Defense`s Feeds

EDA’s Steering Board has given its green light for the launch of a new project designed to improve the receiver performance of electronic radio frequency (RF) sensors used in military platforms in adverse and heavily contested environments. Dubbed SPICE (‘Superior Performance in Contested Environments’), the project builds on the successful work already accomplished at the Agency in the same critical domain. 

At this stage, the Netherlands and Sweden are participating in this new project which is however open to all Member States. It aims to further develop the excellent results of two previous EDA ad hoc projects on Switched Applications (SWAP) and Switched Applications-Complementary (SWAP-C), local RF power generation and amplification based on switched technology. These projects were focused on narrow band transceivers to improve the performance of radars for naval applications and on wideband transceivers for electronic warfare for combat aircraft. Both of them demonstrated the superior performance of gallium-Nitride (GaN) technology for the transmit path compared to other technologies previously used.
 

Improving the receivers

Over the next 36 months, SPICE will take this work forward with the aim of improving the performance of the receive channel of the transceiver (dynamic range, linearity, efficiency etc.). This is done in an integral approach over the complete RF chain, while taking into account additional requirements such as cost and other system-imposed constraints (including cooling). The work will start with investigating, defining and specifying concepts with which the linearity and performance of receivers can be achieved. This also includes an assessment of all the technologies currently available. 

As part of an exploration and experimentation phase, the consortium will work on wideband receivers, narrowband receivers and packaging and integration technologies. The consortium involved in the afore-mentioned projects remains the same, contributing to increase the expertise of the European defence industry and create a stable supply chain around key European players.

Americas

Sikorsky Aircraft won an $9 million contract modification, which provides support for the integration and transition of Windows 10 and Server 16 into various VH-92A training devices. The Sikorsky/Lockheed Martin VH-92 will replace the US Marine Corps VH-3D and VH-60N helicopters that transport the US president, while operating under the name of Marine One. The VH-92 presidential helicopter has an executive interior and military mission support avionics, including triple electrical power and redundant cockpit flight controls. The Navy awarded a $542 million order to Sikorsky last June for six Lot I VH-92A presidential helicopters. Sikorsky will begin deliveries of the first six VH-92A helicopters in 2021. Work will take place Quantico, Virginia and its expected to be finished by October 2022.

According to a statement by the navy, aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford completed readiness projects to board 1,000 personnel for an upcoming assignment, which will include integrating with a carrier air wing and carrier strike group. The ship underwent required maintenance and new construction tasks in its “window of opportunity” in Norfolk, Virginia, to prepare it for an at-sea period, Independent Steaming Event, or ISE, 10. The action will involve personnel and aircraft of Carrier Air Wing 8 and Carrier Strike Group 12, meaning that more fixed-wing and rotary aircraft will be aboard the ship than usual.

Middle East & Africa

Boeing received two contracts worth $2.6 billion combined from the US Navy to produce and deliver Harpoon and Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response weapon systems to foreign military sales customers. The company will supply 650 units of SLAM ER missiles and provide nonrecurring engineering support related to the weapon system to the government of Saudi Arabia under a potential $1.9 billion contract. Work will occur in Missouri, Indiana, Michigan, Florida, Connecticut and North Carolina through December 2028. Naval Air Systems Command will obligate the full contract amount using FMS funds at the time of award. The company also won a $657 million modification, which covers the production of 467 Block II lot 91 full-rate production Harpoon missiles and delivery of support equipment to Brazil, Thailand, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Japan, India and South Korea and the Netherlands. Work under the modification will be performed across several sites within the continental US and the UK through December 2026. NAVAIR will use FMS funds to obligate the full contract amount.

The core of China’s Long March 5B rocket came back to Earth on May 11 but instead of landing in the Atlantic Ocean, parts of the rocket could have ended up in Mahounou, Ivory Coast, local media reports. The rocket went into orbit on May 5 while carrying China’s new space capsule. It then went into an unstable low earth orbit before tumbling back to ground. It was the largest man-made object to reenter the atmosphere uncontrolled since 1991. Photos posted on social media shows a long metallic pipe with burn marks in the village of Mahounou. The village lies on the reentry track of the rocket.

Europe

The Israeli Air Force has decided to deactivate 117th Squadron, which operates the F-16C, in October. The move is part of the Momentum Plan initiated by the Israel Defense Forces to improve efficiencies and acquire new systems. “Under the multi-year ‘Momentum’ Plan, Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kohavi made a series of decisions geared toward internal efficiencies and cutting back old systems, alongside the acquiring and development of new systems. As part of these decisions, the chief of staff decided to close a fighter jet squadron,” the IDF said in a statement Wednesday.

Asia-Pacific

Philippine’s Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana said the two Foreign Military Sales package for attack helicopters offered by the United States is too expensive for the country. Lorenzana says Manila has only budgeted $256 million for the purchase of six attack helicopters. Last year, the country selected the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) T129 attack helicopter but the sale has been held up as Turkey needs export approval from Washington for certain parts.

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Americas

Sikorsky won a $29.9 million modification, which provides for rate tooling, physical configuration audits, associated systems engineering and program management in support of CH-53K aircraft production. The CH-53K King Stallion is a large heavy-lift cargo helicopter designed to replace the Marine Corps CH-53E to move Marines from ships to attack beaches. Back in April, it was reported that the aircraft successfully plugged into a funnel-shaped drogue towed behind a KC-130J during aerial refueling wake testing over the Chesapeake Bay. The CH-53K sea-based, long range, helicopter is designed to provide three times the lift capability of its predecessor. The CH-53K will conduct expeditionary heavy-lift transport of armored vehicles, equipment, and personnel to support distributed operations deep inland from a sea-based center of operations, Sikorsky officials say. It can lift more than 18 tons. Work will take place in Connecticut, Utah, Michigan, Kansas, Washington, New York and Nebraska. Estimated completion will be by December 2023.

United Technologies won a $10.6 million modification, which procures one low rate initial production Lot 11 afloat spares package kit for the Marine Corps in support of the F-35 Lightning II combat aircraft program. In the meantime a congressional watchdog group is concerned that as Lockheed Martin ramps up F-35 production, its suppliers are falling behind. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the number of F-35 parts delivered late skyrocketed from less than 2,000 in August 2017 to upward of 10,000 in July 2019. The number of parts shortages per month also climbed from 875 in July 2018 to more than 8,000 in July 2019. More than 60 percent of that sum was concentrated among 20 suppliers, it said. Work under the current modification will take place in Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Georgia, Illinois, Arizona, the UK and Israel. Estimated completion date is in September 2021.

Middle East & Africa

The Idaho Air National Guard’s 190th Fighter Squadron deployed to the Middle East on May 11. The personnel left on that day and the A-10s departed one day later. More than 400 members of the 124th Fighter Wing, based at Gowen Field, will continue to deploy throughout the spring and summer in support of Operations FREEDOM’S SENTINEL, INHERENT RESOLVE and NEW NORMAL. The deployment is the wing’s second largest deployment and includes multiple aircraft, pilots, security forces, maintenance and medical personnel, and various other support staff.

The US Africa Command announced on May 12 that Logistics Advisor Team 1610, 6th Battalion, 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade earlier this year delivered a three-week long vehicle maintenance and recovery course in Dakar, Senegal. According to AFRICOM the course is to prepare the Senegalese Armed Forces as they support United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The 1st SFAB’s operations in Africa have been interrupted by the coronavirus, but the unit will continue working with US Army Africa and the US State Department once conditions allow advisors to return, AFRICOM officials said.

Europe

The Royal Air Force is in talks with British Airways, British Airline Pilots’ Association and other aerospace companies for civilian pilots made redundant due to COVID-19 to be seconded to the military for 18 to 48 months. Pilots who had switched from military to civilian careers are likely to be sought after to fill vacancies. The BALPA said the talks are still “exploratory” while a spokesperson from the RAF said the service has “always interested in recruiting high quality people and are currently in initial discussions with the UK aviation industry on the possibility of employing suitable available personnel.”

Asia-Pacific

The South Korean military conducted the first test-firing of its new Hyunmoo-4 ballistic missile in the middle of march, some two-and-a-half years after Washington and Seoul had agreed to scrap the warhead weight limit for South Korean missiles stipulated in US-South Korean guidelines. The Hyunmoo-4 is thought to be a solid-propellant rocket. has been reported to carry a payload as large as 2 tons to ranges of up to 800 kilometers. Testing was overseen by the Agency for Defense Development, South Korea’s indigenous defense research and development organization.

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Americas

ApiJECT won a $138 million contract action for COVID-19 response “Project Jumpstart” and “Project Rapid,” which will dramatically expand production capability for domestically manufactured blow-fill-seal injection devices. ApiJect also recently partnered with the Department of Health and Human Services to establish the RAPID Consortium to supply prefilled syringes to the US Strategic National Stockpile for public health emergency use. Work will take place throughout the US. Estimated completion date will be by may 8, 2022.

BAE Systems Land $42.8 million for MK 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS) canister production and ancillary hardware. The company will make Mk 41 Vertical Launching System canisters, renew Mk 13 Mod 0 canisters and produce Mk 13 Mod 0, Mk 21 Mods 1 through 3 and Mk 29 Mod 0 canisters under the modification. The Navy initially awarded a potential $954.5M contract to update and repair Mk 41 VLS canisters for the service branch and FMS customers from Denmark, Japan and South Korea. Work will take place in Minnesota and South Dakota. Estimated completion will be by July 2023.

Middle East & Africa

Two US Marine Corps AV-8Bs both encountered emergencies during a mission in Bahrain last year. One of the aircraft caught fire on a taxiway and the jet was armed. The other Harrier had taken off and encountered technical issues as well. Because of the other mishap aircraft on the ground, it had to circle while waiting for the clearance to land. It ended up landing with just five minutes of fuel remaining. Both pilots had to thank Air Traffic Controller 2nd Class Drey Aynes who was on duty in the tower and help direct the emergency crew to handle the situation. Although the article did not state which Harrier unit was involved, VMA-311 was assigned to Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response-Central Command 19.2 in Bahrain last year.

Europe

TASS reports that Russian Air Forces have tested a new hypersonic missile on the Tu-22M3 bomber recently. The new missile is expected to be mounted on the upgraded Tu-22M3M. The anonymous source said the new missile is different from the Kh-32 missile that is part of the armament of the Tu-22M3. Earlier, the Russian defense industry developed two types of aircraft hypersonic missiles. The Kinzhal is the latest Russian airborne system that consists of a MiG-31K aircraft as a delivery vehicle and a hypersonic missile. Tu-22M3M supersonic bomber is a modification of Tu-22M3 with expanded combat potential.

The Hellenic Ministry of National Defense signed an agreement with the Israeli Ministry of Defense to lease an unspecified number of Israel Aerospace Industries Maritime Heron Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), primarily for border defense missions. Under the agreement, the Israeli MoD will lease the Heron system in its maritime configuration to Greece over three years starting within a year, with an option to purchase it when the leasing period is completed, IAI said. The Heron system consists of platforms that can operate both day and night, and is equipped with maritime patrol radars and satellite communications, according to the Israeli company, which added that it offers extended operational endurance for missions including maritime patrol, marine and land border protection, search and rescue, and disaster management.

Asia-Pacific

Australian defense scientists are working with industry and academia on ways of integrating both laser-based optical and radio frequency communications technologies into a single satellite communications (satcom) user terminal, local media reports. Project CHORUS, which stands for Compact Hybrid Optical RF User Segment, is the first collaborative project to be launched by the DoD through the SmartSat Cooperative Research Centre (CRC). Based at the University of South Australia, the SmartSat CRC is Australia’s biggest space industry research-and-development collaboration, and formally opened for business in February.

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Americas

The Wisconsin Army National Guard has created a instrument flight rules (IFR) training visor that uses a smartphone to turn it opaque for training purposes. Traditionally, the student undergoing training will have to put on a hood or the instructor would put his hand in front of the student’s face so that the trainee will only fly the aircraft using the instruments on board.The inventor of the visor, 1st Lt. Nick Sinopoli, felt that the traditional method disrupts training realism and value. He sold his car to pay for the patent for the device and has spent many long nights developing prototypes. His design come in the top 16 of the National Guard Innovation Competition.

AAI Corp. won a $20.7 million modification for engineering and technical services for the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) and Unmanned Surface Vehicle program. The deal modifies a contract originally awarded in September 2014 for work on the UISS, which consists of a mine countermeasure unmanned surface vessel and is designed to operate as part of the littoral combat ship (LCS) mine countermeasure (MCM) package. Unmanned surface vehicles, or Naval drones, are boats that operate on the surface of the water without a crew. According to the Pentagon, the UISS program is intended to satisfy the Navy’s need for a rapid, wide-area coverage mine clearance capability which are required to neutralize magnetic/acoustic influence mines, while also providing a high-area coverage rate in a small, lightweight package with minimal impact on the host platform. Work will take place in Maryland and Louisiana. Estimated completion will be by September 2021.

Middle East & Africa

The US State Department has approved a possible sale of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) armored vehicles to the United Arab Emirates. The sale includes up to 4,569 MRAP vehicles under the Excess Defense Articles program.  Together they have an estimated value of $556 million. The vehicles include the MaxxPro Long Wheel Base vehicle, the MaxxPro Recovery vehicle,  the MaxxPro LWB chassis, the MaxxPro Dash, the MaxxPro Bases Capsule, the MaxxPro MEAP Capsule, and the MaxxPro Plus. They also include Caiman Multi-Terrain Vehicles without armor, and Caiman Base, Caiman Plus, Caiman Capsule, and MRAP All-Terrain vehicles. The Emirati military seeks to use the vehicles “to increase force protection, to conduct humanitarian assistance operations, and to protect critical infrastructure,” according to the statement.

The US State Department has approved a possible Foreign Military Sale of a refurbishment package for 43 Boeing AH-64E Apache attack helicopters owned by Egypt. The deal is estimated at $2.3 billion. “Egypt intends to use these refurbished AH-64 helicopters to modernise its armed forces to address the shared US-Egyptian interest in countering terrorist activities emanating from the Sinai Peninsula, which threaten Egyptian and Israeli security and undermine regional stability,” says the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. “This sale will contribute to Egypt’s military goal to update its capability while further enhancing greater interoperability between Egypt, the US, and other allies.” Over the last couple of decades, the USA has helped Egypt put down a Bedouin insurgency, which has used attacks on civilians and kidnappings of tourists to further its cause.

Europe

The Irish Air Corps has added a PC-12 to its fleet recently. The purchase was worth $5.6 million. Minister of State for Defense Paul Kehoe told parliament that the aircraft “is providing the Air Corps with a further agile resource to service urgent requests from agencies of the State.” The service said on its social media pages that the first operational mission told place on April 25.

Asia-Pacific

Tokyo will procure seven more Type-19 155 mm/52 calibre wheeled self-propelled howitzers (SPHs) and an additional 33 Type-16 Mobile Combat Vehicles (MCVs) this fiscal year as part on ongoing efforts to enhance the capabilities of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF). The new long-range Type-19 SPH, which is integrated into an 8×8 MAN tactical military truck and has a crew of five, is being gradually rolled out to the JGSDF to replace the service’s aging fleet of FH-70 towed artillery systems, said the Ministry of Defense in Tokyo in its latest ‘Defense Programs and Budget of Japan’ report, the English-language version of which was released in late March.

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Americas

Rockwell Collins won a $7.6 million contract for small mission computer hardware and executable software for the RQ-7B Shadow Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System. The aircraft can see targets up to 125 kilometers away from the brigade tactical operations center, and recognize tactical vehicles up to 8,000 feet above the ground at more than 3.5 kilometers slant range, day or night. The RQ-7 Shadow ground control station transmits imagery and telemetry data directly to the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, All Sources Analysis System, and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System in near real time. Work will take place in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Estimated completion date is August 15, 2022.

General Dynamics won a $14.7 million contract modification for Abrams systems technical support. The M1 Abrams is a third-generation american main battle tank.Abrams M1A2 SEPV3 (System Enhanced Package) is a modernized configuration of the Abrams main battle tank (MBT) in service with the US Army. The new version offers enhanced protection and survivability, as well as higher lethality than its predecessors. Work will take place in Sterling Heights, Michigan. Scheduled completion date is September 30, 2023.

Middle East & Africa

MD Helicopters won a $35.8 million modification for logistics support for the Afghanistan Air Force MD-530F aircraft fleet. MD 530F Cayuse Warrior is an armed variant of the OH-6 Cayuse light observation helicopter built by MD Helicopters. It is designed to enhance scout attack, armed escort and close air attack capabilities of the air forces. The multi-purpose armed helicopter can be deployed in tactical, reconnaissance and transport operations. It can also carry out airborne law enforcement, executive and personnel transport, air medical services, search-and-rescue (SAR), firefighting and other public safety missions. Work will take place in Mesa, Arizona, and Kabul, Afghanistan. Estimated completion date is November 30, 2020.

Elbit Systems has developed a rescue capability for the maritime patrol-variant of its Hermes 900 medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The Israeli company announced that its Hermes 900 Maritime Patrol now has the ability to carry and drop life rafts for long-range search and rescue (SAR) operations. The Hermes 900 Maritime Patrol can carry up to four, six-person life-rafts that are integrated on its wings. Using an onboard maritime radar, the [Hermes] detects survivor situations. Upon detection its electro-optic/infrared (EO/IR) payload is deployed to provide visual identification, and a rapid calculation of the drop-point is performed, enabling the Hermes to dispatch life rafts from a low altitude of 600 ft to a pin-pointed location at a safe distance from the survivors.

Europe

The DoS approved a potential Foreign Military Sale to Hungary of sixty AIM-120C-7/C-8 AMRAAM­-ER missiles, and two spare AIM-120C-7/C-8 AMRAAM-ER guidance sections and related equipment for an estimated cost of $230 million. The possible sale is in support of Hungary’s acquisition of the National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS) air defense system. NASAMS is a distributed and networked medium to long-range air defense system developed by Norway’s Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace and USA’s Raytheon.

Asia-Pacific

The head of Australia’s $32.2 billion Sea 1000 program has confirmed that construction of the pressure hull for the first of 12 Attack Class conventionally powered submarines is scheduled to begin in 2024. This will follow the construction in 2023 of a hull qualification section to prove procedures, equipment, and skills at the submarine construction facility now being built at Osborne North near Adelaide by government-owned Australian Naval Infrastructure to the functional requirements of Sea 1000’s French-owned designer and build partner Naval Group.

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Buoy oh buoy…
(click to view full)

News reports from Japan indicate that country is suggesting to Australia that they go in together to build a new series of non-nuclear submarines, hoping to finalize a deal before the end of the year. The Australian DOD would confirm only that they are indeed talking to several countries about cooperating on a new series. The previous Australian government (Labor) had promised 12 new keels, but the sitting government put those plans into a study phase, concerned that doing so would result in an availability gap between the new subs and the existing Collins class boats.

The January 2010 failure of a generator aboard HMAS Farncomb was just the latest in a long history of problems faced by its fleet of 6 Collins Class diesel-electric submarines – which have sometimes been reduced to just 1 operational vessel. That readiness issue presents an immediate financial headache for Australia’s government, and adds a longer-term challenge to the centerpiece of Australia’s future naval force.

With just 6 submarines in its fleet, Australia’s current deployment set-up leaves little room for error. Even a normal setup of 2 in maintenance, 2 for training but available if needed, and 2 on operations makes for a thin line, given Australia’s long coastline and sea lanes. Almost 15 years after the first Collins Class boat was delivered, they are still short of this goal. When crewing problems are added to the mechanical issues, the failings of its current fleet are creating sharp questions about the Australia’s 2009 White Paper plan to build 12 new diesel-electric fast attack submarines, as the future centerpiece of the 2030 Australian Navy.

A Cursed Class?

HMAS Farncomb
returns, 2005
(click to view full)

One of the goals for the Collins Class program was to advance Australian shipbuilding capabilities, by creating state-owned ASC Pty Ltd. to build a foreign submarine design. ThyssenKrupp’s Swedish Kockums subsidiary was chosen to design them, based on the A19 Gotland Class. At 3,000t, their long-range design is the largest diesel-electric submarine type in the world.

Collins was launched in 1993, and delivered in 1996. Its successor boats of class were commissioned in 1998 (Farncomb), 1999 (Waller), 2001 (Deschaineux and Sheean), and 2003 (Rankin). Many of those boats have been laid up for very long periods, and there have been a number of periods when the RAN has had just 1 fully operational submarine available – or less.

That’s a shaky record for a fleet whose final boat of type entered service more than 10 years ago. Launching a submarine building industry is admittedly very difficult, and using what amounts to a new design added to that risk. The Collins Class has performed well in exercises with the US Navy, where it has scored successes against American Los Angeles Class nuclear-powered fast attack subs. On the other hand, it has also encountered a long-running sequence of issues, including significant difficulties with its (Australian chosen) combat systems, noise issues due to mechanical faults, major program cost growth to A$ 6+ billion, schedule slippage, and the reliability issues noted above. As the government’s own Phase 1 Coles Review noted:

“Ownership of a submarine design requires the ‘parent nation’ to invest in facilities and equipment to allow it to operate the submarines effectively – shipbuilding facilities, docks, manpower and training, operational support facilities, engineering and scientific resources, access to the necessary industry resources and skills, and a properly resourced and effective supply chain. Due to the failure to recognize fully what they were taking on, the various agencies involved did not make all the necessary investments post delivery…”

The effects aren’t just mechanical, or financial. Crew retention issues are exacerbated by low mechanical readiness, which restricts training opportunities, and so limits the available pool of crew. That forces higher deployment rates away from home and family among qualified submariners, which in turn feeds back into low recruitment and retention.

Farncomb, and the Future

Readiness issues
(click to view full)

The January 2010 issue with HMAS Farncomb is emblematic. It involved failures in 1 of the submarine’s 3 French Jeumont-Schneider, 1,400 kW/ 440-volt DC generators, and has served in many respects as the final straw. As the Australian Department of Defence put it at the time:

“The problem stems from the way some of the generators were manufactured. At no time was the crew at risk but investigations are continuing in order to determine the impact this deficiency might have on the remainder of the submarine fleet.”

That’s a bland way to describe a serious problem. The generators must power all systems on board, from oxygen generation to combat electronics, and also drive the Collins Class’ 7,200 shp Jeumont-Schneider DC motor. Given the dangers inherent in a submarine’s mission, electrical redundancy, back-up capability, and reliability are all critical.

There were fears that fixing HMAS Farncomb’s generator problem could require cutting open the pressurized hull. If that’s the case, repair costs would be high, and Farncomb would join 3 other boats in a long “deep maintenance cycle”. HMAS Deschaineux was due back in the water in early 2010, but didn’t re-enter service until May 2010. HMAS Sheean wasn’t due back in service until 2011, and HMAS Rankin has no set date yet – it is merely “in queue” behind Sheean. While HMAS Collins reportedly had its generators given a clean bill of health, investigation of the entire fleet’s generators was required. The stakes were clear: if additional problems were discovered, the repair schedules for Deschaineux, Sheean, and Rankin would become much less predictable.

This is just one of several major shocks to the program over the years. Farncomb’s issues, and continuing problems with the fleet as a whole, finally led Australia’s government to commission an independent Coles Review in July 2011. Instead of focusing on a post-mortem, it was charged with finding a way forward to fix the problems. By December 2012, the final recommendations were in, and a sustainment review was complete by April 2014.

Sustainment regress & progress
(click to view full)

This is exactly what Australia needs if it’s going to operate a serious submarine force, because the Collins Class program’s steady pulse of shocks have combined to compromise more than Australia’s strategic present. Left unaddressed, and unremedied, they will compromise Australia’s strategic future. The persistence of serious mechanical issues and very low readiness rates, into 2010 and beyond, raises legitimate questions concerning the long-term risks of Australia’s A$ 36 billion, 12-boat future submarine program.

Australia is a middle power with a small population, without a long submarine building tradition, and without an active submarine construction line. That it overcame these disadvantages to build and field the Collins Class is a respectable achievement, notwithstanding the problems that class as faced in service. At the same time, the strategic stakes in Asia are rising rapidly, and submarines are becoming more important as the country’s neighbors grow their economic and military power into the sea lanes around Australia. An expanded submarine force makes strong strategic sense as a key guarantor of Australian interests and sovereignty – but in some respects, any new program will be starting again from square one. Over a decade can be expected between the commissioning of HMAS Waller in 2003, and construction of any new submarines.

Does repeating the Collins program’s industrial structure for the core of Australia’s future defense risk creating the same cost and readiness issues in the new submarines? If not, why not, especially given the long interval between delivery of HMAS Rankin and future construction of the next submarine type? What are the strategic risks of treating the core of Australia’s future defensive posture as a make work program first, and a defense program second? What savings might be had by simply ordering some or all of the proposed 12 boats from a foreign manufacturer? Should ASC become a wholly-owned subsidiary of whichever firm wins the competition to build Australia’s next 12 boats? Or should the 12-sub program just be scaled back sharply, as too big a risk for cost inflation and low value for money?

Some of these questions are already being raised, by politicians, by media editorials, and now by the government’s own Coles Review. Unless these readiness and technical issues can be turned around, Australia’s governments, of whatever party, should expect more questions – and fewer submarines in both their present and their future.

Updates & Developments 2013 – 2020

Final Coles Review looks at sustainment; Fire on HMAS Waller; Rankin out of FCD, Farncomb in; Shorter FCDs mean changes to industrial processes.

HMAS Sheean & S-70B

May 11/20: Attack Class Construction The head of Australia’s $32.2 billion Sea 1000 program has confirmed that construction of the pressure hull for the first of 12 Attack Class conventionally powered submarines is scheduled to begin in 2024. This will follow the construction in 2023 of a hull qualification section to prove procedures, equipment, and skills at the submarine construction facility now being built at Osborne North near Adelaide by government-owned Australian Naval Infrastructure to the functional requirements of Sea 1000’s French-owned designer and build partner Naval Group.

Dec 10/14: Simulator upgrades. Thales announces the completion of simulator improvements ordered on June 19/12, which include their C2000-X simulation technology, among changes. Source: company press release.

Nov 20/14: No coverage. A recent incident involving a Russian naval task force that sailed close to Australia’s northern waters highlights issues of force structure, readiness, and basing for the RAN’s submarines. In the end, Australia had to content itself with sending 2 ANZAC Class frigates and an AP-3C Orion aircraft, because there were no submarines that could reach the area in time.

The RAN actually has 3 submarines available, but HMAS Rankin was sailing from Western Australia to Tasmania in the south, and the other 2 active submarines were conducting work-up trials off the coast of Perth in the west. To give readers a geographic idea, sailing from Australia’s western coat to its northeast coast is kind of like sailing from Spain to Estonia. None of Australia’s 3 operational submarines could arrive in time.

This isn’t a failing of the Collins Class. A force of 6 submarines is only going to generate about 3 operational boats, and Australia’s submarine base remains fixed on its inaccessible west coast. Defensively, that’s great. In deployment terms, not so great. Lacking the endurance and constant high-speed capabilities of nuclear-powered boats, Australia needs submarine bases in its north and/or east if it wants to project power forward in a timely way. The 2012 Force Posture Review has recommended this course of action. Sources: The Australian, “Russian ships expose failings of Australian submarine operations”.

Sept 8/14: ASC losing sub-building? News Corp. reports that the government is fast-tracking their pursuit of Japanese Soryu Class submarines, because of growing concerns about the $2+ billion cost of maintaining the Collins boats beyond 2026; some estimates put that cost at more than $2 billion. Hence Soryu, especially given Australia’s urgency:

“The Government cannot afford a submarine capability gap and every day past 2026/27 when Collins class is due to begin decommissioning, adds days of risk,” a senior defence source said.”

This risk profile may even get Australia’s future submarines built abroad. ASC’s poor performance building the Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers has reportedly left deep skepticism about trusting them with a project that’s conservatively estimated at $A 36 billion. In contrast, building the Soryus abroad might reduce the cost to a more certain A$ 25 billion. Read “Australia’s Next-Generation Submarines” for full coverage.

Aug 5/4: Support. ASC says that they’ve has been recontracted to provide Collins Class maintenance, but doesn’t say for how long. Under the contract extension, ASC will continue to work on the Collins Class submarines at its headquarters at Osborne in Adelaide, South Australia, and Henderson in Western Australia.

Henderson already hosts significant submarine maintenance work and inventory management, and will be used for all mid cycle and intermediate maintenance work, enabling the focus at Osborne to be on the new 2-year Full Cycle Docking (FCD). Those new FCDs will have to be done in 33% less time, and some early industrial initiatives to meet it have included introduction of a circumferential hull cut (q.v. July 1/14), construction of a new Maintenance Support Tower in Osbirne to provide better access, “remediation” of the supply chain, and the establishment of a rotable pool of spare parts. Sources: ASC, “ASC awarded submarine maintenance contract for SA and WA”.

July 5/14: Misconduct? Former submariner Rex Patrick (q.v. ) has accused senior naval officers of attempting to muzzle his public criticisms of the Collins-class submarine, and has asked the Australian Federal Police to examine the Navy’s conduct. Sources: The Australian, “Collins-class submarine critic calls in AFP over navy ‘plot’”.

July 1/14: HMAS Rankin out of FCD. ASC announces that they’ve completed the Full Cycle Docking (FCD) for HMAS Rankin in South Australia, delivering her early under the agreed integrated master schedule. Rankin will be the last submarine serviced under the RAN’s previous Full Cycle Docking schedule. Sources: ASC, “Rankin handed back to Navy”.

July 1/14: HMAS Farncomb into FCD. HMAS Farncomb arrives at ASC North in readiness for her Full Cycle Docking (FCD), which is the first under Australia’s new 10 years service + 2 year FCD schedule. Sources: ASC, “Farncomb arrives for maintenance under new schedule”.

July 1/14: Industrial. ASC makes a circumferential cut to remove the entire back end of HMAS Collins, a 1st for the company. The engine is being removed entirely to a workshop, and will be swapped into HMAS Farncomb to keep everything on schedule. Why do this?

“Normally, the main motor refurbishment within the submarine takes approximately a year to complete, with other work within the aft end of the boat delayed while this takes place. [This way]… the main motor can be removed and refurbished in a workshop, allowing other work scheduled in that section of the boat to be conducted, including metal loss repairs.”

The cut takes a lot of preparation: removal of all electrical cables, pipes and mechanical items which cross the frame spacing; anechoic tiles over the joint removed; casing brackets and the stinger seat removed; and extra submarine cradles prepped to support the end section. Once prepared, the existing weld joint was cut using an automatic gas thermal cutter, and pulled backwards using a railed transfer system. This will be the approach going forward. Sources: ASC, “Circumferential cut on Collins”.

May 5/14: Industrial. Removing a submarine’s anechoic tiles without damaging them, or the hull, is a long process. ASC thinks they’ve found a way to improve that sharply:

“Prior to each hull cut, a large number of tiles need to be removed…. a cross functional team investigated alternative methods of tile removal, including Ultra High Pressure Water Blasting…. The trial showed that the water blasting would take approximately 35 minutes to remove a tile as opposed to the 17 hours it usually takes. In addition, an engineering assessment of the hull test piece identified that it left the hull in a better state than the previous manual method.”

They think the overall savings on HMAS Farncomb’s Full Cycle Docking will be up to 4,000 worker hours. Sources: ASC, “Tile removal rethink creates significant saving”.

April 8/14: Final Coles Review. The Coles Review finishes its work with a post-implementation final review. It cites considerable improvements, including greater availability of spares, less planned maintenance over-runs, fewer breakdowns, and faster repairs to operational boats when problems occur. Overall, the RAN is up to 2-3 available boats most of the time, after long stretches where the range was 0-2. To get 2 deployable submarines, you actually need a fleet of 6: 3 submarines available for tasking more than 90% of the time, a 4th submarine in short-term maintenance, and 2 more in long-term maintenance.

The challenge will be moving from the current 8 years service + 3 years maintenance interval to a 10+2 framework, which compresses the Full Cycle Docking (FCD) by a factor of about 2, while cutting about 30% of the worker hours. This final report recommends treating the 1st example, HMAS Farncomb in July 2014, it as a dynamic schedule and progressively refining it. Even so, there is significant concern that they’re not going to be able to execute the FCDs in time. Beyond those efforts, the report says that the focus on output vs. efficiency has been justified by circumstances, but the emphasis must flip. Unfortunately:

“It was all too clear to me that the lack of suitably qualified experienced personnel in the DMO to operate within and fulfil their role in an output focused Enterprise, may stall or even reverse the achievement of benchmark availability. It would be an astonishing outcome if the inability to sustain the knowledge and energy now evident in the Collins Class Transformation Program were to lead to its undoing – particularly given there is every indication benchmark performance could be achieved at a lower long-term cost with reduced DMO project oversight. This problem needs to be addressed urgently.”

Workforce development is actually an issue at all levels, but hiring constraints on DMO could make it impossible for them to achiee their goals. An overall IT system to help manage the process is another missing piece. Meanwhile, there’s some key work to do on HMAS Collins, or it won’t be very helpful even if it is ready:

“HMAS Collins will need to be upgraded to match the rest of the Class, otherwise major systems will be unsupportable and she will not be as deployable as the rest of the Class. If a significant amount of upgrade work is not carried out in the period prior to HMAS Collins FCD (she is currently in pre-FCD), then this may have an impact on the overall schedule for HMAS Collins’ FCD.”

There’s more beyond these key highlights – like all of the Coles Reports, it’s quite detailed. Sources: Australia DoD, “Minister for Defence and Minister for Finance – Joint Media Release – Final Coles Review into submarine sustainment” | DMO, “Final Coles Review into Submarine Sustainment” | Full Report [PDF].

Final Coles Review – Sustainment

Feb 27/14: HMAS Waller. The submarine HMAS Waller, fresh out of scheduled maintenance, experiences a fire while traveling on the surface. Nobody dies or is injured, but 4 sailors are helicoptered off for observation. The Navy is still looking into the cause. Sources: Australian DoD, “Fire onboard Royal Australian Navy submarine”.

Waller fire

Feb 25/14: HMAS Waller. ASC Pty Ltd. awards the crew of HMAS Waller their Platypus Cup, to “the Collins Class submarine whose crew best demonstrates the rigorous training needed to ensure the safe and effective operation of the vessel.” Sources: ASC, “HMAS Waller wins Platypus Cup”.

Jan 20/14: The A$ 30-40 billion size of the future submarine project guarantees political scrutiny, and conservative columnist Paul Sheehan decides to start as the new center-right Liberal Party government prepares its 1st budget. It’s a sign worth watching regarding the political fate of the $A 30+ billion future submarine program, and as one might expect, the article isn’t exactly complimentary to the Collins Class.

The Australian DoD takes direct issue with the piece, though it isn’t a great idea to use sentences like “There is no ingrained ‘culture of delusion and arrogance’ within the Australian Defence Force when it comes to the development of capability requirements.” The rest of the reply uses a better form of argument, and includes this statement:

“While we do not comment on the operations of the submarine fleet there have been numerous periods when up to four submarines have been in service. In fact for most of the last two years Navy has continuously had four submarines in service.”

One note: “in service” is not the same as “immediately available for operations.” Sources: Sydney Morning Herald, “Future Submarine project a farce that has missed a mention” | Australia DoD On The Record, “Inaccurate reporting of Navy capability”.

Dec 17/13: ANAO Report. Australia’s National Audit Office releases their 2012-13 Major Projects Report. The Collins Replacement Combat System project has slipped by 36 months over the past year, hitting a total of 108 months (9 years) delay. In comparison, the Collins Class Reliability & Sustainability program is “only” 99 months behind.

The R&S program has seen an overall increase of A$ 339.4 million to A$411.4 million, including A$ 302.8 million for the implementation of additional scope, for a total increase of 471.4%. It actually consists of 22 separate sub-projects,a and only the Special Forces upgrade (on Collins & Dechaineux) and the Torpedo Decoy represent capability upgrades. Of the 22, “Five engineering enhancements have been completed and the two new capabilities are being implemented. However, completion of the remaining 15 engineering enhancements is priority driven and will be continually reassessed throughout the project.” Spending to date amounts to A$ 334.7 million, which will make the management of further work a challenge. Full Operational Capability is scheduled for 2022.

Submarine availability has been one of the factors in both projects, and is the primary reason behind the RCS program’s 2013 slippage. The budget now stands at A$ 450 million and the program has spent A$ 431.9 million. With that said, there hasn’t been much cost change over the past year. HMAS Waller and Farncomb have the CS04 version installed, while HMAS Dechaineux and Sheean have CS05 and its sonar processing improvements installed. HMAS Rankin is testing with CS05, and HMAS Collins will have to wait for its Full Cycle Docking, which has moved. That final installation will be completed in 2018, with Full Operational Capability currently expected to occur in 2019.

Nov 28/13: Upgrade Phase 5B.1. ASC Pty Ltd. receives an A$ 57 million/ $50 million contract from the Australian government to update and modernize the Collins Class Integrated Ship Control Management and Monitoring System (ISCMMS), then turns around ans signs a SEK 180 million / $27.5 million sub-contract with Saab. The contract will run between 2013 – 2016 and will involve Saab’s Security and Defence Solutions operations in Adelaide.

ISCMMS provides maneuvering control and integrated platform systems management. It has been a quiet and reliable success story, but the electronic components need updating to avoid obsolescence problems, and the software needs to be ported to compatible standards. This is SEA 1439 Phase 5B.1 on the DMO’s list of upgrade projects for the Collins fleet. Sources: ASC, “ASC signs multi-million dollar contract” | Saab, “Saab signs contract to upgrade Australian Submarine Sub-System”.

ISCMMS upgrade

Oct 10/13: At the Pacific 2013 maritime security conference in Sydney, DMO’s David Gould is confident that a 7-year life extension would leave Australia with operational submarines, but:

“What could become operationally important in the future is the relative survivability of the submarine in a changing operational environment into the future, to 2030, when you’ve got more new, modern submarines being deployed in this area of the world and so forth.”

Outgoing head of the Future Submarine Program Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt is most concerned about the expected jumps in sonar capabilities, thanks to technical advances and improved computer processing. The Collins Class already has some problems with noise, so this is a very valid concern. Sources: Sydney Morning Herald, “Extension for submarines”.

Sept 25/13: A confidential report “has identified 68 critical problems on the navy’s Collins-class submarines that it warns pose a high to extreme risk of forcing their retirement before new submarines can be built.” The Australian DoD fires back after the report is published, saying that identifying potential issues and risks involved in life extension was the whole point, and that many of the issues are “already known and are or have been addressed in planned upgrades or through continuous improvement programs…. There has been significant improvement in submarine availability over the last 15 months.”

That may be so, but long-term risks must be credibly addressed, and this is where the RAN has demonstrated great difficulty over the last decade or more. Time will tell. Sources: The Australian, “Secret Defence report signals Collins subs crisis” | Australian DoD, “Submarine reporting in The Australian, 25 September 2013”.

June 24/13: Delays. The Australian reports that HMAS Ranking and HMAS Collins will be in maintenance much later than the advertised 3-year maintenance turnaround deadlines:

“The Rankin is the youngest submarine in the fleet yet it has been docked since 2008. It will not be released by shipbuilder ASC until the middle of next year [mid-2014] at the earliest. The Collins is the fleet’s oldest and has been at the ASC facility in Adelaide since last August. It will not be released until 2018.”

Sources: The Australian | Eric Palmer ELP.

2012

Is the Collins fleet unsalvageable? Submarine rescue vessels.

HMAS Waller
(click to view full)

Dec 12/12: Reports. The Government releases the Final Report of the Coles Review into Submarine Sustainment, the results of their Collins Class Service Life Evaluation Program, and the findings of the Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan that began at the end of 2011. The 4th element isn’t a report, it’s plans for a new submarine testing facility in Adelaide.

The Service Life Evaluation Program found what the DoD pretty much had to find, given delays in their future submarine program, and the government’s selection of a longer and riskier approach for that effort. Despite the submarines’ record, “there was no single technical issue that would prevent the Collins Class submarines from achieving their theoretical platform life, their planned withdrawal dates, or a [7-year] service life extension…” A confluence of multiple issues with uncertain resolution? They didn’t say.

With respect to the Industry Skills, indigenous design capability for submarine and surface ships is weak, white collar skills are spread thin, and the blue collar workforce is too sparse, especially in supervisors and electrical trades. Sources: Australian DoD, “Reviews of Australian submarines released” | Australian DoD, “Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Materiel – Joint Media Release – Collins Class Service Life Evaluation Program” | Coles Review | Future Submarine Industry Skills Program.

Several Key Reports

Dec 10/12: Costs. Former submariner and Acoustic Force CEO Rex Patrick (q.v. Oct 7/10) continues to call government estimates into question, describing DMO estimates to date as “spectacularly and consistently wrong”:

“Each of the six boats costs twice as much to sustain and operate as an American nuclear submarine, while falling far short…. “In 2014-15, the accounting cost of Australia’s submarine force will, by Defence’s own numbers, hit $1 billion…. He said the real cost [per boat for operating the Collins Class] is running at “just shy of $100 million…. a number that is made even worse when one considers their availability; a recent US Department of Defence report put the per-boat operating and sustainment cost of the Los Angeles and Virginia class (of nuclear submarines) at $50 million and $59 million respectively…. For the $600 million-plus annual cost of keeping between two and three 20-year-old Collins-class submarines at sea, the RAN [Royal Australian Navy] could buy a brand new, reliable, deployable, high-end submarine every year.”

Sources: The Canberra Times, “Keeping Collins afloat ludicrous: expert”.

O&M costs

Dec 10/12: Costs. Former submariner and Acoustic Force CEO Rex Patrick (q.v. Oct 7/10) continues to call government estimates into question, describing DMO estimates to date as “spectacularly and consistently wrong”:

“Each of the six boats costs twice as much to sustain and operate as an American nuclear submarine, while falling far short…. “In 2014-15, the accounting cost of Australia’s submarine force will, by Defence’s own numbers, hit $1 billion…. He said the real cost [per boat for operating the Collins Class] is running at “just shy of $100 million…. a number that is made even worse when one considers their availability; a recent US Department of Defence report put the per-boat operating and sustainment cost of the Los Angeles and Virginia class (of nuclear submarines) at $50 million and $59 million respectively…. For the $600 million-plus annual cost of keeping between two and three 20-year-old Collins-class submarines at sea, the RAN [Royal Australian Navy] could buy a brand new, reliable, deployable, high-end submarine every year.”

Sources: The Canberra Times, “Keeping Collins afloat ludicrous: expert”.

O&M Costs

Nov 29/12: Submarine rescue. The Dutch firm Damen touts the Royal Australian Navy’s Nov 16/12 order for a Rescue Gear Ship 9316, which will be used to support the country’s submarine fleet. The RGS 9316 will actually be built at a Damen shipyard in Vietnam, and is due to be delivered in 2016. It will be similar to their SD Victoria, built for Serco UK to support Britain’s Royal Navy.

The release also mentions an August 2012 order for an Escape Gear Ship 8316 Submarine Rescue Vessel, to be delivered by 2015. Damen | Marine Log | SD Victoria video.

Submarine rescue vessels

Nov 15/12: Minister for Defence Materiel Jason Clare’s speech at the Submarine Institute of Australia conference sends a signal that the Collins Class can have its life extended. Of course, the government more or less has to believe that, since their Future Submarines project isn’t going to produce new boats in time. The time frame being bandied about is “one more duty cycle” of 8-10 years, and HMAS Collins would be the first to have her hull cut open so the diesels and generators can be accessed.

Meanwhile, the Minister calls out an instance of media bias in his speech:

“The CEO of DMO, Mr Warren King, recently commented: “good news stories about Defence don’t sell papers”. At the supplementary estimates in mid October 2012, the Chief of the Defence Force, General David Hurley explained that one particular journalist – who had had an extremely positive experience on the HMAS Farncomb during its successful efforts at RIMPAC – filed a good news story on Collins and was told by his editor that “it was unpublishable” (p.58 – Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee Estimates, 17 October 2012). “

The Collins Class is a deserving target for criticism, but news suppression is not professional nor honest. The fact that it’s distressingly common these days doesn’t make it any more acceptable. See: Minister’s speech transcript | Canberra Times.

Nov 14/12: Sonar upgrade. Australia’s Defence Materiel Organisation signs an A$ 22.2 million contract with Thales Australia to update their submarines’ Scylla sonars. Thales is the original manufacturer, and currently holds the in-service support contract.

The custom-designed processing boards in the Scylla Signal Processing Cabinets will be replaced with commercial alternatives, sharply reducing the number of boards while improving capacity. These changes will require re-hosting the software on a different system, but the payoffs will include reducing electronics that aren’t manufactured any more, improving reliability, lowering power consumption, taking up less space, and saving about a tonne of weight. Once the software is re-hosted, which is no small task, further software development can take advantage of the new hardware’s capacity, in order to improve overall sonar performance.

Most of this work will be performed at Thales Australia’s underwater systems facility in Rydalmere, in western Sydney. Sea trials are scheduled for 2013, followed by physical installation in the 1st of 6 submarines in 2014. It’s all part of an additional A$ 700 million, which has been budgeted over the next 4 years for Collins Class submarine sustainment. Australian DoD | Thales Group.

July 25 – Aug 3/12: Problems continue. After reporting a successful torpedo firing and sinking exercise during RIMPAC 2012, Australia’s DoD reveals that a leak is forcing HMAS Farncomb to return to port immediately. Fortunately, the submarine was at periscope depth, and the problem “has been traced to a split in a hose on the submarine’s weight compensation system.” The Liberal Party’s shadow defence minister, David Johnston, reminds Sydney Morning Herald readers that these kinds of breakdowns are all too common:

“Farncomb is no stranger to this kind of incident… In August it lost both its propulsion motor and emergency back up in deep water off the Western Australian coast. The second, a few months later in the South China Sea, involved a build up of toxic gases that had the crew wearing oxygen masks and blowing its emergency ballast tanks for a rapid ascent.

In May last year another Collins Class submarine, HMAS Dechaineux was forced to return to Singapore for repairs after breaking down on its way to a training exercise, also in the South China Sea. It was the only submarine due to participate in the 5-nation exercise and the embarrassment was amplified when the Navy News published a pre-written account of its daring exploits on the presumption nothing could go wrong.”

Meanwhile, decisions concerning Australia’s replacement submarine plan may not happen in time. Australia DoD | state-funded ABC | The Australian | Sydney Morning Herald.

June 19/12: Simulator upgrades. Thales Australia announces a contract to upgrade the Collins Submarine Platform Training Simulator (PTS), at HMAS (naval base) Stirling’s Submarine Training and Systems Centre (STSC) in Western Australia. The PTS has been in service since 1993, and includes a Propulsion Control Simulator (PCS) and a Submarine Control Simulator (SCS). The upgrades will ensure that the simulators match all the changes that have been made to the submarines themselves. Given ongoing difficulties in recruiting enough submarine crews, an effective and fully up-to-date simulator is a critical link in Australia’s attempt to fix this situation.

Thales is well positioned to provide simulators for the Collins Class, since it provides and supports the sonar suite, towed array, periscope visual system (also getting upgrades under a recent contract), communications mast and other key sensors.

April 23/12: An interview with Minister for Defence Stephen Smith touches on the Collins Class’ ongoing problems, and the decisions to be taken regarding Australia’s future submarines. An excerpt:

“…since the 1990s we have had long-standing, well known, entrenched maintenance and sustainment issues and difficulties with our Collins Class Submarines… under governments of both political persuasions… it would be irresponsible to rush into the Future Submarine Project without seeking to fully understand… in particular the maintenance and sustainment of the Collins class submarine and the inability over almost two decades to get better operational service out of the Collins Class Submarine.

That caused me to establish the Coles Review, the first part of which I received in December of last year, and the second and final part of which I am expecting to receive in the course of the next month or so… [In addition,] one of the studies we have currently under way is a study trying to better define the life of type [DID: expected service lifetime] of the Collins Class Submarine.”

April 21/12: Unsalvageable? Commander James Harrap, a 20-year navy veteran, resigns from the RAN after commanding both HMAS Waller and HMAS Collins. While the boats and their crews had “serviced the navy well and achieved much,” the media obtain a copy of his overall assessment. It is stark and scathing: scrap the class.

“I don’t believe the Collins-class are sustainable in the long term and many of the expensive upgrade plans which have been proposed would be throwing good money after bad… Over the last two years, I believe these problems have become worse… Throughout my command of both Collins and Waller, full capability was never available and frequently over 50 per cent of the identified defects were awaiting stores… Collins has consistently been let down by some fundamental design flaws, leading to poor reliability and inconsistent performance. The constant stream of defects and operation control limitations makes getting to sea difficult, staying at sea harder and fighting the enemy a luxury only available once the first two have been overcome.”

The submarines’ diesel engines come in for special criticism, but they are far from his only target. His final conclusion: “I do not believe we have the capability to independently design and build our own submarines.” The Australian.

2011

Coles Review, RAND lessons learned reports; $105 million per year each for maintenance?; Some periods have seen 0 subs available; Can new submarines be built in time?

Dec 13/11: Coles Review, Phase 1 Following its July 19/11 announcement (q.v.) and Nov 4/11 delivery, Phase 1 of the Coles Review of RAN submarine sustainment is made public. It goes so far as to call the government’s chosen structure to manage Australia’s submarine force “unfit for purpose,” and the report’s own statement of its raison d’etre is a concise summary of the fleet’s visible issues:

“Despite increases in funding for sustainment, and strenuous efforts on the part of the various authorities and agencies involved, the level of submarine availability continues to fall. The length of dockings is increasing and submarines frequently have to return to harbour with problems. Loss of availability had also been caused by lack of crews, and the level of crew availability remains critical to the support of operations. Ministers became increasingly concerned about damage to the national reputation and frustrated at the apparent inability of Defence to sort out the problems. There was also a strong perception, especially in the DMO, that the ASC was operating inefficiently on a forward funded cost-plus contract for sustainment. The two Commonwealth Departments involved – DoFD (as owner and shareholder of ASC) and DoD (as owner, customer and operator of the submarines) – determined that an independent review was needed… Taking these findings together, we found the disparate organisation to be unfit for purpose. Recovery will demand a very serious and concentrated effort to change relationships for the better. This will be a major undertaking which goes well beyond anything the team expected to find…”

Along the way, it describes fractured and mutually hostile organizational responsibility in government, no culture of performance at builder ASC, a “damaging” relationship between ASC and the DMO, poor RAN planning or even commitment to its submarine force, “micromanagement from afar”, high levels of parts cannibalization between submarines, unclear requirements, and unrealistic goals. Its interim process recommendations have all been approved for immediate implementation, and despite its negative appraisal of ASC, they recommend that the In-Service Support Contact (ISSC) being negotiated should proceed as planned, as an interim, step to a more performance-based contract. Notable observations included:

• “…we have been unable to identify any unanimity of view as to the actual requirement for submarine availability even at the most senior levels…”
  
• “Recent figures indicate that around 85% of lost MRDs are due to operational or safety defects, and of those, about 45% are due to lack of stores. Around 15% of lost days are due to maintenance overrun.”
  
• While the RAN now has 3 trained crews, that doesn’t mean 3 submarines available for operations unless leave and training are removed from the equation;
  
• 33% of trained RAN submariners have been qualified for less than 2 years;
  
• Crews don’t always carry out normal maintenance, and aren’t punished for it;
  
• “We were unable to establish why it is that FCDs [Full Cycle Dockings] take as long as three years, noting that the second FCD (HMAS FARNCOMB) took barely two years… [that’s] a long time even by modern nuclear submarine standards…”
  
• “There is a range of key suppliers to the program beyond ASC itself. This list includes Raytheon (combat system integrator), Thales (sonar), Babcock (weapon launch and handling), Pacific Marine Batteries, Drive Train (diesels), BAES (optronics), and the US Navy (tactical command system). There are others who supply specialist products or services without which the program could not succeed.”
  
• “Of particular note is the issue of [electronic] obsolescence which, 15 years into the program, has the potential to engulf the submarines with further problems…”

Phase 2 is due in April 2012, and will focus on issues of program management, commercial contracts, engineering, and costing. It aims to offer a framework and industry best practice benchmarks against which the DMO, RAN and ASC performance can be measured. Phase 3 will be the final report, but there will also be a Phase 4 follow-up that looks at progress, and implementation of the new ISSC. Coles Review, Phase 1 [PDF] | Australian DoD | Minister transcript: ABC Interview | RAN.

Coles Review, Phase 1

RAND Report
(click to read)

Dec 13/11: RAND Lessons Learned. Australia’s DoD releases RAND’s requested report of lessons learned from US, UK, and Australian submarine programs. RAND Report.

Oct 15/11: $$$$ Australian media look at the Collins Class’ annual costs:

“Figures obtained by the Herald Sun, show the six Collins subs cost about $630 million a year – or $105 million each – to maintain, making them the most expensive submarines ever to put to sea… The annual price for “sustainment” (maintenance and support) is $415.9 million for 2011-12 with operating costs running at $213.4 million for the year, for a total of $629.3 million.

A US Navy Ohio Class nuclear attack submarine – more than three times the size of a Collins boat – costs about $50 million a year to operate.”

See: Herald Sun | Courier Mail, incl. infographic | Australia’s Daily Telegraph.

Oct 5/11: Swedish consulting and software provider Systecon AB announces an order from Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC) for its OPUS10 maintenance support software. OPUS10 optimizes spare parts stocks and support for complex technical systems within defense, transportation, energy and production, and ASC will use OPUS10 in their current re-evaluation and improvement of the Collins Class’ support program.

Sept 15/11: Liberal Party opposition defense spokesman Sen. David Johnston seems to be waking up to the seriousness of Australia’s submarine problems. The Australian:

“The undoubted lead Australia once had in regional submarine capability has, despite the best efforts of our very committed submariners, disappeared,” he told parliament. “Our Collins-class submarines are inherently unreliable, technically challenging to maintain and difficult to crew. We rarely have more than two submarines available to go to sea and there have been instances of late where there have been none, repeat none, available to defend our borders.”

July 25/11: The Australian reports that Australia’s DoD:

“…will seek US help with Australia’s plan to build 12 big conventional submarines to replace the navy’s six troubled Collins-class boats… After initial problems with the Collins fleet a decade ago, the US provided a state-of-the-art combat system and the latest technology to improve the subs’ propulsion systems and make them less noisy.”

July 19/11: Labor Party Defence Minister Stephen Smith admits that there are “long-term difficulties” with the Collins Class submarine fleet, and announces a full independent review led by British private sector expert John Coles. The Minister cites too many stretches where only 1-2 submarines have been available, and there are reportedly doubts that the subs’ diesel engines are robust enough to last until 2025 as planned:

“These problems are significant and highly technically complex. At times we have seen as few as one Collins Class submarine available for operations. This situation is unacceptable but will not be addressed simply by continuation of the status quo… As a consequence, the Government will conduct a review into the optimal commercial framework for the conduct of Collins Class Submarine sustainment… My ambition is that the Coles Review will do for the Collins Class Submarine what the Rizzo Report has done for our amphibious fleet capability: a clear sighted path to improve the sustainment and availability of the Collins Class Submarines… Without having confidence in our capacity to sustain our current fleet of submarines, it is very difficult to fully commence, other than through initial planning, the acquisition program for our Future Submarine. This is consistent with the absolute necessity to work very hard in the early days to get projects right and thereby avoid, reduce, and minimise project difficulties down the track.”

The Coles Review has been asked to provide an interim report by December 2011, and a final version by March 2012. The key questions are how long this will delay Australia’s future submarine program, and whether the review will include political-structural weaknesses in the program, or confine itself to procedures. Minister for Defence ASPI transcript | ASC release | Adelaide Now | Australian Broadcasting Corp. and ABC AM radio | Canberra Times | Queensland’s Courier-Mail | Sydney Morning Herald | The Australian.

July 18/11: Labor Party defense minister Stephen Smith, Jason Clare the Minister for Defence Materiel, and Paul Rizzo release their requested report: “Plan to Reform Support Ship Repair and Management Practices.” It follows serious failures in the legacy amphibious ship fleet, and acknowledgement of widespread issues in the Royal Australian Navy with engineering and ship maintenance generally. Though it isn’t about the Collins Class per se, its recommendations will affect Australia’s submarine programs.

All 24 of Mr. Rizzo’s recommendations are accepted, and he himself will be in charge of chairing the implementation committee he recommended. Two-star Commodore Michael Uzzell is also promoted to a new position: RAN Head of Engineering. Report page with Full Report [PDF format] | Australian DoD release and transcript | Sky News interview.

May 15/11: Australia’s Kokoda Foundation releases “Under the Sea Air Gap: Australia’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Challenge. The study “attempts to identify issues surrounding Australia’s Anti Submarine Warfare capabilities that will require greater scrutiny in the period leading up to the 2014 Defence White Paper.”

Author Brice Pacey is concerned that the design for Australia’s next-generation submarines might not be complete until 2019, and the first boat might not be ready until 2030. With the Collins Class scheduled to begin retiring in the mid-2020s, that would present a problem. Australia would need to either extend the lives of a class that has not performed well or reliably, or accept a vestigial submarine fleet even as it neighbors build up their capabilities. See also Adelaide Now.

April 14/11: Australia’s ASPI think-tank releases “The once and future submarine – raising and sustaining Australia’s underwater capability.” Based on past acquisitions, beginning the future submarine program immediately would only deliver the 1st boat in 2025; further delays would create timing issues with the Collins Class’ retirement. On which subject:

“…the boats have spent so little time in the water due to maintenance and crewing problems that the hulls have not been pressure cycled anywhere near to the extent anticipated. However, a life-of?type extension for the Collins is not an especially appealing prospect for a number of reasons. To start with, the drive train in the Collins has been problematic since day one, and attempts to keep the fleet going into the late 2020s would almost certainly require work to replace the highly problematic diesel engines (which are already ‘orphans’ in the world of maritime diesels). That alone is an undertaking requiring major engineering work, not to mention a lot of money. It is a simple fact of geometry that the engines can only be removed by cutting the pressure hull. Given that less complex mid-cycle dockings are taking 100 weeks to complete (against an anticipated 52 weeks), this exercise would result in considerable downtime. It could be that every five years of additional life would come at the cost of one or two extra years out of the water and/or conducting sea trials for each boat being upgraded. This would further exacerbate the already disappointingly low availability of the fleet.”

2009 – 2010

HMAS Farncomb the lone sub left – then its generators fail; Generator failures, crew recruiting examined in hearings; RAN puts 3 to sea.

Dechaineux returns
(click to view full)

Nov 22/10: The Royal Australian Navy announces that it has 3 Collins Class submarines at sea, adding that both HMAS Collins and HMAS Deschaineux have sailed from Fleet Base West for the ASWEX exercises:

“HMAS Collins had been visiting the east coast of Australia but has returned to her home port to participate in ASWEX. Collins steamed over 10,400 nautical miles around Australia, with port visits in five states and territories. She also qualified 20 new submariners and had 17 sailors complete professional development qualifications.

HMAS Dechaineux has returned to duty after an incident with a civilian tug boat… repairs to the propeller took only a week to complete, at the Henderson shipyard in Western Australia… HMAS Waller is also at sea carrying out training after undergoing scheduled maintenance.”

Nov 9/10: HMAS Dechaineux, which returned to service in May 2010, will miss the Royal Australian Navy’s annual anti-submarine warfare exercises. The submarine was carrying out a routine maneuver with a tugboat while departing its berth at Fleet Base West, when the tug crossed over Dechaineux’s stern; there were no injuries to people, only the submarine.

HMAS Collins, which was at sea, will fill in for the annual exercise. RAN.

Oct 7/10: Under a radical plan authored by Rex Patrick and other former submarines, Australia would retire HMAS Rankin and HMAS Collins immediately, and begin replacing the Collins Class with locally-built, off-the-shelf designs from Europe, instead of waiting until 2025:

“Australia should rapidly acquire four locally built military-off-the-shelf (MOTS) submarines to address the submarine availability issue and address the growing capability gap between the Collins-class submarines and the modern submarines proliferating throughout the region… The Collins-class submarine program has been an unmitigated failure… [HMAS Rankin and HMAS Collins]… are not available anyway, there are no crews for them and maintaining them is placing an ever increasing burden on the navy’s budget.”

Under his plan, the first boat of an initial batch of 4 would be operational for the navy within 5 years, and all 4 would be operational in under 8 years. The Australian | Adelaide Now.

June 17/10: Ministerial release:

“With the recent successful docking of the first submarine at Australian Marine Complex (AMC) in Henderson, Western Australia, ASC have marked a key milestone for the $35 million purpose-built submarine support facility… With this increase in capability ASC is now able to carry out maintenance on as many as three submarines at any one time.”

May 24/10: HMAS Dechaineux returns to service following its Full Cycle Docking at the ASC Pty Ltd. in Adelaide, giving Australia a 2nd operational submarine. Australian DoD photo release.

May 4/10: Australia’s government announces a pair of battery contracts to small/medium firm Pacific Marine Batteries Pty Ltd.

A 6-year, A$ 81 million (currently $75 million) Acquisition Contract will provide 5 lead-acid Collins Class Submarine battery sets.

A parallel 7-year Standing Offer, on the other hand, will provide short notice technical support from the firm. Pacific Marine Batteries will continue to provide an Environmental Protection Authority approved storage facility for up to 4 battery sets (2 in storage and 2 ready for disposal), as well as equipment capable of conditioning the cells before installation, and decommissioning and disposal services.

HMAS Rankin,
RIMPAC 2006
(click to view full)

March 30/10: Generator fail. The Australian Senate’s Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade hears a range of testimony, including updates regarding Australia’s submarines. The bottom line? The Australian firm that manufactured the generators under license didn’t manufacture them to the same standard as the original French firm. The Chair is Archie Bevis [Labor – Brisbane], and the other speakers are Mr. Kim Gillis, General Manager of the Collins effort at Australia’s Defence Materiel Organisation; and Bob Baldwin [Liberal – Paterson]:

“Mr BALDWIN – As I understand it, the issue is that the windings failed on the generators – is that correct?

Mr Gillis – That is correct. We have worked with a company called machinemonitor who are specialists in this particular area. They are providing the quality control. We have now found the best companies in Australia to do vacuum impregnation, which was the failure of the first system – they were not done properly when they were originally manufactured…

Mr BALDWIN – Are there any indications that generators on other submarines are likely to fail?

Mr Gillis – As to the generators that are on Collins, the original ones were actually manufactured in France. The inspections on those would indicate that they are very solid and we are not expecting to have a failure on those. The remainder of the Collins-class submarines that had their generators manufactured in Australia are susceptible to this particular failure. We are monitoring those. We are looking at the way in which we can ensure that we do not get the same sort of failure. We do have three generators on each submarine. The normal requirement is to only operate two. So what you can do is: by operating them at about 80 per cent of their normal operating profile, you restrict the likelihood of a failure. We have now also been able to prove a world’s best practice way of doing this work. We are also going through the following process: from now on, in the normal process of doing their midcycle dockings, their intermediate dockings or their full-cycle dockings, we are undertaking this work. We will be changing out the complete set of generators in the submarines.

Mr BALDWIN – That was my next question. So on the Collins you are doing all three generators?

Mr Gillis – On Farncomb we are only having to do two because we had already swapped out one of them.

CHAIR (Mr. Bevis) – Is there any liability that the original supplier of these faulty generators is exposed to? Have we looked at that?… [exchange follows] I just make the observation that, if we are in the business of handing out money to Australian or American businesses or anybody else in the development of things, we should sure and hell be in the business of making sure what they provide has been delivered properly and in accordance with the contract. I appreciate that you were giving off-the-cuff testimony and what you said may not have been a considered assessment. But, if that was indeed a considered assessment, it seems to me we were not supplied with what we ordered and we should not bear the total cost of making good the repairs.

Mr Gillis – I think it is a matter of the quality of the product that was demonstrated at the time. Its warranty was for a certain period of time and it had exceeded the original warranty period. When an item like that has passed its warranty period, you do not have very much recourse. We would have liked it to have lasted longer and to an indefinite fit, but it is very unlikely that most companies will warranty a piece of manufacture like that for the life of a submarine.

CHAIR – I fully accept that.”

On HMAS Farncomb, there appears to be one small consolation, which is that the repairs are going faster than planned:

“Mr Gillis – Yes. Just in respect of the generators on Farncomb, the original estimate was that it would take in the order of 23 weeks to undertake the repair of the generators. Just due to the physical dimensions, the requirement to get them in and out was a very big task. The Submarine Program Office – a combination of ASC, the Navy and the DMO – have worked collaboratively to produce a much better system of getting them in and out. We have worked with a company called Hofmann Engineering in Western Australia who are specialists in confined-space engineering. Hofmann undertook the challenge to have them removed, repaired and put back in a period of approximately 57 days. They are currently on track… We are very pleased with the work that has been undertaken to date.”

There’s always a tension between buying proven products, and providing design and industrial work for Australian firms. The Kinnaird Review recommended more off the shelf purchases, and the Collins Class was a major exhibit in that recommendation. Having said that, sub-contracted/ licensed manufacture of exactly the type cited above is also the most common way to reconcile true off-the-shelf purchases with industrial needs. By definition, however, a licensed manufacturer does not have the same experience level and process control as the original manufacturer would. This is one of the inherent risks of “indigenization” – and in this case, the risk came back to bite Australia. Australia Hansard transcript | Sydney Morning Herald.

March 30/10: The Australian Senate’s Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade also discussed overall ADF recruiting with Air Chef Marshal Houston. This an especially important issue with respect to the submarine force, which has been hurt by the lack of trained crew:

“Air Chief Marshal Houston – Submarines are going very well. I am very, very happy with the work Chief of Navy has been doing and indeed the work that Phil Minns and his people have been doing on recruitment and retention. In terms of where we are at the moment, we have had an increase of 25 in the submarine force since July. Our target this year is to increase from the current 468 people in the submarine force to 500 by the end of the year. Essentially, if we make that target and then we qualify 100 people a year, we will be well on the way to restoring the submarine force to where it needs to be. That will enable us to establish a fourth crew by the end of next year. Right now with the 468 people, we have three submarines fully manned. I visited one of those crews very recently with the Chief of Nay [sic] – HMAS Dechaineux, which is coming out of full-cycle docking in Adelaide. I was really taken with the high morale on board that vessel.

The other thing that I think is crucial as we go forward is to keep our separation rate with the submarine force below 10 per cent. If we go back to 2008, you will recall that the Chief of Navy put in place a submarine sustainment project under Admiral Moffitt. Admiral Moffitt made a number of recommendations which were all accepted by the Chief of Navy. Since that time, we have gone forward on a very positive and constructive platform. I am very confident that the major problems are behind us. Having said all that, if the economy goes into another boom condition, we are always going to have challenges for both our recruitment and our retention. But at the moment, it is looking good and we are seeing a lot of interest from junior recruits in the business of being a submariner.

Mr BALDWIN – At what stage do you consider you will have six fully qualified crews to man six submarines?

Air Chief Marshal Houston – I talked to the Senate committee about this the other night. Nobody in the world maintains six for six or 50 for 50 or whatever. Submarines just are not like that. Submarines are the most complex weapons system that defence forces operate, and what you should anticipate is that, of those submarines, at least 50 per cent will be in some form of maintenance servicing at any one time. We have benchmarked against all of our friends and allies, and I can assure you that the way we run our submarines is consistent with the way all of our allies run their submarines. Nobody has one crew for each submarine they possess. What they have is sufficient submarine crews to sustain the capability that is defined by the government that owns that capability. In our case, we could not employ six submarine crews.”

Feb 12/10: Australia’s Minister for Defence Personnel, Materiel and Science Greg Combet, announces that a new joint Australian Submarine Program Office will be established in Adelaide as of March 2010, in order to manage the Collins Class’ availability. A tripartite meeting between RAN Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Russell Crane, DMO Program Manager Submarines Mr. Kim Gillis, and ASC Pty Ltd CEO Steve Ludlam met to agree to the new project office’s proposed charter. The office will commence work in March 2010, and will operate as an integrated product team of Navy, DMO and ASC personnel led by DMO’s Director General Submarines, Commodore Bronko Ogrizek. Combet adds that:

“Discussions between the parties have also focused on a way forward for HMAS Farncomb’s generator repairs and a maintenance schedule change which will improve overall submarine availability.”

See: Australian DoD | ASC Pty release.

Jan 25/10: The Collins Class submarine HMAS Farncomb encounters a generator failure, which reduces Australia’s operational Collins Class submarine fleet to 1 boat in 6 – HMAS Waller. Plus HMAS Collins, which is only qualified for training purposes.

The cost of repairs is not yet predictable, and the mechanical issue could extend beyond HMAS Farncomb. Continuing issues with the class also leads to questions concerning the feasibility of, and proposed strategy for, Australia’s next-generation submarine program. DoD Release | Australian Broadcasting Corp. (ABC) | ABC Radio transcript | The Australian | The Australian: op-ed | Defpro.

May 21/09: Adelaide Now reports that problems for the Collins class have worsened:

“With HMAS Waller tied up at the Henderson shipyard south of Perth for urgent battery repairs, the only seaworthy sub is HMAS Farncomb.

The other four boats are either out of active service (HMAS Collins) or out of the water for major maintenance known as full cycle docking (HMAS Sheehan, Rankin and Dechaineux)…”

Additional Readings

• Australia DMO – Collins.

• Kockums AB – The Collins Class Submarine

• Naval Technology – SSK Collins Class (Type 471) Attack Submarine, Australia.

• ASC Pty, Ltd. – Collins Class Fleet.

• Raytheon – Collins Class Submarine Mission System. Based on the USN’s AN/BYG-1. A March 2013 APDR article mentions that ” It seems extraordinary that 12 years later only four out of six Collins submarines have been equipped with this “new” system.”

Reports

• Australian DoD (April 8/14) – Final Coles Review into Submarine Sustainment [PDF]. See also DMO Release.

• Australian DoD (December 2012) – Coles Review. Final Collins Class Sustainment Review, see also accompanying government release, which points to several other reports released at the same time.

• Australian DoD (December 2012) – Future Submarine Industry Skills Program.

• Australian DoD – Collins Class Sustainment Review Phase 1 Report [PDF]. Also known as the “Coles Review”. Delivered to government Nov 4/11.

• RAND 2011 – Learning from Experience: Lessons from the Submarine Programs of the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. Covers SSBN/SSGN Ohio, SSN-21 Seawolf, and SSN-774 Virginia programs in the USA, Britain’s Astute SSNs, and Australia’s Collins Class SSKs (Volume IV).

• Kokoda Foundation (May 25/11) – Under the Sea Air Gap: Australia’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Challenge. “This study attempts to identify issues surrounding Australia’s Anti Submarine Warfare capabilities that will require greater scrutiny in the period leading up to the 2014 Defence White Paper.”

• ASPI (April 14/11) – “The once and future submarine – raising and sustaining Australia’s underwater capability. See also full report [PDF].

• DID – Australia’s 2009 Defense White Paper.

• ASPI (Oct 29/09) – Strategic Insights 48 – How to buy a submarine: Defining and building Australia’s future fleet. See also full PDF download.

• Security Challenges (Spring 2009, Vol.5 #3) – Taking the Past to the Future: The Collins Submarine Project and Sea 1000.

• ANAO (2008-09) – Management of the Collins-class Operations Sustainment.

• Cambridge University Press (June 2008) – The Collins Class Submarine Story: Steel, Spies and Spin. Book.

• Australian Parliament (2001-02) – Lessons of the Collins Submarine Program for Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement.

• Australian Parliament (2001-02) – How Kockums was Selected for the Collins Class Submarine.

• Australia DoD (July 1/99) – Mcintosh-Prescott report. Covering the shortcomings and issues with Australia’s Collins Class submarine program.

Other Coverage

• DID – ADF: An “Aren’t Deployable” Force?

• DID – Australia’s Next-Generation Submarines

• Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter (May 7/13) – Collins Class upgrades a mixed scorecard. “The Department of Defence has summarized much of what is in the DCP in explaining that there are currently eight sub projects under SEA1439, five approved and three unapproved. The five approved projects are SEA1439 Phase 3, Phase 4A, Phase 4B, Phase 5B.1 and Phase RCE3. All of these phases are at various capability maturity levels.”

• Adelaide Now (Dec 12/12) – Australia’s Collins Class submarines well below international standards: report.

• Sydney Morning Herald (Aug 3/12) – Time for talking on new submarine is over. Explains the program’s timing issues, and also ongoing problems with the Collins Class.

• Australian Defence magazine (April 1/10) – Size Matters, by Rex Patrick. A wide-ranging and educational look at trends in submarine warfare.

• ASPI in Brisbane Courier (Feb 1/10) – Royal Australian Navy lumbered with sub-par hardware

• Australian Parliamentary Library’s FlagPost (Sept 27/09) – More problems with the Collins Class submarines.

• DID (Nov 15/05) – Australia’s Collins Class Subs, Submariners On Track for Upgrades. Summarizes the class’ ongoing issues, and the connections to the proposed upgrades.

Americas

Boeing won a $7 million order, which procures non-recurring engineering for the design, fabrication and correction of deficiencies required for the delivery and installation of retrofit kits for Navy P-8A aircraft with Increment 3 Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) 6 capabilities. The P-8A ECP 6 provides a significant modification to the baseline aircraft, installing new airframe racks, radomes, antennas, sensors and wiring, while incorporating a new combat system suite with an improved computer processing and security architecture capability at the higher than secret level, a wide band satellite communication system, an anti-submarine warfare signal intelligence capability, a minotaur track management system and additional communications and acoustics systems to enhance search, detection and targeting capabilities. Work will take place in Puget Sound, Washington. Estimated completion will be by May 2021.

Huntington Ingalls Industries won a $187.1 million contract modification to prepare and make ready for the refueling complex overhaul (RCOH) of USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74). The Stennis is the seventh Nimitz-class nuclear-powered supercarrier in the United States Navy and is currently docked at Naval Station Norfolk in Virginia. The deal, which modifies a contract awarded in 2018, funds continued advance planning efforts including material forecasting, long lead time material procurement and pre-overhaul tests and inspections on the ship, with an expected completion date of January 2021. Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc. is the original building yard contractor for all ships of the CVN-68 class, the reactor plant planning yard, the lead design refueling yard and the only private shipyard capable of refueling and overhauling nuclear powered aircraft carriers. Work will take place in Virginia.

Middle East & Africa

The Cameroon Navy started to use the new floating dock that was supplied by China to repair its vessels. It released photographs of PR 001, a Swiftships 12 m patrol boat, entering the dry dock and naval personnel working on its hull. “This type of operation will continue for all the fleet’s ships,” the navy said. PR 001 is one of the few survivors of 30 such boats that were delivered in the late 1980s under a US military assistance program.

Europe

BAE Systems has acquired Raytheon’s Airborne Tactical Radios business. After reaching a definitive agreement in January, BAE Systems say has now completed the acquisition of Raytheon Technologies Corporation’s Airborne Tactical Radios business. BAE say that this acquisition augments their portfolio in airborne communications with broad-spectrum, multi-band, multi-channel radios that feature robust anti-jamming and encryption capabilities.

Asia-Pacific

A French Air Force A400M arrived in Auckland, New Zealand on May 6. This is the first time that type of French aircraft had landed in the country. The mission was to bring home around 20 French Polynesians stranded in New Zealand to Tahiti. It was deployed to Tahiti from Paris late in April, carrying medical supplies and cash for banks. The deployment is part of Operation Resilience, launched by French President Emmanuel Macron to battle the spread of Covid-19.

The Philippines Department of National Defense is set to conclude its planned procurement of the ATMOS 155 mm/52 calibre self-propelled gun system produced by Israeli firm Elbit Systems. The guns will be acquired by the Philippine Army (PA), which will operate the systems through two batteries initiated under its Army Artillery Regiment (AAR) in January 2020. The NTP provides Elbit with formal authority to start building the howitzers for the PA consistent with the terms of the contract, which was signed in early 2020. A delay in issuing the NTP is thought to be due to funding constraints.

Today’s Video

Watch: Defence Updates #934 – Chandrayaan-3 Delayed, India On Gilgit-Baltistan, No F-21 For India

Americas

Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems Won a $325 million deal for the repair of the Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared System used in support of the F/A-18 Super Hornet aircraft. The ATFLIR is a multi-sensor electro-optical targeting pod used to provide navigation and targeting for military aircraft in adverse weather and using precision-guided munitions such as laser-guided bombs. According to Raytheon, the system is used to provide navigation and targeting for military aircraft in adverse weather, and is intended to replace the Navy’s AN/AA-38 Nite Hawk pod. Work will take place in Texas and Floria. Estimated completion will be by May 2025.

Bell Boeing won a $10.2 million contract modification, which provides for additional repairs in support of the V-22 Common Configuration Readiness and Modernization program. Additionally, this modification provides non-recurring engineering for a drive tube engineering change proposal in support of V-22 Osprey multirole combat aircraft production. The V-22 Osprey is a tiltrotor military aircraft with both vertical takeoff and landing as well as short takeoff and landing capabilities. It has been in use by the US Army, Navy and Marine Corps and Japan’s Self-Defense Force, since 2007. There are currently about 200 Ospreys in service. Work on the contract will be performed at a variety of locations, including Fort Worth, Texas, Ridley Park, Penn., and Amarillo Texas. The expected completion date for the contract is in September 2022.

Middle East & Africa

The Egyptian Navy welcomed its third Type 209/1400 submarine to its main Ras el-Tin base in Alexandria after it completed its maiden voyage from Germany. A video released by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense showed the new submarine S 43 (867) leading the other two Type 209/1400s and two Project 033 (Improved Romeo) Class submarines that the Egyptian Navy has retained in service for the time being despite the arrival of the new boats. These were followed by the FREMM frigate Tahya Misr, which was received from France in 2015, and the two Mistral Class amphibious assault ships, which were handed over the following year. Both Mistrals carried six attack helicopters on their flight decks.

Europe

Flighting Electronics won an $18.6 million contract for the manufacture and delivery of 543 TTU-597/E engineering change proposal kits to address parts obsolescence and availability issues on the fuel control test set for Navy and Foreign Military Sales customers. Additionally, this contract provides logistics support documents to include technical manual updates, provisioning data and the interim support items list. Work will take place in New York and the UK. Expected completion will be by May 2024.

Sweden has formally launched the search for a new jet trainer aircraft, with a request for information (RFI) released by the FMV national procurement agency. The RFI seeks to source a replacement for the Swedish Air Force’s Saab 105 jet trainer aircraft that first flew in 1963 and joined the SwAF inventory in 1967. The jet trainer requirement seeks to procure new aircraft, simulators, safety equipment, and maintenance. With government authorization now granted for a replacement platform for the first phase of pilot training, the goal is to have the system in place at Malmen in Linkoping by the third quarter of 2023. SwAF flight instructors should have access to the platform before that date in order to prepare for the commencement of student training.

Asia-Pacific

A Republic of China Army (ROCA) Aviation OH-58D helicopter, #634, suffered a hard landing during a training flight at Guerin base. Two people on board, an instructor and student, were not injured. The Army is evaluating the damage, and a special taskforce will be assigned to investigate the incident, the AASFC said. All Army flight training will be suspended until the cause of the accident has been determined, the AASFC said. An Army officer, who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to speak on the matter, told CNA that the incident occurred at 3:20 p.m. at the AASFC’s Guiren base in Tainan. A flight student and his instructor were performing an emergency landing drill that simulated a situation in which the helicopter lost power, the officer said.

Today’s Video

Watch: Indian Defence Updates : Non-Stealth ORCA Irrelevant,Rafale Huge Delay,50 K-9 Halted,More Su35 Order

Americas

The Air Force deployed four B1-B Lancer bombers and 200 airmen to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, from Texas for training operations. Three Lancers flew to Guam while one flew east of Japan to conduct training with US Navy assets operating in the region before heading to Andersen AFB, the Air Force said in a statement. The aircraft and personnel are part of the 9th Bomb Squad, 7th Bomb Wing of Dyess Air Force Base in Texas. The length of the deployment was not announced. B-1s, which can carry a larger missile payload than B-52 bombers, were last deployed to the Indo-Pacific region in 2017. “Deployments like this allow our airmen to enhance the readiness and training necessary to respond to any potential crisis or challenge across the globe,” Col. Ed Sumangil, 7th Bomber Wing commander, said in the statement. “It also provides a valuable opportunity to better integrate with our allies and partners through joint and combined operations and exercises.”

Northrop Grumman and Raytheon Missiles & Defense will partner to develop the Defense Department’s next missile interceptor, the companies announced. The joint effort is in pursuit of of a US Missile Defense Agency contract to replace the Redesigned Kill Vehicle program, which was abruptly cancelled in August 2019. Two bidders will be selected to compete for the Next Generation Interceptor program, a $664.1 million project of the MDA. The Pentagon formally issued a request for proposals in April, and will accept bids until July 31.The US military currently uses Raytheon’s Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle, which uses a ground-based interceptor missile to boost it to an intercept trajectory. It then separates from the boost vehicle and using its own rockets to correct the trajectory, collides with an incoming warhead, known as hit-to-kill.

Middle East & Africa

The Israel’s Ministry of Defense ordered 6.6-pound drones for its ground forces working in urban areas. The Rafael Spike Firefly is a “loitering munition,” also known as a kamikaze drone or suicide drone, a category in which the single-use munition loiters airborne in a target area, searches for targets, and attacks once one is located, exploding on contact. The munition weighs about 6.6 pounds. It fills a niche between cruise missiles and unmanned combat aerial vehicles, although the system chosen by the IDF is notably small and transportable by a single soldier.

Europe

General Dynamics Electric Boat won a $60.6 million contract to provide US Trident II Strategic Weapon System (SWS) ship alterations and United Kingdom SWS ship alterations for Strategic Systems Program shipboard integration installations. The Trident missile is a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). Originally developed by Lockheed Missiles and Space Corporation, the missile is armed with thermonuclear warheads and is launched from nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Trident missiles are carried by fourteen United States Navy Ohio-class submarines, with American warheads, as well as four Royal Navy Vanguard-class submarines, with British warheads. The missile is named after the mythological trident of Neptune. Work will take place Washington, Connecticut, Georgia, Florida, Virginia, Scotland and England. Estimated completion will be by April 2024.

Serbia’s 3rd missile battalion of the 250th Air Defense Missile Brigade has been equipped with the Pantsir-S1E self-propelled, medium-range surface-to-air missile system. Serbian President Aleksandar Vu?i? visited the unit on the 21st anniversary of the shot down of USAF chief of staff Gen. David Goldfein on May 2. Goldfein’s F-16 was hit by a S-125 missile fired by the unit.

Asia-Pacific

Boeing Australia has rolled out the first of three Loyal Wingman prototype unmanned aircraft. The aircraft will make its maiden flight this year. It’s the first of three prototypes for Australia’s Loyal Wingman Advanced Development Program, and the first aircraft to be designed, engineered and manufactured in Australia in more than 50 years. Loyal Wingman drones are meant to provide fighter-like performance with the capacity to fly more than 2,000 nautical miles (2,300 statute miles). The prototype unveiled today will now begin ground testing, with taxi tests and flight tests due later this year.

Today’s Video

Watch: Check Out Israel’s Newest AIr Defense Technology

Following his appointment by the EDA Steering Board on 5 March, Jiří Šedivý has officially taken over on 4 May as the Agency’s new Chief Executive for an initial 3-year mandate, extendable for two additional years. 

“It is a great honour and privilege for me to take up the position of Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency. As European defence cooperation has made significant progress over recent years with the establishment of new EU defence tools, the importance of the Agency has considerably grown. The current global COVID-19 pandemic and its economic, budgetary and security-related repercussions make EU defence cooperation even more indispensable. New challenges notwithstanding, we must preserve the continuity and dynamics in the area of collaborative defence capability development. Therefore, and perhaps more than before, we need a strong, effective and reliable Agency supporting its Member States, enhancing cooperation with all relevant EU bodies and institutions as well as partners”, Jiří Šedivý stated when taking up his duties. 
  

Defence experience 

Mr Šedivý has extensive experience in the defence domain, having served as Defence Minister of the Czech Republic (2006-2007), Deputy Defence Minister (2010-2012), NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning (2007-2010) and Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic to NATO (2012-2019). 
 

More information:

• Jiří Šedivý, EDA Chief Executive

 

Americas

Northrop Grumman Systems won a $27.4 million contract modification to exercise options to procure integrated bridge and navigation systems for the DDG-51 (guided missile destroyer) New Construction Ship Program and DDG-51 Midlife Modernization Program with physical throttles kits and engineering services. The Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) Class guided missile destroyers provide a wide range of warfighting capabilities in multi-threat air, surface and subsurface environments. These ships respond to Low Intensity Conflict/Coastal and Littoral Offshore Warfare (LIC/CALOW) scenarios as well as open-ocean conflict independently or as units of Carrier Strike Groups (CSG), Surface Action Groups (SAG), and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG). Work will take place in Charlottesville, Virginia. The integrated bridge and navigation system is a hull, mechanical and electrical upgrade. It is part of the comprehensive plan to modernize the DDG-51 class to ensure the ships remain combat relevant and affordable throughout their life. Estimated completion will be by August, 2021.

Raytheon won $17.2 million for dual band radar systems engineering in support of CVN 78. According to the company, the dual band radar is the first radar system in the US Navy fleet capable of operating on the S-band and X-band frequency at the same time. DBR systems allow unmanned operation of and uses commercial off-the-shelf technology for signal and data processing. CVN 78 is the lead ship of her class of aircraft carriers. Work will take place in Rhode Island and Massachusetts. Estimated completion will be by February 2022.

Middle East & Africa

Point Junction Car Rental won a $95 million contract for lease vehicle services at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, the Pentagon announced. This is a non-personal services contract to provide vehicle lease service for the Expeditionary Logistic Readiness Support Squadron. Completion date is November 30, 2024. Work is the result of a competitive acquisition with 21 offers received. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $30,713 will be obligated at the time of award.

Europe

The German Navy reported that its U212A diesel submarine U33 had moved to Kiel earlier the same day to be placed in drydock after the crew found a leak while at sea the previous week. ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems’ Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft shipyard, which built the submarine, will repair the leak in one of the U33’s torpedo tubes, which could not be precisely located at sea, the German Navy said. The German Navy expects the U33 to return to sea no later than May 11 to continue normal operations.

Asia-Pacific

Lockheed Martin won a $19.5 million contract modification for the procurement of the Korean Gun Computing System development, software, and hardware and subassemblies for installation. The modification will finalize the Korean Gun Computing System interface design specifications for the integration with the Aegis combat system. The Aegis Combat System is an American integrated naval weapons system. The heart of the system is the AN/SPY-1, an advanced, automatic detect and track, multi-function phased-array radar. Work will take place South Korea, New Jersey and Florida. Expected completion will be by July 2026.

DRS Laurel Technology won a $11.8 million modification to exercise options for procurement of AN/USQ-82(V) hardware in support of DDG-51 (guided missile destroyer) class new construction, DDG-51 class modernization, and Aegis Ashore Japan. Aegis Ashore is the land-based variant of the Navy’s Aegis Weapons System. The AN/USQ-82(V) Program is a control system network. Its purpose is to transfer mission critical data to and from users associated with combat, navigation, aviation, power, propulsion, steering, alarms indicating and damage control systems. Work will take place in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Estimate completion will be by August 2021.

Today’s Video

Watch: Indian Defence Updates : LADA V/s S80 Plus Under P-75I,6 SSBN With JL-2 SLBM,Defence Export Strategy

Americas

Lockheed Martin won a $6.1 billion contract for incidental services, hardware, facilities, equipment and all technical, planning, management, manufacturing and testing efforts to produce Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target (PATRIOT) Advanced Capability-3 missiles, missile segment enhancement configuration and associated ground support equipment and spares. The PATRIOTs in question, commonly known as “PATRIOT PAC-3,” comprise only the missile portion of the PATRIOT air defense system. Lockheed peer Raytheon produces the missile’s launcher system and its radar tracker. In addition to the US military, nine allied nations, including Bahrain, Germany, Japan, Korea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Sweden, and the United Arab Emirates have signed agreements to procure PAC-3 MSE interceptors from Lockheed. Work will take place in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Massachusetts, Texas and Pennsylvania. Estimated completion date is June 30, 2027.

Honeywell International won a $11 million contract for the purchase and repair of one spare part supporting the AN/TPQ-50 Counterfire Target Acquisition Radar System. The AN/TPQ-50 is a US Army Program of Record that provides early warning for indirect fire and counterfire target acquisition support. The system has proven to be exceptionally effective at providing early warning and location of rocket and mortar threats facing the warfighter. The AN/TPQ-50 is part of the LCMR family of radars that SRC produces for counterfire missions. Work will take place in Florida. Estimated completion date is April 29, 2025.

Middle East & Africa

Kratos Technology & Training Solutions won a $16.1 million contract supporting all levels of In-Kingdom Royal Saudi Naval Forces training, logistical and advisory services in support of the Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity. Kratos Technology & Training Solutions, Inc. provides information technology services. The Company delivers management software products, as well as offers implementation and consultative services. The contract will include a six-month base period with an additional three-month period option and a 15-day period for demobilization which, if exercised, will bring the total value to $25.6 million.  Saudi Arabian funds in the amount of $16.1 million will be obligated at the time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Saudi Arabian funds will be used under the Foreign Military Sales program. Work will take place in Saudi Arabia and California. The base period of performance is expected to be complete by November 2020; if options are exercised, work will be complete by February 2021.

Europe

Lockheed Martin won a $129.2 million contract modification, which procures the kits required for modification and retrofit activities of delivered Air Force and government of Norway F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. In November 2008, the Norwegian government selected the F-35 as the replacement for the F-16 fleet. And in September 2015, the first F-35A was unveiled before Norwegian and US government officials and Lockheed Martin leadership at a formal ceremony at the Lockheed Martin production facility in Fort Worth, Texas. Work will take place in Nashua, New Hampshire; Fort Worth, Texas; and Baltimore, Maryland. Work is expected to be complete by April 2025.

Asia-Pacific

The DoS approved a possible Foreign Military Sale for six AH-64E Apache attack helicopters and related equipment for an estimated cost of $1.5 billion.The AH-64E Apache is a twin-seat, twin-turboshaft attack helicopter. The E variant is a recent upgrade, expanding the engine, armament, and on-board connectivity capabilities. The E variant is capable of controlling unmanned aerial vehicles and has a greater payload capacity along with more sophisticated datalinks. The Philippines is considering either the AH-1Z or the AH-64E to modernize its attack helicopter capabilities. The proposed sale will assist the Philippines in developing and maintaining strong self-defense, counterterrorism, and critical infrastructure protection capabilities. The Philippines will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and support into its armed forces.

The DoS also approved a Foreign Military Sale to the Philippines of six AH-1Z attack helicopters and related equipment for an estimated cost of $450 million. The AH-1Z Viper is a twin-engine attack helicopter that is smaller than the Apache and a lower payload capacity. The Philippines armed forces would incorporate the proposed attack helicopters for use in counterterrorism and critical infrastructure protection missions. The United States has supported the Philippines in counterterrorism in recent years, including with logistical and intelligence support. Both proposed sales “will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country that continues to be an important force for political stability, peace, and economic progress in South-East Asia,” the DSCA noted in its releases.

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Americas

Physical Optics won a $17.8 million order, which provides non-recurring engineering for the production, test, integration and delivery of the T-45 Head-Up Display (HUD) and its associated internal software. The T-45A/C Goshawk is the US Navy’s two-seat advanced jet trainer. The aircraft is jointly manufactured by Boeing and BAE Systems. The T-45A was selected to meet the US Navy requirement for an undergraduate jet pilot trainer to replace the TA-4J Skyhawk and T-2C Buckeye. The TA-4J was retired in 2003 and the T-2C in August 2008. Work will take place in Torrance, California. Estimated completion date is in April 2022.

An initial report by the US Air Force into the use of contractor-operated boom-type tankers has found legal, regulatory, and financial challenges. Thus, Air Force Secretary Barbara Barrett has given Air Mobility Command another 60 days to better understand those legal and financial issues. The service was keen to have a contractor-operated boom-type tanker support aerial refueling for test and training missions. Private companies are supposed to supply one aircraft equipped with boom and hose and drogue refueling for refueling duties at around 1,100 sorties a year.

Middle East & Africa

The US Army has named FN America LLC and Colt’s Manufacturing Co. LLC as competitors in its $383.3 million contract to supply M16 rifles to Afghanistan, Iraq, Grenada, Lebanon and Nepal. The M16A4 is the fourth generation of the M16 series of military rifles. The US has approved the sale of 80000 and 4400 M16A4 rifles to Iraq in 2008 and 2017, and 891 of them to Afghanistan in 2016. Bids were solicited via the internet with three received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of April 28, 2025. Starting 2015, the US military began replacing the M16 with a shorter and lighter version, the M4 carbine.

Europe

CFM International won a $13.6 million contract modification, which exercises an option to procure one CFM56-7B27AE commercial-off-the-shelf engine for the government of the United Kingdom. CFM International is a joint venture between GE Aviation and Safran Aircraft Engines. The joint venture has delivered 30,700 engines to more than 570 operators and has 13,700 engines in backlog. Work will take place in France, North Carolina and is expected to be complete by April 2021. Foreign Military Sales funds in the amount of $13,582,486 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

Saab has successfully completed the first air trials with its new fighter X-band Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, which will be offered as a new addition to Saab’s PS-05/A radar family. Saab continues to develop core AESA technology and has now successfully completed the first air trials with the new X-band AESA radar. The trials were flown successfully, collecting data while detecting and tracking objects. The radar is designed for fighter aircraft and can be adapted to a variety of platforms. As Saab previously announced, a version of the new AESA antenna has been sold to the US. Government customer. “This is an important step in the development of our new fighter AESA radar. We see great possibilities for the radar, and its modular, adaptable and scalable design means it can also be used for a range of other applications”, says Anders Carp, SVP and head of Saab’s business area Surveillance.

Asia-Pacific

South Korean shipbuilder Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) has launched the fourth of eight Daegu (FFX-II) Class guided-missile frigates on order for the Republic of Korea Navy. Named Donghae, the 122.1 m-long warship entered the water during a ceremony held on April 29 at HHI’s facilities in the southeastern coastal city of Ulsan, and is expected to be handed over to the service in late 2021. The Daegu class is a larger variant of South Korea’s six Incheon (FFX-I) Class ships, the first of which entered service in 2013. The class has an overall beam of 14 m, a standard displacement of 2,800 tonnes, and a full-loaded displacement of 3,650 tonnes. Each FFX-II ship is powered by one Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbine engine and two Leonardo DRS permanent magnet motors driven by MTU 12 V 4000 diesel-generator sets in a combined diesel-electric or gas (CODLOG) configuration. Each of the ships can attain a maximum speed of 30 kt.

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Americas

Lockheed Martin won a $13.1 million to provide engineering and management services for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)-19 Post Shakedown Availability (PSA). LCS-19 is a Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship. The Freedom Class are small and fast vessels, intended to operate in littoral zones, for example close to the shore. These are designed to combat with small craft, rather than equal warships. These ships are designed to have a shallow draft and operate at high speed. Work will take place in New Jersey, Florida, Virginia, Washington DC. Work is scheduled to be finished by September 2021.

Boeing won a $9.7 million contract modification provides engineering, manufacturing and development support to integrate BRR3.1 software to the Next Generation Jammer on Boeing EA-18G Growler carrier-based electronic warfare aircraft, resulting in BRR3.1 software initial operating capability. EA-18G Growler is an airborne electronic attack (AEA) aircraft, which operates from either an aircraft carrier or from land-bases. The Growler was developed as a replacement for the United States Navy EA-6B Prowler aircraft that entered service in 1971 and is approaching the end of operational life. Work will take place in St. Louis, Missouri, and is expected to be complete by December 2020.

Middle East & Africa

The United Arab Emirates’ first of potentially five GlobalEye swing-role surveillance aircraft has touched down in Abu Dhabi following a delivery flight from Linkoping, Sweden. Saab said that it had commenced deliveries of the Bombardier Global 6000 business jet-based platform that were contracted to the UAE Air Force and Defense (AF&D) under the Swing Role Surveillance System award from late 2015. Deliveries of the remaining two aircraft are set to run through to the end of 2021, while an anticipated contract for two additional platforms has not yet been signed. The ground systems had already been handed over to the UAE AF&D, ahead of the aircraft arrival. The GlobalEye is built around the Saab Erieye Extended Range (ER) radar that is housed in the same external dorsal ‘plank’ as the company’s original Erieye system. Equipped with Gallium Nitride (GaN) and other technologies, the Erieye ER is an active electronically scanned array (AESA) system that doubles the radar’s power efficiency compared with previous Erieye iterations. It has a range in excess of 650 km that can be extended by focusing the radar’s energy.

Europe

General Electric has won $707.3 million to supply F110 engines to power F-16 fighter jets of Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Taiwan. The contract includes F110-GE-129 engine production, provision of installs and spares and modernized engine management system computers. According to GE, the F110 powers more than 70 percent of the Air Force’s F-16C/D aircraft, and the 129 variant offers significant mission advantages, including significant additional thrust, for F-15 and F-16 aircraft. For Qatar, the engines will power the twin-engined Boeing F-15QT. Work will take place in Cincinnati and is expected to be finished by December 31.

German defense minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer and her French counterpart, Florence Parly, have signed a framework agreement on the Franco-German Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), Germany’s Federal Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on its website on April 28, describing this as “an important signal for European defense co-operation”. The system will replace German Leopard 2 and French Leclerc main battle tanks (MBTs) starting in the mid-2030s.

Asia-Pacific

The delivery of KM-SAM Block I, developed by South Korea’s Agency of the Defense Development, to the Republic of Korea Air Force (RoKAF) has been completed. The KM-SAM, which is also known as the Cheongung, the first indigenously developed mid-range surface-to-air guided missile, is capable of striking a hostile aircraft at an altitude of up to 40 kilometers. Dubbed the “Korean Patriot,” the system has been deployed since 2015, after the Agency of the Defense Development completed its development in 2011, according to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration.

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One more policy brief from the series on Russian strategic culture and leadership decision-making, written for a collaborative project organized by the Marshall Center with support from the Russia Strategy Initiative. This one is on Russia-China military cooperation.  Several sections of this brief are based on previous work on Russia-China cooperation that was co-authored with Michael Kofman, Paul Schwartz, and Katherine Baughman.

As with the previous ones, I am posting the full text here with permission from the Marshall Center. Please go to the newly updated Marshall Center website if you would prefer to read a PDF version.

Executive Summary

• Since 2014, Russia and China have developed a strategic partnership, primarily due to enhanced military cooperation, including sales of advanced military equipment and an increasingly robust program of bilateral and multi-lateral military exercises. Economic and diplomatic cooperation have also increased, though to a much lesser extent.
• Bilateral cooperation is unlikely to advance to the level of a full alliance because of differences in geopolitical interests and asymmetries of power, with Russia remaining reluctant to fully acknowledge China’s geopolitical rise.
• Actions by the United States to pressure both Russia and China have the effect of pushing the two countries closer together. To prevent a closer partnership, the United States should focus on creating areas of policy divergence between the two states.

Introduction

There is widespread consensus among scholars that, although Russia and China have been moving toward closer cooperation through the entire post-Soviet era, the trend has accelerated rapidly since 2014.1 The relationship was boosted by Russian leaders’ belief that Russia could survive its sudden confrontation with the West only by finding an alternative external partner. China was the obvious candidate because it had a suitably large economy, was not openly hostile to Russia, and was not planning to impose sanctions in response to the Ukraine crisis.

Since 2014, the bilateral relationship has been focused on increased military cooperation, closer economic ties, and an increase in coordination on responses to various issues in international politics. Although some advances have occurred in all three areas, military cooperation has advanced the most. As discussed in more detail later in this paper, Russia and China have institutionalized a comprehensive mechanism for military consultation, expanded military technical cooperation initiatives and military personnel exchanges, and expanded regular joint military exercises. In the diplomatic sphere, Russia and China have supported each other in various international organizations and worked to establish new international institutions that could act as alternatives to existing Western-dominated institutions.2

Although economic cooperation is the weakest aspect of the Russia-China alignment, it has progressed a great deal, particularly in the energy field. “China is eager to increase energy relations with Russian companies,… [while] Russian concern over its increased dependence on China in the East is deemed secondary to expanding Russia’s customer base beyond the still dominant European market.”3 At the same time, there have been limits to this cooperation, particularly in the economic and financial sectors outside of the energy sphere. China refused to help Russia overcome the effects of Western economic sanctions and bilateral trade and trade in national currencies has remained limited, with little diversification of trade and investments. On the political side, neither country has shown itself to be prepared to support the other’s geopolitical interests if doing so would hurt its own interests.4

This policy brief focuses primarily on strategic and military cooperation, where the two sides have made the greatest progress. After briefly discussing the prospects for a strategic partnership between Russia and China, I examine the progress in and remaining constraints on expanding bilateral military cooperation, outline three scenarios for future cooperation in this sphere, and conclude with a discussion of how the United States should respond.

Strategic Partnership?

As bilateral cooperation has progressed, analysts have increasingly examined whether the Russia-China relationship has reached a level of strategic partnership. The growing consensus is that it has.5 According to Alexander Korolev, the partnership is neither ad hoc nor temporary and provides clear benefits for both sides: “Through this partnership, Russia can gain access to more instruments for promoting its agenda of balancing the United States and enhancing its version of multi-polarity in Europe. China, in turn, receives Russia’s political backing and access to Russia’s energy resources and military technologies, which are essential assets for China in its growing tensions with the U.S. in Asia.”6  Some Russian scholars are even more optimistic about the trajectory of the relationship, suggesting that, over time, the two states might even develop an alliance.7

At the same time, there is a similar consensus forming that the current upward trend in Russia-China strategic cooperation should not be viewed as irreversible. In particular, scholars note that, should Russia’s challenge to the United States start to destabilize the international system, it may also jeopardize China’s peaceful rise. This would lead to a divergence in the countries’ interests and potentially cause a rift between the two powers to emerge.8 Some scholars argue that the geopolitical and economic factors that have hindered Russia’s past Asian pivots could have a similar effect again, although this is distinctly a minority position. One possibility proposed by analysts who hold this view is that a future leadership transition in Russia might result in a policy shift back toward a preference for closer relations with Europe, undermining the long-term prospects of Russia’s partnership with China.9

Central Asia represents one potential area of tension between Russia and China, because the two states have formulated competing regional influence projects for the region. As a result, some analysts believe that the two countries may be heading toward a strategic rivalry caused by China’s increasing desire to play a role in Central Asian security and by competition over energy export routes and trade connectivity in general.10 A more likely scenario, however, is that the two countries will maintain a division of responsibilities that allows them to continue to cooperate in the region, with Russia taking primary responsibility for security issues while China focuses on economic development.11

The global coronavirus pandemic initially introduced another source of tension into the Russia-China relationship, especially since Russia moved quickly in late January to close its borders with China. This move was seen by some observers as an indicator of a lack of trust in Chinese information, since China at the time was still making an effort to minimize the scope and threat of the epidemic. At the same time, the almost immediate decision to reopen the border to commercial traffic highlighted Russia’s dependence on Chinese goods.12 As it turned out, even this partial closure proved to be economically damaging, especially in the Russian Far East.13 However, any residual tension was overcome once China largely ended community spread of the virus. Once the threat of spread was over, the two countries developed complementary information campaigns designed to highlight their mutual assistance in the crisis and the superiority of authoritarian systems over democratic ones in marshalling resources to fight the pandemic.14

Future of Bilateral Military Cooperation

Russian senior officials have highlighted the special nature of Russia’s defense relationship with China by characterizing the ties in terms of a strategic partnership. As the two countries have expanded the number of military exercises and consultations while deepening military technical cooperation, analysts have suggested a growing alignment between the two countries at a political level that allows for stronger defense ties. This does not mean that Russia and China are about to enter a military alliance. As cogently argued by Michael Kofman, Russian and Chinese leaders have labeled the relationship a strategic alliance because a military alliance is not needed, given that the two countries do not need each other for security guarantees or extended nuclear deterrence. That said, they have sought to make their ties more formal, as shown by the 2017 agreement on a three-year road map to establish a legal framework to govern military cooperation. This framework is expected to be completed and signed later in 2020, further codifying various aspects of defense ties, including the option of conducting joint long-range aviation patrols.15

Military Technical Cooperation

Although China was Russia’s leading client for military hardware in the 1990s and early 2000s, the arms sales relationship sharply declined after 2006 because of a combination of Chinese unhappiness with Russian pricing policies and the poor maintenance record of Russian equipment, as well as Russian concerns about China’s tendency to reverse-engineer Russian equipment for both its own use and export abroad. Russian arms sales to China saw a modest revival post-2011 but expanded most substantially after the Ukraine crisis, with agreements for the sale of S-400 air defense systems and Su-35 combat aircraft signaling the end of Russia’s informal ban on sales of advanced weapon systems to China.16 In October 2019, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was helping China develop its own ballistic missile early warning system. Russia’s new willingness to share information related to strategic nuclear weapons highlights the extent to which old sensitivities about sharing advanced military technology with China has dissipated in recent years.17 Russia has also turned to China for electronic components and naval diesel engines that it could no longer obtain from the West. Most significantly, military cooperation and defense ties improved as defense sales declined, making clear that such ties are driven at the senior political level and not tied to arms sales.

However, Russia faces a difficult choice this decade in either providing advanced technology to China, knowing that the technology will most likely be copied, or forgoing arms sales but with the expectation that China’s defense sector will develop comparable systems in the near future. The previous Russian arms export strategy of selling the “second-best” technology available while staying a generation ahead is no longer viable. China’s defense industry has sufficiently caught up with or worked around Russia via defense-cooperation deals with other countries that it is now only interested in the most-advanced Russian weapons available. China’s advances in weapon design and general goal of self-sufficiency in military production suggest that Russian arms sales will never reach the peak achieved in the early 2000s and that China will emerge as a stronger arms market competitor to Russia over time.

Military Exercises

Military exercises are a central pillar of bilateral military relations. Moscow and Beijing have recently been rapidly expanding the scale and pace of their joint exercise activity far beyond the two traditional programs, the Peace Mission ground forces exercises in Central Asia and the Joint Sea naval exercises. Both of the long-standing exercise programs have had an anti-U.S. character, with gradually increasing levels of complexity and joint activity. However, the exercises have been criticized for being overly scripted and poorly coordinated, as well as for continuing to lack a joint command structure.18 These criticisms are not necessarily warranted, as the purposes of the exercises are primarily to build military ties at the senior level and to signal political intentions rather than to establish interoperability. There has been no evidence that Russia and China intend to operate in a joint command structure; such a structure would not make sense for two countries that have not entered a formal military alliance.

The naval exercises between Russia and China have been more effective in terms of providing realistic operational experience, although they have not focused particularly on interoperability between the two navies. Naval exercises are not only becoming more frequent but also are being held in new geographical areas. Before the Ukraine crisis, Russia refused to hold bilateral exercises in such controversial territories as southern China near Taiwan. Since 2015, however, naval exercises have been held in areas such as the Baltic and South China Seas as a way of signaling the two countries’ growing power, expanding military ties, and mutual displeasure with the United States.19 Recent trilateral exercises with Iran represent another example of this steady expansion in the use of exercises for political signaling, now including third nations.20 Given China’s desire to be more visible in the European maritime theater, one can expect an increase in exercises that serve the Chinese desire to show its flag in distant waters.

Since 2015, the two countries have expanded their repertoire of exercises, including adding joint missile defense exercises in response to the U.S. deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. Most observers are aware of growing Chinese participation in Russian strategic exercises, including Vostok-2018 and Tsentr-2019. A joint Russian-Chinese bomber patrol in July 2019 demonstrated that Moscow is increasingly willing to disregard the interests of other states in the Asia-Pacific region in its pursuit of a closer military relationship with China.21

These exercises are primarily focused on setting a positive tone for military-to-military ties at the highest levels, rather than increasing interoperability at the tactical level. The exercises suggest that Russian-Chinese military cooperation in the air domain, which lags naval exercises, will increase. Stronger participation of Chinese air assets in Tsentr-2019 further substantiates this observed trend.22 Space is the next likely frontier for expanding cooperation, although it may be limited given sensitivities about the technologies involved in this domain.

Limitations on Bilateral Military Cooperation

Despite steady progress over the past decade, there remain significant geopolitical and technical constraints on military cooperation between Russia and China. Although senior Chinese and Russian officials repeatedly and publicly affirm that their relationship is characterized by great trust, in reality, a lack of mutual trust remains an obstacle to more robust cooperation. Although Russia and China formally settled the last of their border disputes in 2008, there are still regions where the two sides’ geopolitical interests may not align in the long term. Russia remains concerned over potential Chinese encroachment into the Russian Far East. Russia’s concerns are fueled by a combination of past Chinese claims to territory Russia annexed in the 1800s and the contrast between the sparsely populated Russian Far East and the densely populated Chinese border regions, which have generated ongoing Chinese immigration. A military incursion is seen as unlikely by Moscow relative to the more insidious problem of what Russian leaders fear could prove to be (1) a creeping annexation, in which China projects influence into parts of the Russian Far East on a de facto basis through a large influx of illegal Chinese immigrants, and (2) a steady reorientation of the Russian Far East toward more economically attractive Chinese markets and away from the distant center of power in Moscow.

As the relative balance of influence in Central Asia continues to shift more in favor of China, the potential for the two sides to clash over interests in the region remains significant. Beijing has steadily supplanted Russia as the principal economic power in Central Asia in terms of investment and lending. Still, countries in the region continue to look primarily to Russia to defend their security interests; additionally, Russia remains the principal labor market for this region.

Thus far, this de facto division of labor has enabled Russia and China to maintain a reasonably stable working relationship in Central Asia, such that they do not step on each other’s vital national interests or security concerns. However, as China’s Belt and Road Initiative develops, its economic footprint in Central Asia is likely to grow larger, which could lead to tensions between Beijing and Moscow.

Russia has sought to play a key role in the development of the Arctic region; in particular, it plans to capitalize on new energy sources, as well as the opening of the Northern Sea Route. While Moscow has been willing to work with other members of the Arctic Council, Russia has been reluctant to allow non-Arctic powers, such as China, to play a major role in the region. By contrast, a resource-hungry China has plans to extend its presence to the Arctic and is building its first domestically-produced icebreaker. Although none of these geopolitical concerns are currently likely to cause tensions that could limit military cooperation between Russia and China, they could be factors in the long term.

The asymmetry in economic power between the two countries, including their potential regional influence and global heft, has grown more visible. Furthermore, Russian strategic culture, long having seen itself as superior to China, is visibly struggling with the new realities of this power balance. As a result, Russian political elites have yet to come to terms with China’s rise. Finally, both countries are deeply nationalistic and prestige-seeking, which means neither would be particularly willing to subordinate its military to the leadership of the other. Russian leaders’ desire to maintain an independent foreign policy means that they will not accept Chinese leadership or impose limitations on their relationships with other countries for the sake of Chinese foreign policy. Although the two countries seek to manage conflict over core interests, most international competition is seen as fair game, whether it is arms sales or foreign direct investment.

Russia and China have placed a low priority on achieving greater interoperability during joint military exercises, reflecting an enduring lack of interest on the part of both sides in developing the kind of integrated military capability needed to conduct effective joint military operations.23 At the tactical level, issues such as language and communication highlight that these are decidedly different military structures, with different planning processes and organizational cultures. This limits what the Chinese are able to learn from their counterparts.

China is seen as a predatory power by many Russian experts, so there is a natural degree of apprehension among the Russian military. General Staffs plan contingencies around capabilities, because intent can change. This is especially so when dealing with another great power that is self-admittedly revisionist in its ambitions. Despite the positive outlook of Russia’s national leadership on the benefits of a growing Sino-Russian alignment, the military establishment will always see the Chinese military as a potential adversary and plan accordingly.

Scenarios for Future Russia-China Military Cooperation

The impact of various scenarios for the development of Russia-China military cooperation on U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region is inversely correlated with their likelihood. That is, the most likely scenarios are relatively low impact, while the highest-impact scenarios are very unlikely to develop. In this section, I outline three scenarios for future military cooperation between Russia and China.

Low Impact, High Probability

In a low-impact, high-probability scenario, Russia and China expand their military cooperation by holding additional joint naval exercises with countries that are seen as adversarial to the United States and expanding the visibility of their maritime presence both in the Pacific and the Mediterranean regions. As noted earlier, previous joint naval exercises have been conducted in the South China Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Baltic Sea, and future theaters could include other areas within the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. Expanded exercises in these regions would serve the two countries’ respective purposes, as Russia seeks greater visibility in the Asia-Pacific and China seeks greater visibility in the European maritime theater.

Both countries seek to reciprocate U.S. freedom-of-navigation operations to the extent possible by visiting the Western Hemisphere. Russia and China could agree to hold a naval exercise in the Caribbean Sea, hosted by Venezuela or Cuba. Such an exercise would have little long-term impact on either Russia’s or China’s geopolitical influence in Latin America and it would not do much to improve their military capabilities or naval interoperability. It would, however, generate a great deal of media attention, highlighting the countries’ ostensible global reach and potential strategic partnership. In other words, both countries could feel that they had scored a propaganda win at relatively low cost, but the actual impact on regional security would be negligible.

Medium Impact, Medium Probability

A medium-impact, medium-probability scenario might focus on additional sales of Russian advanced military equipment. The most interesting systems for China would include diesel-electric submarines, over-the-horizon radar systems, early warning systems, space-related technology for satellites, microchips, and next-generation aircraft engines. In return, Russia might accelerate the purchase of Chinese defense-industrial components, such as heavy-lift cranes, machine tools, and circuitry board components and parts. Although Russia would benefit substantially from procuring Chinese surface combatant vessels, given the shortcomings in those parts of the Russian defense-industrial complex, the financial interests of Russia’s domestic defense industry would likely prevent such deals from being made.

The two countries could also build on Russia’s recent sale to China of S-400 long-range air defense systems to agree to the sale of Russian S-500 air defense systems once those come online. S-500 systems would have a longer range than existing systems owned by China and may have the capability of defending against a wider range of missile types. These capabilities would lead to a significant improvement in Chinese air defense capabilities versus the United States and its allies. China would seek to acquire the 40N6 extended-range (400-km) missile, which has reached initial operating capability with the S-400, either as part of an S-500 deal or on its own for China’s existing S-400 systems.

High Impact, Low Probability

A number of highly unlikely but potentially very damaging scenarios present themselves. One such area would involve greater Russian-Chinese defense industrial cooperation on sensitive technology, such as theater hypersonic weapons or submarine quieting. Although military establishments on both sides would almost certainly resist allowing the other side access to such technology, if such cooperation did develop, it would substantially affect the ability of the United States to maintain a favorable regional military balance and retain a technological edge in certain domains over China. One possibility for enhanced defense cooperation that has been discussed in recent years, though with little progress to date, is a potential technology transfer deal in which Moscow would provide Beijing with the RD-180 rocket engine in exchange for space-grade microelectronic components.24 Past discussion centered on trading finished equipment, but a  closer relationship between Russia and China may result in consideration of exchanging production technology in the future. Such a deal would increase China’s lift capacity and Russia’s ability to produce advanced guidance and control systems.

Another scenario in this category is a joint military intervention, most likely in a Central Asian country in the event of a political crisis or instability, because Russia and China have previously conducted exercises to deconflict areas of responsibility in this type of scenario. However, one should not exclude the possibility of a joint Russian-Chinese intervention in Africa or the Middle East. While the countries lack core interests in these regions, the cost and risk of intervention is also dramatically lower and the barrier for entry in such operations is not especially high. Both countries have the expeditionary capacity to conduct relatively small force deployments around much of the world and might well seek to do so together in response to a contingency where their interests align.

The least likely, but nonetheless possible, scenario is a military crisis with the United States in which one country takes advantage of a situation to press for geopolitical gains. For example, in the event of a standoff between the United States and China, Russia would seek to leverage the distraction of the United States to make opportunistic gains. Russia could deploy forces to Asia or provide military assistance via deniable means to China in order to raise costs to the United States. Because China is quite remote from Europe, the likelihood of Chinese involvement in a crisis between Russia and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe is too low to be worth considering.

How Should the United States Respond?

There is a general perception among experts that greater cooperation between Russia and China is inevitable, given the core precepts of present-day U.S. foreign policy. Scholars focused on relative power suggest that the two countries will inevitably balance against the most powerful country in the international system.25 Furthermore, U.S. efforts to pursue a hard line against either Russia or China, and especially against both at the same time, have the effect of driving the two countries closer together. For some scholars, this suggests that accommodating them within the existing international order would be a more effective response.26 Scholars focused on the role played by ideas highlight the perceived threat of liberal ideology and suggest that if the United States reduces its emphasis on democracy promotion and regime change, this would reduce the impetus to Russian-Chinese cooperation.27

In this geopolitical environment, actions by the United States that threaten Russia and China in a similar manner or present a common security challenge will have the effect of driving the two countries closer together. This is especially true if the actions are strategic in nature. Examples of such actions include the deployment of missile defense systems or freedom-of-navigation operations near the shores of either Russia or China. Both of these actions create a perception among Russian and Chinese leaders that they share a common global security challenge from the United States—and one that is serious enough that they would be best served by facing it together.

On the other hand, actions that disaggregate the nature of the threat perceived by Russian and Chinese leaders would help create divergence in their interests and thereby slow the trend toward a closer bilateral relationship. For example, the United States could challenge Russia in ways that are exclusive to the European theater, such as by pulsing additional troops to NATO member states for exercises. Similarly, China could be challenged in the regions of Taiwan and Southeast Asia rather than in East Asia or maritime territories adjacent to Russian territory. Russian relations with such countries as Vietnam and India could be exploited to highlight potential tensions between Russia and China.

Notes

1 Alexander Gabuev, Friends with Benefits? Russian-Chinese Relations After the Ukraine Crisis, Carnegie Moscow Center, June 29 2016, https://carnegie.ru/2016/06/29/friends-with-benefits-russian-chinese-relations-after-ukraine-crisis-pub-63953.

2  Alexander Korolev, “How Closely Aligned Are China and Russia? Measuring Strategic Cooperation in IR,” International Politics, May 2019.

3 Tom Røseth, “Russia’s Energy Relations with China: Passing the Strategic Threshold?” Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2017, pp. 23–55.

4 Mikhail Korostikov, Дружба на расстоянии руки: Как Москва и Пекин определили границы допустимого [“Friendship at Arms’ Length: How Moscow and Beijing Determined the Boundaries of the Permissible”], Kommersant, May 31, 2019, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3984186.

5 Tom Røseth, “Moscow’s Response to a Rising China: Russia’s Partnership Policies in Its Military Relations with Beijing,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 66, No. 4, 2019, pp. 268–286.

6 Korolev, 2019, p. 29.

7 Vassily Kashin, “Is the Conflict Inevitable? Not at All. How Reasonable Are Western Expectations of a Russia-China Confrontation?” Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2017

8 Andrej Krickovic, “The Symbiotic China-Russia Partnership: Cautious Riser and Desperate Challenger,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2017, pp. 299–329.

9 Chris Miller, “Will Russia’s Pivot to Asia Last?” Orbis, Winter 2020. See also Mikhail Karpov, “The Grandeur and Miseries of Russia’s ‘Turn to the East’: Russian-Chinese ‘Strategic Partnership’ in the Wake of the Ukraine Crisis and Western Sanctions,” Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2018.

10 Carla P. Freeman, “New Strategies for an Old Rivalry? China–Russia Relations in Central Asia After the Energy Boom,” Pacific Review, Vol. 31, No. 5, 2018, pp. 635–654.

11 Liselotte Odgaard, “Beijing’s Quest for Stability in Its Neighborhood: China’s Relations with Russia in Central Asia,” Asian Security, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2017, pp. 41–58.

12 Jake Rudnitsky and Evgenia Pismennaya, “Russia Closes Border With China to People, Not Goods,” Bloomberg News, January 30, 2020,  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-30/russia-closing-border-with-china-to-affect-people-not-goods.

13 Andrew Higgins, “Businesses Getting Killed on Russian Border as Coronavirus Fears Rise,” New York Times, February 24, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/24/world/europe/coronavirus-russia-china-commerce.html.

14 Van Ivej, “Выход из Кризиса и Преимущества Китая, [Exit from Crisis and China’s Advantages],” Russia in Global Affairs, April 1, 2020, https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/vyhod-iz-krizisa-i-preimushhestva-kitaya/; Fyodor Lukyanov, “Вирус Разнообразия [Virus of Diversity],” Russia in Global Affairs, March 25, 2020, https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/virus-raznoobraziya/.

15 Michael Kofman, “Towards a Sino-Russian Entente?” Riddle, November 29, 2019, https://www.ridl.io/en/towards-a-sino-russian-entente.

16 Siemon Wezeman, “China, Russia and the Shifting Landscape of Arms Sales,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, July 5, 2017, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/china-russia-and-shifting-landscape-arms-sales.

17 Dmitry Stefanovich, “Russia to Help China Develop an Early Warning System,” The Diplomat, October 25, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/russia-to-help-china-develop-an-early-warning-system.

18 Daniel Urchik, “What We Learned from Peace Mission 2018,” Small Wars Journalundated, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-we-learned-peace-mission-2018.

19 Chris Buckley, “Russia to Join China in Naval Exercise in Disputed South China Sea,” New York Times, July 29, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/world/asia/russia-china-south-china-sea-naval-exercise.html and Andrew Higgins, “China and Russia Hold First Joint Naval Drill in the Baltic Sea,” New York Times, July 25, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/world/europe/china-russia-baltic-navy-exercises.html.

20 Andrew Osborn, “Russia, China, Iran Start Joint Naval Drills in Indian Ocean,” Reuters, December 27, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-military-russia-china/russia-china-iran-start-joint-naval-drills-in-indian-ocean-idUSKBN1YV0IB.

21 Franz-Stefan Gady, “The Significance of the First Ever China-Russia Strategic Bomber Patrol,” The Diplomat, July 25, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/the-significance-of-the-first-ever-china-russia-strategic-bomber-patrol/.

22 “China to Send 1,600 Troops, About 30 Aircraft to Russia’s Strategic Military Drills,” TASS, August 29, 2019, https://tass.com/defense/1075535.

23 Paul Schwartz, “The Military Dimension in Sino-Russian Relations,” in Jo Inge Bekkevold and Bobo Lo, eds. Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st Century, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), p. 105.

24 Eric Berger, “Russia Now Looking to Sell Its Prized Rocket Engines to China,” Ars Technica, January 18, 2018, https://arstechnica.com/science/2018/01/russia-now-looking-to-sell-its-prized-rocket-engines-to-china.

25 Robert S. Ross, “Sino‑Russian Relations: The False Promise of Russian Balancing,” International Politics, September 2019.

26 Krickovic, 2017.

27 John M. Owen IV, “Sino‑Russian Cooperation Against Liberal Hegemony,” International Politics, January 2020.

Americas

Bell Boeing Joint Program Office won an $8.1 million contract modification, which adds non-recurring baseline performance rig test efforts in support of the Improved Inlet Solution/Engine Air Particle Separator preliminary design on MV-22 and CV-22 Tiltrotor aircraft. The V-22 Osprey is a joint-service, medium-lift, multimission tilt-rotor aircraft developed by Boeing and Bell Helicopters. The tiltrotor aircraft is available in three configurations: the Combat Assault and Assault Support MV-22 for the USMC and the US Army; the long-range special operations CV-22 for US Special Operations Command (US SOCOM); and the US Navy HV-22, for combat search and rescue, special warfare and fleet logistic support. Work will take place in Indiana, Texas, Pennsylvania and Mississippi.

The Omaha World Herald reports that L3Harris will start converting the first of three KC-135R refueling tankers into WC-135R nuclear radiation sniffing aircraft starting from next month. A US Air Force spokesperson said the first jet is expected to be delivered to the 55th Wing at Offutt Air Force Base in 2022. Maj. Malinda Singleton added that besides removing the refueling boom from the tail of the aircraft, the flight deck will be modernized to the same standard as RC-135S and V/W.

Middle East & Africa

The Boeing AGM-84L Harpoon Block II missiles that the United States approved for Morocco’s Royal Air Force to purchase are the „non-coastal target suppression“ version, the US Federal Register revealed on Monday. This reduction in capability was not mentioned when the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on April 14 that the US State Department had approved the sale of 10 AGM-84Ls for an estimated USD62 million for use by the RMAF’s F-16 multirole fighters. The AGM-84L was designed to have a substantially improved ability to find target ships sailing close to shore or in congested waters.

Europe

A court in Vienna has stopped an Austrian investigation into alleged fraud by Airbus and Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH in connection with a $2 billion Eurofighter jet purchase in 2003, it said on April 27. The investigation was linked to accusations brought by Austria’s defense ministry in 2017, and its closure does not affect a broader criminal investigation of suspected bribery in the same deal that has been going on since 2011, a court spokeswoman said. The ministry triggered a new probe into Airbus and the Eurofighter consortium – which also includes Britain’s BAE Systems and Italy’s Leonardo in February 2017, alleging that they had misled the state about the price, deliverability and equipment of the planes. Among other things, the ministry accused Airbus and the consortium of illegally charging nearly 10% of the purchase price for so-called offset deals, which involve work being given to local companies.

The Royal Air Force is testing an NHS smartphone app that could help prevent the spread of COVID-19. According to the RAF website, personnel at RAF Leeming are trialling the software, led by the station’s digital unit, RAF eXperimental (RAFX), who have been working closely with NHSX and partners. he app uses Bluetooth software to determine a user’s proximity to other devices. If a person shows symptoms or tests positive for the virus, they can choose to share this information with the NHS via the app. An alert will then be sent to other devices they have been near, whose users can then be tested or self-isolate. It is understood that RAFX set up a scenario which simulated people’s experience of shopping. To adhere to social-distancing rules, phones were placed on tables to simulate people clustering in a shopping area.

Asia-Pacific

Airbus pulled out of a joint venture with Thai Airways, the country’s national airline, to provide maintenance, repair, and overhaul services at a civil-military airport near the country’s eastern seaboard. Speaking at a press conference officials from Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor office said in comments reported by the state-owned Thai News Agency that Airbus’ decision was prompted by the economic impact of Covid-19.

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Americas

Boeing won a $75.1 million deal in support of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter aircraft Service Life Assessment Program and Service Life Extension Program, Phase C follow-on effort. The Service Life Modification program started in 2018 and is expected to continue until 2040. The production rate is anticipated to peak at 40 aircraft annually. Boeing also won a contract from the USN in March 2019 to manufacture 78 new-build F/A-18E/F Super Hornets with service-life extensions and Block III upgrades incorporated. Work will take place in St. Louis, Missouri and El Segundo, California. The deal provides non-recurring engineering to assess the fatigue life of the aircraft as well as its subsystems and structures to extend the service life of the F/A-18E/F beyond the original design of the 6,000 flight hour service life. Work is expected to be finished by April 2025.

Hydroid Inc. won a $39.4 million modification to exercise Option Year One for production support for the MK-18 Family of Systems – Unmanned Underwater Vehicle systems. Based on the REMUS 100, the Swordfish MK-18 is designed to Search, Classify, and Map (SCM) the Very Shallow Water Region (10?40 ft). The Navy has a total of 24 Swordfish vehicles: EOD Mobile Unit 1 San Diego, CA : 4 Systems (12 Block A Vehicles), Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit 2 (MDSU?2), Norfolk, VA: 1 System (3 Block A Vehicles), Naval Oceanographic and Mine Warfare Command (NOMWC), Stennis, MS: 3 Systems (9 Block B vehicles). The Mk 18 Mod 1 Swordfish UUV is capable of performing low-visible exploration and reconnaissance in support of amphibious landing; MCM operations (including search, classification and mapping; and reacquire and identification); and hydrographic mapping in the VSW zone (10 to 40 feet depth) and the seaward approaches. It is capable of navigating via acoustic transponders in long-baseline or ultra-short-baseline mode or via P-coded GPS. Work will take place Pocasset, Massachusetts and is expected to be complete by April 2024.

Middle East & Africa

A senior commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Force says the corps will soon take delivery of the Fotros unmanned air vehicle. Fotros is the largest UAV built by Iran so far and was unveiled in 2013. Following extensive meetings with the Defense Ministry and evaluation of features of the homegrown drone, the IRGC Ground Force’s Drone Division has decided to utilize Fotros in operational zones.

Europe

Hensoldt has revealed a new airborne jammer that forms part of a wider family of electronic warfare (EW) systems it is developing for the NATO electronic attack requirement that the Luftwaffe has committed itself to deliver. The Kalaetron Attack jammerr is billed as a modular system that Hensoldt hopes will be adopted by the Luftwaffe to deliver its wider Luftgestützte Wirkung im Elektromagnetischen Spektrum capability to NATO from 2025. As noted by the German electronics house, the Kalaetron Attack jammer is a new addition to the Kalaetron EW product family that uses fully digitalised hardware and artificial intelligence to detect radar-based threats and neutralize them with targeted electronic countermeasures.

Asia-Pacific

Lockheed Martin won a $67.6 million modification to a Foreign Military Sales contract to India and Taiwan. The deal provides for modernized target acquisition designation sight/pilot night vision sensors and its subcomponents on the Apache 64D/E helicopter. The M-TADS/PNVS is a long-range, precision engagement and pilotage solution for day, night and adverse weather missions. The electro-optical sensor provides Apache aircrews with situational awareness. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of April 24, 2023.

China has recently commissioned a “new strategic nuclear-powered submarine”, according to a report by the state-owned Global Times newspaper. Written to reflect recent achievements of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in celebration of the 71st anniversary of the establishment of the naval service, the report refers to “new weapons” entering service including the Type 055 destroyer, the first domestically built aircraft carrier, and new anti-submarine patrol aircraft (the KQ-200), as well as the new submarine. Written to reflect recent achievements of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in celebration of the 71st anniversary of the establishment of the naval service, the report refers to “new weapons” entering service including the Type 055 destroyer, the first domestically built aircraft carrier, and new anti-submarine patrol aircraft (the KQ-200), as well as the new submarine.

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The French Navy’s new nuclear attack submarine made its first sea trip on April 28

Tag: Suffren

Americas

Aviation Training Consulting won a $7.3 million contract modification for B-52 training system contractor logistics support and training system support center sustainment. The contract modification is for the third increment of the seven year basic contract. The B-52 Stratofortress is capable of dropping or launching a significant array of weapons including gravity bombs, cluster bombs and precision guided missiles. It is a long-range, subsonic, jet-powered strategic bomber. It has been operated by the US Air Force since the 50s. Work under the contract modification will take place at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana; and Minot AFB, North Dakota. Estimated completion date is October 31, 2020.

Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems won a $147.6 million contract action modification for the procurement of MK 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS) vertical launcher module electronic components. The electronic components are installed on USN Ticonderoga Class guided missile cruisers and  Arleigh Burke Class guided missile destroyers, as well as vessels operated by allied navies. The purchases are for the USN as well as including purchases via FMS for Finland, Germany and South Korea. The contracting activity is the Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC. This agreement will be financed using the FY2018 and FY2019 shipbuilding and conversion (Navy) funds as well as $29.53 million of FMS funding which was obligated at the time of award. Work is expected to be completed by March 2025.

Middle East & Africa

The US State Department has approved a possible Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on April 23. The Government of the United Arab Emirates had earlier requested a Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement for common spares/repair parts to support the UAE’ fleet of AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Black Hawk, and CH-47 Chinook helicopters, additional support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $150 million. The proposed sale will allow the UAE Joint Aviation Command to continue to purchase needed spare/repair parts to maintain its fleet of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters, and CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopters as part of the Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement program.

A Israeli Air Force F-4 #022 that was neglected in the Air Force Museum has been restored to pristine condition by 201 Squadron and shipped back home to Ramon Air Force Base. 201 Squadron was the first and last operator of the Phantom in the Israeli Air Force. The F-4 Phantom aircraft and the 201 (“The One”) squadron, which currently operates the “Sufa” (F-16I) fighter jet, share a historic route. The squadron was the first and last to operate the aircraft that has since participated in countless IAF wars and operations. Recently, Ramon AFB received a newly renovated Phantom from the IAF museum located in Hatzerim AFB.

Europe

Saab has signed a three-year contract with the British Ministry of Defense for the provision of support and services to the Direct Fire Weapon Effects Simulator (DFWES) capability. The contract came into effect on April 1, 2020. DFWES is a laser-based Tactical Engagement Simulation (TES) system, that allows dismounted and mounted soldiers to simulate the effects of direct and indirect fire. This order includes support and maintenance for the British Army’s DFWES capability.

Asia-Pacific

South Korea will incorporate a Hanwha Systems-developed, medium-range multifunction radar (MFR) system on the new type of frigates referred to locally as the FFX-III class, Jane’s reports. The class, which is also known as the Ulsan Batch III in official Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) documents, will be the first warships to feature the Gallium Nitride-based sensor. The active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar will form the apex of the frigate’s integrated mast system. The Incheon Class frigates also known as the Future Frigate eXperimental or FFX during development, are coastal defense frigates of the Republic of Korea Navy.

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