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Less than a year after Hungary launched its rapid manufacturing program at its newly opened military vehicle factory, the first domestically-made KF41 Lynx infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) has been delivered. The Lynx was completed last December, but as the initial vehicle to roll off the assembly line at the facilities in Zalaegerszeg, it was put through extensive inspections and performance tests.

It was officially handed over to the Hungarian armed forces earlier this month – the first of a new batch of IFVs that will be produced in Hungary under license from the German-based Rheinmetall arms manufacturer. Budapest is already on track to receive forty-six of the German-made tracked IFVs by the end of next year, with the first of the Lynx already delivered in October 2022.

Production on the remaining vehicles began last year at the new Hungarian facility, which was opened as part of a Rheinmetall Hungary Zrt. joint venture – with Rheinmetall controlling a fifty-one percent stake and the Hungarian government maintaining a forty-nine percent share.

Hungary will receive a total of 209 of the modular Lynx vehicles as part of an August 2020 deal valued at 2 billion euros ($2.2 billion). Forty-five will be produced in Germany, while the remaining 172 vehicles will be built domestically in Hungary.

"We are grateful to be able to support the Hungarian armed forces as an industrial partner in the Lynx lighthouse project. We have now reached an important milestone within the project. With the production of the Lynx, we are seriously proving our commitment to creating local added value in Hungary and transferring technology to the country. This model is also transferable to other countries which might also be interested in similar partnerships," said Dr. Björn Bernhard, head of Rheinmetall Vehicle Systems Europe.

In addition to the basic IFV vehicle, other variants include a mobile command post, armored reconnaissance vehicle, fire control vehicle, mortar carrier, medical vehicle, and driving school vehicle. A Lynx air defense tank, armed with a Skyranger 30 turret, is currently in development as part of a second contract that was placed in December 2023.

"Peace requires strength, which means a lot of kinds of strength, and in this regard, we have gained real and serious strength with Rheinmetall and in this alliance, which significantly enriches Hungary," added Hungarian Minister of Defense Kristóf Szalay-Bobrovniczky. "This is a kind of strategic partnership that is more than strategy or partnership – this is a real alliance, and within this framework, we hope to win the future for Hungarians, and we're building something that will remain for the next generations, and we're strengthening Hungary."

The Lynx Beyond Hungary

In addition to supplying the Hungarian Army, the factory will produce the KF41 Lynx for other NATO members and partners. The Lynx was one of the platforms considered by the U.S. Army in its Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle program to replace the aging Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).

However, the initial Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) was canceled in January 2020, only to be "rebooted" in July 2021. The program has since continued to move forward, and in June 2023, the American Rheinmetall KF41 Lynx was selected – along with an offering from General Dynamics Land Systems – as part of the program's efforts to produce the XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Le Royaume-Uni est choqué deux jours après l’attaque au couteau dans un centre aéré au nord de Liverpool, pendant laquelle trois petites filles de 6 à 9 ans sont décédées. Cinq autres enfants et deux adultes restent dans un état critique. Mardi 30 juillet au soir, une marche blanche a été organisée dans la ville de Southport, mais l’hommage a tourné à l’émeute dû à des actions attribuées à l'extrême droite.

Dans une note rendue publique, l'Etat major des armées maliennes porte à la connaissance de l'opinion publique, que conformément à la solidarité entre les Etats membres de la Conféderation des Etats du Sahel (AES), et en application du mécanisme de défense collective et d'assistance mutuelle de l'AES, les FAMa, en coordination avec les Forces armées du Burkina Faso, ont debuté, ce mardi 30 juillet 2024, une campagne aérienne dans le secteur Tinzaouatene.

L'opération vise selon le communiqué, à sécuriser les personnes et les biens dans la localité de Tinzaouatene et ses environs, contre la coalition de terroristes, à la base d'exactions, d'abus et de trafics illicites contre les populations maliennes.

L'État-Major Général des Armées invite la population civile dans le secteur, à se tenir à distance des positions occupées par les Groupes Armés Terroristes durant la période de l'opération, pour prévenir tous dommages collatéraux.

Lefaso.net

Summary and Key Points: The RAH-66 Comanche was the U.S. Army's ambitious attempt to create a stealth attack helicopter, designed to replace the OH-58 Kiowa and provide undetected reconnaissance and support.

-Despite the program's $7 billion investment from 1996 to 2004, the Comanche never entered production due to technological challenges and unproven stealth capabilities. The helicopter featured a smooth fuselage, Radar-Absorbent Material (RAM) coatings, and infrared-suppressant paint, along with a quieter composite rotor.

-Although the program was eventually canceled, the Comanche highlighted the potential value of stealth technology in helicopter operations, especially for special missions like the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound.

Why the RAH-66 Helicopter Program Failed

For the the last several generations, American aerospace designers have invested heavily in stealth technology. The majority of new fighters and bombers that roll off the assembly plant are stealth airframes, with radar cross sections comparable to that of a bumble bee. Examples of new stealth aircraft include the F-117 Nighthawk, the B-2 Spirit, the F-22 Raptor, the F-35 Lightning II, and the B-21 Raider. But as one may have notice, the list does not include any helicopters, despite the use of the rotary-winged aircraft in attack, reconnaissance, and special operations roles which stealth capabilities would be quite useful.

Conceptually, a stealth helicopter makes a lot of sense. US war planners thought so, at least, which is why considerable resources were dedicated to building the RAH-66 Comanche, a stealth attack helicopter. The Comanche never quite panned out, but you can’t fault the effort.

Squaring a Circle with Comanche Helicopter

Helicopters are inherently unstealthy. The turbine exhaust system is cacophonous; the tail rotor is loud; the fuselage vibrates vigorously during flight. Helicopters are simply not well suited for moving through air and space undetected. Yet, given the inherent challenges of sanding down the non-stealth corners of the rotary-winged aircraft, the fact that aerospace designers were willing to try speaks to the value that a stealth helicopter would add.

Stealth characteristics would be helpful for a helicopter in any situation in which you did not want the helicopter detected – that is to say, in most military operations. Consider how helicopters are used: fire support, troop transport, and reconnaissance. Nearly every facet of helicopter operations would benefit from stealth technology. And of course, helicopters are a central component of special operations, which are, almost innately stealthy.

Consider the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound – an example of why the US might want stealth helicopter technology. The US needs to surreptitiously infiltrate a sovereign state (because the US did not have permission to enter the sovereign state), locate an approximate location (bin Laden’s compound), and deliver a SEAL Team. The needs of the mission all demanded a helicopter – aside from the need to enter the sovereign state undetected; which would require stealth. Fortunately, the US happened to have a stealth Blackhawk prototype on hand, two of which were deployed for the raid. This article isn’t about the bin Laden raid or the stealth Blackhawk, but rather a demonstration of why the US might be interested in developing a stealth helicopter like the RAH-66.

Developing the RAH-66

The RAH-66 made a lot of sense on paper, prompting the US Army to invest $7 billion dollars on the program between 1996 and 2004. The RAH-66 was slated to replace the OH-58 Kiowa, a scout helicopter that often attracts small-arms fire. Naturally, the Army would have appreciated a scout helicopter with the ability to move about unseen.

Two Comanches were built, with a smooth fuselage, Radar-Absorbent Material (RAM) coatings, and infrared-suppressant paint. The Comanche was also outfitted with an all-composite, five-blade rotor, which churned more softly than other helicopter rotors. But the Comanche never entered production, because “aspects of Comanche’s technology were deemed too risky (i.e. immature i.e. hadn’t been developed i.e. didn’t exist),” wrote Dan Ward for TIME.

The Comanche was a financial flop. But you can appreciate why the Army may have wanted such a stealthy helicopter.    

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Cinq informations judiciaires supplémentaires pour viols et viols aggravés ont été ouvertes par le parquet de Nanterre à l'encontre de Patrick Poivre d'Arvor, ex-présentateur vedette du journal télévisé de TF1. Le journaliste a toujours nié les accusations et à ce jour, toutes les plaintes ont été classées sans suite.

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's reliance on expensive, complex nuclear-powered submarines is under scrutiny as global rivals like China and Russia expand their naval capabilities.

-Despite the proven effectiveness of diesel-electric submarines—used successfully by allies like Japan, Sweden, and Israel—the U.S. has focused on nuclear subs, which are costly and slow to produce.

-Diesel-electric subs offer a quieter, more affordable alternative that could quickly bolster America's undersea fleet. By purchasing these submarines from advanced allies, the U.S. could enhance its naval power and meet current challenges more effectively, rather than waiting for long-term solutions.

The U.S. Navy: Time for Diesel Submarines? 

The United States Navy has fallen in love, like the rest of the Armed Forces of the United States, with technological wizardry and expensive programs to augment, indeed replace, less sophisticated, affordable, and plentiful systems. America’s wünderwaffe is going strong today. 

Yet, the U.S. military is quantifiably the weakest it has been since the interwar years. One key system that the Navy will need to defend against America’s rising great power rivals is the submarine. And, thanks to long-running problems with America’s failing defense industrial base, as well as the increasing cost of complex systems, America’s vital submarine capability is insufficient to meeting the challenges America faces today.

There is no amount of funding that can address the bottlenecks in our defense industrial base. Nothing short of a complete overhaul of our infrastructure will make U.S. capabilities meet the needs of the U.S. Armed Forces. Despite having spoken wistfully of the need to restore America as the “arsenal of democracy,” no political leader—not former President Donald Trump or current President Joe Biden—has managed to revitalize the dying arsenal of democracy. In fact, as multiple crises across various fronts pull America’s limited supplies of critical systems, ammunition, and personnel to their breaking points, almost nothing has been proffered in the way of a reliable solution in the near term. 

And no one in Washington thinks about the long-term anymore (and whenever they do, the bureaucrats usually get it wrong).

The threats, however, persist. 

What America Really Needs for Subs

The need for a large and capable submarine force remains. We keep hearing about the glories of America’s allies. Although, increasingly, these alliances seem to be pretty one-sided: America gives and gives, while the allies take and take. But America does have competent and technologically advanced allies. 

Many of these allies, such as Sweden or France, routinely and unapologetically rely upon diesel-electric submarines to meet their strategic needs. 

This is not because America’s allies are technologically inferior to the Americans. Quite the contrary. It’s usually because America’s allies don’t want to spend the kind of money, time, and resources building the entire fleet of nuclear-powered submarines that the Americans have built. 

Even the recent Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) submarine deal demands that Australia purchase, and the Americans and British provide, nuclear-powered submarines. Thus, defense contractors are happy because these are long-term contracts that are worth far more than if the contracts were for diesel-electric submarines.

In the meantime, America’s rivals—notably China—grow stronger and their own navies grow larger and more competent. By the time these proposed new nuclear-powered submarines make it to the battlefield, the facts on the ground may have fundamentally changed in China’s favor. What’s needed, therefore, are solutions in the here and now. Not theoretical solutions for 2040 and beyond (which is what the Pentagon is planning for). 

The fact of the matter is that diesel-electric subs work. Indeed, these were the kind of submarines (although much less sophisticated than the diesel-electric subs operated by multiple modern navies today), that won the Pacific Theater of World War II for the Americans. After that conflict ended, though, the U.S. Navy was bitten by the nuclear bug. It’s an understandable trend. Nuke-powered subs are better than their conventional, diesel-electric submarine older brothers. 

But they’re expensive and take long to build—and require long stays in already overburdened U.S. shipyards.

The Case for Diesel-Electric Submarines

Besides, a coterie of diesel-electric submarines has proven their worth against their nuclear-powered brethren. More importantly, diesel-electric subs have proven their mettle in a variety of instances against nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carriers! 

That’s because diesel-electric submarines, on top of being cheaper than nuclear-powered boats, are usually quieter. They’re harder to pick up on sonar. An ancient Chinese Song-class diesel-electric submarine infamously popped up within torpedo firing range of the USS Kitty Hawk when the nuclear-powered carrier was on maneuvers in the Pacific. 

Similarly, a Swedish Gotland-class diesel-electric submarine got within firing range of an American aircraft carrier during joint training exercises. The crew of the American carrier was none the wiser until it was too late. 

A French diesel-electric submarine did the same to an American flattop during joint training between the U.S. and French navies.

The Israelis have also proven that diesel-electric submarines are more than capable of providing for their national defense. While never officially acknowledged, everyone understands that Israel possesses a flotilla of German-built, diesel-electric Dolphin-class submarines that can carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Israel is a highly sophisticated nation that could easily build nuclear-powered boats. They chose not to because diesel-electric subs are cheaper, easier to maintain, and still get the job done. 

During World War II, America’s submarine force became a refined and essential element of America’s maritime defense. While the nuclear-powered sub had yet to be invented, and there were real limitations of diesel-electric subs back then, the fact remains that the United States was able to mass produce these subs and overwhelm the Japanese at sea. America’s rivals today, such as China and Russia, routinely rely upon a mixed force of diesel-electric and nuclear-powered subs to meet their strategic needs. 

Why can’t America do this as well?

Here’s What America’s Allies Can Do for Us

The best part of this entire story is that America’s overburdened shipyards do not need to build diesel-electric subs from scratch. Washington should simply purchase a tranche of diesel-electric subs from one of America’s various advanced allies. James Holmes believes that the Japanese-built Soryu-class diesel-electric sub would get the job done. 

But why stop there? 

We should purchase a hodgepodge of various diesel-electric subs from Japan, Sweden, and France. Let our allies help us out. America needs to augment its submarine force with simple numbers. American allies are more than capable of helping us with this task.

After all, quantity has its own quality. 

Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Les résolutions des Nations unies ont toutes échoué à régler le contentieux autour de l’ancienne colonie espagnole, le Maroc ne concevant l’autodétermination de la population sahraouie que comme l’instrument de validation de sa présence.

Summary and Key Points: As tensions with China rise, the U.S. Navy's reliance on the F-35 Lightning II faces scrutiny, particularly regarding its range limitations. The F-35C, designed for carrier operations, has a combat radius of 600 nautical miles—outdistancing the F/A-18 Super Hornet but still within the reach of China's long-range anti-ship missiles.

-This raises concerns about the vulnerability of carriers in the Pacific theater.

-The Navy’s next-generation F/A-XX program aims to address these issues with enhanced range and capabilities, but the question remains whether any carrier-based aircraft can keep carriers safe from emerging threats.

F-35 Stealth Fighter, China and the Question of Range

Throughout its development history, the F-35 Lightning II was plagued by delays and budgetary overruns. Although it took much longer to reach initial operating capability than expected, the end result is a well-refined tactical aircraft. Detractors of the program have not been silenced, however, and continue to point out challenges facing the aircraft. As tensions with China increase and planners look to the wide expanse of the Pacific, questions about the F-35’s range become more acute, particularly in the case of the Navy.

Launching from a carrier far out at sea limits the options pilots have for landing to refuel; realistically, they usually must return to the boat. If their fighters don’t possess much range, that means the carrier must sail that much closer to the adversary in order to launch effective sorties, potentially exposing itself to enemy defenses.

So, does the F-35 have a range problem? And, if so, what can the Navy do about it?

F-35 Range and Specs

Widely considered to be the most dominant fifth-generation platform in the skies today, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter incorporates stealth, versatility, range, top speed, and advanced electronic warfare/avionics. The F-35 comes in three different variants with their own specifications and, importantly, different ranges.

The F-35A is colloquially designated as the “runway queen” of the group as it is operated like a traditional fighter. This low-cost variant requires roughly 8,000 feet of standard runways to take off properly and land. The F-35B is the Marine Corps’ Lightning II variant. As the most mechanically complex of the three, the F-35B features short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) capability.

The Navy operates the C “Charlie” model. Designed for carrier operations, the F-35C has the largest fuel load and, consequently, the longest range. With full tanks, its combat radius is 600 nm, edging out the F/A-18 Super Hornet at 570 nm in the air-to-air mission configuration. For attacking ground or surface targets, the F-35 maintains its radius while the Super Hornet’s radius drops to only 320 nm.

While the Lightning II does outrange the Super Hornet, it cannot carry nearly the same payload. It makes up for this drawback in that it is a stealth aircraft with a radar cross-section about three orders of magnitude less than that of the F/A-18.

All the stealth airplanes in the world won’t hide the carrier itself, however, and even though the F-35C has longer legs, the carrier would still have to place itself in harm’s way in order to carry out strikes.

The F/A-XX and the CSG

Although the F-35 is still a relatively new platform, the Navy is already looking for its next tactical aircraft in the form of the F/A-XX program. This jet, intended to replace the Super Hornet and the EA-18G Growler, is expected to have stealth capabilities, mount-directed energy weapons, and be capable of integrating with unmanned systems.

Depending on the direction the Navy pursues, it could also have an even greater range than the F-35.

Ultimately, however, no carrier aircraft will have enough range to keep the mothership safe. Tensions between Beijing and Washington have continued to escalate, indicating that the vast Indo-Pacific region is a likely future area of combat operations for the sixth-generation platform.

The Navy will require the jet to have long-range capabilities in order to evade China’s air defense systems across long distances. The rapid growth of the People Liberation Army’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the form of long-range, anti-ship ballistic missiles cannot be overstated.

Their current missiles are capable of reaching a staggering 2,200 nm or more, far beyond even the most ambitious of endurance aircraft.

Clearly, the Navy will have to consider other options for its carriers if it wants to keep them safe and relevant. 

About the Author: Maya Carlin, Defense Expert 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Deux militaires FARDC ont été tués et d’autres blessés lors d’attaques simultanées lancées ce mercredi 31 juillet par des hommes armés sur des positions de la force navale à Kasenyi, Tchomia et Sabe, sur le littoral du lac Albert en Ituri.  

Selon le gouverneur de province, ces assauts sont l’œuvre des miliciens du groupe armé Zaïre. Il soutient que « ces miliciens ont été mobilisés par des ennemis de la paix pour déstabiliser » cette partie de la province, frontalière avec l’Ouganda.

Summary and Key Points: The F-35 Lightning II, the most advanced fighter jet in the skies, faces a hefty $2 trillion lifetime cost, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

-The report estimates $1.6 trillion in sustainment costs, significantly higher than previous projections, and $445 billion in acquisition costs.

-Factors driving the increased expenses include the U.S. military’s plan to operate the F-35 until 2088 and higher inflation.

The F-35 Fighter Will Cost In Total Around $2 Trillion 

The F-35 program’s complexity stems from its three variants (A, B, and C), each designed to meet the specific needs of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, replacing multiple older aircraft.

The F-35 Lightning II is the most advanced jet in the skies today. However, its journey to the skies hasn’t been easy. Indeed, the F-35 program had to overcome several challenges and setbacks to be where it is today. To a certain extent, these challenges continue to this day.

According to the latest assessment by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the F-35 Program will cost more than $2 trillion during its lifetime. This astounding cost makes it the most expensive defense program in recent history and one of the most expensive in military history in general.

Specifically, the GAO report estimates $1.6 trillion in sustainment costs, which include operational demands and maintenance – this is about 45 percent higher than the previous estimate in 2018 ($1.1 trillion). It also estimates approximately $445 billion in acquisition costs, which include the development and procurement of the stealth fighter jet.

One of the main reasons for the hefty half a trillion dollars increase in sustainment costs is the fact that the U.S. military plans to operate the F-35 fighter for an additional decade, or until 2088. Another reason is the higher inflation.

The fact that the GAO had to revise its estimate within six years coupled with the ongoing production and delivery of the aircraft, could indicate that the F-35 Program’s cost might further increase in the near future.

Lockheed Martin and the F-35 Joint Program Office have tried to bring costs down but without significant success. Nevertheless, for many, the high cost and challenges surrounding the F-35 Program have a reasonable explanation.

F-35 Stealth Fighter: It Can Do It All? 

Much like the Russian Babushka wooden dolls that fit several similar toys of different sizes in each other, the F-35 Lightning II isn’t just one aircraft and isn’t intended to replace just one aircraft.

The F-35 comes in three versions: A, B, and C. Although they are essentially the same aircraft in terms of capabilities, each is designed differently to meet the different demands of the U.S. military’s services. Essentially, Lockheed Martin designed three different aircraft in one, and that is reflected in some of the costs.

The F-35A is the conventional take-off and landing aircraft that operates from runways; this is the version used by the Air Force and most of the 19 countries that comprise the F-35 Program.

The F-35B is the Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing (STOVL) version of the aircraft and can take off and land like a helicopter but still fly like a fighter jet; this version is used by the U.S. Marine Corps, as well as several foreign partners.

Finally, the F-35C is the aircraft carrier version of the aircraft and is designed to withstand the extreme pressures of carrier operations; this iteration is used only by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

In addition, the three versions of the F-35 Lightning II are going to replace several older aircraft, including the A-10 Warthog close air support aircraft, AV-88 Harrier STOVL fighter jet, and also probably the F-16.

As such, they include capabilities that would normally be spread over several aircraft. This streamlining of mission sets in a single aircraft is a logistical miracle for the U.S. military and will benefit it in a time of war.

About the Author

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a Greek Army veteran (National service with 575th Marines Battalion and Army HQ). Johns Hopkins University. You will usually find him on the top of a mountain admiring the view and wondering how he got there.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

The program to replace America’s aging nuclear ICBM arsenal, known as the LGM-35A Sentinel, is already projected to go at least 81 percent over budget, which represents tens of billions of dollars in anticipated cost overruns. Yet, despite the program’s ballooning expenses, the Pentagon has reaffirmed its commitment to the effort, calling its continuation, “essential to national security.”

To many outside of the Defense apparatus, the Sentinel ICBM program may seem unnecessary. After all, the United States already maintains a standing arsenal of more than 400 nuclear-armed Minuteman III ICBMs, each of which can deliver its nuclear payload to targets more than 8,000 miles away, traveling at speeds over Mach 23. These weapons lay in wait, housed in hardened underground silos spanning Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota, and represent only the land-based portion of America’s traditional nuclear triad.

A bevy of nuclear gravity bombs, spanning in yield from as low as 0.3 kilotons to as high as 1.2 megatons, serve alongside long-range air-launched nuclear cruise missiles as the airborne leg of the triad, delivered via a laundry list of bombers and fighters. And then, most importantly, a fleet of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, each carrying 20 Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with multiple warheads onboard, serve as the at-sea leg of the triad while also representing the majority of America’s deployed nuclear arsenal.

The land-based Minuteman III fleet is often seen as the least important facet of America’s deterrent nuclear posture, with many experts and analysts dismissing these weapons and their hardened silos as little more than a “warhead sponge,” meant to give adversary nations such a long and daunting list of targets for any potential first strike that there will have little hope of blunting the edge of America’s nuclear response. But while this might make these ICBMs seem less important than the Navy’s deployed SLBMs, for instance, the truth is, using these isolated facilities as a “warhead sponge” might make all the difference in a nuclear conflict. 

The known and permanent locations of these ICBM silos give enemy nations a list of hundreds of targets to focus on, allowing America’s missile subs and nuclear-capable aircraft to retaliate with less interference.

In other words, with hundreds of nuclear ICBMs lying in wait beneath the grasslands of the Great Plains, adversaries planning a nuclear first strike must address the looming threat of these missiles, which are dispersed and sufficiently hardened to nearly require a direct nuclear strike on each to eliminate the possibility of Minuteman III retaliation. 

Even for Russia, which maintains the largest nuclear stockpile in the world and claims to have some 1,710 deployed warheads at any given time, this would be a serious challenge. If you assumed a broadly unlikely 100 percent hit rate, using just one Russian warhead for each of America’s known 450 Minuteman III silos, nerfing America’s ICBM fields alone would require more than a quarter of the nation’s entire deployed nuclear arsenal. If Russia opted to play it safe and devote two warheads to each silo, it would dramatically increase its chances of success, but at the expense of more than half of its deployed nuclear arms. This, of course, also means no other nation on the planet besides Russia has the warheads and the means to mount an effective attack against America’s ICBM fields. 

China’s nuclear stockpile is growing faster than any other nation’s in the world, but its entire arsenal currently amounts to just 500 or so warheads, meaning it could feasibly require every nuclear weapon in China’s inventory – not just the ones deployed – to have the same effect. 

It might be easier to think of the importance of the Minuteman III as a guard standing his post with his rifle up at the alert. Adversaries know there are other guards hidden throughout the landscape and the known location of that rifleman might make him an obvious target, but attackers still have to deal with him first if they intend to mount a successful assault. 

“The land leg’s geographic dispersal creates targeting problems for our adversaries, and our missileers sitting in an alert posture 24/7 ensures responsiveness,” explained Air Force Vice Chief of Staff General James Slife on July 8th.

It’s a cynical and deeply depressing way to see this swath of the American midwest – with these remote, but populated communities carrying that target on their backs for the sake of the rest of the nation. Yet, that’s the inherent and objectively cold-blooded math of nuclear warfare: It’s a game that ultimately, has no winners; only survivors.

And it’s in the interest of continuing this nuclear game of chicken that the Air Force is now forced to swallow the now-projected $140.9 billion cost of replacing those “warhead sponge” Minuteman IIIs, as the ballistic missiles Uncle Sam has long kept tucked beneath the northern Great Plains are rapidly aging into what the Pentagon considers to be an unsafe and strategically neutered obsolescence.

This is a problem the Pentagon saw coming. The Minuteman III program began in the early 1960s, with the first operational missiles entering service in 1970 before microwave ovens were common in American kitchens. At the time, the projected service life of these weapons was just 10 years, meaning the Minuteman III arsenal was slated to be replaced starting in 1980.

Since then, the branch has invested billions of dollars into not just maintaining these weapons but updating them to remain viable in a rapidly changing technological world. After all, these missiles and their launch facilities were designed and built before personal computers, VCRs or portable tape players had been invented. In fact, it wasn’t until 2019 that the Air Force finally migrated away from using eight-inch floppy disks (from the 1970s) to operate the Strategic Automated Command and Control System, or SACCS, that’s responsible for launch functionality.

The dated electronics found throughout the Minuteman III weapon and support infrastructure create significant concerns about cybersecurity – a defensive realm that simply didn’t exist when the weapon was being designed. Likewise, despite limited updates and upgrades over the years, the Air Force has been clear that the Minuteman III’s intercept countermeasures, or classified systems carried onboard meant to hinder an enemy’s ability to shoot the missiles down before they reach their targets, are aging out of relevance, presenting the real possibility that the longstanding nuclear deterrent philosophy of mutually assured destruction may no longer be quite so mutually assured.

More pressing than concerns about hacking, or the unrealistic idea that an adversary state could intercept hundreds of inbound warheads simultaneously, are the continuously reduced reliability of aging systems and components that are now so old that there’s no vendor, contractor, or commercial entity that can support, repair, or replace them – at least, not without a prohibitively high price tag. 

To put it into simpler terms, the Minuteman III is the nuclear equivalent of a 1969 Dodge Charger. Its iconic design and powerful legacy are still enough to leave many in awe, but nobody in their right mind would want to race in the thing today. Upgrading the Charger to make it safe and competitive on the modern race track is certainly possible with enough money and willpower, but there’s no denying that it would be a whole lot cheaper (and easier) to just buy a modern race car.

And that’s exactly what the Air Force determined in 2014 when it conducted what the Congressional Research Service describes as a “comprehensive analysis of alternatives” to the Minuteman III, ultimately assessing that replacing these aging weapons with new, more modern ones would reduce life cycle costs while also ensuring America’s ICBMs are technologically capable of outpacing emerging threats. 

Of course, there are always two sides to a debate, and others have argued that continued service life extension programs (SLEPs) on the Minuteman III arsenal, replacing aging components with more modern ones and eventually producing the ballistic missile equivalent of the Ship of Theseus, might actually be the more cost-effective solution. 

That was the position taken by a group of analysts at the Rand Corporation in 2014 who were tasked with assessing possible alternatives to a new ICBM program (then known as the  Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program). While the Air Force’s 2014 analysis concluded that modernizing the Minuteman III would cost just as much as replacing them, the Rand study presciently argued that a replacement ballistic missile system “will likely cost almost twice (and perhaps even three times) as much as incremental modernization and sustainment of the MM III system.”

Yet, even the Rand analysis left the door open for replacement to be the logical conclusion based on three potential factors. These were, firstly, if the Air Force felt the pressing strategic need to increase the capability of these weapons, which wouldn’t be cost-effective using the old missiles as a basis. Secondly, if the threat environment outside the U.S. changed in such a way that demanded it – such as emerging missile defense capabilities reducing the likelihood of success for Minuteman III strikes. Thirdly, and most pressingly, if the number of Minuteman III missiles the United States had left to launch declined. 

As part of ensuring the land-based leg of the nuclear triad is ready and capable of responding to attack, the United States usually conducts four to five ICBM test launches per year. If the U.S. continued this pace of testing, it would run out of extra weapons to launch by 2035, forcing it to either halt test launches indefinitely or start shaving operational weapons off the inventory to be used for these tests. 

Yet, the Air Force contends that there are several other challenges it would have to face to keep the Minuteman III alive for the foreseeable future. The first and most prominent is the aging out of the rocket motors meant to carry the weapons to their targets. Rocket motor lifespans are determined by destructively testing a small number of them and measuring the degradation of physical, chemical, and mechanical properties to create statistical models that can be used to determine when the motor’s functionality would fall below operational thresholds. In other words, they subject these rockets to immense stresses, measure the damage, and then use that data to extrapolate an expiration date for when the rocket will no longer work well enough to accomplish its mission. 

Based on the Air Force’s rocket lifespan modeling, the three boosters in the Minuteman III will begin to expire in 2029. 

The next technical hurdle another service life extension program would need to overcome is the weapons guidance system also aging out of service. The Minuteman III originally came equipped with the NS-20 Missile Guidance System, which had already aged out of relevance by the 1990s, prompting the branch to kick off the Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program midway through the decade. This program saw the NS-20 swapped out for the more modern and accurate NS-50 system. This cost some $1.6 billion in 1995 currency, or roughly $3.34 billion today, and would extend the lifespan of these guidance systems out to 2020. 

By 2012, the Federation of American Scientists reported that the Defense Department had already invested a total of $7 billion into various Minuteman III service life extension efforts – roughly $9.7 billion in today’s dollars, and it certainly didn’t end there. 

Then, 2020 came and went without a Minuteman III replacement, and the Air Force had to award several subsequent contracts to Boeing to stretch their lifespans out to 2030 and beyond – when the Minuteman III’s replacement was meant to come online. 

While not a conclusive list of these life-extending costs, public records exist for a $51.2 million contract award to Boeing for the job in January 2015 ($68.83 million today), followed by at least two contract modifications to add an additional $15.6 million the following February and an additional $8.1 million in July (a combined $31.43 million today for a total of $100.26 million). 

But even with all this invested, the Minuteman III still faces a laundry list of systems that are not only aging out of relevance but aging out of being feasible to maintain and support. 

A 2019 analysis conducted by the conservative think tank Hudson Institute posited that between 2031 and 2033, as many as 50 missiles might age out of service due to motor or onboard systems falling below the operational threshold, and by 2037, the operational Minuteman III fleet could be as small as 100 weapons. However, the Air Force awarded Boeing another $1.6 billion in February 2023 for Minuteman III “guidance subsystem support,” which is likely to curtail at least a portion of these losses, even if it did mean eclipsing the $10 billion mark on service life extensions. 

As the Pentagon sees it, continuing to funnel billions of dollars into keeping these Kirk-and-Spock-era weapons in service simply isn’t sustainable from either financial or strategic perspectives. 

As Lt. General Andrew Gabera, deputy chief of staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration explained, the Air Force has already modeled out the costs of keeping the Minuteman III relevant, but even those projections have limited value because they simply don’t know what the future may hold. Adapting to unforeseen threats would objectively be simpler (and cheaper) with a fully modern system. 

In 2021, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Navy Admiral Charles Richard, did not mince words regarding the future of the Minuteman III, saying it was simply no longer logical to pursue more service life extensions for the weapon, and issuing harsh criticisms for external calls to do so. 

“I don’t understand frankly how someone in a think tank who doesn’t have their hands on the missile, looking at the parts, the cables, all of the pieces inside that. I was out at Hill Air Force Base looking at this. That thing is so old that in some cases the drawings don’t exist anymore. Or where we do have drawings they’re six generations behind the industry standard. There’s not only not anybody working that can understand them, they’re not alive anymore,” he said. 

The admiral went on to highlight concerns about cyber vulnerabilities, saying the U.S. needed to replace what was “ basically a circuit switch system with a modern cyber defendable up-to-current standards command and control system.”

“Just to pace the cyber threat alone, GBSD is a necessary step forward,” he argued. 

He also highlighted the changing threat environment, one of the factors the 2014 Rand analysis acknowledged would justify an ICBM replacement. 

“This nation has never before had to face the prospect of two, peer, nuclear-capable adversaries who have to be deterred differently and actions to deter one have an impact on the other. This is way more complicated than it used to be,” Richard said. 

The LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM program

But if replacing the Minuteman III was supposed to be the budget-friendly solution, that appears to have backfired. Originally, Northrop Grumman and Boeing were competing for the opportunity to design and field this new missile, with both firms planning to use solid rocket motors produced by Orbital ATK. However, Northrop Grumman purchased the rocket maker in 2019, giving them the ability to procure their rocket motors at cost, while Boeing would have to buy them at market rate. This allowed Northrop Grumman to significantly undercut Boeing’s proposal, and recognizing that, Boeing bowed out, leaving Northrop to pursue the contract uncontested. 

The Air Force ultimately awarded the company a $13.3 billion developmental contract for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) that would become the Sentinel ICBM in September of 2020, with a projected overall program cost of $77.7 billion by the time a new fleet of missiles, silos, and launch facilities had been constructed and put into service. 

Of course, it wasn’t long before that projected $77 billion price tag began to climb. By February of 2021, the projected program cost has already risen to $100 billion, a figure that held until 2023, when the Pentagon acknowledged that the program’s cost had risen so substantially that even a “reasonably modified” version of the ongoing missile program, meant to reduce overall costs, would still likely ring in at roughly $140.1 billion — representing an 81% cost overrun over the effort’s initial projections. More recent estimates from earlier this month saw another roughly $800 million increase, bringing the current total to $140.9 billion.

While cost overruns are pretty commonplace among the Defense Department’s highest-priority efforts, an increase this substantial is not — in fact, the Sentinel’s budget woes are so severe that the program ran the risk of being canceled by law until just a few weeks ago. 

Significant cost overruns in the 1980s associated with programs like the H-60 Series Black Hawk helicopter and MIM-104 Patriot Air Defense System prompted Senator Sam Nunn and Representative David McCurdy to sponsor what has come to be known as the Nunn-McCurdy Act, which mandated public reporting to Congress when Defense acquisition costs began to skyrocket. 

This law has seen at least nine amendments since, with today’s Nunn-McCurdy laws identifying two types of budgetary breaches separated by severity. Significant Breaches occur when a weapon system or platform’s per-unit cost exceeds 15 percent or more of the current baseline cost, or when overall program costs grow more than 30 percent above their original baseline estimate. More severe Critical Breaches occur when costs increase 25 percent or more over current baseline estimates or 50 percent more than the original baseline estimate. 

As of 2009, any program that meets the criteria for a Critical Breach is considered legally canceled unless certified otherwise by the Secretary of Defense, which is generally accompanied by a plan to restructure the program and a full written explanation of the problems — and intended solutions — for Congress. 

At 81 percent above the original program cost estimate, the LGM-35 certainly met the criteria to be classified as a Critical Breach, prompting a Defense Department review of issues the program is facing and potential alternatives to continuing its development. 

The results of that review were released to the public on July 8, with the Pentagon certifying the program to continue despite its immense cost for a number of reasons that could truly all be boiled down to one: The Air Force simply doesn’t have any other option. 

America’s deterrent nuclear posture requires that the country maintain at least 400 operational ICBMs, and even if all the technological hurdles to extending the Minuteman III’s life could be easily overcome, testing alone will ensure that number can’t be maintained through the foreseeable future, as Uncle Sam simply starts running out missiles to launch. 

“We fully appreciate the magnitude of the costs, but we also understand the risks of not modernizing our nuclear forces and not addressing the very real threats we confront,” explained Bill LaPlante, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment. 

“Based on the results of the review, it is clear that a reasonably modified Sentinel program remains essential to U.S. national security and is the best option to meet the needs of our warfighters.”

Over a 120-day review, the Pentagon considered options ranging from starting over with a new ICBM program to doing away with permanent silos in favor of road-mobile ICBM launchers like those employed by nations like Russia. However, it was determined that none of these options could meet the nation’s strategic needs without also coming with an even higher price tag. 

But it isn’t all bad news for the Sentinel program. As General Andrew Gebara pointed out, the missiles have actually been progressing well through development, and while this effort is centered around the new ICBM, the vast majority of cost overruns within the program aren’t related to the weapon itself. 

“It is important to remember the program that stage one, two and three of the missile have been successfully test fired already. I’m not going to say that we’ve retired every risk on the missile. But largely the issues of the missile are known issues that can be worked, and are largely okay,” he said.

The problems, it turns out, are almost entirely caused by the exploding costs of building the new missile’s command and launch facilities. While the plan is to reuse as much of the existing launch infrastructure left behind by the Minuteman III as possible, much of the communications systems, command and control infrastructure and even the launch silos themselves will need to be modernized at best and completely replaced at worst. 

Based on the Air Force’s original assessment, this will require the demolition of 45 missile alert facilities (MAF’s) in the existing silo fields, to be replaced by 45 new communications support buildings in their place, with 24 new “launch centers” constructed to support them, as well as a complete renovation of all 450 launch silos. 

The plans also call for the procurement of 62 plots of land, each roughly 5 acres in size, near existing missile fields to erect the same number of new 300-foot-tall communications towers, as well as the construction of some 3,100 miles of new utility corridors for utility lines to be housed entirely below ground, and a whole lot more. 

As of July 8, however, the Pentagon has rescinded the program’s Milestone B decision that would have allowed the Sentinel ICBM to move into the engineering and manufacturing development phase, pending a program revamp meant to keep the program at or beneath their newly projected $140.9 billion figure. Chief among these changes will be a “scaling back” of the planned launch facilities to make them smaller, simpler, and more cost-effective. 

The Air Force also fired Sentinel Systems Director, Col. Charles Clegg, at the end of June, citing a loss of confidence in his ability to lead the effort. The branch said his termination was not related to the Nunn-Mccurdy violation, but was instead because the colonel “did not follow organizational procedures.”

All told, the Air Force believes plotting out the new way forward for Sentinel may take as long as 18-24 months, and during that time, other big-ticket programs within the branch are also finding themselves in flux. The Air Force’s new air superiority fighter, being developed under the name Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD), is still expected to see a contract award this year, but senior Air Force officials have voiced uncertainty about its future, while being clear that it will have to see cost reductions — almost certainly informed by the need to pick up Sentinel’s financial slack. 

Ultimately, the LGM-35 Sentinel is still expected to enter service sometime in the 2030s, though it may be late in the decade before these new weapons finally do come online. Once they’ve finally made it into their silos, these weapons are expected to remain in service until at least the 2070s, with modular systems meant to allow for cheaper and easier updates as the years press on. 

Of course, there remains a growing chorus of dissenting opinions, with some arguing that the U.S. should simply continue to update the Minuteman III and simply reduce the total number of ICBMs kept in service to 300 or even just 100. This would allow for a continued land-based deterrent at a much lower cost, though others argue that doing so would defeat the purpose of using these sprawling missile fields as a conceptual shield for the rest of the nation, and importantly, the rest of the triad. 

Those who contend the Sentinel ICBM program is absolutely essential to America’s deterrent nuclear posture argue that it’s not just about maintaining a large number of targets for adversaries to worry about, but it’s also about distributing the focus — and the resources — of enemy states looking for ways to work around this deterrent nuclear shield. Put simply, with fewer ICBMs to worry about, Russia and China could allocate more money toward funding ways to detect or track America’s ballistic missile submarines, potentially reducing their efficacy in the long term. 

And therein lies the heart of the financial warfare that is nuclear deterrence. For the better part of a century, the United States’ greatest military asset has been a big pile of money that it can use to fuel a wide variety of defensive endeavors, but nowhere is cost a greater factor than when it comes to nuclear weapons — which are vastly expensive systems to develop, to build, and to maintain, despite having absolutely no utilitarian value beyond the threat of their use. 

While new fighters or bombers could be used in a wide variety of conventional combat operations, nuclear weapons have only two potential use cases: Holding off the end of the world, or directly causing it. 

And that makes the value of these high-dollar assets difficult to quantify. After all, there’s really no way to know how many times nuclear war has been deterred by the mere presence of America’s sprawling nuclear triad, if it truly ever has at all. But deterrence only has to fail once to change the face of our planet and civilization forever. 

And while $140 billion is a high price to pay for a few hundred missiles, some would argue that the cost of nuclear deterrence is worth it, no matter how big the price tag. 

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

In den sozialen Netzwerken wird verbreitet, Trump habe in einer Rede angekündigt, die Wahlen in den USA abzuschaffen. Eine irreführende Aussage fiel zwar - der Kontext ist aber wichtig.

Simone Biles affirme qu'elle savait qu'elle et ses coéquipières américaines remporteraient l'or olympique lorsqu'elle n'a pas eu de flash-back de Tokyo.

Summary and Key Points: China's Type 003 Fujian, the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) most advanced aircraft carrier, successfully completed its third and longest sea trial, returning to port after 25 days in the Yellow Sea.

-The Fujian, equipped with electromagnetic catapults similar to those on the U.S. Navy's USS Gerald R. Ford, is the second domestically-built Chinese carrier and the largest after U.S. supercarriers.

-The trials indicate smooth progress, with the carrier expected to enter service in 2024. China aims to have six carriers by the mid-2030s, signaling a significant enhancement of its naval capabilities.

China's Third Aircraft Carrier Completes Third Sea Trial

The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) completed the third sea trials of its Type 003 Fujian, its second domestically-built aircraft carrier – and the first to be equipped with advanced electromagnetic catapults that are employed to launch aircraft. The carrier returned to the Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai on Sunday after spending 25 days in the Yellow Sea.

The carrier's return to port was anticipated after a traffic restriction notice was issued by Shanghai's maritime safety administration on Saturday that warned a large ship was scheduled to enter the Yangtze River.

A video of the Fujian returning to port escorted by tug boats was shared on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter.

The recently completed sea trials marks the longest period the carrier has been out of port since being launched in 2022, and further serve to highlight that the PLAN's warship is slowly but surely completing its trials while is on track to enter service sometime next year. The Type 003 Fujian had previously conducted its eight-day first sea trial that began on May 1 and lasted until May 8. It was followed by a 20-day second sea trial beginning on May 23 and concluding on June 11, according to a report from the Chinese state media outlet The Global Times.

The Beijing-based news outlet cited Chinese military analyst Fu Qianshao, who said the completion of the three sea trials indicates the testing phase of the aircraft carrier is "going very smoothly." Each sea trial also includes additional tests, beginning with basic systems including the propulsion systems and the carrier's electrical systems. That has likely been expanded to the more complicated shipborne equipment, which likely includes the electromagnetic catapults.

The Type 003 Fujian is the first warship after the United States Navy's USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) to be equipped with the advanced launch system. While CVN-78 is nuclear-powered, the Fujian is still a conventionally-powered carrier – yet, it is still the 80,000-ton Chinese warship is still the largest aircraft carrier in service today after only the U.S. Navy's 10 Nimitz-class and sole Ford-class supercarriers.

China Wants 6 Aircraft Carriers to Take on U.S. Navy

The Type 003 Fujian, named after East China's Fujian Province, is expected to operate not only improved versions of the J-15 fighter jet, but also new aircraft including the next-generation stealth fighter J-35, as well as the fixed-wing early warning aircraft KJ-600, and the JL-10 advanced trainer jet. Launched in June 2022, the Type 003 Fujian completed its mooring trials, outfitting work, and equipment tests earlier this year in preparation for its sea trials.

In just over a decade, the People's Republic of China has made a great leap forward in aircraft carrier development. The PLAN's first aircraft carrier, the Type 001 Liaoning, a refurbished Soviet carrier, was commissioned in 2012. The second carrier, the Type 002 Shandong, was launched in 2017.

The PLAN has a goal of having six carriers in service by the mid-2030s, and Beijing is expected to soon reveal plans for its fourth aircraft carrier. Speculation abounds that the next carrier could be nuclear-powered, indicating that China will continue to improve its naval capabilities.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

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Telecom industry stakeholders have called on incumbent Commissioner for the Internal Market, Thierry Breton, to reconsider some of his previous stances in light of his potential reappointment for the 2024-2029 term.

A U.S. Navy Icon Takes to the Skies After a 17-Year Restoration. On their Facebook page, The Fagen Fighters WWII Museum, located in Granite Falls, Minnesota, announced they’d completed a test flight of their 17-year [...]

The post Fagen Fighters WWII Museum Flies Restored SB2C-5 Helldiver for First Time Since 1945 appeared first on The Aviationist.

Depuis le 24 juillet 2024, Simplice ESSOH, précédemment Directeur Central Développement, est le nouveau Directeur Général de SITARAIL, filiale ferroviaire d'AGL (Africa Global Logistics) qui fait partie du groupe italo-suisse MSC et opère la ligne de chemin de fer, Abidjan – Ouagadougou – Kaya, a annoncé l'entreprise dans un communiqué. Il remplace à ce poste Quentin GERARD, appelé à d'autres fonctions au sein d'AGL.

Ingénieur des Travaux publics, Simplice ESSOH est titulaire d'un DESS en Management de l'IAE Paris – Sorbonne Panthéon, d'un diplôme en suivi et évaluation de projet du CEFEB (AFD) et du Certificate of Program for Management Development (PMD) de MDE Business School d'Abidjan et IESE Business School de Barcelone. Il débute sa carrière en 1994, en tant que Chargé d'études Transport à la Direction et Contrôle des Grands Travaux (Ex DCGTx), actuel BNETD en Côte d'Ivoire.

Il rejoint SITARAIL en 2000, en tant que Responsable du trafic hydrocarbures par rail, puis occupe graduellement les fonctions de Chef du PCCC (Poste de Commandement de Coordination et de Contrôle) de 2001 à 2003, Directeur du Transport adjoint de 2003 à 2007 à Bobo Dioulasso, Directeur commercial de 2007 à 2011, Directeur du Transport de 2011 à 2016 et Directeur central en charge de l'Exploitation à partir 2016. En 2022, il est promu Directeur Central Développement. A ce poste stratégique, il a piloté l'élaboration du programme de renaissance du réseau et la mobilisation de partenaires techniques et financiers pour le financement dudit programme.

« C'est avec un sentiment de fierté que j'accueille cette nomination. J'exprime ma profonde reconnaissance au Conseil d'Administration et au TOP management du groupe AGL, avec à sa tête le Président Philippe LABONNE. Je salue également mon prédécesseur, Quentin GERARD pour le travail abattu durant ces sept dernières années à la tête de notre belle entreprise. Je mesure l'importance de la responsabilité qui est désormais la mienne, mais aussi les enjeux et attentes de nos partenaires étatiques, du personnel, de nos clients et des populations de nos deux pays. Je m'engage donc à travailler avec l'ensemble de nos parties prenantes, à la réussite de cette mission. », a indiqué Simplice ESSOH.

« J'adresse mes vives félicitations à Simplice pour sa nomination. Au regard de son parcours professionnel de près d'un quart de siècle au sein de SITARAIL à plusieurs postes de responsabilité, et de sa parfaite connaissance de l'activité ferroviaire en Côte d'Ivoire et au Burkina Faso, je suis convaincue qu'il réussira sa mission à la tête de SITARAIL. », a déclaré Asta-Rosa CISSÉ, Directrice Régionale d'AGL Côte d'Ivoire – Burkina Faso.

Quentin GERARD, Directeur Général sortant, a été, quant à lui, promu au sein de la Direction régionale d'AGL, où il aura en charge la gestion les grands projets du groupe en Côte d'Ivoire. Arrivé à la tête de l'entreprise ferroviaire en août 2017, il a su insuffler une nouvelle dynamique organisationnelle et opérationnelle aux équipes, permettant ainsi à SITARAIL de renouer avec le record du million de tonnes de marchandises transportées en 2019, après celui de 2001.

A propos de SITARAIL

SITARAIL (Société internationale de transport africain par rail) est la filiale ferroviaire d'AGL (Africa Global Logistics) qui opère, depuis août 1995, le chemin de fer reliant Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) et Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). Elle transporte en moyenne 1 000 000 de tonnes de fret chaque année. Avant l'apparition de la COVID-19, l'entreprise transportait annuellement 200 000 voyageurs. SITARAIL emploie environ 1 500 collaborateurs directs et génère 3 000 emplois indirects via des sociétés sous-traitantes. Elle constitue, grâce à son activité et à ses actions en faveur de la santé, de l'éducation et de l'environnement, un vecteur essentiel de développement socio-économique et d'intégration régionale en Afrique de l'Ouest.

Josué Bonkoungou

La Russie multiplie les exercices militaires sur son territoire avec des manœuvres navales qui ont débuté en début de semaine et qui impliquent plus de 300 navires. Depuis le mercredi 31 juillet, elle mène des exercices sur l'utilisation des armes nucléaires tactiques, la troisième étape de ces exercices qui ont commencé en mai dernier.

Alors qu’il venait de rencontrer le Guide suprême Ali Khamenei à Téhéran, Ismaël Haniyeh, le chef du bureau politique du Hamas, a été tué dans la capitale iranienne par une frappe ciblée, imputée aux services israéliens. Quelques jours après l’assassinat du numéro 2 du Hezbollah libanais, Fouad Chokr, l’armée israélienne peut se targuer d’avoir fait tomber une nouvelle tête d’un dirigeant impliqué dans les attentats du 7 octobre. Malgré les réticences de Washington et le risque d’expansion du conflit, c’est une politique offensive et militaire que Benjamin Netanyahou et son gouvernement continuent de mener après bientôt 11 mois de bombardements dans la bande de Gaza. En revanche, par ce va-tout belliqueux, Benjamin Netanyahou prend également le risque de couper court à toutes possibilités de négociations pour libérer les otages encore détenus par le Hamas.

L’analyse de Pascal Boniface