Agrégateur de flux

Malmstrom, right, signs an intellectual property deal with Beijing at June's EU-China summit

The gloves are coming off in the intensifying dispute over whether the EU should recognise China as a market economy.

A group of European industry organisations has commissioned a report from the left-leaning Economic Policy Institute in Washington, which concludes that the granting of market economy status to Beijing would endanger between 1.7m and 3.5m jobs in the EU.

That report – published here today – certainly lobs a grenade into the debate, and takes it out of the realm of legal hair-splitting by trade wonks. It comes with all the normal caveats about macroeconomic modelling, but it definitely takes things to a more visceral level.

For Cecilia Malmström, EU trade commissioner, China’s status poses a serious headache.

Here’s why: China itself argues that it automatically achieves market economy status within the World Trade Organisation at the end of 2016, according to the terms of its WTO accession agreement in 2001.

If Beijing is right about that, the EU could face significant strategic problems as it would be prevented from using its standard defence – retaliatory tariffs – to block what it sees as Chinese dumping in vulnerable sectors. Under international trade rules, is much harder for the EU to punish a country with high retaliatory tariffs when the offender is officially considered a market economy.

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Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyaju of Israel complained of Iran’s uranium-enrichment program before the UN General Assembly in 2012. (Photo: UN Photo)

There has been considerable opposition to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the so-called Iran Deal. One of the most curious assertions being made, however, is that we cannot negotiate with the Iranians because they cannot be trusted. This simply defies logic. If we trusted them, we would not need to negotiate an agreement. The JCPOA is all about verification, through which we will know what they are doing with their nuclear program. The verification regime, in turn, is vilified as well. Opponents declare that its provisions fall short of the declared goal of “anytime, anywhere” inspections, not that the term has ever actually been defined. They also seek to create the impression that all inspections will be delayed by 24 days. This last distortion has been described as the “death panels” of the Iran Deal. In general, the discussion has focused not on the most essential aspects of the agreement, but rather on those that appear weak or can be made to appear weak.

Uranium Production and the Verification Regime

It is important to remember is that this agreement, or any agreement, will not prevent every objectionable activity Iran might engage in. Separate issues will have to be dealt with separately. This agreement focuses on the activity that has been at the core of key allegations against Iran, the production of nuclear fuel, which Iran says it wants for peaceful purposes and is entitled to under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). (The NPT grants countries a right to a nuclear industry, but not specifically to the indigenous production of fuel.) When processing uranium with centrifuges, the process is the same whether you want to produce reactor fuel to generate electricity or bomb-grade fuel for a nuclear weapon. The essential difference is in how long you do it, or rather, how many times you run uranium gas through a cascade of centrifuges. Natural uranium consists primarily of two isotopes: it is about 0.7 percent U-235 and 99.3 U-238. Most reactor fuel is enriched to the level of about 3.5 percent U-235; Iran’s Tehran Research Reactor takes a fuel that is just below 20 percent U-235; bomb-grade is in excess of 90 percent U-235. Unfortunately, the process gets easier the further it goes, so that when you have reached 20 percent (or even 3.5 percent), you have actually gone most of the way toward reaching 90 percent. The technical ease with which one might glide from civilian production to military production is at the center of the suspicions directed at Iran. Thus the monitoring of uranium production is at the heart of the Iran deal.

Iran, of course, does not trust the United States, either, and does not want the United States poking around its facilities, regardless of whether they concern nuclear or conventional military technologies. Thus verification is to be carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a neutral third party. For decades, the IAEA has inspected nuclear facilities around the world under the NPT for the purpose of “verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” It has not always been successful, but it has learned from its failures and strengthened its capacities over time.

Under the JCPOA, Iran reaffirms its denunciation of nuclear weapons and acceptance of standard inspections under its NPT Safeguard Agreement; agrees to additional challenge inspections, granting access to nuclear facilities within 24 hours (2 hours if inspectors are already on site), under an NPT Additional Protocol; and is obliged to give prior notification of the construction or modification of nuclear facilities under what is known as modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Safeguards Agreement (or simply, modified Code 3.1). Furthermore, Iran forswears any research-and-development activities applicable to the development of a nuclear weapon, including dual-purpose activities. These obligations do not expire, ever. In addition, Iran agrees to added measures and restrictions beyond those for a limited time period, with the duration varying from 10 to 25 years, depending on the specific measure. While nothing in life is guaranteed and the situations are not perfect parallels, it is worth noting that inspectors successfully disarmed Iraq in the 1990s without these additional measures.

When it comes to Iran’s uranium-conversion and uranium-enrichment facilities, monitoring by remote-controlled cameras and radio frequency identification (RFID) technology will be permanent and continuous, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, under Iran’s Safeguard Agreement. In addition, for 15 years Iran will permit direct access by IAEA inspectors on demand up to once a day. In an unprecedented arrangement, Iran’s uranium mines and mills will be under continuous monitoring for 25 years. In another unprecedented arrangement, Iran’s centrifuge production facilities will be under continuous monitoring for 20 years. The import of dual-use materials will be monitored for 10 years. The idea here is to keep track of Iran’s uranium-related resources. If inspectors can keep track of how much uranium Iran has and where it is—how much enters each facility, how much leaves, and where it goes—then they should be able to detect if uranium is diverted for unapproved purposes. Without the fuel, you cannot make a bomb.

Not Anytime, Anywhere?

As a precaution going beyond the continuous monitoring of declared nuclear sites, the JCPOA permits inspectors to investigate other sites, military or civilian, if they suspect that illicit activity related to nuclear weapons is being undertaken there. This alone is the subject of the “anytime, anywhere” controversy. The compromise reached allows Iran to challenge the accusation and to give reasons why the accusation is not true. The delay, however, is limited to a maximum of 24 days. It is important to understand that this is a limit on Iran’s ability to stall. Of the 121 countries in the world that adhere to an Additional Protocol, only Iran faces this restriction.

A current television ad attacking the JCPOA claims that the agreement gives Iran “24 days to remove evidence of nuclear activity.” Note the careful wording. The ad makes no explicit claim that it is possible to remove evidence of nuclear activity within 24 days, probably because its producers are fully aware that it is not. Inspectors can detect the presence of nuclear materials years after it has been removed, and efforts to scrub a site leave evidence both of its presence and of the attempt to hide it.

Is it possible, within 24 days, to remove evidence of nonnuclear activity related to the development of nuclear weapons? It is certainly conceivable. Relevant computer simulations could be undertaken without detection under virtually any inspection regime, but by themselves they are not going to give you a bomb. Generally speaking, the easier it is to hide, the less likely it is to produce a breakthrough. Since no inspection regime can guarantee that cheating will never happen, a high likelihood that any possible cheating would be caught or ultimately be irrelevant is an acceptable standard. More importantly, the agreement’s opponents offer no superior solution.

Potential Military Dimensions and Parchin

Finally, considerable attention has been devoted to the uncovering of Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s past research, including possible activities in a particular building at the Parchin military facility. Iran has been accused of doing research on nonnuclear aspects of weapons design, such as testing the reactions of certain materials to high stress and experimenting with conventional explosives that could be used to trigger a nuclear device. The CIA and other sources believe that this activity was halted in 2003, but many people want it investigated. Iran is loath to admit that it engaged in research dedicated to developing a nuclear weapon (the Ayatollah has said publicly that nuclear weapons are un-Islamic) and is reluctant to invite outsiders to inspect its military facilities, but an arrangement has been worked out. The IAEA will investigate the issue and keep the results to itself. Since this concerns past activity, this will involve a one-time investigation rather than ongoing monitoring. Most of the investigation will entail a review of documents, but there will also be some physical inspections of relevant sites. The IAEA will write up its conclusions before the main Iran deal goes into effect. The conclusions will not be shared with the P5+1 countries but will be available to the inspectors. Iran will not have to admit publicly to past misconduct, but the purpose of the JCPOA is to prevent nuclear proliferation, not to elicit public confessions. The IAEA reports that the Iranians have been cooperative so far.

There are reasons for wanting to examine PMD, but that is not the same as saying it is central to the overall agreement. Investigating the PMD allegations potentially serves two purposes. First, if IAEA inspectors can determine how far Iran has progressed toward developing the nonnuclear aspects of a nuclear weapon, then they might be better able to calculate how long it would take Iran to build a bomb if it did indeed break out of the verification regime. (Remember, the much-discussed “breakout time” is not how long it would take them to build a bomb, but rather how long it would take them to produce enough bomb-grade uranium to build a bomb. Building the actual bomb is a separate process.)

The second purpose could actually benefit Iran, depending on the circumstances. If inspectors at some point in the future find evidence of work on bomb components, then a thorough understanding of the work completed in the past will help them determine whether the new find is the product of recent clandestine work or simply a relic of previous efforts. Thus it would help prove that a discovery is evidence of a violation or that accusations of a violation are unfounded. This supports the overall mission. It would certainly be useful in settling disputes, and disputes are sure to arise. Still, it is not essential to the purpose of preventing the diversion of nuclear material for unauthorized purposes.

Parchin is one subset of the PMD investigation. The issue here concerns allegations that Iran may have used a building at the Parchin site for nonnuclear tests related to the development of a nuclear weapon. Since the allegation concerns activity that ended a dozen years ago, since the building may never have contained nuclear material, and since the building may have been used for other purposes since then, the prospects of finding conclusive evidence of anything are slim.

In fact, IAEA inspectors already visited Parchin twice in 2005 and found nothing suspicious. By agreement with Iran, the inspectors were free to pick any quadrant of the Parchin site and examine buildings of their choosing in that quadrant. They did not have to identify the buildings they had chosen prior to their arrival. As it happens, they did not choose to visit the building that they plan to visit now, although it was available to them.

An Effective Agreement

When a politician says “I’ll eat my hat” if X, Y, or Z doesn’t happen, no one really expects him to do it. Yet political discourse in the United States seems to have settled at the level of denouncing public officials for not eating their hats, without concern for what purpose would actually be served by doing so. In this case, “anytime, anywhere” inspections are an admirable goal and a fine starting point for negotiations (although, as far as I know, the term has never been operationally defined), but real-life negotiations do not end up squarely at one side’s starting point. Moreover, repeated accusations that the agreement did not produce “anytime, anywhere” inspections ignore (or purposefully draw attention away from) the fact that the agreement actually produced 24/7 monitoring of the essential aspects of the issue and that the arrangements for challenge inspections of undeclared sites (the aspect that allegedly falls short of “anytime, anywhere”) are perfectly adequate, indeed, an unprecedented achievement in themselves. There is no reason to believe the JCPOA will not be effective. The greatest threat to it are the hard-liners in the United States and Iran, but they would equally be threats to any agreement produced by negotiations.

Saturday 19 September 2015

Visit to Egypt
11.30 Meeting with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi 

12.45 Joint press statement

 Sunday 20 September 2015

Visit to Jordan
12.00 Meeting with H.M. the King of Jordan, Abdullah II bin al-Hussein

Visit of a refugee camp 

Tuesday 22 September 2015

13.00 Meeting with President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker 

15.00 Meeting with High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini

Wednesday 23 September 2015

15.00  European People's Party Summit (Stanhope Hotel) 

18.00  Informal meeting of Heads of State or Government

Thursday 24 September 2015

09.00 Meeting with Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron (photo opportunity)

11.45 Meeting with President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz (European Parliament)

Saturday 19 September 2015

Visit to Egypt
11.30 Meeting with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi 

12.45 Joint press statement

 Sunday 20 September 2015

Visit to Jordan
12.00 Meeting with H.M. the King of Jordan, Abdullah II bin al-Hussein

Visit of a refugee camp 

Tuesday 22 September 2015

13.00 Meeting with President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker 

Wednesday 23 September 2015

15.00  European People's Party Summit (Stanhope Hotel) 

18.00  Informal meeting of Heads of State or Government

Thursday 24 September 2015

11.00 Meeting with President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz (European Parliament)

 

Saturday 19 September 2015

Visit to Egypt
11.30 Meeting with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi 

12.45 Joint press statement

 Sunday 20 September 2015

Visit to Jordan
12.00 Meeting with H.M. the King of Jordan, Abdullah II bin al-Hussein

Visit of a refugee camp 

Tuesday 22 September 2015

13.00 Meeting with President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker 

Wednesday 23 September 2015

15.00  European People's Party Summit (Stanhope Hotel) 

18.00  Informal meeting of Heads of State or Government

Thursday 24 September 2015

11.00 Meeting with President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz (European Parliament)

 

Russia has a huge advantage in terms of combat armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles), self-propelled guns, towed artillery complexes and multiple rocket launchers. New Russian tanks will confirm this advantage. US experts hail Russia's Su-35 fighter saying that it is superior to the US F-35

Le 13 septembre, quelques jours après avoir annoncé l'accueil de plusieurs centaines de milliers de réfugiés, l'Allemagne a réinstauré le contrôle temporaire de ses frontières avec l'Autriche. Une décision contradictoire vue comme un rétropédalage de la part d'Angela Merkel. Incapable de réunir un consensus au niveau européen sur une répartition contraignante des migrants au sein des Etats membres, la chancelière doit également faire face à la frilosité de la CSU, branche bavaroise de son parti, vis-à-vis de son élan d'ouverture. La réunion des dirigeants européens, le 23 septembre, s'annonce par conséquent tendue.

Eine kurzfristige Reform des europäischen CO2-Handels ist beschlossene Sache. Die Umweltminister der EU einigten sich bei einem Treffen in Brüssel…

Republican presidential candidates Ted Cruz and Donald Trump hosted a rally to oppose the Iran Deal in Washington, D.C., on Sept. 10, 2015. (Photo: updatednews.ca)

A great deal has been written about the agreement negotiated between Iran and the P5+1 countries (the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China), officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). A lot of the commentary has been nonsense. A great deal of attention has been allocated not according to the relative importance of the various aspects of the deal, but rather according to how vulnerable to attack they appear to be. Also, much of the public discussion has been technically inept. Many assert, for example, that if Iran wants even more centrifuges, then that proves that its nuclear program is really intended for military purposes. In fact, generating fuel for a power plant requires far more fuel (albeit, enriched to a lower level) and many more centrifuges. Iran has had enough centrifuges to make a bomb since the Bush administration.

The JCPOA is complex, and it has been attacked from several directions. I will focus on the key issue of verification in an accompanying post. Here I would like to address three other popular lines of attack.

First, some commentators insist that the only realistic way to deal with the Iranian nuclear program is to bomb it. (The same people often insist that the Iranians will hide facilities in secret locations, so it is difficult to say exactly where they plan to bomb.) They frequently cite Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 as an example of how it can be done successfully. Evidently they are unaware that the Iraqis did not have a serious nuclear-weapon program before 1981. Far from stopping Iraq’s nuclear program, the bombing of Osirak exposed Iraq’s vulnerability to an Israeli attack and prompted Saddam Hussein to pour resources into the development of a nuclear weapon. Much of that nuclear program, as well as chemical and biological weapons, survived weeks of intensive bombing during the Gulf War of 1991. So, what happened to Iraq’s notorious weapons of mass destruction (WMD)? Who finally disarmed the country, leaving it without WMD at the start of the Iraq War in 2003, after bombing failed to do so? The answer is: UN weapons inspectors.

Second, other commentators simply assert that we should discard the agreement and negotiate a better one. A number of experts, administration officials, and foreign envoys have listed factors working against the success of that approach. In brief, Iran is not simply going to be talked into demilitarizing the way Japan did after we destroyed its navy and air force, bombed its cities (two of them with nuclear weapons), and occupied and disarmed it.

If we wanted a better deal, then the time to do it would have been a decade ago, when a previous moderate government was in power in Iran. In 2003 Iran offered to negotiate a comprehensive settlement touching on U.S. interests (WMD, terrorism, coordination on Iraq, and movement toward a Palestinian-Israeli settlement based on a two-state solution, including the possibility of Iranian pressure on Hezbollah) and Iranian interests (an end to U.S. efforts at regime change, an end to sanctions, Iranian access to technology, including nuclear technology; and action against Mojahedin-e Khalq, an anti-Iranian group based in Iraq). The nuclear part of the deal might well have been similar to today’s agreement, except that Iran’s nuclear program was far less advanced at that time, so its bargaining position would have been weaker. In addition, many other loose ends of the relationship might have been covered as well.

The Bush administration, however, was not interested in compromising, or even in negotiating, opting instead to rely on economic sanctions. Rather than respond to the offer, the administration complained that the Swiss ambassador had exceeded his authority by transmitting the message at all. (Since Iran and the United States have no diplomatic relations, Switzerland represents U.S. interest in Tehran.) Could a mutually acceptable arrangement have been worked out at that time? We will never know. What we do know is that in 2003, when the offer was sent, Iran had not yet enriched any uranium. By the time the recent negotiations started in 2013, Iran had a stockpile of 10,000 kilograms of low-enriched uranium and 19,900 operational centrifuges. Moreover, it no longer appeared interested in discussing the other regional and bilateral issues, or at least not until they saw how the nuclear deal went. That was the result of the Bush administration’s decision to hold out for a better deal.

Additionally, the similarity between the 2003 offer and the present deal suggests that the presence of a moderate Iranian government, rather than the force of sanctions, is what makes negotiation possible. The most important role of sanctions may have been in convincing Iranian voters to give moderates another chance. Rejecting the treaty (and some people are still trying to do so) would essentially teach the Iranian public that their hard-liners were right, that the moderates were fools for thinking they could negotiate an acceptable deal with the Americans.

Third, some cite North Korea’s abandonment of the 1994 Agreed Framework, apparently assuming that if one negotiated arrangement turned out badly, then they all must. This may actually be more relevant to the case at hand, but not necessarily in the way those making the argument have in mind. The Agreed Framework was negotiated by a Democratic administration, but a Republican Congress decried it as appeasement and refused to implement certain key provisions that were important to the North Korean government, including the lifting of sanctions and the normalization of relations. Other aspects were delayed for years (sometimes because of North Korean actions that were objectionable but not covered by the agreement). Then a new Republican administration denounced the agreement, threatened the North Korean regime, and unilaterally tried to change provisions of the agreement retroactively. When the Bush administration suspected that the North Koreans were cheating on the agreement, it made no effort to bring them back into compliance. Now North Korea has nuclear weapons. Would North Korea still have cheated if the United States had followed through on its commitments? Again, we will never know. Yet some people seem intent on repeating this singular example of diplomatic failure step for step.

En autorisant de nouveau l'utilisation de la substance pour l'export, la plus haute cour française fragilise la position de la France qui l'interdit totalement.

Mariam Sankara, la veuve de l'ex-président burkinabè Thomas Sankara, tué en 1987, s'inquiète pour les suites de l'enquête en raison du putsch survenu mercredi, la veille du jour où les résultats de l'enquête devaient être rendus publics.

Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok Megyei Rendőr-főkapitányság

a “Közalkalmazottak jogállásáról szóló” 1992. évi XXXIII. törvény 20/A. § alapján

pályázatot hirdet

Közbeszerzési főelőadó

munkakör betöltésére.

A közalkalmazotti jogviszony időtartama:

határozatlan idejű közalkalmazotti jogviszony.

Foglalkoztatás jellege:

Teljes munkaidő

A munkavégzés helye:

Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok megye, 5000 Szolnok, Baross út 39.

A munkakörbe tartozó, illetve a vezetői megbízással járó lényeges feladatok:

• közbeszerzési eljárás teljes körű lebonyolítása (eljárásokkal kapcsolatos ajánlatok, részvételi jelentkezések, ajánlati dokumentáció hatályos jogszabályoknak megfelelően történő, teljes körű összeállítása)
• közbeszerzési eljárások előkészítésében és lebonyolításában történő részvétel, az eljárás eredményeként szerződés megkötésében történő közreműködés, kapcsolattartás a megbízókkal.
• beszerzési igények feldolgozása, ajánlatkérések kidolgozása és teljes körű lebonyolítása, társterületekkel való egyeztetés és információcsere a beszerzésekkel kapcsolatban, a beérkezett ajánlatok ellenőrzése, értékelés, szerződéskötés előkészítése, megrendelések előkészítése,
• az eljárásokhoz kapcsolódó dokumentumok elkészítése
• hirdetmények elkészítése és feladása a Közbeszerzési Hatóság részére
• uniós forrásból megvalósuló közbeszerzési eljárások kapcsán a dokumentumok EMIR rendszerben történő rögzítése
• Folyamatos kapcsolattartás a gazdálkodási területeken dolgozó munkatársakkal.
• Adatszolgáltatási feladatok támogatása, együttműködés hivatalos szervekkel

Illetmény és juttatások:

Az illetmény megállapítására és a juttatásokra a “Közalkalmazottak jogállásáról szóló” 1992. évi XXXIII. törvény rendelkezései az irányadók.

Pályázati feltételek:

• Felsőfokú képesítés, közbeszerzési referens,
• Közbeszerzési referens – Legalább 1-3 év szakmai tapasztalat,
• Felhasználói szintű MS Office (irodai alkalmazások),
• Kifogástalan, büntetlen életvitel

A pályázat elbírálásánál előnyt jelent:

• Egyetem, jogász,
• közbeszerzési eljárások teljes körű lebonyolítása az eljárás előkészítésétől a szerződésmódosításig – Legalább 1-3 év szakmai tapasztalat,
• ECDL
• “B” kategóriás jogosítvány

Elvárt kompetenciák:

• Kiváló szintű precizitás, megbízhatóság, terhelhetőség

Előnyt jelentő kompetenciák:

• Kiváló szintű szervezeti lojalitás, elkötelezettség

A pályázat részeként benyújtandó iratok, igazolások:

• Végzettségeket igazoló bizonyítványok fénymásolata, referenciák a szakmai tapasztalatról, önéletrajz

A munkakör betölthetőségének időpontja:

A munkakör legkorábban a pályázatok elbírálását követően azonnal betölthető.

A pályázat benyújtásának határideje: 2015. október 12.

A pályázati kiírással kapcsolatosan további információt Zsiga Attila r. őrnagy igazgatási osztályvezető nyújt, a 56/501-600/1504 -os telefonszámon.

A pályázatok benyújtásának módja:

• Postai úton, a pályázatnak a Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok Megyei Rendőr-főkapitányság címére történő megküldésével (5000 Szolnok, Baross út 39. ). Kérjük a borítékon feltüntetni a pályázati adatbázisban szereplő azonosító számot: 16000-101/821-2015, valamint a munkakör megnevezését: Közbeszerzési főelőadó.
• Elektronikus úton Nagy Andrea Olimpia részére a nagya@jasz.police.hu e-mail címen keresztül
• Személyesen: Nagy Andrea Olimpia, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok megye, 5000 Szolnok, Baross út 39.

A pályázat elbírálásának határideje: 2015. október 15.

A KÖZIGÁLLÁS publikálási időpontja: 2015. szeptember 7.

A pályázati kiírás közzétevője a Nemzeti Közigazgatási Intézet (NKI). A pályázati kiírás a munkáltató által az NKI részére megküldött adatokat tartalmazza, így annak tartalmáért a pályázatot kiíró szerv felel.

További állások >>

Global and regional leaders met in Alaska at the 2015 GLACIER conference, trying to shape the future of the Arctic. That future will probably look like one of five existing models.

U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy (Wikipedia)

The changes to the environment in the Arctic–the Arctic Ocean as water and ice, its air, its surrounding land, and its plant, fish, animal and human life–revolve primarily around changes to the extent of sea ice.  The findings are consistent: the extent of sea ice is declining, including multi-year ice. An additional concern is Arctic amplification– the concept that less sea ice is self-reinforcing, as more sunlight is absorbed by ocean water instead of being reflected by ice cover–may already be underway.

2015 Sea Ice Extent is far below the 1981-2010 median.

What’s At Stake?

The decrease in sea ice is already impacting Arctic animal life, indigenous peoples, and scientific, industrial and tourism traffic–from oil and gas exploration to the annual North Pole Marathon. In recent years, the polar states have increased their patrols on training, research, emergency response, and border protection missions. In the last ten years, scholarship on the politics of the Arctic has surged–not only on the environment but on the region’s history, people, politics, economics, and security questions.

Who Decides?

States and others interested in the Arctic region have built a number of governing agencies.  The UN’s Law of the Sea Treaty applies rest-of-the-world rules to the region’s natural resources. The UN’s International Maritime Organization deals with shipping and environmental concerns.

Arctic-specific structures start with the Arctic Council, founded in 1996 and now comprised of eight member states and a number of indigenous peoples organizations.  States, sub-state units, and indigenous populations have also formed more localized bodies such as the Barents Euro-Atlantic Council, Nordic Council of Ministers, Northern Front, and Northern Forum.  The 2008 Ilulissat Declaration emphasized the leading role of states.

The United States has issued two recent policy documents on the Arctic: at the end of the Bush administration in 2009, and from the Obama administration in 2013.  Earning considerable criticism in August, President Obama permitted Shell to drill in the Chukchi Sea.  Meanwhile, Russia has called the Arctic central to its security interests, and China is building ice-breaking ships.

What Models for the Arctic?

Combined, these geopolitical questions and governing structures make the Arctic region not “ungoverned” but “under-governed.”  At the GLACIER conference and in the future, the Arctic is likely to develop into one the following models:  development first, international agreement, unilateral universalism, continuing contest, and imminent danger.

Development First.  In ungoverned or under-governed regions, opportunities often take precedence over possible challenges, risks or negative impacts.  The prospect of economic benefits drives policy; indigenous cultures, environmental costs, and political risks are given less regard.   Development first is a common pattern with some familiar examples.  Productive examples include the development of agriculture in Australia and Argentina.  Extractive examples range from copper in Chile to gold in California and diamonds in Africa.  Cases that are more combative and destructive include the seizure of gold from the Aztecs and Inca, the near-extinction of the North American bison, and the African slave trade.  It can also result in unintended consequences, as with poverty reduction programs that contributed to the partial clearing of the Amazon rainforest.

Development first is a potential model for the Arctic in very traditional ways.  Its natural resources (oil and gas, minerals, fishing) and commercial sea routes are coveted by states and industry in a competitive global political economy.

International Agreement.  A second approach to under-governed spaces is international agreement–like in the Arctic’s polar opposite, the Antarctic.

Antarctica, without a native population and not part of potential commercial traffic, is governed primarily by the Antarctic Treaty (1959) and other agreements under the Antarctic Treaty System, committing signatories to peaceful activities only.  It authorizes freedom of scientific research, prohibits military activity, nuclear testing and radioactive waste, specifically does not recognize (nor dispute) states’ territorial claims and precludes additional claims, and establishes annual Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM).

The 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty  emphasizes the importance of the protection of Antarctica’s environment, prohibits exploration or exploitation of energy or mineral resources, and promotes environmental assessment of activities, emergency response preparation, and international resolution of disputes.  Additionally, the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) is an association of environmental non-governmental organizations, and an official observer to the Antarctica Treaty System.

Mikhail Gorbachev proposed in 1987 an Arctic “zone of peace;” others have called for demilitarization or a non-state “polar park.”  An international agreement model may be relevant to the Arctic if it can draw from existing resources, be adapted to its distinct geographic, biological, political and economic traits – and if signatories can remain motivated to comply.

Unilateral Universalism.  A third approach to existing and potential Arctic trading routes is based on transit free from economic, political, or military hindrances.  The sea routes over Russia and through Canada are each predominantly under the geographical shadow of one state but subject to the interest of many, like the Panama Canal today.

The Panama Canal opened in 1914, shaved some 8,000 miles off the 14,000-mile Cape Horn route from New York to the U.S. west coast, and greatly shortened European and Asian routes as well.  Under U.S. control, the Canal met its maritime goals for the United States and for global commerce, and U.S. military interests shortening the travel time between its Atlantic and Pacific seaboards.  It retains its importance today under Panama’s control.

By comparison, the world’s other most important shipping straits today do not paint an entirely rosy scenario for Arctic potential.  The historical difficulties with the Suez Canal, and the current challenges in the Strait of Malacca, illustrate political, economic, safety and environmental risks.  But perhaps none are as important or as precarious as the Strait of Hormuz.

Imminent Danger.  Critical oil shipping flows from Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz to Western Europe, Asia and the United States. Between Iran and the Arabian peninsula the Strait is vulnerable to small or large efforts at traffic disruption.  There is no easy substitute for the oil flow.  The global economy could face immediate, severe damage if a state or non-state actor were able to impede traffic or even briefly close the Strait.

If Arctic shipping and resource exploration are to expand, and if the environment and indigenous communities are to be protected, the most critical effort is the avoidance of military conflict in the region.  There is no evidence at this time that such a scenario is likely, but increased military presence, border disputes and potentially large economic stakes could lead to escalating conflict.  All parties must remain motivated and committed to avoiding such a path.

Continuing contest.  Short of direct military conflict or the imminent threat of it, another future scenario for the Arctic is ongoing competition. This condition has the chance of armed conflict but the predominance of political and diplomatic discord.  Throughout history, the Bosporus Strait, the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea and others have held this condition–like the Caspian Sea today.  In some sense, this combines elements of the preceding logics:  development, diplomacy, and security risks.
Increased human activities will continue to influence the Arctic.  Nation-states with competing interests have begun to prepare for the opportunities and potential conflicts.  Policy choices, environmental changes and technological advances will continue to influence each other.  The GLACIER conference is a step along, not a resolution to, states and others shaping the Arctic’s future.

 

Le général Gilbert Diendéré, à l'origine du coup d'État au Burkina Faso, suscite de nombreuses interrogations pour l’avenir démocratique pays. Entretien avec David Zounmenou, chercheur à l'Institut d'études de sécurité de Pretoria en Afrique du Sud.

L’armée de Terre au contact s’investit dans un nouveau modèle où l’engagement opérationnel et la réorganisation organique sont les maîtres mots. En visite à Illkirch-Graffenstaden, le général Jean-Pierre Bosser, chef d’état-major de l’armée de Terre, a rappelé aux cadres de la 2e brigade blindée (2e BB) ses attentes et objectifs.

The number of attacks by Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria and neighbouring countries has risen, and half a million children have had to flee to safety in the past five months, bringing the total number of displaced children in the region to 1.4 million, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) said today.

Le général Gilbert Diendéré, ancien chef d’état-major et bras droit de l’ancien président Blaise Compaoré en exil depuis le 31 octobre 2014, a pris la tête des putschistes issus du Régiment de la Sécurité présidentielle (RSP) qui ont renversé le 16 septembre les autorités de transition au Burkina Faso. Il a promis d’organiser « rapidement » des élections prévues à l’origine pour le 11 octobre 2015.

Les violences qui ont eu lieu lors de ce coup d’Etat ont fait au moins trois morts et une soixantaine de blessés, des militaires qui quadrillaient la capitale, tirant pour disperser les manifestants hostiles au coup d’Etat.

Les réactions internationales ont été unanimes pour réclamer la libération du Président de transition Mathieu Kafando, du premier ministre Isaac Zida (lui-même un officier du RSP) et les ministres arrêtés lors du Conseil des ministres.
Ban Ki-moon, le secrétaire général de l’Organisation des Nations unies, a formulé sa « ferme condamnation du coup d’Etat » dans le pays et a estimé que « les responsables de ce coup d’Etat et de ses conséquences devaient rendre des comptes ». La France a adopté la même attitude, tout en indiquant que le contingent militaire français présent au Burkina Faso n’a « pas à interférer » dans les événements en cours à Ouagadougou.

Cette situation est révélatrice d’une faiblesse chronique des institutions démocratiques africaines. La transition politique née de l’insurrection exemplaire conduite il y a onze mois par la société civile avait suscité beaucoup d’espoir. Hélas, les erreurs ont été nombreuses. L’exclusion par les organes de transition d’un certain nombre de candidats du Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès (CDP), l’ancien parti au pouvoir, aux législatives et à la présidentielle, dont Djibrill Bassolé, l’ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères de Blaise Compaoré, parce qu’ils avaient pris une position favorable à l’amendement constitutionnel permettant à Blaise Compaoré de briguer un nouveau mandat après 27 ans au pouvoir, a fourni un prétexte au RSP pour intervenir. Arque-boutés à cette position, les responsables de la transition se sont discrédités, quitte à aller contre la décision de la Cour de justice de la Communauté économique des Etats d’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) qui a invalidé en juillet le nouveau code électoral. La saisie de plusieurs milliers de fausses cartes d’électeurs en septembre avait encore un peu plus contribué à renforcer la défiance envers la classe politique. L’annonce de la dissolution du RSP composé de 1200 hommes par son intégration dans l’armée régulière était aussi vécue comme une provocation par des soldats jusque-là choyés par le régime et largement indépendants. La prise de risques était forte. Le hasard de calendrier s’en est mêlé. Le juge d’instruction en charge de l’enquête sur l’assassinat de Thomas Sankara en 1987 venait de convoquer les avocats des parties civiles pour leur communiquer les résultats de l’autopsie du corps présumé de l’ex-président.  Gilbert Diendéré est sous le feu des projecteurs pour son rôle trouble dans cet assassinat jamais élucidé. C’est lui qui en effet supervisait son arrestation qui tournera au bain de sang.

La transition a brutalement déraillé et le Burkina Faso, qui a longtemps figuré parmi les bons élèves des bailleurs de fonds internationaux se retrouve fragilisé et déchiré. On attend une attitude claire et unanime des partis en présence et de leurs candidats aux élections, à commencer par les deux principaux rivaux, Roch Kaboré et Zéphirin Diabré, qui jusqu’à présent semblaient se satisfaire de la mise à l’écart des candidats proches de Blaise Compaoré. On peut aussi compter sur la vigilance, voire sur l’activisme des associations de la société civile, notamment du célèbre groupe « le balais citoyen » pour ne pas accepter une régression institutionnelle et démocratique.

Enfin, la position et l’intervention des pays voisins dont les institutions sont les mieux assises (Ghana, Sénégal et Bénin en particulier) seront cruciales. Ce coup d’Etat pourrait menacer la stabilité de la sous-région. Plusieurs pays organisent des élections présidentielles dans les prochains mois : la Côte d’Ivoire et la Guinée en octobre, le Niger en février 2016. Et le Mali est toujours dans un état de grande vulnérabilité. Si le chaos s’installe au Burkina Faso, cela risque d’entériner les déséquilibres d’une région avec des issues politiques et sécuritaires incertaines et, au-delà, de conforter le doute sur la démocratisation en marche en Afrique subsaharienne.

Non violent, animé par des jeunes, le Balai citoyen incite les Burkinabés à s'engager. En octobre 2014, il a joué un rôle décisif dans la chute du président Blaise Compaoré. / Burkina Faso, Démocratie, Élections, Jeunes, Mouvement de contestation, Musique, Corruption - (...) / Burkina Faso, Démocratie, Élections, Jeunes, Mouvement de contestation, Musique, Corruption - 2015/04