Since the early 2000s, populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have more than doubled their electoral support in Europe. Previous research found that PRRPs impact migration policy. However, little is known about whether they also impact other fields of domestic and foreign policy. Using a cross-country panel analysis, we test to what extent the rise of PRRPs has influenced European foreign aid spending. We find that while the rise of PRRPs has not been associated with an overall reduction in foreign aid, it has led to changes in how aid moneys are spent. PRRP strength is linked to a higher share of aid for migration-containment objectives, and less aid for addressing climate change and for multilateral organizations. Our analysis thereby provides evidence that the ‘electoral threat’ of PRRPs puts mainstream parties under pressure not only with regard to migration but also in relation to the climate–development nexus and aid for multilateralism.
Präsident Biden hat die unter seinem Vorgänger eingeleitete Ausrichtung amerikanischer Weltpolitik auf den Konflikt mit China weitergeführt. Eingebettet ist die »strategische Konkurrenz« mit China in ein Narrativ, dem zufolge sich die Welt in einer fundamentalen Auseinandersetzung zwischen Demokratie und Autokratie befindet. Diese Erzählung beherrschte auch den »Summit for Democracy« im Dezember 2021. Die Ideologisierung der geopolitischen und geoökonomischen Hegemonialkonkurrenz mag nützlich sein, um andere Staaten in die Politik kollektiver Gegenmachtbildung einzubinden, die unter Präsident Biden Gestalt gewonnen hat. Innenpolitisch könnte dieses Narrativ jedoch den Republikanern in die Hände spielen. Zwar existiert im Kongress ein breiter überparteilicher Konsens zugunsten einer harten Linie. Allerdings verdeckt dieser die Unterschiede, die in der Frage des Umgangs mit China nach wie vor bestehen. China ist kein Thema, das der Polarisierung in den USA völlig entzogen ist. Die Demokraten bleiben der republikanischen Kritik ausgesetzt, in Sachen China »schwach« zu sein.
Democratisation is hailed as a pathway to peace by some, yet, blamed for provoking renewed violence by others. Can democracy aid explain the effect of democratisation after civil war? Building upon findings that transitions to democracy are prone to violence, this article shows that external democracy aid can mitigate such negative effects. It is the first to disaggregate democracy aid and analyse its effect on peace after civil war. To this end, it uses a configurational approach and focuses on support for competition (for example, promoting free and fair elections), institutional constraints (for example, strengthening the judiciary), and cooperation (for example, facilitating reconciliation). Combining Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) with an illustrative case study on Liberia, it demonstrates that democracy aid can help to prevent recurrence during postconflict democratisation. Two pathways can explain peaceful democratisation: first, fostering ‘cooperative democratisation’ characterised by substantial support for cooperation in lower-risk contexts; and second, fostering ‘controlled competition’ by combining substantial support for institutional constraints and competition. Importantly, democracy support does not trigger renewed violence. These findings speak to the academic debate on the destabilising potential of democratisation processes after civil wars and inform policymakers designing postconflict support strategies.
Democratisation is hailed as a pathway to peace by some, yet, blamed for provoking renewed violence by others. Can democracy aid explain the effect of democratisation after civil war? Building upon findings that transitions to democracy are prone to violence, this article shows that external democracy aid can mitigate such negative effects. It is the first to disaggregate democracy aid and analyse its effect on peace after civil war. To this end, it uses a configurational approach and focuses on support for competition (for example, promoting free and fair elections), institutional constraints (for example, strengthening the judiciary), and cooperation (for example, facilitating reconciliation). Combining Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) with an illustrative case study on Liberia, it demonstrates that democracy aid can help to prevent recurrence during postconflict democratisation. Two pathways can explain peaceful democratisation: first, fostering ‘cooperative democratisation’ characterised by substantial support for cooperation in lower-risk contexts; and second, fostering ‘controlled competition’ by combining substantial support for institutional constraints and competition. Importantly, democracy support does not trigger renewed violence. These findings speak to the academic debate on the destabilising potential of democratisation processes after civil wars and inform policymakers designing postconflict support strategies.
Democratisation is hailed as a pathway to peace by some, yet, blamed for provoking renewed violence by others. Can democracy aid explain the effect of democratisation after civil war? Building upon findings that transitions to democracy are prone to violence, this article shows that external democracy aid can mitigate such negative effects. It is the first to disaggregate democracy aid and analyse its effect on peace after civil war. To this end, it uses a configurational approach and focuses on support for competition (for example, promoting free and fair elections), institutional constraints (for example, strengthening the judiciary), and cooperation (for example, facilitating reconciliation). Combining Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) with an illustrative case study on Liberia, it demonstrates that democracy aid can help to prevent recurrence during postconflict democratisation. Two pathways can explain peaceful democratisation: first, fostering ‘cooperative democratisation’ characterised by substantial support for cooperation in lower-risk contexts; and second, fostering ‘controlled competition’ by combining substantial support for institutional constraints and competition. Importantly, democracy support does not trigger renewed violence. These findings speak to the academic debate on the destabilising potential of democratisation processes after civil wars and inform policymakers designing postconflict support strategies.
A growing impact evaluation literature on antipoverty transfer programmes in low- and middle-income countries measures changes in utilitarian terms, at their unit value. The paper argues that valuing antipoverty transfers is more appropriately done within a framework of prioritarian social welfare functions, as the very presence of these programmes indicates that polities place a greater value on gains and losses among the disadvantaged. The paper applies this framework to the Senior Citizen Grant in Uganda, including survey and experimental work throwing light on social preferences for redistribution. It finds that default utilitarian valuation significantly underestimates the social value of transfer programmes.
A growing impact evaluation literature on antipoverty transfer programmes in low- and middle-income countries measures changes in utilitarian terms, at their unit value. The paper argues that valuing antipoverty transfers is more appropriately done within a framework of prioritarian social welfare functions, as the very presence of these programmes indicates that polities place a greater value on gains and losses among the disadvantaged. The paper applies this framework to the Senior Citizen Grant in Uganda, including survey and experimental work throwing light on social preferences for redistribution. It finds that default utilitarian valuation significantly underestimates the social value of transfer programmes.
A growing impact evaluation literature on antipoverty transfer programmes in low- and middle-income countries measures changes in utilitarian terms, at their unit value. The paper argues that valuing antipoverty transfers is more appropriately done within a framework of prioritarian social welfare functions, as the very presence of these programmes indicates that polities place a greater value on gains and losses among the disadvantaged. The paper applies this framework to the Senior Citizen Grant in Uganda, including survey and experimental work throwing light on social preferences for redistribution. It finds that default utilitarian valuation significantly underestimates the social value of transfer programmes.
Im März 2022 wollen die 27 Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union (EU) einen »Strategischen Kompass« (SK) verabschieden, der die Union bis zum Jahr 2030 zu einem Anbieter von Sicherheit machen und ihre strategische Souveränität stärken soll. Der erste Entwurf dieses Dokuments liegt seit Mitte November vor – und weist gravierende Defizite auf: Strategische Zerfaserung, Überinstitutionalisierung und Verantwortungsdiffusion bleiben Kennzeichen der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Berlin ist bei der anstehenden Überarbeitung des Kompasses insbesondere gefordert, dessen Stellenwert zu klären und ein klares Ambitionsniveau vorzugeben. Andernfalls dürfte der Strategische Kompass einer EU-Sicherheitspolitik Vorschub leisten, deren Motto lautete: »Alles kann, nichts muss.«
Seit Frühjahr 2019 war Israel politisch gelähmt, weil keine stabile Regierung zustande kam. Vier Wahlen waren nötig, bis am 13. Juni 2021 eine neue Regierung die Geschäfte übernahm. Nicht nur wurde Benjamin Netanjahu nach zwölf Jahren als Premier abgelöst. Es wurde eine Koalition gebildet, die fast das ganze politische Spektrum abdeckt. Mittlerweile hat sie sich stabilisiert, und die Ausrichtung wird klarer. National und international hat die Koalition mit der populistischen Rhetorik der Netanjahu-Regierung gebrochen. Zugleich sucht sie nach anderen Politiken: Innenpolitisch integriert sie erstmals eine unabhängige arabische Partei und hat die Angriffe auf Prinzipien liberaler Demokratie gestoppt. Außenpolitisch wirbt sie für Annäherung an die EU und an die Biden-Regierung, aber auch um mehr Integration in die Region. Zudem bemüht sie sich, den Konflikt mit den Palästinensern durch soziale und wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen einzudämmen. Doch eine politische Annäherung ist nicht in Sicht. Es droht ein »point of no return«, der eine Zweistaatenlösung unmöglich macht.
This study explores the contribution of quality infrastructure (QI) to the development of a green economy (GE) using the example of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). It is part of the project Promotion of innovation in the green economy by including quality infrastructure, which the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) implemented on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) from December 2015 to July 2019. Project partners were the regional organizations of the quality infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean (COPANT, IAAC and SIM).
This study explores the contribution of quality infrastructure (QI) to the development of a green economy (GE) using the example of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). It is part of the project Promotion of innovation in the green economy by including quality infrastructure, which the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) implemented on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) from December 2015 to July 2019. Project partners were the regional organizations of the quality infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean (COPANT, IAAC and SIM).
This study explores the contribution of quality infrastructure (QI) to the development of a green economy (GE) using the example of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). It is part of the project Promotion of innovation in the green economy by including quality infrastructure, which the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) implemented on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) from December 2015 to July 2019. Project partners were the regional organizations of the quality infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean (COPANT, IAAC and SIM).
Es previsible que en 2022 quede superada definitivamente la emergencia sanitaria que dura ya dos años y se avance en la recuperación, pero, en vez de un retorno a la normalidad previa, el escenario internacional seguirá dominado por cambios estructurales de fondo que la pandemia ha acelerado.
La calidad de la democracia española sigue siendo notable en todos los índices comparados y resisten los consensos sociales fundamentales, incluyendo la alta consideración hacia el sistema nacional de salud o el apoyo a las líneas estratégicas tradicionales de la acción exterior.
La política europea de España en 2022 vendrá marcada por el despliegue de los fondos Next Generation EU, el debate sobre la reforma de las reglas fiscales, la culminación de la Conferencia sobre el futuro de Europa y las actuaciones para la defensa del Estado de Derecho en Hungría y Polonia.