The Council:
1. WELCOMES the Commission Communication of 25 October 2016[1] on building a fair, competitive and stable corporate tax system for the Union (doc. 13729/16) and related legislative proposals;
2. RECALLS the European Council conclusions of 18 December 2014 stating the urgent need to advance efforts in the fight against tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning, both at the global and EU levels and REITERATES its commitment to principles of international taxation;
3. RECALLS its conclusions on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), adopted on 8 December 2015 (doc. 15150/15) and on the Communication from the Commission of 5 July 2016 on further measures to enhance transparency and the fight against tax evasion and avoidance of 11 October 2016 (doc. 13139/16);
4. RECOGNISES recent important achievements in the field of corporate taxation in the Union and in particular the legislation aimed at increasing tax transparency and ensuring that companies operating in the European Union pay taxes where profits are generated;
5. REAFFIRMS the importance of continuing to promote tax good governance in the EU's relations with international partners to ensure an effective level-playing field between the Member States of the EU and third States;
6. ENDORSES the view that the EU tax environment could benefit from a forward-looking framework for corporate taxation that is growth-friendly and efficient, fair and effective in tackling aggressive tax planning practices, without prejudice to Member States' competence in these matters;
7. UNDERLINES the importance of having corporate tax rules which offer stability, legal certainty and administrative simplification to large companies as well as small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and, in the light of this, WELCOMES further discussion on the proposal on a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) and on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB);
8. NOTES the two step approach proposed by the Commission concerning the proposals on a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) and on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) and SUPPORTS the view that work should focus as a priority on the elements of a common tax base;
9. TAKES NOTE of the incentives for research and development, and innovation as well as investment incentives at EU level proposed by the Commission and INVITES Member States to continue discussion on assessing the need and the added value of the elements proposed on this matter;
10. CONCURS that current international tax rules can, in some cases, lead to double taxation and double non-taxation that should be eliminated through coordinated EU measures and Acknowledges that there is a need to review existing dispute resolution mechanisms to enhance tax certainty for business in the EU;
11. Therefore LOOKS FORWARD to the examination of the proposal for a Double Taxation Dispute Resolution Mechanism in the European Union for businesses in the EU;
12. NOTES the ambitious timeline proposed by the Commission in the proposals on CCTB, CCCTB and Double Taxation Dispute Resolution Mechanism, and CALLS FOR swift progress on the examination of these legislative files;
13. INVITES incoming Presidencies to sequence the work on the CCTB and CCCTB proposals along the lines of the following:
(a) As a start, Member States should concentrate their efforts on the rules for calculating the tax base and, in particular, on the new elements of the relaunched initiative (chapters I to V);
(b) Member States should then concentrate on the remaining elements of the common base (chapters VI to XI), that is: i) those that have already been extensively discussed under the 2011 proposal for a CCCTB, and ii) those that are included in the recently adopted Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market;
(c) Tax consolidation should be examined without delay once the discussion on these elements has been successfully concluded;
14. RECALLS its statement on hybrid mismatches at the Council (ECOFIN) meeting on 12 July 2016, and therefore WELCOMES the proposal amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries;
15. ACKNOWLEDGES that these initiatives may contribute to building a fair, competitive and stable corporate tax system for the EU.
[1] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 25 October 2016 on building a fair, competitive and stable corporate tax system for the EU (doc. 13729/16).
Macédoine : branle-bas de combat avant les élections du 11 décembre
Macédoine : l'opposition ratisse large pour la bataille des législatives
Macédoine : la course aux législatives est (re)lancée, que peut-on espérer ?
Macédoine : les Albanais du BDI claquent la porte du gouvernement... et y reviennent aussitôt
Albanais de Macédoine : victoire sur commande pour le BDI d'Ali Ahmeti
Macédoine : un meeting du BDI dégénère à deux jours des élections
Macédoine : branle-bas de combat avant les élections du 11 décembre
Macédoine : l'opposition ratisse large pour la bataille des législatives
Macédoine : la course aux législatives est (re)lancée, que peut-on espérer ?
Macédoine : les Albanais du BDI claquent la porte du gouvernement... et y reviennent aussitôt
Albanais de Macédoine : victoire sur commande pour le BDI d'Ali Ahmeti
Macédoine : un meeting du BDI dégénère à deux jours des élections
Shortly after the UK referendum, EU leaders met Western Balkan leaders in Paris. The EU message was clear: enlargement would continue as usual. But in the Balkans, fears abound that their region may slip off the radar, as the EU gets mired in the unprecedented task of British withdrawal.These fears accurately reflect the relationship between the EU and its Balkan partners. Balkan countries want EU membership, but the driver of change is still the EU.
Europeanisation in the Western Balkans has been equated with building regional peace and stability. The EU made integration conditional on cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), tackled the region’s political and economic fragmentation through a policy of regional cooperation, and took the lead resolving outstanding conflicts, such as over
Kosovo. Yet Croatia is the only Western Balkan nation to reach the final destination, leaving five countries – all at different stages of integration – now making up a non-EU enclave inside the EU. The Balkan states’ long road to the EU suggests a need for vigilance of two risks: benign neglect and geopolitics.
Political declarations by local elites favouring European integration haven’t necessarily been accompanied by deeds. The political vision is not yet a reality. Countries have shied away from implementing EU laws, causing delays in visible improvements to people’s lives. In recent years, months and weeks, people in all five Balkan countries outside of the EU have held public protests over poor governance, corruption and abuse of the law. Their ire has been directed at local political elites, but the risk is that it may also damage trust in the European project’s ability to improve their societies. The EU’s biggest ally in the Balkans is the people who demand the rule of law and a better quality of life. That is why the EU shouldn’t allow Brexit to divert its attention from the Balkans. Benign neglect may allow elites to subvert the European project permanently by eroding popular attraction to a future in the EU.
The related risk of Brexit for the Western Balkans is the ascendance of geopolitics. European integration as a political project is based on the idea of interconnectivity, and the conception of power
as cooperation. Europeanisation of the Western Balkans entails forging political, economic and cultural connections with the EU, as well as between Balkan states. But the geopolitical outlook is its
antithesis – all about going it alone, and the conception of power as a threat. The Balkans has been a geopolitical battleground throughout history, and its position as a non-EU enclave within the EU makes it particularly conducive to the logic of competition and protection. Russia and Turkey have each stamped their mark on the region while the EU tries to exercise its magic power of
attraction and transformation. But unlike the EU’s vision, which is future- and norms-orientated, Russia and Turkey have drawn on historic links reinforced by religious affinities. Russia appeals to
the idea of Slavic brotherhood – a notion that resonates with large sections of the population in the Christian Orthodox areas. Turkey is seen as a natural guardian of fellow Muslims.
Russia and Turkey’s economic investments in the region have been on the increase, but they are still dwarfed by those of the EU. But this fact barely affects popular perceptions that Russia and Turkey can better understand – and possibly better protect – people’s interests.
Such sentiments persist despite Russia’s use of the Balkans to assert its own position towards the West. Russia has been seen to deliver when Serb nationalist interests are at stake. Its opposition to Kosovo’s independence in the UN is only one example. Brexit has been embraced by nationalists in the region, who interpret the UK’s departure from the EU as a blow to interconnectedness and a vindication of their Euroscepticism. Brexit leaves open the risk that both Russia and Turkey may increasingly provide a vision of an alternative future, exposing the region to open geopolitical competition.
If Brexit forces the EU’s Balkan involvement to stall, the critics will have a field day. They already say that Europeanisation has created weak states that are producers of instability and insecurity,
through illegal people trafficking and trade, organised crime and the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism. But EU membership is a goal that continues to unite all Balkan states despite their divisions
– both within states and between neighbours. In the post-Brexit climate, the EU needs to step up its engagement. Alternative visions for a non-EU future for the Balkans are as perilous for the security of the region as they are for the EU.
IMAGE CREDIT: F. De la Mure/MAEDI
The post Brexit’s twin risks for the Balkans appeared first on Europe’s World.
La fin de la guerre froide n’a-t-elle été qu’un événement stratégique et géopolitique majeur ? Ce fut aussi un fait économique de toute première importance : la fin de l’un des deux systèmes économiques en cours à ce moment-là. C’était la fin de l’histoire, la preuve pour beaucoup de dirigeants occidentaux de la pertinence du système capitaliste donc des valeurs qui le fondent, en tête desquelles se trouve le libéralisme. Les choix politiques libéraux qui avaient été initiés à partir de la fin des années 1960 puis dans les années 1970 et 80 s’en trouvaient plus que jamais légitimés. Le consensus de Washington (1) en 1994 universalisait cet ultralibéralisme et ouvrait la voie à une dérégulation généralisée.
Vingt-quatre ans plus tard, c’était LA crise, une crise financière majeure, et les mêmes qui avaient œuvré pour la dérégulation se mirent à réclamer des règles nouvelles et des interventions politiques fortes afin d’éviter le pire. La question fut posée de savoir si l’ultralibéralisme avait vécu, et ce, d’autant plus qu’au-delà de la crise en elle-même, cette dernière mettait plus en évidence que jamais les effets pervers des choix faits trente ans plus tôt : la montée des inégalités, une dépendance extrême à la croissance économique et des conséquences environnementales inquiétantes. Les mouvements contestataires se multiplièrent partout dans le monde, les votes devinrent de plus en plus populistes, extrêmes, aujourd’hui imprévisibles, traduisant une volonté de changement et le rejet de la mondialisation ultralibérale.
Est-ce que, pour autant, le paysage politique qui se dessine actuellement apportera des réponses et apaisera les tensions ? Rien n’est moins sûr, à court terme dans tous les cas. L’élection de Donald Trump, comme le choix du Brexit pour le Royaume-Uni, ou, plus récemment en France, le score de François Fillon aux primaires de la droite ont surpris nombre d’observateurs ; le dire constitue une banalité. Beaucoup ont parlé de déni pour expliquer les erreurs des sondeurs et des analystes de toute nature. Ils ont probablement raison.
Les économistes en ont également pris pour leur grade, accusés de soutenir que le libre-échange a du bon et de refuser de voir ou d’intégrer dans leurs modèles les effets pervers de la mondialisation. Ils n’auraient pas pris toute la mesure des inégalités, du déclassement et du mal-être ambiant. C’est vrai qu’il y a eu, là aussi, une sorte de déni qui était fondé sur l’idée qu’au fond en entraînant la croissance et un développement économique plus universel que jamais, tous les individus en profiteraient à un moment ou à un autre, d’une manière ou d’une autre.
La principale erreur de jugement des économistes est de n’avoir pas su identifier et interpréter le ressenti des individus dans ce contexte : celui d’un sentiment d’injustice profond créé par les inégalités et qui se révèle plus fort que celui suscité par la pauvreté. Ce phénomène n’est pas statistique et c’est pour cette raison que les statistiques ne viennent pas corroborer le ressenti des individus : le déclassement, par exemple, n’est pas une réalité sauf pour une minorité.
Une autre erreur réside dans l’appréciation de la concurrence. Dans la mondialisation libérale, la concurrence s’est immiscée partout entre les individus, les travailleurs, les entreprises, certes, mais aussi les pays ou les régions. Elle redéfinit la valeur de tout au plus grand profit du consommateur, consommateur dont les besoins ne sont jamais totalement satisfaits, et qui par définition, finit par en être frustré ! Cette concurrence, devenue globale, est une échelle probablement plus juste que les privilèges dus à son nom, à son lieu de naissance ou à son origine sociale. Pour autant, elle rétrograde voire marginalise ceux dont les compétences ne sont plus au top niveau parce qu’ils n’ont pas de diplômes ou n’ont pas réussi à s’adapter.
Enfin, la contestation est aussi nourrie par l’incapacité des politiques à améliorer une situation, à régler les problèmes. Il est vrai que la mondialisation réduit les marges de manœuvre des pouvoirs publics et, dans le même temps, l’efficacité des politiques publiques. Cependant, elle n’empêche pas de lutter contre l’argent sale, la corruption, les paradis fiscaux et les trafics en tout genre, phénomènes d’autant plus choquants qu’ils amplifient encore les inégalités…
C’est tout cela qui est exprimé par les votes ou les refus de voter des électeurs. Pour autant, et c’est là tout le paradoxe des urnes aujourd’hui, les programmes ne garantissent en rien qu’on va vraiment régler ces problèmes. À court terme tout au moins, les baisses d’impôts annoncées par M. Trump seront favorables aux plus aisés, quand le protectionnisme augmentera certainement les prix donc pénalisera les plus pauvres… Une chose est sûre, par contre, la mondialisation si contestée n’en sera que plus affectée, les pays du Nord se repliant toujours plus sur eux-mêmes. Le pari fait par les politiques de ces pays est que dans un deuxième temps, cela leur rendra leurs marges de manœuvre et relancera leur économie, l’emploi et le pouvoir d’achat. Ce pari repose toutefois sur un élément qu’ils ne maîtrisent pas, la capacité des pays du Sud, Chine en tête, à stimuler leur propre consommation pour éviter une nouvelle crise mondiale.
The Council (ECOFIN) adopted the following conclusions:
A number of positive developments in the EU since the global economic and financial crisis signal the resilience and recovery of the European economy. All Member States' economies are growing again, investment has started to pick up and 8 million new jobs have been created since 2013. However, since the global economic and financial crisis, the level of investment in the EU has fallen substantially. Economic recovery, job creation, long-term growth and competitiveness are being hampered as a result. In this context the Investment Plan for Europe presented in November 2014 aims to address this low investment via three mutually reinforcing pillars: mobilising private finance for investment; targeted initiatives to ensure investment reaches the real economy and improving the investment environment by removing sector specific and other barriers to investment.
Under the first pillar, the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI) is expected to have already mobilised total investment of 154bn euros. The European investment Advisory Hub, which constitutes the second pillar, together with the European Investment Project Portal, has been active since September 2015 and has been providing advice to projects in a majority of the Member States. Furthermore, the Council RECOGNISES aggregate demand as a driver of investment and CONSIDERS that in order to unlock the full potential of the opportunities provided by the Investment Plan, and to mobilise its full multiplier effect, relevant and appropriate measures including structural reforms to remove barriers to investment under the so-called "third pillar" of the plan are critical. This requires implementing an ambitious agenda to further strengthen the Single Market, providing greater regulatory predictability and removing remaining bottlenecks to investment through combined actions at EU and at Member State level. Against this background, the Council WELCOMES the work conducted by the Economic Policy Committee, in cooperation with services of the Commission and the European Investment Bank to identify bottlenecks to investment.
The Council STRESSES that completing the Single Market is essential for the delivery and success of the objectives of the Investment Plan for Europe. Europe needs a regulatory environment which is predictable, reduces administrative burdens and encourages investment and needs to actively work to achieve these conditions. Favourable framework conditions for businesses across the Single Market are essential to unlock the full potential of investment. To this end the Council WELCOMES the Commission´s efforts to improve Europe´s investment environment and facilitate the financing of the real economy and CALLS on the Commission to continue with these efforts in the context of the Energy Union, the Capital Markets Union, the Single Market Strategy for Goods and Services, the Digital Single Market Strategy, the Better Regulation Agenda, as well as the Circular Economy package. The Council NOTES the Commission's legislative proposal amending Directive 2012/30/EU on insolvency procedures which will be assessed as a matter of priority.
The Council STRESSES that further progress towards increasing investment in Europe, and the success of the Investment Plan are strongly contingent on the implementation of structural reforms to address bottlenecks to investment identified under the third pillar but, as noted by Council in July 2016, progress on improving the investment environment has been insufficient so far.
In light of the work carried out so far, the Council HIGHLIGHTS the following specific bottlenecks to investment:
The Council TAKES NOTE of the bottlenecks to investment identified by this work and INVITES the Commission to consider these findings into further draft recommendations in the framework of the European Semester and INVITES Member States to fully implement the 2016 Council Country Specific Recommendations issued under the European Semester and particularly those identifying investment bottlenecks.
The Council HIGHLIGHTS the need to continue the work on identifying the barriers to investment and INVITES the Economic Policy Committee to continue its thematic work to identify further investment bottlenecks and best policy practices to address them. Furthermore, the Council INVITES the European Investment Bank to complement the work of the Economic Policy Committee through its findings on barriers and bottlenecks to investment identified when carrying out its market-based activities, notably under the Investment Plan for Europe.
Turkey is a candidate country for EU membership following the Helsinki European Council of December 1999. Accession negotiations started in October 2005. Turkey’s accession process is set to move forward with the opening of a new chapter on financial and budgetary provisions on 30 June 2016.