Emmanuel Macron hat während seiner ersten Amtszeit (2017–2022) versucht, sich von altbekannten, weithin kritisierten Mustern französischer Afrikapolitik abzusetzen. Er diversifizierte die Beziehungen zu Afrika in regionaler und inhaltlicher Hinsicht, integrierte nicht-staatliche Akteure und pflegte einen vergleichsweise offenen Umgang mit Frankreichs problematischer Vergangenheit auf dem Kontinent. Das Narrativ des Wandels, das Paris vor allem über Kanäle der Public Diplomacy verbreitet hat, wurde jedoch von Pfadabhängigkeiten überlagert, sichtbar vor allem an der Fortsetzung des gescheiterten militärischen Engagements im Sahel und an einem politisch inkohärenten Auftreten gegenüber autoritären Regierungen. Ein Resultat war der unfreiwillige militärische Abzug aus Mali im August 2022, der eine historische Zäsur in den französisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen darstellt.
Under the current global environmental governance and trade regimes, several initiatives, such as the new United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, the European Union’s European Green Deal, and regional free trade agreements the European Union has implemented with strategic partners like Mexico, are prompting a vibrant discussion on how trade agreements can be used as a potential mechanism to create enforceable cross-border commitments to tackle climate change. However, to cut greenhouse gas emissions within a few decades, a decisive departure from current trends in emission and trade policies is required by all countries, both developed and developing. As a result, politicians, scholars and experts around the world have looked to trade agreements as a possible tool for reaching global climate commitments, either related to or independent from the Paris Agreement. But how well do these agreements suit this purpose? Carbon-intensive products worldwide increased when tariff reductions were implemented, resulting in destructive practices for many countries, particularly those in the Global South. For countries such as Mexico, the nexus between trade and climate change is not easy to address: the country is trapped between its ambitions to play a role in global trade platforms as an industrial manufacturer and agricultural exporter and its desire to be recognized as a global actor in climate change policy and actions within the global community. Despite recent changes in climate and environmental politics under the administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024), Mexico is a middle-income country with a long-standing tradition as climate champion and environmental leader in the Global South and needs to make clear where it stands under the new global environmental and ecological transition scenario imposed by the climate crisis and trade-related issues. The “entanglement” of global trade treaties and commitments under the current climate crisis, represents a major shift for Mexico. Caught between the new US–Mexico-Canada Agreement, the EU–Mexico Trade Agreement and the possible impacts of the European Green Deal, Mexico needs to define its role in trade and environmental terms alongside giant partners such as the United States and the European Union, while defending its role as a regional power. If the European Green Deal takes off as an international driver for deepening climate and sustainable development goals with European Union strategic partners, it remains to be seen how Mexico will respond to the challenge. In this paper we address the possible implications for Mexico under each of these instruments. We look at the interplay between them, explore the linkages and possible conflictual pathways, and “disentangle” the schemes in which trade and climate change are interconnected. Mexico may be trapped in a “catch-22” situation. Environmental provisions embedded in trade treaties provide critical benefits to the country, but this often comes at the expense of “unacceptable” environmental enforcement measures that can put at risk national development plans, especially at a time when the environment and climate change issues are not at the top of the current administration’s political agenda.
Under the current global environmental governance and trade regimes, several initiatives, such as the new United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, the European Union’s European Green Deal, and regional free trade agreements the European Union has implemented with strategic partners like Mexico, are prompting a vibrant discussion on how trade agreements can be used as a potential mechanism to create enforceable cross-border commitments to tackle climate change. However, to cut greenhouse gas emissions within a few decades, a decisive departure from current trends in emission and trade policies is required by all countries, both developed and developing. As a result, politicians, scholars and experts around the world have looked to trade agreements as a possible tool for reaching global climate commitments, either related to or independent from the Paris Agreement. But how well do these agreements suit this purpose? Carbon-intensive products worldwide increased when tariff reductions were implemented, resulting in destructive practices for many countries, particularly those in the Global South. For countries such as Mexico, the nexus between trade and climate change is not easy to address: the country is trapped between its ambitions to play a role in global trade platforms as an industrial manufacturer and agricultural exporter and its desire to be recognized as a global actor in climate change policy and actions within the global community. Despite recent changes in climate and environmental politics under the administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024), Mexico is a middle-income country with a long-standing tradition as climate champion and environmental leader in the Global South and needs to make clear where it stands under the new global environmental and ecological transition scenario imposed by the climate crisis and trade-related issues. The “entanglement” of global trade treaties and commitments under the current climate crisis, represents a major shift for Mexico. Caught between the new US–Mexico-Canada Agreement, the EU–Mexico Trade Agreement and the possible impacts of the European Green Deal, Mexico needs to define its role in trade and environmental terms alongside giant partners such as the United States and the European Union, while defending its role as a regional power. If the European Green Deal takes off as an international driver for deepening climate and sustainable development goals with European Union strategic partners, it remains to be seen how Mexico will respond to the challenge. In this paper we address the possible implications for Mexico under each of these instruments. We look at the interplay between them, explore the linkages and possible conflictual pathways, and “disentangle” the schemes in which trade and climate change are interconnected. Mexico may be trapped in a “catch-22” situation. Environmental provisions embedded in trade treaties provide critical benefits to the country, but this often comes at the expense of “unacceptable” environmental enforcement measures that can put at risk national development plans, especially at a time when the environment and climate change issues are not at the top of the current administration’s political agenda.
For years, German development cooperation (GDC) has been striving to become more results-oriented. In 2022, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) took an important step in this direction by introducing 43 standard indicators. The aim was to aggregate development results across themes and countries in order to present them to the public. The BMZ hopes for more effective communication with Parliament (Bundestag) and the general public, as well as more coherent reporting by Germany’s two main implementing organisations, the GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – the German agency for international cooperation) and the development bank of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). From an international vantage point, Germany needs to catch up in respect to results orientation. Other major actors, especially the United Kingdom, the United States and multilateral development banks, introduced compre-hensive reporting systems back in the 2010s. These organisations report on 20 to 50 standard indicators to demonstrate how their activities contribute to measurable results. On this basis, they communicate more coherently with the public.
BMZ aims to create a similar basis for improved communication. In a participatory process – and jointly with the GIZ and the KfW development bank – the BMZ has formulated indicators that are equally suited to implementing organisations’ political priorities and their needs. The administrative burden of collecting the standard indicators is limited by leveraging existing data. In addition, the BMZ has set methodological standards whose obligatory use is intended to increase the quality of the data collected. However, the introduction of standard indicators also entails risks: They can set perverse incentives that encourage reporting on short-term results. Such reporting can lead to a neglect of long-term effects, which are more difficult to measure. Research also shows that indicators no longer fulfil their original purpose of providing neutral representations of change if they are used to exert political control. In addition, there are methodological challenges, such as double counting across different benchmarks, as well as concerns about unrealisable expectations. Overall, we assess the development and introduction of standard indicators in GDC positively. Yet, some important decisions are still pending. The level of detail at which the data will be shared among stakeholders and the public has yet to be determined. The quality of the data collected and the transparency of reporting will in turn determine what larger effects towards an improved results orientation of GDC can be achieved. In view of the decentralised and fragmented structure of GDC, especially regarding monitoring and evaluation systems, we hope that the new indicators can foster the harmonising of the reporting systems of the GIZ and the KfW development bank. The standard indicators can also help make GDC more transparent. We therefore recommend that all data collected be made publicly available. Finally, the integrative potential of standard indicators should be harnessed to improve the division of labour between the ministry and the two main implementing organisations towards becoming learning-oriented – both in the data collection process and during evaluation.
For years, German development cooperation (GDC) has been striving to become more results-oriented. In 2022, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) took an important step in this direction by introducing 43 standard indicators. The aim was to aggregate development results across themes and countries in order to present them to the public. The BMZ hopes for more effective communication with Parliament (Bundestag) and the general public, as well as more coherent reporting by Germany’s two main implementing organisations, the GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – the German agency for international cooperation) and the development bank of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). From an international vantage point, Germany needs to catch up in respect to results orientation. Other major actors, especially the United Kingdom, the United States and multilateral development banks, introduced compre-hensive reporting systems back in the 2010s. These organisations report on 20 to 50 standard indicators to demonstrate how their activities contribute to measurable results. On this basis, they communicate more coherently with the public.
BMZ aims to create a similar basis for improved communication. In a participatory process – and jointly with the GIZ and the KfW development bank – the BMZ has formulated indicators that are equally suited to implementing organisations’ political priorities and their needs. The administrative burden of collecting the standard indicators is limited by leveraging existing data. In addition, the BMZ has set methodological standards whose obligatory use is intended to increase the quality of the data collected. However, the introduction of standard indicators also entails risks: They can set perverse incentives that encourage reporting on short-term results. Such reporting can lead to a neglect of long-term effects, which are more difficult to measure. Research also shows that indicators no longer fulfil their original purpose of providing neutral representations of change if they are used to exert political control. In addition, there are methodological challenges, such as double counting across different benchmarks, as well as concerns about unrealisable expectations. Overall, we assess the development and introduction of standard indicators in GDC positively. Yet, some important decisions are still pending. The level of detail at which the data will be shared among stakeholders and the public has yet to be determined. The quality of the data collected and the transparency of reporting will in turn determine what larger effects towards an improved results orientation of GDC can be achieved. In view of the decentralised and fragmented structure of GDC, especially regarding monitoring and evaluation systems, we hope that the new indicators can foster the harmonising of the reporting systems of the GIZ and the KfW development bank. The standard indicators can also help make GDC more transparent. We therefore recommend that all data collected be made publicly available. Finally, the integrative potential of standard indicators should be harnessed to improve the division of labour between the ministry and the two main implementing organisations towards becoming learning-oriented – both in the data collection process and during evaluation.
Dem kürzlich veröffentlichen besonderen Bericht des Entwicklungsprogramm der Vereinten Nationen (UNDP) zufolge stellen Herausforderungen im Gesundheitsbereich eine der zentralen Gefährdungen für die menschliche Sicherheit dar. Die Ausbreitung der Affenpocken in Europa zeigt, dass sich global ausbreitende (Infektions-)Krankheiten mit der Covid-19-Pandemie nicht enden, sondern ein bleibendes und voraussichtlich immer häufiger auftretendes Phänomen darstellen. In Folge des Klimawandels und der Ausbreitung des menschlichen Lebensraumes werden Zoonosen, also die Übertragung von Krankheiten von Tier zu Mensch und von Mensch zu Tier, zunehmen und sich schnell flächendeckend verbreiten. Doch nicht nur Zoonosen, sondern vor allem nichtübertragbare Krankheiten wie Diabetes, Krebs oder Herz-Kreislauf-Erkrankungen werden dem UNDP-Bericht zufolge immer häufiger auftreten. Vor diesem Hintergrund, und aus den Erfahrungen der Covid-19-Pandemie lernend, setzt sich die neue Bundesregierung im Koalitionsvertrag das Ziel, ein »vorsorgendes, krisenfestes und modernes Gesundheitssystem «aufzubauen. So soll unter anderem ein Gesundheitssicherstellungsgesetz» regelmäßige Ernstfallübungen für das Personal für Gesundheitskrisen« garantieren. Während es zweifelsohne einer Stärkung des deutschen und des globalen Gesundheitssystems bedarf, stellt sich jedoch die Frage, inwiefern tatsächlich neue Gesundheitskrisen zu erwarten sind und wie die erwähnten Entwicklungen überhaupt zu solchen werden.
Dem kürzlich veröffentlichen besonderen Bericht des Entwicklungsprogramm der Vereinten Nationen (UNDP) zufolge stellen Herausforderungen im Gesundheitsbereich eine der zentralen Gefährdungen für die menschliche Sicherheit dar. Die Ausbreitung der Affenpocken in Europa zeigt, dass sich global ausbreitende (Infektions-)Krankheiten mit der Covid-19-Pandemie nicht enden, sondern ein bleibendes und voraussichtlich immer häufiger auftretendes Phänomen darstellen. In Folge des Klimawandels und der Ausbreitung des menschlichen Lebensraumes werden Zoonosen, also die Übertragung von Krankheiten von Tier zu Mensch und von Mensch zu Tier, zunehmen und sich schnell flächendeckend verbreiten. Doch nicht nur Zoonosen, sondern vor allem nichtübertragbare Krankheiten wie Diabetes, Krebs oder Herz-Kreislauf-Erkrankungen werden dem UNDP-Bericht zufolge immer häufiger auftreten. Vor diesem Hintergrund, und aus den Erfahrungen der Covid-19-Pandemie lernend, setzt sich die neue Bundesregierung im Koalitionsvertrag das Ziel, ein »vorsorgendes, krisenfestes und modernes Gesundheitssystem «aufzubauen. So soll unter anderem ein Gesundheitssicherstellungsgesetz» regelmäßige Ernstfallübungen für das Personal für Gesundheitskrisen« garantieren. Während es zweifelsohne einer Stärkung des deutschen und des globalen Gesundheitssystems bedarf, stellt sich jedoch die Frage, inwiefern tatsächlich neue Gesundheitskrisen zu erwarten sind und wie die erwähnten Entwicklungen überhaupt zu solchen werden.
Europas Handelspolitik steuert auf eine Zeitenwende zu. Dafür ist jedoch nicht in erster Linie Putins Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine verantwortlich. Vielmehr ist dies eher langfristig wirkenden Einflussfaktoren zuzuschreiben: Die WTO-zentrierte multilaterale Handelsordnung erodiert zusehends. Protektionismus nimmt weltweit zu. Der Welthandel wächst nur noch geringfügig oder stagniert gar. Die Globalisierung befindet sich in einer ungewissen Transformation. Und der internationale Handel wird zunehmend für Zwecke der Politik instrumentalisiert. Auf diese strukturellen Umbrüche hat die EU-Kommission im Februar 2021 mit der Ankündigung einer »offenen, nachhaltigen und entschlossenen Handelspolitik« reagiert. Die operative Umsetzung der Ziele, die in der neuen handelspolitischen Strategie postuliert werden, war bislang aber ungleichgewichtig. Während der Vorsatz, die Selbstbehauptung Europas und die Nachhaltigkeit des Handels zu stärken, durch zahlreiche neue Instrumente und Maßnahmen mit Leben gefüllt wurde, bleibt das Offenheits- und Liberalisierungsversprechen der EU einstweilen uneingelöst. Insbesondere der indo-pazifische Raum jenseits von China würde der deutschen und europäischen Wirtschaft indes beträchtliche Chancen zur Erschließung neuer Rohstoffquellen, zuverlässiger Zulieferernetzwerke und wachsender Absatzmärkte bieten.
Italy is facing profound change after the last parliamentary elections: The centre-right alliance of the right-wing populist parties Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) and Lega, as well as the centre-right party Forza Italia, won an absolute majority in both chambers of parliament. From economic policy to cooperation with the EU and the rule of law to the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine – the election victory raises many questions about the country’s future course.
Economy as the biggest challengeItaly’s economy has many competitive advantages, being the second-largest net exporter of goods in the EU after Germany. However, Rome faces significant problems, including the North-South economic divide, the slow pace of growth, and the enormous public debt of about 150 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). The labour market and the social situation also pose challenges. According to the latest Eurostat data, in 2021 more than 23 per cent of 15- to 29-year-olds in Italy were neither in education nor in employment or training – the highest figure in the EU.
The new government will have to function in an increasingly unfavourable economic climate. In the coming months, the economy will continue to weaken and the energy crisis will worsen. At the same time, inflation in the Eurozone remains at record levels and the European Central Bank is likely to raise interest rates further. This will increase the cost of government debt and weaken GDP growth. This macroeconomic environment leaves little room for populist economic policies or miscommunication with the financial markets, which will be watching the coalition’s signals very closely.
Cooperation in the EUAn important question in this context is how the new government will cooperate with Brussels. In addition to topics such as migration and the green transition, fiscal policy in the Eurozone is likely to cause considerable controversy. Italy should submit its draft budget for the coming year to the EU Commission by mid-October. A resumption of talks on EU fiscal rules is planned for October as well. According to forecasts, it is rather unlikely that Italy will achieve a budget deficit of 3 per cent before 2025. Therefore, Brussels and Berlin should temper their expectations here.
Another point of contention with the EU Commission is likely to be the announced revision of the Italian recovery and resilience plan by the centre-right coalition. However, the need for European money from the Next Generation EU fund, from which Italy benefits the most, as well as the risk of a negative reaction from the financial markets should tend to deter the government from taking a confrontational course. Despite assurances of cooperation with the EU, however, there is a risk that the inability to address the country’s economic challenges and the rivalry between Lega leader Matteo Salvini and FdI leader Meloni could lead to a more confrontational course towards Brussels.
Respect for the rule of lawGiven the populist character of all three parties in the coalition and the fascist roots of the party of the new prime minister, the question arises as to the attitude of the new parliamentary majority to the rule of law. The scenario of “Orbanisation”, that is, the assumption of complete control over state institutions as in Hungary, is rather unlikely. The centre-right coalition has not achieved the two-thirds majority in parliament required for a constitutional amendment. Moreover, President Sergio Mattarella will continue to uphold the constitutional order. However, the new government can hardly be expected to take measures to strengthen state institutions. In addition to the announced plans to reinforce the executive through constitutional reforms that have not yet been named, the management of the state’s economic resources by the three populist parties could increase the level of political corruption in Italy.
Position towards RussiaFormer Prime Minister Mario Draghi has been one of the most committed European politicians in supporting Kiev in the Russian war of aggression from the beginning. According to the latest edition of Eurobarometer from September of this year, support for economic sanctions against Russia is greater in Italy than in France. But how does the new government position itself vis-à-vis Russia? On the one hand, both Salvini and Meloni have distanced themselves from Russia since the beginning of the war. On the other hand, it is precisely these parties that have taken strongly pro-Russian positions in the past. In the case of Lega, there were even accusations of illegal financing from Moscow. Forza Italia leader Silvio Berlusconi, who has maintained very close ties with the Russian president’s inner circle for some time, made a statement shortly before the elections in which he de facto denied Ukraine the right to an independent government. Even if it is hard to imagine the new government openly torpedoing support for Ukraine or the economic sanctions against Russia, it must show that it is serious about European solidarity on this point.
Italy will be a difficult and complicated cooperation partner for Germany and the EU. However, it is in the interest of Berlin and Brussels to involve and keep Rome in dialogue with European partners as much as possible. Whether it is fiscal policy, the rule of law, or defence, it is difficult to imagine progress in these areas without cooperation with the third-largest economy in the EU and the Eurozone.
In der Debatte darüber, wie die Handlungsfähigkeit der Europäischen Union (EU) gestärkt werden kann, werden die Rufe nach einer Ausweitung von Mehrheitsentscheidungen lauter. Im Rat der EU wird aktuell diskutiert, die sogenannten Passerelle-Klauseln im EU-Vertrag (EUV) zu nutzen. Mit ihnen ließen sich auch ohne große Vertragsänderung oder Konvent mehr Mehrheitsentscheidungen einführen. So ein Verzicht auf nationale Vetos erfordert aber zunächst Einstimmigkeit sowie zum Teil nationale Zustimmungsverfahren, die mit hohen Hürden verbunden sind. Eine solche Einstimmigkeit ist derzeit nicht in Sicht, da sich in kleineren und mittelgroßen Mitgliedstaaten Widerstand regt und sie befürchten, regelmäßig überstimmt zu werden. Notwendig ist daher ein institutionelles Reformpaket, bei dem Mehrheitsentscheidungen auch mit dem Ziel ausgeweitet werden, eine neue EU-Erweiterung zu erleichtern, und mit Notfallklauseln zum Schutz nationaler Kerninteressen abgesichert werden.
Der ägyptische Präsident Abdel Fatah al-Sisi hat seine autoritäre Herrschaft in den vergangenen Jahren konsolidiert. Dies ging einher mit einem deutlichen Anstieg von Kairos Auslandsverschuldung, die sich – gemessen am Bruttoinlandsprodukt – zwischen 2013 und 2021 nahezu verdreifacht hat. Die Schuldenpolitik des Landes war direkt an das präsidiale Machtzentrum angebunden. Der Regierung gelang ein gut choreographierter Mix aus Anreizen, Drohungen und Täuschung, der es ermöglichte, immer neue Kredite aufzunehmen und für machtpolitische Zwecke einzusetzen. Profitiert hat von der Schuldenpolitik zuvorderst das ägyptische Militär, auf dessen Unterstützung Präsident Sisi angewiesen ist, um seinen Herrschaftsanspruch durchsetzen zu können. Die Streitkräfte haben das staatliche Gewaltmonopol inne und kontrollieren damit auch den Repressionsapparat. Durch die machtpolitische Instrumentalisierung der Schuldenpolitik steigt das Risiko, dass Ägypten seine Verbindlichkeiten zukünftig nicht mehr bedienen kann. Vor allem aber unterminiert die Fehlallokation knapper Finanzmittel die sozioökonomische Entwicklung des Landes und befördert polizeistaatliche Repression. Letztere begünstigt ihrerseits die machtpolitische Instrumentalisierung der Schuldenpolitik, da sie jegliche Kontrolle des Regierungshandelns verhindert. Die Bundesregierung sollte daher künftig die bilaterale Kreditvergabe und die Unterstützung Ägyptens bei dessen Verhandlungen mit internationalen Finanzinstitutionen an zwei Bedingungen knüpfen: erstens den Rückbau der militärischen Wirtschaftsaktivitäten – wobei auch die Vermögenswerte der Streitkräfte offenzulegen sind – und zweitens konkrete Schritte zur Beendigung der polizeistaatlichen Repression.
Due to Europe’s gas crisis and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, ramping up the hydrogen market has become more urgent than ever for European and German policymakers. However, ambitious targets for green hydrogen present an enormous challenge for the European Union (EU) and its young hydrogen economy. Apart from the demand for electricity, there is above all a lack of production capacities for electrolysers. The envisioned production scaling of electrolysers is almost impossible to achieve, and it also conflicts with import efforts and cements new dependencies on suppliers of key raw materials and critical components. Although a decoupling from Russia’s raw material supply is generally possible, there is no way for the EU to achieve its goals without China. Aside from loosened regulations and the active management of raw material supply, Europe should also reconsider its biased preference for green hydrogen.