Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Latest News

Amid rising restrictions on foreign funding, localization—directly funding local groups—is seen as a path to more effective, locally owned aid. This policy brief examines whether donors should shift support from large civil society organizations to grassroots community groups.

The Trump administration is pursuing an explicitly anti-multilateralist policy rooted in national sovereignty, geopolitical calculation, and transactional economics. Conspiracy theories played a significant role in justifying actions like the dismantling of USAID. Global norms, including the SDGs, are cast as threats to U.S. interests precisely because they promote forms of cooperative governance. The withdrawal from international organizations, disregard for established norms (even to the point of military threats), and blunt pressure on other nations—such as the baseless accusations of “genocide” against South Africa—signal a paradigm shift. It redefines the balance between values and interests, privileging short-term political dominance over long-term global cooperation.

Background: Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, lockdown policies emerged as pivotal measures to contain viral transmission. Questions arose about whether their implementation challenged access to care, particularly in regions with fragile or less resilient health systems, such as sub-Saharan Africa. Robust evidence on the effect of lockdowns on healthcare access remains sparse, partly due to a lack of suitable data. We addressed this gap and assessed the effect of the COVID-19 lockdown policy on facility-based delivery during the first pandemic wave in Kenya. Methods: We triangulated findings from two independent quantitative analyses, exploiting the fact that lockdowns in Kenya were implemented only in selected counties. First, we used nationally representative repeated cross-sectional surveys from 2018 and 2020, applying a pre-post-test design with independent controls. Second, we analyzed monthly data from the Kenya Health Information System (Jan 2019–Nov 2020) using an interrupted time series (ITSA) with independent controls, with April 2020 set as the interruption point. Results: The controlled pre-post analysis found no significant effect of lockdowns on facility-based delivery in lockdown vs. non-lockdown counties. The ITSA showed an immediate increase of 4.97% (CI: 0.51%, 9.43%) in facility deliveries in lockdown counties, followed by a significant monthly decrease of 0.97% (CI: -1.60%, -0.34%) compared with non-lockdown counties. Conclusion: We found no overall effect of lockdowns on facility-based deliveries. Our results suggest that, when managed well, lockdowns do not necessarily disrupt access to maternal health services—demonstrating elements of resilience even under crisis conditions. These findings underscore the value of context-specific, adaptive strategies to ensure continuity of essential services during health emergencies. Future research should explore localized and socioeconomic factors shaping responses to public health interventions and further examine how resilience can be strengthened at all levels of the health system.

Capital is grabbing back land allocated through diverse national land reform and landrestitution programmes globally. This article critically analyses this trend, which has so far received insufficient attention from land grab scholars. Drawing from independent research in South Africa, Bolivia, Canada, and Zimbabwe, we define a future research agenda investigating the capital segments and grabbing mechanisms involved as well as the factors that encourage or retard capital in grabbing back redistributed and restituted lands. We point to the need for further research into the land grabbing-land reform/restitution nexus in different geographic contexts and its implications for future land and agrarian struggles.

This paper analyses the structural vulnerabilities of Latin American economies amid recent United States (US)-China tariff escalations and identifies strategic opportunities emerging from these shifts. Based on descriptive bilateral trade data from 2023 for the largest Latin American economies – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico – the study assesses exposure to US tariffs at the industry level. It further highlights sectors with the potential to benefit from diverted trade flows in the context of trade polarisation between China and the US. The degree of exposure varies across countries, depending on export structure and trade partners. While the tariff conflict may enable some countries to expand exports to China or the US, most Latin American economies – except Mexico – export their largest share of their manufactured goods within the region. Strengthening regional trade integration can therefore enhance resilience to external shocks and support technological upgrading.

Melike Döver and Martin Middelanis are researchers at Freie Universität Berlin in Germany.

United States (US) trade policy has undergone a series of significant changes introducing far-reaching uncertainty for trading partners in both the short and long term. Among the most vulnerable to these changes are low- and middle-income countries. Anticipating the potential impact of proposed or enacted US trade measures ex-ante is difficult. Therefore, this discussion paper examines the structural vulnerabilities of a selection of African countries – Lesotho, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa, and Tunisia – to recent shifts. Using descriptive trade data, the paper maps direct and indirect channels of exposure and highlights the structural constraints that amplify vulnerability. While Africa is not among the most directly exposed regions, several countries face significant risks due to concentrated export structures, reliance on a few trade partners, and limited capacity to redirect trade in the short term. This highlights the strategic importance for African countries to strengthen regional integration, industrial upgrading, and reduce external dependencies.

Sascha Berndt and Andreas Edele are trade policy experts at Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.

Der Ruf nach einer stärkeren Ausrichtung der Entwicklungspolitik an nationalen Eigeninteressen ist in vielen Geberländern – auch in Deutschland – lauter geworden. Tatsächlich gibt es gute Gründe, die internationalen Politiken Deutschlands besser zu verzahnen. Synergien zwischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (EZ), Außenwirtschaftsförderung und Wissenschaftskooperation werden bislang nicht systematisch genutzt, könnten aber sowohl deutschen Interessen als auch jenen der Partnerländer dienen. Zudem steht Deutschland in geopolitischer Konkurrenz zu Akteuren, die ihre EZ längst offensiv für strategische Interessen einsetzen.
Wir plädieren für eine Entwicklungspolitik, die deutsche und europäische Interessen dort verfolgt, wo diese mit entwicklungspolitischen Zielen vereinbar sind. Statt einzelne Unternehmensinteressen zu fokussieren, gilt es, langfristige Win-win-Potenziale zu erkennen – etwa durch eine strategischere Vorbereitung der EZ-Angebotsplanung unter Einbindung von Wirtschaft und Ressorts im Vorfeld von Regierungsverhandlungen mit den Partnerländern. Gleichzeitig warnen wir vor einer Unterordnung der EZ unter außenwirtschaftliche Ziele. Auflagen wie Lieferbindungen, die finanzielle Zusammenarbeit an Aufträge für deutsche bzw. EU-Firmen knüpfen, sind teuer, ineffizient und entwicklungspolitisch kontraproduktiv. Zudem liefe sie Gefahr, die übergeordneten deutschen Interessen an Lösungen für globale Probleme – wie Friedenssicherung und Schutz von Klima und Biodiversität – aus den Augen zu verlieren.
Wir formulieren fünf Leitlinien für eine entwicklungspolitische Strategie, die Eigeninteressen gerecht wird, ohne den Partnerländern zu schaden:
1. Strikte Lieferbindung vermeiden. Diese wäre entwicklungspolitisch ineffizient und würde auch deutschen Unternehmen kaum nützen. Als Exportnation sollte Deutschland sich an Regeln für Vertragsfreiheit halten.
2. Gesamtgesellschaftliche Eigeninteressen ver-folgen, wo sie mit EZ-Zielen vereinbar sind. Wir unterscheiden zwischen globalen deutschen Inter-essen und jenen von Einzelunternehmen. EZ-Projekte sollten wirtschaftliche Interessen mit dem Gemeinwohl im Partnerland in Einklang bringen.
3. Strategische Angebotsentwicklung vor Regierungsverhandlungen. Die stärksten Synergien entstehen, wenn EZ-Initiativen gemeinsam mit Wirtschaft und anderen Ressorts frühzeitig vorbereitet werden. Dies erfordert, dass gemeinsame nationale Ziele definiert, die Instrumente der Ressorts zu deren Erreichung koordiniert und Angebote der Wirtschaft vorab sondiert werden.
4. Modellhafte strategische Partnerschaften schaffen. Deutschland hat viele bilaterale Partnerschaften vereinbart, insbesondere für Energie, Rohstoffsicherung und Migration. Keine davon ist vorzeigbar im Sinne guter Ressortkoordination, Einbindung der Wirtschaft und nachweisbarer Vorteile für beide beteiligten Länder. Mindestens ein Leuchtturmprojekt pro genanntem Themenfeld würde Deutschland als glaubwürdigen Partner attraktiv machen.
5. Minilaterale Formate mit europäischen und einflussreichen anderen Ländern ausbauen. Drei- und Viereckskooperationen mit „Globalpartnern“ und Geberländern, die gleiche oder ähnliche Interessen haben, können verstärkt werden, um Deutschlands Interessen an einer gemeinwohlorientierten internationalen Entwicklung zu fördern.

Andy Sumner and Stephan Klingebiel outline a potential path forward rooted in progressive coalitions that cut across traditional North–South divides.

Entwicklungszusammenarbeit erhöht nachweislich die Nachfrage nach deutschen Produkten und Dienstleistungen. Jeder Euro, der in die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit fließt, bringt 36 Cent zurück in die deutsche Wirtschaft. Rund 139.000 Arbeitsplätze hängen damit zusammen. Das sind Ergebnisse einer 2024 veröffentlichtenStudie der Universität Göttingen. Die Studie analysiert im Auftrag der KfW Entwicklungsbank, wie deutsche Entwicklungsgelder die deutschen Exporte in die jeweiligen Empfängerländer beeinflussen. Das Ergebnis zeigt, wie sehr Deutschland wirtschaftlich von seinem entwicklungspolitischen Engagement profitiert.

Seit dem Beginn der zweiten Amtszeit von US-Präsident Donald Trump Anfang 2025 hat sich nicht allein die US-amerikanische, sondern auch die gesamte internationale Entwicklungspolitik grundlegend verändert. Die USA, bislang der mit Abstand führende Akteur der globalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, haben sich in rasantem Tempo aus zentralen multilateralen Strukturen zurückgezogen, Budgets massiv gekürzt und die Arbeit ihrer eigenen Entwicklungsbehörde USAID nahezu eingestellt. Diese Entwicklung steht exemplarisch für eine tieferliegende tektonische Verschiebung: das Ende einer Phase westlich geprägter globaler Kooperation und der weitgehenden Akzeptanz von regelbasierter Zusammenarbeit hin zu einer multipolaren, aber machtbasierten und konfliktiven Weltordnung.

This guide is designed to support non-governmental organisations (NGOs), think tanks, public sector entities and other institutions in strengthening diversity, equity, inclusion and belonging (DEIB) within their leadership programmes. It is important to emphasise that this guide addresses both leadership programmes and the organisations that run them. Since this is a matter of structural change, it is essential to also look at the internal practices and cultures of these institutions as part of the transformation.

Tâmara Andrade is a guest researcher in the Department of Knowledge Cooperation and Training at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) in Bonn and a German Chancellor Fellow from Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.

This article examines the complexities of marine carbon observations by exploring how non-humans and humans, including: scientists, floats, and geopolitics, (de-)stabilize these processes. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in Brazil and Germany, the study uses Karen Barad’s (2007) concept of agential realism to understand how these diverse actors are mutually co-producing knowledge on marine carbon. Instead of viewing entities as separate, intra-action emphasizes their co-constitution. Through theme-based coding, the analysis identifies both stabilizing and destabilizing forces in marine carbon observations. Stabilizing forces include the dedication of scientists, two-way communication between floats and humans, and the global accessibility of data on marine carbon observations. In contrast, destabilizing forces involve climate change’s impact on data collection and quality, funding shortages, and national borders. The research highlights how geopolitical and scientific practices are deeply dynamic and often overlooked in discussions of marine carbon observations. By following non-humans and humans and incorporating diverse perspectives from the sea and land, the study provides new insights into the (un-)becoming of marine carbon observations, emphasizing the importance of the more-than-human in shaping knowledge production practices. This work underscores the value of thinking with Science and Technology Studies and new materialism about marine environments.

The return of Donald Trump to the White House has reignited deep uncertainty about the trajectory of global development cooperation. Long before 2025, the multilateral system was already under pressure. But Trump’s second term marks a normative rupture: the retreat of the United States not just from global leadership, but from the very principles of internationalism, multilateralism, and development solidarity it once helped to construct. In response to this new reality, EADI and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) convened a diverse group of researchers to reflect on the implications of the “Trump 2.0 moment”. The result is a newly released EADI–IDOS Discussion Paper, Development and Development Policy in the Trump Era, which brings together sixteen concise contributions from scholars based across Europe, Asia, and Latin America, offering perspectives from both the Global North and South.

Green, circular buildings and their construction are essential for climate change mitigation and resource efficiency. However, the impact of a systematic shift towards green, circular buildings on employment in Sub-Saharan Africa remains unclear. Rwanda, particularly Kigali, is a relevant case due to its high urbanisation rate, pressing housing needs and political commitment to greening the economy. Currently, we do not know what types of green jobs exist in Kigali’s construction value chain or what potential they have for economic development. This paper addresses these questions using a sequential mixed-methods approach. We conducted 33 qualitative, semi-structured interviews with local experts and stakeholders. Based on these insights, we ran a survey with 546 firms across five construction value chain segments: planners/architects, material producers, material and equipment suppliers, construction/masonry firms, and firms installing energy, water, and wastewater technologies. Our analysis reveals four key findings: (1) a significant number of green jobs exist in the construction value chain, with varying degrees of greenness based on the number of environmentally-friendly practices performed (about are 5 per cent highly green and 58 per cent are partly green); (2) diverse green and circular practices are developing through both state support and grassroots initiatives; (3) greening is positively and significantly correlated with employment growth for highly green firms; and (4) greening is positively and significantly associated with improved job quality for all firms. For policy-makers, our results suggest that supporting firms in critical transition phases – those that have initiated greening but are not fully engaged – may enhance both job quantity and quality in the short to mid-term. Expanding green and circular, bio-based building practices across the construction sector requires a mix of interventions focused on cost competitiveness, skills and attitudes.

Dr Aimé Tsinda is Associate Professor, College of Science and Technology, at the University of Rwanda.
Erick Mujanama is a consultant at Equilibria Ltd., Rwanda.
Roger Mugisha is a consultant at Equilibria Ltd., Rwanda.

The global system of development cooperation is in a state of flux. In this paper we discuss how and why the very foundations of international aid and development are being shaken by geopolitical shifts, contested norms and institutional upheaval. We argue that the crisis is not a mere cyclical downturn, nor is it only about money, but rather a fundamental reordering of the global development landscape. In short, a “tipping point” – in the sense of a dramatic moment when incremental changes coalesce into a transformative shift, for better or worse – is in the offing. We ask what might come next.

To meet decarbonization targets, demand for low-emission hydrogen is increasing. A considerable share of supply will come from latecomer countries. We study how latecomer countries and firms participate in the emerging global low-emission hydrogen economy and how industrial policies can help maximize societal benefits. This requires a specific conceptualization of industrial policy: First, the latecomer condition calls for specific policy mixes, as latecomers typically cannot build on established innovation systems and network externalities, and rather need to combine FDI attraction with measures strengthening absorptive capacity and ensuring knowledge transfer from FDI to domestic firms; second, low-emission hydrogen is a policy-induced alternative that requires creating entirely new firm ecosystems while competing with lower-cost emission-intensive incumbent technologies. Hence, industrial policies need to account for enhanced coordination failure and internalization of environmental costs. We analyze the published national hydrogen strategies of 20 latecomer economies and derive a novel typology differentiating four hydrogen-specific industrial development pathways. For each pathway, we assess entry barriers and risks, identify the policies suggested in the country strategies, and discuss how likely those are to be successful. The novel pathway typology and comparison of associated policy mixes may help policymakers maximize the gains of hydrogen investments.

Climate extremes like prolonged droughts or excessive flooding disrupt the intertwined lives of rural women with agriculture in the Global South, especially those dependent on traditional practices like shifting cultivation or rain-fed irrigation. Agriculture is not just food production or a livelihood for these women but an extension of the care work that helps them feed their families. On the other hand, traditional hetero-patriarchal social norms continue to disempower them to make choices related to agriculture and food production as they often lack the decision-making and ownership rights on the land they toil. Women belonging to marginalized tribal communities facing compound intersectional challenges due to gender, caste, ethnicity, illiteracy, poverty, and language find it even harder to define their life goals and act upon them. This chapter shows how specific gender-transformative adaptation measures, such as promoting women’s land rights, providing access to climate-resilient seeds, and offering training in climate-smart agricultural practices, can bring in, albeit small, transformative changes. Based on ethnographic research, semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussions with Mal Pahariya women and NGO workers in Jharkhand, India, this chapter shows how these measures, if designed effectively, can tackle the root causes embedded in the existing social, political, economic, and cultural context that aids gender inequality and injustice to persist. The study also shows that food and nutrition security, leadership, economic decision-making, and capacity building by learning new skills can emerge as co-benefits that can help them address other daily challenges.

Both World Bank shareholders and the Bank’s management have emphasised the need for large-scale private investment to achieve development and climate goals. For the World Bank Group, this means collaborating more closely between its different institutions, an issue that World Bank President Ajay Banga has prioritised. This paper examines the extent to which these ambitions are being translated into practice, using energy-related reforms, with a focus on renewable energy sources, as an example. Through three country case studies (Romania, Bangladesh and Cameroon), it examines how the Bank’s diagnostic work is reflected in its country strategies and policy-based lending programmes. Coherence is assessed using nine questions. The case studies show that despite many cross-references between the documents and some parallels in the analysis of key constraints, three challenges emerge. First, the diagnostic documents lack coherence. Second, the issues raised in these documents are often not translated into the Country Partnership Frameworks (CPFs). Third, in many cases there is a very weak link between the proposals in the diagnostic documents and the CPF on the one hand, and the policy-based lending programme with its prior actions (PAs) and disbursement-linked indicators (DLIs) on the other. The PAs and DLIs are often unambitious. The paper recommends four reforms to address these shortcomings: (1) Diagnostic documents should indicate which policy reforms are considered most binding and suggest steps to address them. In addition, all CPFs should include an annex with the diagnostic documents’ main operational (policy) proposals and how they are reflected in the CPF. (2) CPFs should explicitly explain how management intends to use country platforms. If their use is not considered feasible, the CPF should explain why. (3) Given that fiscal policy is a powerful tool for decarbonising the energy sector, and given the underperformance in translating reform needs into policy-based programmes and appropriate PAs/DLIs, the Bank should review its approach in this area; the new, planned energy policy would be a first opportunity. (4) As bringing together private and public sector perspectives is key to mobilising private sector investment, the Bank’s management should include public sector perspectives and representatives in the Private Sector Lab, set up by the Bank’s president in 2023. The Bank’s management is currently reforming both its country engagement model and its energy policy strategy. Moreover, it has introduced some organisational changes aimed at fostering a closer cooperation between its various institutions. The recommendations in this paper should be considered in this context. Implementing the recommendations would greatly increase private capital mobilisation, which was a key issue on the agenda for the Financing for Development conference in Seville in July 2025.

An evaluation of the U.N. country teams states that the resident coordinator system has “proven challenging” with “limited results.” Where to now for the U.N. at 80?

Our paper examined the impact of economic sanctions on food prices and security. Anecdotal evidence suggests that food security is threatened in nations subject to sanctions. However, the causal link has not been proven. We employ a two-way fixed-effects approach and leverage the entropy balancing technique to ascertain the existence of a causal link. Our analysis relies on the Global Sanctions Database for sanctions and the FAOSTAT database for food security proxies: food prices and prevalence of undernourishment (PoU). Sanctions increase food prices: during the sanctions period, real food prices are higher by 1.24 percentage points compared to the non-sanctions period. Although the increase in food prices is marginal, overall food security is threatened, as the PoU is 2.1 percentage points higher during sanctions compared to periods without sanctions.