Des routes, des autoroutes et le nouveau Centre hospitalier universitaire de Podgorica. La France renforce sa coopération avec le Monténégro, et un accord de partenariat permet aux entreprises françaises de ne pas se soumettre aux procédures d'appel d'offres.
- Le fil de l'Info / Vijesti, Monténégro, Economie, Relations internationalesWritten by David Kemp.
The ability of generative AI (‘GenAI’) to generate plausible text, images, music and computer code in response to human prompts is impressive. GenAI promises huge productivity gains in many domains, and large amounts of financial and political capital are staked on its success. Nevertheless, the current generation of models exhibit well-publicised weaknesses that might not simply disappear by using more data and processing power or smarter training. This paper looks at those limitations, and the lower-profile alternative approaches to AI that could overcome them and even provide the EU with a competitive advantage.
Since the unveiling of ChatGPT in 2022, we have witnessed what many commentators consider to be the most rapid adoption of new technology in recent times in virtually all segments of society. One cannot fail to be impressed by the speed at which it can produce outputs that some say can be ‘PhD-level’.
At the same time, there is growing awareness that these algorithms often produce plausible but demonstrably false outputs (‘hallucinations‘) or outputs that are inconsistent with logic, maths or ‘how the real world works’; they regurgitate problematic biases present in their training data and cannot provide a reliable explanation of how the outputs were derived. ‘GenAI-optimists’ believe that accuracy and tractability will emerge through scaling up the data and processing power available and adding external (human or automated) processes to fine-tune the models. ‘GenAI-pessimists’, on the other hand, point to the fact that finding solutions to the above problems is slowing down, strongly suggesting that the approach is reaching its limits. In addition, the very high energy and resource consumption of the infrastructure necessary for training and running these ‘brute force’, data-driven applications is putting pressure on already stretched supplies. Given the several trillions of private and public capital invested, now and over the next few years, in the geopolitically strategic race for an ‘all-purpose’ artificial general intelligence (AGI), it is worth asking where GenAI’s limits lie and what other approaches might be explored to put Europe at the forefront of AI innovation.
Potential impacts and developmentsGenAI models, in essence, generate a multi-dimensional map of statistical relationships in the training data between ‘tokens‘ – digital representations of linguistic, graphical, musical or other data. The models can then be prompted to produce new combinations of text, images, music, etc. that are consistent with those relationships. In contrast to traditional statistical regression analysis, these models contain billions of parameters and make almost no assumptions about the form of the relationships between tokens. This gives GenAI its enormous advantage in finding the subtle, multivariate patterns that allow it to output plausible text, code, music, images, etc. in response to prompts.
The flip side of this underlying design, however, is that GenAI (like traditional statistical regression) is prone to mistaking ‘noise’ in the training sample for meaningful patterns and producing bizarre results when it is applied to data outside the training set. In addition, pure GenAI trades transparency of ‘reasoning’ for power: a printout of the billion-parameter map of relationships provides no explanation. This is a problem for the required ‘human in the loop’: how can one have confidence in the result if no one knows exactly how it was reached?
Clearly, these design weaknesses limit mission-critical uses of AI. Scaling GenAI does not appear to eliminate these problems, all the while adding additional problems linked to resource usage. Ideally, we would make the most of the powerful pattern detection that GenAI offers, and overcome some of the limitations of a purely data-driven approach. This requires boostingresearch into ‘hybrid’ approaches which, like the human brain, leverage GenAI’s pattern extraction and matching abilities using built-in, explicit models of efficient reasoning strategies and the real world, as well as strategies formaintaining and developingthose models. These approaches provide a reality check to improve the reliability of GenAI’s probabilistic outputs. They are also more efficient (algorithmically and energetically) as they directly encode readily available, fundamental knowledge rather than requiring everything to be extracted by brute force from the data. Finally, the use of explicit representations and strategies allows their reasoning to be inspected.
Neuro-symbolic approaches, such as IBM’s neuro-symbolic concept learner, combine GenAI with explicit rules for symbolic reasoning (for logic, abstraction and generalisation) to enhance reasoning and explainability. Embodied AI – such as Meta’s Habitat – involves training agents in virtual or physical environments where they are designed to learn through perception, action and feedback, promoting causal learning and the development of sensorimotor intelligence. Cognitive architectures, such as Soar, ACT-R and OpenCog, include explicit models of human cognitive processes, integrating perception, memory, learning, planning and reasoning in a modular way. This enables continuity of learning, goal-directed behaviour and long-term memory. World model learning approaches such as DeepMind’s MuZero, Ha & Schmidhuber’s world model agents and DreamerV3 focus on training agents to derive compact, predictive models of their environment to support causal reasoning, generalisation and efficient planning. Finally, it must be underlined that, regardless of the underlying technology, the pursuit of artificial general intelligence is not necessarily the most efficient route to useful applications. Artificial specific intelligence (AI approaches focused on a specific domain, such as the Nobel prize-winning, protein-folding algorithm, AlphaFold2) gives more reliable and transparent results by combining the subtle pattern detection at which GenAI excels with explicitly encoded, domain-specific knowledge.
Anticipatory policymakingThe reliability issues mentioned above call into question GenAI’s ability to deliver the ‘trustworthy and human centric AI … pivotal for economic growth and … [preserve] the fundamental rights and principles that underpin our societies’, as promised in the AI continent action plan. Most AI initiatives from the European Commission have so far concentrated on the implementation of GenAI rather than on research and development of alternative and complementary AI approaches. The €700 million flagship GenAI4EU programme, for example, states its aim as being to ‘integrate generativeArtificial Intelligence (AI) in Europe’s strategic sectors, and keep their competitive edge’. Consequently, most of the calls for projects focus on applying GenAI in particular sectors and providing the data and computing power it needs. The pursuit of artificial general intelligence has attracted an enormous amount of political and economic interest, potentially to the detriment of equally interesting and possibly more efficient and effective alternatives, including those mentioned above.
To best serve the EU’s goals of competitivity and innovation in AI, EU policy and funding could be targeted more directly to support the wholevalue chain of alternative and complementary approaches to GenAI.It is also important to actively further domain-specific AI (artificial specific intelligence)applications alongside GenAI. This can be achieved through proactively promoting such projects for existing funding programmes and by policy guidance in the next multiannual financial framework and the Competitiveness Fund for Digital Leadership.
Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if generative AI is reaching its limits?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
L'Istrie fut une terre de résistance, où la mémoire des partisans de la Seconde Guerre mondiale reste plus présente qu'ailleurs en Croatie. Pas seulement avec d'imposants monuments brutaliste, mais aussi par des témoignages plus diffus et plus intimes, dans tous les petits villages de la péninsule. Diaporama.
- Articles / Mémoires Italie, Courrier des Balkans, Croatie, Histoire, YougonostalgieDu 30 octobre au 28 novembre 2025, l'Institut culturel bulgare à Paris accueille l'exposition Georges Papazoff "Retrouver son chez-soi" dédiée à l'un des grands noms bulgares de l'avant-garde européenne.
L'exposition présente 22 œuvres originales de Georges Papazoff (1894–1972), peintre bulgaro-français, pionnier du modernisme, toutes issues de la collection privée de Georgi Vassilev, collectionneur et mécène engagé dans la redécouverte de l'artiste. Aux côtés de Papazoff, l'exposition (…)
Das Thema Kennzeichen in Europa bietet eine faszinierende Reise durch die Vielfalt und Einzigartigkeit verschiedener Länder. Ob es um die unterschiedlichen Formatstrukturen oder die speziellen Kennzeichenfarben für diplomatische und militärische Fahrzeuge geht, jedes Land hat seine eigenen Regeln und Besonderheiten.
Wussten Sie, dass das Erstzulassungsdatum auf modernen Kennzeichen oft verschlüsselt ist? Oder dass personalisierte Kennzeichen teilweise hohe Gebühren verursachen können? In diesem Artikel erfahren Sie mehr über diese spannenden Aspekte und vieles mehr rund um das Thema Kennzeichen in Europa.
Entdecken Sie, wie alte Kennzeichen als begehrte Sammlerstücke gehandelt werden und welche Unterschiede es bei der Kennzeichenpflicht für Motorräder und Anhänger in verschiedenen europäischen Ländern gibt. Tauchen Sie ein und lassen Sie sich von der Welt der europäische Nummernschilder überraschen!
Das Wichtigste in KürzeDie Kennzeichenformate und -strukturen in Europa sind nicht einheitlich und variieren erheblich zwischen den einzelnen Ländern. Während einige Länder ein alphabetisches System verwenden, setzen andere auf numerische Codes oder eine Mischung aus beidem. Darüber hinaus unterscheiden sich auch die Abstandsregelungen für Buchstaben und Zahlen, was zu unterschiedlichen Designs und Lesbarkeit der Kennzeichen führt.
Empfehlung: Europa Park Wasserpark: Spaß und Erfrischung
Erstzulassungsdatum auf modernen Kennzeichen meist verschlüsselt Kennzeichen in Europa: WissenswertesAuf modernen Kennzeichen in Europa ist das Erstzulassungsdatum oft nicht direkt ersichtlich. Stattdessen wird es in einer Art Code verschlüsselt, was Neulingen schnell als kompliziert erscheinen kann.
Kennzeichen sind mehr als nur eine Kombination aus Buchstaben und Zahlen. Sie erzählen Geschichten und spiegeln die Kultur eines Landes wider. – Ferdinand Dudenhöffer
Spezielle Kennzeichenfarben für diplomatische und militärische FahrzeugeIn vielen europäischen Ländern haben diplomatische und militärische Fahrzeuge spezielle Kennzeichenfarben, um Ihre Zugehörigkeit sichtbar zu machen. Diplomatische Kennzeichen sind häufig grün oder blau hinterlegt, während militärische Fahrzeuge oft schwarze oder olivgrüne Kennzeichen tragen. Dies erleichtert die Identifikation und stellt sicher, dass diese Fahrzeuge sich von denen des zivilen Straßenverkehrs unterscheiden.
Unterschiedliche Abstandsregelungen für Buchstaben und ZahlenIn vielen europäischen Ländern gibt es unterschiedliche Abstandsregelungen für Buchstaben und Zahlen auf Kennzeichen. Diese Regelungen beeinflussen unter anderem die Lesbarkeit und die optische Balance des Kennzeichens. Beispielsweise kann in einem Land der Abstand zwischen Buchstaben und Zahlen strenger reguliert sein als in einem anderen, was zu variierenden Designs führen kann. Es ist wichtig, diese Regularien zu beachten, um Konformität und Erkennbarkeit sicherzustellen.
Interessanter Artikel: Insel kaufen in Europa: Ihr Privatparadies
.table-responsiv {width: 100%;padding: 0px;margin-bottom: 0px;overflow-y: hidden;border: 1px solid #DDD;overflow-x: auto;min-height: 0.01%;} Land Kennzeichenformat Besonderheit Deutschland AB 123 CD Regionaler Buchstabencode Frankreich AA-123-AA Buchstaben als Gruppierung verstanden Italien AA 123 AA Abgaben an Regionen Regeln für personalisierte Kennzeichen variieren stark Regeln für personalisierte Kennzeichen variieren stark – Kennzeichen in Europa: WissenswertesDie Regeln für personalisierte Kennzeichen variieren stark zwischen den einzelnen europäischen Ländern. In einigen Staaten gibt es relativ lockere Bestimmungen, während andere Länder strikte Vorgaben haben. Besonders begehrte Kombinationen können hohe Gebühren verursachen und sind oft nur begrenzt verfügbar.
Mehr dazu: Städtetrips Europa Geheimtipps: Wo es sich lohnt
Hohe Gebühren für bestimmte KennzeichenkombinationenIn vielen europäischen Ländern können bestimmte Kennzeichenkombinationen mit hohen Gebühren verbunden sein. Besonders beliebte oder personalisierte Kombinationen werden als exklusiv angesehen und sind dementsprechend teurer. Die Nachfrage nach einzigartigen Nummernplatten kann so stark sein, dass Einzelpersonen bereit sind, hohe Summen zu zahlen, um Ihre Wunschkombination zu erhalten. Auch historische Kennzeichen sind oft sehr begehrt und erzielen auf dem Markt beträchtliche Preise.
Alte Kennzeichen werden oft als Sammlerstücke gehandeltAlte Kennzeichen, besonders historische oder seltene Serien, werden oft als Sammlerstücke gehandelt. Diese Stücke sind bei Sammlern sehr beliebt und können hohen Wert erreichen, insbesondere wenn Sie aus früheren Epochen stammen. Besonders begehrt sind Kennzeichen mit ungewöhnlichen Nummern- und Buchstabenkombinationen oder solche, die ein besonderes Ereignis repräsentieren. Der Handel mit Vintage-Kennzeichen hat sogar einen eigenen kleinen Markt geschaffen, auf dem Enthusiasten tauschen und handeln können.
Kennzeichenpflicht für Motorräder und Anhänger variiertDie Kennzeichenpflicht für Motorräder und Anhänger variiert beträchtlich zwischen den europäischen Ländern. Während einige Staaten von einem Motorrad keine zwei Kennzeichen – eines vorne und eines hinten – verlangen, gibt es andere, in denen nur ein einziges Schild erforderlich ist.
FAQ: Antworten auf häufig gestellte Fragen Welche Materialien werden für Kennzeichen in Europa verwendet? Die meisten Kennzeichen in Europa bestehen aus Aluminium, aber es gibt auch Kunststoffvarianten, die insbesondere in einigen skandinavischen Ländern verwendet werden. Aluminium ist aufgrund seiner Haltbarkeit und Langlebigkeit das am häufigsten verwendete Material. Gibt es europäische Länder, die keine Kennzeichen für bestimmte Fahrzeugtypen vorschreiben? Ja, in einigen europäischen Ländern wie zum Beispiel in Monaco sind gewisse Fahrzeugtypen wie Fahrräder oder kleine Mopeds von der Kennzeichenpflicht befreit. Wie werden Kennzeichen in Europa gegen Fälschung gesichert? Zur Fälschungssicherung enthalten viele Kennzeichen holografische Aufkleber, Wasserzeichen oder spezielle reflektierende Materialien. Einige Länder nutzen auch Barcodes oder RFID-Chips. Können Kennzeichen in Europa über Ländergrenzen hinweg verwendet werden? Nein, die Kennzeichen sind grundsätzlich national und können nicht über Ländergrenzen hinweg ohne Neuzulassung verwendet werden. Bei Umzug oder Fahrzeugverkauf ins Ausland muss das Fahrzeug im neuen Land neu zugelassen und mit einem entsprechenden Kennzeichen ausgestattet werden. Wie lange sind Kennzeichen in Europa gültig? Die Gültigkeit von Kennzeichen hängt von den jeweiligen nationalen Gesetzen ab. In einigen Ländern sind Kennzeichen an das Fahrzeug gebunden und bleiben für die gesamte Lebensdauer des Fahrzeugs gültig. In anderen Ländern müssen Kennzeichen regelmäßig erneuert oder bei der Hauptuntersuchung überprüft werden. Welche Farben haben temporäre Kennzeichen in Europa? Temporäre Kennzeichen in Europa haben oft spezielle Farben wie Rot oder Gelb, um Sie von dauerhaften Kennzeichen zu unterscheiden. Die genaue Farbgebung kann je nach Land unterschiedlich sein.Der Beitrag Kennzeichen in Europa: Wissenswertes erschien zuerst auf Neurope.eu - News aus Europa.
By Monika Brusenbauch Meislová (Masaryk University, Czech Republic), Julie Smith (Cambridge University, UK) and Ed Turner (Aston University, UK)
As we discuss in our recent article in the Journal of Common Market Studies, a proposed youth mobility scheme between the European Union and the United Kingdom ought to have been an easy win. After all, who could oppose giving young people the chance to live, work or study across the Channel? Yet this apparently low-stakes, mutually beneficial idea quickly turned into a symbol of post-Brexit gridlock.
Since 2022, British officials had quietly explored the possibility of a youth mobility scheme with the EU. When initial talks stalled, London pivoted towards bilateral deals with individual member states. That move triggered alarm in Brussels. In April 2024, the European Commission tabled its own EU-wide proposal, granting citizens aged 18–30 the right to live, work or study in the UK for up to four years – and offering the same to young Britons in Europe, including equal tuition fees.
The response from London was swift rejection. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak insisted that the era of EU free movement was over. Labour leader Sir Keir Starmer echoed the same line. When Labour swept to power in July 2024, the new government maintained that there were no plans for a youth mobility scheme – pointing to a “red line” against any return to free movement, even though youth mobility and free movement are not the same thing.
For Brussels, this was more than a technical disagreement. EU officials described youth mobility as “a test of goodwill” and “a token of good faith” in rebuilding trust. Several member states called it their “No. 1 demand”. When London said no, frustration followed swiftly. Across Europe, officials were “baffled” and “dismayed”, while young people on both sides expressed disappointment at another missed opportunity.
At the first formal EU-UK summit since Brexit, held in May 2025, leaders pledged to “deepen our people-to-people ties, particularly for the younger generation”. Yet the rebranded “youth experience scheme” lacks detail, and an agreement still appears distant, even though British politicians, including Chancellor Rachel Reeves, have sought to adopt a more positive framing of the issue.
How did a no-brainer become a deadlock?We argue that the debate about the youth mobility scheme is striking precisely because it seems irrational. Public opinion in Britain strongly supports such a scheme: 68 per cent of the public – and more than 70 per cent of Labour voters – say they support one. The EU sees it as a confidence-building measure and a prerequisite for progress in other areas, from veterinary cooperation to professional qualifications. So why has a positive-sum game produced a lose-lose outcome?
Our analysis draws on three concepts – bounded rationality, path dependence and bilateralism – to explain how cognitive limits, historical legacies and institutional preferences combined to lock both sides into mutually reinforcing constraints.
Bounded rationalityBounded rationality describes the cognitive and organisational limits that prevent actors from making fully rational choices. In the case of the youth mobility scheme, both sides fell prey to predictable biases.
In London, policymakers equated youth mobility with free movement. Then Home Secretary Yvette Cooper summarised the government’s view: “The UK voted to leave free movement. We are not going back […].” Yet youth mobility schemes are controlled and reciprocal — and Britain already runs generous versions with Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The refusal to acknowledge that difference reflected a fixed-sum mentality: if one side gains, the other must lose.
In Brussels, the Commission’s timing can also be explained by bounded rationality. Launching the proposal amid a British general election and migration debates was politically tone-deaf. The plan appeared to many in Westminster as a tactical move to block bilateral deals rather than a genuine gesture of cooperation. By insisting on an all-or-nothing, EU-wide framework and excluding potential compromises, Brussels left little room for negotiation.
Path dependenceOld habits die hard. Brexit created deep institutional scars and mutual suspicion that still shape interactions today. The UK for some time relied on familiar tactics — compartmentalising issues, testing divisions among member states, and framing any mobility measure as a threat to sovereignty. The EU, for its part, remains determined to avoid being played off bilaterally, insisting that unity among the 27 comes first.
These path-dependent behaviours keep both sides trapped in defensive postures. What might have been a simple exchange of opportunities for young people has become another proxy battle over control and trust.
BilateralismThe row about the youth mobility scheme also illustrates the limits of London’s promiscuous bilateralism – the strategy of forging deals directly with individual EU countries rather than negotiating with the bloc as a whole. While bilateralism offers flexibility, it creates inequalities. The UK was reportedly courting six countries, including France, Germany and Spain, but excluding others. Smaller member states feared second-class treatment, and the Commission stepped in to protect the EU’s cornerstone of equal treatment.
Moreover, member states themselves were reluctant to jeopardise EU solidarity by cutting side-deals with London. The EU’s multilateral reflex thus collided with the UK’s bilateral instincts, producing yet another stand-off.
Lessons from the youth mobility scheme deadlockThe youth mobility impasse reveals how the ghosts of Brexit continue to shape – and distort – the earliest stages of post-Brexit cooperation. We suggest that the problem is not irreconcilable interests but bounded imagination: the inability to think beyond entrenched habits and mutual mistrust.
In our view, breaking the stalemate would require three things. First, the UK must move past its conflation of youth mobility with free movement and engage with the EU on the merits of the proposal. Second, the EU should recognise the political sensitivity of the issue in Britain and frame its overtures with greater contextual awareness. Third, both sides need to escape the gravitational pull of path dependence — to see that what was forged in the heat of Brexit negotiations need not define the next decade.
The youth mobility controversy may seem a minor issue, but it offers a mirror for the wider UK-EU relationship. We believe that the lesson is sobering: rebuilding trust requires not just political will but the courage to move beyond the reflexes shaped by the Brexit years.
Monika Brusenbauch Meislová is Associate Professor at Masaryk University (Czech Republic), Visiting Professor at Aston University (United Kingdom) and Visiting Fellow at Loughborough University London. She holds the Jean Monnet Chair in EU Digital Diplomacy and is an associate member of the Centre for Research on the English-Speaking World at Sorbonne-Nouvelle University in Paris. Her research work covers issues of political discourse, legitimacy and EU-UK relations.
Julie Smith is Professor of European Politics at Cambridge University and a Fellow of Robinson College. As Baroness Smith of Newnham, she sits in the House of Lords. She was previously head of the European Programme at Chatham House. Julie’s research interests centre on the history and politics of the European Union, democracy in Europe and the UK’s relations with the EU.
Ed Turner is Reader in Politics at Aston University, Birmingham, UK, where he is also Co-Director of the Aston Centre for Europe. He is Acting Chair of the International Association for the Study of German Politics. He spent over two years recently on secondment to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office of the UK Government. Ed is a leading expert on German politics and his research interests also cover comparative politics, notably in the areas of political parties, federalism and public policy.
The post Anatomy of a Stalemate: Why the EU-UK Youth Mobility Plan Hit a Brick Wall appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
High-level speakers include Commissioner Andrius KUBILIUS, Commissioner for Defence and Space, Admiral Pierre VANDIER, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, NATO's Assistant Secretary General Boris RUGE and the EEAS Deputy Secretary General Charles FRIES.
High-level speakers include Commissioner Andrius KUBILIUS, Commissioner for Defence and Space, Admiral Pierre VANDIER, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, NATO's Assistant Secretary General Boris RUGE and the EEAS Deputy Secretary General Charles FRIES.