Foreign Policy Blogs

Photo Credit: Kremlin Press and Information Office

Kyrgyzstan has canceled a two decades-old agreement governing U.S. economic aid in response to the State Department’s decision to recognize a jailed human rights campaigner with a prestigious commendation. The dispute concerns Azimjon Askarov, who was arrested in 2010 for “inciting ethnic hatred.” Askarov, a member of Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbek minority, filmed rioting by Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in June 2010 that claimed that lives of 400 people. The Kyrgyz-led government in Bishkek accused Askarov of encouraging the violence and handed him a life sentence. Since then, international NGOs and human rights groups have called for Askarov’s release, alleging he is the victim of political and ethnic persecution.

The State Department’s recent decision to bestow the Human Rights Defender Award on Askarov follows years of work to obtain his exoneration. In response to the award, Kyrghyz President Almazbek Atambayev accused the U.S. of “trying to stir up ethnic hatred,” and canceled the 1993 Bilateral Agreement governing American aid to the former Soviet republic. Atambayev suggested that Washington is deliberately destabilizing the country, darkly referencing unspecified “attempts to sow division [and] chaos.”

The move is part of a general trend in Central Asia that has seen U.S. influence decline and official commitment to human rights weaken, with Russia eagerly stepping into the vacuum.

Since 1993, Kyrgyzstan has received $2 billion in aid from the United States, mainly through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Under the terms of the 1993 Bilateral Agreement, USAID and other U.S. aid organizations are exempt from taxation and auditing requirements and their personnel are granted the same immunity from prosecution as diplomats.

Atambayev’s dark hints that the U.S. is trying to “sow division” may sound paranoid, but one needs only look to recent events in Ukraine to see their underlying logic. USAID provided unaccountable millions in funding to various organizations and news outlets opposed to former President Viktor Yanukovych prior to his overthrow in February 2014. There’s no doubt that the work these organizations played some role in the Euromaidan protests that ousted Yanukovych last year. Atambayev has taken the lesson to heart: seemingly innocuous aid organizations can act as catalysts for unwanted political change.

But Ukraine is just the tip of the iceberg. Russia and the United States are involved in a Cold War-esque struggle for influence across Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan is a political football that has been tossed between the two superpowers for more than a decade.

Kyrgyzstan is one of the most politically volatile states in the world today. The so-called Tulip Revolution in 2005 overthrew the country’s pro-Russian president, Askar Akayev, with support from the United States. Five years later, Russia allegedly supported yet another revolution to overthrow Akayev’s successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. After two revolutions in the last decade, Atambayev is seeking security by decisively entering the Russian camp.

For more than a decade, the country was the only in the world to host both a US air base and a Russian one.  The Manas Transit Center proved instrumental in supporting the troops fighting in Afghanistan – hundreds of thousands of passengers passed through Kyrgyzstan on their way to the frontlines. However, the base was closed in June 2014, coinciding with a $2 billion Russian loan for Kyrgyzstan.

Then, on Aug. 6, Kyrgyzstan officially joined the Eurasian Economic Union, becoming the fifth member of Russia’s response to the European Union. The EAEU now includes Russia and three other former Soviet republics: Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan’s entry into the EAEU marks a further step into Russia’s economic and political domain, away from the U.S. and the West.

In the realm of domestic policy, as well, Kyrgyzstan is increasingly modeling itself after Russia. On June 4, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament passed a “foreign agents” law modeled after Russia’s through the first stage of the legislative process. If successful, the law would require all NGOs that receive funding from foreign donors to register as “foreign agents” and submit to intrusive auditing by the state.

Russia’s own “foreign agents” law — passed in 2012 — has targeted NGOs and human rights groups including the GOLOS Association (Russia’s only independent election monitoring organizations), the Levada Center (the country’s only independent polling agency), and the Committee Against Torture, an investigative body that researches allegations of torture by Russian police and military forces. Since 2012, many Russian NGOs have been forced to close their doors or curtail important work to avoid scrutiny, fines and imprisonment by the state.

Kyrgyzstan looks to be following in Russia’s footsteps: the repeal of the 1993 Bilateral Agreement, the passage of its own “foreign agents” law, and its entry into the Eurasian Economic Union point to a decisive shift towards Russia and a further attenuation of U.S. influence in the former Soviet periphery. NGOs, aid workers and human rights groups will be the first to feel the wrath of Krygyzstan’s eastward slide.

President Barack Obama has shown a recent willingness to engage forcefully on tough issues in a manner some found lacking earlier in his presidency. With re-election behind him, he discovered the value of the bully pulpit. His recent discussion of prison reform may be the initial steps of the long walk other social issues — like marriage equality — had to take before they were addressed fully. Presidents cannot resolve issues like these alone — no president can move gun control through an obstructive Congress, for example — but they can set down markers for action on an issue so that successors can approach it with the ball moved a little further down the field. In short, while it’s not an endgame, the bully pulpit adds value.

Since Obama uses the bully pulpit domestically, can he take it abroad? In a sense, he has. His trip to Africa last month aimed to clarify U.S. policy towards the continent’s major nations. His openness toward Cuba showed a willingness to take action to “unfreeze” American policy toward the country that was mired in Cold War thinking. Even in the waning months of his presidency, there is still more that he could accomplish abroad. In the remaining months before the 2016 presidential campaign kicks into high gear and soaks up all available media, here are three areas where Obama’s “foreign policy bully pulpit” could be useful.

NATO. Obama’s administration coined the term “leading from behind” in reference to U.S. participation in the ouster of Moammar Gadhafi from power in Libya, and the amount of responsibility it could shoulder for the results. “Leading from behind” positioned U.S. forces as facilitators of collective actions, but not as the spearhead they were for the Iraq War.

Such actions not only honor alliances they diffuse burdens to a U.S. military that is still looked to first as the global policeman. NATO now encompasses Central and Eastern Europe; its members are best positioned to counter Russian influence in the region. NATO’s rounds of enlargement and efforts to partner with Russia have not matched the level of strategic reassessment NATO undertook with the 1967 Harmel Report. That document outlined the alliance’s guiding principles during the Cold War. Some analysts have called for a repeat of the Harmel process to clarify NATO’s post-Cold War principles and mission. Obama’s motive to share alliance responsibilities more equally with European powers still applies.

Moreover, well into their second decade of NATO membership, rising Central European economies like Poland have increasing resources and strategic need for a revitalized alliance. Obama could call for a second Harmel process, led in part by NATO’s most recent Central and Eastern European members, to determine how the alliance will continue to ensure European security. A a second Harmel process could clarify circumstances under which NATO would take out-of-area action, such as the criteria for an equivalent of the Libya intervention.

Japan. Central to Obama’s foreign policy has been a “pivot” toward Asia. China commands a separate level of attention from U.S. policymakers; but the most important U.S. ally in Asia is Japan. It is the world’s largest economy behind the U.S. and China. Its financial contribution to the United Nations (close to $294 million in 2015) are second only to the U.S. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s new security legislation passed Japan’s lower house last month and is headed to its upper chamber.

The new security measures have been controversial in Japan and the U.S. for proposing to alter Article 9 of Japan’s post-World War II constitution to allow Japan to project military force. But they offer Obama an opportunity to move U.S.-Japan relations forward from its World War II-era posture in the way he pushed the U.S.-Cuba relations out of their Cold War stasis. Japan’s economic might, like Germany’s was long seen as a potential security threat; it is time that its economic power carry with it responsibilities to global security.

A reformed Article 9 could open options for Japanese contribution to security actions without encouraging unilateral action by Japan. Abe’s domestic critics pose the greater challenge, but Obama can make further steps towards getting Japan to shoulder more of Asia’s security burdens while incorporating Japan into global security leadership more directly (by endorsing its addition as a UN Security Council Permanent Member, for example.) A full course correction in policy will not be accomplished in the next year, but Obama can move it forward while he has time.

Germany. To paraphrase Henry Kissinger’s famous comment, when Obama has to “call Europe,” he has to call Germany. Chancellor Angela Merkel has directed Europe’s response to the Greek crisis, cementing Germany’s position as the guiding voice of the euro.

Germany, like Japan, has been run deliberately as a militarily rudderless economic engine. Any path to a common EU security policy, however, will go through Germany. Likewise, the EU’s response to Russian aggression has centered on Germany’s energy and economic relations with that country.

In short, if President Obama wants to be on good terms with Europe, he needs to leave office on good terms with Germany. The Obama administration has made efforts to clean up the mess of the NSA’s alleged tapping of Merkel’s cell phone, but it still stands that the U.S.’ standing in Germany has been dinged during Obama’s tenure. An effort on his part to cement good relations with Berlin would pay dividends for his successor and America’s ongoing ties with the EU.

It is hard to underestimate the power of the media in today’s politics. Obama is a master communicator, and his rhetorical gifts have played a key role in moving America forward on some key domestic issues. As he aims to cement his legacy, why not take his talents abroad?

The Point of No Return: Climate Change Nightmares Are Already Here
By Eric Holthaus
Rolling Stone

From acidification and warming waters to the disappearance of entire species, climate change has already begun to take its toll on the earth. Some of these changes may be irreversible, and what’s particularly frightening is a lot of them are coming sooner than expected.

Hiroshima
By John Hersey
The New Yorker

Pulled from the archives in remembrance of the 70th anniversary of Hiroshima, this extraordinary article provides an in-depth look into the lives lost and those who somehow managed to survive.

The harrowing story of the Nagasaki bombing mission
By Ellen Bradbury and Sandra Blakeslee
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Although the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were touted as clear and decisive victories by U.S. leadership, the Nagasaki mission in particularly was riddled with screw-ups and errors that could have plunged the plane into the Pacific Ocean. This comprehensive account of the bombing on August 9, 1945, looks at what went wrong and how it changed the course of history.

The Bureaucrats Who Singled Out Hiroshima for Destruction
By Paul Ham
The Atlantic

At first glance, Hiroshima may have seemed like an odd target for the 1945 bombing. It wasn’t Japan’s biggest city, nor was it as obvious of a military target as, say, Kokura. In this excerpt from Hiroshima Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath, Paul Ham tells the story of the reasons military strategists chose their targets and the process that led to dropping the two atomic bombs a few months later.

When Canada Learned It Had Spies
By Graham Templeton
Vice

Canada’s intelligence gathering efforts remained largely a secret until 1972, when a senior analyst at the U.S. National Security Agency divulged the name of its intelligence branch in an interview with the leftist magazine Ramparts. Dubbed the Communications Branch of the National Research Council, or CBNRC, the 1970s marked the death of anonymity for Canada’s SIGINT program. Templeton explores how this information came to light.

Rebuilding Afghanistan: The Way Forward by Elly Rostoum
Russia and the World are not on Good Terms by Hannah Gais
Netanyahu’s Problematic Remarks on the Iran Deal by Josh Klemons
GailForce: Aspen Security Forum Part II – Terrorism by Gail Harris
Beijing Attempts to Stifle South China Sea Discussion at ASEAN by Gary Sands

The turbulent modern history of Afghanistan provides a sketch of a nation either battling or recovering from a series of wars, political unrest and corruption scandals — the confluence of which has left the country facing poverty and an uncertain future.

Afghanistan’s economy is largely reliant on an international community that provides billions of dollars a year to prevent the country from falling into complete chaos. Despite these efforts, international influx of money in Afghanistan has done little to build a sustainable economy that could eventually stand independent of international support.

The perennial challenge for international reconstruction efforts lies with the lack of fiscal and economic sustainability, and in the absence of proper political governance at the governmental level.

Earlier this month, the Center for Rebuilding Sustainable Communities After Disasters (CRSCAD) at the University of Massachusetts Boston, hosted an international conference on “Rebuilding Sustainable Communities in Afghanistan: The Way Forward.” I had a chance to catch up with the center’s founding director and a professor of Urban Planning and Community Studies, Dr. Adenrele Awotona, who explained,

In March 1948, just after the end of World War II, the United States Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act and approved funding of over $12 billion for the rebuilding of war-ravaged Western Europe. That comprehensive European Recovery Program was nicknamed the “Marshall Plan.” In 2014, after over a decade of war in Afghanistan, records show that more United States and NATO money had been invested in the “reconstruction” of that country than was spent on the Marshall Plan.

For once, money doesn’t seem to be the problem. Corruption and the lack of regulatory, fiscal and constitutional structures have lead to an uneven distribution of wealth in the country — mostly concentrated with the top 15 to 20 percent of the population. The economic disparity is a bit of deja vu, and had previously been an contributing factor the original Communist takeover in the 1978. Today, competing political ideologies remain a problem. They are mostly sectarian and Islamic in flavor and continue to divide the country, eliminating any semblance of good governance.

The challenge for Afghan reconstruction is ensuring sustainability. The international community’s reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan has not stressed the need for sustainability. The majority of the hundreds of billions already poured into reconstruction has gone to building roads, dams, hospitals and schools – but the Afghans are not able to sustain much of that infrastructure without the continued financial support. In other words, when the money stops flowing, the structures won’t last long.

Perhaps a better strategy to rebuilding Afghanistan lies in focusing efforts on 1.) formulating a strong constitution that is embedded and reflective of the country’s history, culture, faith and one that is deeply committed to a modern understanding of human and civic rights; 2) strengthening law enforcement — not through militarization, but in the ability to enforce laws, keep the peace, and prosecute those who break the law — this point is particularly important in helping curb corruption — which remains rampant given the inability to prosecute those who break the laws; 3) providing  a strong regulatory and fiscal framework to facilitate and protect investment. A viable solution for Afghanistan’s economic woes and development lies with the private sector. Private international investment can help develop profitable business enterprises that can spur and generate greater economic development in the country, and produce needed revenues for the government to aid in rebuilding Afghanistan.

The caveat lies with the substantial above-ground security risks of doing business in Afghanistan. Providing the conditions for private sector growth requires proper political governance at both the national and local levels. It also requires that the international community focus its efforts on paving the way and providing the right conditions for private sector growth both in terms of infrastructure, but perhaps most importantly in building a robust, enforceable regulatory structure to secure and protect investments.

You can follow Elly on Twitter @EllyRostoum

Putin at a BRICS summit in 2014. Photo Credit: Presidential Press and Information Office

Is Russia’s aggressive foreign policy finally catching up to it?

A recent poll of 26 countries, which was conducted by the Pew Research Center, found that views of Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, are largely unfavorable, and in some countries, still on the decline.

Anti-Russian sentiment was highest in Jordan and Poland, where 80 percent of participants expressed a negative view toward the country. Some notable runner-ups included Israel (74 percent), Japan (73 percent) and Ukraine (72 percent). In Western Europe, Germany and France followed shortly behind, with 70 percent of participants expressing unfavorable opinions toward the country.

For the most part, public perception of Putin was lower in all of these countries, even if only marginally, than perception of Russia. Here, Spain took the lead, with 92 percent of participants expressing no confidence in Putin’s ability to do the right thing in world affairs. Poland (87 percent), France (85 percent) and Ukraine (84 percent) followed closely behind.

To some extent, these numbers are not tremendously surprising. Even before the conflict in Ukraine kicked off in early 2014, relations between Germany and Russia had begun to sour. In 2010, 50 percent of Germans expressed favorable views toward Russia; by 2014, that number had dropped to a staggering 19 percent. Meanwhile, in Russia, positive feelings toward Germany dropped from 78 percent in 2011 to 35 percent in 2015.

Distrust runs rampant — and for good reason. Eastern European and Baltic states, even those that are NATO members, view Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a stepping stone. “Little green men,” the title given to the unmarked, unacknowledged forces that entered Ukraine in 2014, are just a hop, skip and a jump away. In preparation, Baltic and Eastern European states have girded themselves up in a defensive position. Some, like Poland, have witnessed a dramatic rise in membership to paramilitary associations. There’s even been a proposal to scoop up some of the members of these associations to establish a Territorial Defense Force, somewhat akin to the U.S. National Guard.

Of course, pissing off — or at the very least, freaking out — the EU is undoubtedly on Putin’s agenda. The question is how Russia’s relationship with those countries with a positive opinion, or even no opinion at all, will change in the years to come.

Pro-Russian sentiment was highest in Vietnam (75 percent), Ghana (56 percent) and China (51 percent). All three were mostly supportive of Putin’s conduct in world affairs as well. That makes sense: Russia’s own so-called pivot to Asia has emphasized both Vietnam and China.

Where things get murky for Russia is in Africa. Although Russian influence in Africa was extensive during the Cold War, it pulled back dramatically after the fall of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Russia continues to engage in arms and resources trade with a number of Africa nations, albeit under different ideological pretexts. This time it’s more about business, not exporting a revolution.

Although Russia has actively pushed for more economic engagement in both Africa and Asia, more trade doesn’t necessarily lead to an empathetic public. In South Africa, a member of the BRICS partnership, of which Russia is an integral part, only about 25 percent of people viewed Russia in a positive light. As a leader, Putin was viewed slightly more favorably — 28 percent were confident he would do the right thing in world affairs. Meanwhile, over half of South Africans held negative opinions of Russia.

But there were also a number of countries where participants claimed to have no opinion of Putin. In Ethiopia, for example, only 10 percent expressed an unfavorable view of Russia, but that’s because a little less than 50 percent of those polled expressed any opinion at all. So as Russia pushes to build its ties with Africa and Asia, a little charm offensive may be in order.

NEW YORK, NY – SEPTEMBER 27: Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, points to a red line he drew on a graphic of a bomb while addressing the United Nations General Assembly.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu just addressed the American Jewish community via live webcast. He spoke for 10 minutes, followed up with a 10 minute question and answer.

All of his standard arguments against the deal were there; he didn’t cover too much new ground. But there were some interesting tidbits.

For one, he re-stated the idea that giving Iran 24-days notice of inspection was like giving several weeks notice to a drug dealer that you’ll be raiding their labs. It’s a great talking point, and he’s used it before. The problem is that the response is stronger than the accusation.

FACT: The half-life of uranium is 700 million years. That’s 10 billion 24-day periods. It will be detected, thanks to the #IranDeal.

— The Iran Deal (@TheIranDeal) July 23, 2015

Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, one of the architects of the Iran deal — and an MIT trained nuclear scientist — prefers to refute this line with an example of Iran from 2003.

“In February 2003, the IAEA requested access to a suspicious facility in Tehran, and negotiations dragged on as Iran tried to remove evidence. But even after six months, tests revealed nuclear activity despite Iran’s attempt to cover it up.”

Netanyahu commented that after receiving notice, Iran would flush their “nuclear meth” in order to hide it from inspectors. It’s powerful language that conjures criminal mastermind Walter White, the main character in the award-winning show “Breaking Bad,” outsmarting the authorities, season after season. But it’s not in line with the facts, and Netanyahu surely knows that. It undermines his position to use talking points that are so blatantly without merit. He clearly believes deep in his heart than this deal is bad — for Israel, the U.S. and the world. But he won’t win his argument through manipulation.

Netanyahu argues that he is not against all deals, only this deal. The glaring problem here is that he is been vocally, vehemently and vociferously against this deal since well before this deal even existed. He says he believes a better deal could have been reached. The Obama administration is just as vehement in their rejections. But it doesn’t matter. Bibi has been talking about a better deal for years! He is the face of all global opposition to this deal, he seems to see himself the leader of a movement, bent on preventing the actualization of this deal. He has thus made himself irrelevant as a force for change. He’s been arguing, since 1993, that Iran is just years away from a nuclear weapon. How can anyone take seriously the Bibi who cried bomb?

The most glaring issue with his remarks, however, revolved around Israel’s neighbor’s reactions to the agreement. When Bibi first came out against the deal, he pointed out that both Israel and the Arab states were against it. He posed the question: How often do Israel and our Arab neighbors see eye-to-eye on anything?

It’s a powerful argument. Israel was against the deal, so too Saudi Arabia and their Arab allies.

But the day before this speech, the Washington Post reported that during a visit from Secretary of State Kerry, the Persian Gulf Arab states had publicly endorsed the Iran nuclear deal. They continued:

“The GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) support leaves Israel as the only country in the Middle East to vehemently oppose the agreement.”

This is extremely problematic for Netanyahu since he is supposed to be the learned teacher, patiently explaining why this deal is so bad for the entire world. Ignoring such developments make him look either dishonest or uninformed. Neither are great traits for the leader of a movement, especially not one as serious as this.

Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk.

Secretary Kerry presides over meeting of anti-ISIS coalition members at NATO Headquarters in Belgium. Photo Credit: U.S. Department of State

I went into this year’s Aspen Security Forum with the opinion that an effective terrorism strategy should not just be about addressing our options against Al Qaeda and/or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) operations; rather, I viewed defeating these groups as a worldwide problem that requires a worldwide policy. In spite of the many critics, the Obama administration does have a robust strategy for dealing with terrorism; it just does not go far enough in forming an effective, unified global alliance against all violent extremist organizations (VEOs). What you have are separate ongoing, unconnected efforts of various nations, many with varying degrees of U.S. assistance, against groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabaab in Somalia.

What is needed, in my opinion, is an organization much like the NATO alliance, which was formed to deal with the threat of Communism during the Cold War. This time around, however, such an alliance would be directed against VEOs. The organization would maintain a multinational standing rapid deployment force that would be dispersed when requested by a member nation. Although the U.S. government, specifically the Department of Defense, has tried to tackle this issue with varying degrees of success, I heard nothing during the forum that caused me to change my views.

Many of the speakers were asked if Al Qaeda was still a threat. Others weighed in with their opinion on whether ISIS or Al Qaeda posed a the greater threat. My takeaway was that while it has been severely degraded, Al Qaeda was still a threat, but ISIS presented what I call a more “clear and present danger” to the homeland because of the efficacy of their outreach and the potential effect of “lone wolfs.”

As I mentioned in my last blog, FBI Director James Comey considers ISIS the greater threat to the homeland. Others weren’t so sure. James Clapper, the director of National Intelligence, when asked if the use of social media by ISIS made it a greater threat to the homeland than Al Qaeda replied: “Well, that’s a hard…question because it’s different; it’s threatening. To say one is of greater magnitude than the other at least for me is hard.”

Still, I think Jeh Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, summed this issue up best during his talk when he remarked:

[O]ver the last 14 years, since 9/11, we’re seen core Al Qaeda, as everybody knows, AQAP, the Al Qaeda-affiliated elements of Al Shabab, which, while I was at DoD, we were focused on in our counterterrorism efforts. We have done a lot to degrade core Al Qaeda, through our good efforts. We have done a lot to degrade AQAP and Al Shabaab through our good efforts. The global terrorist threat now, as everybody knows… has evolved, and it has evolved in a very significant way from those groups to more groups, [ISIS] being the most prominent example, obviously, and it has evolved from terrorist directed terrorist attacks to terrorist-inspired attacks.… I think that the distinction between terrorist directed and terrorist-inspired is a significant one that the American people need to understand…why we are where we are in our efforts.

And so if you catalog the terrorist attacks and attempted attacks in this country and in Europe, for example, they almost fit neatly into one of two boxes, the terrorist-directed attacks, with an operative who has been recruited, trained, directed overseas and exported to someplace else to commit a terrorist attack, to terrorist-inspired attacks, which very often, most often involve a homegrown or even homeborn threat, and the individual has never even come face to face with a member of [ISIS] or AQ, but is inspired, through the very effective use of social media, to commit an attack or attempt to commit a small-scale attack.

And I think the American people need to understand how we have evolved to this new phase, because it does involve a whole of government approach, it does involve a lot of domestic-based efforts, in addition to the good work of the FBI and in addition to taking the fight to the enemy overseas.

Since most of the terrorism discussions revolved around ISIS, that will be my focus for the rest of this blog. I’m a bottom line kind of person, so it seems fitting to start with defining what is President Obama’s ISIS strategy and the status of the threat and the challenges as described by the intelligence community. The White House was represented by Lisa Monaco, Deputy National Security Adviser and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. Monaco stated the goal was “to degrade, defeat and ultimately, to destroy [ISIS]. But we’ve got to be very clear-eyed about this. It is going to take time.”

ISIS’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “the caliph,” has urged other groups to join them. Many VEOs around the world, such as Nigeria’s Boko Haram have responded and declared allegiance to ISIS. Monaco indicated the Obama administration was prepared to respond to this challenge by taking the fight into areas other than Iraq and Syria.

[ISIS] is undertaking an effort to establish an Islamic State, first in the heartland of Syria and Iraq. But…they’re trying to expand to at least eight provinces at this point, Libya being the most advanced and concerning in terms of sending actual operative focused on external attacks, but everywhere, from North Africa to the Caucasus. So yes, we’re absolutely concerned about their ability to find safe haven, to take root, and to attract fighters and to then extend their reach against our partners, our allies and ultimately to the homeland. And we’re going to make sure that we’re taking steps. If there is a threat posed to the United States from Libya, from one of these places, there should be no satisfaction amongst [ISIS] that they’re going to have a safe haven and that that threat won’t be addressed.

What form these efforts take or how robust they would be was unclear. The Obama administration has been pretty adamant about the boots on the ground issue.

Nevertheless, the Obama administration is working with a coalition of 62 nations to implement its strategy. Former Marine General John Allen, now the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, remarked that the coalition operated along five lines of efforts: military, counter-finance, countering flow of foreign fighters, counter-messaging, and humanitarian assistance and stabilization support. The intent of the effort is to achieve the U.S.’s strategic goals.

As for the challenges the intelligence community faces, the senior leaders present were pretty much in agreement. Clapper best summarized these challenges:

[T]he problem for us in intelligence is with the way people radicalize on their own or are radicalized via social media where they don’t leave out a signature. They don’t emit, if you will — and I mean that in a holistic sense — some attribute or trait or behavior that would lead you to begin watching them.

And so we’re lacking that. And this phenomenon of the radicalization, either on one zone or through the vehicle of social media — and I think [Comey] spoke to the challenge we have now where someone is proselyted by an [ISIS] recruiter sitting in Syria or some place, and then if there is an interest that is evoked on the part of the one being proselyted or the potential extremist, and then they’ll switch to, you know, encrypted communications that we can’t watch, we can’t warrant.

And as Jim has said, probably there are now investigations in every one of the 50 states. And this is a real worry, a real concern for us because I personally think it’s a question of time before we have more of these than we have already. And it’s a very daunting challenge for us. And so — and I think it’s illustrative of how the threat has morphed to a certain extent from, you know, industrial-size attack of the magnitude of the 9/11 in which there are or were, as we learned afterwards, signatures that could have forewarned us had we seen them.

And in this case, you don’t have those, even though there are a smaller scale, but as we’ve seen with the case of the shootings in Chattanooga, the psychological impact that has is, I think, quite profound. So it’s a serious threat.

Think I’ll end here. More to follow on terrorism, cyber and other issues discussed at the Forum in the coming days.

Representatives of ASEAN countries gather at Putra World Trade Centre on Saturday. RAJA FAISAL HISHAN/The Star.

“It should not be discussed,” remarked Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin on Monday, referring to the South China Sea dispute prior to Tuesday’s meeting in Kuala Lumpur of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China claims close to 90 percent of the South China Sea, amid rival claims by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei, many of which overlap.

Liu, in an interview with Reuters, warned non-ASEAN countries, such as the U.S., not to interfere. “This is not the right forum. This is a forum for promoting cooperation. If the U.S. raises the issue we shall of course object. We hope they will not.” Other non-ASEAN participants in this week’s meeting include China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Russia and the European Union.

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi also argued on Monday that the upcoming ASEAN meeting is not “the appropriate place for discussing specific bilateral disputes” and noted that discussion would “heighten confrontation.”

The most vocal of nations criticizing China’s actions in the South China Sea is the Philippines, which recently took Beijing to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague for a ruling over its right to waters in a 200-nautical mile “exclusive economic zone” off its coast. The U.S. has also been critical of Beijing’s actions, calling for a halt to the construction of artificial islands and an airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef. Last week, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) speculated Beijing is building another artificial island for military purposes.

While the U.S. is officially neutral in the dispute, arguing for freedom of navigation to protect the $5 trillion in shipping trade that passes through the region each year, the U.S. military has become increasingly active in the region, stepping up military drills with regional allies such as the Philippines and Japan. The Obama administration will send Secretary of State John Kerry as its representative to Kuala Lumpur on Wednesday, who will likely press for a halt to island reclamation and a demilitarization in the South China Sea, regardless of any attempt by Beijing to stifle discussion.

Indeed, the dictatorial attempt by Liu to halt discussion is almost laughable in diplomatic circles. It is counter to Beijing’s policy of non-interference in other countries affairs and inherently unenforceable. Furthermore, Wang’s similar attempt to stifle discussion of the South China Sea at the ASEAN meeting by suggesting the forum is not “the appropriate place for discussing specific bilateral disputes,” purposely fails to take into account that some of these disputes are multilateral. Many disputes are multilateral and overlapping.

Beijing, of course, prefers to approach the dispute on a bilateral basis, using potentially lucrative trade deals as an economic carrot and its vast military clout as a stick. This carrot and stick approach has been used to stifle discussion during other ASEAN meetings held in Laos and Cambodia, but this time around in Kuala Lumpur may prove more difficult, given heightened island reclaiming activity by China in the Spratley Island chain, increased military activity by Beijing, budding anger among other South Sea claimants, and (given the slow pace and inability to enforce any decision reached by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague) the lack of an alternative multilateral platform for resolving the issues.

Photo of elaborate cross-border drug smuggling tunnel discovered inside a warehouse near San Diego. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Photo by Ron Rogers

How to Think About Islamic State
By Pankaj Mishra
Guardian

Is the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), now known as the so-called Islamic State, a medieval or modern phenomenon? In this essay, Mishra looks at the alienation bred by some forms of modernization and Westernization has played in drawing more and more fighters to ISIS.

The Mystery of ISIS
By Anonymous
The New York Review of Books

ISIS’s rise — and indeed, its success — has been shrouded in mystery. Riddled with contradictory explanations for anything from its military success in Iraq to how it draws foreign fighters en masse, many of the accounts that attempt to explain the group’s success in detail are lacking in some way. Whatever the “real” secret is to ISIS’s success, it will do little to quell the fear its rise instills within us.

Against All Odds
By T.A. Frank
National Journal

With such a crowded Republican field, one of the main questions that’s come up this primary season is:  Why even bother running for president when you know you’re not going to win the nomination? In this article, Frank looks at the logic behind George Pataki’s campaign, which has, to the say the least, been received without much fanfare.

Cattle-Camp Politics
By Jérôme Tubiana
Foreign Affairs

Underneath the power struggle among the “big men” of South Sudan (i.e., military leaders), there’s another far more longstanding conflict: that which has been created by inter-tribal tensions. These conflicts have played out over control of land and cattle and represent a far deeper conflict within the country — one that has left Tubiana wondering, “Is no one innocent in South Sudan?”

Underworld
By Montel Reel
New Yorker

The infrastructure supporting the U.S.-Mexican drug trade is vast. Indeed, within the past century, officials have come across over 181 illicit passages between the U.S.-Mexican border. Some are small, offering barely enough space for a single person to travel through; others are far more complex, fitted with electric lights, elevators and ventilator shafts. Reel delves into some of the recent investigations that have shed light on how these so-called supertunnels came to pass and how they have impacted the international drug trade.

How Beijing’s Foreign Policy Can Backfire on its Tourists by Gary Sands
Burundi’s Electoral Quagmire by Eliza Keller
GailForce: Aspen Security Forum Part I by Gail Harris
Syrian Conflict Drags On by Scott Bleiweis

President of Burundi Pierre Nkurunziza addresses guests during the state banquet at Tuyhuis in Cape Town. (Photo: DOC)

By Eliza Keller

The east African nation of Burundi went to the polls last week in an election marred by violence, media suppression and human rights abuses. Burundi, a country roughly the size of Vermont, is in the midst of its worst crisis since 2005, when a tentative peace agreement ended 12 years of civil war. More than 170,000 men, women, and children have fled to neighboring Tanzania and Rwanda, putting a strain on already scarce resources.

The government of Burundi first held parliamentary elections in late June, despite pleas for postponement from the international community. The European Union and the African Union pulled out their election observers in advance of the elections, fearing that their presence would lend legitimacy to an illegitimate process. A few days later, the United States announced the cutoff of security assistance, and threatened to remove Burundi’s preferential trade status under the recently renewed African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). In a statement at the time, the Department of State declared that the United States “regrets” President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to move ahead with elections.

The parliamentary elections were boycotted by seventeen political parties. Burundi’s electoral commission called turnout “enormous,” but media reports noted that streets in the capital of Bujumbura were deserted and polling stations at universities reported attendance in the single digits. A few days later, U.N. observers declared that the elections were not fair or free and that human rights were violated.

Last week’s presidential elections, in which President Nkurunziza won an unprecedented third term, were held after only a brief postponement, far from the months-long delay called for by Burundi’s neighbors and international partners. Secretary of State John Kerry called the vote “deeply flawed.” As the crisis continues, the international community stands by helplessly. Strongly worded press releases and finger-wagging denunciations are piling up at the feet of President Nkurunziza, who appears unfazed. (A few days after an attempted coup in May, the president was photographed playing soccer with friends while protests raged across Bujumbura.)

These bland public statements carry little influence, but the U.S. has few alternatives in its diplomatic repertoire. In the old days of diplomacy, the U.S. ambassador in Burundi would sit down with President Nkurunziza over Cuban cigars and hash out a compromise — perhaps an agreement to step down in exchange for an esteemed university professorship or, even better, a briefcase filled with crisp U.S. bills. Today, just the protocol involved in arranging such a meeting is deterrent enough. Programs like the Ibrahim Prize, a $5 million cash award granted to African leaders who voluntarily relinquish power, attempts to fill this void, but the prize has only been awarded twice in the last six years.

Of course, more transparent and responsible foreign policy is a good thing. But in a region in which relationships tend to carry more diplomatic weight than memos and mandates, this shift to modern diplomacy has come at the expense of diplomatic influence. The escalating situation in Burundi is evidence of the consequences.

The administration’s much-hyped “pivot to Asia” has brought political backing, diplomatic attention, and resources to a region of the world facing immense challenges. The United States’ leadership in brokering a nuclear deal with Iran shows us the potential of what can happen when these resources are brought to bear. In executing this pivot, however, the administration must not turn its back on the small but ambitious countries of Africa and Latin America. President Obama’s visit to Kenya this week represents an important opportunity for renewed U.S. commitment to the region, and the goodwill that it generates must not be squandered.

Despite dire appearances in Burundi, there is good news: The current U.S. ambassador to Burundi, Dawn Liberi, is not a political fundraiser, but a career diplomat with extensive experience living and working in sub-Saharan Africa. This is a lucky break for the United States. Ambassador Liberi must take pains to ensure that her voice remains strong, steady and assuring amid the gunfire and explosions plaguing Burundi’s capital. She and other diplomats must not isolate President Nkurunziza, but must remain engaged and empathetic.

There is still time for President Nkurunziza to graciously step down and, in doing so, preserve the state that he helped build and establish a legacy as an honorable and benevolent leader. With camaraderie and patience (and maybe a little cash), perhaps Ambassador Liberi and her colleagues can swing the pendulum away from an emerging dictatorship and toward a more peaceful, democratic future for the people of Burundi

Eliza Keller is Editor-in-Chief of the Columbia Journal of International Affairs and a Partner with the Truman National Security Project. She has more than ten years of experience in politics and public service; most recently, she served as Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation. Eliza is currently an MPA candidate at Columbia University and holds a B.S. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University.

Last week brought the passing of Omar Sharif, the legendary actor who became widely known to Western audiences for his work in David Lean’s World War I classic “Lawrence of Arabia.” In that film, Sharif played Sharif Ali, a fictional composite character that becomes Lawrence’s chief adviser and ally among the Arab tribes Lawrence aims to lead.

By coincidence, also last week a 70mm print of the restored “Lawrence of Arabia” had its annual summer screening at the American Film Institute in Silver Spring, Md. The film remains a technical and artistic wonder. It certainly takes its share of artistic liberties: Sharif’s fictionalized Sharif Ali is one of many. However, beyond its value to film history and in spite of its Hollywood embellishments, “Lawrence” still speaks truths about the West’s relationship to the Middle East.

It’s Not All About Oil. The money and influence oil reserves bring to Saudi Arabia and other Arab powers have dominated Western involvement in the region for decades. It makes it easy to forget that the region’s fractious and violent politics predate oil’s existence. Exploration in the region began prior to the war years depicted in the film, but it would be two more decades before the Arabian Peninsula was to be known as an oil powerhouse.

Oil is not a factor in the turmoil “Lawrence” depicts. All of the film’s political struggles stem from Western colonialism and the factionalism among the Arab tribes. The film is a reminder that oil was an added catalyst for political contentions that were already present prior to its discovery.

It’s Not All About Religion. The East/West cultural divide is the film’s over-arching theme. Sharif Ali calls Lawrence “English” throughout, and being awarded tribal robes is both a great source of pride for Lawrence and disdain among his fellow British officers.

However, the sectarianism that is a central part of today’s Middle East politics is as absent as oil from “Lawrence.” The film depicts the waning days of the Ottoman Empire, which served as the center of Muslim political life, and which Western powers sought to plunder at its demise. The absence of religion as a cause of conflict stands in stark contrast to current struggle against ISIS efforts to build a pan-Arab caliphate across existing regional borders. When asked if his men will join the cause of Arab freedom, tribal leader Auda abu Tayi (Anthony Quinn) responds, “What is an Arab?”

Tribal loyalties, and the people and resources tribal leaders control, are paramount. The role of religious identity has come to the political forefront in recent decades. Those in the region still place substantially less weight on colonial-era national borders than do Western powers. One might imagine a contemporary version of the film’s conversation ending in, “What is an Iraqi?”

Don’t Underestimate the Role of Politics Within Western Militaries. One of the film’s crucial relationships is that of Lawrence and Gen. Allenby, the head of British forces in the region. After Lawrence’s forces capture the port of Aqaba from the Turks, Allenby supports his ongoing rearguard actions against Turkish forces while insulating himself from them with a cynical detachment.

“I’ve got my orders, thank God,” Allenby says. “Not like that poor chap. He’s riding the whirlwind.”

Allenby flatters Lawrence’s courage, but he communicates the fact that no one of his political stature would place his reputation in jeopardy to do what Lawrence is doing. That sort of institutional conservatism, and aversion to risk-taking, is not always given its due as a cause of the inertia in the region’s politics over decades. The film does a nice job of depicting the fact that it is as present a factor in the military as it is in the diplomatic world.

“Lawrence” is a feast for the eyes even for those less concerned with the region’s politics. It gave us several performances for the ages — Sharif’s included. It is as masterful a technical achievement as we are likely to see on film (and decades before computer graphics, so every camel you see in “Lawrence” is a camel).

For those following the region’s politics, however, its concluding message is more “plus ça change” than one would hope. Fifty-three years after “Lawrence” arrived on screens, we are still describing the West’s relationship with the Middle East in similar terms. That may change. To quote one of Lawrence’s favorite sayings in the film, “Nothing is written.”

Photo Credit: Daphne Carlson Bremer/USFWS

How Britain and the US decided to abandon Srebrenica to its fate
By Florence Hartmann and Ed Vulliamy
The Guardian

Dubbed the worst massacre in Europe since World War II, the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 has long been considered a stain on Western efforts to secure peace in the Balkans. But another recent investigation sheds new light on the West’s involvement, or lack thereof, during those weeks in July.

Elephant Watch
By Peter Canby
The New Yorker

As demand for ivory in Asia rises, offering more monetary incentives for poachers throughout the region, poachers are going to great lengths to harvest ivory, threatening Africa’s already-dwindling elephant population even further. Canby looks into poaching as it is practiced today in countries like the Central African Republic and the Congo, and profiles the scientists, activists and politicians working to end the noxious practice.

The Rule of Boko Haram
By Joshua Hammer
The New York Review of Books

While it’s one of the wealthiest and most oil-rich countries in Africa, Nigeria has been chasing political stability for quite some time. Corruption and a series of military dictatorships have weakened the country significantly, making the rich richer and the poor much, much poorer. It’s within this context that Boko Haram emerged, with its roots in one of the poorest parts of Nigeria. In this review of Mike Smith’s Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War, Hammer looks into the terrorist group’s roots, the damage it’s done to the country and the military efforts against it.

Well Aimed and Powerful
By Margaret Lazarus Dean
Longreads

In this excerpt from Dean’s latest book, Leaving Orbit, Dean looks at space travel and the strange phenomenon of moon landing conspiracy theories. In recent years, the theory has, for whatever reason, picked up steam, and a staggering number of “doubters” have come forward. An era of ignorance, it seems, about spaceflight is upon us.

The Mixed Up Brothers of Bogota
By Susan Dominus
The New York Times Magazine

Two sets of fraternal twins; one big mix up. Dominus tells the story of how it happened and how they found out.

The Overlooked Roots of the Greek Crisis by Scott Monje
Unleashing the Patriotic Dragon by Gary Sands
Israel has Hired a Cartoonist by Josh Klemons
The Diplomatic Erosion of the SALT II Treaty: Russia Builds a New ICBM by Richard Basas
Tensions Between Russia and the West Play Out Over Srebrenica by Hannah Gais

A boy at a grave during the 2006 funeral of genocide victims at the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Center. Photo Credit: Emir Kotromanić

Twenty years on, one of the largest massacres in Europe since World War II continues to spur controversy, now threatening to further divide Russia and the West.

The event in question is the Srebrenica massacre — the systematic killing of over 8,000 Bosniak men and boys in and around Srebrenica in July 1995 during the Bosnian War. Srebrenica, which had been declared a “safe area” under the protection of U.N. peacekeeping units, was stormed by the Bosnia Serb Army (VRS) in the afternoon of July 10, 1995. At the time, U.N. officers in the region put out an urgent call to stop the VRS from overrunning the town. Despite repeated requests, NATO did not attempt to provide air support until July 11. Without substantial assistance, the VRS was able to drive out the U.N. peacekeepers and Dutch forces stationed there and seize the town, killing thousands.

Ten years later, U.N. secretary-general Kofi Annan called it “the worst [crime] on European soil since the Second World War.”

Still, whether or not the event should be classified as a genocide continues to be a major point of contention for a number of countries, including some of Serbia’s closest allies. That controversy has reignited over Russia’s veto of a recent U.N. resolution put forward to the U.N. Security Council for a vote on Wednesday. The resolution would have formally recognized the massacre as a genocide on the eve of its 20th anniversary.

Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s ambassador to the U.N., accused the resolution of being “not constructive, confrontational and politically-motivated.” He further argued that the text, at least as it stands now, would “doom the region to tension” because it singled out war crimes committed by Bosnian Serbs.

But a number of Western diplomats have taken issue with Churkin’s characterization of the resolution, particularly because the vote had actually been delayed in order for British, American and Russian diplomats to come to a compromise on some of the language.

“We had very, very close contact with the Russians throughout all of this. Indeed, we would’ve held this debate yesterday — we postponed it for a day in order to allow for last-minute consultations with the Russians to try and get the widest support possible for this resolution,” Peter Wilson, the U.K. ambassador deputy permanent representative to the U.N., told the BBC.

“People recognize that you can’t make progress in the way that Bosnia-Herzegovina needs to make progress if you don’t recognize what happened in the past.”

Samantha Power, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., took an even more aggressive stance, saying, “Russia’s veto is heartbreaking for those families and it is a further stain on this Council’s record.”

“This Council did everything in its power to get Russia on board with this simple resolution that did not even name the perpetrators. But Russia had a red line; the resolution could not reference the genocide in Srebrenica. It could not reference a fact.”

These diplomatic efforts aside, Russia’s veto is not tremendously surprising. Russia and Serbia are close allies. Both Putin and Medvedev have repeatedly backed Serbia’s condemnations of Kosovo’s independence, calling its efforts “immoral and illegal.” Still, with Serbia sniffing out a possible EU membership, Russia does have some cause for concern. It has seen other former Soviet satellite states fall out of its sphere of influence and gravitate toward the West. Fears of Serbia doing the same are not unfounded. Backing Serbia and its narrative about Srebrenica (Serbia denies the killings were genocidal in nature) is one way to try and keep the country in Russia’s orbit.

Students and pro-democracy activists were among those who marched to the Hong Kong government’s headquarters to protest the new curriculum, which authorities are encouraging schools to begin using when classes resume in September. Students and pro-democracy activists marching to the Hong Kong government’s headquarters in 2012 to protest the new patriotic curriculum. Vincent Yu / The Associated Press

An exhibition to commemorate the World War II victory over Japan is Beijing’s latest attempt to prop up nationalism and is part of a greater effort at patriotism that could eventually backfire. The “Great Victory and Historical Contribution” exhibition opened on Tuesday at the Museum of the War of the Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in Beijing. The opening marked the 78th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, regarded as the first battle of the second Sino-Japanese war. The exhibition was visited later that day by Chinese President Xi Jinping and all of the top leadership of the seven-man Politburo Standing Committee.

The exhibition comes at a time when relations between Beijing and Tokyo have soured over the last few years, largely as a result of Beijing’s dissatisfaction with the depth of Japanese apologies for war suffering and heightened tensions over competing claims to islands in the East China Sea, alternatively known as the Diaoyu or Senkaku. Beijing also frets over Japan’s recent constitutional push for greater militarism, while Tokyo claims Beijing is becoming more aggressive in asserting its maritime territorial claims.

While the exhibition includes the usual weaponry and gruesome photos, it differs little from similar war-time exhibitions found in other countries, as it is intended to serve as propaganda for furthering patriotic education. Yet the seemingly harmless exhibition can be viewed as but one in a series of efforts toward the promotion of nationalism, following last year’s creation by Xi of three new annual national holidays linked to the war. Also this week, Beijing announced on Monday the staging of 183 war-themed performances, and the screening of new movies, television shows, and documentaries intended “to increase patriotism.” Beijing will also hold a military parade in September to mark the anniversary of the end of the war in Asia.

Unfortunately, the enhanced drive by Beijing to create nationalists and promote citizen patriotism has worrisome parallels to its attempt to promote stock ownership among its citizens. The party’s attempt at hyping stock ownership and propping up share values has only increased expectations of higher and unreasonable returns, as the average price-earnings ratio reached 64 for the Shenzhen exchange (anything above 25 is considered expensive). These high valuations eventually proved unsustainable, with fears causing the markets to crash over 30 percent from their peak on June 12 and forcing Beijing to restrict trading in close to half of the market’s shares. The inability of Beijing to impose effective stabilization measures to limit the downward spiral of share selling has many Chinese now wondering just how effective their government is at overall control measures.

Could the same downward spiral happen because of rising nationalism? Were changes to the Japan constitution to allow for greater militarization, could Tokyo seek to aggressively assert its claim over the Senkaku island chain, thereby prompting a strong (and face-saving) response from Beijing? With growing patriotism and today’s social networking capabilities, angry nationalistic mobs could rise up more quickly and coordinated in provinces and cities throughout China. We have already witnessed rampant Chinese nationalism against the Japanese in recent years, as patriotic citizens burned a Panasonic factory in Qingdao, looted a Toyota dealership and Japanese restaurants, and torched Japanese-branded cars (being made in China by Chinese workers). Meanwhile, Chinese fishermen have amassed in huge flotillas to challenge fishing rights in disputed waters.

Xi’s willingness to foster a greater patriotism among his citizens is a method copied from Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution with his backing of the Red Guards. The growth of nationalism and the encouragement of a New Red Guard in China is potentially as dangerous, as it raises expectations which may spiral out of control. Growing nationalism and subsequent support for Chinese companies vis-a-vis foreign companies (through increased regulation) also has the potential to scare off new foreign direct investment. Japanese manufacturers are already reconsidering investing in China and other countries may follow.

While the excesses of Mao’s Red Guard cannot currently compare with the patriotic fervor Xi has begun to promote, China is not strengthening its cause by encouraging these nationalistic forces to draw attention in international media and is failing to draw international sympathy for its cause. Instead, China is heightening anxieties among neighboring nations and inadvertently stoking the nationalist fires of other countries who are racing to upgrade their military capabilities. By firing up nationalism, the party is shooting itself in the foot as it weakens its ability to partner with these countries (and others not directly involved in maritime territorial disputes) to secure the resources it needs for its somewhat diminished, but continued, growth.

This escalation of nationalism will no doubt backfire as countries realize the extent the party will go to in order to secure its own interest — to the detriment of its trade partners. Perhaps most importantly, though, the party must be careful not to raise the nationalistic expectations of its patriotic populace in similar ways it raised the materialistic expectations of its profiteering populace — witness the recent anger and resentment over the all-powerful party’s inability to stem losses on the Shanghai and Shenzen stock markets. The new party leadership under Xi should reconsider its approach to promoting nationalism, in light of its failure to control the stock markets, and reign in its latest effort to promote nationalism, for as Mao Zedong once said, “It only takes a spark to start a prairie fire.”

Public anger over austerity in Greece. Via: Flickr by how will I ever

There seems to be a widespread belief that Greece is in the trouble it is in today because it will not implement the policies that Europe has demanded of it. While it has neglected some reforms, it has adhered to Europe’s key austerity demands more faithfully than any other country in Europe. It appears, however, that this very policy, far from constructing the anticipated sound foundation, has driven the Greek economy into the ground. That is why Greece does not want to follow that path any more.

You could argue, I suppose, that the roots of the Greek crisis go back to the failure of traditional Keynesian economics to explain the “stagflation” of the 1970s. Stagnation and inflation were not supposed to happen at the same time. Thus, many academic economists began to move away from Keynes and his assumptions. Governments, too, were becoming less enthusiastic about Keynesian fiscal policies, in particular, which were rarely nimble enough to deal with the relatively quick fluctuations of the routine business cycle. As a result, there were fewer active efforts to manipulate the economy to avoid recessions and inflation and toward a greater reliance on markets to regulate themselves.

When the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was built within the European Union (EU) in the 1990s, it followed this model. As several countries moved toward the use of a single currency (eventually called the euro), a European Central Bank (ECB) was built, but its functions were limited to fighting inflation. No common fiscal institutions were created whatsoever. Instead, member countries retained their own sovereign fiscal institutions and policies. They were instructed to keep their budget deficits within three percent of GDP and national debt within 60 percent of GDP, but these restrictions have been routinely violated by member countries without triggering sanctions.

Germany, the largest economy in the European Union, was particularly fond of the new arrangement (indeed, it had insisted on it), given its own focus on balanced budgets and inflation. Germany had been scarred by the hyperinflation that it suffered in the early 1920s. (In November 1923, a loaf of bread cost 200,000,000,000 marks.) One of its highest priorities was to prevent any of the less disciplined countries of Europe from imposing inflation on it through the new monetary union. That, however, has not prevented Germany from violating its own restrictions on deficit and debt.

Most EU members transitioned to the euro as the common currency from 1999 to 2002. Greece’s acceptance into the EMU was delayed until 2001 because of its unacceptable deficits and inflation rate, and many Europeans were skeptical of its prospects even then. Once the “eurozone” was born, it created the impression that lenders were dealing with a single politico-economic entity, that buying euro-denominated bonds from the Greek treasury was the equivalent of buying euro-denominated bonds from the German treasury. Money began flowing freely out of core European economies into Greece and other peripheral economies.*

In Greece, interest rates fell, inflation grew and relative productivity plummeted. Current accounts were soon out of balance in both core and periphery. The periphery ran large deficits, while the core ran correspondingly large surpluses, as the peripheral economies used the money to buy things from the core economies. The core economies were, in effect, growing at the expense of the weaker peripheral economies, which financed their deficits by borrowing even more from German, French, and other European banks.

Then, in 2010, the euro crisis hit, the Greek bubble burst and demand collapsed. The unemployment rate in Greece peaked at 28 percent, and has been holding steady at 25 percent. Youth unemployment approaches 50 percent.

Despite the appearance of a single European politico-economic system, when the crisis hit, Greece was not able to rely on overall European fiscal resources, but on its own meager capacity, immediately generating a fiscal crisis at the national level. When the Germans and other members of the European core looked at Greece, they saw the profligate and sometimes fraudulent borrowing accompanied by corruption, widespread tax evasion, an unaffordable pension system and other fiscal problems.** These problems were real and needed to be addressed, although arguably the middle of an economic crisis was not the best time for some of them. Yet the leaders of the core economies failed to recognize their own contribution to the problem, or even raise the issue of addressing their own current-account surpluses, which continued to siphon money out of Greece.

Because Greece was a member of the EMU, certain policy options available to other countries in crisis were not available to it. For instance, it could not improve its current-account balance by devaluing its currency relative to its major trade partners because they were using the same currency. (As a consequence of the single currency, German companies that export outside the eurozone benefit every time the Greek crisis drives the value of the euro lower.) Greece could not expand its money supply in an effort to lower interest rates and boost domestic demand because it had no control over monetary policy. Monetary policy was decided at the continental level, primarily in ways consistent with Germany’s preferences, which are the opposite of Greece’s needs.

While Greece’s fiscal problems required reducing its budget deficits, a logical accompaniment to that would have been for Germany to expand its own economy and buy more things from Greece. That would have given a boost to demand in the Greek economy and helped reduce the imbalance in their mutual current accounts. Instead, European leaders offered Greece a bailout consisting of even more loans, the proceeds of which were dedicated not to easing a Greek fiscal transition but almost entirely to paying back European banks for older loans. In return for this, Greece was expected to eliminate its budget deficits through austerity — by increasing taxes and reducing government spending and pensions, laying off workers and privatizing state-owned assets.

The austerity approach has proved to be counterproductive. That may not be true in every situation, but it is true in the conditions prevailing since the global economic crisis of 2008, a situation in which consumer demand and corporate investment collapsed and interest rates are stuck near zero. The problem of insufficient demand cannot be remedied by depressing demand even further, which is the consequence of reducing government spending. Even if other reforms were to succeed in improving productivity, companies will have no reason to take advantage of that productivity if there are no consumers. The IMF’s own research department, after studying the impact of Europe’s austerity policies in the aftermath of 2008, concluded that for every $1.00 cut from government spending, economic activity was reduced by roughly $1.30. Thus, austerity has depressed economies even further, and no country in has pursued austerity more than Greece.

The Greek bailout of 2010 had to be followed by another in 2012. That one involved writing off 75 percent of Greece’s debts and the transfer of most of the remaining debt from private banks to public European institutions (shielding the core economy banks in the event of a Greek default). It appears that yet another bailout is required now.

From 2007 to 2014, Greece reduced government spending by more than 20 percent, far more than any other country in the EU, including countries held up to Greece as models. In the same period, Greek GDP has contracted by 20 percent, and per capita consumption by even more. (Keep in mind that 20 percent of GDP is much more than 20 percent of the budget, even in Greece.) Greece’s debt burden (that is, its debt-to-GDP ratio) has worsened under the recovery plan not only because of the additional loans but because its GDP is smaller. Whereas the Troika supervising Greece’s economic recovery program (the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF) predicted in 2010 that their program would turn the Greek economy around in 2011 and have it approaching precrisis levels by now, the Greek GDP still remains 20 percent below that figure. While Greece showed signs of growth in 2014 (0.8 percent) for the first time since 2007, it slipped back into recession in 2015.

Greece’s deficit reduction (first bar) has been substantially greater than any other European country’s. (Graph: European Commission, via Paul Krugman’s blog, Conscience of a Liberal, www.nytimes.com)

The Syriza government that came into office in Athens in January sought to renegotiate the terms of Greece’s recovery program. The latest offer from the Troika, which officially expired on June 30, would have required Greece to increase austerity further, raising the country’s primary budget surplus (i.e., revenues minus expenditures excluding interest payments on outstanding debt) in stages from 1 percent of GDP this year to 3.5 percent of GDP starting in 2018. Although Greece did achieve a primary budget surplus in 2014, it is back in deficit in 2015.

All this comes at the same time that the IMF is acknowledging that Greece will never be able to pay its debts in full even if it follows the Troika’s demands to the letter. Some observers see this as a European conspiracy to keep Greece down, yet that does not seem right either. European leaders appear to believe in the healing effects of austerity; the entire continent has followed the austerity path, albeit not as extremely as Greece. They do not want to bend the rules for Greece in large part because they fear that other countries will then demand to be released from the general austerity prescription. Yet, according to some economists, austerity is the reason that the entire European continent is barely keeping its collective economic nose above water — and has repeatedly threatened to drive the global economy back into recession — regardless of the repeated proclamations of success coming out of Brussels. In 2009, unemployment was 9.5 percent in both the United States and the eurozone; in 2015, unemployment is 5.4 percent in the United States and 11.1 percent in the eurozone.***

Now, of course, the United States also has states with different economic trends and different levels of development, just like Europe, but because the United States considers itself a single country, it handles fiscal issues differently. Florida did not have to deal with its real estate crisis on its own in 2008; if it had, it would have suffered bankruptcy as well. Federal funds flow freely from state to state. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco has calculated that Mississippi, for example, receives $500 per capita more in federal transfers than it pays in federal taxes, whereas Delaware pays $13,000 per capita more in federal taxes then it receives in federal transfers. This goes on perpetually. Since we all live in the same country, however, we do not see it as a crisis, do not call it a bailout, do not demand that Mississippi pay the money back, and do not exact punishment for the state’s failure to cover its own expenses. It is simply government functioning.

Since 2010 the ongoing euro crisis has prompted the EU to strengthen some of its economic and financial institutions. Still, Jean Monnet’s dream of a United States of Europe clearly is still a long way off.

*In the case of Greece, the government borrowed large amounts. In Spain and Ireland, large amounts flowed into the private sector, fueling large real estate bubbles. When the crisis hit, both of those countries suffered despite the fact that their government budgets were actually in surplus at the time. Greece is really the only country where government debt played a substantial role in the crisis, which suggests at least the possibility that the Greek crisis could have happened even if the government had not borrowed so much.

**The Greek pension system manages to be a significant fiscal burden (about 18% of GDP, half of which comes out of the national budget) without being especially generous on an individual level. For nearly half the recipients it is below the poverty line, and for many households (especially these days) it is the only source of income. Unfortunately, this makes it extremely difficult to forge a compromise.

***The United States has probably focused too much on deficit reduction, slowing its own recovery, but not as much as Europe.

Recently, the Foreign Ministry of Israel released a cartoon mocking (Western) reporters, portraying them as clueless and ignorant.

The cartoon shows a blonde American reporter missing all of the obvious atrocities happening around him as he reports live from Gaza.

“We are here in the center of Gaza, and as you can see, people here are trying to live quiet lives. There are no terrorists here, just ordinary people,” he says.

In the meantime, a militant launches a missile in the background, and a Hamas official carries off an LGBT activist with a bag over his head, presumably for execution.

The cartoon was in English, clearly intended for a foreign audience.

It was released to preempt the publication of a U.N. Human Rights Council report critical of Israel’s war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip last summer.

Then, Israel released another cartoon this week. It was tweeted out by account of the Prime Minister of Israel (as opposed to Bibi’s personal account) and shared through their Facebook account. In fact, at the time of this writing, @IsraelPM has it as a pinned tweet and the Prime Minister of Israel‘s Facebook account has it as a pinned post.

The cartoon presents the case that Iran is just like ISIS:

“The Islamic State of Iran.
Like ISIS.
Just much bigger.”

Again, the cartoon is in English.

Neither cartoon got much of a warm reception online, or from the press. If Israel was hoping to change hearts and minds, they need look no further than the YouTube comments of the most recent video to see they fell short. It has twice the number of thumbs down as thumbs up, and that was the polite response. The comments are particularly nasty.

Many have compared both videos to be of the “South Park style.” Neither swayed anyone who didn’t already agree with their point, and both gave ample room for mockery, if not outright anger.

If nothing else, whoever was tasked with creating this videos should be reprimanded for keeping the comments section open on YouTube.

Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk.

The threat of nuclear war was diminished greatly in the early 1980s after the SALT II treaty between the United States and Soviet Union created an agreed upon reduction of nuclear arms. The emergence of MIRVs, missiles that could release multiple warheads on various targets using one rocket as its base, was considered to be a significant risk to both sides. MIRVs and similar systems were limited and eventually banned by the SALT I and SALT II treaties. However, in 2013, the Russian government announced it was going to replace their late generation SS-18 Satan missiles with a new system. The new system, named Sarmat, will begin testing in October 2015. This new ICBM will likely be the newest and most advanced system to be put into service in a generation.

The re-establishment of Russian and NATO military units across the borders is ramping up while diplomacy in Ukraine continues to be usurped by active battles in Eastern Ukraine. NATO’s commitment to place heavy tank and artillery divisions in countries bordering Russia has given Russia the narrative and catalyst to increase its military presence on its own border. Russia’s 2015 May Day parade showed several new ground systems being introduced into their arsenal based on the T-14 Armata tank hull and chassis. Air defense systems similar to that of the BUK-M1 were also on display, such as the related BUK-M2, TOR-M2E and Pansir-S1. Russia’s public demonstrations of new equipment used to be the way Western powers saw how the Soviet army’s capabilities changed from year to year. It seems like this tradition will continue with the “Armata” parade

Mobile nuclear missile systems like the SS-25 Sickle have been the mainstay of Russian nuclear forces for the last few years. The May Day parade featured the SS-27 system, an updated SS-25, along with the new Armata-based systems. Another recent announcement that Russia will start to upgrade more TU-160 strategic bombers after years of stalled production also confirmed a return to the Cold War status quo that was diminished at the end of the 1980s.

The return to large and complex weapons systems might require a shift in U.S. policy in order to compete with new Russian equipment. If the United States and NATO are unable to balance Russian forces on the border, diplomacy may only come after deterrence neutralizes any future “hot” conflict in Eastern Europe.

“Nhiệm Vụ Tối Mật” – “Secret Mission” 2015 by Pham Huy Thong

Just when the memories of anti-Chinese protests and rioting have started to fade among the Vietnamese, the Chinese are stoking the fires again with another salami-slicing maneuver.

Last Thursday, Beijing announced the redeployment of the deepwater oil rig Haiyang Shiyou-981 to the waters near the disputed Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands. The placement of the rig this time around is in waters south of the Gulf of Tonkin and northwest of the Paracels, according to the website of the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration, and is expected to be operational up until August 20.

The website announcement also requested passing vessels to stay at least 2,000 meters away, perhaps fearing a repeat of last May’s confrontation, where several Vietnamese coast guard boats, fisheries surveillance ships, and fishing boats were rammed by Chinese naval vessels for coming too close to this same Chinese rig deployed offshore but within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone.

This year, however, the Chinese have located the rig outside the exclusive economic zone of Vietnam, in a grey zone currently being negotiated between Vietnam and China. According to a Vietnamese Coast Guard source, should the Chinese oil rig violate Vietnam’s sovereignty, the Coast Guard would “make announcements.”  This small, possibly incremental step by Beijing can be described as “salami-slicing”, or “Salami tactics,” a term first coined by the Hungarian Communist leader Matyas Rakosi in the late 1940s to describe the destruction of the non-Communist parties by “cutting them off like slices of salami.”

The announcement of the rig’s arrival by Vietnamese media follows a visit by Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh to Beijing on June 17 to 19 for the eighth meeting of the Vietnam-China Steering Committee on Bilateral Cooperation. During the meetings, both sides agreed to use negotiations to keep territorial disputes under control, avoid any actions to complicate disputes, emphasize the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (East Vietnam Sea/West Philippine Sea) and make progress toward a Code of Conduct. Given the lack of outrage here in Vietnam over the rig’s deployment, the positioning of the Chinese rig was also likely negotiated between Hanoi and Beijing, with Beijing promising to strengthen economic, trade and investment ties.

So far, the Vietnamese people appear to have accepted the deployment of the Chinese rig, as there have been no reports of anti-Chinese protests or rioting despite media coverage. However, some Ho Chi Minh resident representatives voiced their strong opposition to China’s recent actions in the East Sea on Monday to State President Truong Tan Sang and Tran Du Lich, head of the NA delegation of the city. Residents there called for a strong, official response from the National Assembly to China’s violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty, which President Sang acknowledged has not been strong enough.

The arrival of the Chinese rig also coincides with the delivery of a fourth of six Russian-built Kilo-class submarines to Vietnam, under a $2 billion deal signed in 2009. Vietnam may be able to tolerate some salami-slicing by the Chinese, but for this tactic to work most effectively, the true long-term motives should be hidden and cooperation emphasized. Given Vietnam’s long history of successfully fighting off the Chinese, the Vietnamese are traditionally skeptical of Chinese motives and cooperation, and should Beijing choose to slice too much, history tells us the Vietnamese will be ready once again.

Photo Credit: CH’7K via Flickr

A leading naval strategist asks: Could cyberattacks actually prevent war?

In this two-part series, leading thinkers from a prior era of globalization directly inform our understanding of critical issues today. Part 1 examined the lessons for current maritime security concerns from naval strategist Alfred T. Mahan and Nobel laureate Norman Angell. Part 2 considers their competing insights into a very modern challenge: cybersecurity.

Mahan’s ideas of the late 19th century set the track for U.S. naval policy for decades, including growing and strengthening the fleet and developing reliable resupply stations worldwide. Angell described in 1909 that war had become futile as a means to enhance state power and wealth, but not impossible because men sometimes act irrationally. Each saw enormous potential from the surges of trade and technology by the turn of the 20th century. Mahan saw mostly threats; Angell saw more possible benefits.

For Angell, the extent of trade and investment created an “interdependence” among European powers, so that “war, even when victorious, could no longer achieve those aims for which peoples strive.” His ideas are found in international relations theories that developed nearly a century later: complex interdependence, democratic peace, and even constructivism. In each of these, states choose paths other than conflict-for-power and power-for-conflict. The Internet would have made perfect sense to Angell: Social networking, online commerce, and “Twitter revolutions” across borders and cultures increase national wealth, standards of living and human aspirations.

For Mahan, the analysis is more complex, and the policy implications more surprising. Mahan’s cybersecurity policies depend upon his views on “freedom of the seas” and on populations used to material comfort. Freedom of the seas popularized by Grotius’s 1609 Mare Liberum, which asserted that the high seas are open to all, especially for commerce. This idea has been supported by the American Continental Congress, Elizabeth I, Woodrow Wilson and the U.N. During the Cold War, the U.S. and USSR generally left alone one another’s seaborne trade.

But for Mahan, commerce produces the national wealth necessary for military power:

Ships and cargoes in transit upon the sea …are national wealth engaged in reproducing and multiplying itself, to the intensification of the national power…[commerce is] therefore a most proper object of attack.

Additionally, Mahan argued that modern populations had an “excessive sensitiveness” to their new wealth. Attacking international private (commercial) sea trade was actually a benefit to mankind, “more humane, and more conducive to the objects of war, than the slaughter of men.”

The lessons for cybersecurity are evident. Mahan’s realism would endorse state-on-state cyberattacks, like digital spying, Stuxnet, or degrading the military systems of a country you are planning to attack. But Mahan essentially validates cyberattacks on civilian and commercial interests as well. Where private property is the ultimate source of national power, he argues, it is a legitimate target. When populations are “exasperated by the delicacy of financial situations,” not used to widespread discomfort or “privation,” cyberattacks might be used to achieve the intended goals of the attacker without the extensive violence and casualties traditional warfare.

In this way, cyberattacks among great states might serve as proxy wars did during the Cold War: great power contests with minimal casualties to the principals. The risks of this approach then and now, of course, are multiple. Cyber casualties can still occur from economic, financial, industrial or infrastructure damage. Cyberattacks can begin or escalate a conflict which leads to kinetic warfare. Mistaken attribution of cyberattacks can widen the conflict to unrelated or unintended parties.

If Mahan is right, a number of implications follow. Countries are already developing offensive and defensive cyberstrategies – these need to be fully integrated into national security and economic means and ends. (As Peter Singer and Allan Friedman note, whether these questions are fully understood by the key decision makers remains a question.) Governments must work closely with other public and commercial organizations – preventing a cyberattack on finance, industry, and infrastructure as they would from a terrorist or traditional warfare. Many countries are already well into these kinds of discussions, including with each other. Too often though, security measures have proven inadequate. The recent U.S. government’s loss of millions of employees’ personal and security data is just the latest example. Internet security firms like Mandiant and Symantec have detailed intense ongoing efforts, not merely hypothetical ones.

The Internet offers “interdependence” far beyond what Angell could have imagined. But the natures of conflict, spying, industrial espionage, organized crime, and “attack” are all very different from what Mahan understood. By Mahan’s logic, withholding energy exports as diplomatic leverage, theft of commercial intellectual property, manipulating industrial controllers or breaches of financial institutions may be “more humane” alternatives to conventional war.

But Mahan’s logic helped lead the great powers into war.

This post and the previous one are drawn in part from J.Quirk’s article in the Mediterranean Quarterly, June 2015.

Photo Credit: Theophilos Papadopoulos via Flickr

Greece’s far-left may have reached its day of reckoning far faster than anticipated.

As negotiations between Greece and the troika came to a screeching halt last week over the terms of a multibillion-euro bailout — a few days before the country is expected to vote on the troika’s terms and conditions for a bailout — the country’s already-weakened economy has come to a standstill. Just hours before the deadline for the country’s 1.6 billion euro debt payment on Tuesday, markets were relatively calm, but capital controls to prevent cash from flowing rapidly out of the country have been in full effect. Banks have been forced to close as well and will remain so until July 7, and withdrawals, if one can find a working ATM, are severely limited.

But for Alexis Tsipras and his party, Syriza — both of whom rode into Athens on a wave of popular frustration with Greece’s pro-austerity political establishment — what comes next will be the make-or-break moment for the party’s ability to lead in difficult times.

As far as leadership is concerned, Tspiras’ motives for backing such a referendum are clear. Putting the creditor’s offer to a vote takes some of the weight of his shoulders and opens up the opportunity for the party to lead the country through a time of trial without (presumably) as much backlash. In essence, it’s a way of saying: Whatever road we choose to take, we’re all in this together.

It’s no surprise, then, that Tsipras has presented the referendum not as a vote on Greece remaining in the eurozone, nor as a vote between the euro or the drachma. Rather, for Tsipras, the referendum is a democratic imperative — an exercise in sovereignty before all else.

“Greece, the birthplace of democracy, should send a resounding democratic message to the European and global community,” he said in his address on the referendum on June 27.

“I am absolutely confident that your choice will honor our country’s history and will send a message of dignity worldwide. In these critical times, we all have to remember that Europe is the common home of all of its peoples.”

Whether or not the referendum is a practical exercise has been the matter of some controversy. Those opposing the referendum, including a number of former Greek government officials, have framed the vote as “yes” or “no” to Europe. Even Former Prime Minister George Papandreou — who carried out a similar referendum in 2011, which he has since defended — has repeatedly condemned the July 5 referendum, referring to it as a “tactical ploy” and a sort of negotiating weapon.

Still others have argued much of the blowback comes from the fact that the European project wasn’t all that democratic to begin with. Writing in The Guardian, economist Joseph Stiglitz noted, “[W]hat we are seeing now, 16 years after the eurozone institutionalized those relationships, is the antithesis of democracy.” European leaders, Stiglitz continues, want Tsipras and Syriza out, and they want a Greek government in power that is willing to accept the terms and conditions of eurozone membership without a fight.

What happens on July 5 is up to the Greeks, and only the Greeks, to decide. No matter that outcome, it’s impossible to deny that this is the moment for Syriza. Tsipras’ government is young, but it’s already had its share of fights. They’ve already confronted the EU — but will they capitulate?

“More than ever we must be clear that there is no middle course between confrontation and capitulation,” wrote Stathis Kouvelakis, a member of Syriza’s central committee, after the party was elected in January 2015. “The moment of truth is at hand.”

Those words couldn’t be more relevant now.