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Sa Majesté Naba Sigri Dima de Boussouma
La Grande Famille Royale à Boussouma, Birghin, Tagala et Kaya,
La famille Tiendrébéogo à Toudoubwéogo à Ouagadougou,
La veuve AlimataTontorogobo
Les familles alliées, Moyenga, Bamogo, Wagner, Sana, Baguyan, Ouarma et Ilboudo,
Les enfants : Saidou, guide touristique ; Mme Wagner Mariam en France ; Abdoulaye frigoriste ; Mme Baguyan Adama à la pharmacie Univers ; Mme Ouarma Awa à la pharmacie Camille ; Rainatou et Rachid (Agent des travaux routiers).
Les Nièces et neveux,

Les petits-enfants et arrières petits-enfants, ont la profonde douleur de vous informer du décès de l'Adjudant-Chef Major des Transmissions de l'Armée Nationale, à la retraite, Nabikienga Boureima OUEDRAOGO, le samedi 18 Juillet 2026 à l'âge de 81 ans. (1945-2026). L'enterrement a eu lieu, le même jour au cimetière de Tabtenga à Ouagadougou.

Très touchés par les nombreuses marques de sympathie, de compassion et de soutiens multiformes qui leur ont été témoignés lors de la maladie et du rappel à Dieu, de leur époux, père, frère, oncle, grand-père et arrière-grand-père, ils rremercient tout particulièrement la Communauté musulmane de Zogona et l'imam de la mosquée de Bogodogo, toutes les belles familles, les jeunes du quartier, les voisins, amis et connaissances ,le Directeur du parc urbain Bangréwéogo et l'ensemble de son personnel, le responsable de la clinique Bel Patient à Wayalghin et mooré Ali, l'ami du défunt.
Que Dieu rende à chacun le centuple de ses bienfaits.

Ils informent par ailleurs que le Doua musulman du septième jour aura lieu, le dimanche 2 Août 2026 à 8h30 à son domicile à Zogona/Ouagadougou.

Union de prières.

This year's iteration of the exercise reflects several important strategic concepts – and a focus on countering China's navy.

Le parquet national financier a requis le renvoi de BNP Paribas, ainsi que des enfants de l'ancien président gabonais Omar Bongo, devant le tribunal correctionnel de Paris dans le cadre d'une enquête sur des biens acquis frauduleusement en France, selon une source judiciaire. Au total, le PNF demande le renvoi de 23 personnes physiques et morales.

Beijing’s engagement is more cautious, selective, and constrained than it appears.

Le retrait de N’Djamena, qui prendra effet en juillet 2027, n’affecte pas la poursuite des enquêtes déjà lancées. Le rôle trouble joué par le Tchad dans la guerre au Soudan est dans le viseur de l’instance.

La convocation de l’ambassadrice de France par les autorités tunisiennes, le 24 juillet, s’inscrit dans une série de tensions avec les diplomates européens, alors que le régime accroît la répression politique et ne parvient pas à empêcher la détérioration des services publics.

The vulnerabilities of Hormuz and Malacca are fundamentally different – but a closure of the Strait of Malacca would be far worse.

Décidément, le groupe suédois Saab a le vent en poupe, grâce, notamment, à son avion d’alerte avancée GlobalEye, lequel enchaîne les commandes et les marques d’intérêt depuis le début de cette année. Et cela aux dépens de l’E-7A Wedgetail de Boeing et de l’Aeris X de L3Harris. Ainsi, en décembre, la France lui en a...

Cet article Saab signe un contrat de 915 millions d’euros pour livrer deux avions d’alerte avancée GlobalEye à un client «mystère» est apparu en premier sur Zone Militaire.

Ammar Mohammed Mahmoud Mohammed, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Sudan to the United Nations, addresses the Security Council meeting that heard reports of the Secretary-General on Sudan. Credit: UN Photo/Mark Garten

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 27 2026 (IPS)

In the three years since the outbreak of the Sudanese Civil War, the humanitarian crisis has deteriorated significantly, with the United Nations underscoring a blatant disregard for international humanitarian law among warring parties. This includes the deliberate targeting of civilians in residential areas, widespread sexual violence, and attacks on critical infrastructure that have hindered aid efforts and pushed communities to the brink of collapse. To manage rising military expenses, the warring parties have increasingly relied on the exploitation of trade routes and territories, prompting humanitarian experts to express concern about a persistent, self-sustaining “war economy.”

“Sudan’s vast wealth of natural resources should benefit its people. Distressingly, what we are seeing today is anything but that. In fact, this wealth is only serving to undermine human rights and drive conflict, bringing pain and suffering on an enormous scale,” said UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk. “This war economy must be disrupted, and the international community must pay much closer attention to the commodities and trade routes that help keep it alive.”

On July 15, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published a report titled Business and Human Rights in Conflict: Gum Arabic from Sudan, underscoring how the illicit trade of gum arabic is being exploited to fund the violent activities of both the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Beyond gum arabic, the report shows that warring parties are generating massive revenues from gold, livestock, and other commodities by seizing control of local extraction, transport, and trade routes.

Historically, gum arabic has been a critical economic staple for Sudan, serving as a key ingredient in food, drinks, cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals around the world. Sourced from the bark and branches of the acacia tree, gum arabic acts as a lifeline for over five million people in Sudan and remains deeply embedded in local rural communities.

Before the eruption of hostilities in 2023, Sudan’s gum arabic trade accounted for roughly 70 to 80 percent of the global crude gum arabic exports, with annual exports reaching as high as USD $183 million. Today, the vast majority of acacia forests in Sudan—which form the country’s “gum arabic belt”—are located in regions that are largely under RSF and SAF control, such as Kordofan and Darfur.

The report found that rural communities relying on gum arabic for financial stability have faced numerous protection risks and severe human rights abuses—including looting, extortion, and arbitrary detention. This further compounds the struggles of their daily lives as they face shrinking access to basic services, such as food, clean water, education, and healthcare.

Traders working along corridors stretching through RSF-controlled sections of Darfur and Kordofan have experienced confiscation of goods, excessive taxation, and violence. Additionally, the report notes that considerable quantities of gum arabic have been redirected by the RSF from West Kordofan and Darfur to Souq al-Na‘am, South Sudan, Juba, Chad, Cameroon, and Kenya. Furthermore, the UN has reported that lootings of gum arabic conducted by the RSF are often used as a form of compensation rather than traditional salaries, with roughly 3,700 tonnes looted between January and June of 2024.

OHCHR noted that gold is also a primary driver of Sudan’s war economy, being considered “the most financially significant commodity in export terms”, as well as a major source of revenue for the RSF and SAF. Figures from the Central Bank of Sudan and the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company show that in 2024, roughly 65 tonnes of gold were produced in SAF-controlled areas, including 28 tonnes that were exported through Port Sudan. This generated approximately USD $1.6 billion in revenue, contributing to 48.5 percent of the nation’s annual exports.

Despite gold production climbing to 70 tonnes in 2025, considerable portions of the gross output have been smuggled outside of the country. According to the report, in 2024, only 52 percent of the annual gold exports were passed through formal export channels. Additionally, RSF-affiliated economic entities continue to extract and trade gold from Darfur and Kordofan, with the RSF seizing over 1.3 tonnes of unrefined gold early in the conflict.

“Gold is the most important and decisive financial driver, while gum arabic provides supporting liquidity and demonstrates how the war has extended into agricultural commodities and global trade routes,” said Dr Abdelmonem Mukhtar, Executive Director of the Centre for Evidence and Data-Based Policy. “If it is established that a supply chain contributes directly or indirectly to financing parties to the conflict, regulatory, civil or ethical responsibilities may arise, in addition to reputational and commercial risks.”

Emphasizing the need for more rigid oversight, Türk called on UN member states to strengthen accountability and monitoring measures to ensure that commodity trade in Sudan does not fund violations of international humanitarian law, but rather helps to alleviate the suffering of civilians. He also urged corporations to prioritize human rights.

“Companies cannot continue business as usual when sourcing from conflict-affected value chains,” Türk said. “They should undertake heightened, conflict-sensitive human rights due diligence, including stronger scrutiny of routes, intermediaries, documentation and possible re-labelling, and ensure that affected people have access to safe and effective grievance and response mechanisms.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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« Tour du monde en séries » (1/6). Six fictions étrangères qui sont le reflet de questions politiques et sociales brûlantes. Aujourd’hui, le feuilleton de Kalista Sy, qui a impulsé un style, à mi-chemin entre le mélo familial et la fresque sociale, et continue de susciter des débats.

Plus d’une centaine de femmes disposent désormais de titres fonciers dans les provinces du Nord-Kivu et du Sud-Kivu. Ce progrès est le fruit de la campagne « Femmes en Action », initiée par l’Association pour la Conservation Communautaire de la Biodiversité (ACCB).

Après Kalehe et Mwenga, au Sud-Kivu, l’initiative a atteint Walikale, où elle en est à son troisième jour ce lundi. Elle vise à renforcer la compréhension des droits fonciers des femmes et à promouvoir un accès équitable à la propriété foncière.

Nigeria face Malawi, Zambia and Egypt at the 2026 Women's Africa Cup of Nations, looking to defend their crown and claim an 11th title.

Three years of declining hunger have answered one question: Progress is possible. The question now is whether governments will scale what works before conflict, climate shocks and financial retreat erase it. Credit: Isaiah Esipisu/IPS

By Máximo Torero
ROME, Jul 27 2026 (IPS)

Here is a fact that should interrupt the world’s drumbeat of bad news: Hunger fell again in 2025.

For the third consecutive year, fewer people faced chronic hunger. The total declined to an estimated 645 million, 14 million fewer than in 2024 and 43 million fewer than at the 2022 peak. Moderate or severe food insecurity fell by 86 million, to 2.1 billion from 2024 to 2025.

The number remains a profound collective failure. But the decline challenges the fatalistic assumption that conflict, climate change and economic instability make rising hunger inevitable. When governments align social protection, agricultural investment and economic policy, they can bend the hunger curve.

Countries making the greatest gains offer no single formula, but they do offer a common lesson. Their histories differ, but their choices share key features: social protection that preserves purchasing power; investment that raises agricultural productivity; rural roads, irrigation and market infrastructure; and policies connecting small scale farmers to expanding food markets. Hunger falls when these policies reinforce one another

Asia’s hunger is now about one quarter below its 2015 level. Latin America and the Caribbean has also moved below the rate recorded a decade ago. In Africa, the rate declined for the first time in nearly a decade, from 20.3 percent in 2024 to 20 percent in 2025.

Africa’s progress is fragile. Rapid population growth kept the number of hungry people at about 309 million. Yet even this small reversal is significant, especially because bilateral development assistance to sub Saharan Africa fell 26.3 percent in 2025 and is projected to fall again this year.

Countries making the greatest gains offer no single formula, but they do offer a common lesson. India cut hunger from 21.1 percent in the mid 2000s to 9.8 percent; Senegal from 15.8 percent to 5.3 percent; Rwanda from 31.8 percent to 22.6 percent; and Peru from 17.9 percent to 5.7 percent. Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic and Guyana now report rates below 2.5 percent.

Their histories differ, but their choices share key features: social protection that preserves purchasing power; investment that raises agricultural productivity; rural roads, irrigation and market infrastructure; and policies connecting small scale farmers to expanding food markets. Hunger falls when these policies reinforce one another.

The danger is that governments will read three years of improvement as permission to retreat.

The Middle East conflict and disruption of the Strait of Hormuz are already raising energy, fertilizer and transportation costs. The strait is critical not only for oil and liquefied natural gas but also for sulphur, fertilizers and other farm inputs. Decisions made now could determine whether this shock becomes a much larger food price crisis within six to 12 months.

Climate is the second threat. El Niño is strengthening, with an 81 percent probability of becoming a very strong event late this year. That does not guarantee crop losses, but it raises the odds of damaging heat and rainfall patterns across major producing regions.

The third threat is cutting even more humanitarian and development financing when vulnerable countries most need resilience. Aid cuts do not make costs disappear. They transfer them to food importing governments, humanitarian agencies and households already spending most of their income on food.

But preventing hunger is only the first test. The harder challenge is helping people eat well.

About 2.69 billion people, roughly one third of humanity, still cannot afford a healthy diet. In Africa, the share is 66.6 percent. Calories alone are not enough. A diet that prevents hunger does not necessarily prevent anaemia, child stunting, obesity or diabetes.

The economics explain why. Starchy staples provide about half the calories in a healthy diet but only 13 percent of its cost. Fruits and vegetables provide roughly 5 percent of calories but account for 16 percent of the cost. Animal source foods provide 13 percent of calories but consume 28 percent of the budget. Calories are relatively cheap. Nutrients are expensive.

Much of that expense accumulates after food leaves the farm. New analysis for the 2026 State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World indicates that 70 to 75 percent of the cost of a healthy diet arises in storage, processing, transportation, wholesale and retail. Poor roads, inadequate cold storage, unreliable electricity and post harvest losses turn nutritious perishables into luxuries.

That should change how governments spend. They already provide $540 billion to $635 billion a year in agricultural support, much of it concentrated on a few staples. Supporting staples alone can pull land and investment away from fruits, vegetables and other nutrient dense foods. Governments should redirect more support toward horticultural productivity, cold chains, irrigation, rural roads, storage, energy and competitive markets.

They must also get the sequence right. Expanding school meals, food vouchers and other demand programs without increasing supply can raise prices. Investment in farms and supply chains must precede, or accompany, policies that stimulate demand.

Three years of declining hunger have answered one question: Progress is possible. The question now is whether governments will scale what works before conflict, climate shocks and financial retreat erase it.

The next frontier is not just cheaper calories. It is making healthy diets affordable.

Excerpt:

Máximo Torero is the Chief Economist of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Illustrative photograph of a university campus in Kazakhstan. The universities discussed in this article have been anonymised. Photo credit: Abylkas Saginov Karaganda Technical University website

Danagul Yembergenova

In 2018, Kazakhstan granted public universities greater institutional autonomy, encouraging them to become more entrepreneurial, internationally competitive, and responsive to societal and economic needs. But autonomy reforms do more than change governance arrangements; they reshape how universities understand themselves.

Rather than asking whether universities have become more autonomous, our recent research asks a different question: How do universities redefine who they are when formal autonomy expands but practical constraints remain?

Universities do not begin these transformations with a blank slate. They carry organizational histories, traditions, values, and identities that have developed over decades. As new policy expectations emerge, institutions must negotiate these legacies while responding to growing pressures for internationalization, research excellence, and competitiveness.

This blog presents findings from our recent article Negotiating organizational identity under symbolic autonomy: evidence from regional universities in Kazakhstan, published in Higher Education and authored by Ahmet Aypay, Danagul Yembergenova, Aida Sagintayeva and Murat Özdemir.

 

Autonomy on paper – but not always in practice

Institutional autonomy has become a central feature of higher education reforms worldwide. Governments increasingly expect universities to become more innovative, internationally visible, and responsive to labor market needs while reducing direct state control. Kazakhstan has embraced this agenda through reforms intended to decentralize university governance and strengthen institutional decision-making.

However, our study suggests that legal autonomy does not automatically translate into genuine institutional freedom. Although universities have formally gained greater authority over governance and strategic planning, many regional institutions remain constrained by state funding dependence, rigid accountability requirements, ministerial performance indicators, and limited internal governance capacity. As one vice-rector puts it, “Full autonomy is not possible in an environment where the government provides funding as a founding institution.”

We describe this situation as symbolic autonomy—a condition in which universities appear autonomous in legal terms but continue to operate within strong structural constraints that limit their ability to act strategically.

 

Organizational identity matters as much as governance

Importantly, our research goes beyond examining whether autonomy reforms succeeded or failed. Drawing on and extending Stensaker’s framework of organizational identity, we show that identity work unfolds differently when autonomy is largely symbolic. Under these conditions, organizational identity is shaped not only by strategic ambitions but also by structural constraints, institutional histories, and regional contexts.

To explore this process, we conducted interviews and focus groups with 63 university leaders and academics across five regional public universities in Kazakhstan. Rather than evaluating policy implementation alone, we examined how institutional actors interpreted, negotiated, and experienced organizational change in their everyday work.

 

Five universities, five identity trajectories

Our findings reveal that there was no single response to autonomy reforms. Instead, the five universities followed distinct organizational identity trajectories. In four universities, identity change was largely driven by leadership efforts to strengthen the institution’s external image through research excellence, internationalization and global competitiveness. However, these ambitions frequently collided with practical realities, including limited resources, staff shortages, bureaucratic reporting requirements and continued ministerial oversight. Many faculty members viewed these initiatives through the lens of their everyday constraints, creating a gap between the image projected by institutional leaders and the lived experience of academic life.

Although these universities shared a broad orientation towards external prestige, they followed different identity trajectories. Some selectively adapted new ambitions while preserving long-established traditions. Others experienced fragmentation as competing priorities, historical legacies and bureaucratic pressures pulled the institution in different directions. In several cases, externally promoted institutional images proved difficult to integrate into everyday practices, leading to a decoupling between organizational identity and institutional image.

One university, however, followed a markedly different trajectory. Instead of building its identity primarily around external prestige, it grounded institutional development in local culture, regional heritage, and addressing community challenges. The university has preserved local heritage by naming classrooms and laboratories after historical figures, making local culture part of its institutional identity.

Organizational identity, thus, emerged more organically through shared values and collective engagement rather than through top-down strategic branding. Although this university continued to face many of the same structural constraints, including limited resources and bureaucratic pressures, it demonstrated stronger internal commitment and a clearer sense of shared institutional purpose.

 

Why this matters beyond Kazakhstan

Although our study focuses on Kazakhstan, its lessons extend well beyond one national context. Across Europe and many other higher education systems, governments continue to encourage universities to become more autonomous while simultaneously increasing accountability through performance metrics, rankings, funding conditions, and quality assurance systems. Universities are therefore expected to act independently while remaining closely monitored.

Our findings suggest that successful reforms require more than legislative changes. Universities need sufficient financial resources, governance capacity, and opportunities for meaningful participation by academic communities. Without these conditions, autonomy risks becoming largely symbolic, encouraging institutions to project ambitious public images without enabling genuine organizational transformation.

The study also suggests that regional embeddedness – strong connections to local communities, culture and history – should not simply be viewed as an obstacle to modernization. Instead, these local foundations can become valuable resources for organizational renewal, helping universities integrate external reform agendas with internally meaningful missions.

 

Looking ahead

Higher education reforms are often assessed by changes in governance, funding or institutional performance. Our findings suggest that another question deserves equal attention: Who do universities become as they reform?

Organizational identity cannot simply be engineered through legislation or strategic plans. It is continually negotiated through interactions among leadership, academic communities, institutional histories and structural constraints. Paying closer attention to these processes may help explain why universities experiencing similar reforms follow very different developmental paths.

As policymakers continue to promote university autonomy across Europe and beyond, paying greater attention to organizational identity may help ensure that reforms foster not only new governance structures, but also meaningful and sustainable institutional change.

 

Dr. Danagul Yembergenova holds a PhD from the University of Geneva. She is a researcher specializing in higher education governance, university autonomy, organizational identity, and higher education reform. Her research focuses on institutional transformation in Central Asia, with additional interests in secondary education, inclusive education,

The post University Autonomy and Organizational Identity: What’s the Story of Regional Universities in Kazakhstan? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

L’Afrique de l’Ouest devient de plus en plus attrayante pour ceux qui veulent fabriquer et exporter des drogues illicites.

Les enseignants du territoire de Malemba Nkulu exigent le paiement de trois mois d’arriérés de salaire. Ils l’ont déclaré ce lundi 27 juillet à Radio Okapi.

À cette occasion, la Synergie des syndicats des enseignants de Malemba Nkulu a demandé au gouvernement de transférer la paie des enseignants de CARITAS vers la TMB, dénonçant des irrégularités dans le processus de paiement.

En RDC, des soignants ont manifestés samedi à Bunia, contre des mois de salaires impayés. Une mobilisation qui intervient alors que l'épidémie d'Ebola a déjà fait plus de 1 300 morts, selon le dernier bilan de l'OMS.

L'incendie est toujours actif lundi 27 juillet dans les régions espagnoles de Madrid, Tolède et Avila. Il a déjà ravagé près de 77 000 hectares, soit sept fois la taille de Paris. Les conditions météorologiques auxquelles sont confrontés les pompiers qui luttent contre les flammes sont moins favorables que celles de dimanche, mais la situation pourrait se dégrader à partir de mardi 28 juillet, en raison de l'arrivée d'une vague de chaleur. Et les tensions syndicales et politiques bloquent en partie la riposte prévue par le gouvernement.