Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Candida Splett: Border closures and production stoppages associated with the Covid-19 pandemic disrupted supply chains. What consequences can be identified?

Melanie Müller: Many countries have realised how heavily they depend on supply relationships, be it for their imports, their exports or even both. It has also highlighted the central role of China in global supply chains. Many countries are now thinking about how to reduce their dependencies and improve their security of supply – as is the European Union.

Does that mean we have to turn back globalisation?

That would be unrealistic for most sectors. For example: We already know that the growth in digitalisation and green energy will increase demand for particular metals in the coming years. That demand cannot be met by recycling alone. Lacking meaningful extractable ore deposits of its own, Germany relies heavily on imports. On the other hand, many countries in the Global South are highly dependent on exports. For example, South Africa is the main source of platinum required by the car industry, and its exports generate crucial revenues. At the same time, there is a discussion among African countries about increasing local processing to boost the local share of added value.

What are the most important steps for improving the EU’s security of supply?

The EU needs to take a medium to long-term perspective on the question of security of supply and should not simply leave it to the individual member states. The point is not just to diversify supply chains, but also to incorporate the social, environmental and human rights aspects. Pandemics are not the only source of potential supply disruption. It could just as well be political unrest, or strikes over social or environmental standards. Environmental problems can also increase production costs – for which the consumer ends up paying. If we are truly interested in resilient supply chains, our strategies need to take account of the situation in the Global South.

So what needs to happen now?

Much progress has already been made in the past decade. The German and European discussion about supply chain laws is the outcome of a long process. For example in 2011 the United Nations adopted the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the OECD has been setting standards in this area for even longer. The crucial point is to hold economic actors responsible for activities outside their own enterprise. That means a statutory obligation to monitor the human rights situation in their supply chains and the political environment in which they operate.

What stands in the way of German and European supply chain laws?

The biggest obstacles concern questions such as: Which companies should the obligations apply to? If companies are required to adopt a human rights agenda, who evaluates their success and are the reports open to the public? Such technical questions have enormous political implications. There are also disagreements over the relationship between the German and the European level. Some people say we need the European supply chain law first. I think Germany should go ahead with its own legal framework. We are a central political actor in the EU, and can set an example. If the EU regulation turns out to have a broader scope, we can always bring the national law into line.

What will implementation depend on?

Companies will have to learn more about what they should be looking out for: how to verify whether violations occur, which aspects are potentially detectable, and which remain hidden. Our Transnational Governance of Sustainable Commodity Supply Chains project investigates supply chains that are in some cases utterly opaque to the final purchasers. Ore is mined in one part of the world, smelted in another, and then the metal might be drawn into wire somewhere in Europe to be used in a manufacturing process in yet another country. Human rights violations can affect any of these numerous processing stages. Even with a simple product like a computer mouse it is practically impossible to trace the sources reliably. In our project we start by investigating selected complex supply chains for metals, seeking possibilities to make them more transparent and above all more sustainable. So transparency is an important objective. Finally, we have to persuade those countries where we know human rights violations to be prevalent to address and prevent the problem.

To what extent are states in the Global South already working towards sustainable production processes?

The process of realisation is already under way, and many states in the Global South have adopted their own commitments and regulations. There is also a vigorous civil society pushing in the same direction and a UN process initiated by Ecuador and South Africa to develop a Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights. Meanwhile, some countries fear losing their competitive edge if they can no longer operate as cheaply as possible. What they tend to forget, however, are the costs attributable to poor production conditions.

What can Germany do to support them?

We can give direct support to states and firms in the Global South that are implementing the existing rules as well as to civil society actors exposing abuses. Sharing knowledge is also relevant. Finally, prevention is important. For example if a new mine is proposed, the risks that come along with it must be assessed and reduced right from the start. The point is to strengthen the relevant institutions and agencies in these countries while curbing corruption in the resource sector.

Melanie Müller heads the project "Transnational Governance of Sustainable Commodity Supply Chains".

The interview was conducted by Candida Splett, head of the online editorial team.

After a year of continuous tensions, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Cavusoglu visited Brussels in January to discuss the future of Turkey-EU relations. He and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have both stated that 2021 is the year to set things right with the European Union. Many in Europe are sceptical, since the current state of democracy and rule of law in Turkey falls well short of the requirements for a candidate country. Furthermore, Turkey’s recent foreign policy moves have also clashed with the interests of its Western allies. While welcoming the intention to improve the overall atmosphere, European decision-makers also want to see credible gestures and concrete actions. Whether or not Turkey continues its charm offensive, Europe should get to work on the long-neglected task of defining its common policy towards Turkey. While Washington may play a helpful role, the real strategic thinking will have to take place in Europe, Brussels and elsewhere.

The EU member states still have no real consensus on common foreign policy making. For all the talk of strategic autonomy, sovereignty and »speaking the language of power« – as High Representative Josep Borrell likes to call it – Europe is not united around any particular line. France and Germany, whose historic rivalry led to the creation of the European Union, also have their differences over the future of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy. French President Emmanuel Macron objects to Europe’s de facto dependency on the United States, arguing that the Union should be self-reliant in security and defence. German officials including Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer are not necessarily convinced, emphasising that the EU needs the protective umbrella of the United States to guarantee its own security, stability and prosperity.

These difficulties around the design and implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy are also manifest in the discussions on relations with Turkey. As an accession candidate, neighbour and strategic ally on migration management and counter-terrorism, Turkey poses a key test for the European Union. Military involvement in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh exemplifies Ankara’s increasingly assertive foreign policy and regional ambitions. All these conflicts affect the Union’s immediate neighbourhood.

Recent tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean have again shown that Turkey does not hesitate to explicitly oppose its Western allies’ interests. According to both European and US officials, Turkey’s actions have a direct impact on the security and sovereignty of Greece and Cyprus. In response NATO established a bilateral military de-confliction mechanism between Greece and Turkey, and the two agreed to resume exploratory talks over territorial claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. While these are all positive developments, it will be difficult to establish a truly functioning Turkey-EU relationship as long as the member states cannot agree on the big picture.

The European Council decided in December 2020 that »the EU will seek to coordinate on matters relating to Turkey and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean with the United States«. This was taken as a part of the general reassessment of transatlantic relations following the election of Joe Biden, where Europe is seeking – and expecting – a more coordinated strategy on future challenges – including those posed by NATO allies. The new US president is expected to steer back to multilateralism and international organisations. On his first day in office he signed executive orders restoring US membership of the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organisation. This return to multilateralism will definitely put Brussels and Washington shoulder-to-shoulder on many issues, including the desire to increase NATO’s coherence. This is bad news for all those who claim that the West is in decline, including President Erdoğan of Turkey.

While there are certainly advantages to having a US president who cares about transatlantic relations, the burden of asserting conditionality on democracy and rule of law will still fall on the European Union itself. Washington has always privileged security over values – and expected the EU to play the part of propagating Western values in Turkey. Accordingly, the United States supported the establishment of a customs union, as well as Turkey’s application to join the European Union. But it remains the responsibility of the European Union to find a functioning common framework with Turkey, either as a part of its enlargement policy or within its neighbourhood policy.

It is simply – and obviously – not enough to sign a new deal on managing illegal migration and call it a day. Even if any step towards dialogue is indeed very positive, the European Union should not fall for an easy reset with Turkey. The domestic political dynamics in the country leave no places for reassurance for the European Union that Turkey will keep its intentions of a positive agenda. The ultimate goal must be to reshape the relationship: »to look for mutual strategic interests, the development of a cooperative and reciprocal relationship anchored in common values and principles«, as Josep Borrell recently put it. While short-term interests may be better served by a transactional approach, long-term stability in Turkey-EU relations demands a well-functioning framework rooted in common principles.

On 3 February 2016, the mutilated body of Giulio Regeni was discovered on the outskirts of Cairo. The Italian scholar had been conducting research in Egypt on the development of independent trade unions. This evidently attracted the attention of the country's security authorities, who fear any form of unmonitored civil society organisation as potential opposition.

Regeni was last heard from on the evening of 25 January 2016, the fifth anniversary of the start of the popular uprising against the Mubarak regime, a day when Cairo was swarming with security forces. Multiple witness statements and circumstantial evidence indicate that Regeni was subjected to inhumane torture by Egyptian security forces for days. Although an in-depth investigation by the Italian public prosecutor's office was able to identify four high-ranking employees of the Egyptian security apparatus as the main perpetrators, the authorities in Cairo have stubbornly refused to initiate criminal proceedings.

In the wake of the murder, European governments and parliaments have repeatedly demanded clarification of the incident. The German government, which itself has gathered intelligence on the case, has addressed Regeni's fate in a series of bilateral talks. However, the incident has not had any consequences for Europe's political and economic relations with the most populous country to their south.

And yet the gruesome murder of Giulio Regeni is not an isolated case. Ever since the military coup in 2013, led by then defence minister Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, the state of Egyptian civil society has deteriorated dramatically. International observers estimate that there are as many as 60,000 political prisoners languishing in the horrendously overcrowded Egyptian prisons. Local human rights activists report widespread and systematic use of torture at police stations.

According to Human Rights Watch, Egypt is among the ten states where the death penalty is most frequently imposed and carried out. And Reporters Without Borders cites Egypt under President Sisi as one of the countries harbouring the highest number of imprisoned journalists.

But instead of holding Egypt's leadership politically responsible for this situation, the Europeans have repeatedly upgraded its status in recent years. Since Regeni's death, there have been a number of high-level state visits. Bilateral development loans and, not least, generous support under a comprehensive IMF agreement have been granted without any political conditions being imposed. Particularly worthy of note is that arms exports also continue to flow on a grand scale. Egypt is a major client not only for Germany and France. Even Italy continues to supply the country with weapons.

The Europeans justify this policy by citing the need to stabilise the country. They fear developments like those in Libya and Syria, which could be accompanied by massive violence, terrorism and renewed waves of migration. On the surface, their strategy seems sound, because Egypt has hermetically sealed off the country's maritime borders, preventing people from fleeing across the Mediterranean. European companies such as the German Siemens Group are profiting from lucrative business deals for large-scale infrastructure projects. And for European arms manufacturers, the military regime's drive for rearmament has provided a welcome economic boost.

The notion that human rights violations are simply the price to pay for a development dictatorship that is allowing Egypt to achieve stability and prosperity has however already proven to be a fallacy in the past. Ten years ago, mass protests in Tahrir Square in the heart of Cairo led to the collapse of the authoritarian Mubarak regime. The Europeans, who supported the president at the time, were forced to concede that the country's supposed stability was in fact extremely fragile. Is the same mistake being made today?

From the outside, it is not apparent that any decisive action has yet been taken to finally curb the endemic problems of mismanagement, corruption, lawlessness and poor governance that have long plagued Egypt. The few available reports from independent observers speak instead of increasing mismanagement by the military, rising poverty and growing social inequality. The situation has only been exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic, the true extent of which is evidently being hushed up by the regime.

It is extremely difficult to gain a reliable picture of what is going on in the country, as it is currently nearly impossible to report independently from Egypt or even to conduct research on the ground. Regeni's brutal murder set a precedent that discourages other scholars, journalists, civil society organisations, or political foundations from travelling there.

Extensive control of information is essential if the Sisi regime is to pursue its own interests. The regime has been successful in procuring fresh loans from international financial institutions such as the IMF by warning that the stability of the country is at risk. In the next breath it then turns around and emphasises Egypt's stability as a regional cooperation partner when cajoling European governments to sign arms contracts.

The evident realpolitik that forms the tacit conceptual framework for the continued cooperation by European governments with the Egyptian regime is thus increasingly becoming an unrealpolitik – a policy based on scarcely verifiable statements made by a regime that is playing for time, with the goal of maximising its own chances of survival. To that end, it seems willing to stoop to anything, even murdering a 28-year-old graduate student.

The German original was translated into English by Qantara.de.

¿Cuáles son los retos y perspectivas de las relaciones de la UE con la Administración Biden?

Die Serviceabteilung Finanzen vereint die Bereiche Rechnungswesen, Beschaffung, Drittmittel und Controlling und bietet interne Dienstleistungen für den Vorstand, die MitarbeiterInnen sowie die Gäste des Instituts an. Die Abteilung entwickelt innovative Instrumente zur Unterstützung der wissenschaftlichen Arbeit des DIW Berlin und setzt sie um. Dabei sorgt der Bereich Rechnungswesen für den reibungslosen Ablauf aller finanztechnischen Prozesse. Der Bereich Beschaffung kümmert sich um alle Beschaffungs- und Vergabevorgänge des Instituts. Der Drittmittelbereich betreut die Drittmittelprojekte von der Antragsphase bis zur Endabrechnung. Der Bereich Controlling verantwortet die Budgetplanung und das interne Berichtswesen, berät bei operativen Maßnahmen und bereitet strategische Entscheidungen vor. Die Abteilung verwaltete im Geschäftsjahr 2019 ein Budget von 32,4 Mio €, davon wurden 11,9 Mio € durch Drittmittelprojekte erwirtschaftet.

Die Serviceabteilung Finanzen sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine/n

 DrittmittelreferentIn (w/m/div).

Die Abteilung Konjunkturpolitik des DIW Berlin sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine/n

promovierte/n WissenschaftlerIn (w/m/d)

für den Arbeitsschwerpunkt der Arbeitsmarktforschung
(in Vollzeit oder Teilzeit)

Am 3. Februar 2016 wurde die verstümmelte Leiche Giulio Regenis am Stadtrand von Kairo aufgefunden. Der italienische Wissenschaftler forschte in Ägypten zur Entwicklung unabhängiger Gewerkschaften. Damit geriet er ins Visier der Sicherheitsbehörden, die jede Form unkontrollierter zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisation im Land als potenzielle Opposition fürchten und bekämpfen. Seine Spur verlor sich am Abend des 25. Januar 2016, dem fünften Jahrestag des Beginns des Volksaufstands gegen das Mubarak-Regime, als Kairo von Sicherheitskräften wimmelte. Zahlreiche Zeugenaussagen und Indizien deuten darauf hin, dass Regeni von ägyptischen Sicherheitskräften über Tage gefoltert und unmenschlichen Qualen ausgesetzt wurde. Obwohl die italienische Staatsanwaltschaft in akribischer Kleinstarbeit vier hochrangige Mitarbeiter des ägyptischen Sicherheitsapparats als Hauptverantwortliche identifizieren konnte, weigern sich die Behörden in Kairo beharrlich, Strafverfahren einzuleiten.

Infolge des Mordes haben europäische Regierungen und Parlamente immer wieder Aufklärung gefordert. Auch die Bundesregierung, der selbst geheimdienstliche Informationen über den Fall vorliegen, hat in zahlreichen bilateralen Gesprächen Regenis Schicksal angesprochen. Tatsächliche Konsequenzen für die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zu dem bevölkerungsreichsten Land in ihrer südlichen Nachbarschaft zogen die Europäer nicht.

Dabei ist der Foltermord an Giulio Regeni kein Einzelfall. Seitdem 2013 das Militär unter Führung des damaligen Verteidigungsministers Sisi putschte, hat sich die Situation für die ägyptische Zivilgesellschaft dramatisch verschlechtert. Internationale Beobachter sprechen von bis zu 60 000 politischen Gefangenen in den völlig überfüllten ägyptischen Haftanstalten. Lokale Menschenrechtsaktivisten berichten von weitreichender und systematischer Anwendung von Folter auf Polizeistationen. Laut Human Rights Watch gehört Ägypten zu den zehn Staaten, in denen die Todesstrafe am häufigsten verhängt und ausgeführt wird. Gemäß Reporter ohne Grenzen ist Ägypten unter Präsident Sisi eines der Länder mit den meisten inhaftierten Journalisten.

Anstatt aber Ägyptens Führung hierfür in die politische Verantwortung zu nehmen, haben die Europäer sie in den vergangenen Jahren sukzessive aufgewertet. Seit Regenis Tod kam es zu zahlreichen hochrangigen Staatsbesuchen. Bilaterale Entwicklungskredite und nicht zuletzt die großzügige Unterstützung eines umfangreichen IWF-Abkommens hat man ohne politische Konditionen gewährt. Besonders bemerkenswert: Auch Waffenexporte werden im großen Stil fortgesetzt. Nicht nur für Deutschland und Frankreich ist Ägypten eines der wichtigsten Empfängerländer. Selbst Italien beliefert das Land weiter mit Rüstungsgütern.

Die Europäer begründen diese Politik mit der Notwendigkeit der Stabilisierung des Landes. Sie befürchten eine Entwicklung wie in Libyen oder Syrien, die mit massiver Gewalt, Terrorismus und irregulärer Migration einhergehen könnte. Oberflächlich betrachtet scheint diese Rechnung aufzugehen: Ägypten hat die Seegrenze des Landes hermetisch abgeriegelt und verhindert damit die Flucht über das Mittelmeer. Europäische Unternehmen wie der deutsche Siemens-Konzern profitieren von lukrativen Geschäftsabschlüssen im Zusammenhang mit großangelegten Infrastrukturprojekten. Und für die europäischen Waffenschmieden stellt die Aufrüstung des Militärregimes eine willkommene Konjunkturspritze dar.

Die Vorstellung, Menschenrechtsverletzungen seien der Preis für eine Entwicklungsdiktatur, die Ägypten Stabilität und Wohlstand ermöglicht, hat sich jedoch bereits in der Vergangenheit als Irrglaube erwiesen. Vor zehn Jahren führten Massenproteste auf dem Tahrir-Platz im Herzen Kairos dazu, dass das autoritäre Mubarak-Regime zerbrach. Die Europäer, die den damaligen Präsidenten unterstützt hatten, mussten erkennen, dass die vermeintliche Stabilität des Landes außerordentlich brüchig war. Wird dieser Fehler heute wiederholt? Von außen ist nicht erkennbar, dass in der Zwischenzeit entschiedene Maßnahmen ergriffen worden wären, um endlich die endemischen Probleme wie Misswirtschaft, Korruption, mangelnde Rechtsstaatlichkeit und schlechte Regierungsführung einzudämmen, die Ägypten seit langem plagen. Die wenigen verfügbaren Berichte unabhängiger Beobachter sprechen eher von zunehmender Misswirtschaft durch das Militär, steigender Armut und wachsender sozialer Ungleichheit. Hinzu kommt die Corona-Pandemie, deren wahres Ausmaß durch das Regime offenbar verschleiert wird.

Ein verlässliches Bild der Lage im Land lässt sich kaum noch gewinnen, denn mittlerweile ist es nahezu unmöglich, unabhängig aus Ägypten zu berichten oder gar vor Ort zu forschen. Die Ermordung Regenis hat einen Präzedenzfall geschaffen, der viele andere Wissenschaftler, Journalisten, zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen oder politische Stiftungen davon abhält. Die weitgehende Kontrolle der Informationen stellt für das Sisi-Regime eine zentrale Ressource dar, um die eigenen Interessen zu verfolgen: Gegenüber internationalen Finanzinstitutionen wie dem IWF begründet das Regime die Notwendigkeit frischer Kredite damit, dass ohne sie die Stabilität des Landes gefährdet sei. Gegenüber europäischen Regierungen kann es umgekehrt die Stabilität des Landes als regionaler Kooperationspartner hervorheben, um damit Rüstungsaufträge zu rechtfertigen.

Die scheinbare Realpolitik, die unausgesprochen den konzeptionellen Rahmen für die fortgesetzte Kooperation der europäischen Regierungen mit dem ägyptischen Regime bildet, wird damit zusehends zu einer »Irrealpolitik« – einer Politik, die auf der Grundlage der kaum verifizierbaren Angaben eines auf Zeit spielenden Regimes erfolgt, dessen Ziel die Maximierung der eigenen Überlebenschancen ist. Dafür scheint es bereit, alles zu tun, einschließlich der Ermordung eines 28-jährigen Doktoranden.

Eine Reihe von Unternehmen aus den USA und China planen den Aufbau von Netzwerken aus mehreren Tausend Satelliten, um an jedem Ort der Erde den Zugang zum Internet per Satellitenverbindung zu ermöglichen. Die Satelliten dafür sollen in erdnaher Umlaufbahn stationiert werden.

Werden diese Pläne realisiert, wird die globale Internet-Infrastruktur um eine gänzlich neue Dimension ergänzt, mit weitreichenden Folgen für den Zugang zum Internet, für die Sicherheit und die Resilienz der Internet-Infrastruktur und nicht zuletzt für die Machtbeziehungen in der globalen Internet-Governance.

Für die Staaten, aus denen die führenden Unternehmen kommen – allen voran die USA, gefolgt von China –, würden sich umfassende Möglich­keiten der politischen Einflussnahme ergeben. Sie könnten auf der Ebene der globalen Internet-Infrastruktur kontrollieren, ob und unter welchen Bedingungen weltweit Informationen ausgetauscht werden.

Um das Spektrum möglicher Entwicklungen und die damit verbundenen Handlungsmöglichkeiten zu verdeutlichen, werden in dieser Studie zwei Szenarien entworfen: eines beschreibt die Herausbildung globaler Oligo­pole, das andere eine Form politisch regulierten globalen Wettbewerbs.

Die deutsche und die europäische Politik sollten durch regulatorische Maßnahmen und öffentliche Förderung darauf hinwirken, dass die Internet-Infrastruktur der Zukunft durch technologische Redundanz und Diversität sicher und zuverlässig ist. In einem angemessenen Technologie-Mix können auch die neuen Satellitenkonstellationen eine wichtige Ergänzung bilden.

Für Europa wäre der Aufbau einer eigenen Konstellation sowohl unter politischen wie wirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten erstrebenswert.

At the 10-year anniversary of the Tunisian Revolution, which toppled decades of dictatorship and repositioned discussions about democracy across the Middle East and North Africa, the democratic transition in Tunisia is in flux, or rather at an impasse. On the one hand, Tunisia is celebrated as the lone democratic success story of the 2011 Arab Uprisings, based on multiple cycles of free and fair elections. On the other hand, serious domestic political agitation over the last decade, coupled with deep structural inequalities and a rise in public perceptions of corruption in government, has nearly derailed its course towards democratic consolidation and stability.
Democratisation in Tunisia has hinged on the widely celebrated mechanism of consensus among political adversaries in parliament, and among key political and civil society actors. Yet, instead of achieving consensus on critical political and economic-structural reforms, compromise-based arrangements have fallen apart due to intense party infighting, regular resignations of governments, and enormous public pressure resulting from a stagnating economy and lack of vision for comprehensive and equitable economic reform. The effect has been sustained infighting over economic and social policy, which in turn has resulted in diminishing public trust in political parties and new democratic institutions, an all-time low level of satisfaction with the government’s performance and a significant rise in contentious politics, particularly between 2019 and 2021. The proliferation of micro-parties (209 registered political parties for a population of 11.8 million) has resulted in confusion among the electorate, while the economic reality of a suffocating international debt crisis, which has only been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, has rendered levels of public trust in government to an all-time low.
At this pivotal moment, Tunisia needs a clear political plan that encompasses a framework for productive political competition and a sound economic vision. To enter into the phase of democratic consolidation – defined as the moment of political, economic and societal stability when authoritarian rule begins to diminish – Tunisian elected authorities and the international community must address rising public demands, which emanate from across all socio-economic classes, for wealth redistribution and sound fiscal policy reform. More effective and transparent public spending will alleviate issues of public trust in all aspects of governance. Reconstructing trust in new democratic institutions is key and also requires a concerted effort to build democracy from the bottom up, particularly in marginal and impoverished areas where socio-economic ills are deeply entrenched, and where political contention is rampant and highest.

At the 10-year anniversary of the Tunisian Revolution, which toppled decades of dictatorship and repositioned discussions about democracy across the Middle East and North Africa, the democratic transition in Tunisia is in flux, or rather at an impasse. On the one hand, Tunisia is celebrated as the lone democratic success story of the 2011 Arab Uprisings, based on multiple cycles of free and fair elections. On the other hand, serious domestic political agitation over the last decade, coupled with deep structural inequalities and a rise in public perceptions of corruption in government, has nearly derailed its course towards democratic consolidation and stability.
Democratisation in Tunisia has hinged on the widely celebrated mechanism of consensus among political adversaries in parliament, and among key political and civil society actors. Yet, instead of achieving consensus on critical political and economic-structural reforms, compromise-based arrangements have fallen apart due to intense party infighting, regular resignations of governments, and enormous public pressure resulting from a stagnating economy and lack of vision for comprehensive and equitable economic reform. The effect has been sustained infighting over economic and social policy, which in turn has resulted in diminishing public trust in political parties and new democratic institutions, an all-time low level of satisfaction with the government’s performance and a significant rise in contentious politics, particularly between 2019 and 2021. The proliferation of micro-parties (209 registered political parties for a population of 11.8 million) has resulted in confusion among the electorate, while the economic reality of a suffocating international debt crisis, which has only been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, has rendered levels of public trust in government to an all-time low.
At this pivotal moment, Tunisia needs a clear political plan that encompasses a framework for productive political competition and a sound economic vision. To enter into the phase of democratic consolidation – defined as the moment of political, economic and societal stability when authoritarian rule begins to diminish – Tunisian elected authorities and the international community must address rising public demands, which emanate from across all socio-economic classes, for wealth redistribution and sound fiscal policy reform. More effective and transparent public spending will alleviate issues of public trust in all aspects of governance. Reconstructing trust in new democratic institutions is key and also requires a concerted effort to build democracy from the bottom up, particularly in marginal and impoverished areas where socio-economic ills are deeply entrenched, and where political contention is rampant and highest.

At the 10-year anniversary of the Tunisian Revolution, which toppled decades of dictatorship and repositioned discussions about democracy across the Middle East and North Africa, the democratic transition in Tunisia is in flux, or rather at an impasse. On the one hand, Tunisia is celebrated as the lone democratic success story of the 2011 Arab Uprisings, based on multiple cycles of free and fair elections. On the other hand, serious domestic political agitation over the last decade, coupled with deep structural inequalities and a rise in public perceptions of corruption in government, has nearly derailed its course towards democratic consolidation and stability.
Democratisation in Tunisia has hinged on the widely celebrated mechanism of consensus among political adversaries in parliament, and among key political and civil society actors. Yet, instead of achieving consensus on critical political and economic-structural reforms, compromise-based arrangements have fallen apart due to intense party infighting, regular resignations of governments, and enormous public pressure resulting from a stagnating economy and lack of vision for comprehensive and equitable economic reform. The effect has been sustained infighting over economic and social policy, which in turn has resulted in diminishing public trust in political parties and new democratic institutions, an all-time low level of satisfaction with the government’s performance and a significant rise in contentious politics, particularly between 2019 and 2021. The proliferation of micro-parties (209 registered political parties for a population of 11.8 million) has resulted in confusion among the electorate, while the economic reality of a suffocating international debt crisis, which has only been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, has rendered levels of public trust in government to an all-time low.
At this pivotal moment, Tunisia needs a clear political plan that encompasses a framework for productive political competition and a sound economic vision. To enter into the phase of democratic consolidation – defined as the moment of political, economic and societal stability when authoritarian rule begins to diminish – Tunisian elected authorities and the international community must address rising public demands, which emanate from across all socio-economic classes, for wealth redistribution and sound fiscal policy reform. More effective and transparent public spending will alleviate issues of public trust in all aspects of governance. Reconstructing trust in new democratic institutions is key and also requires a concerted effort to build democracy from the bottom up, particularly in marginal and impoverished areas where socio-economic ills are deeply entrenched, and where political contention is rampant and highest.

Primer estudio que revisa la situación de las relaciones culturales bilaterales de España y Japón en el cambiante escenario internacional y la nueva era Reiwa, analiza la evolución de la política cultural japonesa y sus vinculaciones con la proyección internacional del poder blando del país, y profundiza en la presencia de la lengua española en el sistema educativo nipón.

There is a case to be made for greater transparency of the United Nations’ (UN) development work at the country level. Transparency can, in the simplest terms, be defined as the quality of being open to public scrutiny. Despite improvements in recent years, UN organisations still only partially meet this standard. Only the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and, with limitations, the World Food Programme (WFP) systematically publish basic project parameters such as project documents, funding data and evaluations. Others do not even publish project lists. Only the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) publishes evaluations – a key source on performance – in an easily accessible way next to programme or project information.
Lack of project transparency constitutes not only a failure to operate openly in an exemplary way, as should be expected of the UN as a public institution with aspirations to play a leadership role in global development. It also undermines in very practical ways the development purposes that UN organisations were set up for: It reduces their accountability to the stakeholders they serve, including executive boards and local actors; it hampers the coordination of aid activities across and beyond the UN; and it undermines the learning from both successes and failures.
In principle, the UN and its development organisations (which in many cases also provide humanitarian assistance) have fully embraced transparency. All nine of the UN’s funds and programmes had joined the International Aid Transparency Index (IATI) by 2019; four of them have also set up their own transparency portals that provide information on country-level work. The UN Secretary-General has made greater transparency and accountability key priorities of his ongoing reform efforts to strengthen the UN development system (UNDS) and win the trust of governments, both as hosts and donors.
However, existing transparency arrangements in many cases fall short – either through their design or implementation – in creating a meaningful degree of transparency at the operational level of projects. It appears that both UN organisations and member states, for whom transparency comes with (perceived) downsides, have accepted improvements in project transparency in recent years as a kind of mission accomplished. Ongoing reforms focus on the level of country programmes, where they promise greater transparency on financial allocation patterns and aggregated results.
This focus on programme-level transparency should be complemented by full transparency on how the UN works and achieves results at the level of projects. The following actions are recommended:
• Member states should request full project-level transparency in the UN General Assembly and the executive boards of UN development organisations.
• Member states should, in the executive boards, review agency-specific rules and mechanisms regarding transparency and monitor compliance.
The UN Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG) should ensure that a system-wide UN transparency standard exists.

There is a case to be made for greater transparency of the United Nations’ (UN) development work at the country level. Transparency can, in the simplest terms, be defined as the quality of being open to public scrutiny. Despite improvements in recent years, UN organisations still only partially meet this standard. Only the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and, with limitations, the World Food Programme (WFP) systematically publish basic project parameters such as project documents, funding data and evaluations. Others do not even publish project lists. Only the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) publishes evaluations – a key source on performance – in an easily accessible way next to programme or project information.
Lack of project transparency constitutes not only a failure to operate openly in an exemplary way, as should be expected of the UN as a public institution with aspirations to play a leadership role in global development. It also undermines in very practical ways the development purposes that UN organisations were set up for: It reduces their accountability to the stakeholders they serve, including executive boards and local actors; it hampers the coordination of aid activities across and beyond the UN; and it undermines the learning from both successes and failures.
In principle, the UN and its development organisations (which in many cases also provide humanitarian assistance) have fully embraced transparency. All nine of the UN’s funds and programmes had joined the International Aid Transparency Index (IATI) by 2019; four of them have also set up their own transparency portals that provide information on country-level work. The UN Secretary-General has made greater transparency and accountability key priorities of his ongoing reform efforts to strengthen the UN development system (UNDS) and win the trust of governments, both as hosts and donors.
However, existing transparency arrangements in many cases fall short – either through their design or implementation – in creating a meaningful degree of transparency at the operational level of projects. It appears that both UN organisations and member states, for whom transparency comes with (perceived) downsides, have accepted improvements in project transparency in recent years as a kind of mission accomplished. Ongoing reforms focus on the level of country programmes, where they promise greater transparency on financial allocation patterns and aggregated results.
This focus on programme-level transparency should be complemented by full transparency on how the UN works and achieves results at the level of projects. The following actions are recommended:
• Member states should request full project-level transparency in the UN General Assembly and the executive boards of UN development organisations.
• Member states should, in the executive boards, review agency-specific rules and mechanisms regarding transparency and monitor compliance.
The UN Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG) should ensure that a system-wide UN transparency standard exists.

There is a case to be made for greater transparency of the United Nations’ (UN) development work at the country level. Transparency can, in the simplest terms, be defined as the quality of being open to public scrutiny. Despite improvements in recent years, UN organisations still only partially meet this standard. Only the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and, with limitations, the World Food Programme (WFP) systematically publish basic project parameters such as project documents, funding data and evaluations. Others do not even publish project lists. Only the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) publishes evaluations – a key source on performance – in an easily accessible way next to programme or project information.
Lack of project transparency constitutes not only a failure to operate openly in an exemplary way, as should be expected of the UN as a public institution with aspirations to play a leadership role in global development. It also undermines in very practical ways the development purposes that UN organisations were set up for: It reduces their accountability to the stakeholders they serve, including executive boards and local actors; it hampers the coordination of aid activities across and beyond the UN; and it undermines the learning from both successes and failures.
In principle, the UN and its development organisations (which in many cases also provide humanitarian assistance) have fully embraced transparency. All nine of the UN’s funds and programmes had joined the International Aid Transparency Index (IATI) by 2019; four of them have also set up their own transparency portals that provide information on country-level work. The UN Secretary-General has made greater transparency and accountability key priorities of his ongoing reform efforts to strengthen the UN development system (UNDS) and win the trust of governments, both as hosts and donors.
However, existing transparency arrangements in many cases fall short – either through their design or implementation – in creating a meaningful degree of transparency at the operational level of projects. It appears that both UN organisations and member states, for whom transparency comes with (perceived) downsides, have accepted improvements in project transparency in recent years as a kind of mission accomplished. Ongoing reforms focus on the level of country programmes, where they promise greater transparency on financial allocation patterns and aggregated results.
This focus on programme-level transparency should be complemented by full transparency on how the UN works and achieves results at the level of projects. The following actions are recommended:
• Member states should request full project-level transparency in the UN General Assembly and the executive boards of UN development organisations.
• Member states should, in the executive boards, review agency-specific rules and mechanisms regarding transparency and monitor compliance.
The UN Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG) should ensure that a system-wide UN transparency standard exists.

With inequality reduction now being officially and broadly recognised as a key development objective with its own Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 10), there is a need for simple, economical and quick methodologies with which to focus on this area and assess progress. This paper presents such a methodology, which allows a rough assessment of the potential impacts of development cooperation on income, consumption and wealth inequality.
This is important, as a rigorous causal analysis of the contribution development cooperation makes to reducing a partner country’s inequality is complex and costly. First, the relative contribution of targeted development cooperation programmes and projects to the economies of partner countries tends to be small (though admittedly not in all cases). Second, a myriad of factors contribute to changes in inequality in any given country, and assessing the impact of all of them is a complex, imprecise, time-consuming and resource-intensive exercise.
The proposed methodology therefore makes use of SDG 10’s focus on the poorest 40% of the population to assess whether development cooperation in a given partner country has been directly targeted at them.
This Briefing Paper presents a simple methodology to support donors or multilateral development cooperation institutions in assessing, addressing and mainstreaming inequality in their operations. The first step of the method¬ol¬ogy recommends that development agencies identify a country’s needs in terms of inequalities as a basis for providing support for policies and interventions to address them. The second step consists of making sure that inequality has been taken into account in key strategic documents. Subsequent steps aim to assess whether the design and implementation of specific programmes, projects and budget support operations targets inequalities.
In the case of projects and programmes, the recommended assumption is that if their direct beneficiaries are in the bottom 40%, then these projects and programmes can be considered to address inequality. For the sake of simplicity and practicality, this does not account for general equilibrium or indirect effects. In the case of budget support of any kind, any indication of the distributional profile of government expenditure in the area of support can be used as a proxy for the support’s distributional profile.
As a complement to this, it may be possible in many cases to analyse whether the subnational geographic allocation of funds corresponds to the location of the national bottom 40%. Despite many good reasons why funding should not always go to poorer areas, this information may provide important insights.
A key limitation of this approach is that disregarding indirect or general equilibrium effects does not establish any causal link between targeting and macroeconomic effects on inequality. Yet it does allow an assessment of the degree to which portfolios (or parts of them) are potentially addressing inequality, thereby providing important feedback for development actors.

With inequality reduction now being officially and broadly recognised as a key development objective with its own Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 10), there is a need for simple, economical and quick methodologies with which to focus on this area and assess progress. This paper presents such a methodology, which allows a rough assessment of the potential impacts of development cooperation on income, consumption and wealth inequality.
This is important, as a rigorous causal analysis of the contribution development cooperation makes to reducing a partner country’s inequality is complex and costly. First, the relative contribution of targeted development cooperation programmes and projects to the economies of partner countries tends to be small (though admittedly not in all cases). Second, a myriad of factors contribute to changes in inequality in any given country, and assessing the impact of all of them is a complex, imprecise, time-consuming and resource-intensive exercise.
The proposed methodology therefore makes use of SDG 10’s focus on the poorest 40% of the population to assess whether development cooperation in a given partner country has been directly targeted at them.
This Briefing Paper presents a simple methodology to support donors or multilateral development cooperation institutions in assessing, addressing and mainstreaming inequality in their operations. The first step of the method¬ol¬ogy recommends that development agencies identify a country’s needs in terms of inequalities as a basis for providing support for policies and interventions to address them. The second step consists of making sure that inequality has been taken into account in key strategic documents. Subsequent steps aim to assess whether the design and implementation of specific programmes, projects and budget support operations targets inequalities.
In the case of projects and programmes, the recommended assumption is that if their direct beneficiaries are in the bottom 40%, then these projects and programmes can be considered to address inequality. For the sake of simplicity and practicality, this does not account for general equilibrium or indirect effects. In the case of budget support of any kind, any indication of the distributional profile of government expenditure in the area of support can be used as a proxy for the support’s distributional profile.
As a complement to this, it may be possible in many cases to analyse whether the subnational geographic allocation of funds corresponds to the location of the national bottom 40%. Despite many good reasons why funding should not always go to poorer areas, this information may provide important insights.
A key limitation of this approach is that disregarding indirect or general equilibrium effects does not establish any causal link between targeting and macroeconomic effects on inequality. Yet it does allow an assessment of the degree to which portfolios (or parts of them) are potentially addressing inequality, thereby providing important feedback for development actors.

With inequality reduction now being officially and broadly recognised as a key development objective with its own Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 10), there is a need for simple, economical and quick methodologies with which to focus on this area and assess progress. This paper presents such a methodology, which allows a rough assessment of the potential impacts of development cooperation on income, consumption and wealth inequality.
This is important, as a rigorous causal analysis of the contribution development cooperation makes to reducing a partner country’s inequality is complex and costly. First, the relative contribution of targeted development cooperation programmes and projects to the economies of partner countries tends to be small (though admittedly not in all cases). Second, a myriad of factors contribute to changes in inequality in any given country, and assessing the impact of all of them is a complex, imprecise, time-consuming and resource-intensive exercise.
The proposed methodology therefore makes use of SDG 10’s focus on the poorest 40% of the population to assess whether development cooperation in a given partner country has been directly targeted at them.
This Briefing Paper presents a simple methodology to support donors or multilateral development cooperation institutions in assessing, addressing and mainstreaming inequality in their operations. The first step of the method¬ol¬ogy recommends that development agencies identify a country’s needs in terms of inequalities as a basis for providing support for policies and interventions to address them. The second step consists of making sure that inequality has been taken into account in key strategic documents. Subsequent steps aim to assess whether the design and implementation of specific programmes, projects and budget support operations targets inequalities.
In the case of projects and programmes, the recommended assumption is that if their direct beneficiaries are in the bottom 40%, then these projects and programmes can be considered to address inequality. For the sake of simplicity and practicality, this does not account for general equilibrium or indirect effects. In the case of budget support of any kind, any indication of the distributional profile of government expenditure in the area of support can be used as a proxy for the support’s distributional profile.
As a complement to this, it may be possible in many cases to analyse whether the subnational geographic allocation of funds corresponds to the location of the national bottom 40%. Despite many good reasons why funding should not always go to poorer areas, this information may provide important insights.
A key limitation of this approach is that disregarding indirect or general equilibrium effects does not establish any causal link between targeting and macroeconomic effects on inequality. Yet it does allow an assessment of the degree to which portfolios (or parts of them) are potentially addressing inequality, thereby providing important feedback for development actors.

Um die gesundheitlichen, sozialen und ökonomischen Folgen der Pandemie zu mindern, ist es wichtig, diese weltweit nachhaltig zu kontrollieren. Dafür muss auch ein großer Teil der Weltbevölkerung schnellstmöglich gegen COVID-19 geimpft werden. Dies erfordert globale Solidarität: zwischen Staaten im globalen Norden und Süden sowie zwischen gesellschaftlichen Akteuren weltweit. Globale Probleme erfordern globale Lösungen. Im Fall von COVID-19 sind wir gegenwärtig weit davon entfernt.

Außergewöhnlich schnell wurden Impfstoffe von mehreren Pharma-Konzernen mit der Unterstützung von öffentlichen Geldgebern entwickelt. Frühzeitig sicherten sich reiche Staaten zum Schutz der eigenen Bevölkerung umfassende Mengen des Impfstoffes. Mit den per Vorkaufsrecht gesicherten Mengen könnte die eigene Bevölkerung um ein Vielfaches geimpft werden. Viele ärmere Staaten, etwa aus Afrika, haben aber bis jetzt das Nachsehen. Das wird die sozialen Folgen der Pandemie, wie Ungleichheit und Armut, aber auch die ökonomischen Folgen weiter verlängern. Selbst wenn die reicheren Länder bis Ende Juni 2021 eine optimale Impfversorgung ihrer eigenen Bevölkerung schaffen sollten, kann die eigene Wirtschaftsleistung um 4,5 Billionen Dollar sinken. Angebots- und Nachfragekrisen in anderen Ländern führen zu wirtschaftlichen Verlusten im Inland.

Reiche Länder sollten nun – aus globaler Verantwortung, aber auch im wohlverstandenen Eigeninteresse – solidarisch handeln. Überschüssige und per Vorkaufsrecht gesicherte Impfstoffdosen sollten bereits jetzt an ärmere Länder gespendet oder zu einem deutlich reduzierten Preis abgegeben werden. Dies wird durch die Impfstoffinitiative COVAX, die unter anderem von der Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) ins Leben gerufen wurde, organisiert. COVAX hat sich zum Ziel gesetzt, so viele Impfdosen zu sichern, dass bis Ende 2021 mindestens 20 Prozent der Bevölkerung in den ärmsten Ländern geimpft werden kann. Dafür benötigt COVAX jedoch circa sieben Milliarden US-Dollar. Bisher stehen der Initiative nur lediglich vier Milliarden US-Dollar zur Verfügung. Diese Finanzierungslücke gilt es schnellstmöglich zu schließen.

Um eine schnelle Impfstoffverteilung auch in ärmeren Ländern zu ermöglichen, ist es ebenfalls unabdingbar, die Produktion durch Hersteller in Ländern im globalen Süden zu ermöglichen. Impfstoffe können vergleichsweise einfach in Lizenz hergestellt werden. Faktische Patent-Regelungen schränken jedoch die Produktion durch andere Hersteller ein. Die Europäische Union (EU), die USA und andere Industriestaaten lehnten eine Aussetzung des Patentschutzes im Allgemeinen Rat der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) jedoch ab. Südafrika und Indien hatten den Vorschlag im Namen von mehr als 100 Staaten – darunter Kenia und Nigeria– eingebracht. Positive Beispiele für eine Lockerung des Patentschutzes sind weithin bekannt. So hat die Lockerung des Patentschutzabkommens TRIPS vor 20 Jahren bei der Bekämpfung von HIV/Aids viele Menschenleben gerettet.

Nicht nur die Produktion von Impfstoffen muss global erfolgen. Viele Niedrigeinkommensländer brauchen auch globale Unterstützung, um die Logistik für die Auslieferung der COVID-19-Impfstoffe zu bewältigen. Eine kürzlich veröffentliche Studie zeigt, dass nur 10% der Basisgesundheitseinrichtungen im globalen Süden über eine ausreichende Kühlinfrastruktur verfügen. Die technische und finanzielle Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ist hier stark gefordert, um ihre Partnerländer bei dieser logistischen Herausforderung zu unterstützen.

Aber selbst wenn Impfstoffe im Land verfügbar sind, unterscheiden sich Menschen auch in ihrer Impfbereitschaft. So kann die Entfernung zu Gesundheitszentren ein wesentlicher Grund sein, sich nicht impfen zu lassen, da der Zugang beschwerlich und teuer ist. Studien dazu in Afrika zeigen eine große Bandbreite der Bereitschaft von 90% der Befragten in Äthiopien zu 65% im Senegal. Aufklärungskampagnen gegen die Angst vor einer Impfung und möglichen Nebenwirkungen scheinen für Risikogruppen besonders wichtig. Welche Faktoren die Impfbereitschaft konkret beeinflussen, wird derzeit im Rahmen des Projekts Soziale Kohäsion in Afrika am Deutschen Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) untersucht.

Drei Bausteine sind nun elementar, um die Pandemie weltweit nachhaltig zu kontrollieren: die finanzielle Stärkung der COVAX-Initiative, die lokale Herstellung der Impfstoffe und die Unterstützung bei der Verteilung der Impfungen. Dies kann nur durch globale Solidarität zwischen Staaten im globalen Norden und Süden gelingen. Davon würde auch der globale Norden selbst profitieren, da bestehende COVID-19 bedingte Einschränkungen in Ländern des globalen Südens hohe Verluste für die Weltwirtschaft mit sich bringen. Die internationale Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ist hier besonders gefordert – ganz besonders in Ländern, die stark von der Pandemie betroffen sind. Gelingt es nicht, COVID-19 im globalen Süden einzudämmen, so führt dies unweigerlich dazu, dass erzielte Erfolge bei der Erreichung der Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung (SDGs) verspielt werden.