Foreign Policy Blogs

BUK-M1 Missile System

Dutch investigators took to analyzing the crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 after it was shot down over Ukraine by what was suspected to be a BUK anti-aircraft missile. The Netherlands took the lead in the investigation and collection of wreckage from the contested region in Eastern Ukraine as many of the victims were Dutch nationals, the plane departing from Amsterdam that day. Dutch analysts came to the conclusion that the plane indeed was struck by a missile from a BUK anti-aircraft system that showered the  left side t of the airplane with distinct bowtie-shaped shrapnel. Fragments pierced the skin of the aircraft as well as the left windscreen, directly injuring part of the crew from the blast. Criticisms were made over not taking appropriate precautions such as warning airliners to avoid flying over that region of Ukraine. While the investigation concluded that the plane was hit by an older version of the BUK missile, it only specified that the missile was of Russian design, but not that the shooters were part of Russian, Ukrainian or rebel forces.

Some of the initial impressions of the shoot down of MH17 concluded that a BUK missile likely did hit the plane, but suspicions of a Ukrainian SU-25 type ground attack aircraft bringing down the airline were also raised by critics. However, the maximum altitude of the SU-25 is restrictive and it often carries few air-to-air missiles. The investigation concluded that an older BUK missile, a type 9M38 or 9M38M1 was the missile used to bring down the Boeing airliner, and that other air-to-air missile types present in the region would not have matched the forensic patterns found on the wreckage of MH17. Another criticism was raised that perhaps the BUK system was used by Ukraine itself, since much of the Ukrainian army uses older Russian and Soviet weapons systems.  Russia claims to have withdrawn the older BUK system years ago from its own armed forces, and while there is suspicion on both sides of the conflict, the location of the BUK at the time of impact places the onus on rebel forces according to most investigations.

While the technical aspects of the BUK attack shed some light on how the aircraft was shot down, it does not give a clear answer as to who shot it down or the motivation for firing on a civilian airliner. Neither Ukraine, Russia nor the rebel forces have much to gain by shooting down an airliner full of Dutch, Malaysian and other international citizens, and claims by either side of a conspiracy to create such a tragedy on purpose holds little weight. It is most likely the case that the airliner was shot down due to ignorance, negligence and a radar system on the BUK that could not distinguish what kind of aircraft MH17 was. It would be logical for the leaders of the country that ordered the BUK into the region to make the crew and commanders liable for the attack in court, as prolonging the absence of justice for the victims of MH17 does nothing to improve the reputation of the parties involved in the shooting. Unanswered crimes will simply maintain a rift in European-Russian relations for generations and create the catalyst for more victims of senseless crimes between nations.

The Indian Air Force recently agreed to purchase Apache, pictured, and Chinook helicopters from Boeing. The deal, valued at around $3 billion, is the largest defense contract closed by the government of Indian Minister Narendra Modi. Photo: thehindu.com

Good relations between the United States and India, the world’s largest democracy, are crucial to stability in South Asia. The two countries took significant steps toward a stronger defense partnership in recent weeks, but major challenges still lie ahead.

At the end of Sept. 2015 the Indian Air Force finalized the purchase of 37 helicopters from U.S.-based Boeing, in a deal worth $2.5 billion (Foreign Policy reports the price at $3 billion). This deal was 2 years in the making, and is the largest defense contract reached by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government; it is believed to have an option to add 15 additional helicopters at a later date.

In 2012, while a deputy in the Defense Department, current Defense Secretary Ashton Carter developed the U.S.-India Defense Technology Trade Initiative, a broad-ranging series of joint defense projects. But development stalled for three years. Now, thanks to renewed emphasis from Modi’s government, things seem to be moving forward. Four short-term projects are underway, and discussions were arranged to explore longer-term efforts related to aircraft carrier and jet engine technology cooperation.

What’s more, on a visit to India earlier this year Carter signed a 10-year defense framework agreement to renew bilateral commitments. According to Sylvia Mishtra of the India-based Observer Research Foundation, “Defence ties are one of the brightest spots in the tapestry of cooperation between India and the U.S.”

Yet, as with many large-scale defense arrangements, there is some discord. One of the short-term Defense Technology Trade Initiative projects, concerning design and delivery of drones, has been delayed amid reports the units failed to meet Indian military specifications.

Looking at U.S.-India defense relations from a strategic perspective, there may be a larger-scale problem, which Foreign Policy‘s Akriti Vasudeva writes is “something historically emblematic of U.S.-India relations: mismatched expectations.” Vasudeva goes on to say that while with Defense Technology Trade Initiative represents a statement of commitment to strategic closeness by the U.S., India may not see it that way. Given the volatility of its relations with Pakistan–furthered by Pakistan’s recent defense ties to China–India may be hesitant to appear too closely linked to the U.S. (it also has defense relationships with Russia, Israel, and France).

The U.S. and India should have common strategic goals for keeping the peace in the region. What role India will play, or wants to play, in doing so is unclear. But coming to an understanding on this issue may help both nations better manage expectations and help get the defense projects back on track.

At a maritime conference in Sydney held on Tuesday, U.S. Admiral Scott Swift, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, in an apparent reference to Chinese actions in the South China Sea, commented:

“Some nations continue to impose superfluous warnings and restrictions on freedom of the seas in their exclusive economic zones and claim territorial water rights that are inconsistent with (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). This trend is particularly egregious in contested waters.”

Earlier, at a gathering of Asia-Pacific defense officials in Hawaii last week, Chinese Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army, reiterated Beijing’s hope for mutual cooperation in the South China Sea, telling his counterpart, U.S. Admiral Harry Harris, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command:

“(We) hope the U.S. side can pay great attention to China’s concerns, earnestly respect our core interests, avoid words and actions that harm bilateral ties, and reduce activities which cause misunderstandings or misjudgments.”

The pair of comments follow a series of dangerous maneuvers both in the air and on the sea in recent months, including last year’s barrel roll by a Chinese warplane over a U.S. Navy patrol jet.  Adding to Beijing’s concern, a top U.S. commander suggested last month that U.S. ships and aircraft should patrol close to artificial islands which China has built in the South China Sea.  And last week, one of the U.S. Navy’s most advanced aircraft carriers docked in Japan, as part of a deployment to strengthen defense ties between Japan and the U.S.

Concern over potential misunderstandings and a possible escalation of tensions over territorial claims have led both nations to set up a military hotline along with rules of airborne engagement, which were announced last week.

Some analysts have downplayed the fears, however, arguing miscalculation concerns over incidents in the maritime realm are exaggerated and can artificially increase tensions, raise threat perceptions, and justify arms build-ups.  Last month’s attack by Thai coast guard vessels on Vietnamese fishing boats certainly had the potential to escalate, yet was handled diplomatically.  While threats may indeed be exaggerated for a domestic audience for political gains, the potential for escalation is real should diplomacy fail.  Many geopolitical analysts and diplomats failed to predict the nationalist outburst and rioting in Vietnam that followed the movement of a Chinese offshore oil drilling rig into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone in May of last year.  Rioters attacked Chinese and other Asian factories in an industrial zone outside of Ho Chi Minh City, Chinese workers were attacked and at least two were killed at a Taiwanese steel plant in central Vietnam, and some 3,000 Chinese workers were hastily evacuated from Vietnam.

Despite a long history over rules of engagement and efforts at diplomacy, miscalculations have occurred in the past –  the Gulf of Tonkin incident leading to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War is still being debated to this day.  In his book In Retrospect, the Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam War, Robert McNamara, describes how the U.S. destroyer Maddox “was attacked by torpedoes and automatic weapons fire” in international waters.  While U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson declined to retaliate, he did send a second destroyer, the C. Turner Joy, to the region.  Just two days later, low clouds and thunderstorms added to the confusion over whether the Maddox and Turner Joy were under another attack, both ships reporting “more than twenty torpedo attacks, sighting of torpedo wakes, enemy cockpit lights, searchlight illumination, automatic weapons fire and radar and sonar contacts”.  A patrol commander aboard the Maddox later that day communicated to Washington:

Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful.  Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonar men may have accounted for many reports.  No actual sightings by Maddox.  Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken.

Despite the message and amongst the confusion, President Johnson authorized that day the launch of naval aircraft, which flew 64 sorties against the Vietnamese patrol boat bases and a supporting oil complex, and submitted a resolution to Congress requesting their support for U.S. combat operations in Southeast Asia.  The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave Johnson great leeway in exacerbating America’s involvement in Vietnam and led to the ultimate withdrawal of U.S. military forces after their failure to defeat the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong.

One would think with the advanced technologies and greater communication available to today’s diplomats, the same set of events has little chance of happening.  Yet surely that was the same consensus held back then, and despite the plethora of information available today, how one interprets the actions and intent of the enemy will always be subject to debate.  The fog of war has not gone away.  

Netanyahu glowers at the UN (Photo: CNN)

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu recently spoke at the UN General Assembly meeting on behalf of the Jewish state. He spoke at length about Iran (67 mentions by my count), the peace process and PA President Abbas’s comments the previous day before the international body, Syria, ISIS and generally about Israel’s courage and fortitude in the face of a hostile world.

Read the full text of the speech here.

Peace with the Palestinians
On the subject of peace, Bibi expressed his frustration with Abbas for refusing to return to the negotiating table without preconditions. He stated,

“I am prepared to immediately—immediately—resume direct peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority without any preconditions whatsoever. Unfortunately, President Abbas said yesterday that he is not prepared to do this.”

He continued,

“Well, I hope he changes his mind, because I remain committed to a vision of two states for two peoples, in which a demilitarized Palestinian state recognizes the Jewish state” [emphasis mine].

For such an articulate speaker, Netanyahu has a strange blindspot to his own preconditions. The italicized clause above, immediately following his bemoaning Abbas’s unwillingness to negotiate without preconditions, actually lays out two preconditions of its own!

1) That a future Palestinian state will be demilitarized and
2) That it will recognize a Jewish state.

The first point is generally understood (although certainly not universally accepted) to be a starting point for an eventual peace plan. The second point however is extremely controversial, seen by many as a roadblock created by Netanyahu specifically to tie Abbas’s hands and prevent the Palestinian leadership from sitting down at the table in the first place.

Global opinion of these points aside, Netanyahu is literally laying out two preconditions to peace talks, in the same breath that he is scolding Abbas for refusing to set aside his own preconditions.

“I’m prepared to resume peace negotiations without any preconditions. Abbas said he is not prepared to do this. I hope he changes his mind.”

— Benjamin Netanyahu (@netanyahu) October 1, 2015

Dealings with Iran
Speaking to Iran, Netanyahu invoked the awe-inspiring story of survival that is the Jewish people, enduring through millennia versus all odds and against countless enemies. He invoked the Babylonians, the Romans and the Nazis. He then cautioned:

“[The Iranian] regime would be wise to consider this: I stand here today representing Israel, a country 67 years young, but the nation-state of a people nearly 4,000 years old. Yet the empires of Babylon and Rome are not represented in this hall of nations. Neither is the Thousand Year Reich. Those seemingly invincible empires are long gone.”

This is amazing and worth reflection. But the reason I mention it is: the Iranian (Persian) people have been around even longer than the Jews. Does it mean they (or anyone!) will last forever? Of course not. But survival through the ages is a strange point to rub in the noses of a people that are arguably even older.

Resolution Overkill
Later, Netanyahu stated,

“In four years of horrific violence in Syria, more than a quarter of a million people have lost their lives. That’s more than ten times—more than ten times—the number of Israelis and Palestinians combined who have lost their lives in a century of conflict between us. Yet last year, this Assembly adopted 20 resolutions against Israel and just one resolution about the savage slaughter in Syria.”

On this point, I couldn’t agree with him more. In my opinion, one of the gravest sins that the international community has made regarding Israel is attempting to hold the Jewish state to standards which no other nation is held.

It is bad for Israel — it paints them a pariah. It’s bad for the UN — it undermines their role as a just, deliberative body. And perhaps most relevantly, it’s bad for the Palestinians and the peace process — it is easy for Israel to dismiss all judgement when they are so obviously and unfairly being held to unattainable standards. Due to this over-scrutiny, bordering on the absurd, Israel can casually bat away all criticism. Though not every critique is unfair, when seen through the lens of such hypocrisy, Israel can simply say: It’s not us. It’s you. And when reflecting on the overbearing burden of attention paid it, they are right. It isn’t them.

Israel is not perfect, but can anyone really claim them worthy of 21—out of a total of 25!—UN resolutions in a year? With all the atrocities happening in the world, anyone who believes that 85% were perpetrated by Israel is either lying or ill-informed.

Down the Hall, a Deputy Speaks Out
On the same day that Netanyahu addressed his colleagues at the UN, his deputy foreign minister Tzipi Hotovely gave her own address. At a UN meeting of countries who donate to the PA, she took the floor and equated all Palestinians to terrorists. As reported by Haaretz, after speaking about the Jewish right to ascend to the Temple Mount (something that is currently causing riots in the region):

“Hotovely continued with criticism of the Palestinians, saying that while an Israeli child dreams of being an engineer so he can be part of the start-up nation, a Palestinian child dreams of being an engineer so he can prepare explosive devices and perpetrate terror attacks.”

The following speaker was Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh. He informed the body that he had “written [an] address but I don’t plan to give it because I can’t not respond to what we’ve heard from the Israeli representative.”

According to Haaretz:

“The incident became particularly embarrassing when Hotovely interrupted Judeh several times to argue with him. This was contrary to protocol for the meeting, which was not an open discussion but a series of short speeches. One person in the room said that the meeting’s chairman, Norwegian Foreign Minister Borge Brende, had to call Hotovely to order twice.”

For those who are less familiar with the role of a foreign minister in Israel, it is equatable with an American Secretary of State. Currently, the position is being handled by Prime Minister Netanyahu. Hotovely is his deputy.

While I stand by my argument that Israel is vastly, and unfairly, over-scrutinized at the UN, it probably wouldn’t hurt if they rounded up an actual diplomat to represent them before the international body. I’m just saying.

Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk

Yazidi militia on Sinjar Mountain – Al Jazeera

Rwanda will always be remembered as a genocide that came from the failure of the international community to act. While there was information coming from a Canadian representative to the international community at the time of a severe sectarian conflict brewing in the nation of Rwanda, neither the international community nor former Canadian Prime Minister Chretien responded to their cries for help. The result was that two million people lost their lives, and the international community failed to hold up the standards of justice they committed to at the end of the Second World War.

This week’s discussions at the UN between the Obama Administration and Vladimir Putin are a response to Russia’s decision to put aircraft and soldiers into Syria. Coalition airstrikes have been able to quell some of the pressure on the Kurdish forces facing ISIS and help save some members of the Yazidi community and other minorities in the region from extinction. The reality however is that more help is needed. The lack of a further commitment by the coalition has left the fight in the region at a stalemate without support on the ground and heavy weapons. Russian forces will likely commit to a heavy assault against ISIS, leaving the US as sidekick as opposed to an equal partner in Syria. Russia is seeking to gain the trust of US allies in the region, as the minimal help given to minorities trying to survive has not been able to keep them out of danger.

There have been many theories in Western countries on why there has been a flood of refugees coming to Europe. Some politicians with various political parties have refused to accept the need for proper military support in the refugee’s home countries, as humanitarian aid without protection would be a fruitless endeavor. Without a firm commitment from parties from all political stripes in acknowledging the source and solution to the refugee crisis, the politics of Western elites threatens to ignore another crisis on a mass scale. The lessons learned from ignoring the Rwandan genocide should be paramount. In order to save innocent people, sectarian issues must be understood on many different levels and approached with humanitarian assistance and the use of force when necessary to protect innocent communities. Putting politics before threatened minorities in the Middle East is tantamount to turning a blind eye to the extermination of a whole community so one can win a job in Washington, Brussels or Ottawa. Communities that have existed for thousands of years are being directly threatened and will be wiped out without a serious commitment to preventing another Rwanda.

An example of a group that has been created by minorities from the Middle East in order to help save innocent people in the region is C.Y.C.I. – The Liberation of Christian and Yazidi Children of Iraq. They assist victims of torture and sex slavery by purchasing them back from their captors and bringing them to freedom. This group, based out of Quebec, Canada has recently gained some assistance from the Canadian government after a lot of grassroots support. They have shown that countries like the US and Russia can do more to help, as these individuals have stood firm in not accepting another Rwandan genocide. Their focus is on saving children, young girls and families from some of the most brutal treatment of individuals in human history. Despite a lot of political backlash from opponents, they push on because there is no excuse for another Rwanda. Now with the international community discussing Syria and Iraq, Russia, the US and their allies have an opportunity to not repeat another Rwanda.

One day after Christmas of 1991, the red star, hammer and sickle were lowered from the Kremlin for the final time.  As the West declared victory over their “Evil Empire”, a new set of countries were born on the banks of the Caspian Sea: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  This region, part of Halford Mackinder’s “great pivot” has been of strategic importance to trade and politics for millennia, but has failed to climb to the top of the political agenda in Washington.

Bailovo, Baku, Azerbaijan by David Davidson @flickr

An Office of Congressional Ethics report leaked to the Washington Post this spring detailed an all-expenses-paid trip taken by a bipartisan group of ten influential congressmen and their staff to Azerbaijan in 2013.  The bill for the two-day conference was picked up by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) by funneling $750,000 to two Houston non-profits: Turquoise Council of Americans and Eurasians (TCAE) and the Assembly of the Friends of Azerbaijan (AFAZ).  Although investigators stated that SOCAR’s involvement in the conference was public knowledge, each congressman claimed not to know that the state-owned company was the benefactor. To make matter worse, all but one congressman failed to report thousands of dollars in gifts received on the trip.  Despite pressure from watchdog groups, the OCE has yet to release the report, but has already made a ruling on the matter, finding that the congressmen involved did not knowingly violate any rules.

But, despite highly questionable junkets by congressmen, central Asian states still find themselves on the outside of the Washington establishment looking in, while signing lucrative contracts with Moscow and Beijing. Last fall, the Caspian 5 (Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan) signed a political declaration recognizing the right of only the states littoral to the Caspian Sea to have a military presence on it, a shot across the bow of NATO and the United States.  Already at odds with Russia due to the situation in Ukraine, the declaration also spells trouble for a proposed trans-Caspian pipeline for moving natural gas from fields in the region to the European Union, bypassing current routes through Russia and Iran.  Just as the West sees itself locked out of the region, China has continued fostering lucrative relationships in the area.  In 2013 Chinese Premier Xi Jinping introduced an effort to link China to Turkey via the Central Asian states by increasing infrastructure, cultural exchange, and trade.  The “One Belt One Road” is already well on the way to becoming reality, having created a US$40 billion fund for the project, and slating US$1.65 billion of it for a hydroelectric project in Pakistan.

Why should Central Asia even be on the US’ radar?  For one, the Caspian Sea region is estimated to have 68 billion barrels of oil and 535 trillion cubic feet of natural gas beneath it.  The region’s production is set to increase by about 10% in the next two decades as well.  Under the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea area’s production was consumed exclusively by the USSR, but since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Central Asian states have been seeking to branch out.  Turkmenistan, the region’s largest natural gas exporter, has already inked a deal with China and is projected to increase its sale to the Middle Kingdom threefold by 2020. The country could be a geopolitical asset for the US: both the EU and Ukraine have expressed interest at tapping into Turkmenistan’s gas reserves. For Brussels, the key lies in overcoming Russian opposition to the building of the Trans-Caspian pipeline and deliver Turkmen gas through the so-called Southern Gas Corridor. Ukraine has been suffering under the weight of high gas prices, ever since the scrubbing of a 2006 deal negotiated by Dmitry Firtash to bring in Turkmen gas. Some have even suggested that given the many countries vying for Turkmenistan’s gas, Firtash should be brought to the negotiating table to make sure Europe outrivals China.

In addition to legitimate markets such as petroleum, controlling the area means gaining a better grasp on the market for contraband from East Asia.  Afghanistan, which produces 75% of the world’s heroin and whence 99% of the region’s opiates originate, shares a border of about 1,800 miles with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.  Illicit drug trade from the Golden Triangle passes through China’s Xinjiang before it goes on through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan to consumers throughout the world.

Central Asia remains in play, but not for long.  The policymakers in D.C., who are more than happy to partake in the hospitality and gifts dished out by its strongmen, would do well to acquaint themselves with the immense importance of the region and formulate a policy for engaging with it.  The time to do so is now, lest they be left out in the cold of the Eurasian Steppe.

Vietnamese fishermen return after surviving a gun attack by a foreign boat on September 11, 2015. Photo: Dinh Tuyen

Local fishermen in the South China Sea have long gone unprotected when fishing in their own waters or in waters claimed by other countries. But this may soon change, following attacks this year on Vietnamese fishing boats.  On September 11, a group of fishing vessels off the southern Vietnamese province of Kien Giang, were fired upon by a Thai Coast Guard vessel, leaving one fisherman dead and two others injured.  Vietnamese authorities claim the shooting incident occurred in Vietnamese waters that border those of Malaysia while Thai authorities claim the incident took place 45 kilometers off their shore.

Local Vietnamese media reported the Thai ship consisted of six crew members who proceeded to detain the captain of one of the Vietnamese boats. The Thai vessel then chased a pair of fishing boats, warning them in Vietnamese, “the Vietnamese ships are required to stop or you will be shot dead”. 

Shortly thereafter, the Thai vessel fired upon one of the boats for 15 minutes, injuring the captain.  Afterward, it chased another fishing vessel, reportedly shooting at it for 10 minutes.  Another pair of Vietnamese fishing boats were also fired upon for 15 minutes.  One of the captains of a local boat, Ngo Van Sinh, died in his cabin, while another was released before the Thai patrol boat fled the waters.  The same Thai boat has been accused by local fishermen of firing on four Vietnamese boats over the past two months, with one fisherman dying last month after being shot while fishing off of Kien Giang province.

Vietnamese fishermen have also been attacked in recent months by Chinese naval vessels near the Truong Sa (Spratly) and Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands, which are claimed by both Vietnam and China.  On June 19, a Vietnamese fishing boat operating off the Hoang Sa archipelago was boarded by a Chinese crew, which destroyed its fishing gear and confiscated an ICOM walkie-talkie, a positioning system, and about five metric tons of catch worth US$13,780.  

Previously, on June 10, four ships surrounded a Vietnamese fishing boat and then forcefully boarded it, forcing the 11 Vietnamese fishermen to transfer all of their catch – about six metric tons – to the other vessels.  Also, two fish detectors, a positioning system, an ICOM walkie-talkie, five tanks of oil, and diving clothes were taken from the fishing boat.

As a result of these attacks, the Vietnamese government now plans to allow its coast guard to employ weapons to help chase away foreign vessels which have illegally entered Vietnam’s waters.  The rule is expected to start being implemented on October 20, but comes with a warning for Vietnamese fishermen to obey the laws of the sea:

“Given such attacks, we once again advise that local fishermen absolutely comply with the sea-related laws and regulations of Vietnam and its neighbors to avoid regrettable losses of their lives and property as well as not to cause damage to the diplomatic ties between Vietnam and other countries,” said Colonel Tran Quoc Lap, vice commander of the provincial Headquarters of Border Guard.

Hanoi’s authorization for use of force and a plan to augment its coast guard patrol capabilities means Vietnam (and its neighbors) are taking these threats seriously.  Japan has agreed to supply Vietnam with 200 million yen (US$1.6 million) in non-refundable aid to buy used Japanese patrol ships and to conduct joint search and rescue exercises at sea.  The U.S. has already provided Vietnam with five patrol vessels and has pledged to contribute more in the future.  And the Philippines expects to boost defense ties by signing a strategic partnership agreement with Vietnam by the end of this year.

Given the propensity of local fishermen to follow the catch and pay little attention to maritime boundaries, another confrontation is likely.  The recent spate of attacks on Vietnamese fishermen in the disputed waters of the South China Sea is unlikely to cease, and a more serious and deadly clash may well take place.  Unfortunately, given the various overlapping claims on waters and pledges of allegiances in the region, China may step up its aggression in order to save face and enforce its claims, while the U.S. may well be dragged into the conflict to defend its allies in the South China Sea.

Almost every aspect of the security in Somalia is outsourced to deeply entrenched competing foreign interests of various shades. None of them are accountable to the Somali government. Not even the legally mandated African Union Mission to Somalia peacekeeping force—AMISOM.

Contrary to the noble services that it provided in its early years, AMISOM has become a serious liability to the stabilization and also the main obstacle to Somalia’s sovereignty. Like IGAD—the East Africa regional authority on development—AMISOM has morphed into a politico-security monster that does not honor its mandate. Currently, AMISOM is Ethiopia, and Ethiopia is AMISOM.

AMISOM played an aggressive role in legally ushering in the Ethiopian Trojan Horse. Along with Kenya, Ethiopia espouses a thinly disguised zero-sum objective. For the last decade, the Ethiopian military has been aggressively pursuing said objective. Today, Ethiopia is the de facto leader of the military campaign to fight al-Shabaab. And this is a serious problem.

Firsthand Experience

On November 2013, right before the Ethiopian troops were accepted into AMISOM, I received a formal invitation from AMISOM’s political office to attend an event intended to solicit the Somali diaspora’s support for the group. The event was to be held in a luxury venue in a third country, and it was to be attended by high level officials.

I thought to myself perhaps this would be a great opportunity to highlight why the inclusion of Ethiopian army into AMISOM would be disastrous and, in the process, persuade the African Union leadership to turn down Ethiopia’s offer.

So, I asked a simple question to the official: “If I joined you and in my presentation made a case against inclusion of Ethiopian forces into AMISOM would that be taken into consideration; also would it appear in your public literature?” Next day, I got his response: “Have you received details of the retreat?” I thought he forgot to answer my question, so I repeated it. Next day, I got his response: “Please send me a copy of your passport so we can process your travel arrangement”. I repeated my question for the third time. Next day I received his response: “I can’t beg you. If you are not interested, I am sure others will jump on this invitation”. So I responded: “I am sure you would match well.”

The message was clear: Welcoming Ethiopia into AMISOM was a fait accompli and the event itself was nothing more than a PR stunt to preempt any negative public sentiments.

Abyssinian Empire and Its Stooges

The “global war on terrorism” could not have been declared at a better time for Ethiopia. The late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi saw an opportunity to kill two birds with one stone. He could become a terror-preneur and position himself as the Horn of Africa’s Parvez Musharraf (former President of Pakistan) and generate for his nation its sorely needed resources and political backing to swallow Somalia, one piece at a time.

Meles was a Machiavellian visionary and a brilliant strategist. Though it was no secret that he came to power by the barrel of a gun and that he would only invoked the principles of ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy’ to hypnotize the progressive elements within his Western partners, he was lionized by neoconservatives.

In 2002, Ethiopia released its Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy which lays out its foreign policy toward Somalia. “Somalia has become a haven and conduit for terrorists and extremists. Anti-peace elements are using the country as a base and place of transit in order to threaten Ethiopia’s peace.” Needless to say, at that time, Somalia was ruled by ruthless warlords who were never accused of ever having any religious affiliation.

In the same document, one of the main motives that compel land-locked Ethiopia to keep Somalia divided and to use all of its means to install a cardboard president in each region is stated: “starting from the port of Zeila […] to Kismayo, there are no less than seven ports in Somalia that can be used by different parts of our country.”

Contrary to the phrase often used by the beneficiaries of Ethiopia’s micromanagement of Somali political affairs, “Itoobiya waa dowlad eynu walaalo nahay” or Ethiopia is a brotherly state; states, due to their shifting interests and alliances, are never “brothers”. This naïve perception of international relations secures Ethiopia the privilege to maintain its embassy virtually within the presidential compound.

Keeping Political Stooges Dependent

Almost a decade since AMISOM assumed the peacekeeping mission, Somali soldiers still remain poorly-equipped and unpaid, thanks to a corrupt leadership busy squandering money in luxury hotels abroad. Within that context, it is hardly surprising that the Somali leadership depends on AMISOM for security.

In Somalia, fear is a traded commodity. And these phenomena play major roles in perpetuation of fear: ghost assassinations of patriotic civil servants with institutional memories, government officials, and activists; and periodical suicide bombings that never get investigated. AMISOM bomb experts are notoriously absent from the scene—with photo opportunities being the only exception.

Furthermore, AMISOM routinely manufactures insecurity by abruptly evacuating towns and territories gained from al-Shabaab. This is a tactic that Ethiopia was known to use in order to manufacture insecurity for political expedience. The latest were the evacuation of Burhakabe, El Salindi, and Kunturwarey. Al-Shabaab reoccupied all three areas. In Burhakabe, among other atrocities, they beheaded two brothers for “spying.” Meanwhile, al-Shabaab, which was estimated around 3,000 gunmen when the Ethiopian tanks rolled into the heart of Mogadishu almost a decade ago, is now an international corporation of terror that wreaks havoc in Somalia and Kenya, but not Ethiopia—supposedly its worst enemy.

Conclusion

Somalia has been kept in a state of political uncertainty and security catastrophe in which no level of the state security apparatus is independent or wholly operated and governed by Somalis.

Ethiopia seems to have taken a page out of the playbook of the global war on terrorism. In order to get leaders to dutifully march to the beating drums of jingoism, they must be psychologically terrorized beyond common sense. Neoconservatives were very effective in tightly managing this perception of reality.

Former President George W. Bush’s shining moment came when he was most vulnerable, despite the fact that he was being flown across the country to keep him safe in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. “In the thick fog of war, Bush heard (manufactured apocalyptic) reports that Camp David and the State Department had been attacked, that there was a fire in the White House, and that his ranch in Texas may have been targeted.”

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s ‘shock doctrine’ moment or his total submission to Ethiopia and its zero-sum strategy came when al-Shabaab bypassed AMISOM barricades and attacked the presidential palace.

In conclusion, no peacekeeping operation can succeed without the support of the local population; and, under the Ethiopian de facto command, AMISOM’s credibility is beyond repair. As I stated in the conclusion of my article titled Somalia’s Sullied Security, I would like to reiterate my call for the Somali government to request UN Blue Berets to replace AMISOM. A similar call was recently made by the British think tank Chatham House.

Meanwhile, the fateful scenario of the stubborn python trying to swallow the wounded tiger continues to play itself out.

Photograph by AFP

Minority groups in the Middle East who have been at the front lines against the war on terror have benefited from airstrikes in Iraq and Syria against strategic targets. While air strikes are effective to a certain degree, in a strategic sense they are tantamount to precision artillery. Artillery is there to support troops on the ground as opposed to dominating a battlefield by their sole application in a battle. Without material help using ground forces, groups like the Kurds, Yazidis and Arab Christians fight hard to achieve a stalemate in many cases. Help in the form of heavy weapons or added troops have been supplied in scarce amounts from Western countries, even though a defeat for those communities means almost certain slavery or death.

For many groups in Syria and Iraq, assistance in their fight to survive has come too late on almost every occasion. The hopelessness of many currently migrating to Europe comes from the realization that help on the ground is inefficient in keeping some of the oldest cultures alive, and there has been little to no attention given in Western media to the reality that with ancient structures, ancient cultures made up of real people are also becoming extinct.

When assistance has been given, it is often turned into an internal political issue in Western countries. This was addressed by a Kurdish community leader in Toronto who praised the Canadian government for its help with Kurds in Kobani. He highlighted the issue of why more help is not given to Kurds in Syria and Iraq. In his statement, he took aim at opposition leaders in Canada who want to remove all military help for the Kurds, yet wish to gain a job in government by falsely claiming that Canada has done nothing to help. The false narratives and lack of attention on the ground results in Kurdish fighters having little to no heavy weapons, which may result in their ultimate defeat.

The gaps in addressing issues in a reasonable time frame coming from the West since 2009 has done little to help minority communities in the region fight for their political freedoms and existence. With small militias from the region getting limited support on the ground, and the Iraqi army and their Iranian advisers also fighting to a stalemate, the only force in the region that can work as an effective heavy combat force continues to be the Syrian army of Bashar al-Assad. When a chemical attack pulled together Western powers to launch an assault on the Assad government, Russian diplomats negotiated the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria to keep the West at bay. Recently, Russia announced they would give ground support to the Syrian army, betting on the fact that the Syrian army will be the most capable fighting force to gain back ground in Syria.

Despite condemnation from the White House, Russia has decided to fill the gap that the West has left in combating threats in Syria. With limited support having a minimal effect in Syria and Iraq, Russian help and even Russian personnel may be the only option left for the West if they do not want to move beyond air strikes and equip minority groups fighting for their survival in Syria and Iraq. The obvious gap in assistance coming from the Obama administration has brought Russia closer to the Middle East. Western leaders would be hard-pressed to criticize Russia when their efforts have been so lackluster on almost every occasion.

With a defeat of the more dangerous groups by a Syria-Russia alliance, the West can decide whether or not to deal with Assad afterwards with whatever leverage is left. Until Sunni Arabs have a secure place in their traditional lands in Iraq and Syria, it is likely that the region will remain in a state of permanent revolution.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyaju of Israel complained of Iran’s uranium-enrichment program before the UN General Assembly in 2012. (Photo: UN Photo)

There has been considerable opposition to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the so-called Iran Deal. One of the most curious assertions being made, however, is that we cannot negotiate with the Iranians because they cannot be trusted. This simply defies logic. If we trusted them, we would not need to negotiate an agreement. The JCPOA is all about verification, through which we will know what they are doing with their nuclear program. The verification regime, in turn, is vilified as well. Opponents declare that its provisions fall short of the declared goal of “anytime, anywhere” inspections, not that the term has ever actually been defined. They also seek to create the impression that all inspections will be delayed by 24 days. This last distortion has been described as the “death panels” of the Iran Deal. In general, the discussion has focused not on the most essential aspects of the agreement, but rather on those that appear weak or can be made to appear weak.

Uranium Production and the Verification Regime

It is important to remember is that this agreement, or any agreement, will not prevent every objectionable activity Iran might engage in. Separate issues will have to be dealt with separately. This agreement focuses on the activity that has been at the core of key allegations against Iran, the production of nuclear fuel, which Iran says it wants for peaceful purposes and is entitled to under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). (The NPT grants countries a right to a nuclear industry, but not specifically to the indigenous production of fuel.) When processing uranium with centrifuges, the process is the same whether you want to produce reactor fuel to generate electricity or bomb-grade fuel for a nuclear weapon. The essential difference is in how long you do it, or rather, how many times you run uranium gas through a cascade of centrifuges. Natural uranium consists primarily of two isotopes: it is about 0.7 percent U-235 and 99.3 U-238. Most reactor fuel is enriched to the level of about 3.5 percent U-235; Iran’s Tehran Research Reactor takes a fuel that is just below 20 percent U-235; bomb-grade is in excess of 90 percent U-235. Unfortunately, the process gets easier the further it goes, so that when you have reached 20 percent (or even 3.5 percent), you have actually gone most of the way toward reaching 90 percent. The technical ease with which one might glide from civilian production to military production is at the center of the suspicions directed at Iran. Thus the monitoring of uranium production is at the heart of the Iran deal.

Iran, of course, does not trust the United States, either, and does not want the United States poking around its facilities, regardless of whether they concern nuclear or conventional military technologies. Thus verification is to be carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a neutral third party. For decades, the IAEA has inspected nuclear facilities around the world under the NPT for the purpose of “verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” It has not always been successful, but it has learned from its failures and strengthened its capacities over time.

Under the JCPOA, Iran reaffirms its denunciation of nuclear weapons and acceptance of standard inspections under its NPT Safeguard Agreement; agrees to additional challenge inspections, granting access to nuclear facilities within 24 hours (2 hours if inspectors are already on site), under an NPT Additional Protocol; and is obliged to give prior notification of the construction or modification of nuclear facilities under what is known as modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Safeguards Agreement (or simply, modified Code 3.1). Furthermore, Iran forswears any research-and-development activities applicable to the development of a nuclear weapon, including dual-purpose activities. These obligations do not expire, ever. In addition, Iran agrees to added measures and restrictions beyond those for a limited time period, with the duration varying from 10 to 25 years, depending on the specific measure. While nothing in life is guaranteed and the situations are not perfect parallels, it is worth noting that inspectors successfully disarmed Iraq in the 1990s without these additional measures.

When it comes to Iran’s uranium-conversion and uranium-enrichment facilities, monitoring by remote-controlled cameras and radio frequency identification (RFID) technology will be permanent and continuous, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, under Iran’s Safeguard Agreement. In addition, for 15 years Iran will permit direct access by IAEA inspectors on demand up to once a day. In an unprecedented arrangement, Iran’s uranium mines and mills will be under continuous monitoring for 25 years. In another unprecedented arrangement, Iran’s centrifuge production facilities will be under continuous monitoring for 20 years. The import of dual-use materials will be monitored for 10 years. The idea here is to keep track of Iran’s uranium-related resources. If inspectors can keep track of how much uranium Iran has and where it is—how much enters each facility, how much leaves, and where it goes—then they should be able to detect if uranium is diverted for unapproved purposes. Without the fuel, you cannot make a bomb.

Not Anytime, Anywhere?

As a precaution going beyond the continuous monitoring of declared nuclear sites, the JCPOA permits inspectors to investigate other sites, military or civilian, if they suspect that illicit activity related to nuclear weapons is being undertaken there. This alone is the subject of the “anytime, anywhere” controversy. The compromise reached allows Iran to challenge the accusation and to give reasons why the accusation is not true. The delay, however, is limited to a maximum of 24 days. It is important to understand that this is a limit on Iran’s ability to stall. Of the 121 countries in the world that adhere to an Additional Protocol, only Iran faces this restriction.

A current television ad attacking the JCPOA claims that the agreement gives Iran “24 days to remove evidence of nuclear activity.” Note the careful wording. The ad makes no explicit claim that it is possible to remove evidence of nuclear activity within 24 days, probably because its producers are fully aware that it is not. Inspectors can detect the presence of nuclear materials years after it has been removed, and efforts to scrub a site leave evidence both of its presence and of the attempt to hide it.

Is it possible, within 24 days, to remove evidence of nonnuclear activity related to the development of nuclear weapons? It is certainly conceivable. Relevant computer simulations could be undertaken without detection under virtually any inspection regime, but by themselves they are not going to give you a bomb. Generally speaking, the easier it is to hide, the less likely it is to produce a breakthrough. Since no inspection regime can guarantee that cheating will never happen, a high likelihood that any possible cheating would be caught or ultimately be irrelevant is an acceptable standard. More importantly, the agreement’s opponents offer no superior solution.

Potential Military Dimensions and Parchin

Finally, considerable attention has been devoted to the uncovering of Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s past research, including possible activities in a particular building at the Parchin military facility. Iran has been accused of doing research on nonnuclear aspects of weapons design, such as testing the reactions of certain materials to high stress and experimenting with conventional explosives that could be used to trigger a nuclear device. The CIA and other sources believe that this activity was halted in 2003, but many people want it investigated. Iran is loath to admit that it engaged in research dedicated to developing a nuclear weapon (the Ayatollah has said publicly that nuclear weapons are un-Islamic) and is reluctant to invite outsiders to inspect its military facilities, but an arrangement has been worked out. The IAEA will investigate the issue and keep the results to itself. Since this concerns past activity, this will involve a one-time investigation rather than ongoing monitoring. Most of the investigation will entail a review of documents, but there will also be some physical inspections of relevant sites. The IAEA will write up its conclusions before the main Iran deal goes into effect. The conclusions will not be shared with the P5+1 countries but will be available to the inspectors. Iran will not have to admit publicly to past misconduct, but the purpose of the JCPOA is to prevent nuclear proliferation, not to elicit public confessions. The IAEA reports that the Iranians have been cooperative so far.

There are reasons for wanting to examine PMD, but that is not the same as saying it is central to the overall agreement. Investigating the PMD allegations potentially serves two purposes. First, if IAEA inspectors can determine how far Iran has progressed toward developing the nonnuclear aspects of a nuclear weapon, then they might be better able to calculate how long it would take Iran to build a bomb if it did indeed break out of the verification regime. (Remember, the much-discussed “breakout time” is not how long it would take them to build a bomb, but rather how long it would take them to produce enough bomb-grade uranium to build a bomb. Building the actual bomb is a separate process.)

The second purpose could actually benefit Iran, depending on the circumstances. If inspectors at some point in the future find evidence of work on bomb components, then a thorough understanding of the work completed in the past will help them determine whether the new find is the product of recent clandestine work or simply a relic of previous efforts. Thus it would help prove that a discovery is evidence of a violation or that accusations of a violation are unfounded. This supports the overall mission. It would certainly be useful in settling disputes, and disputes are sure to arise. Still, it is not essential to the purpose of preventing the diversion of nuclear material for unauthorized purposes.

Parchin is one subset of the PMD investigation. The issue here concerns allegations that Iran may have used a building at the Parchin site for nonnuclear tests related to the development of a nuclear weapon. Since the allegation concerns activity that ended a dozen years ago, since the building may never have contained nuclear material, and since the building may have been used for other purposes since then, the prospects of finding conclusive evidence of anything are slim.

In fact, IAEA inspectors already visited Parchin twice in 2005 and found nothing suspicious. By agreement with Iran, the inspectors were free to pick any quadrant of the Parchin site and examine buildings of their choosing in that quadrant. They did not have to identify the buildings they had chosen prior to their arrival. As it happens, they did not choose to visit the building that they plan to visit now, although it was available to them.

An Effective Agreement

When a politician says “I’ll eat my hat” if X, Y, or Z doesn’t happen, no one really expects him to do it. Yet political discourse in the United States seems to have settled at the level of denouncing public officials for not eating their hats, without concern for what purpose would actually be served by doing so. In this case, “anytime, anywhere” inspections are an admirable goal and a fine starting point for negotiations (although, as far as I know, the term has never been operationally defined), but real-life negotiations do not end up squarely at one side’s starting point. Moreover, repeated accusations that the agreement did not produce “anytime, anywhere” inspections ignore (or purposefully draw attention away from) the fact that the agreement actually produced 24/7 monitoring of the essential aspects of the issue and that the arrangements for challenge inspections of undeclared sites (the aspect that allegedly falls short of “anytime, anywhere”) are perfectly adequate, indeed, an unprecedented achievement in themselves. There is no reason to believe the JCPOA will not be effective. The greatest threat to it are the hard-liners in the United States and Iran, but they would equally be threats to any agreement produced by negotiations.

Republican presidential candidates Ted Cruz and Donald Trump hosted a rally to oppose the Iran Deal in Washington, D.C., on Sept. 10, 2015. (Photo: updatednews.ca)

A great deal has been written about the agreement negotiated between Iran and the P5+1 countries (the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China), officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). A lot of the commentary has been nonsense. A great deal of attention has been allocated not according to the relative importance of the various aspects of the deal, but rather according to how vulnerable to attack they appear to be. Also, much of the public discussion has been technically inept. Many assert, for example, that if Iran wants even more centrifuges, then that proves that its nuclear program is really intended for military purposes. In fact, generating fuel for a power plant requires far more fuel (albeit, enriched to a lower level) and many more centrifuges. Iran has had enough centrifuges to make a bomb since the Bush administration.

The JCPOA is complex, and it has been attacked from several directions. I will focus on the key issue of verification in an accompanying post. Here I would like to address three other popular lines of attack.

First, some commentators insist that the only realistic way to deal with the Iranian nuclear program is to bomb it. (The same people often insist that the Iranians will hide facilities in secret locations, so it is difficult to say exactly where they plan to bomb.) They frequently cite Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 as an example of how it can be done successfully. Evidently they are unaware that the Iraqis did not have a serious nuclear-weapon program before 1981. Far from stopping Iraq’s nuclear program, the bombing of Osirak exposed Iraq’s vulnerability to an Israeli attack and prompted Saddam Hussein to pour resources into the development of a nuclear weapon. Much of that nuclear program, as well as chemical and biological weapons, survived weeks of intensive bombing during the Gulf War of 1991. So, what happened to Iraq’s notorious weapons of mass destruction (WMD)? Who finally disarmed the country, leaving it without WMD at the start of the Iraq War in 2003, after bombing failed to do so? The answer is: UN weapons inspectors.

Second, other commentators simply assert that we should discard the agreement and negotiate a better one. A number of experts, administration officials, and foreign envoys have listed factors working against the success of that approach. In brief, Iran is not simply going to be talked into demilitarizing the way Japan did after we destroyed its navy and air force, bombed its cities (two of them with nuclear weapons), and occupied and disarmed it.

If we wanted a better deal, then the time to do it would have been a decade ago, when a previous moderate government was in power in Iran. In 2003 Iran offered to negotiate a comprehensive settlement touching on U.S. interests (WMD, terrorism, coordination on Iraq, and movement toward a Palestinian-Israeli settlement based on a two-state solution, including the possibility of Iranian pressure on Hezbollah) and Iranian interests (an end to U.S. efforts at regime change, an end to sanctions, Iranian access to technology, including nuclear technology; and action against Mojahedin-e Khalq, an anti-Iranian group based in Iraq). The nuclear part of the deal might well have been similar to today’s agreement, except that Iran’s nuclear program was far less advanced at that time, so its bargaining position would have been weaker. In addition, many other loose ends of the relationship might have been covered as well.

The Bush administration, however, was not interested in compromising, or even in negotiating, opting instead to rely on economic sanctions. Rather than respond to the offer, the administration complained that the Swiss ambassador had exceeded his authority by transmitting the message at all. (Since Iran and the United States have no diplomatic relations, Switzerland represents U.S. interest in Tehran.) Could a mutually acceptable arrangement have been worked out at that time? We will never know. What we do know is that in 2003, when the offer was sent, Iran had not yet enriched any uranium. By the time the recent negotiations started in 2013, Iran had a stockpile of 10,000 kilograms of low-enriched uranium and 19,900 operational centrifuges. Moreover, it no longer appeared interested in discussing the other regional and bilateral issues, or at least not until they saw how the nuclear deal went. That was the result of the Bush administration’s decision to hold out for a better deal.

Additionally, the similarity between the 2003 offer and the present deal suggests that the presence of a moderate Iranian government, rather than the force of sanctions, is what makes negotiation possible. The most important role of sanctions may have been in convincing Iranian voters to give moderates another chance. Rejecting the treaty (and some people are still trying to do so) would essentially teach the Iranian public that their hard-liners were right, that the moderates were fools for thinking they could negotiate an acceptable deal with the Americans.

Third, some cite North Korea’s abandonment of the 1994 Agreed Framework, apparently assuming that if one negotiated arrangement turned out badly, then they all must. This may actually be more relevant to the case at hand, but not necessarily in the way those making the argument have in mind. The Agreed Framework was negotiated by a Democratic administration, but a Republican Congress decried it as appeasement and refused to implement certain key provisions that were important to the North Korean government, including the lifting of sanctions and the normalization of relations. Other aspects were delayed for years (sometimes because of North Korean actions that were objectionable but not covered by the agreement). Then a new Republican administration denounced the agreement, threatened the North Korean regime, and unilaterally tried to change provisions of the agreement retroactively. When the Bush administration suspected that the North Koreans were cheating on the agreement, it made no effort to bring them back into compliance. Now North Korea has nuclear weapons. Would North Korea still have cheated if the United States had followed through on its commitments? Again, we will never know. Yet some people seem intent on repeating this singular example of diplomatic failure step for step.

Global and regional leaders met in Alaska at the 2015 GLACIER conference, trying to shape the future of the Arctic. That future will probably look like one of five existing models.

U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy (Wikipedia)

The changes to the environment in the Arctic–the Arctic Ocean as water and ice, its air, its surrounding land, and its plant, fish, animal and human life–revolve primarily around changes to the extent of sea ice.  The findings are consistent: the extent of sea ice is declining, including multi-year ice. An additional concern is Arctic amplification– the concept that less sea ice is self-reinforcing, as more sunlight is absorbed by ocean water instead of being reflected by ice cover–may already be underway.

2015 Sea Ice Extent is far below the 1981-2010 median.

What’s At Stake?

The decrease in sea ice is already impacting Arctic animal life, indigenous peoples, and scientific, industrial and tourism traffic–from oil and gas exploration to the annual North Pole Marathon. In recent years, the polar states have increased their patrols on training, research, emergency response, and border protection missions. In the last ten years, scholarship on the politics of the Arctic has surged–not only on the environment but on the region’s history, people, politics, economics, and security questions.

Who Decides?

States and others interested in the Arctic region have built a number of governing agencies.  The UN’s Law of the Sea Treaty applies rest-of-the-world rules to the region’s natural resources. The UN’s International Maritime Organization deals with shipping and environmental concerns.

Arctic-specific structures start with the Arctic Council, founded in 1996 and now comprised of eight member states and a number of indigenous peoples organizations.  States, sub-state units, and indigenous populations have also formed more localized bodies such as the Barents Euro-Atlantic Council, Nordic Council of Ministers, Northern Front, and Northern Forum.  The 2008 Ilulissat Declaration emphasized the leading role of states.

The United States has issued two recent policy documents on the Arctic: at the end of the Bush administration in 2009, and from the Obama administration in 2013.  Earning considerable criticism in August, President Obama permitted Shell to drill in the Chukchi Sea.  Meanwhile, Russia has called the Arctic central to its security interests, and China is building ice-breaking ships.

What Models for the Arctic?

Combined, these geopolitical questions and governing structures make the Arctic region not “ungoverned” but “under-governed.”  At the GLACIER conference and in the future, the Arctic is likely to develop into one the following models:  development first, international agreement, unilateral universalism, continuing contest, and imminent danger.

Development First.  In ungoverned or under-governed regions, opportunities often take precedence over possible challenges, risks or negative impacts.  The prospect of economic benefits drives policy; indigenous cultures, environmental costs, and political risks are given less regard.   Development first is a common pattern with some familiar examples.  Productive examples include the development of agriculture in Australia and Argentina.  Extractive examples range from copper in Chile to gold in California and diamonds in Africa.  Cases that are more combative and destructive include the seizure of gold from the Aztecs and Inca, the near-extinction of the North American bison, and the African slave trade.  It can also result in unintended consequences, as with poverty reduction programs that contributed to the partial clearing of the Amazon rainforest.

Development first is a potential model for the Arctic in very traditional ways.  Its natural resources (oil and gas, minerals, fishing) and commercial sea routes are coveted by states and industry in a competitive global political economy.

International Agreement.  A second approach to under-governed spaces is international agreement–like in the Arctic’s polar opposite, the Antarctic.

Antarctica, without a native population and not part of potential commercial traffic, is governed primarily by the Antarctic Treaty (1959) and other agreements under the Antarctic Treaty System, committing signatories to peaceful activities only.  It authorizes freedom of scientific research, prohibits military activity, nuclear testing and radioactive waste, specifically does not recognize (nor dispute) states’ territorial claims and precludes additional claims, and establishes annual Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM).

The 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty  emphasizes the importance of the protection of Antarctica’s environment, prohibits exploration or exploitation of energy or mineral resources, and promotes environmental assessment of activities, emergency response preparation, and international resolution of disputes.  Additionally, the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) is an association of environmental non-governmental organizations, and an official observer to the Antarctica Treaty System.

Mikhail Gorbachev proposed in 1987 an Arctic “zone of peace;” others have called for demilitarization or a non-state “polar park.”  An international agreement model may be relevant to the Arctic if it can draw from existing resources, be adapted to its distinct geographic, biological, political and economic traits – and if signatories can remain motivated to comply.

Unilateral Universalism.  A third approach to existing and potential Arctic trading routes is based on transit free from economic, political, or military hindrances.  The sea routes over Russia and through Canada are each predominantly under the geographical shadow of one state but subject to the interest of many, like the Panama Canal today.

The Panama Canal opened in 1914, shaved some 8,000 miles off the 14,000-mile Cape Horn route from New York to the U.S. west coast, and greatly shortened European and Asian routes as well.  Under U.S. control, the Canal met its maritime goals for the United States and for global commerce, and U.S. military interests shortening the travel time between its Atlantic and Pacific seaboards.  It retains its importance today under Panama’s control.

By comparison, the world’s other most important shipping straits today do not paint an entirely rosy scenario for Arctic potential.  The historical difficulties with the Suez Canal, and the current challenges in the Strait of Malacca, illustrate political, economic, safety and environmental risks.  But perhaps none are as important or as precarious as the Strait of Hormuz.

Imminent Danger.  Critical oil shipping flows from Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz to Western Europe, Asia and the United States. Between Iran and the Arabian peninsula the Strait is vulnerable to small or large efforts at traffic disruption.  There is no easy substitute for the oil flow.  The global economy could face immediate, severe damage if a state or non-state actor were able to impede traffic or even briefly close the Strait.

If Arctic shipping and resource exploration are to expand, and if the environment and indigenous communities are to be protected, the most critical effort is the avoidance of military conflict in the region.  There is no evidence at this time that such a scenario is likely, but increased military presence, border disputes and potentially large economic stakes could lead to escalating conflict.  All parties must remain motivated and committed to avoiding such a path.

Continuing contest.  Short of direct military conflict or the imminent threat of it, another future scenario for the Arctic is ongoing competition. This condition has the chance of armed conflict but the predominance of political and diplomatic discord.  Throughout history, the Bosporus Strait, the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea and others have held this condition–like the Caspian Sea today.  In some sense, this combines elements of the preceding logics:  development, diplomacy, and security risks.
Increased human activities will continue to influence the Arctic.  Nation-states with competing interests have begun to prepare for the opportunities and potential conflicts.  Policy choices, environmental changes and technological advances will continue to influence each other.  The GLACIER conference is a step along, not a resolution to, states and others shaping the Arctic’s future.

Oh Mrs Wu, what will you do?  Photograph by AFP/Getty Images

Is the Chinese economic model doomed or is the Western business press making much ado about nothing?  Last month we witnessed how China’s falling stock markets, and the subsequent inadequate responses from Chinese regulatory authorities, were blamed for subsequent falls in worldwide stock markets. Many analysts scrambled for answers, insinuating that the precipitous decline in China’s stock markets must have had something to do with fundamentals—there must be something seriously wrong with the Chinese economy. An editorial in the Global Times argued that the Western investors’ panic is overdone. “The stock market’s sharp fall is like a fever, but foreign media describes it as a cancer. If so, the market plunge seven years ago would have ended the China model.”

While the jury is still out on whether or not the Chinese economy has cancer, the Global Times editorial does send a correct message: in China, the stock markets have very little to do with fundamentals. Typically, stock markets in China are driven by government announcements of loosening or tightening fiscal policy, and changes to monetary policy. Last year, public announcements by government officials on the health of the stock markets helped drive up share prices to exorbitant levels.  Other actions, such as announcing that banks will have to hold smaller reserves in order to free up more money for lending (whether or not companies are in a mood to borrow) has driven stock markets higher.

If stock markets were really driven by fundamentals in China, they would not have risen dramatically over the last twelve months while slower growth targets were simultaneously being announced by Chinese authorities and commodity prices were crashing.  Similarly, the fall of China’s stock exchanges (stocks in Shanghai have fallen more than 39 percent since mid-June) have little to do with the underlying economy and more with punters cashing in their gains before the Ponzi scheme collapses. The same panic in the U.S. markets (the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 6.6 percent in August—its worst performance in three years) has very little to do with fundamentals in China, for few U.S. companies have significant profits coming out of China.  

Analysts are now blaming a slowing manufacturing sector in China as Western markets continue to decline, and Beijing’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth forecast of 7 percent is also being questioned. Other analysts are probing further into such growth indicators as electricity usage, commodity prices and cement production to arrive at growth rates close to half the target.  

Concern over China’s growth (data released this week showed manufacturing sector slowing at the fastest pace in three years) prompted the central bank to cut interest rates and loosen bank lending—measures which again triggered panic in stock markets worldwide.  And in an effort to support its manufacturing sector, the yuan has also been allowed to weaken in order to make Chinese exports cheaper to purchase by other countries.  

Economists have long argued China needs to move away from an economy driven largely by cheap manufacturing and toward one based on services and domestic consumption.  This shift is already happening, as consumption contributed 50 percent of GDP growth and manufacturing approximately 30 percent. Market watchers also argued that the Chinese stock markets are overvalued, yet many were willing to gamble.  Despite the recent froth having been taken off the stock markets, many of the 9 percent of Chinese who invest in the stock markets in China have made money, though their earnings will do little to boost domestic consumption spending.  The irrational exuberance of the Chinese stock market bubble is in the process of deflating.

But what of the argument that the U.S. markets will further deflate due to disappointing manufacturing data coming out of China?  If we hold the other components of GDP constant, even a halving of manufacturing growth will take little off growth, since it only accounts for one-third of GDP and declines could be offset by growth in other sectors, should the Chinese government chose to stimulate agriculture, infrastructure or consumption through a variety of means.

The above sectors are the ones which could come under attack in the next few days, as market analysts try to point to other weakening components of the Chinese GDP as the cause for the fall of worldwide stock markets. Yet, with all eyes on China, how well the Party leadership responds to these concerns with greater transparency and guidance may continue to drive stock market volatility worldwide in the coming weeks.

This past year has seeing the US dollar and the US economy growing steadily after years of anemic progress following the 2009 global recession. Economies like China and Brazil, once the stable economic engines surviving the recession with a few scratches, are now the likely source of a new global economic downturn. The reliability of Chinese economic data has not been stellar, and nervous investors have fled the Chinese market this past month due to fears of a greater crash in the Chinese economy. Emerging markets that depended on Chinese growth in order to profit from raw material exports have been struggling. Economic mismanagement and a dwindling source of revenue coming from exports to China has left Brazil in a perilous economic situation—a situation they assumed was in the past and would stay in the history books.

The shrinking demand in China has affected natural resource economies in different ways. Low oil prices have hit emerging markets hard, and have even dented some otherwise healthy and diverse economies. Canada, an example of a diversified economy based on manufacturing and energy, has been able to weather a low oil price by ramping up manufacturing. With the drop in oil prices and other natural resources due to the slowdown in China, the Canadian dollar has fallen, making Canadian manufactured good less expensive on the global market. While Canada’s manufacturing regions face additional challenges, the low Canadian dollar acts as a cushion to a drop in commodity prices by boosting demand for Canadian goods.

Germany has benefited the most from previous double digit growth in China. Demand in China for high-end German manufactured goods, especially in the automotive sector, has driven much of Germany’s impressive growth over the last few years. Engineering and high-end German products helped build much of China’s transport and infrastructure during its boom. With a slowdown in Chinese growth, Germany’s source of wealthy consumers may be greatly restricted. While Canada offsets its energy sector losses with an increase in manufacturing and exports thanks to a low currency value, the slowdown in China has created a situation where funds leaving China have gone into euros. With investors seeking a safe haven for their funds, the value of the euro was up greatly compared to other world currencies this month. A slowdown in demand for German products and a high euro is creating a barrier to purchasing European goods and services for those outside the region. Even with a high US dollar, the boost in the value of the euro will deter Germany’s other large export market, the United States, from buying its products.

The slowdown in China may not be as severe as many expect, but it is unlikely that demand for German high-end products and engineering services will rebound in China for the next few months. The value of the euro may respond to Germany’s economic slowdown, but if investors keep the euro high, it will be a difficult time to purchase European goods for the rest of us. Expect the European Central Bank to address this challenge if the Euro remains high and demand does not return to a healthy level. In the end, it will really depend on China and whether investors trust the economic data coming out from the government and cushion losses in China by returning to the yuan.

Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko speaking at the Atlantic Council (2014), via flickr atlanticcouncil

When asked about the UK government’s decision to double the number of Ukrainian troops it would be training, the Defense Secretary, Michael Fallon, supported the move by arguing that the conflict remains “red hot”. And boy, is he right. On August 11th, the Ukrainian government took one more step in the journey leading democracies astray from the straight and narrow: a book ban.

In what reads like a page from Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451, thirty-eight Russian books were banned from being imported into the country because the government deemed them “hateful” and “separatist” for challenging the prevalent narrative endorsed by Kiev. One can almost imagine Kiev’s new Western-clad and US trained police officers hunting down suspects guilty of smuggling in ‘propaganda’ books.

Even if the military side of the conflict has recently been injected with a new lease of life, the propaganda war never relented. All conflicts involve a war over territory, territory in the form of land; but also territory over hearts and minds. Indeed, the nature of the propaganda campaign waged by the parties in the conflict can tell us about  the parties themselves. Through the image of the Ukrainian crisis as it is generally framed by leaders and pundits, it is easy to sniff out which side of the conflict is supposed to correspond to which message. The western region of Ukraine is depicted as being drawn towards EU, the US, and NATO, and everything that they imply: liberal democracy, pluralism, and freedom of expression; while the east gravitates towards Russia, meaning authoritarianism, repression, and an intolerance to dissent.

But, as recent developments in the propaganda war illustrate, this division may not be as clear-cut as it appears on paper. The book ban accounts for just one aspect of Kiev’s multi-pronged assault on the freedom of thought, expression, and press in Ukraine. On August 9th, the government issued a blacklist of Russian actors and films that are banned from being screened on its territory, as they pose a threat to the country’s national security. The ban extends also to French films, more specifically the features that star Gérard Depardieu, who recently acquired Russian citizenship. The law just confirms an on-going state of mind among Ukraine’s officialdom – since the beginning of this year, 376 Russian films and TV series have been denied distribution certificates by the Ukraine State Cinema Agency. In the words of the Agency’s director Filipp Ilyenko, “we scrutinize films and TV series to see whether they violate the law banning popularization of the aggressor state and Soviet-era security agencies or not.”

The same critical attitude extends to media channels. Inter, a TV station owned by the leader of the Opposition Bloc Sergei Levochkin and gas mogul Dmitry Firtash, narrowly avoided having its license revoked after a New Year’s Eve broadcast featuring Russian singers performing a satirical song about the Western sanctions imposed on Russia. The performance was described as “a humiliation for the whole country” by the head of the Ukrainian Security Council, Alexander Turchinov, in language that echoes that of the law passed against communist propaganda, in which one clause states that “the public denial of…the just cause of the fighters for Ukrainian independence in the 20th century insults the dignity of the Ukrainian people and is illegal.”

Among those so called national hero fighters, one can find ultra-nationalist groups like OUN and UPA, who worked alongside the Nazis and carried out acts of mass ethnic cleansing against the Poles and Jews in Ukraine. This effort to downplay the Nazi regime atrocities while magnifying those of Russia, and criminalizing any deviation from the official reading of history, is the exact mirror image of legislation passed by Russia itself in 2014 – only in their version, of course, it is the Nazis who shoulder all the blame while Russian crimes are glossed over.  

That Ukraine is passing legislation that echoes that of repressive regimes may be a cause for concern for its Western backers. Mounting accusations that politicians and journalists opposed to the Kiev government have been murdered for expressing their views should certainly set alarm bells ringing. Instead, the official reaction to the 10 opposition politicians and journalists who have suspiciously died this year has been muted and the case files have been classified as state secrets.

The signs coming out of Ukraine are ominous and the silence of its Western backers is deafening, but as the book ban sinks in, observers would do well to remember Ray Bradbury’s line from Fahrenheit 451, itself a work about the criminalization of thought and expression, “If you don’t want a man unhappy politically, don’t give him two sides to a question to worry him; give him one. Better yet, give him none. Let him forget there is such a thing as war. If the government is inefficient, top-heavy, and tax-mad, better it be all those than that people worry over it.”

Flickr via donkeyhotey

Last Thursday, Greece was momentarily shaken out of its crisis funk when Alexis Tsipras announced that he was resigning from the post of Prime Minister and calling for new elections to be held on September 20th. Tsipras had only been in office since January, but he declared that his mandate had “exhausted its limits”. Having lost a third of his party’s support, the now ex-Prime Minister prefers to wager on the chance that a favorable majority will form by September rather than risk struggling with negotiating coalitions for the rest of his term.

Tsipras splintered Syriza, a radical left party, when he agreed to the bailout terms presented by the troika—the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund—just weeks after 61.3 percent of Greeks had voted against them on July 5th. Despite his drastic U-turn, polls still indicate that Greeks favor Alexis Tsipras as a leader over most other candidates. This popularity, however, is not very useful to a Prime Minister who faces a hostile parliament. Observers say that Tsipras had no choice but to agree to the creditors’ terms for another bailout. But for some, agreeing to the memorandum after holding a national referendum was the straw that broke the camel’s back. The party fractured itself between pro- and anti-memorandum partisans; the latter working hard to form stronger coalitions in order to oppose creditor conditions and leave the Eurozone to return to the Greek drachma.

On Friday, the former Energy Minister under Tsipras, Panagiotis Lafazanis, became the head of Popular Unity, a new left-wing party looking to bring together Syriza’s disenfranchised electorate and politicians. If the 25 Syriza MPs that defected to Popular Unity were not enough to cause a tight race, pressure is also mounting on the right. While radical socialists hurry to organize on time for elections and a caretaker government takes Syriza’s place, far-right party Golden Dawn is addressing the overlooked immigration crisis that Greece faces in the Aegean sea, at the expense of Tsipras’ and Syriza’s MPs.

Despite such active opposition, it  seems unlikely that parties, especially newly-formed ones, will have time to campaign and win over many new supporters. Tsipras’ idea that next month’s elections will allow for a more cohesive government to form is not senseless. The former Prime Minister has gained right-wing voters at the expense of left-wing voters. Even if this was unintentional, the shift from  radical ideologist to being perceived as a social democrat might work in his favor.

It is difficult to predict whether Tsipras is simply breeding more uncertainty for Greece’s future or if his resignation is a ploy meant to ensure stronger bargaining power on the national stage. Many say that Greece should be actively implementing reforms to meet the expectations of creditors, rather than putting Greeks through a new round of political brinkmanship. On the one hand, it may seem like Tsipras is stalling the implementation of strict austerity measures, but, on the other hand, he also appears to be heading in a direction that favors dialogue with the troika.

Tsipras’s new style of politics, which cost him a third of his party, is one driven by survival instinct.  Steering away from the idealistic (and reactionary) goals first set by Syriza, a Greek utopia that wanted to avoid austerity while maintaining the Euro, Tsipras is now appealing to wider political base.

A 2013 Pew Research Center poll indicated that a majority of EU citizens considered Greeks to be the least hardworking country in Europe. This kind of stereotype demonstrates the finger-pointing tendency that the Jacques Delors Institute warned against: “It is of crucial importance that backward looking criticism will be replaced by forward looking constructive dialogue on how to strengthen the euro”. According to the Institute, that aims to advise European Union leaders, the EU needs to customize its approach to countries’ economies in the future and invest in Greek industries in a way that will trigger growth. Rafael Correa, Ecuador’s President, who knows a thing or two about sovereign debt, told Euronews in June, “All those measures are not meant to overcome the crisis, they are just to liquidate the debt”.

However, irrespective of the outcome of the vote, I would venture a guess that Tsipras, both lacks the political will and the common sense to see through the reforms demanded by the creditors. The Greek default, often compared with Latvia’s, Iceland’s, Ireland’s or Argentina’s, is nevertheless unique. Athens not only lacks a strong export sector or any significant comparative advantage over other EU members (the much-touted olive oil and cheese industry only account for $790 million worth of exports), but the shabby state of the Greek institutional framework and inefficient court system render the austerity-driven bailout vacuous.

Increasing the country’s competitiveness through austerity measures without bolstering its manufacturing sector, imposing tax hikes without strengthening its tax collection capacities, selling off state assets without stamping out corruption, and holding elections on the fickle platform “paying lip service to the creditors while bemoaning the European diktat” are the wrong ways to put Greece back on track. As much as some pundits have tried to spin the Greek crisis into a case of victim blaming whereby evil European creditors snuffed democracy in the name of finance and at the expense of the Greeks themselves, without deep, comprehensive structural reforms Athens will be dead in the water.

China watchers around the world are alarmed at the significant fall in Chinese stock markets and many are warning that the recent crash has alarming prospects for the underlying Chinese economy. Their worries reached new heights following the 8.5% drop in the Shanghai Composite Index on Monday – the biggest fall in eight years. Many attempts were made to stem the decline in the stock markets, including the banning of short-selling and new listings, the threat to arrest short sellers, the freezing of close to half the companies traded, and massive influx of state capital to buy shares. Perhaps in an attempt to prop up the financial position of its exporters, a supposed one-time yuan devaluation of 1.9% was announced last Tuesday by the People’s Bank of China. Since then, the yuan (or renminbi) has had its value cut an additional two consecutive days.

Some prominent China watchers are calling into question the Communist Party’s ability to control not only its stock markets, but also other policy-making areas. Paul Krugman, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2008 and professor of economics and international affairs at Princeton University, calls the Chinese leadership “naked emperors” and says “they have no clue what they’re doing.” Despite Krugman’s admonition, the Party may have a few tricks up its sleeve.

Beijing has been expanding its reach in other markets, such as Africa, where ten out of the top twenty fastest-growing economies between 2013 and 2017 are located according to the International Monetary Fund. Indeed, it has done so for some time now, with China’s trade with Africa reaching an estimated $200 billion in 2012. Chinese companies are also winning massive infrastructure contracts to build railways, airports, highways and ports, typically supported by large, state-owned financial institutions such as the Export-Import Bank of China. Most of the financing of these large projects is tied to procurement of Chinese equipment, machinery and materials—a boost to its exporters. And many Chinese have flocked to Africa to set up small retail stores and sell cheap Chinese-made household items.

Yet, while providing new markets for Chinese state-owned enterprises and traders may help improve China’s gross domestic product (GDP), this strategy is not without risk. As Howard French, author of China’s Second Continent relates, it is “outcomes that count.” Chinese citizens and companies have been welcomed by many African leaders who believe they can quickly build much-needed infrastructure. And in many countries they have done just that. However, French reports in his many travels throughout Africa, that some of the Chinese-built infrastructure is substandard, with airports subject to flooding or newly-built highways crumbling. In another example, French points to the “outraged Ghanaians who seem to have awoken one recent day to the discovery that thousands of Chinese newcomers were scrambling illegally to take control of their country’s lucrative gold mining sector, digging up the countryside, despoiling the land, and bribing local chiefs and police officials in the process.”

If Chinese policy-makers want to sustain their stated GDP growth near 6-7 percent for the near future, increasing the number of countries their exporters have access to would certainly help. With Chinese-led initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS New Development Bank, and the Silk Road Fund, their exporters and state-owned enterprises could well gain access to new markets. But given the backlash many Chinese companies are now facing in Africa, new efforts will need to be undertaken to improve their behavior—lest better-governed countries turn to their competitors.

Nadiya Savchenko, third from left, is pictured before a deployment to Iraq in 2004. In Aug. 2015 she appeared in a Russian court to face murder charges, after allegedly being kidnapped from Ukraine. Many feel her trial is an example of Russia’s impropriety in seeking justice for casualties in the Ukraine crisis. Photo: Savchenko family via Washington Post

A covert agent disappears from his homeland, and next shows up days later in an enemy prison. The agent’s government claims he was kidnapped in a police operation and forcibly moved to enemy territory. The enemy claims the agent carried covert audio equipment and firearms, intending to execute a “covert operation.”

A Cold War-era spy thriller? On the contrary, this situation happened in 2014 and is very real. The agent in question—Estonian security officer Eston Kohver—was taken into Russian custody. He was convicted on charges of espionage, and sentenced to 15 years in prison last Wed., Aug. 19, 2015.

Just hours after Kohver’s sentencing, prosecutors in the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don sought a prison term of 20 years for Oleh Sentsov. A Ukrainian filmmaker, Sentsov is accused of plotting to destroy a statue of Lenin in Crimea. He is charged with terrorism.

Two days later a Ukrainian military officer, Nadiya Savchenko, was indicted on murder charges in Russia after allegedly being kidnapped from Ukraine. She is accused of carrying out a mortar strike that killed 2 Russian journalists.

High profile court cases have become the latest battleground between familiar adversaries: Russia and the West. All of these arrests result from the involvement of the FSB, Russia’s intelligence agency and main successor of the KGB, and evidence used in each of the trials has been deemed top secret and not been publicly released. Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, states that Moscow is on a “war footing” with the West, and the trials are another front.

Savchenko’s case has received particular attention around the world, as she was elected to Ukraine’s parliament while in prison. U.S. officials have identified Savchenko as a “hostage” and demanded her release. According to the Washington Post, Russia has offered to exchange Savchenko for two Russian soldiers being held in Ukraine. It is possible that the accused in the other trials could also end up as political bargaining chips in prisoner exchanges, but nothing is certain at this point. Some are accusing Russia of violating international laws by arresting Kohver, Sentsov, and Savchenko without sufficient evidence and holding biased trials.

These cases are certainly troubling, and represent yet another volatile area of contention with Russia. Relations with Russia are delicate, but it cannot be allowed to make unsubstantiated arrests and abduct suspects from other countries. This might be the beginning of a slippery slope no one wants to go down.

Role player under NSC or manager of foreign policy?

The recent Washington Post article by Karen DeYoung, outlining the burgeoning role of the National Security Council (NSC), raises issues that go beyond the foibles of any particular administration. Most salient is that “politics … have become so much more corrosive and challenging that it’s a natural instinct for the White House to say, ‘We’ve got to have an eye on this. On everything,’ ” as DeYoung quotes an ex-White House official.

Micromanagement is a common impulse of executives for complex or contentious matters. Foreign policy today is both.  As General Stanley McChrystal notes in his book Teams of Teams, the post-modern world’s complexity makes prediction of external threats almost impossible. It is inevitable, as Daniel Drezner comments, that events will “catch the White House off guard and cause the opposition party to howl in protest.”

Foreign policy is rife with potential points of political vulnerability.  The growth of the NSC’s role, and the proliferation of politically-appointed ambassadors and officials, reflects their location at the interface of politics with management of a large, multi-faceted institution. Executive branch discretion over foreign policy makes it a high-profile political arena.  Contests of presidents and opposition parties increasingly overshadow functional considerations.  As the political environment locks presidents more and more into a marketing function, control of the political enterprise takes priority over institutional management.

A major consequence is that the world now has to guess what makes America tick. Politics involves management of diverse interests high and low. Their assembly into coalitions means that diverse claims will always tug and push at foreign relations. But beyond this natural play of interests, as pundit Ian Bremmer notes, friends and foes alike really do not know what America wants. Adversaries easily find evidence that the U.S. seeks economic domination or debases moral codes, and their claims go unrefuted.

Micromanagement is inefficient, even politically. Managing foreign policy to a coherent message of its own would be simpler. During the Cold War, foreign policy clearly revolved around “Containment“ of the USSR. The Soviets’ full-spectrum opposition to U.S. interests made reaction to their efforts a clear priority. Today America must assert its own enduring priorities to formulate a consistent message. But choosing and sticking to priorities is difficult, even without a politics that precludes consensus. After the Arab Spring, Americans might conclude that making democracy a priority over stability (or vice versa) will look foolish (or craven) as events unfold. The New York Times notes Washington’s difficulty choosing Russia, ISIS, or North Korea as the top national security threat.

Most dangerously, inconsistent policy overshadows America’s conviction in unalienable rights. It portrays free people caring less about freedom than short-term gratification. The nation was conceived in a document justifying independence on the principle of rights; failure to validate that “self evident” truth undermines the premise of American legitimacy.

Validation, therefore, defines U.S. foreign policy’s fundamental purpose. It is a nuanced, complex concept; full understanding yields a non-political guideline for foreign policy management. If a free society can defend itself, serve its people’s needs, and honor its principles, not only will America survive, but U.S. influence and power will revive.

Political leaders must set the ongoing choices of foreign policy. Most popular concerns will fit with the validation of America’s creed. It requires defense and prosperity as well as fidelity to the ideals of human liberty. What politics lacks, however, is a function to keep policies aligned with America’s creed, and with each other. A NSC and any number of political appointees can push a president’s political enterprise. A permanent corps should carry the management rationale, framing issues in terms of America’s fundamental interest.

The U.S. diplomatic corps is naturally positioned for this function. Diplomats staff the foreign policy decision processes, represent policies abroad, and can report successes or shortfalls in projecting America’s purpose. A new genre of professional formation, steeping U.S. diplomats in the origins, questions, and debates around the creed of individual rights, will be necessary to equip them for this mission. Institutional practices and structures will also be needed; a corps invested in the mission will shape them best.

This training and these practices will require time and effort to implement. But embedding America’s founding rationale in foreign policy institutions will aid administrations in managing policy. Balancing political considerations with enduring priorities will show America’s basic nature, as a catalyst for human freedom.

Brazil is often seen by its own people as a fallen economic angel. Once the great success story of an emerging market titan and key member of the BRICS, Brazil is now returning to the poor economic conditions it was stuck in twenty-five years ago. Many Brazilians were proud to see their country break out from a history of credit devaluations and transform itself into one of the only countries that successfully weathered the 2007–08 economic crisis, better than most of their European and North American counterparts.

Today, protests against the government are fueled by the realization that the opportunity to change Brazil has been squandered. Corrupt practices by large industry leaders and the ruling political party were exposed after President Dilma Rousseff narrowly won her second term as president. This scandal came about after years of pouring money into national infrastructure projects that were designed to satisfy the needs of foreign companies and the International Olympic Committee over those benefiting the citizens of a democratic Brazil.

The August 2015 protest is the fourth mass protest that has taken place pushing for the Rousseff’s impeachment. While there is no legal mechanism to force her impeachment, her political party’s connection to a scandal linked to one of Brazil’s biggest oil companies has led to her having one of the lowest approval ratings of any elected official in the world. While the strength of Brazil’s economy has dwindled, peaceful protests and the actions by some in Brazil’s activist community to expose the scandal have shown Brazil to be a country that holds values like fairness and democracy close to its heart.

The catalyst for the first wave of protest movements was Brazil hosting the 2014 World Cup. Many in Brazil resented the fact that the country’s love of the beautiful game would take away from the government’s ability to look after the country’s more basic needs. Funds went to various international agencies in order to put on sporting events and were given precedence over building up Brazil and its people. The government’s actions sparked anti-FIFA protests, some of which ended with the deaths of several protesters. The recent corruption scandal and the upcoming Olympic Games has done nothing more than fan the flames of almost universal outrage among all Brazil’s political factions, placing the PT party in jeopardy and getting even the once-loved former president, Lula Da Silva, into legal trouble.

With the 2016 Olympic Games coming up, mass protests could reach such an extreme so as to lead to the end of the PT party in Brazil and perhaps even the Olympics as beloved “brand.” That would be more than acceptable if it meant Brazil would become a more democratic country. The hit the games can have on the democratic system has scared, and perhaps will continue to scare, some away from bidding for the Olympic Games.

Nevertheless, a number of cities and countries still view hosting the games as an appropriate and responsible idea even when they are burdened by massive amounts of debt. Sure, Boston wisely backed out of the most recent bid process. But Toronto is currently considering a bid despite the fact that Ontario has the highest amount of sub-sovereign debt in the world. Los Angeles is also under consideration even though California has the second highest sub-sovereign debt in the world, second only to Ontario. Along with the economic conditions of candidate cities being ignored, investigations into allegations of corrupt practices are being currently conducted against IOC officials. It seems that some will just never learn.