and avionics equipment, not only to military companies, but to all Russian purchasers;
• a ban on broadcasts by Kremlin propaganda channels RT and Sputnik.

Sanctions coordination, and further restrictive measures:

Like the previous sanctions of 2014, these measures have been coordinated with the USA, Canada, and the UK. Together with the EU, the latter three countries have frozen Russian international reserves, banned Russian planes, restricted technology exports, and adopted targeted sanctions against elite figures. The four partners have committed to ending ‘golden passports’ for wealthy Russians connected to the Russian government. Following the example of the UK and Canada, the EU and USA are considering a ban on Russian ships. Czechia is one of the EU countries that have already stopped issuing visas to Russian citizens, and there are calls for other Member States to follow suit.

Western companies have taken some initiatives of their own that go beyond sanctions compliance. Shell and BP have announced that they will sell off their Russian assets. Apple and Jaguar Land Rover will stop selling products in Russia, while MSC and Maersk will no longer ship containers to Russia.

Consequences of new sanctions

Previous EU and Western sanctions adopted in 2014 were targeted at a narrow group of strategic companies and sectors. Their objective was not to cripple the Russian economy but to slow down long-term growth. After an initial shock, Russian banks and energy companies adapted to the new situation; energy production and exports have now reached record levels. Nevertheless, there are signs that sanctions have imposed significant costs: foreign investment is down, and according to some estimates, Russia may be losing around 1 % of GDP growth per year.

The latest sanctions are more similar to Washington’s post-2018 ‘maximum pressure‘ campaign against Iran, in that they aim at a much broader impact. Without access to SWIFT, Russian traders will find it difficult to send and receive international financial transfers, obstructing the oil and gas exports on which the Russian economy so crucially depends (however, it is still unclear whether this ban will include energy exports). Whereas previous sanctions targeted elites rather than ordinary Russians, the new measures, such as the ban on Russian flights and heavy restrictions on visas, could make travel almost impossible for everyone in the country. With the ban on aviation exports, Russia could run out of spare parts for its commercial air fleet, three quarters of which originate from Western countries, in just a few months. Technology export restrictions will hold back economic modernisation, and financial restrictions will isolate Moscow from international markets.

Since the invasion, the Russian rouble has lost 30 % of its value against the euro and share markets have crashed, forcing Moscow’s stock exchange to close. In a bid to prop up the rouble, Russia’s Central Bank raised interest rates sharply, from 9.5 to 20 %; the latter move will hurt heavily indebted Russian households, which had already seen disposable incomes decline to a 12-year low even before the conflict. Moscow has US$630 billion in international reserves, giving it some scope for cushioning the impact of economic shocks, but around half of these reserves are now frozen by Western sanctions.

The longer-term impact is less clear. Russia proved more resilient to previous sanctions than expected, and there is a limit to how far EU countries are prepared to go in restricting energy trade, given that many of them depend on Russian supplies. For the time being, gas exports continue to flow, including via Ukraine. In 2014, to overcome Western restrictions on exports of dual use goods for the defence sector, Russia looked to domestic manufacturers and Chinese imports for replacements. Yet such alternatives are often of inferior quality and can take years to develop. Furthermore, it is not clear whether Chinese producers will want to risk secondary sanctions from the USA, which is by far their biggest export market.

In the short term, EU countries are unlikely to stop buying gas from Russia, which supplies over 40 % of their imports. However, in the long term, sanctions could spur more determined diversification efforts; Germany, which is currently the biggest importer, has already put the Nord Stream 2 pipeline on hold and announced plans to build two LNG terminals.

European Parliament: in its 1 March 2022 resolution on Russian aggression against Ukraine, Parliament welcomes the EU’s swift adoption of sanctions, but calls for further measures against Russia and Belarus, including total exclusion from SWIFT, a ban on exports of all high-tech products, and a ban on Russian shipping.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: New EU sanctions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Russian President Vladimir Putin told French leader Emmanuel Macron on Thursday (3 March) that Russia would achieve the goals of its military intervention in Ukraine whatever happens, the Kremlin said.

Russia and Ukraine agreed on Thursday (3 March) to the need for humanitarian corridors to help civilians escape Moscow's eight-day-old invasion, the first apparent progress in talks, as the United States added to Western sanctions on more oligarchs.

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