Credit: Juan Barreto/AFP via Getty Images
By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Feb 3 2025 (IPS)
Venezuela stands at a critical juncture as Nicolás Maduro begins a controversial third term as president. His 10 January inauguration, following a post-election period marked by widespread protests against election fraud and heightened repression, represents a significant setback for democratic aspirations in a country devastated by years of economic collapse and political oppression. Maduro’s confirmation at the helm is the latest chapter in a decades-long process that has transformed Venezuela from a beacon of leftist democratic aspirations into a full-blown authoritarian regime, where the last shred of legitimacy – popular election – has now vanished.
The implications of Venezuela’s crisis extend far beyond its borders, triggering the largest refugee exodus in the Americas and creating significant challenges for neighbouring countries. Almost eight million Venezuelans live abroad, with projections suggesting another two or three million might leave in the coming years.
This crisis comes at a moment when, unlike in the past, two key factors potentially leading to a democratic transition are present: unprecedented opposition unity capable of sustaining a protest movement and growing international support, with progressive Latin American governments increasingly distancing themselves from Maduro. However, Maduro’s willingness to use violent repression and his ability to maintain military loyalty suggest a difficult path ahead for democratic restoration.
Election fraud and post-election repression
The 2024 presidential election initially sparked hopes for democratic change. These hopes were crushed when Maduro declared himself the winner despite clear evidence that opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia had secured a significant victory.
The election campaign unfolded against a backdrop of intensifying civic space restrictions and was far from free and fair. The government disqualified popular opposition leader María Corina Machado and blocked her proposed replacement, forcing the opposition to field González Urrutia. Additional irregularities included systematic persecution of opposition leaders, abuse of public resources, media manipulation and voter suppression tactics, particularly targeting the estimated four million Venezuelan voters abroad.
Despite these challenges, the opposition demonstrated unprecedented unity and organisation. Through its Plan 600K initiative, it mobilised around 600,000 volunteers to monitor polling stations, collect the tallies produced by voting machines and independently calculate results. Their parallel count revealed that González won around 67 per cent of votes compared to Maduro’s 29 per cent, figures supported by independent exit polls. However, the National Electoral Council stopped publishing results after counting 40 per cent of votes, eventually declaring an implausible Maduro victory without providing any supporting data.
Fraud sparked widespread unrest, with 915 spontaneous protests erupting across Venezuelan cities in the two days following the election. The regime’s response was swift and severe. It labelled protests a ‘fascist outbreak’ and charged many protesters with terrorism and incitement to hatred. Security forces used deadly force, resulting in at least 25 deaths, while pro-government paramilitaries engaged in intimidation and violence.
The crackdown extended beyond protesters to target opposition and civil society leaders. Several prominent figures were forced into hiding or exile, while others faced arbitrary detention. Repression intensified in the lead-up to Maduro’s inauguration, with 75 new political detentions in the first 11 days of January alone.
Inauguration day
Maduro’s inauguration reflected both the regime’s isolation and its increasingly authoritarian character. Only two presidents – from Cuba and Nicaragua – attended the ceremony, while other governments sent lower-level representatives. The swearing-in ceremony took place 90 minutes earlier than scheduled, out of fear that the opposition’s president-elect, in exile in Spain, could somehow materialise its declared intention to enter Venezuela and hold a parallel counter-inauguration.
The government implemented extraordinary security measures to make sure this wouldn’t happen, closing land borders with Brazil and Colombia, shutting down Venezuelan airspace and deploying an unprecedented number of security forces throughout Caracas. The militarisation extended to the closure of opposition-controlled neighbourhoods and the pre-emptive detention of dozens of opposition figures.
Maduro’s inaugural address and subsequent appearances were particularly confrontational. He announced plans for constitutional changes to further consolidate power and declared the beginning of a new phase of governance based on a strong alliance between civilian authorities, military forces, the police and the intelligence apparatus. He openly discussed Venezuela’s readiness to take up arms against intervention alongside Cuba and Nicaragua, framing political opposition as a threat to national sovereignty.
International responses and regional implications
In the Americas, only Bolivia, Cuba, Honduras and Nicaragua recognise Maduro as the legitimately elected president, with only an additional handful worldwide, including China, Iran and Russia, maintaining their support.
The USA responded to Maduro’s inauguration by increasing the reward it offers for information leading to Maduro’s arrest to US$25 million, while also targeting his inner circle with new sanctions. The European Union also imposed new sanctions. The G7’s foreign ministers and the High Representative of the European Union issued a joint statement condemning Maduro’s ‘lack of democratic legitimacy’ and the ongoing repression of civil society and the political opposition.
Most significantly, the positions of Latin American states appear to be slowly shifting, with some left-wing leaders, notably those of Brazil and Colombia, not automatically siding with the Maduro regime for the first time. However, Colombia’s pragmatic approach reveals the complexities faced by Venezuela’s neighbours: while not accepting the official election results at face value, Colombia has stopped short of condemnation and has been careful to maintain its diplomatic relations, citing the need to manage border issues and the refugee situation.
Prospects for democratic change
The path to democratic transition faces significant obstacles, with military support remaining crucial to Maduro’s hold on power. The regime has secured military loyalty through a combination of institutional integration, coercion and economic privilege, with high-ranking military officers reaping generous rewards. The regime has found additional layers of protection in security structures including the National Bolivarian Guard, special police units and pro-government militias, and the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service, strongly backed by G2, Cuba’s secret service.
But the authoritarian regime has vulnerabilities. Growing international isolation, combined with continued economic deterioration, may eventually strain the system of patronage that maintains elite loyalty, including among the military. The opposition’s commitment to peaceful resistance, while seemingly ineffective in the short term, continues to earn it moral authority and international support.
While the combination of peaceful resistance, international pressure and potential internal divisions within the regime may eventually create conditions for change, the immediate future suggests a continuing struggle between an entrenched authoritarian system and a resilient democratic movement. The outcome will have profound implications for Venezuela and for all of Latin America.
Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org.
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Credit: Emidio Jozine. Mozambique has been affected by weeks of post-electoral violence. UN News
By Egídio Chaimite
MAPUTO, Mozambique, Feb 3 2025 (IPS)
No illusions: Mozambique remains in crisis, despite the inauguration of Daniel Chapo as president and the establishment of a new parliament. While the widespread allegations of massive electoral fraud during the elections on 9 October 2024 were the immediate trigger for the unrest, the protests revealed deeply entrenched socio-economic and political grievances.
There is significant frustration over the escalating cost of living, rising inequality, persistent unemployment and lack of quality public services — challenges that have defined Mozambique’s development path over the past decade. These socio-economic pressures have fuelled feelings of marginalisation and despair, particularly among the youth and the large group of people struggling to make ends meet.
Led by Venâncio Mondlane, the officially recognised runner-up in the presidential election, the protests quickly gained momentum, especially among young people. The protesters explicitly rejected the election results and expressed their dissatisfaction with FRELIMO’s 49-year rule, calling for an end to what they describe as a failed governance model that has perpetuated economic stagnation and political exclusion.
More than three months of protests have now passed. The death toll surpasses 300, with over 600 injured and many still unaccounted for. Both public and private infrastructures have sustained extensive damage. Yet, the deadlock continues. Attempts at dialogue have failed, leaving the country engulfed in a state of uncertainty.
Two presidents, one divided nation
Mozambique now faces the unprecedented challenge of two claimants to the presidency: Chapo, the official head of state, and Mondlane, the self-declared ‘president of the people’. Both inaugurations have been overshadowed by violence, reflecting a wider trend in how dissent is managed in the country.
FRELIMO’s long history of using state security forces to advance its own political agenda is evident in the police’s consistent and brutal response to protests. Tear gas, live bullets and even home invasions have been deployed, resulting in the deaths and injuries of uninvolved civilians.
This excessive use of force has gone largely unaddressed by Chapo, his predecessor Filipe Nyusi, and senior police officials, reinforcing perceptions of complicity or even direct orchestration in the suppression of opposition.
But the violence is not one-sided. Protesters have engaged in sabotage and even launched attacks on police stations, resulting in the deaths of police officers. In some neighbourhoods, protesters went so far as to declare that they would completely replace the Polícia da República de Moçambique (PRM) and form their own police force, further eroding the authority of the official security apparatus.
Adding fuel to the fire, Mondlane recently announced a controversial retaliation doctrine: for every protester killed by police, a police officer would be killed in return. It is ‘an eye for an eye’.
In a defiant bid to undermine Chapo’s authority, Mondlane has embraced a shadow governance model. Issuing what he calls ‘presidential decrees’, he has called for civil disobedience, including boycotts of toll fees and demands for price reductions on essential goods like water, energy and cement.
His populist measures have struck a chord with many supporters, but their enforcement often spirals into protests and, at times, violence.
Meanwhile, Chapo’s administration, still struggling to form his government, has yet to meaningfully address the unfolding crisis. In a recent development, Ana Rita Sithole, a senior figure within FRELIMO, dismissed the possibility of a political agreement with Mondlane, sending a clear signal that a faction within the party is unwilling to engage in dialogue, thereby prolonging the standoff and undermining any prospect of restoring peace. This hard-line position only deepens the political divide, casting a shadow over Mozambique’s already fragile future.
Escalation and authoritarianism or stability and dialogue?
Mozambique’s uncertain future is dominated by two possible scenarios — one of escalation, the other of reconciliation and a return to stability. The potential for dialogue stands as the decisive factor separating these two trajectories. However, progress in fostering such dialogue has so far been disappointingly limited.
In the first scenario, instability deepens as both sides entrench their positions. In this scenario, Mondlane continues to rally civil disobedience, protests and mass mobilisation, further eroding Chapo’s ability to govern effectively. Faced with mounting pressure, Chapo might follow the repressive path of his predecessor Nyusi, increasingly depending on police crackdowns and state security forces to assert control.
While these measures may be aimed at restoring order, they risk inflaming tensions further. Every act of repression could provoke stronger resistance from opposition supporters, potentially spiralling into a dangerous cycle of violence and escalating unrest.
Political persecution might intensify, targeting prominent opposition figures, journalists and activists. In an extreme scenario, this could even result in the assassination or imprisonment of key opposition leaders such as Mondlane himself, sparking further outrage among his supporters and deepening societal divisions.
This trajectory is neither new nor unique. Other nations facing post-electoral crises have travelled similar roads of increased repression and authoritarianism. Zimbabwe after its 2008 elections, Ethiopia after 2005, Venezuela in 2018 and Russia in 2011 are stark examples. While such measures may offer short-term control, they ultimately prove unsustainable, leading to prolonged instability or deeper authoritarian rule.
Mozambique now faces a similar risk, with police brutality against protesters reaching alarming and unacceptable levels. This intensification of repression underscores the urgent need for a new, more inclusive and less militaristic approach to address the crisis.
A second, more optimistic scenario hinges on a return to dialogue. Genuine engagement between Chapo, Mondlane and key societal stakeholders – including civil society, religious leaders and academics – could defuse tensions and restore trust in governance.
Unfortunately, efforts to initiate dialogue have so far encountered substantial setbacks. Former President Nyusi made an early attempt by inviting Mondlane to the table, but the latter’s preconditions – primarily related to his safety – were not addressed, leading to his absence from the talks.
Subsequent discussions included Chapo and representatives from several opposition parties, such as Ossufo Momade (RENAMO), Lutero Simango (MDM), Albino Forquilha (Podemos) and Salomão Muchanga (Nova Democracia), but Mondlane’s continued absence limited their scope and effectiveness.
When Mondlane eventually returned to Mozambique at the beginning of this month, there was speculation about possible meetings with other opposition leaders, but these talks never materialised. In his inaugural speech, Chapo himself stressed the need for ‘frank, honest and sincere’ dialogue, calling it a priority for political and social stability.
Yet, nearly two weeks after assuming office, there were no reports of any substantial dialogue initiatives, and Chapo publicly denied the existence of any ongoing negotiations.
For this scenario to succeed, Chapo, as the president of the Republic, must take decisive action and leverage his leadership position to build consensus for the good of the country. At the same time, Mondlane must demonstrate openness for a negotiated solution to the conflict and reconsider his list of demands, particularly since his fight for ‘electoral truth’ seems difficult to win after the constitutional court processed the complaints and officially determined the final results.
Although more serious now, Mozambique’s current deadlock mirrors the tensions that followed the 2009 elections. As then, there is reluctance to engage in meaningful dialogue. Sadly, that earlier impasse eventually gave way to armed confrontations between RENAMO, the largest opposition party at the time, and the FRELIMO government.
To prevent history from repeating itself, leaders need to do more than make symbolic gestures; the situation calls for authentic, inclusive engagement that amplifies the voices of all — including opposition leaders and civil society. Only by replacing entrenched divisions with sincere dialogue can the country break free from its cycle of conflict and work toward a stable, democratic future.
Egídio Chaimite is a Senior Researcher at IESE in Mozambique, specialising in governance, elections, human rights and social movements. With extensive publications and experience in programme design, implementation and evaluation, he also teaches electoral management and public policy at top Mozambican universities.
Source: International Politics and Society (IPS), published by the Global and European Policy Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin.
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The proportion of America’s elderly population, currently defined unfortunately as those aged 65 years or older, has increased from 8 percent in 1950 to 18 percent today. Credit: Shutterstock.
By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, US, Feb 3 2025 (IPS)
Many Americans, especially the wealthy and successful, have discovered that the US is facing the scourge of an ageing elderly population that is seriously threatening the nation’s prosperity, economic growth and international standing.
The youthful, dynamic and innovative population of the recent past is being rapidly replaced by an unproductive ageing elderly population that is becoming increasingly costly and dependent on the government for support and care.
The demographic sign posts are clear. The average age of America’s population, for example, shot up from 30 years in 1950 to close to 40 years today. As the scourge endures, the country’s average age is expected to reach 42 years by 2050 and 45 years before the end of the century (Table 1).
Source: US Census Bureau.
In contrast, the average age of Nigeria’s population, which is the largest in Africa, has remained at 18 years or less since 1950. Moreover, by midcentury, Nigeria’s average age is expected to be a robust 24 years.
In addition to average age, the proportion of America’s elderly population, currently defined unfortunately as those aged 65 years or older, has increased from 8 percent in 1950 to 18 percent today. And by mid-century, a staggering one in four Americans is expected to be elderly according to today’s antiquated definition.
The number of elderly in America is expected to surge from today’s 60 million to more than 80 million by 2050. Also, the number of Americans who are 85 years or older is expected to more than double over the next several decades. Even more troubling, the number of people aged 100 or older is projected to more than triple by mid-century.
Some of the consequences of America’s ageing elderly population include increased health and medical care costs, shrinkage of the labor force, unsustainable financial strains approaching insolvency, rising demands for costly long-term care and financial assistance, less innovation and fewer business startups, reduction in technological adoption, and slowdowns in the nation’s vital economy due to reduced spending by the elderly.
Expenditures on the various woke socialist programs for the elderly, such as Social Security and Medicare, are devouring close to half of the country’s federal budget and contributing to the national debt, which is on course to exceed its record as a share of the economy in the next two years.
The return on investment (ROI) on those costly socialist programs for the elderly is negative, thereby incurring considerable losses for the country.
Stated simply and honestly, as America’s top economists have repeatedly warned, the government’s spending on the woke socialist programs for the elderly is a terrible economic investment for America. The ROI on government expenditures needs to be positive.
Also as a result of America’s scourge of an ageing elderly population, its working age population has not kept pace with the growth of the elderly. In particular, the critical number of people in the working ages per elderly person has decreased dramatically. Whereas in 1940 there were 42 people in the working ages per elderly person, by 1950 that ratio declined to 17. Today the ratio has totally collapsed to 3 and by 2050 is projected to decline to 2 people in the working ages per elderly person (Figure 1).
Source: US Census Bureau.
Instead of wasting taxpayer dollars on the ageing elderly population, those dollars need to be invested in young Americans who will enthusiastically participate in the labor force. That investment will strengthen America’s economy as well as sustain its primacy in the world.
The fundamental cause of America’s scourge of an ageing elderly population is a low fertility rate. And the country’s low fertility rate is due to women in America choosing to have few or no children.
Unfortunately, America’s fertility rate has collapsed from nearly four births per woman around 1960 to approximately 1.6 births per woman today. The current fertility level is well below the needed replacement level of about two births per woman.
Coupled with the country’s tragically low fertility rate is the worrisome increase in life expectancies among the elderly, especially among the oldest old. Regrettably, America’s elderly are living longer than ever before.
Whereas in 1950 life expectancy at age 65 years was a reasonable 14 years, today it has reached 20 years. Unfortunately, life expectancies of the elderly are expected to continue increasing throughout the remainder of the 21st century.
Fortunately, however, the US president can take actions, Congress can adopt policies and the Supreme Court can render decisions to address and even reverse America’s scourge of an ageing elderly population.
The government should incentivize, promote and encourage young women to have numerous children. Also, they need to emphasize the enormous benefits of families with many children for America’s future.
Policies, programs and legal decisions should facilitate women having numerous children and remain working. Moreover, women with numerous children should receive special consideration and priority in employment, government service and university admissions.
The country’s unproductive nursing homes for the elderly need to be shut down with the elderly currently residing in those institutions returned to their homes and families. Instead of relying on the government’s woke socialist programs for the elderly, families should be responsible for caring for their old and feeble relatives as was the case throughout much of America’s history.
Transferring the costs and care for the elderly from the government to the families of the elderly will rein in the federal budget. It will also reduce the growing and excessive tax burden on hard-working American taxpayers.
Such a transfer will also encourage young women as well as men across America to have numerous children in order to ensure that they will have the needed care and support when they become elderly.
In addition to criminals, illegal migrants aged 65 years or older should be given high priority for return to their home countries. America should also limit legal immigration to healthy, heterosexual men below the age of 30 years and fertile, heterosexual women below the age of 25 years. Doing so will increase the size of the country’s labor force as well as increase America’s low birth rate.
Regarding the many elderly people relying on government funds and assistance, they will be required to join the labor force and become financially independent. Many of them can take over the jobs of the deported illegal migrants as well as provide childcare services. Doing so will help maintain the size of America’s labor force, assist families with young children, contribute to lowering poverty levels among the elderly and also reduce the government’s financial burden on the highly unprofitable programs for the elderly.
Given the troubling increased longevity of both men and women across America, the traditional, antiquated definition of the elderly, which is persons 65 years or older, must be changed in order to be in line with the demographic and economic realities of the 21st century.
With the backing of the Supreme Court, Congress should pass legislation redefining America’s elderly population as men and women who are aged 80 years or older. Such a definitional change would reduce the number of elderly people in America to slightly less than a quarter of its current size (Figure 2).
Source: US Census Bureau.
Such a common sense and desirable change in the definition of the elderly will significantly increase the size of the country’s labor force. It will also raise the eligibility age for Social Security, Medicare and related programs for the elderly and hence reduce the unprofitable expenditures on those programs.
In sum, the scourge of an ageing elderly population is spreading across the country and undermining America’s economy, prosperity and global standing. In order to halt and reverse the spread of this dreadful scourge, the president must take action with Congress passing legislation and the Supreme Court rendering decisions that will return America to the wonderful, youthful, productive, energetic populations of its recent past. It’s time to make America young again!
Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division and author of numerous publications on population issues, including his recent book, “Population Levels, Trends, and Differentials”.
Syrian Civil Defense prepares to remove unexploded munitions of all shapes and types, including landmines. Credit: Sonia Alali/IPS
By Sonia Al Ali
IDLIB, Syria, Feb 3 2025 (IPS)
When 42-year-old Amina al-Hassan’s family returned home after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, her son stood on a landmine.
Hassan, from Kafranbel in southern Idlib countryside, sits beside her son’s bed in the hospital after his leg was amputated following the explosion on agricultural land near their home.
“After the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime and the expulsion of its elements from our city, we went to check on our house, while my son went to inspect the agricultural land near the house. He did not notice a landmine planted among the weeds and plants, and it exploded, amputating his leg,” she told IPS.
Explosive remnants of war and landmines are scattered haphazardly across Syria, endangering the lives of civilians, hindering the return of displaced persons to their cities and villages, and obstructing their agricultural work. The frequency of explosions caused by unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance has significantly increased following the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime and the fading of the frontlines between the regime and the opposition, where mines and unexploded ordnance are widely dispersed.
“When I heard the explosion, I ran as fast as lightning towards the source of the sound. When I reached the explosion site, I tried to take out my son myself, but the people present at the scene prevented me from doing so. One of the engineering team specialists took charge of removing the mines around him and took him out, then we rushed him to the nearest hospital in the city,” she said, her voice tinged with sorrow.
The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) confirmed on January 14 that the deadly legacy of landmines and other explosives left behind by years of conflict in Syria had killed more than 100 children in December alone, urging the international community to urgently support mine clearance projects across the country.
According to the Syria Response Coordinators team, the war remnants left by the former Syrian regime continue to claim the lives of Syrians. Since December 8, 2024, explosions of mines and cluster munitions in more than 108 locations in Syria have killed 109 people, including 9 children and 6 women. More than 121 others were injured, including 48 children and one woman.
Rowan al-Kamal (46), from the western Aleppo countryside, visited her home after Syria was liberated from the Assad regime. Unlike many others, she was fortunate, not because her house was intact, but because she noticed an unexploded shell near the house. She recounts, “I moved my children away and called the Syrian Civil Defense, who worked to dismantle it. We were saved from death or injury.”
Kamal adds, “I don’t know how I spotted it amidst the rubble. When I saw it, I was rushing to check what remained of the house. I think my eyes have become accustomed to recognizing shells, as we lived with them throughout the long years of war.”
She reveals that she won’t be able to return to her home due to the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance, despite living in a makeshift camp with her family of seven and facing extremely harsh conditions, especially with the significant drop in temperatures and the inability of humanitarian organizations to provide the displaced with necessary supplies such as food and heating.
While Kamal and her family survived injury or death, Wael al-Ahmad (22), from Has town in southern Idlib, lost his life after his city was liberated. His mother, Fatima al-Ahmad, recounts, “My son was tending to the sheep on the outskirts of the town and stepped on a landmine without noticing it, causing him severe injuries. He passed away hours later due to his injuries.”
Ahmad calls for intensified efforts to remove these remnants to prevent further casualties and ensure the safe return of the displaced. “The war remnants planted by the Syrian regime and its allies represent a delayed death for Syrians, as they threaten lives and prevent civilians from returning to their homes and farms,” she says tearfully.
Mohammed al-Saeed (32), who works on a war remnants removal team at the Syrian Civil Defense, explains, “War remnants are unexploded munitions of all shapes and types that remain in an area after the end of a war.”
He adds, “War remnants pose a real threat to Syrians in various parts of the country. They are divided into unexploded ordnance such as bombs, rockets, and shells, in addition to landmines.”
Al-Saeed clarifies that the first type is easier to remove and avoid because it can be seen and is usually found above ground. However, the biggest challenge lies in landmines that people cannot see.
Saeed further explained that Syrian government forces planted hundreds of thousands of mines in various regions of Syria, particularly in agricultural lands, military barracks, and frontline areas between the regime and the opposition. He warned that anyone returning to their town, home, or land should be aware that there may be unexploded ordnance present.
According to Saeed, Syrian Civil Defense teams conducted 822 operations to dispose of unexploded ordnance in northwestern Syria between November 27, 2024, and January 3, 2025.
He urged residents to be cautious of strange objects, to avoid touching or moving them, and to report them immediately. Meanwhile, Civil Defense engineering teams continue to conduct daily technical surveys of land contaminated with war remnants and work to dispose of munitions.
Saeed emphasized the need for the international community to work with the new Syrian government and coordinate with it to remove mines by providing funding to expand the Civil Defense’s capacity, hire more personnel, purchase more equipment, and operate in wider areas.
‘The former Syrian regime and its allied militias deliberately planted mines in vital areas, aiming to inflict the maximum number of civilian casualties. This long-term crime represents another facet of their brutal practices,” says Saeed.
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