Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Dass Ressortkonkurrenz außenorientierte Politik nicht erfolgreicher macht, ist eine Binsenweisheit. Dass alle Teile der Regierung am selben Strang ziehen, reicht jedoch nicht aus. Es muss auch die Richtung stimmen.

In the debate on how to strengthen the European Union’s (EU) capacity to act, calls for an extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) are growing louder. The Council of the EU is currently discussing using the so-called passerelle clauses in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). With these clauses, more decisions by QMV could be intro­duced without a major treaty change or a convention. However, abolishing national vetoes in this way would first require unanimity as well as, in some cases, additional national approval procedures. Such unanimity is currently not in sight, as resistance is prevailing in smaller and medium-sized member states, which fear that they could be regularly outvoted. What is needed, therefore, is an institutional reform package in which decisions by QMV are extended with the aim of facilitating further enlargement of the EU and are accompanied by emergency clauses to protect core national interests.

Seit 2020 die Indo-Pazifik-Leitlinien der Bundesregierung veröffentlicht wurden, hat die deutsche Politik wichtige Fortschritte dabei erzielt, die Beziehungen mit bestehenden und neuen Partnern in der indopazifischen Region zu vertiefen. Der dies­jährige Fortschrittsbericht zu den Leitlinien nimmt erstmals eine geostrategische Perspektive ein, denn er verknüpft gegenwärtige außen- und sicherheitspolitische Entwicklungen mit den deutschen Zielen in der Region. Nun gilt es, diesen geostrategischen Ansatz weiter zu verfolgen. Die Bundesregierung sollte die künftige Umsetzung der Leitlinien in Einklang mit der von ihr angekündigten China-Strategie brin­gen und sich zudem mit einschlägigen regionalen Partnern abstimmen.

A close reading of Russia’s nuclear statements and actions during the first seven months of its war against Ukraine reveals a threefold approach. Moscow is walking a fine line between a well-crafted and successful deterrence strategy to prevent foreign military intervention; a more modest and rather unsuccessful attempt at dissuading foreign aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia; and incremental nuclear coercion against Kyiv that spurred Western deterrence messaging in response. This analysis reveals a careful Russian approach, suggesting that cost-benefit calculations are likely to continue to render nuclear escalation unlikely. However, nuclear use cannot be fully discounted, particularly if war-related developments severely imperil the sur­vival of Russia’s regime.

Russland verfolgt mit seinen nuklearen Drohgebärden im Krieg gegen die Ukraine eine dreigleisige Strategie. Erstens versucht es eine westliche Intervention abzuschrecken, zweitens Unterstützung für die Ukraine zu verhindern und drittens schrittweise Kyjiw zu erpressen, worauf der Westen bislang mit eigenen Abschreckungssignalen reagiert hat. Moskaus scheinbar vorsichtiges Vorgehen legt nahe, dass ein Kernwaffen­einsatz aufgrund von Kosten-Nutzen-Kalkülen unwahrscheinlich bleibt. Dennoch lässt sich ein solches Szenario nicht ausschließen, insbesondere dann nicht, wenn sich aus dem Krieg eine ernsthafte Bedrohung für Putins Regime ergeben sollte.

Seit dem Koreakrieg 1950–53 basierte die Sicherheitsarchitektur der lange Zeit als »Asien-Pazifik« bezeichneten Region auf einem US-geführten System bilateraler Allianzen, dem sogenannten Nabe-und-Speichen-System. Ein multilaterales System kollektiver Verteidigung, ähnlich der Nato in Europa, gab es in der Region bislang nicht. 2014 begann die Volksrepublik China unter Xi Jinping, eigene Ideen zur Neugestaltung des regionalen Sicherheitssystems zu entwickeln. Xi nannte das Nabe-und-Speichen-System ein Relikt des Kalten Krieges und forderte eine regionale Sicherheitsarchitektur »von Asiaten für Asiaten«. Das Konzept »Indo-Pazifik« gilt weithin als strategischer Gegenentwurf zu einer sinozentristischen Neustrukturierung der Region. Dabei wird die Sicherheitsarchitektur mehrheitlich als antagonistische Ordnung verstanden, in der Sicherheit gegen und nicht mit China hergestellt wird. Diese Architektur ist stärker als bisher »asianisiert«: Nicht nur wächst die Bedeutung der US-Alliierten in der Region im Verhältnis zu Washington. Immer wichtiger werden auch bi- und minilaterale Partnerschaften außerhalb des Nabe-und-Speichen-Systems, etwa diejenigen mit Beteiligung von Staaten wie Indien oder Indonesien. Strukturell dominieren bilaterale Allianzen und Partnerschaften, die zunehmend um minilaterale Formate wie AUKUS oder Quad ergänzt werden. Für die EU und ihre Mitgliedstaaten bedeutet all dies, dass die Verwirk­lichung der Idee eines inklusiv ausgerichteten Indo-Pazifik in weite Ferne gerückt ist. Auch der effektive Multilateralismus, den die EU propagiert, gerät zusehends ins Hintertreffen, da die regionale Sicherheitsarchitektur sich mehr und mehr zu einem Nebeneinander bi- und minilateraler Kooperationsformate wandelt.

Europe’s trade policy is heading for a sea change. But it is not Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine that is the main reason for this development. Rather, there are long-term influencing factors at work here: the WTO-centred multilateral trade order is visibly eroding. Protectionism is on the rise around the globe. World trade is grow­ing only marginally or is even stagnating. Globalization is undergoing a transforma­tion whose outcome is uncertain. And international trade is increasingly being instrumentalized for political purposes. In February 2021, the European Commission responded to these structural upheavals by announcing an “open, sustainable and assertive trade policy”. However, there has so far been uneven progress towards im­plementing the objectives included in the new trade policy strategy. While the EU’s intention to strengthen both Europe’s assertiveness and the sustainability of trade is being realized through numerous new instruments and measures, its promise of openness and liberalization remains unfulfilled for the time being. In particular, the Indo-Pacific region beyond China would offer the German and European economies significant opportunities to tap new sources of raw materials and access reliable sup­plier networks and growing sales markets.

IPI, in partnership with the French Ministry of Armed Forces and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, cohosted the 2022 Peacekeeping Observatory Annual Workshop on October 18, 2022. The half-day workshop explored the interconnected nature of climate change, peace, and security within the context of UN peace operations. The hybrid event convened over sixty-five participants, including UN personnel, member-state representatives, and independent experts from civil society organizations.

Throughout three sessions, discussions examined the substantive and operational implications of this intersection, specifically focusing on: (1) achieving sustained peace through environmental peacebuilding and climate responses; (2) integrating climate analysis into the mandated activities of UN peacekeeping operations; and (3) mitigating the environmental footprint of UN peace operations and the impact of climate change on mission operations.

The first session highlighted the importance of considering environmental issues, including climate change, in efforts to sustain peace. However, the way to integrate these considerations into multilateral and national policy agendas remains contested. Connections could be made more organically at the local level. Localized assessments of climate-related impacts were identified as pivotal to inform adequate climate responses to sustain peace, along with awareness-raising and the inclusion of local voices. It was noted that these would benefit from governmental buy-in and the support of intergovernmental initiatives, including climate financing.

The second session examined how UN peace operations could integrate climate-related considerations into their strategic planning and mandated activities. Participants discussed whether current mandates and existing UN Security Council resolutions provide sufficient entry points in this regard. They also highlighted the importance of managing expectations and emphasized the need for partnership with the UN country team. Emerging initiatives undertaken by the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) were underlined, including its participation in the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) and the deployment of environmental and climate security advisers. These were noted as the first steps to mainstream climate and environmental considerations in missions’ work, but they still require financial and political support to develop a holistic climate-sensitive approach to peacekeeping.

The third session reviewed UN peace operations’ efforts to reduce their environmental footprint. Participants discussed the significant progress missions have made under the “greening the blue” initiative but acknowledged there is still room to increase the use of renewable energy and achieve the UN Secretariat’s 2030 emissions-reduction goals. As missions seek to ensure a “positive legacy” when they exit, participants agreed that they can play a more prominent role in providing host communities with basic and sustainable sources of energy with the support of the private sector. Finally, the impact of climate change on missions’ capacity to operate and their need to adapt was discussed.

As part of the 2022 Peacekeeping Observatory Project and in advance of the workshop, IPI published three issue briefs on topics related to UN peace operations and climate change: “The UN Environmental and Climate Adviser in Somalia,” authored by Jenna Russo, “Toward an Environmental and Climate-Sensitive Approach to Protection in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” authored by Agathe Sarfati, and “Contingent-Owned Equipment and Environmental Considerations in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” authored by Daniel Forti and Emmanuelle Cousin.

The Peacekeeping Observatory is a multiyear IPI project examining emerging issues and challenges in peace operations. It is funded by the French Ministry of Armed Forces. This year, the theme of the project is “Climate Change, Peace, and Security: What Role for UN Peace Operations?” IPI plans to focus on the topic of new technologies in peace operations for the 2023 cycle of the Peacekeeping Observatory project.

The achievement of global sustainability and climate objectives rests on their incorporation into policy-making at the level of nation-states. Against this background, governments around the world have created various specialized sustainability institutions - councils, committees, ombudspersons, among others -in order to promote these agendas and their implementation. However, sustainability institutions have remained undertheorized and their impact on policy-making is empirically unclear. In this paper, we develop a conceptual framework for sustainability institutions and systematically explore their potential impact on more sustainable policy-making. We define sustainability institutions as public, trans-departmental and permanent national bodies with an integrated understanding of sustainability that considers socio-ecological well-being, global contexts and a future-orientation. Drawing on literature on sustainability and long-term governance as well as on illustrative case examples, we propose conducive conditions and pathways through which sustainability institutions may influence policy-making. As conducive, we assume sustainability institutions' embodiment of sustainability governance principles as well as their authority, a strong legal basis, resources, and autonomy. Further, we outline how sustainability institutions can influence policy-making based on their roles in the public policy process. We conclude that the increasing prevalence of national sustainability institutions indicates an ongoing shift from the environmental state toward a more comprehensive sustainability state. However, sustainability institutions can only be one building block of the sustainability state out of many, and their potential to reorient political decision-making effectively toward the socio-ecological transformation hinges upon individual design features such as their mandate, resources and authority, as well as on the specific governance context.

The achievement of global sustainability and climate objectives rests on their incorporation into policy-making at the level of nation-states. Against this background, governments around the world have created various specialized sustainability institutions - councils, committees, ombudspersons, among others -in order to promote these agendas and their implementation. However, sustainability institutions have remained undertheorized and their impact on policy-making is empirically unclear. In this paper, we develop a conceptual framework for sustainability institutions and systematically explore their potential impact on more sustainable policy-making. We define sustainability institutions as public, trans-departmental and permanent national bodies with an integrated understanding of sustainability that considers socio-ecological well-being, global contexts and a future-orientation. Drawing on literature on sustainability and long-term governance as well as on illustrative case examples, we propose conducive conditions and pathways through which sustainability institutions may influence policy-making. As conducive, we assume sustainability institutions' embodiment of sustainability governance principles as well as their authority, a strong legal basis, resources, and autonomy. Further, we outline how sustainability institutions can influence policy-making based on their roles in the public policy process. We conclude that the increasing prevalence of national sustainability institutions indicates an ongoing shift from the environmental state toward a more comprehensive sustainability state. However, sustainability institutions can only be one building block of the sustainability state out of many, and their potential to reorient political decision-making effectively toward the socio-ecological transformation hinges upon individual design features such as their mandate, resources and authority, as well as on the specific governance context.

The achievement of global sustainability and climate objectives rests on their incorporation into policy-making at the level of nation-states. Against this background, governments around the world have created various specialized sustainability institutions - councils, committees, ombudspersons, among others -in order to promote these agendas and their implementation. However, sustainability institutions have remained undertheorized and their impact on policy-making is empirically unclear. In this paper, we develop a conceptual framework for sustainability institutions and systematically explore their potential impact on more sustainable policy-making. We define sustainability institutions as public, trans-departmental and permanent national bodies with an integrated understanding of sustainability that considers socio-ecological well-being, global contexts and a future-orientation. Drawing on literature on sustainability and long-term governance as well as on illustrative case examples, we propose conducive conditions and pathways through which sustainability institutions may influence policy-making. As conducive, we assume sustainability institutions' embodiment of sustainability governance principles as well as their authority, a strong legal basis, resources, and autonomy. Further, we outline how sustainability institutions can influence policy-making based on their roles in the public policy process. We conclude that the increasing prevalence of national sustainability institutions indicates an ongoing shift from the environmental state toward a more comprehensive sustainability state. However, sustainability institutions can only be one building block of the sustainability state out of many, and their potential to reorient political decision-making effectively toward the socio-ecological transformation hinges upon individual design features such as their mandate, resources and authority, as well as on the specific governance context.

Die Serviceabteilung Drittmittelmanagement unterteilt sich in die Bereiche Projektkoordination und Drittmittelverwaltung und verantwortet den Drittmittelhaushalt. Im Bereich der Projektkoordination werden den Wissenschaftler*innen die Fördermöglichkeiten aufgezeigt, die Drittmittelstrategie des DIW Berlin weiterentwickelt und die Projektleiter*innen bei ihren Projektanträgen fachlich strukturell begleitet. Die Drittmittelverwaltung übernimmt das Controlling der Projektbudgets, kommuniziert in allen finanziellen Angelegenheiten mit den Projektleiter*innen und Zuwendungsgeber*innen und übernimmt die Drittmittelplanung. Der Drittmittelhaushalt erwirtschaftete im Jahr 2020 14,3 Mio. €.

Die Serviceabteilung Drittmittelmanagement sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine*n Mitarbeiter*in Drittmittelverwaltung (w/m/div) (Vollzeit mit 39 Stunden pro Woche, Teilzeit ist möglich) für die Abwicklung aller mit nationalen und internationalen Drittmittelprojekten verbundenen administrativen Aufgaben und Prozesse von der Antragsphase bis zur Abrechnung.

Kenya’s refugee policy has morphed over time due to factors that include security threats, regional geo-politics and strategic interests. This policy brief addresses the relevance of national and regional geo-strategic interests for refugee policy in Kenya. It provides a historical overview of refugee policy in the country, highlighting the factors that account for policy fluctuations, contradictions and differential treatment of refugees hosted in Kenya, which is one of the pilot countries for the implementation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). For policy-makers seeking to localise international refugee governance frameworks, it is important to situate frameworks such as the CRRF within the relevant national contexts because refugee hosting does not take place in a political vacuum or an ahistorical context (Jaji, 2022).
Kenya is an interesting case study because the contra-dictions in its refugee policy take a bifurcated approach, in which it has approved the implementation of the CRRF’s main objective to promote refugees’ self-reliance in north-western Kenya, where it hosts the mainly South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma camp and simultaneously put on hold the implementation of the same in the north-east in Dadaab camp, which predominantly hosts Somali refugees.
Over the years, the government of Kenya has threatened to close the two camps, the most recent threat being in April 2021, when it announced that it wanted UNHCR to re-patriate refugees within 14 days. Although the imple-mentation of KISEDP made closure of Kakuma refugee camp a logical course of action, the non-implementation of GISEDP in Garissa County raised concern in humanitarian circles regarding the fate of Somali refugees if Dadaab camp were to be closed without an integrated settlement similar to Kalobeyei.
The geo-political context accounts for the policy dis-crepancies and ambivalence evident in how the Kenyan
government has implemented the CRRF in Turkana County but not in Garissa. The complex relations between Kenya and Somalia are salient for the implementation of the CRRF in Garissa County, where the majority of Somali refugees in Kenya are hosted. Kenya and Somalia are locked in a maritime border dispute, which cannot be overlooked in trying to understand Kenya’s policy towards Somali refugees. The government of Kenya views Somalis as a threat to national security and blames them for the terrorist attacks in the country. Based on an analysis of these factors, we offer the following recommendations:
• International processes such as the CRRF should be sensitive to the security and geo-political interests of host countries. Security issues between Kenya and Somalia have a uniquely negative impact on Somali refugees in Kenya, which makes humanitarian operations harder to implement in Garissa County.
UNHCR and its partner organisations and funders should:
• encourage Kenya to implement GISEDP and provide sustained financial contributions under burden-sharing, which would provide more incentives for Kenya to remain committed to implementing the CRRF.
• clearly present the economic benefits of implementing the CRRF in terms of promoting self-reliance not only for the refugees, but also for Kenyans in both Turkana and Garissa counties.
• maintain support for Kenya’s efforts to engender self-reliance for refugees in north-western Kenya and commend the country for implementing the CRRF under KISEDP while also remaining aware of Kenya’s securi-tisation of Somali refugees in north-eastern Kenya.
• consider the insights from Kenya in addressing con-textual issues in other host countries that have agreed to implement the CRRF.

Kenya’s refugee policy has morphed over time due to factors that include security threats, regional geo-politics and strategic interests. This policy brief addresses the relevance of national and regional geo-strategic interests for refugee policy in Kenya. It provides a historical overview of refugee policy in the country, highlighting the factors that account for policy fluctuations, contradictions and differential treatment of refugees hosted in Kenya, which is one of the pilot countries for the implementation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). For policy-makers seeking to localise international refugee governance frameworks, it is important to situate frameworks such as the CRRF within the relevant national contexts because refugee hosting does not take place in a political vacuum or an ahistorical context (Jaji, 2022).
Kenya is an interesting case study because the contra-dictions in its refugee policy take a bifurcated approach, in which it has approved the implementation of the CRRF’s main objective to promote refugees’ self-reliance in north-western Kenya, where it hosts the mainly South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma camp and simultaneously put on hold the implementation of the same in the north-east in Dadaab camp, which predominantly hosts Somali refugees.
Over the years, the government of Kenya has threatened to close the two camps, the most recent threat being in April 2021, when it announced that it wanted UNHCR to re-patriate refugees within 14 days. Although the imple-mentation of KISEDP made closure of Kakuma refugee camp a logical course of action, the non-implementation of GISEDP in Garissa County raised concern in humanitarian circles regarding the fate of Somali refugees if Dadaab camp were to be closed without an integrated settlement similar to Kalobeyei.
The geo-political context accounts for the policy dis-crepancies and ambivalence evident in how the Kenyan
government has implemented the CRRF in Turkana County but not in Garissa. The complex relations between Kenya and Somalia are salient for the implementation of the CRRF in Garissa County, where the majority of Somali refugees in Kenya are hosted. Kenya and Somalia are locked in a maritime border dispute, which cannot be overlooked in trying to understand Kenya’s policy towards Somali refugees. The government of Kenya views Somalis as a threat to national security and blames them for the terrorist attacks in the country. Based on an analysis of these factors, we offer the following recommendations:
• International processes such as the CRRF should be sensitive to the security and geo-political interests of host countries. Security issues between Kenya and Somalia have a uniquely negative impact on Somali refugees in Kenya, which makes humanitarian operations harder to implement in Garissa County.
UNHCR and its partner organisations and funders should:
• encourage Kenya to implement GISEDP and provide sustained financial contributions under burden-sharing, which would provide more incentives for Kenya to remain committed to implementing the CRRF.
• clearly present the economic benefits of implementing the CRRF in terms of promoting self-reliance not only for the refugees, but also for Kenyans in both Turkana and Garissa counties.
• maintain support for Kenya’s efforts to engender self-reliance for refugees in north-western Kenya and commend the country for implementing the CRRF under KISEDP while also remaining aware of Kenya’s securi-tisation of Somali refugees in north-eastern Kenya.
• consider the insights from Kenya in addressing con-textual issues in other host countries that have agreed to implement the CRRF.

Kenya’s refugee policy has morphed over time due to factors that include security threats, regional geo-politics and strategic interests. This policy brief addresses the relevance of national and regional geo-strategic interests for refugee policy in Kenya. It provides a historical overview of refugee policy in the country, highlighting the factors that account for policy fluctuations, contradictions and differential treatment of refugees hosted in Kenya, which is one of the pilot countries for the implementation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). For policy-makers seeking to localise international refugee governance frameworks, it is important to situate frameworks such as the CRRF within the relevant national contexts because refugee hosting does not take place in a political vacuum or an ahistorical context (Jaji, 2022).
Kenya is an interesting case study because the contra-dictions in its refugee policy take a bifurcated approach, in which it has approved the implementation of the CRRF’s main objective to promote refugees’ self-reliance in north-western Kenya, where it hosts the mainly South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma camp and simultaneously put on hold the implementation of the same in the north-east in Dadaab camp, which predominantly hosts Somali refugees.
Over the years, the government of Kenya has threatened to close the two camps, the most recent threat being in April 2021, when it announced that it wanted UNHCR to re-patriate refugees within 14 days. Although the imple-mentation of KISEDP made closure of Kakuma refugee camp a logical course of action, the non-implementation of GISEDP in Garissa County raised concern in humanitarian circles regarding the fate of Somali refugees if Dadaab camp were to be closed without an integrated settlement similar to Kalobeyei.
The geo-political context accounts for the policy dis-crepancies and ambivalence evident in how the Kenyan
government has implemented the CRRF in Turkana County but not in Garissa. The complex relations between Kenya and Somalia are salient for the implementation of the CRRF in Garissa County, where the majority of Somali refugees in Kenya are hosted. Kenya and Somalia are locked in a maritime border dispute, which cannot be overlooked in trying to understand Kenya’s policy towards Somali refugees. The government of Kenya views Somalis as a threat to national security and blames them for the terrorist attacks in the country. Based on an analysis of these factors, we offer the following recommendations:
• International processes such as the CRRF should be sensitive to the security and geo-political interests of host countries. Security issues between Kenya and Somalia have a uniquely negative impact on Somali refugees in Kenya, which makes humanitarian operations harder to implement in Garissa County.
UNHCR and its partner organisations and funders should:
• encourage Kenya to implement GISEDP and provide sustained financial contributions under burden-sharing, which would provide more incentives for Kenya to remain committed to implementing the CRRF.
• clearly present the economic benefits of implementing the CRRF in terms of promoting self-reliance not only for the refugees, but also for Kenyans in both Turkana and Garissa counties.
• maintain support for Kenya’s efforts to engender self-reliance for refugees in north-western Kenya and commend the country for implementing the CRRF under KISEDP while also remaining aware of Kenya’s securi-tisation of Somali refugees in north-eastern Kenya.
• consider the insights from Kenya in addressing con-textual issues in other host countries that have agreed to implement the CRRF.