Vendredi 17 avril 2026 à 18 heures au campus Malesherbes (amphithéâtre 128) au 108, boulevard Malesherbes 75017 Paris
- Agenda / Monténégro, Région parisienneJeudi 16 avril 2026 à 16 heures à la bibliothèque Malesherbes (108, boulevard Malesherbes 75017 Paris).
- Agenda / Monténégro, Région parisienneMardi 14 avril 2026 à 18 heures à la Maison de la recherche de l'Inalco 2, rue de Lille 75007 Paris
Le Centre de Recherches Europes-Eurasie-CREE (Inalco) vous invite à une nouvelle séance des Débats du CREE autour du nouveau roman de Lea Ypi : Indignité (Calmann-Lévy). Le débat sera animé par l'historien Andreas Guidi.
« Et si tout ce que je sais sur ma grand-mère s'avérait être une histoire tissée d'espoir, de trahison, de pouvoir et de perfidie, une histoire qu'elle aurait inventée (…)
Né au Monténégro, il fut l'entraîneur mythique du Partizan de Belgrade. Grande figure du basket-ball, Duško Vujošević, décédé le 8 avril à l'âge de 67 ans, était toujours resté un Yougoslave de coeur, rétif à tout nationalisme et opposant déclaré au régime Vučić.
- Le fil de l'Info / Monténégro, Serbie, Sports, PersonnalitésDimanche, la Serbie a vécu à l'heure hongroise. Tandis qu'Aleksandar Vučić espérait la victoire de son ami, allié politique et partenaire économique Viktor Orbán, l'opposition espérait, elle, que la Hongrie sache enfin tourner la page.
- Articles / Serbie, Courrier des Balkans, Orban Balkans, Vucic, Economie, Relations régionales, PolitiqueImplementing the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda and mainstreaming gender have the potential to make UN peacekeeping operations more operationally effective, including by improving situational awareness and strengthening mission planning. Within this effort, military gender advisers (MGAs) play a central role in integrating a gender perspective across the military components of UN missions.
This policy paper examines the role of MGAs in UN peacekeeping operations, drawing on interviews and survey data from gender advisers and focal points across missions.
It discusses how MGAs are situated within the UN Peacekeeping Gender Architecture, variations in recruitment and training of MGAs, and the wide range of roles and responsibilities of MGAs. Furthermore, the paper identifies persistent challenges, including unclear job descriptions, short deployment cycles, limited training, and difficulties in coordination with civilian counterparts. The paper finds that the effectiveness of MGAs is shaped by factors such as leadership support, professional background, gender and cultural dynamics, and resource constraints. It underscores that as peacekeeping operations face financial pressures and structural reforms, ensuring that gender advisers are adequately trained, resourced, and integrated into mission planning will be critical to maintaining operational effectiveness.
The post The Role of Military Gender Advisers in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Implications for Operational Effectiveness and The Future of Peacekeeping Operations appeared first on International Peace Institute.
La Vjosa, le dernier grand fleuve sauvage d'Europe, est théoriquement protégée par un parc naturel créé en 2023, mais sa mise en oeuvre patine. Le long des berges, au cœur des plaines agricoles, jusque dans le delta où le fleuve se jette dans l'Adriatique, la protection de ce cours d'eau unique se heurte à d'immenses défis.
- Articles / Barrages Balkans, Courrier des Balkans, Albanie, EnvironnementThe African Union’s admission to the G20 as a permanent member in 2023 marked a major milestone in global economic governance, giving the continent its first collective seat at one of the most influential decision-making forums on debt, trade, climate finance, and development. While this corrected a long-standing imbalance in representation, key questions remain about whether this institutional presence will translate into substantive influence.
This issue brief examines how the AU organizes its participation in the G20 and assesses the progress made under South Africa’s 2025 presidency, particularly on debt sustainability. It highlights initiatives such as the ministerial declaration on debt and the Africa Expert Panel proposals for reforms to the global debt architecture, while underscoring the continued limitations of existing G20 mechanisms, and the structural challenges posed by high borrowing costs..
The brief finds that while Africa has generated momentum within the G20, sustaining progress will require stronger coordination within the AU, the operationalization of key institutional mechanisms, and a more focused and strategic approach to advancing continental priorities in a shifting geopolitical landscape.
The post Africa in the G20 and Debt Sustainability appeared first on International Peace Institute.
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IPI and the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations cohosted a policy forum, “Examining the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund in UN Peace Operation Contexts” on April 9th.
The UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is designed to support catalytic, timely, and risk-tolerant investments through projects that contribute to advancing national peacebuilding priorities. Over the past two decades, the PBF has supported programming in over twenty contexts where the UN has deployed a peace operation and has often played a crucial role during mission transitions. The purpose of this event is to examine the role of the Fund in UN peace operation settings. The event will also serve to launch an IPI publication, “UN Peace Operations and the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund,” authored by Lauren McGowan, Policy Analyst at IPI.
Building on the insights of the report, this forum brought together representatives of the UN Secretariat, member states, and civil society organizations to discuss how the PBF has been leveraged in peace operation settings and how it can “further enhance its support” to countries preparing for or undergoing transitions from peace operations, in line with the recommendations of the recent review of the UN peacebuilding architecture (PBAR).
Opening Remarks:
Djeyhoun Ostowar, Counsellor, Deputy Head of Political Affairs Section, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN
Speakers:
Lauren McGowan, Policy Analyst, International Peace Institute
Bushra Hassan, Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Adviser, Peacebuilding Fund Support Branch, Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office
Anayansi Lopez, Head of Pillar, Civil Affairs, Human Rights, Guidance and Learning, Policy and Best Practices Service, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peace Operations
Anees Ahmed, Director, Rule of Law Advisory Section, UN Mission in South Sudan (VTC)
Sheila Romen, Coordinator, Peacebuilding Fund Secretariat in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Resident Coordinators Office (VTC)
Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations and Peacebuilding, International Peace Institute
The post Examining the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund in UN Peace Operation Contexts appeared first on International Peace Institute.
Written by Antonio Vale.
IntroductionThe past few years have seen considerable interest in generative AI, particularly large language models (LLMs). This has translated into massive investment amounting to hundreds of billions of euros per year, especially in the US, in AI data centres designed around Graphics Processing Unit (GPU)-based platforms. Such breakneck expansion is increasingly running into constraints, particularly with regard to electricity availability.
Running AI models requires large amounts of power (as well as water, much of which is used to produce the electricity required), with data centres responsible for 1.5 % of global electricity consumption (2 % in the EU) and growing at 12 % annually. Moreover, they are often geographically concentrated, for example in Ireland, where they account for over 20 % of electricity consumption. Future scenarios suggest that this demand could continue to increase rapidly, although this should be taken with the caveat that investment in AI might be a bubble, LLMs may be supplanted by other models with different compute needs, and chip design innovations beyond GPUs may provide energy efficiency gains.
This situation has given rise to the idea of deploying compute in space to take advantage of the free, abundant solar energy. Originally focused on orbital processing of observational data and space mission support, the concept has rapidly evolved into the deployment of AI data centres in orbit to service ground-based needs. Recently, the strongest push has come from the US, with the merger between SpaceX and xAI linked to a request to put a million satellites in orbit, as well as interest from Google with project Suncatcher, and startups such as Starcloud and Axiom. Meanwhile, China has also launched pilot satellites intended to be the first in a future constellation, and in the EU the Horizon Europe-supported ASCEND project has concluded a feasibility study, aiming towards an operational system from 2030.
Potential impacts and developmentsLaunch costs represent a key constraint for any orbital infrastructure. The introduction of reusable rockets has led to a considerable decrease in recent times, to around several thousand euros per kilo of payload. This reduction is expected to continue thanks to improved heavy rockets and reusable second stages, with the European Space Agency (ESA) aiming for €280/kg with a new super-heavy lift launcher. Most ideas for future space data centres would involve either large constellations or modular construction, allowing build-up to occur over time. Even so, this would require a very high launch cadence, with a complete data centre likely needing upwards of one hundred launches, followed by a significant proportion yearly to replace satellites at end of life; this compares to around 300 space launches overall in 2025.
The main attraction of placing data centres in space is solar power: for objects located above the atmosphere, insolation (incoming solar radiation) can be several times greater than on the ground. The ideal choice would be a terminator sun-synchronous orbit, allowing satellites to keep pace with the dawn/dusk line and ensuring constant solar exposure on one side, while keeping the other dark to assist with cooling. Solar panels would need to be very large – up to a gargantuan 4 km per side, as envisaged by Starcloud for a 5 GW data centre; a small satellite with the equivalent of a server rack might make do with a more manageable 60 m2 and 28 kW, as deployed on the International Space Station (ISS). Newer thin-film solar panel technology may help keep the weight down.
If power is the main advantage, cooling is possibly the major challenge. Although space is cold, it is also a vacuum, meaning cooling can only take place via radiative emission. This can be achieved by coupling a coolant loop (the ISS uses ammonia) with large radiators pointing towards deep space, which would be of comparable size to the solar panels but considerably heavier. The spacecraft’s cooling system is particularly vulnerable: any rupture, for example from a meteoroid strike, can cause coolant loss and damage the electronic systems. Given radiative cooling scales as the fourth power of temperature, further advances may come from lighter radiators running at higher temperatures. The other main concern in orbit is radiation, which can cause random bit flips and whose impact over time can lead to a degradation of performance or malfunction. Recent work from Google and Starcloud, which has deployed a NVIDIA H100 chip in orbit, has given promising indications, but fault tolerance, error correction, redundancy (deliberate duplication of critical components or systems), and shielding are all required.
Any assembly or maintenance would pose a significant challenge. Heavy AI workloads can lead to relatively high chip failure rates, which, added to radiation effects, imply short lifespans of a few years. Depending on the concept, this would require redundancy or satellite replacement, with a weight or cost penalty, or else robotic maintenance in orbit, which still needs further development. Finally, there is the issue of communications. Large amounts of data from the ground, to be used for training, may simply be physically carried by ‘data shuttles‘, while server-side communications, needing high data rates, could use optical communication between satellites, in turn implying close proximity. Google’s plans, for example, envisage satellites hundreds of metres apart. With space debris and collisions being a critical issue, this would represent a major challenge in terms of the coordination of collision avoidance manoeuvres, which may be frequent given the sizes of the constellations being proposed.
Anticipatory policymakingDeploying data centres in space poses important challenges, but does not appear to face insurmountable technical barriers and might be feasible even with current technology. The main hurdle is rather economic, with a mildly optimistic estimate placing near-future costs around three times those on the ground, although opinions are divided on whether such optimism is justified or not. Further innovation could help, with the evolution of launch costs a key determinant. This may lead to interesting synergies, with further technological and skills development benefiting other potential uses of space such as space-based solar power.
The current legal framework leaves space data centres in a grey zone: the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty establishes no sovereignty in outer space, with launch states (a concept that presents its own issues) instead bearing responsibility and liability for space activities. Drafted in the 1960s, this treaty lacks explicit provisions regarding data. Article VIII of the treaty refers to jurisdiction over a space ‘object, and over any personnel thereof’, which has prompted some stakeholders to urge regulators to explicitly consider the concept of a ‘digital flag state’. Furthermore, relevant laws and treaties relying on the territorial location of data may require clarification. Examples include the GDPR‘s concept of transfers of personal data to third countries and the recently signed UN Convention against Cybercrime, which includes ships and aircraft but not satellites under its jurisdictional provisions. Likewise, legislation dealing with space activities may need to account for considerable processing of data originating from the ground rather than space. Extending the definition of space-based data and primary providers of space-based data in the Space Act, for example, could offer additional clarity. The overall situation is complex, involving potential multiple layers of overlapping jurisdiction. In the future, in-orbit assembly and AI agents risk further increasing this complexity. These issues highlight that extraterritorial application, as conceived in the GDPR or the Space Act, will be a crucial factor in the future regulation of space data centres.
The potential scale of orbital data centres is also important to consider. A 1 GW data centre, similar in scale to the largest under construction on the ground, could require a total payload upwards of 10 000 tons, or over three times the total payload mass launched in 2025. This risks potential infrastructure bottlenecks, such as the limited availability of launch facilities or liquid oxygen. It also raises sustainability questions, given that lifetime emissions may be larger than on the ground. Furthermore, the pollution of the upper atmosphere that would be caused by de-orbiting large numbers of end-of-life satellites is still poorly understood. Finally, it poses a critical, geopolitically relevant question regarding orbital congestion, as international regulation of slots in low Earth orbit is currently only done indirectly through radio spectrum assignment by the International Telecommunications Union, generally on a first-come, first-served basis.
What ifs are two-page-long publications about new or emerging technologies aiming to accurately summarise the scientific state-of-the art in an accessible and engaging manner. They further consider the impacts such technologies may have – on society, the environment and the economy, among others – and how the European Parliament may react to them. As such, they do not aim to be and cannot be prescriptive, but serve primarily as background material for the Members and staff of the European Parliament to assist them in their parliamentary work.
Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if AI data centres were put in space?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
La schadenfreude de l'Europe face à l'échec de Trump à provoquer un changement de régime en Iran est aussi imprudente que prématurée
The post Analyse : Iran, une trêve au goût d’incertitude appeared first on Euractiv FR.
As the UN reexamines the future of its peace operations amid shifting geopolitical dynamics and financial constraints, greater attention is being paid to how to leverage peacebuilding tools, including to support more coherent and sustainable transitions. In this context, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has emerged as a central instrument for bridging operational, programmatic, and financial gaps—particularly in settings where peace operations are drawing down or have recently withdrawn.
This policy paper examines the role of the PBF in UN peace operations contexts. Since its inception, the PBF has invested over $1.3 billion through nearly 700 projects in countries hosting UN peace operations. The paper finds that the PBF has been leveraged as a support mechanism, a strategic enabler, and a political tool. It also finds that the PBF has played an important role in supporting sustainable UN transitions. At the same time, while the PBF is a flexible and catalytic instrument, it is not a substitute for peace operations, and expectations regarding its role must remain realistic.
The post UN Peace Operations and the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund appeared first on International Peace Institute.
Le mandat de Rutte « ne s'étend pas à l'imposition aux Européens de toute question sur laquelle ils n'ont pas été consultés. », a déclaré un diplomate de l’OTAN
The post La « daddy diplomacy » de Rutte s’essouffle, même après le recul de Trump sur l’Iran appeared first on Euractiv FR.
Written by Marie Lecerf.
The Roma are Europe’s largest ethnic minority. A significant number of Roma people live in very poor socio-economic conditions. The social exclusion, discrimination and segregation they face are mutually reinforcing. Their restricted access to education and difficulties entering the labour market result in low income and poor health compared with non-Roma people.
Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been stressing the need for better Roma inclusion. In 2011, an EU framework for national Roma integration strategies up to 2020 was launched to tackle their socio-economic exclusion and discrimination. This was followed in October 2020 by the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation 2020-2030, complemented by the Council’s March 2021 recommendation promoting national strategic frameworks and the October 2023 European Council conclusions on desegregated housing and segregated settlements. The EU continues to support Member States through structural and investment funds with the 2021-2027 Common Provisions Regulation emphasising alignment with European Semester recommendations and the European Pillar of Social Rights.
In parallel, the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025, succeeded by the EU anti-racism strategy 2026-2030, strengthened enforcement of anti-discrimination law, while the Fundamental Rights Agency’s Roma survey 2024 confirms modest progress but warns of shortfalls against 2030 targets in poverty, housing, employment, education and discrimination.
Issues relating to the promotion of democratic values and practices, as well as economic, social and cultural rights for Roma people, have received particular attention from civil society organisations. The European Parliament has consistently advocated for Roma inclusion since the 1990s, with recent resolutions and debates targeting implementation gaps, antigypsyism, child segregation, women’s rights and the new anti-racism strategy.
This is a further update of a briefing originally published in May 2021; the previous update was in March 2025.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding EU action on Roma inclusion‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
La route des Balkans reste toujours l'une des principales voies d'accès l'Union européenne, pour les exilés du Proche et du Moyen Orient, d'Afrique ou d'Asie. Alors que les frontières Schengen se ferment, Frontex se déploie dans les Balkans, qui sont toujours un « sas d'accès » à la « forteresse Europe ». Notre fil d'infos en continu.
- Le fil de l'Info / Bosnie-Herzégovine, Albanie, Kosovo, Bulgarie, Questions européennes, Populations, minorités et migrations, Migrants Balkans, Courrier des Balkans, Croatie, Turquie, Grèce, Moldavie, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro, Slovénie, Roumanie, Serbie, Gratuit, Grèce immigration