Defense`s Feeds

Poland’s Lodz-based WZL-1 (Wojskowe Zakłady Lotnicze Nr 1 S.A. (Military Aviation Works No. 1) has completed the modernisation, conducts maintenance, repair, overhaul of a Mil Mi-24V (6W-HCA) attack helicopter for the Senegal Air Force. The secondhand rotorcraft is understood to have been acquired from a former Soviet-era operator.

Acceptance flights were conducted on 12 January by a team of Polish and Senegalese personnel, and witnessed by the customer air force’s commander-in-chief, Brig Gen Birame Diop. This is the first Mi-24 to have been acquired by Senegal, and it is unclear whether the West African nation intends to field additional examples.
Flight Fleets Analyzer records the Senegal air force as already operating a pair of 11-year-old Mi-35s, which it acquired directly from Russia.

WZL-1 is one of the leading aviation companies in Europe. The company established its position on local, national and foreign market thanks to untypical activity which generally covers:
• overhaul, maintenance and modernization of the following helicopters: Mi-8, Mi-14, Mi-17, Mi-24, W-3 Sokół and SH-2G Kaman;
• general overhaul of SO-3/W aviation engines and TW3-117 (III s, M, MT, W) family engines.

Downing Street has been accused of covering up a Trident missile malfunction weeks before a crucial Commons vote on the future of the submarine-based missile system.

A Trident II D5 missile test ended in failure after it was launched from the British submarine HMS Vengeance off the coast of Florida in June 2016. The weapon is 13 metres long, weighs 60 tonnes and can carry nuclear warheads with up to eight times the destructive capacity of the bombs that hit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the second world war. Trident missile can hit a target 4,000 nautical miles away and be accurate to within a few metres.

The problem is that when HMS Vengeance, one of the UK’s four nuclear submarines, test-fired the missile off the coast of Florida, the missile was not out by a few metres but several thousand miles. It had been targeted at the southern Atlantic off the coast of west Africa. Instead, it was heading in the opposite direction, over the US.

The four previous UK tests – in 2000, 2005, 2009 and 2012 – were successful, it was the only firing test of a British nuclear missile in four years and raises serious questions about the reliability and safety of the weapons system. But the error was hushed up. The cause of the failure remains top secret, but quotes a senior naval source saying the missile, which was unarmed for the test, suffered an in-flight malfunction after launch. According to defence sources, the missile did not veer off in the wrong direction because it was faulty but because the information relayed to it was faulty. This explanation is not reassuring.

It was reportedly intended to be fired 5,600 miles to a sea target off the west coast of Africa but may have veered off towards America instead. There was a major panic at the highest level of government and the military after the first test of our nuclear deterrent in four years ended in disastrous failure. In July, MPs voted by 472 to 117 to back the renewal of Britain's Trident nuclear deterrence. The overwhelming vote supported the Government's plans to spend up to £40 billion on four new Successor-class submarines.

Some analysts say the fact that UK tests are infrequent is not important because the US tests much more frequently and both share the underlying technology. There are over 150 tests over almost 30 years, with a sub-3% failure rate, and well under 1% since British submarines began carrying the missiles.

Source
http://www.independent.co.uk/
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/
https://www.theguardian.com

Under the aegis of the African Union, the 54 states will set up a "Schengen-like" borderless area in 2017 to boost trade. Negotiations for the establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) in Africa were formally launched in June 2015 at the African Union Summit in Johannesburg. A year later, a boost seems to be given to the project, although the project exists since the signing in 1991 of the Treaty of Abuja.

Why now ? In a context of global economic crisis, African states are somewhere forced to accelerate the pace. In 2015 the Tripartite Initiative involving COMESA, EAC and SADC was launched, with a view to the preparation of a large free trade area from Cairo to Cape Town. The Tripartite Initiative, the largest free trade agreement involving 26 countries from three regional economic communities (RECs), Comesa, CEA and SADC, with a total of 530 million inhabitants for a gross domestic product Total of $ 630 billion, more than half of Africa's economic output. This initiative has rekindled the interest of African leaders in broadening the continental free trade area.

Intra-African trade must be saved because it accounts for only 10% of trade on the continent, while in the EU, Asia and North America, intra-regional trade represents respectively 70 %, 52% and 50% of trade. Moreover, the share of Africa in world trade is even more derisory since it represents only about 2%. Implementing such an Africa-wide FTA could boost intra-African trade to the tune of US $ 35 billion annually by 2022. A review of the genesis and functioning of this area of free movement of more than one billion people.

The CFTA is a priority initiative of the AU Agenda 2063. The objective of the CFTA is to create a single continental market for goods and services, to establish the free movement of business people. It also aims to pave the way for the acceleration of the establishment of the customs union in 2022 and an African economic community by 2028. This gradual approach is justified by the fact that integration should be consolidated at regional level, through the creation and the strengthening of regional economic communities (RECs). The RECs would ultimately merge into the African Economic Community. (There are 8 RECs : UMA, CEN-SAD, CEDEAO / ECOWAS, UEMOA, MRU, CEEAC, SADC, COMESA, IGAD.)

The current intra-African trade situation is disappointing. Despite the fact that the free movement of persons, the right of residence and the right of establishment are the founding principles enshrined in Chapter VI of the Abuja Treaty, a truck that delivers supermarkets in Southern Africa needs 1,600 documents, permits and licenses to legally cross borders.In the future, the continental free trade area could just as well require the removal of barriers such as the imposition of visa requirements that restrict the movement of people across national borders. Far from being settled, remains the issue of labor mobility among African countries, one of the most contentious issues for African leaders due to security or political instability problems.

Trade and industry are catalysts for African development for the African Union, once the establishment of the CFTA, the competitiveness of industrial products would be increased by exploiting the potential of economies in a wider continental market . The initiative would also help diversify and transform the African economy, improve resource allocation, reduce prices in countries and make Africa less vulnerable to external trade shocks. In addition, regional integration of the continent should integrate regional markets with efficient infrastructure to attract investment and improve access to better products and services.

Twenty million dollars were raised to finance the initial CFTA projects in the areas of goods and services, investment and intellectual property. Of the amount so far obtained from development partners, the AU Member States contributed $ 3 million for 2016 and $ 4.9 million for 2017.
CFTA can be a paradise for international and african criminality and smuggle, like the Schengen area? Planned for 18 July 2017, the release of an African electronic passport should enable nationals of the 54 African countries to travel visa-free across Africa. For now, the initiative only concerns heads of state, government and foreign ministers. In practice, African citizens would retain their national passports and would be issued an African e-passport by the AU. A first on the world scale. But the billion African citizens will have to wait until 2025 to benefit.

After nearly a decade of support for civilian police in Afghanistan, the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) officially closed its activities today, Saturday (31 December 2016) at midnight. In fact, the mission has already slowed down its activities for a few days already. A meeting marking the end of the mission was organized, Wednesday, December 14, a few days after the official end of the mission.

Source

en français

To replace its submarines dating back to the 1990s, Australia opted for the construction of 12 French ocean submarines. French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian inked the inter-governmental agreement (IGA) in Adelaide that will see French shipbuilder DCNS design and build the Shortfin Barracudas (Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A). The total cost of the 12 submarines, including separate agreements with US and Australian contractors, will hit Aus $50 billion (34 Mds Euro). This contract would be the most important contract concluded by France with a foreign country.

Conventionnaly powered submarines
The vessels will be a scaled-down, conventionally-powered version of France's 4,700-tonne nuclear-fuelled Barracuda but boast the same stealth capabilities.Australia awarded DCNS the main contract in April, beating off competition from Germany TKMS (ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems) and Japan Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.

"Home-made vessels" with French know-how and US weapons
The IGA is the last foundation stone needed to ensure Australia is able to develop a cutting-edge sovereign submarine capability, this will be a sovereign defence industry creating 2,800 jobs at the very cutting edge of technology. This was the sine qua non condition for winning the contract. And in France probably between 3,000 and 4,000 jobs will be perpetuated thanks to this contract. Design and mobilisation work has already been launched with Australian experts working in Cherbourg while DCNS was to open new offices in Adelaide later Tuesday employing up to 300 engineers.
US defence contractor Lockheed Martin was named in September to fit the combat systems for the Barracudas.

Geopolitical background
If Australia decides today to renew its fleet of submarines, it is because the Pacific has become one of the hotspots of the planet. The Chinese government claims several archipelagos of the region, multiplying the frictions with the riparian states that also dispute them, like Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan or Vietnam. For several months, with enormous operations of backfilling, Beijing transforms coral reefs into artificial islands to place new advanced bases at the disposal of the army. According to the Pentagon, also worried by these maneuvers, China would have gained more than 600 ha on the waters.

For President François Hollande, who said the contract is historic, the announcement "marks a decisive step forward in the strategic partnership between the two countries, which will cooperate over 50 years on the major element of sovereignty represented by sub-marine capacity ".

The Deficiencies, Mistakes and Contradictions of the New EU Foreign and Security Strategy
Evolution or Devolution? From the « Solana Paper » to the « Mogherini Paper »
András István Türke
CERPESC 16/E/3/2016 - 20 December 2016

The events of the last 20 years, the first operations and missions, show that the Common Security and Defense Policy, the CSDP (the European Security and Defense Policy: the ESDP, before 2009) does not exist only on paper. Europe must act to prevent wars and crises or to stop them. The European Union and its member countries are confronted with decisive choices for the future of Europe as a political entity. The external (and above all, energy) dependence of the Union is particularly emphasized by the European security strategies. The documents that function as strategies (the first, the 2003 ESS and the most recent, 2016 EUGS) of the European Union are quite poor in terms of content and objectives. They list the challenges, without drafting the places and means of the overall strategic presence. The purpose of this analysis is to examine the major development issues of EU strategic thinking during the period 2003-2016. Can we talk about development, stagnation, or devolution? Is the new strategy capable of fulfilling its role and can really serve as the basis of our ambitions?

The third in a series of five meetings of the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (CF SEDSS) was held in Rome on 22 – 24 November 2016.

The conference was opened by Major General Francesco Maurizio Noto Director, Energy Task Force, Italian MoD, from the Italian Ministry of Defence, Mrs Claudia Canaveri Deputy Head of Energy Efficiency at DG Energy, and Mr Denis Roger, Director European Synergies and Innovation at the European Defence Agency. It was closed by Mr Rini Goos, Deputy Chief Executive European Defence Agency.

“We need to maintain the momentum of the Consultation Forum events and gain an increased pace on delivering sustainable energy to the Defence sector,” EDA Director European Synergies and Innovation Denis Roger said during his opening address. “We need to develop a framework for increasing resilience to the impacts of energy insecurity on Defence capability, whilst enabling MODs to meet international and national commitments. Energy must increasingly be an integral element to the planning and delivery of military capability.”

Building on the success of the first and second events held in Brussels and Dublin earlier this year, this third conference was attended by around 100 experts from government administrations representing the majority of EDA Member States, as well as industry, academia, NATO representatives and the European Commission.

In closing the conference, EDA Deputy Chief Executive Rini Goos set out, “The sustainable energy challenge that all of us in the European Defence community need to address is how we are going to confront our own entrenched thinking and approaches, embracing innovative new concepts to ensure that we can continue to deliver world class military capability”. Mr Goos concluded, “Through an approach of cooperation, collaboration, and complementarity, you have the combined and continued support of the European Defence Agency and the Commission in this endeavor.”

The Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector is a European Commission initiative managed by the European Defence Agency. It brings together experts from the defence and energy sectors to share information and best practice on improving energy management, energy efficiency, and the use of renewable energy.
The Consultation Forum takes place in a series of five plenary meetings over 24 months, concluding in October 2017. The work is carried out in three parallel working groups each with a particular focus: (1) Energy Management, (2) Energy Efficiency & 3) Renewable Energy.

• 1st CF SEDSS meeting report (Brussels, January 2016)
• 2nd CF SEDSS meeting report (Dublin, June 2016)
• CF SEDSS factsheet
• European Defence Energy Network (EDEN)
  
  

Since his appointment in 2012, French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian is concerned about the threats in cyberspace. With reason. CIA suspicions about the role played by Russian hackers in the election of Donald Trump to the fears expressed by the German Chancellor, the "cyber-menace" is now omnipresent. On the occasion of the inauguration on Monday of a skill center on cyber defense in Rennes as well as a new building with 7,000 sensors to house the cyber experiments of the Directorate General of Armaments (DGA) in Bruz (Ille-et-Vilaine), Jean-Yves Le Drian announced in a way the creation of a 4th army, or at least its matrix, that of cyberspace, to complete the army of the last century built on the triptych land, air and sea.

The future cyber force will be based on three missions:
- intelligence (identification of faults, detection of hostile actions),
- protection (building walls of cyber fortress)
- and finally computerized offensive fight (neutralization of tools used by the cyber - opponent).
But Jean-Yves Le Drian goes further: "If a cyber attack is akin to an act of war, notably by the seriousness of its effects, an adequate response must be imposed, even beyond the neutralization of infrastructures alone Involved, in a logic this time of open conflict. "

Clearly, the Minister of Defense warns that in the event of an attack, France reserves the right to retaliate by a cyber or conventional counter-attack. It is the first time that France officially warns its potential opponents that it can qualify a cyber attack in act of war and to respond accordingly. "A major computer attack, given the damage it would cause, could constitute an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and justify the invocation of self-defense," the Minister said. So to replicate in a "proportional" way, we need a cyber-army.

On Monday, the minister summarized the efforts made and the road ahead. Under the latest military planning law, the force under construction will reach 3,200 people by 2018, double the number in 2012. Given the high level of technical skills required, the minister is also proposing to build a reserve of 4,400 specialists , Of which 400 are capable of offensive action. There, it is a matter of multiplying by ten the effort. Finally, on the side of the DGA, the effort must be multiplied by three to go from 250 to 650 experts. Over 2014-2019, the appropriations devoted to the cyber-war amount to 440 million euros.

Finally, the minister announced the imminent appointment of a new cyber operations commander, a four-star general who will be placed directly under the authority of the chief of staff. In order to carry out military operations, the French army will have its commander-in-chief, which will "have authority over all operational units specializing in cyber defense of the ministry, belonging to all armies, ie 2,600 digital fighters by 2019". Vice-Admiral Arnaud Coustillière, appointed general officer in cyber defense in July 2011, is approached. Decrees and decrees will be promulgated to institutionalize this cyber defense. For the minister, the white collar war is just beginning. In this respect, he often referred to the Stuxnet weapon, the undetectable virus transmitted on Iranian nuclear centrifuges, which delayed Iran's advances in nuclear enrichment by at least two years. 'uranium.

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Depuis sa nomination en 2012, le ministre français de défense, Jean-Yves Le Drian s'inquiète des menaces dans le cyberespace. Avec raison. Des soupçons de la CIA sur le rôle joué par des hackeurs russes dans l'élection de Donald Trump aux craintes exprimées par la chancelière allemande, la « cyber-menace » est désormais omniprésente. A l'occasion de l'inauguration ce lundi d'un pôle de compétences sur la cyberdéfense à Rennes ainsi que d'un nouveau bâtiment doté de 7.000 capteurs pour abriter les expériences cyber de la Direction générale de l'armement (DGA) à Bruz (Ille-et-Vilaine), Jean-Yves Le Drian a annoncé en quelque sorte la mise sur pied d'une quatrième armée, ou tout du moins de sa matrice, celle du cyberespace, pour compléter l'armée du siècle passé, construite sur le triptyque terre, air et mer.

La future force cyber s'articulera autour de trois missions : le renseignement (identification des failles, détection des actions hostiles), la protection (édification des murs de la forteresse cyber) et enfin la lutte informatique offensive (neutralisation des outils employés par l'adversaire). Mais Jean-Yves Le Drian va au-delà : « Si une attaque cyber s'apparente à un acte de guerre, notamment par la gravité de ses effets, une riposte adéquate s'impose, au-delà même de la neutralisation des seules infrastructures impliquées, dans une logique cette fois de conflit ouvert. »

En clair, le ministre de la Défense avertit qu'en cas d'attaque, la France se réserve le droit de riposter par une contre-attaque cyber ou conventionnelle. C'est la première fois que la France prévient ainsi officiellement ses adversaires potentiels qu'elle peut qualifier une attaque cyber en acte de guerre et y riposter en conséquence. « Une attaque informatique majeure, eu égard aux dommages qu'elle causerait, pourrait constituer une agression armée au sens de l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations unies et justifier l'invocation de la légitime défense », affirme le ministre. Donc pour répliquer d'une manière « proportionnelle », il faut une cyber-armée.

Une réserve de 4.400 spécialistes
Le ministre a dressé ce lundi un bilan des efforts fournis et du chemin qui reste à parcourir. La force en construction atteindra selon la dernière loi de programmation militaire 3.200 personnes à l'horizon 2018, soit le double des effectifs de 2012. Au vu des compétences techniques de très haut niveau nécessaires, le ministre propose aussi de bâtir une réserve de 4.400 spécialistes, dont 400 aptes à des actions offensives. Là, il s'agit de multiplier par dix l'effort. Enfin, du côté de la DGA, l'effort doit être multiplié par trois pour passer de 250 à 650 experts. Sur 2014-2019, les crédits consacrés à la cyber-guerre atteignent 440 millions d'euros.

Enfin, le ministre a annoncé la nomination imminente d'un nouveau commandant des opérations cyber, un général quatre étoiles qui sera placé directement sous l'autorité du chef d'Etat-major. Pour mener des opérations militaires, l'armée française aura son commandant en chef, lequel « aura autorité sur toutes les unités opérationnelles spécialisées dans la cyberdéfense du ministère, appartenant à toutes les armées, soit 2.600 combattants numériques à l'horizon 2019 ». Le vice-amiral Arnaud Coustillière, nommé officier général à la cyberdéfense en juillet 2011, est pressenti. Des décrets et arrêtés vont être promulgués pour institutionnaliser cette cyberdéfense.

Pour le ministre, la guerre en col blanc ne fait que commencer. Il a, à cet égard, souvent fait allusion ce lundi à l'arme Stuxnet, ce virus indétectable transmis sur les centrifugeuses nucléaires iraniennes qui a permis de retarder d'au moins deux ans les avancées de l'Iran en matière d'enrichissement d'uranium.

More than 12,000 people have already signed a petition asking the Geneva-based giant Trafigura to sell only gasoline and diesel that comply with European standards around the world.
The Swiss trader business model of producing and selling highly polluting high sulfur fuels in Africa has also been politically critical. In Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, the responsible authorities and members of the government have had to answer many questions and criticisms about the health consequences of poor sulfur standards and poor quality fuels.

Swiss commodity trading companies take advantage of weak fuel standards in Africa to produce, deliver and sell diesel and gasoline, which is damaging to people’s health. Their business model relies on an illegitimate strategy of deliberately lowering the quality of fuels in order to increase their profits. Using a common industry practice called blending, trading companies mix cheap but toxic intermediate petroleum products to make what the industry calls “African Quality” fuels. These intermediate products contain high levels of sulphur as well as other toxic substances such as benzene and aromatics.

By selling such fuels at the pump in Africa, the traders increase outdoor air pollution, causing respiratory disease and premature death. This affects West Africa, in particular, because this is the region where the authorised levels of sulphur in fuels remain very high. West Africa does not have the re ning capacity to produce enough gasoline and diesel for its own consumption, and so it must import the majority of its fuels from Europe and the US, where fuel standards are strict, Public Eye`s investigation September 2016 analyse writes.

To draw attention to this swiss illegal traffic, thanks to Public Eye's "Return to sender" action, the container Irene Rainbow, with on board a container marked "Return to sender" ", Filled with polluted air from the Ghanaian capital traveled 7,000 kilometers separating Accra from the port of Anvers and was then transported to Geneva, where it was handed to Trafigura.

The EDA is now inviting participants to the third conference of the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (CF SEDSS) which will take place from 22-24 November in Rome (Italy).

Building on the progress made during the previous conferences, experts from national administrations, industry and academia are encouraged to continue to work in three parallel working groups: (1) Energy Management, (2) Energy Efficiency focusing on buildings, and (3) Renewable Energy.

The Conference will take place in the Hotel Roma Aurelia Antica, Rome.

Registration is open until 06 November 2016. After which, registration will be permitted for conference attendance, but accommodation at the conference facility may not be available.

For more information and registration, please click here.

• Second meeting of the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in Defence opens in Dublin (EDA webnews June 2016)
• Energy and Environment Programme (EDA project page)

On 17 October, the Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructures (PCEI) expert group, established in May of this year, met at the EDA under the chairmanship of the Hellenic Ministry of National Defence. The Ministries of Defence (MoDs) of Cyprus and Greece offered to take the lead on this project within the framework of the EDA.

Colonel Georgios Drosos, Head of the Infrastructure & Environment Department of the Hellenic MoD, was appointed as the group chairman. He stressed that the group’s main objective was “to assess how EU legislation on the Protection of European Critical Energy Infrastructure can be applied by the defence sector in a holistic way”.

Each and every part of defence critical infrastructure needs to be protected appropriately to ensure that the overall energy supply chain can function properly. As Colonel Drosos said, maintaining and improving regional energy security and sustainability within the EU will contribute to achieving this goal. The expert group’s chairman also stressed that possible shortfalls can be addressed by developing “projects of common interest for the defence sector”.

To promote joint efforts and scientific collaboration between the defence sector and the research community, Professor Athanasios Konstandopoulos, chairman of the board of the Centre for Research and Technology Hellas (CERTH) was appointed as the co-chairman of the group. Professor Konstandopoulos pointed out that “the task of securing Energy Strategic Autonomy in a highly connected world presents challenges and creates opportunities for strengthening collaboration between the research community and the defence sector”. He called on stakeholders “to face the challenges and exploit the opportunities.”

To accomplish its goals, the PCEI expert group will use the expertise of EDA Member States’ Ministries of Defence, national academic and research centres as well as EDA’s partners: the European Commission DG ENERGY, Joint Research Centre, and the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence.

Air Commodore Peter Round, EDA Capability Armaments and Technology (CAT) Director, stated that “EDA aims through the PCEI Experts Group to identify common capability and research shortfalls and to address them collectively to help to achieve resilience of Armed Forces in Europe.”

Denis Roger, EDA European Synergies and Innovation (ESI) Director, emphasized that “in times of crises, it is imperative to ensure the continued availability of secure and sustainable energy supplies and we are glad that EDA can contribute to this vital work by exploring the defence element of critical energy infrastructure.”

The PCEI expert group is supported within EDA at an inter-directorate level (CAT and ESI) by CAT Project Officer Protect, Constantinos Hadjisavvas, and ESI Project Officer Energy and Environment Systems, Richard Brewin.

The next PCEI experts group meetings will be hosted by Cyprus in January 2017 and by Greece in March 2017. The meetings will be open to all the participating Member States of the Agency, the Agency’s partners as well as other international organisations.

Securing Energy Strategic Autonomy for European Defence (SESAED) is becoming more vital than ever for national and international security and economic prosperity due to the increased number of terrorist attacks, and the emerging threats from hybrid and asymmetrical warfare as well as vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and natural hazards across Europe.

Hence, Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructures was identified as one of the component areas to be examined as part of the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (CF SEDSS) which was jointly launched by the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Commission in October 2015.

In May 2016, the PCEI Experts Group was established to explore PCEI further from a defence point of view. The Cypriot and the Hellenic Ministries of Defence (MoDs) offered to take the lead on this project within the framework of EDA. In this effort academic and research support is provided by the KIOS Research Center, the Cyprus University of Technology, the European University Cyprus, the Centre for Research & Technology, Hellas CERTH and the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA).

• Energy and Environment Programme (EDA project page)
• Second meeting of the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in Defence opens in Dublin (EDA webnews)

The new European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) is established today, October 6, 2016.

This successor of the former Frontex (from French: Frontières extérieures for "external borders") is an agency of the European Union headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, tasked with border control of the European Schengen Area, in coordination with the border and coast guards of Schengen Area member states. Frontex was established in 2004 as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, and primary responsible for coordinating border control efforts.

In response to the European migrant crisis of 2015-2016, the European Commission proposed on December 15, 2015, to extend Frontex's mandate and to transform it into a fully-fledged European Border and Coast Guard Agency. On 18 December 2015, the European Council roundly supported the proposal, and after a vote by the European Parliament, the Border and Coast Guard was officially launched on 6 October 2016 at the Bulgarian external border with Turkey.

To enable the Agency to carry out its tasks, its budget would be gradually increased from the €143 million originally planned for 2015 up to €238 million in 2016, €281 million in 2017, and will reach €322 million (about US$350 million) in 2020. The staff of the agency would gradually increase from 402 members in 2016 to 1,000 by 2020.

The European Border and Coast Guard Agency is not a new body. It does not replace Frontex and it retains the same legal personality. What the Commission draft Regulation aims to do is to strengthen the mandate of the EU border agency, to increase its competences and to better equip it to carry out its operational activities. The new tasks and responsibilities of the Agency need to be reflected by its new name. It coordinates its work alongside the European Fisheries Control Agency and European Maritime Safety Agency with regard to coastguard functions.
The permanent staff of the Agency will be more than doubled between 2015 and 2020. The new proposal provides for a reserve of European border guards and technical equipment. The Agency will be able to purchase its own equipment (this is not a novelty). However - and this is new - the Member States where this equipment is registered (this refers mainly to big equipment items such as patrol vessels, air crafts, etc. which need a flag of state) will be obliged to put it at the Agency's disposal whenever needed. this will make it possible for the Agency to rapidly deploy the necessary technical in border operations. A rapid reserve pool of border guards and a technical equipment pool will be put at the disposal of the agency, intending to remove the shortages of staff and equipment for the Agency's operations.

A monitoring and risk analysis centre will be established, with the authorisation to carry out risk analysis and to monitor the flows towards and within the EU. The risk analyses includes cross-border crime and terrorism, process personal data of persons suspected to be involved in acts of terrorism and cooperate with other Union agencies and international organisations on the prevention of terrorism. A mandatory vulnerability assessments of the capacities of the Member States to face current or upcoming challenges at their external borders will be established. The Agency is able to launch joint operations, including the use of drones when necessary. The European Space Agency's earth observation system Copernicus provides the new Agency with real time satellite surveillance capabilities alongside the current Eurosur border surveillance system.

ember States will be able to request joint operations, rapid border interventions, and deployment of the EBCG Teams to support national authorities when a Member State experiences an influx of migrants that endangers the Schengen area. In such a case, especially when a Member State’s action is not sufficient to handle the crisis, the Commission will have the authority to adopt an implementing decision that will determine whether a situation at a particular section of the external borders requires urgent action at the EU level. Based on this decision, the EBCGA will be able to intervene and deploy EBCG Teams to ensure that action is taken on the ground, even when a Member State is unable or unwilling to take the necessary measures.

The right to intervene is a point of contention between a number of EU Members and the Commission, especially those Members whose borders form the external borders of the EU, such as Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Poland. They want to ensure that intervention is possible only with the consent of the Member States, whose external borders necessitate the presence of the ECBGA. Greece’s Alternate Minister for European Affairs, Nikos Xydakis, stated in an interview that while Greece is supportive of a common European action and of changing Frontex’s mandate, it wants the ECBGA to take complete charge of migration and refugee flows.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) currently has several job openings in the different directorates: 15 temporary agents, five seconded national experts and one contractual agent. The profiles we’re looking for include director, head of unit, project officer and assistant positions across all EDA directorates. Candidates must apply via the EDA website.

Among the vacancies, you will find the position of Director Capability, Armament and Technology, Head of Unit Human Resources, Head of Unit Industry Strategy and Wider EU Policies, Policy Officer Industry Relations and Support, Project Officer Rotary Wing, Project Officer Maritime Capabilities or Personal Assistant to the Chief Executive and many more. Do not miss this chance and consult the EDA job portal for an overview of all open posts. Starting dates vary between March and October 2017.

The Agency is an “outward-facing” organisation, constantly interacting with its shareholders, the participating Member States, as well as with a wide range of stakeholders. It works in an integrated way, with multi-disciplinary teams representing all the Agency’s functional areas, to realise its objectives including its annual Work Programme and its rolling three-year Work Plan. Its business processes are flexible and oriented towards achieving results. Staff at all levels need to demonstrate the corresponding qualities of flexibility, innovation, and team-working; to work effectively with shareholders and stakeholder groups, formal and informal; and to operate without the need for detailed direction.

• Access the vacancy notices through our job portal

Written by Suzana Elena Anghel,

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At three recent European Councils (December 2012, December 2013 and June 2015), the Heads of State or government have called for a deepening of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) namely by strengthening its crisis management dimension and further developing civilian and military capabilities. The June 2016 European Council reverted to security and defence policy with particular attention to the strengthening of the relationship with NATO, including on the development of complementary and interoperable defence capabilities.

But what are the achievements? Is there a way of measuring progress made over the past years? Is there a gap between intentions/declarations and deeds? What are the challenges and how to address them?

The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) will address these questions at a roundtable discussion on ‘The European Council and CSDP: success or failure?’ on 27 September 2016, 13h30-15h00, in the European Parliament’s Library main reading room in Brussels. Participants at this roundtable debate are: Elmar Brok MEP, Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, General Jean-Paul Perruche, Former Director-General of the European Union Military Staff, Professor Alexander Mattelaer, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), and Elena Lazarou, Policy Analyst, EPRS.

Registration
If you do not have an access badge to the European Parliament and are interested in attending the event, it is essential to register by Friday 23 September, using this link.

At the event the EPRS study on ‘The European Council and CSDP: Orientation and Implementation in the field of Crisis Management’ will be presented and discussed. This study assesses the planning, command and control of civilian and military CSDP missions and operations, progress made in developing civilian and military capabilities, particularly rapid response capabilities in the form of the EU Battlegroups, as well as challenges encountered during the force generation process, areas in which the European Council repeatedly called for further progress to be made.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© mrallen / Fotolia

Challenges to security in Europe will take centre stage at the NATO summit in Warsaw on 8-9 July when its heads of state and government will discuss issues ranging from Russia’s conflict with Ukraine and its growing military assertiveness to turmoil across the Middle East and North Africa, and the future of the military alliance.

This note highlights a selection of commentaries, studies and reports by some of the major international think tanks and research institutes on European security and defence published in the run-up to the NATO summit. More reports on the subject can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are thinking’ from in November 2015.

NATO Summit 2016: From reassurance to deterrence. What’s really at stake?
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, June 2016

The Warsaw summit and the return of Western nationalism
Danish Institute for International Studies, June 2016

Warsaw summit
Atlantic Council, June 2016

NATO Summit 2016: NATO must reaffirm its “open door” policy
Heritage Foundation, June 2016

National priorities for the NATO Warsaw summit
German Marshall Fund, May 2016

NATO defence planning between Wales and Warsaw: Politico-military challenges of a credible assurance against Russia
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2016

What NATO for what threats? Warsaw and beyond
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2015

Preparing for NATO’s Warsaw summit: The challenges of adapting to strategic change
Danish Institute of International Studies, December 2015

Restoring the power and purpose of the NATO alliance
Atlantic Council, June 2016

Time to restore conventional deterrence-by-denial
Egmont, June 2016

A new strategy: Implications for CSDP
Clingendael, June 2016

All not quiet on NATO’s eastern front
Carnegie Europe, June 2016

A threat-based strategy for NATO’s southern flank
Carnegie Europe, June 2016

Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Activation of risk potential
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 2016

The future of Transatlantic security
Rand, June 2016

Evaluating future U.S. Army force posture in Europe
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, June 2016

NATO must stop crowding Russia
Cato Institute, June 2016

European defence: From strategy to delivery
Clingendael, May 2016

Embedding NATO into the European Union Global Strategy: The missing link?
European, May 2016

Closing NATO’s Baltic gap
International Centre for Defence Studies, May 2016

Russia: A test for Transatlantic unity
Transatlantic Academy, German Marshall Fund, May 2016

A historic reminder, an ever-present dilemma? Assessing Brexit’s potential consequences for European security
European Policy Centre, May 2016

Russian “countermeasures” to NATO are coming
Brookings Institution, May 2016

EUISS yearbook of European security 2016
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2016

Envisioning European defence: Five futures
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2016

For a “new realism” in European defense: The five key challenges an EU defense strategy should address
German Marshall Fund, April 2016

A new Helsinki needed? What security model for Europe?
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, April 2016

The parliamentary dimension of defence cooperation
Clingendael, April 2016

European defence spending 2015: The force awakens
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2016

Do we need an EU army? Which way for the European security and defence cooperation
Mendel European Centre, March 2016

NATO’s guns point the wrong way
Friends of Europe, March 2016

NATO, the US and Baltic Sea security
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, February 2016

The annexation of Crimea: Lessons for European security
Fondation Robert Schuman, February 2016

Ensuring deterrence against Russia: The view from NATO’s front-line States
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, February 2016

Forces terrestres et réassurance: Quelles options pour l’Alliance?
Institut français des relations internationales, January 2016

The defence of Europe before European Defence: Returning to the Schuman method
Fondation Robert Schuman, January 2016

A stronger CSDP: Deepening defence cooperation
Clingendael, January 2016

Defence budgets and cooperation in Europe: Developments, trends and drivers
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Consortium of Think Tanks, January 2016

Reinforcing deterrence on NATO’s Eastern flank: Wargaming the defense of the Baltics
Rand, January 2016

NATO and European security: back to the roots?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2015

The EU, Russia and the quest for a new European security bargain
Clingendael, December 2015

European strategy, European defence and the CSDP
Egmont, November 2015

L’Europe à la croisée des chemins: La politique de défense et de sécurité a besoin d’initiatives franco-allemandes
Institut français des relations internationales, November 2015

This 25-26 June 2015 summit witnessed an intense debate. While the agenda originally covered Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the digital single market and the European Semester, in addition to a presentation from David Cameron, United Kingdom Prime Minister to outline his vision on renegotiating his country’s relationship with the EU, the summit became a crisis Council. Many discussions again focused on the situation in the Mediterranean, with several lively exchanges. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel described the issue as the ‘biggest challenge’ Europe had faced during her time in office.

The Council’s conclusions nevertheless managed to address all issues on the agenda. The Heads of State or Government concentrated on three key dimensions of the European Commission’s agenda on migration: the relocation/resettlement of migrants; their return/readmission/reintegration; and cooperation with countries of both origin and transit. Clear differences in opinion persisted on the voluntary or mandatory nature of the relocation scheme, but agreement was reached on ‘the temporary and exceptional relocation, over two years, from the frontline Member States: Italy and Greece, to other Member States of 40 000 persons in clear need of international protection’.

Although the debate on CSDP fell short of its original ambition, the Council conclusions included a statement that the European Council ‘will keep security and defence policy on its regular agenda’, thereby clearly underlining the future importance of CSDP.

United Kingdom Prime Minister, David Cameron’s presentation of his vision on renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with the EU, did not outline any specific details, however, it provided an impetus for European level discussions on this issue, with Council President Donald Tusk seeing it as ‘the first step in a longer process that will also end at the European Council’. This issue is certain to reappear on the agenda for the Council meeting in December 2015.

The significantly shortened debate on the Commission communication on a Digital Single Market strategy for Europe, nevertheless led to Council conclusions calling for the rapid adoption of the Telecommunications Single Market Regulation, the Directive on Network and Information Security, and the Data Protection package. Heads of State or Government also stressed that action must be taken on key components of the Commission communication, such as eliminating mobile roaming charges. On this issue, on 30 June 2015, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, reached agreement to end roaming surcharges by 15 June 2017.

The EPRS publishes briefings on the European Council before summits, and European Council outcome briefings (next to be issued just after the European Council of 15-16 October 2015).

The June European Council has a comprehensive list of topics to discuss, including the situation in the Mediterranean, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), fighting terrorism, economic governance aspects, and the digital agenda. In addition, a presentation by the British Prime Minister on the future role of the United Kingdom is on the agenda.

Migration is the main topic of this June European Council. Heads of State or Government will discuss the recently published European Agenda for Migration and take stock of the progress made since the extraordinary European Council meeting on migration in April 2015. The European Council will discuss the European Commission’s proposal for a temporary relocation mechanism, which envisages relocating 40 000 persons from Italy and Greece to other Member States.

The European Council should also agree on a new CSDP roadmap and set the objectives for capabilities development, fostering the defence industry and the defence market, and strengthening relations with international organisations (i.e. the UN, NATO, the African Union). The Heads of State or Government will decide on a timeline for the completion of the strategic review process, most probably by June 2016. Within the broader context of discussing security aspects, the European Council will also examine the implementation of the informal February 2015 European Council‘s decisions on the fight against terrorism. 

During discussions on the 2015 European Semester the European Council endorse the Country Specific Recommendations that Member States should implement to ensure sound public finances and to make their economies more competitive. Whilst on the topic of better economic governance in the euro area, the ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’ report is expected to be presented to the Heads of State or Government.

The European Commission’s recent Digital Single Market strategy for Europe will be tabled for examination, and the European Council will most likely call for a rapid adoption of pending legislation in this field, such as the European Single Market for Electronic Communications, the Directive on Network and Information Security and the proposal for a Regulation on Data Protection.

This European Council meeting will also hear United Kingdom Prime Minister, David Cameron outline his vision for renegotiating his country’s relationship with the EU.

The recent interview by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, in which he advocated ‘a joint EU army’ as a means to strengthen European foreign policy and ‘allow Europe to take on responsibility in the world’ has revived an on-going debate in think-tank and academic circles about how to maximise the effectiveness of existing national and Europe-wide efforts in the field of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The European Council adopted an extensive set of conclusions on the subject in December 2013.

This note highlights a selection of recent studies, reports and commentaries by some of the major international think tanks and research institutes that analyse issues surrounding the development of CSDP.

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Federalist rhetoric or political tactics? The what, where, who, when and why of Juncker’s call for a common European army  European Policy Centre (EPC), March 12, 2015

Does the EU need its own army?  Carnegie Europe, March 11, 2015

The illusion of an independent EU army  Carnegie Europe, March 10, 2015

If not now, when? The Nordic EU battle-group

European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS), February 17, 2015

The EU and the UN: together for peace

European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 18, 2014

Europe’s global power potential: locked in the EU28’s defence silos  Friends of Europe, December 4, 2014

2014: a centenary and a discovery  Egmont, December 2014

The EU neighbourhood in shambles  Bertelsmann Stiftung, March 3, 2015

More Union in European defence  Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), February 26, 2015

European Defence Trends  Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), January 6, 2015

Report: EU as a security provider  Clingendael, December 18, 2014

Why Europe must stop outsourcing its security

European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), December 15, 2014

Peacemaking: Can the EU meet expectations?  Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, December, 2014

Europe’s changing security landscape: What role will the EU play in security and defence?

Finnish Institute of International Affairs, December 12, 2014

Actors in the European defence policy area: roles and developments

Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 24, 2014

Constructing the defence dimension of the EU

International Security Information Service Europe, June, 2014

Security and defence: an issue for the European citizen?

Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), March, 2014

Livre blanc français de la défense 2013 : lignes de forces autour de la sécurité-défense européenne

L’Institut royal supérieur de défense, December, 2013

Why do Europeans need armed forces?  Fride, November, 2013

Why peacekeeping matters to Europe  Friends of Europe, March 11, 2015

The Wales pledge revisited: A preliminary analysis of 2015 budget decisions in NATO member states

European Leadership Network, February, 2015

In the belly of the beast: A European view on sending arms to Ukraine

Brookings Institution, February 4, 2015

Challenges for European Foreign Policy in 2015: How others deal with disorder  Fride, January 12, 2015

A new European security order: The Ukraine crisis and the missing post-Cold War bargain

Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, December 8, 2014

Integrating EU defence and migration policies in the Mediterranean  Fride, November, 2014

The Cost of Non-Europe in Common Security and Defence Policy

European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), European Added Value Unit, June 2013

This workshop is organised by the European Defence Agency in cooperation with the working group on Safety and Regulations for European Unmanned Maritime Systems (SARUMS) 27 March 2014 in the EDA premises in Brussels. 

The workshop will be a major forum focusing on the discussion of latest developments and on the exchange of recent experiences in the field of safety of Unmanned Maritime Systems. It will bring together end users and various stakeholders from industry, research institutes and governmental organisations.

The workshop is supported by European Defence Agency and SARUMS working group whose aim is to provide European navies with a best practice framework for the handling, operations, design and regulations of Unmanned Maritime Systems. 

More information on how to register and the draft programme can be found here. 

• Workshop event entry
• News "Call for Papers: Safety & Regulations for European Unmanned Maritime Systems" (10 January 2014)