Feed aggregator

A national children and youth organization to assist in the socialization of children and adolescents is to appear in Russia. Additionally, Communists of Russia announced the revival of the youth organization with the historic name of the Russian Leninist Young Communist League, known for the Russian initials as VLKSM

Der Rat hat das gegen 170 Personen verhängte Einfrieren von Geldern und Reiseverbot sowie das gegen drei Organisationen in Belarus verhängte Einfrieren von Geldern für vier Monate ausgesetzt. Dieser Beschluss wurde als Reaktion auf die Freilassung aller belarussischen politischen Gefangenen am 22. August und vor dem Hintergrund der Verbesserung der Beziehungen zwischen der EU und Belarus gefasst.

Die Freilassung aller politischen Gefangenen war ein von der Europäischen Union seit langem ersehnter Schritt. Mit der Aussetzung der meisten restriktiven Maßnahmen hat die EU auf diese Fortschritte reagiert und zu weiteren positiven Entwicklungen ermutigt, die zu einer Verbesserung der Beziehungen zwischen der EU und Belarus führen. Die EU wird die Lage der Demokratie und der Menschenrechte in Belarus auch weiterhin genau beobachten. 

Die Geltungsdauer der restriktiven Maßnahmen gegen Personen und Organisationen sollte am 31. Oktober ablaufen. Der Rat hat diese Maßnahmen um vier Monate, d.h. bis zum 29. Februar 2016, verlängert und sie dabei zugleich für 170 Personen und für drei Organisationen ausgesetzt. Vier Personen, die am ungeklärten Verschwinden von Personen in Belarus beteiligt sein sollen, unterliegen nach wie vor den restriktiven Maßnahmen. Auch das Waffenembargo gilt weiterhin. 

Der Rat hat ferner die Liste der Personen und Organisationen aktualisiert, um der jüngsten Rechtsprechung Rechnung zu tragen.

Der Beschluss wurde im Wege des schriftlichen Verfahrens angenommen. Die Rechtsakte, einschließlich der genauen Angaben zu den betroffenen Personen und Organisationen, werden im Amtsblatt der EU vom 30. Oktober veröffentlicht und treten am 31. Oktober in Kraft.

2015. október 29-én háromhetes egyeztetési időszak veszi kezdetét, amelynek célja, hogy megállapodás jöjjön létre a Tanács és az Európai Parlament között az EU 2016. évi költségvetéséről. Ennek előzménye, hogy a Parlament 2015. október 28-án olyan módosításokat fogadott el, amelyek a Tanács számára nem voltak elfogadhatóak.

A Tanács különösen aggályosnak tartja, hogy a Parlament az EU kiadásait jóval a 2014–2020-as időszakra szóló többéves pénzügyi keretben meghatározott felső határok fölé kívánja emelni. A Tanács úgy véli, hogy az EU 2016. évi költségvetéséről nem lehet a korábban elfogadott kiadási határokat figyelmen kívül hagyva határozni, és tekintettel kell lenni azokra a pénzügyi nehézségekre is, amelyek a tagállamokat jelenleg sújtják. Véleménye szerint bölcs döntés lenne egyfajta pénzügyi egérutat hagyni arra az esetre, ha váratlan események és pénzügyi szükségletek merülnének fel. Ezért felkéri a Parlamentet, hogy tegyen különbséget az esetleg kívánatos és az alapvetően szükséges intézkedések között.

Helyes döntéseket kell hozni 

„A költségvetéssel kapcsolatos döntések hasonlóak azokhoz, amelyeket mindenki hoz a mindennapi életben: meghatározott pénzösszeget kell beosztani. A Tanács készen áll arra, hogy konstruktívan együttműködjön az Európai Parlamenttel annak biztosítása érdekében, hogy a helyes döntéseket hozzuk meg, amelyek Európa, annak polgárai és gazdasága érdekeit szolgálják” – mondta Pierre Gramegna, Luxemburg pénzügyminisztere, a Tanács elnöke. 

Bizalmi kérdés

A Tanács rendkívül fontosnak tartja továbbá, hogy minden uniós intézmény csökkentse alkalmazottai létszámát, hogy 2017-re el lehessen érni a 2013-hoz képest meghatározott 5%-os létszám-csökkentési célt. „Lényeges, hogy minden intézmény a 2013 decemberében tett kötelezettségvállalásának betűjével és szellemével összhangban járjon el. Ha az uniós intézmények meg kívánják őrizni az európai polgárok bizalmát, be kell tartaniuk a saját szabályaikat” – mondta Pierre Gramegna.

Teljes elkötelezettséggel a menekültügyi válság megoldása iránt 

A Tanács a Parlamenttel egyetértve fontosnak tartja a menekültügyi válság megoldását célzó intézkedéseket, és készen áll arra, hogy rendkívüli pénzügyi erőforrásokat bocsásson rendelkezésre ezen intézkedések finanszírozásához. A migrációs válság kezelése érdekében a Tanács – a Parlamenttel együtt – az EU 2015. évi költségvetése keretében a kötelezettségvállalási előirányzatokat összesen 490,3 millió EUR-val, a kifizetési előirányzatokat pedig összesen 133,6 millió EUR-val már megnövelte. A Tanács változtatások nélkül elfogadta a migrációval kapcsolatos intézkedések tekintetében javasolt erőforrásokat, a Bizottság 2016. évre szóló költségvetési tervezetének megfelelően. Ezenkívül a Tanács készen áll megvitatni, hogy a Bizottság 2. sz. módosító indítványa alapján további támogatást biztosítsanak az EU 2016. évi költségvetéséből. 

Háttérinformációk

A 2016. évre szóló költségvetési tervezetében a Bizottság azt javasolta, hogy a kötelezettségvállalások összértékét 153,83 milliárd EUR-ban, a kifizetések összértékét pedig 143,54 milliárd EUR-ban állapítsák meg. Ez 5,2%-os csökkenés a kötelezettségvállalások, és 1,6%-os csökkenés a kifizetések terén az 1–7. sz. költségvetés-módosítással módosított 2015. évi költségvetéshez képest. 

A Tanács szeptember 4-én egyhangú szavazással elfogadott álláspontjában a kötelezettségvállások összege 153,27 milliárd EUR (-5,5%), a kifizetéseké pedig 142,12 milliárd EUR (+0,6%). 

Az Európai Parlament azt kéri, hogy a kötelezettségvállalások teljes összegét emeljék 157,43 milliárd EUR-ra (-3,0%), a kifizetések teljes összegét pedig 146,46 milliárd EUR-ra (+3,7%). Ez 1,5 milliárd, illetve 1,3 milliárd EUR-val haladná meg a többéves pénzügyi keretben megállapított felső határokat. 

Ami az alkalmazottak létszámát illeti, a Bizottság által az intézmények mindegyike tekintetében egyenlően alkalmazott módszertan szerint 2013 és 2016 között a Tanács 4,5%-kal, a Bizottság pedig 4%-kal fogja csökkenteni a létszámtervi álláshelyek számát. A Parlament személyzetének létszáma viszont a tervek szerint ugyanebben az időszakban 0,4%-al nőni fog. A három intézmény a 2013 decemberében a költségvetési fegyelemről elfogadott intézményközi megállapodásában kötelezettséget vállalt arra, hogy alkalmazottai létszámát 2013 és 2017 között 5%-kal csökkenti.

Az egyeztetés ki fog terjedni a 2/2016. sz. módosító indítványra is, amelynek célja, hogy a legnehezebb helyzetű tagállamok megsegítésére, a menekültek áthelyezésére, valamint a migrációs, illetve a határok védelmét szolgáló alapokra szánt, a 2016-os költségvetésből nyújtandó támogatást 1,55 milliárd EUR összegű kötelezettségvállalással és 1,42 milliárd EUR összegű kifizetéssel növelje. Sem a Tanács, sem a Parlament nem alakított még ki álláspontot a módosító indítvánnyal kapcsolatban.

Ruandában kínosan ügyelnek a környezetvédelemre, a nejlonzacskók használatát még törvény is tiltja.

Am 29. Oktober 2015 beginnt die dreiwöchige Vermittlungsfirst, in der sich der Rat und das Europäische Parlament über den EU-Haushalt für 2016 einigen müssen. Das Parlament hat nämlich am 28. Oktober 2015 Abänderungen angenommen, mit denen der Rat nicht einverstanden ist.

Der Rat ist insbesondere besorgt darüber, dass das Parlament die EU-Ausgaben weit über die im mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen für die Jahre 2014 bis 2020 vereinbarten Obergrenzen hinaus anheben möchte. Er ist der Auffassung, dass der EU-Haushalt 2016 nicht unter Missachtung der in der Vergangenheit vereinbarten Ausgabengrenzen und der gegenwärtigen finanziellen Zwänge der Mitgliedstaaten beschlossen werden kann. Auch sollte aus seiner Sicht ein gewisser finanzieller Spielraum für den Fall eines unvorhergesehen Ereignisses oder Mittelbedarfs eingeplant werden. Daher ersucht er das Parlament, zwischen wünschenswerten und unbedingt notwendigen Maßnahmen zu unterscheiden.

Die richtigen Entscheidungen treffen 

"Bei den Haushaltsbeschlüssen geht es uns wie allen Menschen: Wenn die Mittel begrenzt sind, muss man auswählen. Der Rat ist bereit, mit dem Europäischen Parlament konstruktiv zusammenzuarbeiten, damit die richtigen Entscheidungen für Europa, seine Bürger und seine Wirtschaft getroffen werden", erklärte der luxemburgische Finanzminister und derzeitige Ratspräsident, Pierre Gramegna. 

Eine Frage des Vertrauens

Der Rat hält es zudem für äußerst wichtig, dass alle EU-Institutionen Personal abbauen, damit bis 2017 die vereinbarte Reduzierung um 5 % gegenüber 2013 erreicht werden kann. "Es ist unabdingbar, dass alle Institutionen entsprechend dem Geist und Wortlaut ihrer Zusagen vom Dezember 2013 handeln. Wenn die EU-Institutionen das Vertrauen der europäischen Bürger nicht verlieren wollen, müssen sie sich an ihre eigenen Regeln halten", so Gramegna.

Entschlossenes Vorgehen in der Flüchtlingskrise 

Der Rat ist sich mit dem Parlament einig, dass Maßnahmen zur Bewältigung der Flüchtlingskrise von größter Bedeutung sind, und er ist bereit, hierfür außerordentliche Mittel zur Verfügung zu stellen. So hat er gemeinsam mit dem Parlament als Reaktion auf die Migrationskrise schon jetzt die Mittel für Verpflichtungen um insgesamt 490,3 Mio. € und die Mittel für Zahlungen um insgesamt 133,6 Mio. € aus dem EU-Haushalt 2015 aufgestockt. Auch hat er die von der Kommission in ihrem Haushaltsplanentwurf für 2016 vorgeschlagenen Mittel für migrationsbezogene Maßnahmen ohne Änderungen gebilligt. Er ist zudem bereit, auf der Grundlage des Berichtigungsschreibens Nr. 2 der Kommission über eine zusätzliche Unterstützung aus dem EU-Haushalt 2016 zu sprechen. 

Hintergrundinformationen

Die Kommission hat in ihrem Haushaltsplanentwurf für 2016 Mittel für Verpflichtungen in Höhe von insgesamt 153,83 Mrd. € und Mittel für Zahlungen in Höhe von insgesamt 143,54 Mrd. € vorgeschlagen. Im Vergleich zu dem durch die Berichtigungshaushalte Nr. 1-7 geänderten Haushalt 2015 entspricht dies einer Abnahme von 5,2 % bei den Verpflichtungen und einer Zunahme von 1,6 % bei den Zahlungen. 

In dem am 4. September einstimmig angenommenen Standpunkt des Rates sind Mittel für Verpflichtungen in Höhe von 153,27 Mrd. € (-5,5 %) und Mittel für Zahlungen in Höhe von 142,12 Mrd. € (+0,6%) vorgesehen. 

Das Europäische Parlament beantragt eine Aufstockung der Mittel für Verpflichtungen auf insgesamt 157,43 Mrd. € (-3,0 %) und der Mittel für Zahlungen auf insgesamt 146,46 Mrd. € (+3,7%). Diese Beträge übersteigen die Obergrenzen des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens um 1,5 bzw. 1.3 Mrd. €.  

Was den Personalbestand anbelangt, so werden nach der Methode, die von der Kommission auf alle Institutionen angewandt wird, die Planstellen zwischen 2013 und 2016 beim Rat um 4,5 % und bei der Kommission um 4 % verringert. Beim Parlament würde jedoch im gleichen Zeitraum das Personal um 0,4 % aufgestockt. In ihrer interinstitutionellen Vereinbarung vom Dezember 2013 über die Haushaltsdisziplin haben sich die drei Institutionen verpflichtet, ihr Personal zwischen 2013 und 2017 um 5 % abzubauen.

Das Vermittlungsverfahren erstreckt sich auch auf das Berichtigungsschreiben Nr. 2 für 2016, wonach die Unterstützung für die Mitgliedstaaten mit dem größten Bedarf, für die Umsiedlung von Flüchtlingen und für den Migrations- und den Grenzenfonds im Haushaltsplan 2016 um 1,55 Mrd. € an Mitteln für Verpflichtungen und um 1,42 Mrd. € an Mitteln für Zahlungen aufgestockt werden soll. Weder der Rat noch das Parlament haben derzeit zu dem Berichtigungsschreiben Stellung genommen.

"An extremey good man"

"The conference of Presidents decided that the Sakharov Prize will go to Saudi blogger Raif Badawi," said Schulz announcing the 2015 laureate in plenary. "This man, who is an extremely good man and an exemplary good man, has had imposed on him one of the most gruesome penalties that exist in this country which can only be described as brutal torture." The EP President added: "I call on King of Saudi Arabia to stop the execution of this sentence, to release Mr Badawi, to allow him to back to his wife and to allow him to travel here for the December session to receive this prize."
Press release on the winner of the Sakharov Prize 2015
President Schulz announces the winner of the Sakharov Prize 2015
Sakharov Prize webpage
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

La Revue Politique et parlementaire a publié dans son dernier numéro une recension sur le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (3/2015).

« Dans une région secouée par des guerres sans fin, au milieu d’un chaos généralisé, le Maroc et l’Algérie semblent relativement épargnés. Pour combien de temps encore alors que l’environnement international risque de remettre en cause ce calme relatif : chute des prix du pétrole, baisse de la rente entraînant une dislocation du tissu social, mettant à nu le fonctionnement du système : structures politiques opaques, clientélisme corruption, faisant le lit d’une islamisation rampante et un chaos extérieur explosif (Sahel, Tunisie, Lybie). Le dossier de Politique étrangère donne un éclairage percutant de l’ensemble de ces questions. Sont également abordés deux thèmes majeurs de 2015 : le centenaire du génocide arménien, occasion de rapprochement entre Ankara et Erevan gaspillée, mais révélatrice, entre autres, des contradictions turques ; et la mutation des migrations internationales, en particulier celles qui concernent l’Europe et l’espace méditerranéen.

D’autres sujets de réflexion y sont développés : la négociation d’un éventuel TTIP, la vision chinoise des « nouvelles Routes de la soie », l’état de la Somalie, la piraterie dans le golfe de Guinée, les rapports entre les États musulmans et l’islam de France. En rendant compte des débats relevant des
relations internationales et en proposant des analyses approfondies de l’actualité internationale, La revue trimestrielle Politique étrangère constitue un instrument de référence pour les milieux académiques, les décideurs et la société civile. »

Raif Badawi is the laureate of this year's Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, following an October 29 decision by EP President Martin Schulz and the political group leaders. Badawi is a blogger from Saudi Arabia currently serving a 10-yearprison sentence for insulting Islam on his website promoting social, political and religious debate. The Sakharov award ceremony will be held in Strasbourg on16 December
Further information
Press release on Laureate Raif Badawi
President Schulz announces the winner of the Sakharov Prize 2015
More on the Sakharov Prize
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

A Tanács négy hónapra felfüggesztette 170 fehéroroszországi személy utazási tilalmát, valamint e személyek és három belarusz szervezet vagyoni eszközeinek befagyasztását. A döntés előzménye, hogy augusztus 22-én szabadon engedték az összes politikai foglyot Belaruszban, célja pedig az EU és Belarusz közötti kapcsolatok javítása.

Az összes politikai fogoly szabadon engedése olyan lépés, amelyet az Európai Unió régóta elvárt. A korlátozó intézkedések nagy részének felfüggesztésével az EU erre a folyamatra reagált, számítva arra, hogy ez további olyan kedvező változásokhoz vezet, amelyek következtében javulhat a viszony az EU és Belarusz között. Az EU továbbra is szorosan figyelemmel kíséri a demokrácia és az emberi jogok helyzetét Belaruszban. 

A személyekkel és szervezetekkel szemben kivetett korlátozó intézkedések hatálya október 31-én járt volna le. A Tanács egyfelől meghosszabbította ezeket négy hónappal, azaz 2016. február 29-ig, másfelől felfüggesztésükről döntött 170 személy és három szervezet vonatkozásában. Négy olyan személlyel szemben továbbra is érvényben maradnak a korlátozó intézkedések, akik Belaruszban eltűnt személyek felderítetlen ügyében érintettek. A fegyverembargó szintén érvényben marad. 

A Tanács emellett a legutóbbi ítélkezési gyakorlat fényében aktualizálta a személyek és szervezetek listáját.

A határozatot írásbeli eljárással fogadták el. A jogi aktusok, amelyek a személyek és szervezetek részletes adatait is tartalmazzák, az EU Hivatalos Lapjának október 30-i számában jelennek meg, és október 31-én lépnek hatályba.

 The USS Lassen, a guided-missile destroyer. Photograph: John Hageman/U.S. navy via The New York Times

Tuesday’s voyage of the guided-missile naval destroyer USS Lassen through waters claimed by China in the South China Sea had the potential to escalate an already tense situation.  Despite being perfectly legal— international maritime law allows “innocent passage” of warships through territorial seas without notification—Beijing responded with the deployment of its own guided-missile destroyer, the Lanzhou, and its naval patrol ship Taizhou to issue warnings and shadow the U.S. destroyer.  Fortunately, cool heads prevailed, and the American destroyer sailed without incident within the 12-nautical-mile territorial limit China has declared surrounding one of its artificial islands.  

The artificial islands, located in the hotly disputed Spratly island chain, were previously submerged reefs during high tide, and turned into islands after significant dredging efforts by the Chinese.  Under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed by China, nations have no claim to 12-nautical mile limits around man-made islands built on previously submerged reefs.  The Spratly island territory is disputed among Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam—all of which, except Brunei, occupy some of the maritime features.  

Tuesday’s mission by the U.S. Navy was ostensibly a routine exercise in freedom of navigation.  White House spokesman Josh Earnest referred to “billions of dollars of commerce that float through that region of the world,” adding, “Ensuring that free flow of commerce … is critical to the global economy.”

Yet while the naval maneuver was an exercise in freedom of navigation, it was also understood in many quarters to be a direct challenge to Beijing’s claims of sovereignty, following last month’s declaration by Beijing that it would “never allow any country” to violate its territorial waters and airspace in the Spratlys.  The U.S. mission had been expected, following Washington’s discussion of its proposal with other claimants to the waters.  

Not only was Tuesday’s mission widely foreshadowed, but it followed similar actions by the U.S. to counter Beijing’s claims to the waters and air of the East and South China Seas.  Back in May, a U.S. P8-A Poseidon surveillance aircraft flew near the artificial islands (but outside the 12-mile limit) with a television crew aboard from CNN.  And in 2013, two U.S. B-52 bombers flew through an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea—newly-established by China to cement its claims over territory contested with Japan.  The last time the U.S. challenged a 12-mile limit claimed by China was in 2012, also in the Spratlys.

As in the past, the reaction by Beijing to the latest challenge to its claims of sovereignty  was swift and pronounced, but largely targeted to a domestic audience. Lu Kang, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said the U.S. destroyer had “illegally entered” the waters near the islands “without receiving permission from the Chinese government.”  The state news agency, Xinhua, issued a warning, “Decision-makers in Washington need to be reminded that China has little room for compromise when it comes to matters regarding its sovereignty, and it will take whatever means at whatever cost to safeguard its sovereign interests.” The Chinese Embassy in Washington had earlier warned the United States should “refrain from saying or doing anything provocative and act responsibly in maintaining regional peace and stability,” arguing, “Freedom of navigation and overflight should not be used as excuse to flex muscle and undermine other countries’ sovereignty and security.”  

These comments and others, along with the shadowing of the U.S. destroyer, have clearly illuminated Beijing’s stance concerning the artificial islands. Beijing considers these new islands as Chinese territory de facto and will oppose all efforts to challenge that authority.  So far that opposition has been one of rhetoric to please the home crowd, and given the inefficiencies of the Chinese navy, should remain so as long as the U.S. maintains its strategic pivot to Asia, where 60% of the U.S. Navy’s assets are expected to be deployed by 2020.

Besides, any military action by China would be premature, given that its own military experts reckon their navy has another 30 years to go before being able to match the efficiency of the U.S. Navy.  And although the Pentagon figures China has more than 300 warships, submarines, amphibious ships and patrol boats compared to 200 among Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, the combined forces of the U.S. and its regional allies could easily neutralize any and all of its military bases in the South China Sea should push come to shove.

This past week’s freedom of navigation exercise went a long way in reassuring Washington’s allies in the region, and did not escalate due to Beijing being fully cognizant of the risks of a military response.  The sail-by exercise by the U.S. should be thought of as tantamount to a neighborhood foot patrol by police—not as a SWAT team crackdown like some Chinese netizens would seem to think.  Should the exercises continue, as expected in the coming weeks, Washington will again need careful planning and timing, coalition-building and advanced warnings (while maintaining a low-key approach), for its actions not to raise any geopolitical alarms.

Perhaps over time, these freedom of navigation exercises will become as newsworthy as the barely mentioned news of five Chinese naval vessels penetrating the 12-mile limit of the U.S.-owned Aleutian Islands off Alaska last month, during a visit by President Barack Obama.

Mehr Migranten denn je erreichen zur Zeit die Europäische Union, und dieser vermehrte Zustrom wird voraussichtlich weiter anhalten. Gemeinsam mit den Mitgliedstaaten ergreift die EU eine Vielzahl von Maßnahmen, um die Probleme in den Griff zu bekommen und zu einer wirksamen, humanitären und sicheren europäischen Migrationspolitik zu gelangen. Migrationssteuerung ist eine gemeinsame Aufgabe und hat überdies erhebliche Auswirkungen auf die Herkunfts- und Transitländer. 

Zusammenarbeit EU-Afrika

Seit 2005 gibt es den Gesamtansatz für Migration und Mobilität (GAMM), einen Rahmen für die Zusammenarbeit der EU mit Drittländern in den Bereichen Migration und Asyl. Er wurde im Mai 2012 überarbeitet und dient als Ergänzung der EU-Politik in außen- und entwicklungspolitischen Angelegenheiten. Auf seiner Grundlage wurden mehrere Prozesse der Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EU und afrikanischen Ländern auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen eingeleitet:

• auf kontinentaler Ebene
• auf regionaler Ebene (Rabat-Prozess, Khartum-Prozess)
• auf bilateraler Ebene (über Mobilitätspartnerschaften und andere Instrumente)

Auch der Migrationsgipfel in Valletta dient diesem Ziel. Er soll die EU und die afrikanischen Länder zusammenbringen, damit sie im Geiste der Partnerschaft versuchen, Probleme, die beide Seiten betreffen, gemeinsam zu lösen. Dabei soll auf bestehenden Maßnahmen und Kooperationsrahmen aufgebaut und insbesondere fünf Bereichen besondere Beachtung geschenkt werden.

Beseitigung der Migrationsursachen

Die Migranten verlassen ihre Länder aus vielerlei Gründen, unter anderem wegen Konflikten, politischer und wirtschaftlicher Instabilität, Menschenrechtsverletzungen oder Armut. Um den Zustrom von Migranten zu verringern, bemüht sich die EU verstärkt um Frieden, Stabilität und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in den betroffenen Ländern.

Nincs olyan európai uniós jogszabály, amely tiltaná a magyar otthonok rezsicsökkentő felújításának vissza nem térítendő forrásokból való támogatását, vagyis van uniós pénz a lakossági energetikai pályázatokra - közölte a Magyar Energiahatékonysági Intézet (MEHI) csütörtökön az MTI-vel Walter Deffaa-ra, az Európai Bizottság Regionális Főigazgatóságának vezetőjére hivatkozva.

To mark the 20th anniversary of International Crisis Group, we are publishing a series of 20 essays by foreign policy leaders forecasting the “Future of Conflict”.

Die Außenminister der USA, Russlands, Saudi-Arabiens und der Türkei treffen sich am 29.10.2015...

PONARS Eurasia has just published my memo on Russian naval shipbuilding from our September policy conference. I’m reposting it here. Lots of other very interesting memos are available on the PONARS website.

—–

Russia’s takeover of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent reinforcement of the region’s military forces have been combined with a general increase in naval activity—including aggressive activity vis-à-vis NATO countries’ maritime interests beyond the Black Sea. All this has led to increased international interest in Russian naval modernization plans. Although this modernization effort is going slowly, the Russian Navy’s ability to place effective long-range cruise missiles on relatively small ships means that Russia remains a serious regional maritime power with the capability to threaten not only its neighbors but much of Europe in the event of a conflict.

Russian Naval Construction Plans

Strategic nuclear deterrence will remain the number one mission of the Russian Navy in the coming decades. For this reason, the construction of Russian nuclear submarines has received priority financing and has been largely insulated from budget cuts.

The main new submarine projects include the following:

• Borei-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which will replace the remaining Delta III and Delta IV submarines over the next 15 years. Three are commissioned, 3 are under construction, and 2 more are contracted.
• Yasen-class nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), which are large and expensive. One is currently commissioned and a total of 8 are planned. Only 2 are likely to be completed by 2020 due to financial constraints on construction.
• New, smaller, and cheaper nuclear submarines. Two versions:  one designed for protecting naval strike groups against attack submarines and the other to be armed with cruise missiles. Construction on these submarines will start in 1-2 years, with a production goal of 16-18 of them in service by 2040.
• Kalina-class diesel submarine with air independent propulsion (AIP). This will serve as the successor to the Lada-class submarine. Although the head of the Navy has said that an AIP design will be complete by the end of 2016, it is unclear how much progress has actually been made.

As for surface ships, the Navy is primarily building small ones at present, while finalizing designs for larger ships for the future. The main projects include:

• Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates (FFG). Construction of these ships has been unusually slow even by the glacial pace of recent Russian shipbuilding. Eight are currently under construction, with the first scheduled to be commissioned this year. At the current rate of construction, the Navy can expect to have 5 ships of this class by 2025, and 9 by 2030.
• Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates (FFG) (updated Soviet design). Six have been ordered to fill the gap left by the slow construction of the Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates. Construction of the last three ships has been suspended due to the end of military cooperation with Ukraine, which produced the gas turbines for these ships.
• Steregushchiy-class corvette (FFC). Four ships are in active service, 7 are under construction, and 9 more are under contract. Eighteen were originally planned to be built by 2020, although delays associated with Western sanctions are likely to reduce this number to 12-14.
• Admiral Bykov-class corvette (FFC). Two are under construction, with 4 more under contract and a total of 12 expected to be built over the next 10-15 years. These ships are expected to have greater range and more self-sufficiency than their predecessors.
• Buyan-M-class missile ships (PFG). These small ships are designed to be used primarily in the Caspian Flotilla and Black Sea Fleet. Three are in service, 2 are in sea trials, and 4 are under construction.
• Lider-class 15,000-ton nuclear destroyers (DDG). Construction is scheduled to begin in 2018-2019, with a goal of 12 in the fleet by 2035. Some analysts argue that financial limitations mean only 3-4 of these ships will be built.
• New large amphibious ships (LHD). These would have at least 14,000-ton displacement and be capable of conducting expeditionary missions. Construction of these ships is likely to start before 2020.

The Feasibility of Russian Shipbuilding Plans

Official statements related to naval shipbuilding give the appearance that the Russian Navy is undergoing a rapid revival. However, the reality is that many of these projects have faced lengthy delays and cost overruns. As a result, some of the most prominent naval procurement projects have been scaled back while others have been postponed for years at a time.

The main reasons for these delays and cost overruns involve a) long-term decline in naval research and development; b) an inability to modernize the shipbuilding industry, which is considered to be particularly outdated and poorly structured as compared to other sectors of the Russian defense industry (and has suffered more than other sectors due to Western sanctions); and c) pre-existing budgetary constraints that have been exacerbated in recent years by Russia’s economic downturn.

Russia’s current shipbuilding industry was primarily formed in the 1960-70s, and its ship design capabilities have changed little since the early 1980s. As a result, Russian naval research and development (R&D) has fallen several decades behind Western and Asian capabilities. Russian leaders recognized this problem in the late 2000s and sought to absorb Western knowledge through joint projects, such as the Russian version of the French Mistral amphibious assault ship. In addition, they organized joint projects with foreign designers such as Saipem, Wartsila, and STX in civilian shipbuilding. However, the freezing of military cooperation with NATO states in 2014 as a result of the Ukraine conflict has largely foreclosed the possibility of catching up by borrowing Western know-how. Russian naval R&D is therefore likely to remain significantly behind when compared to the Western state-of-the-art.

Western sanctions have also resulted in major problems with the production of ship components, particularly in navigation and communication equipment. Most of these components are not produced domestically in Russia, and the industry has long been dependent on imports from Europe for high quality components. Efforts to start domestic production are underway, but prices for domestic variants are relatively high while quality is relatively low.

Although it has improved somewhat in recent years, shipbuilding is one of the more poorly performing sectors of Russia’s defense industry. Russian analysts argue that Russia’s United Shipbuilding Corporation is the least effective of all state corporations in Russia’s defense sector. This results from its excessive size, bloated management structures, and misguided efforts to combine military and civilian shipbuilding under a single corporate roof.

Financial Constraints

The State Armament Program (SAP) for 2011-2020 assigned five trillion rubles—a quarter of its total expenditures—to military shipbuilding. This amount was almost double the amount allocated to the ground forces and airborne forces combined. According to Russian analysts, currently announced naval procurement plans would require the amount of spending on military shipbuilding to increase to six to seven trillion rubles for the next SAP.

That said, funding the existing SAP through 2020 was beyond the means of the Russian government even prior to the budget crisis that began in 2014. While the percentage of Russian GDP devoted to military spending increased from 1.5 percent in 2010 to 3.4 percent in 2014, this higher level of spending was sustainable for the Russian economy at the time. However, 70 percent of the program’s expenditures were scheduled for the second half of the ten-year program. Since Russia’s economic growth was already slowing, fulfilling these plans would have required Russian military spending to increase to unsustainable levels of 6-8 percent of GDP even without the cuts in Russia’s government budget required by the collapse of world oil prices.

Potential Russian Navy Order of Battle, 2020-2030

The following tables are based on the Russian Navy’s announced construction plans, modified by an analysis of the financial and industrial constraints the Navy faces. These show that the Navy will substantially renew its submarines and small ships over the next fifteen years while it will just be starting on construction of a new generation of large surface combat ships.

Table 1. Submarines in the Russian Navy

Class 2020 2025 2030 Delta III 0 0 0 Delta IV 6 5-6 0-2 Borei 6 8-10 10-12 Sierra I & II, Victor III 0 0 0 Oscar 6 6 4-6 Akula 6 6 4-6 Yasen 2-3 6-8 6-8 New class SSGN 0 4-6 6-10 Kilo (project 877) 10-15 5-10 0 Improved Kilo (project 636.3) 6 6 6 Lada (project 677) 3 3 3 Kalina 0 4-6 6-10

The Russian Navy plans to have 12 SSBNs in active service by 2020. The three remaining Delta III SSBNs will be retired by this point, with six Borei-class SSBNs taking their place in the fleet. All six Delta IV SSBNs will most likely be retired in 2025-30. The Navy is planning to overhaul six Oscar-class guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) and six Akula-class SSNs, which will extend their lifespan by 12-15 years. Older classes, such as the Sierra and Victor III, will be retired before 2020. Yasen-class construction will proceed slowly, with no new orders expected after the current set of 6-8 are completed. Instead, the Navy will focus on the new class of nuclear submarines currently being designed. Older Kilo-class diesel submarines will be gradually retired as the Kalina-class begins to enter service in the early 2020s. The recently built improved Kilo-class and Lada-class submarines will serve as a bridge until a sufficient number of the Kalina-class are constructed.

Table 2. Large Combat Ships

Class 2020 2025 2030 Kuznetsov CV 1 1 1 Kirov CGN 1 2-3 2-3 Slava CG 2 3 3 Sovremennyi DDG 0 0 0 Udaloy DDG 8 7 4-5 Lider DDG 0 0-1 4-6 Krivak I & II FFG 0-2 0 0 Neustrashimyi FFG 2 2 1-2 Admiral Grigorovich FFG 3-5 3-6 3-6 Admiral Gorshkov FFG 2-4 4-6 8-10

The Navy is currently refurbishing its cruisers. The program should be complete by 2025, although it is not yet clear whether the Admiral Lazarev Kirov-class cruiser will be modernized or decommissioned. All Sovremennyi-class destroyers will be decommissioned before 2020, while six Udaloy-class destroyers will be modernized to extend their lifespan through the early 2030s. The total number of Admiral Grigorovich frigates to be constructed will depend on the state of defense cooperation with Ukraine. If no agreement can be reached on purchasing gas turbines for these ships, only three will be commissioned.

Table 3. Small combat ships

Class 2020 2025 2030 Grisha  FFC 18-20 8-10 0 Parchim FFC 7 5-7 0-3 Steregushchii FFC 12-14 20-24 20-24 Admiral Bykov FFC 4-6 6-12 12-15 Gepard FFL 2 2 2 Tarantul PFG 13-15 8-10 0-3 Nanuchka PFG 8-10 0-4 0 Bora PFG 2 2 2 Buyan PG 3 3 3 Buyan-M/Sarsar PFG 12-14 20-24 30-32

The overall number of small combat ships is expected to remain fairly steady over the next fifteen years. The older classes of corvettes and missile ships will be gradually retired as new corvettes and missile ships are commissioned. The new Sarsar-class of missile ships that has been announced recently will be a further modification of the Buyan-M-class and will be built in the 2020s.

Table 4. Amphibious ships

Class 2020 2025 2030 Ropucha LST 12-15 8-10 0 Alligator LST 2-4 0 0 Ivan Gren LST 2 2 2 New class LST 0-1 2-3 6-8 New class LHD 0 0 2-3

The overall number of amphibious ships is likely to decrease over the next fifteen years due to the retirement of Ropucha-class tank landing ships (LST). The overall amphibious capability of the Navy will nonetheless increase as the replacement LSTs will be larger and more capable than the ships they are replacing, while the helicopter landing ships (LHD) will add a capability that the Navy has not previously possessed.

Implications

Regardless of what long-term development path the  Russian Navy chooses to pursue, in the near to medium term it will remain almost exclusively a coastal defense and deterrence force. For the foreseeable future, the strength of the Navy will be in its submarines. Under any development scenario, Russian SSBNs will retain an adequate strategic deterrence capability. Meanwhile, Russian SSGNs will be sufficient to protect the SSBNs and deter enemy naval forces from attacks on Russian territory. These forces will be supported by a new generation of small- and medium-sized combat ships, most of which will be equipped with anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles. These naval forces will be fully sufficient to ensure Russian dominance in neighboring waters.

They will not, however, provide Russia with the forces to make it even a near-peer competitor to the U.S. Navy. Even under the most optimistic projections, the  Russian Navy will not have a serious expeditionary capability for at least 15 years. Planning for large amphibious ships and aircraft carriers is still very much in the early stages.  Whether the Navy should build either type of ship is still highly disputed among both the expert community and military planners. If they are built in the numbers currently being discussed and in the most likely timelines, then the United States may have to be prepared to deal with expeditionary Russian forces in the mid-to-late 2030s. It is far more likely, however, that financial and industrial limitations will lead to the cancellation or significant reduction of plans to develop a naval expeditionary capability.

Furthermore, out-of-area deployment capability is likely to deteriorate in the medium term as legacy Soviet-era large combat ships age and become less reliable. This trajectory will depend to some extent on the ability of the Russian Navy to successfully modernize its existing cruisers and Udaloy-class destroyers. If these programs are all carried out as currently planned, then the Navy will be able to continue to deploy large combat ships in numbers and frequency comparable to present-day rates until the next generation of destroyers are ready in the late 2020s. If these programs are fulfilled only partially or not at all, however, by 2025 the Navy will have few if any large combat ships capable of deploying regularly outside the immediate vicinity of their bases.

Overall, in the next 10-15 years the Russian Navy will most likely be good enough to defend the Russian coastline and ports. It will also be capable of posing a threat to its smaller neighbors and potentially to European NATO member states. The main source of the threat will be Russian ships’ ability to launch land attack cruise missiles from a distance of up to 2500 kilometers away from the target. The launch of cruise missile strikes against targets in Syria from small ships in the Caspian Sea in October 2015 was a demonstration of this capability that was not lost on NATO planners or neighboring states. Ships capable of carrying out similar strikes could be based in the Black or Baltic Sea, where they would be well protected by ship-based and coastal air defenses. The construction of a fairly sizeable fleet of small missile ships and corvettes equipped with land attack cruise missiles, combined with a strong layered coastal air defense capability, obviates to a large extent the need to build a sizeable fleet of large combat ships. Russian missile ships will be able to target most of its smaller neighbors and a large part of Europe without leaving the relative safety of enclosed seas where Russian forces are dominant.

In summary, although the Russian Navy will continue to have problems with its platforms, its offensive capabilities will increasingly not be dependent on the size and range of its ships. The new generation of ships will allow the Navy to mount new generations of long-range cruise missiles in a modular fashion on a variety of platforms. While the Navy will not be able to project power globally or reach the levels of the U.S. Navy, it will be able to target U.S. allies in Europe and states it wants to influence on its borders. Since these countries are likely to be its primary targets in any case, Russia’s naval capabilities will be good enough to achieve Russia’s main maritime military goals in the short to medium term.

Le 25 octobre 2015, quatre militaires du 11e régiment d’artillerie de marine (11e RAMa), engagés à Toulouse dans le cadre de l’opération SENTINELLE, ont participé au marathon en relais organisé par la ville.

Az osztrák-szlovén határ már a schengeni övezeten belül van. Ott elvileg nem akadályozhatják az átkelést.