Feed aggregator

The Council: 

1.           WELCOMES the Commission Communication of 25 October 2016[1] on building a fair, competitive and stable corporate tax system for the Union (doc. 13729/16) and related legislative proposals; 

2.           RECALLS the European Council conclusions of 18 December 2014 stating the urgent need to advance efforts in the fight against tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning, both at the global and EU levels and REITERATES its commitment to principles of international taxation; 

3.           RECALLS its conclusions on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), adopted on 8 December 2015 (doc. 15150/15) and on the Communication from the Commission of 5 July 2016 on further measures to enhance transparency and the fight against tax evasion and avoidance of 11 October 2016 (doc. 13139/16); 

4.           RECOGNISES recent important achievements in the field of corporate taxation in the Union and in particular the legislation aimed at increasing tax transparency and ensuring that companies operating in the European Union pay taxes where profits are generated; 

5.           REAFFIRMS the importance of continuing to promote tax good governance in the EU's relations with international partners to ensure an effective level-playing field between the Member States of the EU and third States; 

6.           ENDORSES the view that the EU tax environment could benefit from a forward-looking framework for corporate taxation that is growth-friendly and efficient, fair and effective in tackling aggressive tax planning practices, without prejudice to Member States' competence in these matters; 

7.          UNDERLINES the importance of having corporate tax rules which offer stability, legal certainty and administrative simplification to large companies as well as small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and, in the light of this, WELCOMES further discussion on the proposal on a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) and on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB); 

8.           NOTES the  two step approach proposed by the Commission concerning the proposals on a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) and on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) and SUPPORTS the view that work should focus as a priority on the elements of a common tax base; 

9.           TAKES NOTE of the incentives for research and development, and innovation as well as investment incentives at EU level proposed by the Commission and INVITES Member States to continue discussion on assessing the need and the  added value of the elements proposed on this matter; 

10.        CONCURS that current international tax rules can, in some cases, lead to double taxation and double non-taxation that should be eliminated through coordinated EU measures and Acknowledges that there is a need to review existing dispute resolution mechanisms to enhance tax certainty for business in the EU; 

11.        Therefore LOOKS FORWARD to the examination of the proposal for a Double Taxation Dispute Resolution Mechanism in the European Union for businesses in the EU; 

12.        NOTES the ambitious timeline proposed by the Commission in  the proposals on CCTB, CCCTB and Double Taxation Dispute Resolution Mechanism, and CALLS FOR swift progress on the examination of these legislative files; 

13.        INVITES incoming Presidencies to sequence the work on the CCTB and CCCTB proposals along the lines of the following: 

(a)     As a start, Member States should concentrate their efforts on the rules for calculating the tax base and, in particular, on the new elements of the relaunched initiative (chapters I to V); 

(b)     Member States should then concentrate on the remaining elements of the common base (chapters VI to XI), that is: i) those that have already been extensively discussed under the 2011 proposal for a CCCTB, and ii) those that are included in the recently adopted Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market; 

(c)     Tax consolidation should be examined without delay once the discussion on these elements has been successfully concluded; 

14.        RECALLS its statement on hybrid mismatches at the Council (ECOFIN) meeting on 12 July 2016, and therefore WELCOMES the proposal amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries; 

15.        ACKNOWLEDGES that these initiatives may contribute to building a fair, competitive and stable corporate tax system for the EU. 

 [1]         Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 25 October 2016 on building a fair, competitive and stable corporate tax system for the EU (doc. 13729/16). 

Brüssel drängt die Regierung in London dazu, einen Termin für das geplante EU-Austrittsgesuch zu nennen.

On the second day of closing statements at Ratko Mladic’s trial, the prosecution said the former Bosnian Serb military chief praised and promoted officers involved in ethnic cleansing and murder.

Macédoine : branle-bas de combat avant les élections du 11 décembre
Macédoine : l'opposition ratisse large pour la bataille des législatives
Macédoine : la course aux législatives est (re)lancée, que peut-on espérer ?
Macédoine : les Albanais du BDI claquent la porte du gouvernement... et y reviennent aussitôt
Albanais de Macédoine : victoire sur commande pour le BDI d'Ali Ahmeti
Macédoine : un meeting du BDI dégénère à deux jours des élections

/ Dérive autoritaire en Macédoine, Courrier des Balkans, Macédoine, Politique intérieure

Macédoine : branle-bas de combat avant les élections du 11 décembre
Macédoine : l'opposition ratisse large pour la bataille des législatives
Macédoine : la course aux législatives est (re)lancée, que peut-on espérer ?
Macédoine : les Albanais du BDI claquent la porte du gouvernement... et y reviennent aussitôt
Albanais de Macédoine : victoire sur commande pour le BDI d'Ali Ahmeti
Macédoine : un meeting du BDI dégénère à deux jours des élections

/ Dérive autoritaire en Macédoine, Courrier des Balkans, Macédoine, Politique intérieure

(B2) Après avoir formé huit bataillons de l'armée, EUTM Mali a entamé son tournant. Le commandant de la mission européenne, le général belge Eric Harvent, détaille pour B2 les différents évolutions. Au menu : le ré-entraînement des bataillons formés et leur évaluation, les écoles militaires maliennes, les formations spécialisées et le projet de soutien médical […]

Marking the 25th anniversary of the Yugoslav People’s Army attack on the Croatian port town of Dubrovnik, rights groups urged the authorities to prosecute Montenegrins who participated in it.

Bonn, 6 December 2016. From 28 November to 1 December, several thousand people gathered in Nairobi for the second High-Level Meeting (HLM) of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC). The first meeting was held in Mexico City 18 months ago. The question is: was the second meeting a success? Size doesn’t matter: in search of a narrative If the length of the outcome document may be taken as a gauge of success, the Nairobi HLM was indeed fairly successful. The document devotes a total of 23 pages (40 even, including the annex) to highlighting the commitments made at the meeting. However, it is hard to pinpoint any commitments that might require clear follow-up processes. The actors commit to hardly any concrete, measurable next steps. It would be difficult for any development cooperation provider or partner country to design a concrete follow-up process based on the outcome of the HLM. At the same time, there is a need for a global platform on effective development cooperation. Indeed, the GPEDC’s rationale remains fully valid: “The Global Partnership (…) seeks to maximize the effectiveness and impact of all forms of cooperation for development” (Outcome document, p. 1).  It sees its role as contributing to the UN High Level Political Forum (HLPF), which is the main platform for follow-up action on the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development. Thus, the GPEDC’s most important role is:

1. to set standards for all development cooperation actors;
2. to monitor the implementation of these standards.

Both of these are needed. Both have yet to come. Perceptions have an impact The GPEDC’s most important innovation is its multi-stakeholder approach. In fact, it includes all relevant actors such as members of parliament, civil-society organisations, the private sector, think tanks and academics, in addition to government representatives. Yes, all these actors raised their voices and yes, they were heard. And for sure, the GPEDC does not follow the overly balanced, diplomatic approaches adopted by a number of UN platforms. In other words, at least the non-plenary sessions and side-events provided scope for creative and controversial – and often constructive – debate. However, even though all countries were invited to attend the HLM, several governments preferred not to attend or just to be present as observers. As was the case at the first HLM in Mexico City, Brazil, China and India did not show up. South Africa also decided not to attend the HLM on its own continent. As in 2014, this sensitive issue was not a topic on the main agenda of the plenary session, but was discussed in side-events where think tank representatives from all the above countries helped to foster a better understanding of their respective reasons for not attending. The absence of four of the five BRICS, i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (only Russia attended), is a clear signal and has had a big impact on the ‘global nature’ of the partnership. So why did a number of emerging powers decide to stay away? There are likely to have been two main perceptions. Perception one: the GPEDC is still considered as OECD-driven and several emerging powers do not recognise the GPEDC as a legitimate platform for debating global development. Perception two: the fact that the GPEDC is facilitated jointly by UNDP and the OECD means that there is a good basis for a widely accepted platform. However, the problem might rather be a limited degree of willingness to bring in more transparency and accountability for South-South cooperation. Leadership aspects Most of the preparatory work for the Nairobi HLM was done by the three co-chairs from Malawi, Mexico and the Netherlands. As planned, the three co-chairs will now rotate for the next two years. Uganda will act as the representative of ‘recipients of development co-operation’; Bangladesh will represent ‘recipients and providers of development co-operation’; and Germany will be the representative of ‘providers of development co-operation’. Informal discussions revealed that a number of actors are in favour of proactive co-chairs who might seek to pursue an intensive dialogue with emerging powers about their views on the future of the GPEDC. There is also a need to link up more closely with UN processes (including the HLPF and the Financing for Development activities). Based on the discussions about the outcome document, the GPEDC’s steering committee might approve the establishment of a non-executive co-chair position for a non-state representative of a broad spectrum of constituencies including civil-society organisations, trade unions, local governments, parliaments, philanthropy and the private sector. The way ahead In our view, the case needs to be made for a global platform in charge of standards for development cooperation, including South-South cooperation and the OECD’s Official Development Assistance. It is pretty clear what homework needs to be done first:

• the GPEDC’s narrative needs to be more specific;
• an open, serious dialogue with emerging powers about their perceptions and positions is long overdue.

Stephan Klingebiel is the head of the Bilateral and Multilateral Development Cooperation Department at the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut for Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), a regular visiting professor at Stanford University and a senior lecturer at the Philipps University Marburg. Li Xiaoyun is a professor and former dean of China Agricultural University’s College of Humanities and Development, the president of the China International Development Research Network (CIDRN) and the chairman of the Network of Southern Think-Tanks (NeST).

Enlevé très jeune dans le nord de l'Ouganda par la LRA, Dominic Ongwen, enfant soldat devenu chef de guerre, est aujourd'hui jugé devant la CPI pour crimes contre l'humanité commis au sein de cette milice sanguinaire.

Shortly after the UK referendum, EU leaders met Western Balkan leaders in Paris. The EU message was clear: enlargement would continue as usual. But in the Balkans, fears abound that their region may slip off the radar, as the EU gets mired in the unprecedented task of British withdrawal.These fears accurately reflect the relationship between the EU and its Balkan partners. Balkan countries want EU membership, but the driver of change is still the EU.

Europeanisation in the Western Balkans has been equated with building regional peace and stability. The EU made integration conditional on cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), tackled the region’s political and economic fragmentation through a policy of regional cooperation, and took the lead resolving outstanding conflicts, such as over
Kosovo. Yet Croatia is the only Western Balkan nation to reach the final destination, leaving five countries – all at different stages of integration – now making up a non-EU enclave inside the EU. The Balkan states’ long road to the EU suggests a need for vigilance of two risks: benign neglect and geopolitics.

Political declarations by local elites favouring European integration haven’t necessarily been accompanied by deeds. The political vision is not yet a reality. Countries have shied away from implementing EU laws, causing delays in visible improvements to people’s lives. In recent years, months and weeks, people in all five Balkan countries outside of the EU have held public protests over poor governance, corruption and abuse of the law. Their ire has been directed at local political elites, but the risk is that it may also damage trust in the European project’s ability to improve their societies. The EU’s biggest ally in the Balkans is the people who demand the rule of law and a better quality of life. That is why the EU shouldn’t allow Brexit to divert its attention from the Balkans. Benign neglect may allow elites to subvert the European project permanently by eroding popular attraction to a future in the EU.

The related risk of Brexit for the Western Balkans is the ascendance of geopolitics. European integration as a political project is based on the idea of interconnectivity, and the conception of power
as cooperation. Europeanisation of the Western Balkans entails forging political, economic and cultural connections with the EU, as well as between Balkan states. But the geopolitical outlook is its
antithesis – all about going it alone, and the conception of power as a threat. The Balkans has been a geopolitical battleground throughout history, and its position as a non-EU enclave within the EU makes it particularly conducive to the logic of competition and protection. Russia and Turkey have each stamped their mark on the region while the EU tries to exercise its magic power of
attraction and transformation. But unlike the EU’s vision, which is future- and norms-orientated, Russia and Turkey have drawn on historic links reinforced by religious affinities. Russia appeals to
the idea of Slavic brotherhood – a notion that resonates with large sections of the population in the Christian Orthodox areas. Turkey is seen as a natural guardian of fellow Muslims.

Russia and Turkey’s economic investments in the region have been on the increase, but they are still dwarfed by those of the EU. But this fact barely affects popular perceptions that Russia and Turkey can better understand – and possibly better protect – people’s interests.

Such sentiments persist despite Russia’s use of the Balkans to assert its own position towards the West. Russia has been seen to deliver when Serb nationalist interests are at stake. Its opposition to Kosovo’s independence in the UN is only one example. Brexit has been embraced by nationalists in the region, who interpret the UK’s departure from the EU as a blow to interconnectedness and a vindication of their Euroscepticism. Brexit leaves open the risk that both Russia and Turkey may increasingly provide a vision of an alternative future, exposing the region to open geopolitical competition.

If Brexit forces the EU’s Balkan involvement to stall, the critics will have a field day. They already say that Europeanisation has created weak states that are producers of instability and insecurity,
through illegal people trafficking and trade, organised crime and the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism. But EU membership is a goal that continues to unite all Balkan states despite their divisions
– both within states and between neighbours. In the post-Brexit climate, the EU needs to step up its engagement. Alternative visions for a non-EU future for the Balkans are as perilous for the security of the region as they are for the EU.

IMAGE CREDIT: F. De la Mure/MAEDI

The post Brexit’s twin risks for the Balkans appeared first on Europe’s World.

  Alors que Manuel Valls s’est déclaré hier candidat à l’Elysée avec la volonté de contenir l’influence de son ancien ministre de l’Economie dans l’électorat socialiste, le livre que vient de publier ce dernier est d’une médiocrité affligeante. Pompeusement intitulé « Révolution », le livre d’Emmanuel Macron se décline en 16 chapitres dans le but de nous apprendre à mieux connaître le candidat et ses quelques idées. Cela donne notamment : « Ce que je suis », « Ce que je crois », « Ce que nous sommes » et plus loin « Réconcilier les France », puis « Vouloir la France ».

La fin de la guerre froide n’a-t-elle été qu’un événement stratégique et géopolitique majeur ? Ce fut aussi un fait économique de toute première importance : la fin de l’un des deux systèmes économiques en cours à ce moment-là. C’était la fin de l’histoire, la preuve pour beaucoup de dirigeants occidentaux de la pertinence du système capitaliste donc des valeurs qui le fondent, en tête desquelles se trouve le libéralisme. Les choix politiques libéraux qui avaient été initiés à partir de la fin des années 1960 puis dans les années 1970 et 80 s’en trouvaient plus que jamais légitimés. Le consensus de Washington (1) en 1994 universalisait cet ultralibéralisme et ouvrait la voie à une dérégulation généralisée.

Vingt-quatre ans plus tard, c’était LA crise, une crise financière majeure, et les mêmes qui avaient œuvré pour la dérégulation se mirent à réclamer des règles nouvelles et des interventions politiques fortes afin d’éviter le pire. La question fut posée de savoir si l’ultralibéralisme avait vécu, et ce, d’autant plus qu’au-delà de la crise en elle-même, cette dernière mettait plus en évidence que jamais les effets pervers des choix faits trente ans plus tôt : la montée des inégalités, une dépendance extrême à la croissance économique et des conséquences environnementales inquiétantes. Les mouvements contestataires se multiplièrent partout dans le monde, les votes devinrent de plus en plus populistes, extrêmes, aujourd’hui imprévisibles, traduisant une volonté de changement et le rejet de la mondialisation ultralibérale.

Est-ce que, pour autant, le paysage politique qui se dessine actuellement apportera des réponses et apaisera les tensions ? Rien n’est moins sûr, à court terme dans tous les cas. L’élection de Donald Trump, comme le choix du Brexit pour le Royaume-Uni, ou, plus récemment en France, le score de François Fillon aux primaires de la droite ont surpris nombre d’observateurs ; le dire constitue une banalité. Beaucoup ont parlé de déni pour expliquer les erreurs des sondeurs et des analystes de toute nature. Ils ont probablement raison.

Les économistes en ont également pris pour leur grade, accusés de soutenir que le libre-échange a du bon et de refuser de voir ou d’intégrer dans leurs modèles les effets pervers de la mondialisation. Ils n’auraient pas pris toute la mesure des inégalités, du déclassement et du mal-être ambiant. C’est vrai qu’il y a eu, là aussi, une sorte de déni qui était fondé sur l’idée qu’au fond en entraînant la croissance et un développement économique plus universel que jamais, tous les individus en profiteraient à un moment ou à un autre, d’une manière ou d’une autre.

La principale erreur de jugement des économistes est de n’avoir pas su identifier et interpréter le ressenti des individus dans ce contexte : celui d’un sentiment d’injustice profond créé par les inégalités et qui se révèle plus fort que celui suscité par la pauvreté. Ce phénomène n’est pas statistique et c’est pour cette raison que les statistiques ne viennent pas corroborer le ressenti des individus : le déclassement, par exemple, n’est pas une réalité sauf pour une minorité.

Une autre erreur réside dans l’appréciation de la concurrence. Dans la mondialisation libérale, la concurrence s’est immiscée partout entre les individus, les travailleurs, les entreprises, certes, mais aussi les pays ou les régions. Elle redéfinit la valeur de tout au plus grand profit du consommateur, consommateur dont les besoins ne sont jamais totalement satisfaits, et qui par définition, finit par en être frustré ! Cette concurrence, devenue globale, est une échelle probablement plus juste que les privilèges dus à son nom, à son lieu de naissance ou à son origine sociale. Pour autant, elle rétrograde voire marginalise ceux dont les compétences ne sont plus au top niveau parce qu’ils n’ont pas de diplômes ou n’ont pas réussi à s’adapter.

Enfin, la contestation est aussi nourrie par l’incapacité des politiques à améliorer une situation, à régler les problèmes. Il est vrai que la mondialisation réduit les marges de manœuvre des pouvoirs publics et, dans le même temps, l’efficacité des politiques publiques. Cependant, elle n’empêche pas de lutter contre l’argent sale, la corruption, les paradis fiscaux et les trafics en tout genre, phénomènes d’autant plus choquants qu’ils amplifient encore les inégalités…

C’est tout cela qui est exprimé par les votes ou les refus de voter des électeurs. Pour autant, et c’est là tout le paradoxe des urnes aujourd’hui, les programmes ne garantissent en rien qu’on va vraiment régler ces problèmes. À court terme tout au moins, les baisses d’impôts annoncées par M. Trump seront favorables aux plus aisés, quand le protectionnisme augmentera certainement les prix donc pénalisera les plus pauvres… Une chose est sûre, par contre, la mondialisation si contestée n’en sera que plus affectée, les pays du Nord se repliant toujours plus sur eux-mêmes. Le pari fait par les politiques de ces pays est que dans un deuxième temps, cela leur rendra leurs marges de manœuvre et relancera leur économie, l’emploi et le pouvoir d’achat. Ce pari repose toutefois sur un élément qu’ils ne maîtrisent pas, la capacité des pays du Sud, Chine en tête, à stimuler leur propre consommation pour éviter une nouvelle crise mondiale.

Alors que Bruno Le Roux arrive au gouvernement au poste de ministre de l'Intérieur, Jean-Marie le Guen et André Vallini s'échangent leurs postes respectifs de secrétaire d'État chargé des relations avec le Parlement et de secrétaire d'État chargé du Développement et de la Francophonie.

Difficile de faire plus loyal et fidèle à François Hollande que Bruno Le Roux. Début novembre, sur son site officiel, le président du groupe socialiste à l'Assemblée nationale défendait sans l'ombre d'une...

The Council (ECOFIN) adopted the following conclusions: 

A number of positive developments in the EU since the global economic and financial crisis signal the resilience and recovery of the European economy. All Member States' economies are growing again, investment has started to pick up and 8 million new jobs have been created since 2013. However, since the global economic and financial crisis, the level of investment in the EU has fallen substantially. Economic recovery, job creation, long-term growth and competitiveness are being hampered as a result. In this context the Investment Plan for Europe presented in November 2014 aims to address this low investment via three mutually reinforcing pillars: mobilising private finance for investment; targeted initiatives to ensure investment reaches the real economy and improving the investment environment by removing sector specific and other barriers to investment. 

Under the first pillar, the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI) is expected to have already mobilised total investment of 154bn euros. The European investment Advisory Hub, which constitutes the second pillar, together with the European Investment Project Portal, has been active since September 2015 and has been providing advice to projects in a majority of the Member States. Furthermore, the Council RECOGNISES aggregate demand as a driver of investment and CONSIDERS that in order to unlock the full potential of the opportunities provided by the Investment Plan, and to mobilise its full multiplier effect, relevant and appropriate measures including structural reforms to remove barriers to investment under the so-called "third pillar" of the plan are critical. This requires implementing an ambitious agenda to further strengthen the Single Market, providing greater regulatory predictability and removing remaining bottlenecks to investment through combined actions at EU and at Member State level. Against this background, the Council WELCOMES the work conducted by the Economic Policy Committee, in cooperation with services of the Commission and the European Investment Bank to identify bottlenecks to investment. 

The Council STRESSES that completing the Single Market is essential for the delivery and success of the objectives of the Investment Plan for Europe. Europe needs a regulatory environment which is predictable, reduces administrative burdens and encourages investment and needs to actively work to achieve these conditions. Favourable framework conditions for businesses across the Single Market are essential to unlock the full potential of investment. To this end the Council WELCOMES the Commission´s efforts to improve Europe´s investment environment and facilitate the financing of the real economy and CALLS on the Commission to continue with these efforts in the context of the Energy Union, the Capital Markets Union, the Single Market Strategy for Goods and Services, the Digital Single Market Strategy, the Better Regulation Agenda, as well as the Circular Economy package. The Council NOTES the Commission's legislative proposal amending Directive 2012/30/EU on insolvency procedures which will be assessed as a matter of priority. 

The Council STRESSES that further progress towards increasing investment in Europe, and the success of the Investment Plan are strongly contingent on the implementation of structural reforms to address bottlenecks to investment identified under the third pillar but, as noted by Council in July 2016, progress on improving the investment environment has been insufficient so far. 

In light of the work carried out so far, the Council HIGHLIGHTS the following specific bottlenecks to investment:   

• The most frequent barriers to investment are for example related to an unfavourable business environment, inefficiencies in public administration, frequent changes to regulation, market size and structure, and high sector-specific administrative and regulatory burdens. In some countries, access to finance particularly for SMEs, complex taxation systems and/or a high level of capital taxation, distortions in product and labour markets, and weaknesses in research and innovation frameworks can also hinder investment.
• Investment in Network Industries: Investment in sectors of transport, energy, and telecoms combined has constituted on average around 3% of GDP for the EU 28. Whilst often of a sector specific nature, there are substantial and growing synergies between networks across sectors which are shaping market dynamics through new uses for infrastructure and demanding changes in business models. In the energy sector, new services rely on fast precise telecommunication leading operators to invest in broadband infrastructure. In the transport sector, new services are being developed relying on quality electricity infrastructure and advanced telecoms.
• Whilst this varies across the EU, important bottlenecks hampering investment include a lack of interconnection of networks across the EU, complexity and heavy burden within the regulatory framework, lengthy permit procedures, the lack of competitive tendering often limiting the full benefit of public procurement, and time overruns due to unnecessary lengthy legal and administrative procedures.
• In energy markets, consistent price signals are important for a market based and efficient allocation of investment. Any public intervention should aim to minimise regulatory distortions and address misaligned incentives. Instruments to support the transition to the low carbon economy need to be designed to ensure environmental, social and fiscal sustainability over time.
• Investment into Energy efficiency and residential investment in renewable energy: households may face specific constraints leading to sub-optimal investment decisions for the long term. These can include a lack of awareness of the true costs and returns to investment as they are not matched over time. Households may also face a limited access to finance, with a need for affordable financing products to incentivise consumers, particularly low-income households for example through large scale or pooling solutions while also respecting their risk profiles. Investments are typically small and often only considered as part of periodic renovation projects. In the case of rental markets, incentives may be split between building owners and renters.
• Investment for the Digital Economy: investment in digital physical infrastructure is key in order for the EU to benefit from the wave of innovation brought by the expansion of the digital economy and to continue being competitive. However, important bottlenecks hamper investment. Deployment costs for very high capacity broadband networks are high and sometimes not commercially viable in less densely populated areas. Directive 2014/61/EU, which aims to help reduce those costs, still has to be fully transposed and implemented in most Member States. Quicker and more efficient administrative procedures would also help to reduce costs. Markets are often national which keeps costs high and may hamper the realisation of economies of scale. Uncertainty about the short-term uptake of very high capacity broadband implies low expected earnings compared to investment costs and acts as a brake on investment. In some countries, other obstacles than those linked to the physical infrastructure also exist, such as a lack of trust in security of digital systems and insufficient digital skills among layers of the population.  
• The use of Public Private Partnerships (PPPS): Public Private Partnerships can, when used appropriately, represent a facilitator for specific kinds of investment and offer an alternative way to deliver public assets and services. As long-term contractual obligations they however require strong and stable commitment from public and private sector partners and are a potential source of risk to public finances. Their use is often hampered by unfavourable framework conditions including a lack of administrative resources, unstable and ineffective regulatory framework and a lack of political commitment for longer-term investments. In certain circumstances EU funds may contribute to funding PPPs, and the recent changes in the regulations should facilitate the blending of EU funds and PPPs.
• Insolvency Frameworks: Well-functioning insolvency frameworks benefit economic growth and financial stability. Clear rules for cross-border procedures may contribute to cross-border investment, as well as reduced differences in insolvency systems across countries. Insolvency regimes differ significantly across the EU, with the length and cost of procedures, their predictability and transparency, second chances for entrepreneurs and consumers, and the possibility of restructuring debt all varying.  
• Important bottlenecks created by inefficient insolvency frameworks may include low recovery rates for claimholders, including secured creditors, the possible use of creditor priority ranking, and a lack of effective and efficient restructuring procedures. Adequate flanking policies that would help reap the benefits of effective insolvency frameworks include the resolution of Non Performing Loans including via the creation of a secondary market, at the national level, and adequate tax and prudential policies to ensure effective offloading of bad debt.
• There remains considerable potential to further promote synergies and complementarities between EU financial instruments to support blending of funds for infrastructure projects. Regulatory complexities and administrative bottlenecks for the use of EU funds can be reduced through the key principles of simplification and standardisation of process, combination of instruments, and pooling of resources irrespective of their origin.

The Council TAKES NOTE of the bottlenecks to investment identified by this work and INVITES the Commission to consider these findings into further draft recommendations in the framework of the European Semester and INVITES Member States to fully implement the 2016 Council Country Specific Recommendations issued under the European Semester and particularly those identifying investment bottlenecks. 

The Council HIGHLIGHTS the need to continue the work on identifying the barriers to investment and INVITES the Economic Policy Committee to continue its thematic work to identify further investment bottlenecks and best policy practices to address them. Furthermore, the Council INVITES the European Investment Bank to complement the work of the Economic Policy Committee through its findings on barriers and bottlenecks to investment identified when carrying out its market-based activities, notably under the Investment Plan for Europe.  

https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_7e18a1c646f5450b9d6d-a75424f262e53e74f9539145894f4378.r8.cf3.rackcdn.com/Flag-turkey_thumb_169_1418306018_1418305846_129_97shar_c1.jpg

Turkey is a candidate country for EU membership following the Helsinki European Council of December 1999. Accession negotiations started in October 2005. Turkey’s accession process is set to move forward with the opening of a new chapter on financial and budgetary provisions on 30 June 2016. 

Download this video here.

The resignation of Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi after the failed referendum in Italy has been delayed. At the request of President Mattarella, Renzi is to remain in office until parliament passes the budget for 2017. Some commentators are delighted that voters clearly rejected Renzi's reform. Others fear a new phase of political instability.