Last week, the Chautauqua Institution dedicated its programming to “Redefining Europe.” Then, last Friday, amid all the Europe talk, both the Greek parliament and the Eurozone finance ministers approved a bailout to keep Greece in the Eurozone. European Commissioner Jean-Claude Junker acknowledged that EU leaders have “looked into the abyss” of a Eurozone breakup this year, suggesting that they are now back from the brink of it. Eurozone leaders, once again, showed their intent to preserve the Euro and have chosen to take politically difficult actions to defend the credibility of the European Union. But Junker’s abyss is still there, even if the Eurozone has backed away from it. Europe still must be “redefined.” Part of that “redefining,” as the past few months have shown, will involve concessions to keep Europe’s perennially weaker economies in step with its stronger ones. Beyond that, how does Europe need to be “redefined”?
It is far from an academic question, and the Chautauqua speakers had some ideas. New York Times columnist Roger Cohen defended the EU as the 20th century’s “dullest miracle” for preserving peace during its tenure despite continually wrestling with budgetary and immigration issues. The EU has achieved its fundamental aim: preserving Europe’s stability.
To buy into the argument that EU expansion in any way pushed Russia into its current aggression in Ukraine, Cohen suggested, was to accept a myth that serves Putin. Meanwhile France and Italy, he argued, are powers to be taken more seriously than America currently sees them. In response to the Charlie Hebdo shootings in early 2015, France has explored enhanced intelligence capabilities to address domestic terrorist threats. Italy, meanwhile, under the leadership of Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and with Mario Draghi leading the European Central Bank, has assumed a greater role in EU affairs than it did under former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.
Finally, German Chancellor Angela Merkel finds Germany in the EU’s captain’s chair, a state of affairs the EU itself was designed to prevent. America has prodded Merkel to lead Europe, in a manner that she, her fellow Germans, and many of her fellow Europeans (Greeks, in particular) find discomforting. Reluctance towards German leadership stems from a firm historical base, and the best that can be hoped for, Cohen argued, is a Germany that does just enough to keep Europe stable. Proactive leadership, particularly in the realm of defense, is asking too much.
Constanze Stelzenmuller, Robert Bosch Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, painted a different picture. German leaders, she argued, hold both the lessons of their nation’s past and the need for its contemporary leadership concurrently in their minds. In her view, Germany is intent on playing all of the leadership roles — economic and strategic — that its economic weight begs of it.
Stelzenmuller spoke of her advisory role on a current German Defense Ministry initiative to reassess the role of the German military in light of the renewed Russia threat. Tellingly, this initiative includes town hall meetings with German citizens to calibrate what level of support to expect for a more assertive strategic stance. Germans have balked at such efforts in the past; attempts to re-establish a standing army in West Germany early in the Cold War met with ambivalence among politicians and protests among citizens. Stelzenmuller suggests that decades-long tide is turning. Still, Germany’s leaders preserve the anti-Nazi graffiti that was placed on Berlin’s Reichstag by that cities’ liberators for a good reason. Germany’s role in Europe’s defense will change only after careful and public consideration.
It was not a coincidence that the writings of the late Tony Judt were discussed repeatedly. Judt, a former New York University professor and author of the classic Cold War history of Europe Postwar, analyzed the fundamental differences between the development of democracy in Europe and the United States. Building off the pre-World War II example of the Fabians in Britain, the role of democratic government in Europe had less of a free market character than America. Even before the rise and fall of the Nazis underscored the connection between economic and strategic stability, a broader belief prevailed in Europe than in America that government should maintain backstops for basic human needs.
As a result, taxes that were high enough to provide universal health care and stronger unemployment and social insurance have a level of support in Europe they do not, and likely will not, have in America. But Judt’s point is broader: Apples-to-apples comparisons of American and European democracy, while tempting, are not possible. Having endured the horrors of war on their own soil, many European countries see government as a force that stabilizes society. More insular and self-sufficient than most of Europe, many Americans still see government as a financial drag and creative constraint on its citizens’ inherent dynamism. When another post-World War II generation comes of age, the gap between the two may close. For now, it remains.
The EU’s latest actions towards Greece demonstrate an enduring commitment to the European project. Without minimizing its challenges, “redefining,” or even “reforming” Europe is a simpler job than rebuilding it. That is a blessing, and a mark in the EU’s favor during a challenging time in its history.
The Italian coastguard rescues survivors from a crash at Lampedusa Island. Lampedusa, the closest Italian island to Africa, has become a destination for tens of thousands of refugees seeking to reach Western Europe. Credit: Guardia Costiera
By Katherine Tan
Conflict, persecution, and human rights violations have forcibly displaced an unprecedented 59.5 million people worldwide at the end of 2014, according to a recent UNHCR report. That figure, roughly equivalent to the population of the United Kingdom, was up from 51.2 million the previous year, already a level unseen since World War II. From 2011 to 2014 alone, the total number of forcibly displaced people increased by 40 percent. The international community must do more to support them. Inaction will not stem the tide of forced migration; it will simply exacerbate the toll on countries already struggling to bear the burden. Developed countries must come to terms with the scale of this escalating crisis and commit to resettling more of the most vulnerable and persecuted refugees.
The global forced migration crisis is perhaps the most under-reported and disturbing development facing the world today. Even more troubling than the staggering figures are the tragedy’s human dimensions and governments’ hesitance to address the plight of refugees stranded in horrific conditions along coastlines and borders worldwide. This year, an estimated 1,750 migrants have died crossing the Mediterranean Sea, over 30 times more than during the same period last year. Meanwhile, in Southeast Asia, over 100,000 Rohingya have fled persecution and apartheid-like conditions in Myanmar. Many have endured starvation and brutality aboard overcrowded boats as they are ping-ponged between nations refusing to accept them. Others have suffered imprisonment, torture and death at the hands of Thai traffickers with alleged government complicity.
The international community’s response to this humanitarian crisis has been anemic at best and morally negligent at worst. The United Kingdom recently announced that it would not accept any migrants as part of the European Union’s agreement to redistribute 40,000 Syrian migrants already in Italy and Greece. London has faced backlash for accepting just 140 Syrian refugees so far this year. Indonesia and Malaysia, two comparatively well-off Southeast Asian nations, previously announced that they would turn back any Rohingya boats found along their shores. They later agreed to accept 7,000 stranded migrants, but only on the condition that those migrants would be resettled elsewhere within a year.
Underlying this crisis is an international system ill-prepared to tackle the current scale of displacement head on. According to Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Research Director of the Danish Institute for Human Rights, developed states are primarily concerned with keeping migrants outside their borders so they can avoid responsibility for admitting refugees while technically complying with international law. This simply “passes the buck” to poorer states without addressing the problem. According to the UNHCR, the world’s poorest countries bear the brunt of the refugee burden, with 86 percent of refugees hosted by developing countries and one in four hosted by the least developed countries. This imbalance threatens to destabilize states already under pressure at the periphery of conflict zones and may lead to even greater migration rates if unaddressed.
The plight of Myanmar’s Rohingya poignantly demonstrates the international system’s failure to protect the most vulnerable refugees and the broader consequences of inaction. Stripped of citizenship rights by Myanmar’s military government in 1982, the Rohingya face severe persecution and mob violence as a Muslim minority in a majority Buddhist state. Today, they are confined to heavily policed ghettos where they are forbidden access to basic services and international aid.
The United States and human rights organizations have called upon Myanmar to recognize the Rohingya as citizens, but the ruling regime has shown little interest in stemming what observers call a “slow genocide.” Whether any appeal to Myanmar’s government will gain much traction in the foreseeable future is questionable. In the meantime, the international community has failed to resettle Rohingya refugees at rates necessary to ease regional pressures. Many Rohingya have flooded into Bangladesh, a country even poorer than Myanmar and with its own migration problems, thereby exacerbating the crisis.
These circumstances make a compelling case for developed countries to offer long-term resettlement to the Rohingya. However, Australia, one of the Asian-Pacific region’s wealthiest countries, has categorically refused to resettle any Rohingya, despite urging from the UNHCR.
“Australia will do absolutely nothing that gives any encouragement to anyone to think that they can get on a boat, that they can work with people smugglers to start a new life,” said Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott.
Abbott’s callous statement ignores the fact that most Rohingya aren’t voluntary migrants, but victims of ethnic cleansing fleeing a state that has branded them pariahs. India and China, regional giants that share borders with Myanmar, also remain on the sidelines, despite holding significant sway with Myanmar’s government.
The international community has resettled refugees en masse before, most notably after the Indochina Wars of the mid-1970s, when the United States, Australia, Canada, and others resettled more than 3 million refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
With such a precedent, one must ask why states are failing to act decisively now. Indeed, they may soon have little choice. Even if humanitarian motives aren’t enough to compel action, these crises’ destabilizing effects may well prove difficult to ignore.
Katherine Tan is a fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy and a development professional, specializing in private sector development.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect the views of their employer or Young Professionals in Foreign Policy.
Photo Credit: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Evil But Stupid
The Editors
n+1
A couple of months ago, the London Review of Books published a 10,000 word piece questioning the White House’s narrative regarding the death of Osama bin Laden. The story, written by investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, resulted in a sea of backlash, much of which was aimed at Hersh on a personal level. The media has charged Hersh with being too paranoid. But, as n+1 asks, why isn’t the media more paranoid?
My Grandfather’s Imposter
By James McGirk
Roads and Kingdoms
To join the Explorer Club in New York, you have to do something extraordinary, to make your own adventures — by land, by sea or by air. Or, as was the case with James McGirk’s grandfather, you could loan your stories out to a friend. In this piece, McGirk delves into his grandfather’s history and grapples with the question — are our experiences, our stories really ours to give away?
The Nation-State: Not Dead Yet
By Alasdair Roberts
The Wilson Quarterly
Pundits and academics have claimed many things have supposedly come to an “end” in the past two decades or so. From history to capitalism, most have had experienced a revival shortly thereafter. In this piece, Roberts looks into what caused the obsession with the “death” of the nation-state, and why those predictions were premature.
ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape
By Rukmini Callimachi
The New York Times
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) introduction to systematic sexual slavery began in 2014. Ever since, the group has (ab)used the Quran to justify its horrific human rights abuses and enshrine a “theology of rape.” Callimachi investigates the group’s history with sexual slavery, its practices and the twisted logic behind it.
Hellbent, But Not Broken
By Eva Holland
SB Nation
Holland tells the story of her experience with the Yukon River Quest, which at 445 miles, is the world’s longest canoe and kayak race. It’s as much a battle against nature as it’s a battle of wills.
Blogs:Kyrgyzstan’s Eastward Slide by Mark Varga
Somalia, No Political Legitimacy without Genuine Reconciliation by Abukar Arman
Kenya’s Catholic Leadership Takes on the WHO by Hannah Gais
A Challenging August for Dilma by Gary Sands
Obama’s Foreign Policy “Bully Pulpit” by Michael Crowley
As the old saying goes, the more things change, the more they remain the same. Somalia seems ahead of the curve as the debate over how to ensure a legitimate outcome in the upcoming August 2016 election is already underway. Still, the fact that the whole debate on political legitimacy within the country is limited to the upcoming election in and of itself indicates that little has changed.
The Somali state did not disintegrate because of elections or lack thereof. It disintegrated because of institutional injustice and the chronic meddling of foreign powers. That is why the state imploded and over million people died. It’s also how clan-based balkanization or “federalism” has come to destroy an already ailing state by keeping it in a state of perpetual dependency and subjugation.
Make no mistake, the most serious existential threat facing the Somali nation is the status quo.
Any time that the peripheries resort to entering into international relationships that first and foremost serve the interests of the elite, haphazardly signing agreements with foreign countries, and building clan militaries, they make the recovery of the state an increasingly impossible task.
What’s on First?In broken nations, all political issues of contention must be renegotiated and reconciled before the nation can be pieced back together and the healing process can be set in motion. Through such process, trust is cultivated and sustainable peace is achieved. However, the process must be both genuine and indigenous.
Failing to recognize these fundamentals or haphazardly rushing into a power-sharing arrangement only exacerbates the problem. Somalia has a quarter-century-long experiment to prove that. Placing the Somali political dilemma within the fallacious framework that election is a panacea undermines the direly needed debate on justice, reconciliation, and breaking the shackles of foreign dependency.
What Might be a Viable Alternative?Under the current system, where foreign political actors, particularly from Ethiopia and Kenya, dominate the process, genuine reconciliation is a pipedream. Total transformation of the current system that perpetuates status quo is an imperative. After all, it is not only the Somali state that failed; the international community and those who have squandered Somalia’s resources have allowed the state to fail.
The system at hand has sustained itself by periodically reinventing itself. On the domestic end, by partnering with “leaders” who possess relentless appetites to hoard executive power, the state has locked an entire branch of the government in “on-the-job-training” by annually changing prime ministers and their cabinets.
Regionally, the system has sustained itself by partnering with states — such as Ethiopia and Kenya, who are legally in Somalia as part of AMISOM — bent on implementing their own thinly disguised zero-sum schemes to co-opt Somali political actors in order to expand their spheres of influence. Internationally, the system has allowed the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) to replace the stained United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). This change did little to prevent Somalia from being trapped in a perpetual transition. Decisions are dictated; lucrative security projects are sustained; corruption and economic exploitation are facilitated; and shadowy characters are allowed to maintain backdoor entries to keep the cash flowing. The abuses and financial costs placed on the Somali state by the international community and its regional partners far outweigh their benefits.
As I have argued before, it is time to cut this umbilical cord of dependency. It is time to focus on bilateral strategic partnerships in which parties could hold each other accountable. The benefits are self-evident, as practically all foreign financed successful development projects in Somalia are the byproducts of nation-to-nation relationships.
Misplaced Focus, Erroneous OutcomeA few individuals have recently proposed a couple election-focused alternatives. The most prominent of said proposals argues, in essence, that political legitimacy requires sidelining the federal parliament, empowering regional actors and their clan exclusive parliaments, while arbitrarily keeping political parties with any Islamic identity at bay. This proposal, needless to say, considers reconciliation before power-sharing as irrelevant, the Somaliland issue as an independent problem, and constitutional reform as a priority over reconciliation.
While these may satisfy certain domestic and foreign actors and special interests groups who may see benefit in another four years of transition, they by no means ensure legitimacy.
By contrast, Gurmad Movement underscores the importance of reclaiming Somalia’s right to independently shape its political future and craft its own strategy to pull the nation out of its current subservient dilemma. Real legitimacy, according to Gurmad, could only be attained through a Somali-led process that is negotiated in the interest of the collective good, not by drive-thru legitimization process that may or may not be motivated to maintain the status quo.
All proposals agree that an election of some sort will be necessary in August 2016. According to Gurmad’s proposal at least, the current federal parliament should be given a conditional two-year extension, at which point the parliament would have to complete, among other things, the establishment of the Constitutional Court and National Reconciliation Commission, and elect an interim president for that duration.
The election process must be open to ensure fair participation of any and all candidates who possess fresh ideas to salvage this dying nation.
No More Scotch Tape SolutionsDespite the façade of sustainable recovery, beneath the veneer of Mogadishu’s rapid development is societal erosion rooted in an innate hopelessness perpetuated by lack of genuine reconciliation.
Against that backdrop, the need for indigenous discourse and a process to repair this broken nation and inspire its demoralized and beaten psyche is a dire priority. But you would not know that from the actions of the current political actors, domestic and foreign. That is why Somalia is caught in that stubborn Sisyphus effect, where we as a nation periodically roll the bolder of peace to the top of the hill, only to helplessly watch it roll back to the bottom.
One of the most prevalent fallacies that prolonged the status quo of distrust, division and sporadic hostilities in Somalia is the erroneous claim that the multifaceted Somali political conundrum could be solved by holding an election.
Herded LeadershipThe many shepherds herding Somali leadership has been one of the corrosive phenomena that facilitated the systematic destruction of the Somali nation. The current government is just one example. There is the irrefutable failure of its political strategy, its failure to pay its soldiers for over six months, which has caused insecurity to exacerbate, and its reputation as the poster child of corruption. It certainly occupies a infamous and unique space in history.
Granted, the herded leadership — both in the center and the peripheries — as well as those within the civil society who are direct beneficiaries of the current arrangement, may attempt to torpedo any transformative effort that threatens the status quo. Neither of these entities have the necessary public support withstand any type of resistance.
At this do-or-die moment, Somalia needs more than random political belches from its so-called leaders. Granted, at all times, leaders ought to be judged, not by what they promise, but by what they deliver. It needs leaders who would govern ethically and justly, who would lead the nation in the best interest of Somalia and its people.
Difficult as it may seem, history attests to the fact that when the human will is driven by good intention and a willingness to compromise for peace, it can beat all odds and overcome all obstacles. Failure is not a permanent status unless those who experience it opt to make it so!
It goes without saying: The Somali people desperately need transformational leaders whose vision, strategy, courage and willingness to sacrifice for the common good will help prevent the nation from self-destructing.
A Necessary FoundationReconciliation is the foundation that is yet to be built for sustainable peace to materialize. Somalia is a broken nation that is handicapped by a generation long bloodshed and trauma.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom of Somalia’s political elite and power brokers, reconciliation is not made up of powwows, artificial communiques, and photo opportunities in banquet halls. Rather, it is a deliberate and a systematic process driven by a comprehensive strategic plan fully understood and implemented by the Somali people.
Reconciliation is necessary as it deflates the hateful narrative that sustains inter-clan distrust and enmity. It opens a new page for negotiating the terms of a social contract that will allow for co-existence. It enables the center and the peripheries to recognize their interdependence. It plays a significant role in teaching future generations that impunity and the habit of sweeping problems under rugs only makes matters worse. It sets in motion a genuine process of repairing our broken nation.
Finally, reconciliation is a critical post-conflict element necessary for healing and trust-building; it is a noble objective and a process that takes time. Neither its pace nor its broad impact could be rushed for political expedience.
Photo Credit: U.S. Army Africa
Skepticism over vaccines isn’t just an American problem anymore.
As Africa celebrates one year of being polio free, renewed controversy over the polio vaccination efforts in Kenya may threaten to push back that milestone.
Last week, the Kenyan Conference of Catholic Bishops announced its intention to boycott the World Health Organization’s (WHO) polio vaccination campaign until authorities verify the vaccine will have no sterilization effects. Those skeptical of the vaccine’s effect on fertility claim it may be laced with sterilizing elements — namely beta human chorionic gonadotropin (beta-hCG), a chemical produced during pregnancy that is claimed to be used to sterilize women — and demanded the drug be tested independently.
The Catholic Church in Kenya’s skepticism of vaccines is nothing new. In 1995, the WHO proposed a similar campaign to vaccinate against tetanus. Kenya’s Catholic bishops protested, citing concerns over the presence of beta-hCG, and the WHO gave up on the campaign.
Nearly two decades later, the debate over the WHO and UNICEF’s joint vaccine program came to the fore yet again. The program sought to inoculate newborns against a severe form of tetanus by targeting women of reproductive age (15–49). In a statement released in November 2014, the Catholic Health Commission of Kenya and the Kenya Conference of Catholic bishops asserted they now have proof these vaccinations contained beta-hCG.
Public health officials have responded to these accusations by raising two points. Even if beta-hCG is there in trace amounts — which it shouldn’t be — the bishop’s own report has found it’s not at levels high enough to cause permanent damage a woman’s reproductive health. As James Elder, a spokesman for UNICEF, told the Washington Post in November 2014, its presence would be a result of “extremely rare contamination,” not some secret depopulation program.
Alternatively, these tests could have come up with a false positive. In a 1995 article detailing the tetanus vaccine controversy, the authors noted that the testing mechanisms being used by hospital laboratories were insufficient. Many used pregnancy tests, which do test for hCG in women but are inappropriate for testing a vaccine. The combination of certain chemicals in the tetanus vaccine make it highly likely these results were simply false positives.
The recent controversy over the polio vaccine, then, is just an extension of a much longer debate between large multi-national organizations and national authorities. The Kenyan bishops’ skepticism, at its core, isn’t an issue with Catholic writ large.
Today, what debate there is in the church at the institutional level is over whether it is or is not moral to vaccinate one’s self or one’s family with vaccines consisting of stem cells. Even here, church officials note, “the burden of this important battle cannot and must not fall on innocent children and on the health situation of the population — especially with regard to pregnant women.” In the case of Kenya, the burden the bishops are asking their parishioners to take falls squarely on that demographic.
Indeed, the Kenyan church’s position points more to concerns over the activities of these large, seemingly opaque multinational institutions, such as the WHO and UNICEF. The church’s boycott may be misguided and misinformed, but their actions seem to be rooted in a desire for more transparency and better protection of the country’s citizens. Given the country’s recent struggles with corruption and security, it’s easy to see where those broader concerns may be coming from. Still, whatever the deeper reasons for their objections, keeping a new generation of Kenyans polio-free is definitely in the church’s best interests.
Canada made an agreement recently to adopt the radar technology behind the Iron Dome anti-aircraft missile system. In an agreement between ELTA Systems, Rheinmetall and the Canadian Government, a version of the radar behind the Iron Dome will be produced in Canada in cooperation with companies from Israel and Germany. Delivery of the Iron Dome to Canadian forces is set to begin in 2017.
With Russia’s increased investment in defense in its Arctic region, Canada hopes to use their new Iron Dome-inspired system to manage any possible threats in the north. Despite minimal threats to Canada coming from aircraft and ballistic missiles, the Canadian defense system will replace an almost non-existent air defense capability that had eroded after the removal of Canada’s ADATS system a few years ago.
The logic behind Canada’s need for an Iron Dome-like system sheds light on what NATO anticipates will be international security concerns abroad in the near future. The system may serve as a starting point for a low-cost NATO-wide system that could deter Russian aircraft and missile systems in Eastern European countries concerned with rebel movements near Russia’s border. The Iron Dome also allows for an easing of tensions and reduction of causalities in many cases, so it’s as much of a political tool as it is a technological instrument. The system also allows for the targeting of other missiles and mortars, possibly giving it the ability to knock down missiles like those from the
There is a slight possibility that an Iron Dome-type system will find its way to countries in the Middle East that are at odds with Iran but would not purchase defense technology from Israel directly. Balancing the Russia’s S-300 in Iran with a system like the Iron Dome may contribute to reducing the use of ballistic missile technology from both sides, keeping the conflict limited to alternative military systems. Besides the S-300, the Iron Dome is likely one of the best systems for targeting medium-range threats.
Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff talks with Vice President Michel Temer during the launch ceremony of Brazil’s 2015/2016 agriculture program in June. REUTERS/Bruno Domingos
A poll on Thursday revealed new lows for embattled Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, with her approval rating hitting eight percent – the lowest of any Brazilian president in the last three decades. Datafolha, the polling institute, found that 71 percent of respondents described her administration as “bad” or “terrible,” up from 65 percent in a June poll. Only eight percent percent described it as “great” or “good,” compared to 10 percent in June. More importantly, Brazilians are fed up – two out of three said they would support her impeachment.
Support for Rousseff’s impeachment has grown in the last several months and has been largely fueled by growing unrest triggered by the country’s worst economic downturn in 25 years. Inflation hit a multiyear high of 9.25 percent in mid-July, and the long-running political kickback scandal at state-run oil company Petroleo Brasileiro (“Petrobras”) has captured headlines.
Although Brazil has a formal mechanism for impeachment and has impeached leaders in the past (former President Fernando Collor de Mello was impeached in September 1992), calls for Rousseff’s impeachment by legislators have so far been muted. Former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and other senior leaders of the opposition Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) have so far not publicly backed impeachment. Even one of Rousseff’s main opponents, Eduardo Cunha (speaker of the lower house of Congress) wrote an opinion piece last Friday arguing an impeachment is too risky for Brazil’s fragile democracy.
But legislators’ patience is wearing thin. Last Wednesday, the governing coalition in Congress failed to pass a lower chamber bill intended to raise salaries for police officers, prosecutors and government attorneys. This latest failure comes just six months Dilma’s second term, and it reveals the waning confidence of her allies and a possible turn toward her opponents. Her main ally, the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), reportedly sat down for dinner with senators of the opposition PSDB last week and discussed a potential pact to govern moving forward.
Eurasia Group, a New York-based political risk consulting firm, believes the call for impeachment could be realized if Rousseff’s approval rating continues to drop. Three other conditions must be met: 1.) a direct link between Rousseff and the corruption; 2.) former President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva failing to support the current administration; and 3.) the opposition gathering behind the call for impeachment.
The PSDB is hoping to establish a direct link between Rousseff and bribe money used to fund her re-election campaign. Yet they may not need it – Dilma is now being accused of manipulating government accounts. Should that link be established by a federal audit court ruling in late August, impeachment proceedings by Cunha could be initiated in the lower chamber.
And former president Lula’s support for Rousseff may falter, after news last Monday of another arrest tied to the Petrobras kickbacks – that of Jose Dirceu, the ex-president’s former chief of staff. Lula is also being investigated for helping influence the award of contracts to Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction company, for contracts in Panama and Venezuela. Many of the allegations date back to Lula’s administration and may weaken his standing and ability to protect Rousseff.
The final condition, that of the opposition gathering behind impeachment, could gather steam should Rousseff’s popularity continue to fall and ability to govern become more impaired. Opposition leaders are increasingly facing pressure from protestors, many of whom gathered last Thursday night in major cities to bang pots and honk horns during the television broadcast of a political commercial featuring Rousseff, Lula and other Workers’ Party officials. The next test could come on August 16, when crowds are expected for a nationwide protest against Rousseff – the first protest the PSDB will openly support.
Photo Credit: Kremlin Press and Information Office
Kyrgyzstan has canceled a two decades-old agreement governing U.S. economic aid in response to the State Department’s decision to recognize a jailed human rights campaigner with a prestigious commendation. The dispute concerns Azimjon Askarov, who was arrested in 2010 for “inciting ethnic hatred.” Askarov, a member of Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbek minority, filmed rioting by Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in June 2010 that claimed that lives of 400 people. The Kyrgyz-led government in Bishkek accused Askarov of encouraging the violence and handed him a life sentence. Since then, international NGOs and human rights groups have called for Askarov’s release, alleging he is the victim of political and ethnic persecution.
The State Department’s recent decision to bestow the Human Rights Defender Award on Askarov follows years of work to obtain his exoneration. In response to the award, Kyrghyz President Almazbek Atambayev accused the U.S. of “trying to stir up ethnic hatred,” and canceled the 1993 Bilateral Agreement governing American aid to the former Soviet republic. Atambayev suggested that Washington is deliberately destabilizing the country, darkly referencing unspecified “attempts to sow division [and] chaos.”
The move is part of a general trend in Central Asia that has seen U.S. influence decline and official commitment to human rights weaken, with Russia eagerly stepping into the vacuum.
Since 1993, Kyrgyzstan has received $2 billion in aid from the United States, mainly through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Under the terms of the 1993 Bilateral Agreement, USAID and other U.S. aid organizations are exempt from taxation and auditing requirements and their personnel are granted the same immunity from prosecution as diplomats.
Atambayev’s dark hints that the U.S. is trying to “sow division” may sound paranoid, but one needs only look to recent events in Ukraine to see their underlying logic. USAID provided unaccountable millions in funding to various organizations and news outlets opposed to former President Viktor Yanukovych prior to his overthrow in February 2014. There’s no doubt that the work these organizations played some role in the Euromaidan protests that ousted Yanukovych last year. Atambayev has taken the lesson to heart: seemingly innocuous aid organizations can act as catalysts for unwanted political change.
But Ukraine is just the tip of the iceberg. Russia and the United States are involved in a Cold War-esque struggle for influence across Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan is a political football that has been tossed between the two superpowers for more than a decade.
Kyrgyzstan is one of the most politically volatile states in the world today. The so-called Tulip Revolution in 2005 overthrew the country’s pro-Russian president, Askar Akayev, with support from the United States. Five years later, Russia allegedly supported yet another revolution to overthrow Akayev’s successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. After two revolutions in the last decade, Atambayev is seeking security by decisively entering the Russian camp.
For more than a decade, the country was the only in the world to host both a US air base and a Russian one. The Manas Transit Center proved instrumental in supporting the troops fighting in Afghanistan – hundreds of thousands of passengers passed through Kyrgyzstan on their way to the frontlines. However, the base was closed in June 2014, coinciding with a $2 billion Russian loan for Kyrgyzstan.
Then, on Aug. 6, Kyrgyzstan officially joined the Eurasian Economic Union, becoming the fifth member of Russia’s response to the European Union. The EAEU now includes Russia and three other former Soviet republics: Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan’s entry into the EAEU marks a further step into Russia’s economic and political domain, away from the U.S. and the West.
In the realm of domestic policy, as well, Kyrgyzstan is increasingly modeling itself after Russia. On June 4, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament passed a “foreign agents” law modeled after Russia’s through the first stage of the legislative process. If successful, the law would require all NGOs that receive funding from foreign donors to register as “foreign agents” and submit to intrusive auditing by the state.
Russia’s own “foreign agents” law — passed in 2012 — has targeted NGOs and human rights groups including the GOLOS Association (Russia’s only independent election monitoring organizations), the Levada Center (the country’s only independent polling agency), and the Committee Against Torture, an investigative body that researches allegations of torture by Russian police and military forces. Since 2012, many Russian NGOs have been forced to close their doors or curtail important work to avoid scrutiny, fines and imprisonment by the state.
Kyrgyzstan looks to be following in Russia’s footsteps: the repeal of the 1993 Bilateral Agreement, the passage of its own “foreign agents” law, and its entry into the Eurasian Economic Union point to a decisive shift towards Russia and a further attenuation of U.S. influence in the former Soviet periphery. NGOs, aid workers and human rights groups will be the first to feel the wrath of Krygyzstan’s eastward slide.
President Barack Obama has shown a recent willingness to engage forcefully on tough issues in a manner some found lacking earlier in his presidency. With re-election behind him, he discovered the value of the bully pulpit. His recent discussion of prison reform may be the initial steps of the long walk other social issues — like marriage equality — had to take before they were addressed fully. Presidents cannot resolve issues like these alone — no president can move gun control through an obstructive Congress, for example — but they can set down markers for action on an issue so that successors can approach it with the ball moved a little further down the field. In short, while it’s not an endgame, the bully pulpit adds value.
Since Obama uses the bully pulpit domestically, can he take it abroad? In a sense, he has. His trip to Africa last month aimed to clarify U.S. policy towards the continent’s major nations. His openness toward Cuba showed a willingness to take action to “unfreeze” American policy toward the country that was mired in Cold War thinking. Even in the waning months of his presidency, there is still more that he could accomplish abroad. In the remaining months before the 2016 presidential campaign kicks into high gear and soaks up all available media, here are three areas where Obama’s “foreign policy bully pulpit” could be useful.
NATO. Obama’s administration coined the term “leading from behind” in reference to U.S. participation in the ouster of Moammar Gadhafi from power in Libya, and the amount of responsibility it could shoulder for the results. “Leading from behind” positioned U.S. forces as facilitators of collective actions, but not as the spearhead they were for the Iraq War.
Such actions not only honor alliances they diffuse burdens to a U.S. military that is still looked to first as the global policeman. NATO now encompasses Central and Eastern Europe; its members are best positioned to counter Russian influence in the region. NATO’s rounds of enlargement and efforts to partner with Russia have not matched the level of strategic reassessment NATO undertook with the 1967 Harmel Report. That document outlined the alliance’s guiding principles during the Cold War. Some analysts have called for a repeat of the Harmel process to clarify NATO’s post-Cold War principles and mission. Obama’s motive to share alliance responsibilities more equally with European powers still applies.
Moreover, well into their second decade of NATO membership, rising Central European economies like Poland have increasing resources and strategic need for a revitalized alliance. Obama could call for a second Harmel process, led in part by NATO’s most recent Central and Eastern European members, to determine how the alliance will continue to ensure European security. A a second Harmel process could clarify circumstances under which NATO would take out-of-area action, such as the criteria for an equivalent of the Libya intervention.
Japan. Central to Obama’s foreign policy has been a “pivot” toward Asia. China commands a separate level of attention from U.S. policymakers; but the most important U.S. ally in Asia is Japan. It is the world’s largest economy behind the U.S. and China. Its financial contribution to the United Nations (close to $294 million in 2015) are second only to the U.S. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s new security legislation passed Japan’s lower house last month and is headed to its upper chamber.
The new security measures have been controversial in Japan and the U.S. for proposing to alter Article 9 of Japan’s post-World War II constitution to allow Japan to project military force. But they offer Obama an opportunity to move U.S.-Japan relations forward from its World War II-era posture in the way he pushed the U.S.-Cuba relations out of their Cold War stasis. Japan’s economic might, like Germany’s was long seen as a potential security threat; it is time that its economic power carry with it responsibilities to global security.
A reformed Article 9 could open options for Japanese contribution to security actions without encouraging unilateral action by Japan. Abe’s domestic critics pose the greater challenge, but Obama can make further steps towards getting Japan to shoulder more of Asia’s security burdens while incorporating Japan into global security leadership more directly (by endorsing its addition as a UN Security Council Permanent Member, for example.) A full course correction in policy will not be accomplished in the next year, but Obama can move it forward while he has time.
Germany. To paraphrase Henry Kissinger’s famous comment, when Obama has to “call Europe,” he has to call Germany. Chancellor Angela Merkel has directed Europe’s response to the Greek crisis, cementing Germany’s position as the guiding voice of the euro.
Germany, like Japan, has been run deliberately as a militarily rudderless economic engine. Any path to a common EU security policy, however, will go through Germany. Likewise, the EU’s response to Russian aggression has centered on Germany’s energy and economic relations with that country.
In short, if President Obama wants to be on good terms with Europe, he needs to leave office on good terms with Germany. The Obama administration has made efforts to clean up the mess of the NSA’s alleged tapping of Merkel’s cell phone, but it still stands that the U.S.’ standing in Germany has been dinged during Obama’s tenure. An effort on his part to cement good relations with Berlin would pay dividends for his successor and America’s ongoing ties with the EU.
It is hard to underestimate the power of the media in today’s politics. Obama is a master communicator, and his rhetorical gifts have played a key role in moving America forward on some key domestic issues. As he aims to cement his legacy, why not take his talents abroad?
The Point of No Return: Climate Change Nightmares Are Already Here
By Eric Holthaus
Rolling Stone
From acidification and warming waters to the disappearance of entire species, climate change has already begun to take its toll on the earth. Some of these changes may be irreversible, and what’s particularly frightening is a lot of them are coming sooner than expected.
Hiroshima
By John Hersey
The New Yorker
Pulled from the archives in remembrance of the 70th anniversary of Hiroshima, this extraordinary article provides an in-depth look into the lives lost and those who somehow managed to survive.
The harrowing story of the Nagasaki bombing mission
By Ellen Bradbury and Sandra Blakeslee
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Although the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were touted as clear and decisive victories by U.S. leadership, the Nagasaki mission in particularly was riddled with screw-ups and errors that could have plunged the plane into the Pacific Ocean. This comprehensive account of the bombing on August 9, 1945, looks at what went wrong and how it changed the course of history.
The Bureaucrats Who Singled Out Hiroshima for Destruction
By Paul Ham
The Atlantic
At first glance, Hiroshima may have seemed like an odd target for the 1945 bombing. It wasn’t Japan’s biggest city, nor was it as obvious of a military target as, say, Kokura. In this excerpt from Hiroshima Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath, Paul Ham tells the story of the reasons military strategists chose their targets and the process that led to dropping the two atomic bombs a few months later.
When Canada Learned It Had Spies
By Graham Templeton
Vice
Canada’s intelligence gathering efforts remained largely a secret until 1972, when a senior analyst at the U.S. National Security Agency divulged the name of its intelligence branch in an interview with the leftist magazine Ramparts. Dubbed the Communications Branch of the National Research Council, or CBNRC, the 1970s marked the death of anonymity for Canada’s SIGINT program. Templeton explores how this information came to light.
Blogs:Rebuilding Afghanistan: The Way Forward by Elly Rostoum
Russia and the World are not on Good Terms by Hannah Gais
Netanyahu’s Problematic Remarks on the Iran Deal by Josh Klemons
GailForce: Aspen Security Forum Part II – Terrorism by Gail Harris
Beijing Attempts to Stifle South China Sea Discussion at ASEAN by Gary Sands
The turbulent modern history of Afghanistan provides a sketch of a nation either battling or recovering from a series of wars, political unrest and corruption scandals — the confluence of which has left the country facing poverty and an uncertain future.
Afghanistan’s economy is largely reliant on an international community that provides billions of dollars a year to prevent the country from falling into complete chaos. Despite these efforts, international influx of money in Afghanistan has done little to build a sustainable economy that could eventually stand independent of international support.
The perennial challenge for international reconstruction efforts lies with the lack of fiscal and economic sustainability, and in the absence of proper political governance at the governmental level.
Earlier this month, the Center for Rebuilding Sustainable Communities After Disasters (CRSCAD) at the University of Massachusetts Boston, hosted an international conference on “Rebuilding Sustainable Communities in Afghanistan: The Way Forward.” I had a chance to catch up with the center’s founding director and a professor of Urban Planning and Community Studies, Dr. Adenrele Awotona, who explained,
In March 1948, just after the end of World War II, the United States Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act and approved funding of over $12 billion for the rebuilding of war-ravaged Western Europe. That comprehensive European Recovery Program was nicknamed the “Marshall Plan.” In 2014, after over a decade of war in Afghanistan, records show that more United States and NATO money had been invested in the “reconstruction” of that country than was spent on the Marshall Plan.
For once, money doesn’t seem to be the problem. Corruption and the lack of regulatory, fiscal and constitutional structures have lead to an uneven distribution of wealth in the country — mostly concentrated with the top 15 to 20 percent of the population. The economic disparity is a bit of deja vu, and had previously been an contributing factor the original Communist takeover in the 1978. Today, competing political ideologies remain a problem. They are mostly sectarian and Islamic in flavor and continue to divide the country, eliminating any semblance of good governance.
The challenge for Afghan reconstruction is ensuring sustainability. The international community’s reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan has not stressed the need for sustainability. The majority of the hundreds of billions already poured into reconstruction has gone to building roads, dams, hospitals and schools – but the Afghans are not able to sustain much of that infrastructure without the continued financial support. In other words, when the money stops flowing, the structures won’t last long.
Perhaps a better strategy to rebuilding Afghanistan lies in focusing efforts on 1.) formulating a strong constitution that is embedded and reflective of the country’s history, culture, faith and one that is deeply committed to a modern understanding of human and civic rights; 2) strengthening law enforcement — not through militarization, but in the ability to enforce laws, keep the peace, and prosecute those who break the law — this point is particularly important in helping curb corruption — which remains rampant given the inability to prosecute those who break the laws; 3) providing a strong regulatory and fiscal framework to facilitate and protect investment. A viable solution for Afghanistan’s economic woes and development lies with the private sector. Private international investment can help develop profitable business enterprises that can spur and generate greater economic development in the country, and produce needed revenues for the government to aid in rebuilding Afghanistan.
The caveat lies with the substantial above-ground security risks of doing business in Afghanistan. Providing the conditions for private sector growth requires proper political governance at both the national and local levels. It also requires that the international community focus its efforts on paving the way and providing the right conditions for private sector growth both in terms of infrastructure, but perhaps most importantly in building a robust, enforceable regulatory structure to secure and protect investments.
You can follow Elly on Twitter @EllyRostoum
Putin at a BRICS summit in 2014. Photo Credit: Presidential Press and Information Office
Is Russia’s aggressive foreign policy finally catching up to it?
A recent poll of 26 countries, which was conducted by the Pew Research Center, found that views of Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, are largely unfavorable, and in some countries, still on the decline.
Anti-Russian sentiment was highest in Jordan and Poland, where 80 percent of participants expressed a negative view toward the country. Some notable runner-ups included Israel (74 percent), Japan (73 percent) and Ukraine (72 percent). In Western Europe, Germany and France followed shortly behind, with 70 percent of participants expressing unfavorable opinions toward the country.
For the most part, public perception of Putin was lower in all of these countries, even if only marginally, than perception of Russia. Here, Spain took the lead, with 92 percent of participants expressing no confidence in Putin’s ability to do the right thing in world affairs. Poland (87 percent), France (85 percent) and Ukraine (84 percent) followed closely behind.
To some extent, these numbers are not tremendously surprising. Even before the conflict in Ukraine kicked off in early 2014, relations between Germany and Russia had begun to sour. In 2010, 50 percent of Germans expressed favorable views toward Russia; by 2014, that number had dropped to a staggering 19 percent. Meanwhile, in Russia, positive feelings toward Germany dropped from 78 percent in 2011 to 35 percent in 2015.
Distrust runs rampant — and for good reason. Eastern European and Baltic states, even those that are NATO members, view Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a stepping stone. “Little green men,” the title given to the unmarked, unacknowledged forces that entered Ukraine in 2014, are just a hop, skip and a jump away. In preparation, Baltic and Eastern European states have girded themselves up in a defensive position. Some, like Poland, have witnessed a dramatic rise in membership to paramilitary associations. There’s even been a proposal to scoop up some of the members of these associations to establish a Territorial Defense Force, somewhat akin to the U.S. National Guard.
Of course, pissing off — or at the very least, freaking out — the EU is undoubtedly on Putin’s agenda. The question is how Russia’s relationship with those countries with a positive opinion, or even no opinion at all, will change in the years to come.
Pro-Russian sentiment was highest in Vietnam (75 percent), Ghana (56 percent) and China (51 percent). All three were mostly supportive of Putin’s conduct in world affairs as well. That makes sense: Russia’s own so-called pivot to Asia has emphasized both Vietnam and China.
Where things get murky for Russia is in Africa. Although Russian influence in Africa was extensive during the Cold War, it pulled back dramatically after the fall of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Russia continues to engage in arms and resources trade with a number of Africa nations, albeit under different ideological pretexts. This time it’s more about business, not exporting a revolution.
Although Russia has actively pushed for more economic engagement in both Africa and Asia, more trade doesn’t necessarily lead to an empathetic public. In South Africa, a member of the BRICS partnership, of which Russia is an integral part, only about 25 percent of people viewed Russia in a positive light. As a leader, Putin was viewed slightly more favorably — 28 percent were confident he would do the right thing in world affairs. Meanwhile, over half of South Africans held negative opinions of Russia.
But there were also a number of countries where participants claimed to have no opinion of Putin. In Ethiopia, for example, only 10 percent expressed an unfavorable view of Russia, but that’s because a little less than 50 percent of those polled expressed any opinion at all. So as Russia pushes to build its ties with Africa and Asia, a little charm offensive may be in order.
NEW YORK, NY – SEPTEMBER 27: Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, points to a red line he drew on a graphic of a bomb while addressing the United Nations General Assembly.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu just addressed the American Jewish community via live webcast. He spoke for 10 minutes, followed up with a 10 minute question and answer.
All of his standard arguments against the deal were there; he didn’t cover too much new ground. But there were some interesting tidbits.
For one, he re-stated the idea that giving Iran 24-days notice of inspection was like giving several weeks notice to a drug dealer that you’ll be raiding their labs. It’s a great talking point, and he’s used it before. The problem is that the response is stronger than the accusation.
FACT: The half-life of uranium is 700 million years. That’s 10 billion 24-day periods. It will be detected, thanks to the #IranDeal.
— The Iran Deal (@TheIranDeal) July 23, 2015
Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, one of the architects of the Iran deal — and an MIT trained nuclear scientist — prefers to refute this line with an example of Iran from 2003.
“In February 2003, the IAEA requested access to a suspicious facility in Tehran, and negotiations dragged on as Iran tried to remove evidence. But even after six months, tests revealed nuclear activity despite Iran’s attempt to cover it up.”
Netanyahu commented that after receiving notice, Iran would flush their “nuclear meth” in order to hide it from inspectors. It’s powerful language that conjures criminal mastermind Walter White, the main character in the award-winning show “Breaking Bad,” outsmarting the authorities, season after season. But it’s not in line with the facts, and Netanyahu surely knows that. It undermines his position to use talking points that are so blatantly without merit. He clearly believes deep in his heart than this deal is bad — for Israel, the U.S. and the world. But he won’t win his argument through manipulation.
Netanyahu argues that he is not against all deals, only this deal. The glaring problem here is that he is been vocally, vehemently and vociferously against this deal since well before this deal even existed. He says he believes a better deal could have been reached. The Obama administration is just as vehement in their rejections. But it doesn’t matter. Bibi has been talking about a better deal for years! He is the face of all global opposition to this deal, he seems to see himself the leader of a movement, bent on preventing the actualization of this deal. He has thus made himself irrelevant as a force for change. He’s been arguing, since 1993, that Iran is just years away from a nuclear weapon. How can anyone take seriously the Bibi who cried bomb?
The most glaring issue with his remarks, however, revolved around Israel’s neighbor’s reactions to the agreement. When Bibi first came out against the deal, he pointed out that both Israel and the Arab states were against it. He posed the question: How often do Israel and our Arab neighbors see eye-to-eye on anything?
It’s a powerful argument. Israel was against the deal, so too Saudi Arabia and their Arab allies.
But the day before this speech, the Washington Post reported that during a visit from Secretary of State Kerry, the Persian Gulf Arab states had publicly endorsed the Iran nuclear deal. They continued:
“The GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) support leaves Israel as the only country in the Middle East to vehemently oppose the agreement.”
This is extremely problematic for Netanyahu since he is supposed to be the learned teacher, patiently explaining why this deal is so bad for the entire world. Ignoring such developments make him look either dishonest or uninformed. Neither are great traits for the leader of a movement, especially not one as serious as this.
Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk.
Secretary Kerry presides over meeting of anti-ISIS coalition members at NATO Headquarters in Belgium. Photo Credit: U.S. Department of State
I went into this year’s Aspen Security Forum with the opinion that an effective terrorism strategy should not just be about addressing our options against Al Qaeda and/or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) operations; rather, I viewed defeating these groups as a worldwide problem that requires a worldwide policy. In spite of the many critics, the Obama administration does have a robust strategy for dealing with terrorism; it just does not go far enough in forming an effective, unified global alliance against all violent extremist organizations (VEOs). What you have are separate ongoing, unconnected efforts of various nations, many with varying degrees of U.S. assistance, against groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabaab in Somalia.
What is needed, in my opinion, is an organization much like the NATO alliance, which was formed to deal with the threat of Communism during the Cold War. This time around, however, such an alliance would be directed against VEOs. The organization would maintain a multinational standing rapid deployment force that would be dispersed when requested by a member nation. Although the U.S. government, specifically the Department of Defense, has tried to tackle this issue with varying degrees of success, I heard nothing during the forum that caused me to change my views.
Many of the speakers were asked if Al Qaeda was still a threat. Others weighed in with their opinion on whether ISIS or Al Qaeda posed a the greater threat. My takeaway was that while it has been severely degraded, Al Qaeda was still a threat, but ISIS presented what I call a more “clear and present danger” to the homeland because of the efficacy of their outreach and the potential effect of “lone wolfs.”
As I mentioned in my last blog, FBI Director James Comey considers ISIS the greater threat to the homeland. Others weren’t so sure. James Clapper, the director of National Intelligence, when asked if the use of social media by ISIS made it a greater threat to the homeland than Al Qaeda replied: “Well, that’s a hard…question because it’s different; it’s threatening. To say one is of greater magnitude than the other at least for me is hard.”
Still, I think Jeh Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, summed this issue up best during his talk when he remarked:
[O]ver the last 14 years, since 9/11, we’re seen core Al Qaeda, as everybody knows, AQAP, the Al Qaeda-affiliated elements of Al Shabab, which, while I was at DoD, we were focused on in our counterterrorism efforts. We have done a lot to degrade core Al Qaeda, through our good efforts. We have done a lot to degrade AQAP and Al Shabaab through our good efforts. The global terrorist threat now, as everybody knows… has evolved, and it has evolved in a very significant way from those groups to more groups, [ISIS] being the most prominent example, obviously, and it has evolved from terrorist directed terrorist attacks to terrorist-inspired attacks.… I think that the distinction between terrorist directed and terrorist-inspired is a significant one that the American people need to understand…why we are where we are in our efforts.
And so if you catalog the terrorist attacks and attempted attacks in this country and in Europe, for example, they almost fit neatly into one of two boxes, the terrorist-directed attacks, with an operative who has been recruited, trained, directed overseas and exported to someplace else to commit a terrorist attack, to terrorist-inspired attacks, which very often, most often involve a homegrown or even homeborn threat, and the individual has never even come face to face with a member of [ISIS] or AQ, but is inspired, through the very effective use of social media, to commit an attack or attempt to commit a small-scale attack.
And I think the American people need to understand how we have evolved to this new phase, because it does involve a whole of government approach, it does involve a lot of domestic-based efforts, in addition to the good work of the FBI and in addition to taking the fight to the enemy overseas.
Since most of the terrorism discussions revolved around ISIS, that will be my focus for the rest of this blog. I’m a bottom line kind of person, so it seems fitting to start with defining what is President Obama’s ISIS strategy and the status of the threat and the challenges as described by the intelligence community. The White House was represented by Lisa Monaco, Deputy National Security Adviser and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. Monaco stated the goal was “to degrade, defeat and ultimately, to destroy [ISIS]. But we’ve got to be very clear-eyed about this. It is going to take time.”
ISIS’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “the caliph,” has urged other groups to join them. Many VEOs around the world, such as Nigeria’s Boko Haram have responded and declared allegiance to ISIS. Monaco indicated the Obama administration was prepared to respond to this challenge by taking the fight into areas other than Iraq and Syria.
[ISIS] is undertaking an effort to establish an Islamic State, first in the heartland of Syria and Iraq. But…they’re trying to expand to at least eight provinces at this point, Libya being the most advanced and concerning in terms of sending actual operative focused on external attacks, but everywhere, from North Africa to the Caucasus. So yes, we’re absolutely concerned about their ability to find safe haven, to take root, and to attract fighters and to then extend their reach against our partners, our allies and ultimately to the homeland. And we’re going to make sure that we’re taking steps. If there is a threat posed to the United States from Libya, from one of these places, there should be no satisfaction amongst [ISIS] that they’re going to have a safe haven and that that threat won’t be addressed.
What form these efforts take or how robust they would be was unclear. The Obama administration has been pretty adamant about the boots on the ground issue.
Nevertheless, the Obama administration is working with a coalition of 62 nations to implement its strategy. Former Marine General John Allen, now the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, remarked that the coalition operated along five lines of efforts: military, counter-finance, countering flow of foreign fighters, counter-messaging, and humanitarian assistance and stabilization support. The intent of the effort is to achieve the U.S.’s strategic goals.
As for the challenges the intelligence community faces, the senior leaders present were pretty much in agreement. Clapper best summarized these challenges:
[T]he problem for us in intelligence is with the way people radicalize on their own or are radicalized via social media where they don’t leave out a signature. They don’t emit, if you will — and I mean that in a holistic sense — some attribute or trait or behavior that would lead you to begin watching them.
And so we’re lacking that. And this phenomenon of the radicalization, either on one zone or through the vehicle of social media — and I think [Comey] spoke to the challenge we have now where someone is proselyted by an [ISIS] recruiter sitting in Syria or some place, and then if there is an interest that is evoked on the part of the one being proselyted or the potential extremist, and then they’ll switch to, you know, encrypted communications that we can’t watch, we can’t warrant.
And as Jim has said, probably there are now investigations in every one of the 50 states. And this is a real worry, a real concern for us because I personally think it’s a question of time before we have more of these than we have already. And it’s a very daunting challenge for us. And so — and I think it’s illustrative of how the threat has morphed to a certain extent from, you know, industrial-size attack of the magnitude of the 9/11 in which there are or were, as we learned afterwards, signatures that could have forewarned us had we seen them.
And in this case, you don’t have those, even though there are a smaller scale, but as we’ve seen with the case of the shootings in Chattanooga, the psychological impact that has is, I think, quite profound. So it’s a serious threat.
Think I’ll end here. More to follow on terrorism, cyber and other issues discussed at the Forum in the coming days.
Representatives of ASEAN countries gather at Putra World Trade Centre on Saturday. RAJA FAISAL HISHAN/The Star.
“It should not be discussed,” remarked Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin on Monday, referring to the South China Sea dispute prior to Tuesday’s meeting in Kuala Lumpur of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China claims close to 90 percent of the South China Sea, amid rival claims by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei, many of which overlap.
Liu, in an interview with Reuters, warned non-ASEAN countries, such as the U.S., not to interfere. “This is not the right forum. This is a forum for promoting cooperation. If the U.S. raises the issue we shall of course object. We hope they will not.” Other non-ASEAN participants in this week’s meeting include China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Russia and the European Union.
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi also argued on Monday that the upcoming ASEAN meeting is not “the appropriate place for discussing specific bilateral disputes” and noted that discussion would “heighten confrontation.”
The most vocal of nations criticizing China’s actions in the South China Sea is the Philippines, which recently took Beijing to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague for a ruling over its right to waters in a 200-nautical mile “exclusive economic zone” off its coast. The U.S. has also been critical of Beijing’s actions, calling for a halt to the construction of artificial islands and an airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef. Last week, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) speculated Beijing is building another artificial island for military purposes.
While the U.S. is officially neutral in the dispute, arguing for freedom of navigation to protect the $5 trillion in shipping trade that passes through the region each year, the U.S. military has become increasingly active in the region, stepping up military drills with regional allies such as the Philippines and Japan. The Obama administration will send Secretary of State John Kerry as its representative to Kuala Lumpur on Wednesday, who will likely press for a halt to island reclamation and a demilitarization in the South China Sea, regardless of any attempt by Beijing to stifle discussion.
Indeed, the dictatorial attempt by Liu to halt discussion is almost laughable in diplomatic circles. It is counter to Beijing’s policy of non-interference in other countries affairs and inherently unenforceable. Furthermore, Wang’s similar attempt to stifle discussion of the South China Sea at the ASEAN meeting by suggesting the forum is not “the appropriate place for discussing specific bilateral disputes,” purposely fails to take into account that some of these disputes are multilateral. Many disputes are multilateral and overlapping.
Beijing, of course, prefers to approach the dispute on a bilateral basis, using potentially lucrative trade deals as an economic carrot and its vast military clout as a stick. This carrot and stick approach has been used to stifle discussion during other ASEAN meetings held in Laos and Cambodia, but this time around in Kuala Lumpur may prove more difficult, given heightened island reclaiming activity by China in the Spratley Island chain, increased military activity by Beijing, budding anger among other South Sea claimants, and (given the slow pace and inability to enforce any decision reached by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague) the lack of an alternative multilateral platform for resolving the issues.
Photo of elaborate cross-border drug smuggling tunnel discovered inside a warehouse near San Diego. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Photo by Ron Rogers
How to Think About Islamic State
By Pankaj Mishra
Guardian
Is the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), now known as the so-called Islamic State, a medieval or modern phenomenon? In this essay, Mishra looks at the alienation bred by some forms of modernization and Westernization has played in drawing more and more fighters to ISIS.
The Mystery of ISIS
By Anonymous
The New York Review of Books
ISIS’s rise — and indeed, its success — has been shrouded in mystery. Riddled with contradictory explanations for anything from its military success in Iraq to how it draws foreign fighters en masse, many of the accounts that attempt to explain the group’s success in detail are lacking in some way. Whatever the “real” secret is to ISIS’s success, it will do little to quell the fear its rise instills within us.
Against All Odds
By T.A. Frank
National Journal
With such a crowded Republican field, one of the main questions that’s come up this primary season is: Why even bother running for president when you know you’re not going to win the nomination? In this article, Frank looks at the logic behind George Pataki’s campaign, which has, to the say the least, been received without much fanfare.
Cattle-Camp Politics
By Jérôme Tubiana
Foreign Affairs
Underneath the power struggle among the “big men” of South Sudan (i.e., military leaders), there’s another far more longstanding conflict: that which has been created by inter-tribal tensions. These conflicts have played out over control of land and cattle and represent a far deeper conflict within the country — one that has left Tubiana wondering, “Is no one innocent in South Sudan?”
Underworld
By Montel Reel
New Yorker
The infrastructure supporting the U.S.-Mexican drug trade is vast. Indeed, within the past century, officials have come across over 181 illicit passages between the U.S.-Mexican border. Some are small, offering barely enough space for a single person to travel through; others are far more complex, fitted with electric lights, elevators and ventilator shafts. Reel delves into some of the recent investigations that have shed light on how these so-called supertunnels came to pass and how they have impacted the international drug trade.
Blogs:How Beijing’s Foreign Policy Can Backfire on its Tourists by Gary Sands
Burundi’s Electoral Quagmire by Eliza Keller
GailForce: Aspen Security Forum Part I by Gail Harris
Syrian Conflict Drags On by Scott Bleiweis
President of Burundi Pierre Nkurunziza addresses guests during the state banquet at Tuyhuis in Cape Town. (Photo: DOC)
By Eliza Keller
The east African nation of Burundi went to the polls last week in an election marred by violence, media suppression and human rights abuses. Burundi, a country roughly the size of Vermont, is in the midst of its worst crisis since 2005, when a tentative peace agreement ended 12 years of civil war. More than 170,000 men, women, and children have fled to neighboring Tanzania and Rwanda, putting a strain on already scarce resources.
The government of Burundi first held parliamentary elections in late June, despite pleas for postponement from the international community. The European Union and the African Union pulled out their election observers in advance of the elections, fearing that their presence would lend legitimacy to an illegitimate process. A few days later, the United States announced the cutoff of security assistance, and threatened to remove Burundi’s preferential trade status under the recently renewed African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). In a statement at the time, the Department of State declared that the United States “regrets” President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to move ahead with elections.
The parliamentary elections were boycotted by seventeen political parties. Burundi’s electoral commission called turnout “enormous,” but media reports noted that streets in the capital of Bujumbura were deserted and polling stations at universities reported attendance in the single digits. A few days later, U.N. observers declared that the elections were not fair or free and that human rights were violated.
Last week’s presidential elections, in which President Nkurunziza won an unprecedented third term, were held after only a brief postponement, far from the months-long delay called for by Burundi’s neighbors and international partners. Secretary of State John Kerry called the vote “deeply flawed.” As the crisis continues, the international community stands by helplessly. Strongly worded press releases and finger-wagging denunciations are piling up at the feet of President Nkurunziza, who appears unfazed. (A few days after an attempted coup in May, the president was photographed playing soccer with friends while protests raged across Bujumbura.)
These bland public statements carry little influence, but the U.S. has few alternatives in its diplomatic repertoire. In the old days of diplomacy, the U.S. ambassador in Burundi would sit down with President Nkurunziza over Cuban cigars and hash out a compromise — perhaps an agreement to step down in exchange for an esteemed university professorship or, even better, a briefcase filled with crisp U.S. bills. Today, just the protocol involved in arranging such a meeting is deterrent enough. Programs like the Ibrahim Prize, a $5 million cash award granted to African leaders who voluntarily relinquish power, attempts to fill this void, but the prize has only been awarded twice in the last six years.
Of course, more transparent and responsible foreign policy is a good thing. But in a region in which relationships tend to carry more diplomatic weight than memos and mandates, this shift to modern diplomacy has come at the expense of diplomatic influence. The escalating situation in Burundi is evidence of the consequences.
The administration’s much-hyped “pivot to Asia” has brought political backing, diplomatic attention, and resources to a region of the world facing immense challenges. The United States’ leadership in brokering a nuclear deal with Iran shows us the potential of what can happen when these resources are brought to bear. In executing this pivot, however, the administration must not turn its back on the small but ambitious countries of Africa and Latin America. President Obama’s visit to Kenya this week represents an important opportunity for renewed U.S. commitment to the region, and the goodwill that it generates must not be squandered.
Despite dire appearances in Burundi, there is good news: The current U.S. ambassador to Burundi, Dawn Liberi, is not a political fundraiser, but a career diplomat with extensive experience living and working in sub-Saharan Africa. This is a lucky break for the United States. Ambassador Liberi must take pains to ensure that her voice remains strong, steady and assuring amid the gunfire and explosions plaguing Burundi’s capital. She and other diplomats must not isolate President Nkurunziza, but must remain engaged and empathetic.
There is still time for President Nkurunziza to graciously step down and, in doing so, preserve the state that he helped build and establish a legacy as an honorable and benevolent leader. With camaraderie and patience (and maybe a little cash), perhaps Ambassador Liberi and her colleagues can swing the pendulum away from an emerging dictatorship and toward a more peaceful, democratic future for the people of Burundi
Eliza Keller is Editor-in-Chief of the Columbia Journal of International Affairs and a Partner with the Truman National Security Project. She has more than ten years of experience in politics and public service; most recently, she served as Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation. Eliza is currently an MPA candidate at Columbia University and holds a B.S. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University.
Last week brought the passing of Omar Sharif, the legendary actor who became widely known to Western audiences for his work in David Lean’s World War I classic “Lawrence of Arabia.” In that film, Sharif played Sharif Ali, a fictional composite character that becomes Lawrence’s chief adviser and ally among the Arab tribes Lawrence aims to lead.
By coincidence, also last week a 70mm print of the restored “Lawrence of Arabia” had its annual summer screening at the American Film Institute in Silver Spring, Md. The film remains a technical and artistic wonder. It certainly takes its share of artistic liberties: Sharif’s fictionalized Sharif Ali is one of many. However, beyond its value to film history and in spite of its Hollywood embellishments, “Lawrence” still speaks truths about the West’s relationship to the Middle East.
It’s Not All About Oil. The money and influence oil reserves bring to Saudi Arabia and other Arab powers have dominated Western involvement in the region for decades. It makes it easy to forget that the region’s fractious and violent politics predate oil’s existence. Exploration in the region began prior to the war years depicted in the film, but it would be two more decades before the Arabian Peninsula was to be known as an oil powerhouse.
Oil is not a factor in the turmoil “Lawrence” depicts. All of the film’s political struggles stem from Western colonialism and the factionalism among the Arab tribes. The film is a reminder that oil was an added catalyst for political contentions that were already present prior to its discovery.
It’s Not All About Religion. The East/West cultural divide is the film’s over-arching theme. Sharif Ali calls Lawrence “English” throughout, and being awarded tribal robes is both a great source of pride for Lawrence and disdain among his fellow British officers.
However, the sectarianism that is a central part of today’s Middle East politics is as absent as oil from “Lawrence.” The film depicts the waning days of the Ottoman Empire, which served as the center of Muslim political life, and which Western powers sought to plunder at its demise. The absence of religion as a cause of conflict stands in stark contrast to current struggle against ISIS efforts to build a pan-Arab caliphate across existing regional borders. When asked if his men will join the cause of Arab freedom, tribal leader Auda abu Tayi (Anthony Quinn) responds, “What is an Arab?”
Tribal loyalties, and the people and resources tribal leaders control, are paramount. The role of religious identity has come to the political forefront in recent decades. Those in the region still place substantially less weight on colonial-era national borders than do Western powers. One might imagine a contemporary version of the film’s conversation ending in, “What is an Iraqi?”
Don’t Underestimate the Role of Politics Within Western Militaries. One of the film’s crucial relationships is that of Lawrence and Gen. Allenby, the head of British forces in the region. After Lawrence’s forces capture the port of Aqaba from the Turks, Allenby supports his ongoing rearguard actions against Turkish forces while insulating himself from them with a cynical detachment.
“I’ve got my orders, thank God,” Allenby says. “Not like that poor chap. He’s riding the whirlwind.”
Allenby flatters Lawrence’s courage, but he communicates the fact that no one of his political stature would place his reputation in jeopardy to do what Lawrence is doing. That sort of institutional conservatism, and aversion to risk-taking, is not always given its due as a cause of the inertia in the region’s politics over decades. The film does a nice job of depicting the fact that it is as present a factor in the military as it is in the diplomatic world.
“Lawrence” is a feast for the eyes even for those less concerned with the region’s politics. It gave us several performances for the ages — Sharif’s included. It is as masterful a technical achievement as we are likely to see on film (and decades before computer graphics, so every camel you see in “Lawrence” is a camel).
For those following the region’s politics, however, its concluding message is more “plus ça change” than one would hope. Fifty-three years after “Lawrence” arrived on screens, we are still describing the West’s relationship with the Middle East in similar terms. That may change. To quote one of Lawrence’s favorite sayings in the film, “Nothing is written.”
Photo Credit: Daphne Carlson Bremer/USFWS
How Britain and the US decided to abandon Srebrenica to its fate
By Florence Hartmann and Ed Vulliamy
The Guardian
Dubbed the worst massacre in Europe since World War II, the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 has long been considered a stain on Western efforts to secure peace in the Balkans. But another recent investigation sheds new light on the West’s involvement, or lack thereof, during those weeks in July.
Elephant Watch
By Peter Canby
The New Yorker
As demand for ivory in Asia rises, offering more monetary incentives for poachers throughout the region, poachers are going to great lengths to harvest ivory, threatening Africa’s already-dwindling elephant population even further. Canby looks into poaching as it is practiced today in countries like the Central African Republic and the Congo, and profiles the scientists, activists and politicians working to end the noxious practice.
The Rule of Boko Haram
By Joshua Hammer
The New York Review of Books
While it’s one of the wealthiest and most oil-rich countries in Africa, Nigeria has been chasing political stability for quite some time. Corruption and a series of military dictatorships have weakened the country significantly, making the rich richer and the poor much, much poorer. It’s within this context that Boko Haram emerged, with its roots in one of the poorest parts of Nigeria. In this review of Mike Smith’s Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War, Hammer looks into the terrorist group’s roots, the damage it’s done to the country and the military efforts against it.
Well Aimed and Powerful
By Margaret Lazarus Dean
Longreads
In this excerpt from Dean’s latest book, Leaving Orbit, Dean looks at space travel and the strange phenomenon of moon landing conspiracy theories. In recent years, the theory has, for whatever reason, picked up steam, and a staggering number of “doubters” have come forward. An era of ignorance, it seems, about spaceflight is upon us.
The Mixed Up Brothers of Bogota
By Susan Dominus
The New York Times Magazine
Two sets of fraternal twins; one big mix up. Dominus tells the story of how it happened and how they found out.
Blogs:The Overlooked Roots of the Greek Crisis by Scott Monje
Unleashing the Patriotic Dragon by Gary Sands
Israel has Hired a Cartoonist by Josh Klemons
The Diplomatic Erosion of the SALT II Treaty: Russia Builds a New ICBM by Richard Basas
Tensions Between Russia and the West Play Out Over Srebrenica by Hannah Gais
A boy at a grave during the 2006 funeral of genocide victims at the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Center. Photo Credit: Emir Kotromanić
Twenty years on, one of the largest massacres in Europe since World War II continues to spur controversy, now threatening to further divide Russia and the West.
The event in question is the Srebrenica massacre — the systematic killing of over 8,000 Bosniak men and boys in and around Srebrenica in July 1995 during the Bosnian War. Srebrenica, which had been declared a “safe area” under the protection of U.N. peacekeeping units, was stormed by the Bosnia Serb Army (VRS) in the afternoon of July 10, 1995. At the time, U.N. officers in the region put out an urgent call to stop the VRS from overrunning the town. Despite repeated requests, NATO did not attempt to provide air support until July 11. Without substantial assistance, the VRS was able to drive out the U.N. peacekeepers and Dutch forces stationed there and seize the town, killing thousands.
Ten years later, U.N. secretary-general Kofi Annan called it “the worst [crime] on European soil since the Second World War.”
Still, whether or not the event should be classified as a genocide continues to be a major point of contention for a number of countries, including some of Serbia’s closest allies. That controversy has reignited over Russia’s veto of a recent U.N. resolution put forward to the U.N. Security Council for a vote on Wednesday. The resolution would have formally recognized the massacre as a genocide on the eve of its 20th anniversary.
Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s ambassador to the U.N., accused the resolution of being “not constructive, confrontational and politically-motivated.” He further argued that the text, at least as it stands now, would “doom the region to tension” because it singled out war crimes committed by Bosnian Serbs.
But a number of Western diplomats have taken issue with Churkin’s characterization of the resolution, particularly because the vote had actually been delayed in order for British, American and Russian diplomats to come to a compromise on some of the language.
“We had very, very close contact with the Russians throughout all of this. Indeed, we would’ve held this debate yesterday — we postponed it for a day in order to allow for last-minute consultations with the Russians to try and get the widest support possible for this resolution,” Peter Wilson, the U.K. ambassador deputy permanent representative to the U.N., told the BBC.
“People recognize that you can’t make progress in the way that Bosnia-Herzegovina needs to make progress if you don’t recognize what happened in the past.”
Samantha Power, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., took an even more aggressive stance, saying, “Russia’s veto is heartbreaking for those families and it is a further stain on this Council’s record.”
“This Council did everything in its power to get Russia on board with this simple resolution that did not even name the perpetrators. But Russia had a red line; the resolution could not reference the genocide in Srebrenica. It could not reference a fact.”
These diplomatic efforts aside, Russia’s veto is not tremendously surprising. Russia and Serbia are close allies. Both Putin and Medvedev have repeatedly backed Serbia’s condemnations of Kosovo’s independence, calling its efforts “immoral and illegal.” Still, with Serbia sniffing out a possible EU membership, Russia does have some cause for concern. It has seen other former Soviet satellite states fall out of its sphere of influence and gravitate toward the West. Fears of Serbia doing the same are not unfounded. Backing Serbia and its narrative about Srebrenica (Serbia denies the killings were genocidal in nature) is one way to try and keep the country in Russia’s orbit.