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A Boldogasszony zarándokvonat május 21-én, csütörtök reggel negyedik alkalommal indult el Erdélybe. A Nyugati pályaudvarról kiinduló 15 kocsiból álló zarándokvonatot Beer Miklós megyéspüspök áldotta meg. A vonat szerelvényein mintegy nyolcszáz zarándok, köztük felvidéki magyar hívők utaznak a csíksomlyói búcsúba.

CDC
Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts
Die durch ein rechtswidriges Kartell Geschädigten können Ersatz ihrer Schäden vor dem Gericht des Ortes verlangen, an dem einer der an der Zuwiderhandlung Beteiligten seinen Sitz hat

CDC
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Les victimes d’une entente illicite peuvent demander réparation de leurs dommages devant le tribunal du domicile de l’un des participants à l’infraction

CDC
A szabadságon, a biztonságon és a jog érvényesülésén alapuló térség
Victims of an unlawful cartel may claim compensation for their loss before the courts where one of the participants in the infringement is domiciled

CDC
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
Victims of an unlawful cartel may claim compensation for their loss before the courts where one of the participants in the infringement is domiciled

Candidate à l'adhésion à l'UE, la Serbie est toujours déterminée à maintenir des liens étroits avec la Russie, a affirmé le ministre russe des Affaires étrangères, Sergei Lavrov, lors d'une visite à Belgrade. Un article d’EurActiv Serbie.

On Tuesday I went to one of my alma maters, LSE’s European Institute, to listen to a panel on Britain’s EU policy. As well as storifying it, I’ve also been thinking about the discussion and particularly three of the things mentioned by Simon Hix, one of the panellists.

“Never underestimate the EU’s ability to find a way to muddle through”

As has been discussed on this blog before, crisis is in many ways the dominant mode of the EU and its predecessors: there’s always something that’s a problem and which requires urgent (and improvised) action. If we can accept that, then the British situation is merely another in a long line stretching from the EDC and the Empty Chair crisis, and there will be a way to sort something out.

In this context, that might mean agreements for the UK that are not embodied in treaty reform per se, but instead in some novel form, such as declarations or intergovermental accords, or the like. As was pointed out at the event, some of the key British objectives might be secured through amending directives, a much more manageable (if still tricky) process than opening a new IGC.

Of course, the danger here is that if too many people come to believe that ‘a way will be found’, then that potentially increases the risk that it doesn’t happen, because everyone assumes someone else is doing it (indeed, that’s what I’m doing here too: I’m not offering any creative solutions): it’s a bit of a ‘tragedy of the commons’ situation, only partly mitigated by the presence of one party who have a strong interest in finding a deal: the British. Now that he is locked on this path, Cameron will not want to turn up empty-handed from any renegotiation, if only for his personal reputation and for getting through the next five years with his backbench, which gives him a good reason to find solutions.

“Never underestimate British arrogance”

However, there’s a second problem. As Hix notes, the dominant way that Brits talk about themselves is a great power (think Empire, sun never setting, UNSC permanent chair, beacon of all that is good, etc.): there’s not a great deal of humility going around, certainly not with this government. The German debate of tying oneself into a European system to protect oneself and others simply wouldn’t happen in the UK. And why should it, you ask?

Exactly.

Naturally, such a view is not universal – it’s one of the reasons that recent Tory governments have been rather suspicious of the Foreign Office – but they are deeply resonant. And in the context of a renegotiation, a view that ‘they need us more than we need them’ is likely to make matters more difficult to resolve. Yes, the UK is a big market for other EU member states, but it’s not as big as the EU market is to the UK: miscalculations of strength/influence raise the risk of an impasse.

And it’s not just the negotiators: the British public will have to be convinced that a meaningful and ‘successful’ deal has been struck by Cameron, if he is to benefit from that stage of the process. If we are going for novel, non-treaty based changes (as above) then that becomes easier to challenge.

“The renegotiation deal doesn’t actually matter at all: it’ll all come down to calculations of the benefit of membership”

In Hix’s view, this might not really matter in any case, because hardly anyone will be too bothered about any ‘deal’: they’ll follow broader cues and perceptions about the value of the system. In this, it’ll be 1975 again, where Wilson’s ‘renegotiation’ really didn’t come into matters at all.

I’ve got some sympathy for this view, since it’s clear that most people don’t have a strong (in the sense of being deeply held) view on the EU, but rather pile it into a wider understanding of their situation: limiting migrant worker benefits by a couple of extra years is neither here nor there.

What does become more important is the bigger picture of the EU’s situation: all the panellists agreed that if the Greek situation worsens, then that will badly damage the ‘yes’ campaign: why shackle yourself to a corpse, in the colourful metaphor of some sceptics. That a resolution in this looks to be no closer than before doesn’t bode well.

As this referendum campaign starts to gather pace, not least with next week’s unveiling of a referendum bill in the Queen’s speech, we are likely to see more of these dynamics. Enjoy the ride.

The post The Brexit referendum: some underlying dynamics appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

L'organisation �tat islamique (EI) s'est empar�e enti�rement jeudi de la ville antique de Palmyre, dans le d�sert syrien. Selon l'Observatoire syrien des droits de l'homme, le groupe extr�miste contr�le d�sormais la moiti� du territoire du pays.

Sanctions and the currency rate of the dollar to the ruble forced changes in the Russian space program.

EDA Deputy Chief Executive Rini Goos travelled to Czech Republic this week for a series of meetings with Central and Eastern European defence industry representatives on the margins of the IDET defence show in Brno. There he also chaired a workshop on the balanced European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).

On the opening day of the IDET show, Rini Goos delivered a speech at the “Security Trends” conference, highlighting the EDA’s role of strengthening the European defence industry. “At EDA, we fully recognize the diversity of the defence industry in Europe”, he stressed during his speech. “Diversity is an asset we need to exploit and this is why we are keen to insist on the notion of a balanced EDTIB”.

During his visit to Czech Republic, Rini Goos also had a series of bilateral meetings with defence industry representatives of Central and Eastern European (CEE) Member States such as Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

On 20 May, the EDA Deputy Chief Executive chaired an EDA-organised workshop dedicated to the Balanced EDTIB. “Europe can no longer afford to ignore the contribution of Central and Eastern European Member States’ defence industries to the European defence industry as a whole”, Rini Goos insisted during the event. “The EDA has just launched a six-month study whose goal is precisely to study the capabilities of the CEE countries and to identify ways to increase capacity building between them”, he added. Two similar workshops were previously held in Brussels in October 2014 and March 2015.

More information

• EDA Chief Executive visits Czech Republic
• IDET Defence Show in Brno

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Tavaly 18 százalékkal, 29 milliárd euróra csökkent Németország oroszországi exportja - közölte csütörtökön a német szövetségi statisztikai hivatal, a Destatis. Ugyanezen idő alatt a német import Oroszországból 7 százalékkal, 38 milliárd euróra csökkent. Mindez éles kontrasztban áll a két ország közötti kereskedelmi forgalom korábbi alakulásával.

Benyamin Netanyahou a annonc� sa nouvelle coalition le 6 mai, form�e in extremis apr�s deux mois de tractations. Les nationalistes religieux du Foyer juif d�crochent plusieurs minist�res capitaux.

Paul-Henri Spaak, l’un des pères fondateurs de l’Union européenne, était obsédé par la règle de l’unanimité qui encore aujourd’hui prend l’Europe en otage, notamment sur l'immigration, explique sa fille Antoinette Spaak dans une interview exclusive avec EurActiv.

A Fidesz EP-frakciója hallani sem akar a halálbüntetésről.

A Fidesz EP-frakciója hallani sem akar a halálbüntetésről.

 

A kormány elfogadott egy jogszabályt, amely szerint azok, akik 15 napon belül rendezik a tartozásukat, a feljegyzett büntetés felét kell csak befizessék. Eddig 2 napon belül lehetett kedvezményesen fizetni a bírságot. A jogszabály emellett előírja egy olyan elektronikus rendszer létrehozását, amely megkönnyíti a bírságok nyomon követését és befizetését. Ennek adatai a hatóságok és a lakosság számára is hozzáférhetőek lesznek. Az intézkedést a parlament is meg szavazza.

Az EME Orvos- és Gyógyszerésztudományi Szakosztálya ünnepi ülést szervez jövő héten, pénteken, délután 5 órától a Kultúrpalota Nagytermében. Az eseményen a hajdani oktatók emlékeznek az elmúlt 70 évre, majd a jelenlegi oktatók és diákok beszélnek az aktuális helyzetről és a jövőbeli kilátásokról. Rövid videókat is bejátszanak majd, amin az idős tanárok mesélik el emlékeiket az egyetem alakulásáról. Az emlékülésen a Marosvásárhelyi magyar orvos- és gyógyszerészképzés 70 éve emlékkötetet is bemutatják.

Over the past ten years, there have been significant geopolitical shifts in the European Union’s (EU) near and far neighborhood. Crafted in 2003, the opening remarks of the European Security Strategy underline: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.” This is no longer the case. The ring of instability that currently characterises the EU security landscape both in the East – from the crisis in Georgia in 2008 to the on-going conflict in Ukraine – and in the South calls for a serious reassessment of Europe’s neighbourhood and the adoption of  adequate foreign policy tools to respond to fast-changing developments.

“The success of the EaP will largely depend on its ability to meaningfully deal with a diverse group of partners with divergent and diverging goals”

Europe faces new risks and opportunities on its periphery and beyond and needs to recast its strategic and foreign policy thinking to conform to the evolving setting. The EU’s Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – along with its regional component that has been strengthened through the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) initiatives – needs to be closely integrated into a unified EU Foreign Policy framework. To promote a shared commitment to stability, security and prosperity, it needs to reassess the conditions needed for further economic integration and the deepening of political co-operation between the EU and partner countries. These competing patterns of policy platforms do not easily cohere into a unified vision.

Formally launched on March 20, 2009, the overarching aim of the EaP initiative is to intensify the EU’s relations with six partner countries in the neighborhood, namely, Belarus, Moldova and the Ukraine to the east and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to the south-east. Based on the existing ENP framework, the partnership puts the emphasis on a more pragmatic and regionally-tailored format of co-operation.

The programme aims to create a secure ring of stable and well-governed countries on the eastern borders of the EU. It seeks to establish a security belt around the EU borders that is sustained through effective co-operation networks including multi-lateral and bi-lateral frameworks.

“The EU member states do not have a common position on the implantation of EaP”

However, the underlying objective of the new regional co-operation initiatives such as the UfM and the EaP remains unclear and is contingent on different priorities, largely determined by the dominating group interests within the EU. The primary question is whether these initiatives are complementary or whether they compete with existing policies. For example the EaP is often characterised as an initiative which was launched as a response by some EU member states to the the UfM.

Because of absence of a unified vision on regional priorities within the EU some EU member states focus on the South Caucasus, some on the Mediterranean and others on the Middle East. This is all the more compelling since the EU member states do not have a common position on the implantation of EaP; nor do the eastern neighbors have converging views on its execution on the ground.

While all of the Caucasian republics have declared EU integration as their “strategic choice,” albeit with different evidence to sustain these pronouncements, there is no regional coherence within the group as a whole due to existing security concerns and different country-specific measures to accommodate them. For one, Russia is perceived as a major security threat in Georgia, while Armenia – given its geopolitical location and security perceptions vis-à-vis Azerbaijan and Turkey – regards Russia as the main guarantor of its security and heavily relies on it both militarily and economically. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, maintains strong security partnerships with Turkey and Israel, while procuring modern military hardware from Russia.

To complicate the landscape further, Georgia recently signed an Association Agreement with the EU that sets up the legal foundations for an enhanced political and economic co-operation. Armenia has indicated its readiness to join the Russian-led Eurasian Union, along with Belarus and Kazakhstan, and has already gained membership of the body. Azerbaijan has stayed away from both.

These security perceptions and alliances clearly weaken the impact of the EaP. Different visions, political agendas, and alliance partnerships that drive the policies of South Caucasian republics present a clear challenge to the successful accomplishment of the initiative.

“To succeed on its eastern borders, the EU needs to come up with more realistic initiatives, clearer incentives and better mechanism”

On a broader scale, the frequently contradictory interests both within EU member states and those between the EU and Russia not only cripple the integration processes in the region, but also weaken their effective execution on the ground. The success of the EaP will largely depend on its ability to meaningfully deal with a very diverse group of partners with divergent and diverging goals.

While finding a compromise between member states is a complex practice in the EU foreign policy-making process, the divergence  between the Mediterranean and Eastern initiatives undermines the EU’s strategic leverage in the region. Also, such discrepancies find a direct reflection in the perceptions of the participant countries, resulting in half-hearted efforts that undercut the overall outreach of the program and compromise its effectiveness.

The Eastern Partnership summit in Riga on 21-22 May will serve as an important platform for the review of the ENP strategy – and its integration into an overall EU Foreign Policy – in order to bridge the widening gap between the EU and partner countries. To succeed on its eastern borders, the EU needs to come up with more realistic initiatives, clearer incentives and better mechanisms that can be meaningfully translated into more workable and regionally-attuned policies.

The EU’s role in promotion of stability and security at its eastern borders cannot be meaningfully accomplished without taking into account the current geostrategic realities in its eastern neighborhood, as well as aspirations of individual countries with respect to the programme. What is indeed needed is the formulation of a coherent EU policy which reflects the concerns and interests of the eastern neighbors. The partnership should be a two-way process of mutual accommodation.

 

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Crossroads Foundation

The post The EU’s Eastern Partnership: Between promises and realities appeared first on Europe’s World.