Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Der britische Premierminister Keir Starmer werde „mit Sicherheit“ von der Labour-Partei zum Rückzug gezwungen, sagt der Politologe Nicolai von Ondarza. Sein Herausforderer Andy Burnham müsse zuvor eine schwierige Nachwahl zum Unterhaus gewinnen.

The policy brief authored by Dr. Ana Krstinovska, Senior Research Fellow, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration & Research Fellow, Wider Europe Programme, ELIAMEP titled: “From Raw Ores to Strategic Autonomy: The Western Balkans in Europe’s Critical Raw Materials Strategy”, is an expansion of the finding of the thematic report “Raw Materials for a Resilient Europe: The EU’s Strategic Partnership with the Western Balkans” (authored by Dr. A. Krstinovska and Dr. A. Wolf) and it examines the strategic importance of the Western Balkans for Europe’s critical raw materials security and industrial resilience. The brief is part of think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration, an initiative implemented by the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

Against the backdrop of the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) and growing geopolitical competition over access to strategic resources, the brief analyses how the Western Balkans have emerged as a significant, yet underutilized, component of Europe’s raw materials ecosystem. It highlights the region’s deposits of copper, lithium, aluminium, nickel, antimony, and rare earth elements, while examining the geopolitical and economic implications of existing extraction and trade patterns.

The analysis demonstrates how current value chains often channel raw ores and concentrates from the Western Balkans towards China, while processed goods flow to EU markets, reinforcing Europe’s strategic vulnerabilities and limiting regional industrial development. The paper also explores the growing role of non-EU actors in the region’s extractive industries, the lack of local refining and processing capacities, and the governance, environmental, and social challenges associated with major mining projects.

Drawing on these findings, the brief argues that the EU should move beyond a narrowly extractive approach and embed raw materials cooperation within the enlargement process itself. It proposes a strategy centred on value-chain upgrading, regional industrial integration, investment in processing and recycling capacities, updated geological mapping, and stronger governance conditionality linked to EU accession chapters.

The paper concludes that the Western Balkans can contribute substantially to Europe’s strategic autonomy if integrated into EU industrial and regulatory frameworks in a credible and sustainable manner. In this sense, the brief presents raw materials cooperation not only as an economic necessity, but also as a geopolitical and enlargement opportunity capable of strengthening both European resilience and the EU accession perspective of the region.

You can read the policy brief here.

Ino Afentouli, Senior Policy Advisor; Head of the Observatory of Geopolitics and Diplomacy, ELIAMEP

The Xi–Trump summit brings together two vastly different personalities who serve as the primary architects of their countries’ strategic policies. The first, a scion of the Party elite, embodies the Chinese perception of the ‘Middle Kingdom’—of China as the realm between heaven and earth. In this view, China does not need to keep pace with time; instead, time is seen as an asset that works in its favour. Trump, by contrast, is operating on a far more constrained timeline, with only two years remaining of his presidency. His penchant for taking decisions on his own often leads to choices detrimental to his country’s interests, as evidenced by the course of the war in Iran. There can be no doubt that the Chinese leadership has taken note of the mistakes the US has made in its handling of the crisis.

Trump’s personality makes it more likely that the US, rather than China, will fall into the so-called Thucydides Trap. As an ascending power, and true to its strategic tradition of defeating an opponent without engaging in battle, China has the luxury of patience. This is something Trump’s America lacks. The US has to preserve the hegemony it has constructed over eight decades, underpinned by its strategic partnerships across Europe and Asia. But Trump is allergic to alliances; under his presidency, the US risks forfeiting the strategic added value that has enabled American primacy in both continents.

China’s approach to establishing spheres of influence, not only within its own periphery but also on a broader international scale, will be crucial to the emerging balance of power. Chinese strategy over recent decades has prioritized economic penetration as a primary vehicle for exerting political influence. During his 15 years in power, Xi has combined economic power with military might. Huge investments have been made in the armed forces; furthermore, the recent purges—which effectively decapitated virtually the entire military high command—underscore that establishing military primacy remains among his highest strategic priorities. Will this primacy be projected defensively or offensively? The answer to this question will determine the global equilibrium in the years ahead. Xi could exploit the vulnerabilities in Trump’s character, manoeuvring him towards Thucydides’ trap. Possessing strategic patience, Xi is capable of ensnaring Trump in the logic of war through actions that do not jeopardize China’s own security. In this light, the debacle in Iran assumes far greater proportions for the US than a mere military failure. One can only hope the Chinese leader does not pursue such a course while Trump is in office.

Eleni Ekmetsioglou, Non-Resident Fellow, ELIAMEP; Senior Fellow, British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

The Xi-Trump meeting happens at a very unfavorable moment for the US. As many analysts have argued, with the US trapped in the Middle East, China seems to have the upper hand on most of the agenda items. Whereas tariffs, technology and probably Taiwan will dominate the discussions, it  might, nevertheless, be the right moment for the US to try and press on other -equally important and highly consequential- issues such as nuclear risk reduction measures. Given that US pundits and official intelligence reports make ominous speculations about the future trajectory of China’s nuclear arsenal, it is in US interests to push for an institutionalized track 1 dialogue for both parties to work towards a better mutual understanding on nuclear issues that might lead to tangible risk reduction measures such as the establishment of a formal missile launch notification regime, for instance. With the quantitative increase in China’s nuclear arsenal, the US has been feeling that its current nuclear modernization might not be fit for purpose in a world with two peer competitors, Russia and China. After the expiration of the New Start treaty last February, the US is not bound by restrictions over the numbers of its deployed warheads. With both countries investing in their nuclear arsenals for quantitative and qualitative improvements, the nuclear component inevitably plays a bigger role in the relationship creating a dangerous dynamic where even a minor crisis between the two powers will have the potential of turning into a nuclear crisis with unprecedented consequences for the region and the whole planet. The Biden administration scored a major success when the two parties agreed to always include a human in the loop for nuclear decision making. AI and nuclear command and control was the low hanging fruit for the Biden administration but it could mark a great starting point towards a more diverse dialogue on precise risk reduction measures in order to  boost crisis stability between the two countries. Hopefully, the Trump administration will be prepared to press Xi on this deeply consequential aspect of the bilateral relationship and continue the positive trend that the Biden administration kicked off in San Francisco back in 2023. 

George Tzogopoulos, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; European Institute of Nice, Centre international de formation européenne (CIFE)

Understanding China remains an extremely complex undertaking in the West. For instance, while US think tanks and media assess that President Trump will not hold the upper hand in his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Beijing does not operate within this Western paradigm. From a Chinese perspective, it matters little where the White House is occupied by Donald Trump, Joe Biden or anyone else. The web of Sino-American relations is so intricate that a single summit—regardless of its gravity—cannot be expected to yield a definitive breakthrough. China predicates its success on its own strategic choices, negotiating only to secure a measure of relative stability in its relations with Washington. While stability serves the interests of both nations, the path forward is arduous—a reality consistent with historical precedent. Although Sino-American competition is set to intensify, it remains within the power of both states to mitigate the risk of catastrophic consequences. The United States will remain the sole superpower, yet China—as the world’s second-largest economy—will command an amplified voice in global economic and geopolitical affairs. It is this very dynamic that is causing tremors in the international system, as the United States is forced to adapt to a reality far removed from the unipolar era it enjoyed for two decades following the Cold War.

Dimitris Tsarouhas, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; Professor, Center for European and Transatlantic Studies (CEUTS) at Virginia Tech

Measured tones and muted expectations

In a normal political and economic climate, a meeting between a US President and his Chinese counterpart would be front-page news here in Washington, sparking a deluge of analysis aimed at gauging Beijing’s intentions. However, the current climate is anything but normal—at least for Donald Trump.

With inflation hitting 3.8%, its highest level in nearly three years, the gap between the President’s campaign promises and the economic reality has reignited public frustration with the administration’s fiscal direction. Pledges to shield Americans from an unstable global environment are being belied on the ground. Not only is the US embroiled in yet another conflict in the Middle East at great economic and political cost, the administration’s tariff regime—aimed largely at Chinese imports—is also faltering amidst judicial scrutiny and bureaucratic deadlock.

Against this backdrop, the shift since their last October 2025 summit could not be clearer: it is now President Xi who holds the stronger hand (to echo Trump’s infamous remark to his Ukrainian counterpart). Even as the US is being forced into a de facto capitulation in its undeclared—yet very real—trade war with China, Beijing continues to dictate the terms of the broader geopolitical game. It does so by imposing unilateral export restrictions on its rare earth minerals and by bolstering the Russian war machine on the Ukrainian front. And while the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz undoubtedly burdens the Chinese economy as well, officials in Beijing remain optimistic. They anticipate that their recurring tactic—promising multi-billion-dollar commodity purchases—will appease President Trump and pave the way for ‘constructive’ talks. In practice, this means negotiations that bypass the core of Chinese ambitions: namely, the status of Taiwan and the subjugation of neighbouring states’ rights in the South China Sea, where Beijing continues to assert a unilateral right of intervention. Against this backdrop, Washington harbours few illusions regarding the outcome of this meeting—and rightfully so.

UN peacekeeping transitions are increasingly unfolding under crisis conditions marked by deteriorating host-state consent, imposed timelines, and escalating insecurity. While the UN has developed more sophisticated transition frameworks over the past two decades, recent mission withdrawals have exposed significant gaps between policy guidance and operational realities.

This issue brief examines “transitions in crisis” through the cases of UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNAMID in Sudan, MINUSMA in Mali, and MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It explores how operational obstruction, weakened political cooperation, inadequate successor arrangements, and abrupt withdrawals create acute risks for civilians, peacekeepers, and peace processes.

The findings highlight that crisis transitions require different analytical and operational approaches than standard mission drawdowns. Stronger contingency planning, earlier political engagement, more integrated protection mechanisms, and clearer responses to host-state obstruction are essential to mitigating the risks associated with abrupt or noncooperative mission withdrawals.

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Strategic communications are critical when a peace operation is preparing to leave a country. Effective communication can help manage expectations, counter misinformation and disinformation, preserve trust, and facilitate handover processes. Failure to communicate effectively can leave civilians feeling abandoned, fuel false narratives, and complicate mission withdrawals and transitions.

This issue brief examines lessons related to strategic communications during recent peacekeeping transitions, including in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It explores how missions have approached external messaging with local populations and host-state governments, internal communication with mission staff, coordination with national and UN actors, and the transition or closure of UN radio stations.

The findings highlight that communications planning must be integrated into transition processes from the outset and supported at the leadership level. Maintaining communications capacity through and beyond mission drawdowns, strengthening joint messaging with UN and national actors, and developing sustainable approaches to UN radio are essential to effective transitions. At the same time, the brief underscores that even well-executed communications cannot compensate for deteriorating security conditions or political realities on the ground.

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UN peacekeeping missions have played an important role in advancing the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda, including by supporting women’s participation, strengthening gender-responsive institutions, and expanding protection mechanisms. Yet these gains often become vulnerable during mission transitions and withdrawals.

This issue brief examines how peacekeeping transitions have affected WPS gains in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Mali. It explores how missions have incorporated gender-responsive analysis, gender benchmarks, technical expertise, and coordination with civil society into transition planning and implementation.

The findings highlight that sustaining WPS gains requires more systematic gender-responsive planning, stronger coordination with local actors, and continued political and financial support after mission withdrawal. Integrating gender expertise and local women-led organizations into transition processes is essential to preserving progress and reducing protection gaps.

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The Cyprus Presidency activates the Council’s Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements in information sharing mode to actively monitor the hantavirus outbreak.

Main agenda items, approximate timing, public sessions and press opportunities.

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/927 of 27 April 2026 amending Decision 2013/184/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Myanmar/Burma.

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/508 of 23 April 2026 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine.

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/512 of 23 April 2026 amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/504 of 23 April 2026 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2026/503 of 23 April 2026 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The Council and the European Parliament agreed new rules to guarantee the rights of adults in the EU who need protection or support in cross-border situations.