Foreign Policy Blogs

The announcement of the China-brokered Iran-KSA normalization plan triggered pearl-clutching around the globe. Some headlines even implied that Israel’s PM Netanyahu was surprised by the news, even though the negotiations have been ongoing since early in the Biden administration’s tenure. Indeed, there are signs that the Beijing-backed phase of the talks that began in Iraq had the administration’s approval. Some US officials admitted a “cross-over” in interests between the US (or at least the White House) and China in reconciling Tehran and Riyadh. The reason behind Washington’s tacit approval is Tehran’s rapprochement with its implacable opponent advances a new nuclear deal.

Beijing’s entry into this mix also serves another Biden administration priority: getting the world’s worst polluter, China, to come to some arrangement on climate change. While none of this should have surprised the foreign policy establishment, Abraham Accords proponents ignored early warning signs – and continue to be astonished by the turn Gulf policy took immediately following UAE’s and KSA’s return to diplomatic relations with Iran. The impact of the “Winnie the Pooh” Accords is likely to impact the region on all levels – undermining the political benefits of the Abraham Accords, shifting the balance of trade in Iran’s favor, and freezing the growing social and cultural ties between Israelis and their counterparts in Arab states. As some have feared, the Biden’s administration’s contradictory agenda of desperately wanting to take credit for enhancing and expanding the Abraham Accords through the Negev Forum and KSA-Israel normalization while simultaneously pushing for a normalization with Iran was unsustainable. Ultimately, Biden chose the prospects of advancing his climate change agenda over other priorities, including national security.

The political toll of the UAE’s normalization with Iran were initially relatively subtle, but in the past few months the alarm bells should have been going off. In January 2023, for example, Abu Dhabi disinvited Prime Minister Netanyahu, allegedly over concerns about what he might say on Iran while visiting. Iran’s rapprochement with UAE also accelerated normalization efforts with Qatar, its close proxy. Despite both parties being signatories to the Al Ula Agreement pushed through by the Trump administration in January 2021, the unstated “Cold War” continued behind the scenes. Doha and Abu Dhabi needled at each other through Western soft power institutions and competed in other areas globally. Moreover, Qatar-backed propagandists and activists were linked to several human rights-related campaigns against UAE, whereas UAE made no secret of its disdain for Doha’s hosting of the World Cup championship, which was mired in corruption allegations.

In the days preceding the Iran-KSA normalization announcement, public discussions between UAE and Qatar officials in Doha indicated a rapid warming in relations. In the months leading up to these events, Emiratis reportedly stopped funding initiatives critical of Qatar’s geopolitical agenda. Soon after Saudi Arabia’s normalization agreement with Iran was publicized, a Muslim Brotherhood-linked Emirati professor, Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, who was recently reintegrated into the country’s policy circles and warned of deterioration in relations with Israel, announced that UAE would be giving up its hosting bid for IMF and World Bank meetings in favor of “brotherly” Qatar, stating in a tweet: “The UAE withdraws its request to host the meetings of the IMF and the World Bank for the year 2026 in favor of the brothers in Qatar. This is Gulf cooperation and coordination in its most beautiful manifestations. Any success achieved by Qatar is a success for the UAE, and any success achieved by the UAE is a success for Qatar. The Qatari is Emirati and the Emirati is Qatari.”

In another sign of Qatar’s influence in UAE politics—as a result of growing Iranian regional dominance—the now-postponed Abu Dhabi Women’s Forum was slated to host primarily left-leaning personalities and, although only a few women were invited from Saudi Arabia, all of them were linked to Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar-approved interests. One of the featured speakers serves with the Alwaleed Foundation. Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, detained in the 2017 corruption probe, was a contributor to the International Institute of Islamic Thought, a Muslim Brotherhood enterprise, and was a financial backer of Jamal Khashoggi, who, in the last year of his life, was openly backed by the Qatar Foundation International. Such a development would have been unthinkable even a year ago.

The volume of trade between Iran and UAE has expanded substantially; indeed, following the low-key normalization in the summer, UAE has reoriented its investment strategy to extend Iran’s role in the region. Israel recently denied that UAE froze business deals, but difficulties have been ongoing since at least a year ago and Iran normalization may be a contributing factor. UAE trade with Iran is providing Tehran with Western goods. The US has sanctioned a number of entities in UAE over this trade, but has not been successful in curtailing blossoming economic relations. Even if most of the business with Israel continues as usual, the report that military purchases from Israel were frozen amidst political turmoil was reported in Israel based on official comments; Israel’s denial may be nothing more than a face saving measure.

Meanwhile, the fallout from the Saudi normalization with Iran has been just as rapid. Israel’s FM Eli Cohen’s permission to attend a UN tourism event in Saudi Arabia was revoked. The Foreign Ministry recently used the wording “Israel occupation official’ in its critique of an Israeli Minister. These developments are signs of the ongoing struggle between the Old Guard in Saudi Arabia and the more open reformist faction. The visa episode shows that conservative forces are prevailing, and that the Iran deal gives them cover for rolling back Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s measures to enhance Saudi relations with Israel.

The news of Iran-KSA normalization blindsided those who were most invested in the idea that Israel and Saudi Arabia were on the brink of normalization, a mindset fostered by rhetoric from Israel, the Biden administration, and low-level Saudi officials and diplomats – perhaps as a way to divert attention from the real talks. Saudi Arabia’s prior outreach to the US offering normalization with Israel in exchange for regional security guarantees and assistance in civilian nuclear program development was most likely a feint, especially since negotiations about a US role in a civilian Saudi nuclear program have allegedly been going on for a decade. The stumbling block, it appears, has nothing to do with Israel, and everything to do with Saudi Arabia choosing to keep the option of weapons-grade nuclear enrichment on the table despite protestations from the US.

While young Saudis and Israelis started conversations around the halcyon days of the Abraham Accords may continue on social media, Saudis are likely to be increasingly cautious. Moreover, major events with Israeli participation are less likely in the near future. Without close collaboration on various social and cultural issues, people-to-people relations are unlikely to blossom. Moreover, the Saudi turn is impacting other regional actors. Bahrain, which just hosted an N7 series event on tech and start-ups, is reviving its ties to Qatar despite Qatar’s continued occupation of Bahrain’s islands, ongoing attacks on Bahraini fishermen, and various campaigns against Manama. Moreover, following KSA, which is seen as protector of Bahrain since the Arab Spring-era Iran-backed coup attempt, Bahrain hosted a low-key discussion with Iran. All of this points to Bahrain being forced to make significant concessions for its own protection. Of all the countries in the GCC, Bahrain is likely to try to stick with America and Israel as much as possible, but it cannot go against Saudi Arabia’s path.

So, what’s next? Morocco is highly likely to be the next target of the Biden administration’s pressure to normalize with Iran even at the risk of downgrading with Israel. King Mohammed VI terminated relations with the Islamic Republic in 2018 citing Iran’s nefarious backing of the Polisario, a local separatist group that engages in terrorism against Morocco. China already has a growing hand inside Morocco while the US has largely failed to capitalize on the opening left by the Trump administration’s recognition of Rabat’s sovereignty over the Moroccan Sahara. The Biden administration has prolonged indefinitely the much-awaited opening of the physical consulate in Dakhla, but appointed an ambassador who was a key point of contact on JCPOA.

Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood party in Morocco, the PJD, for the first time openly challenged Morocco-Israel relations, calling out the FM Bourita for his closeness with Jerusalem, but de facto attacking the official foreign policy of the country set by the king. This open attack, likewise previously unthinkable, has drawn the sovereign, through the royal cabinet, into the extraordinary position of having to defend Morocco’s national interests and to respond to an effort to rile up public sentiment and make Morocco look weak and isolated while Arab States are switching sides.

Morocco’s defense ties with Israel pre-date the Abraham Accords and are particularly close; it is no wonder that Islamists, Russia, China, and others have focused on undermining Morocco’s cybersecurity ties to Israel. PJD, like Islamists in Saudi Arabia, feel empowered by the Biden administration’s endorsement of an anti-American hegemony in the MENA region. With Iran benefiting from anticipated investments by Saudi Arabia and flush with oil money, despite sanctions, Tehran may be empowered to expand its entry into North Africa via pro-Islamist factions in Morocco, especially if Rabat is pressured to restore relations by Biden with the help of other Arab states. Iran has already announced plans to restore relations with other states in the region.

On September 30, Burkina Faso experienced its second military coup in approximately eight months. Captain Ibrahim Traore, Burkina Faso’s new 34 year-old military leader, seized control from Paul Henri-Damiba. Traore claims Damiba, who only rose to power in January of 2022, failed to contain violence from rebel fighters tormenting the country. Traore capitalized on the deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso to depose Damiba, who he accused of exacerbating the violence. Since Damiba took power in his own coup in January, violence increased by 23%. Rebel fighters, connected to both the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, killed thousands of Burkinabe and displaced approximately 455,000 people between January and August of this year. Traore has made various promises since taking power in September; he ensures an end to the cyclical violence and promises to return power to the people by 2024.

The situation in Burkina Faso has remained volatile for years. The government only controls 60% of the country, with the remaining 40% under the control of various armed factions. A hunger crisis impacts nearly 650,000 people, and the United Nations estimated nearly 4.9 million Burkinabe are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Blockades by armed militias prevent vital aid from reaching towns and villages. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) condemned Traore’s recent power grab, only months after suspending Burkina Faso during Damiba’s military takeover. ECOWAS claims the most recent coup upended slow but steady progress made by the state towards a return to constitutional order.

The situation in Burkina Faso has wide reaching implications. Anti-French sentiment, resulting from France’s colonial history in the area, festers within the state. This anti-French sentiment contributed partially to Damiba’s political demise; he received criticism for working with France to combat the violence from armed groups. Allegations that Damiba sought shelter in a French military base following his removal from office only exacerbated growing distaste for French involvement. Traore, on the other hand, has garnered immense support from anti-French groups, including some groups with an overlapping pro-Russian sentiment. The leader of the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary organization with ties to Vladimir Putin, congratulated Traore and called him a “son of his motherland.” In the streets following Traore’s power grab, some supporters waved Russian flags. This raised fears in the international community of potential Russian involvement in Burkina Faso, and what that would mean for the security situation in the greater Sahel. It represents a possible regional shift towards Russia and away from the West, at a time when Russia has deeply uprooted the norms of the international community. Western leaders fear that Russian influence in the Sahel could lead to more coups resulting in pro-Russian governments.

Political Rally during Brazil’s latest election: REUTERS/Amanda Perobelli

It was shocking to see what had occurred in a local election in a city in my country. A grassroots candidate won because the sitting government representative took to marginalizing certain groups and dividing the community over the last few years. This was done in order to garner majority political support for his chosen candidate. Many of those issues affected everyone’s grandparents and dealt with violence against women, especially diverse women in the community. The candidate did not choose to be supportive of those in the community, but was intentionally divisive to the point of actually accusing a grassroots pro-elder support group of committing illegal acts with no evidence in order to slander them in the community.

While in the above example the community was able to push back against the sitting Government representative and his established allies, the tactic of alienating the other in the quest for a position of power goes against the most basic freedoms established in any healthy democracy. So limiting are some of these restrictions now in a G7 nation, that it would be difficult to even discuss them openly. When you have the feeling that openly presenting your balanced opinion and criticism of your Government would make you identify with characters in a Cold War novel, you are not in possession of your Constitutional rights.

It is essential that this tactic of alienating the other as an election strategy become a thing of the distant past, as the alternative is most likely mutually assured conflict. In recent elections in the Americas the results are almost an even split. In Colombia’s recent election, the left wing candidate was able to pull off a victory despite successive Conservative and anti-cartel governments dominating Colombia’s political landscape and policy discussions for a generation. The end result of the election split came close to 50/50, and this narrow lead assure a Presidential victory. What will be key is to not target the other fifty percent of the population as the “other” in policy discussions, to not label them with terms that minimize their perspective and local issues, nor dehumanize them as a public relations exercise.

The most divisive election result in the Americas took place recently with the final run off vote in Brazil. While Ex-President Lula was able to secure a victory against now Ex-President Bolsonaro, it was by the narrowest of margins and many regions still secured regional seats from Bolsonaro allies. Lula, who came from Brazil’s labour movement, was popular in the past as he tried to secure more labour rights and socially progressive policies while implementing a balanced economic file that differed slightly from his fiscally conservative opposition at the time. With a world recession approaching, Lula will have to try and convince Brazilians that his past successes can be repeated. Lula will have to follow an economic policy that will not place its citizens in a situation of high inflation while burying any image of corruption from his administration. The issue of high inflation is what will likely hurt Biden in his upcoming midterm elections and has placed Canada’s governing party at the lowest levels of popularity in eight years.

Divisive politics often dominates the lingua franca around elections because dividing people might work for votes, but it marginalizes small interests groups in a society and actually seeks to deny them their basic rights. As we saw locally in my town, women who were threatened and assaulted needed to be reminded that despite being told they would not receive help by those in charge, they had the rights to be safe in their community. The phrase “Women get attacked all the time” should never be the common response from leaders in a community. Citizen’s rights are not abolished by being assaulted, nor can they be eliminated by the local politician’s opinion or even the police who gave a lackluster response to safety in the area. Even in the realm of international policy, these local policy tactics affect how a country approaches human rights issues abroad. Freedom cannot exist when a government dehumanizes its opposition for its own political gain.

IRGC’s Unrelenting Attacks On Iraqi Kurdistan – Several Kurdish children taking shelter following an attack by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

NATO and Western countries have spent much of the year supplying Ukraine with systems that would defend attacks from advanced Russian systems while slowly integrating offensive systems into the mix. The offensive systems given to Ukraine by NATO and Western allies were often tactical, allowing Ukraine to target key Russian military infrastructure so that the process of further attacks on Ukrainian territory would be limited.

The recent strike by Iranian made drones by Russia sought to terrorize the population in Kyiv and other cities in Ukraine, without much tactical value beyond terror. While these systems are a new development in Eastern Europe, similar attacks have been carried out using Iranian systems, and Ukraine has been targeted by them for a second time in recent history. A response by Ukraine and their allies would be appropriate, and should be done inconsideration and in support of Iran’s current freedom movement.

As recently as 2020, Iran used a defensive missile system to shoot down a Ukrainian airliner filled mostly with Canadian passengers, other internationals and a Ukrainian crew. Little has been done on the international stage or by the Canadian Government to appropriately address the crime, nor to give due justice to the victims and their families of the atrocity. This did not phase negotiations Western countries had with Iran’s regime at the time. The response was to distribute more missiles abroad that were also used against civilian populations. The recent drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians comes during a time where there is a passive silencing on the protests in Iran by Western media, and a limited response in aid of protests despite past administrations admitting their grave errors in not supporting past movements.

While there should be a limited amount of engagement by Western countries in the affairs of other nations, when human rights and justice are involved, the values that dominate the lives of those in the West should support like minded movements in countries where help has been justifiably requested. The allowance of terror weapons without a response leads to more oppression against local populations and those abroad. A Government cannot allows its people to be targeted, nor should they turn a blind eye to the suffering of those under the chains of oppression in another country. This simple notion of justice can save millions.

A few months ago, I wrote about the early stages of the conflict in Ukraine through the lens of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. While it appears likely that the war will carry on into the foreseeable future, enough time has passed for us to make an honest assessment of each side’s relative strengths and the state of the conflict today.

You may recall that in the very first chapter of the Art of War Sun Tzu presents the reader with Seven Searching Questions that should be asked in order to make predictions about which side will win out. This article will revisit each of Sun Tzu’s questions in order to evaluate the accuracy of the initial assessments and consider where we might look for key developments in the coming weeks and months.

The first question that Sun Tzu poses is “Which sovereign is imbued with the moral law?” In a more modern phrasing, Sun Tzu is asking us which side has the greater and more durable morale. 

There is no doubt that Ukrainian nationals, even in the aftermath of a brutal bombing campaign that targeted civilian centers, are far more commited to the conflict than their Russian counterparts. In truth, one of the conflict’s “silver linings” may be the emergence of a newfound Ukrainian nationhood which could be channeled toward combating the corruption that ensnared Ukraine in the past. While there have always been pockets of resistance to Putin’s autocratic governance within Russian society, the “mobilization efforts” that were initiated in September have caused that discontent to spread toward the broader Russian populace. Similarly, Russia’s international support has dwindled as was clearly displayed by the overwhelming rejection of Putin’s  “referendums” in eastern Ukraine at the United Nations.

The larger question surrounding Ukrainian morale may, in fact, come from beyond Ukraine’s borders as partners in Europe may find themselves squeezed between supporting Ukrainian sovereignty or choosing lower gas prices following a series of tense elections and in the midst of a cold winter.

What impact does potentially reduced support have on the morale of the Ukrainian troops?

Sun Tzu’s second question is “Which of the generals have the most ability?” The meaning of this question is just about as obvious as its answer. 

Few topics have received as much attention as the incompetence of Russian leadership through the course of this conflict. The early stages of Russia’s advance were slowed by logistical problems which have only become more severe as the conflict has dragged on. More recently, Russian military officials were duped into a dramatic shift of forces to the southern front which enabled the UA to reclaim a significant amount of territory in the north of their country in mid-September. The Ukranians have exploited the failures of Russian leadership by targeting individual Russian commanders- numerous Russian military officers have been taken out in targeted strikes. This crisis in Russian leadership is amplified by reports that Putin himself has taken on an increasingly large role in military planning- a troubling sign for those with a keen historical memory.

The next question is one of the more straightforward- we are told to ask “With whom lie the advantages of the heaven and the earth?” Sun Tzu reminds us to consider the basics of battlefield terrain.

The Ukranians continue to benefit from their densely forested defensive positions and have made a nightmare of river crossings for any would-be advancing Russian forces. The clear advantage goes to the Ukrainian defenders on this matter, and given the nature of this question, it should be little surprise that little has changed here since our first assessment.

Fourth, Sun Tzu tells us to consider “On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?” 

Discipline might be more rigorously *enforced* on the Russian side, but even with that in mind there is little doubt that the men and women serving in Ukraine’s defense have behaved in a far more disciplined and orderly way. While there are regular stories of Russian soldiers refusing to carry out war crimes or sabotaging their local commanders, Ukrainian artillery forces have shown themselves capable of autonomous strikes with a deployment time that puts America’s own efforts to shame. 

It is a sad reality that war brings out the worst of people, and both sides of the conflict have allegedly committed numerous war crimes- however the clear advantage in both military and humanitarian discipline lies with the Ukranians. 

Sun Tzu’s fifth question is quite direct, “Which side has the stronger army?” While Putin’s forces retain the advantage in both manpower and equipment, the Ukranians have made novel use of weapon systems and have reduced the impact of Russia’s larger conventional force.

The main strengths of the Russian military, as has been the case since the Second World War, are a large population and heavy artillery- however Putin has struggled to bring both of these factors to bear. The impact of Russia’s large population is muted by the misinformation effect that the war in Ukraine is simply a “special military operation”, and Russian heavy artillery has been slowed by the aforementioned difficult terrain and ineffective leadership.

Ukraine has countered the Russian artillery that has managed to reach the front with tactical nimbleness and an iron chin. The Ukrainian army has deployed light drones, like the Bayraktar, personale sized anti-tank weaponry, like the Javelin, and more recently HIRAS artillery pieces that have greater range and out maneuver their Russian counterparts. It has become a pattern for the United States and other partner nations to supply Ukraine with more advanced weapons at a defensive pacing- but this has not stopped Ukraine’s defenders from using weapons systems in impressive and creative ways.

The Russians retain the advantage of the conventionally stronger military, but Ukraine has outperformed expectations on this measure, perhaps more than any other.

Next, Sun Tzu asks “On which side are the officers and men more highly trained?”

While the Russian army has its advantage in size, the Ukrainian army appears far better trained on both an individual and collective level. It is difficult to get an accurate assessment of how well trained combatants are without being on the ground, but reports have suggested that “mobilized” Russians have been sent into combat with very little training and minimal equipment. 

From an outsider’s perspective little has changed here from the beginning of the conflict- the perception being that the Ukrainian Army was well trained through its ranks, while the training of Russian soldiers would quickly fall off after an initial surge.

Finally, Sun Tzu asks his seventh question “In which army is their greater consistency in both rewards and punishment?” In many respects, this question calls back to the themes posed by the fourth question regarding discipline.

From the Ukrainian perspective rewards and punishments are perfectly clear- the reward for success is national sovereignty and international admiration, while the cost of failure would be seeing meaningful portions of their nation annexed by a bullying neighbor.These rewards and punishments are perfectly consistent in that they are each non-exclusionary. All Ukranians would benefit from continued sovereignty, just as all Ukranians would suffer Russian colonization. 

From the Russian point of view things are less clear, and for many conscripted Russians the “reward” for participating in the conflict is largely avoiding the “punishment” that would come from ignoring their conscription. There are also some, and perhaps many, enlisted Russian fighters who have consumed enough Kremlin propaganda to believe that they are truly “de-nazifying” Ukraine; this would certainly come with the perceived (if unfounded) reward of fulfilling one’s military duty against an “evil” enemy. 

The individual with the most to lose or to gain through continued fighting is Putin himself. Putin likely understands the impact that this conflict will have in shaping his legacy, and his ability to manage those “rewards” and “punishments” without escalating the conflict will be absolutely pivotal in the coming weeks and months. 

When making projections back in March, I suggested that “ the Ukrainians have three clear advantages- a “sovereign imbued with moral law”, “the advantages of heaven and earth”, and “greater consistency in both rewards and punishments”. (While) Putin’s invading force has one clear advantage- its superior size.“ The remaining three matters – good generalship, discipline, and training were each considered toss-ups.

So far, it appears that the conflict has largely played out in accordance with Sun Tzu’s calculations with Ukraine’s outperformance in the remaining three categories leading to their relative military successes. Much of the conflict is yet to unfold, but the Ukrainian side has comfortably succeeded in avoiding the complete annexation of Ukraine by the Russian military.

The Spanish American philosopher, George Santayana observed that, “Those who cannot remember the past are destined to repeat it.” Mark Twain said, “History doesn’t repeat itself but it often rhymes.”  And, Winston Churchill paraphrased Santayana in a 1948 speech to the House of Commons when he said,”Those who fail to learn from history are destined to repeat it.”  Perhaps we should consider ourselves fortunate that Vladmir Putin appears to have forgotten to read his copy of Sun Tzu’s classic work while determining his war effort. If Putin had done his essential reading, however, he might have remembered one of Sun Tzu’s most important lessons- simply knowing when it is best not to fight.

—

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association.

The Documentary Film 752 Is Not A Number (2022) Chronicles Canadian dentist Hamed Esmaeilion’s quest for justice in the aftermath of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752, shot down in 2020 by the Iranian military.

It has become very difficult to find reliable information on topics often essentially important in making life decisions. Many years ago there was a push to convert Opinion Editorials into the realm of mainstream news articles. This was done intentionally in order to raise interest in News as a form of media that would grab the attention of the public. The next wave of transformation for journalism came in the form of advertising that would look like an article, but was created to push a specific product or service. Distinguishing what is actual useful information may require a fair bit of knowledge and research, as much of the information found in 2022 has been corrupted by opinion and ads.

As a basis for determining which journalists and news organisation were reliable, it might be useful to read stories on issues where you have personal, in-depth experience. If a media organisation is misrepresenting something you know to be true, they are likely not a reliable source on other pieces of information. This occurred in my own community when the police brutalised someone we know personally, and it was very evident which reporters were seeking the truth, and which were representing other interest groups in folding the narrative away from justice and the rights of the victim under the national Constitution.

A strategy that has developed in the last few years has been the ignore some topics and stories altogether, and only mentioning them when necessary with opinion shading much of the topic. The recent protests in Iran demonstrates how this has been applied, and unfortunately it is often applied against protesters from Iran and against those seeking justice in the region as a whole. In 2009, a young Iranian protester by the name of Neda was assassinated and died on camera after being shot by security forces. The 2009 protests were massive in scale, but the end result after a few short weeks was silence from international media while those promoting human rights in Iran were silently arrested at night and disappeared. Western governments did little to mention what was occurring, only pushing negotiations with the regime.

In 2020, flight 752 was shot down by two TOR-M1 missiles after taking off from Teheran’s international airport. This brutal murder of mostly Canadian and International passengers and crew never received the level of justice owed to the victims from Canada despite Canada being their representative under International Law. Canada told the victim’s families they needed to seek justice from the prosecutors in Ukraine while the world rapidly moved on from this human rights atrocity, leaving the grieving families with no justice and no direction on how to get justice from their own Government. Even after a court in Ontario, Canada set a decision confirming that the missiles were shot at the plane intentionally by the regime, Canada did little to help the victims. When Ukraine was invaded by Russia and seeking justice through Ukraine became exceedingly difficult, Canada did not advise the victim’s families how to proceed.

In the last few days where Iranians have been protesting, little attention beyond simple Tweets have been paid to the families of Flight 752 and the Iranian community by the Canadian Government. Despite promising to label the IRGC a terror group and blocking IRGC families from coming to Canada to their benefit, a recent vote to label the group currently killing young women and men in Iran a terror group was shut down by the same Government. It is likely the case that the silence from 2009 will become the norm again in 2022, and more negotiations will commence promptly.

Information on the Russia-Ukraine conflict is very available, but information from either side is focused on promoting their own narrative of the conflict. This does not mean that most of the information is false or misleading, but it does require a certain level of between-the-lines reading and knowledge of the source of information being presented. In order to interpret success or losses on the battlefield, it is useful to find sources of information that attempt to quantify losses so a conclusion or hypothesis can be made from as much raw data as possible on the conflict itself. Even through sources may seem biased, you can often see images that reveal more information than the text being spoken while viewing the source in media. It must be noted that media sources are part of the conflict as well, as tactics used by organisations like Radio Free Europe were very effectively used against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and are a detailed source of information still in 2022. This information war might be more advanced as it is actively putting out information in order to damage the other side, whereas general media is passively adjusting information of the message to benefit a small group of interested people. Unfortunately, both strategies are now being used in order to deny rights from those who are being persecuted by a system that will extinguish them for wanting basic justice.

It was recently reported that a mass grave was uncovered in Edilli in the Khojavand district, which was controlled by Armenia in violation of four UN Security Council resolutions but became part of Azerbaijan after the Second Karabakh War.   According to various reports, 12 skeletons were found with their hands and feet bound, although 25 bodies were uncovered to date.  

Fuad Muradov, Chairman of the State Committee for Work with the Diaspora, stated on Twitter following this shocking discovery: “The requirements of Article 17 of the Geneva Convention dated August 12,1949 were grossly violated! In1993, 25 captured servicemen of the Azerbaijan Army, were brutally killed and mass buried in the territory of #Edilli village of #Khojavand district.”

Bullet holes found in the skulls indicated that they may have been executed by shooting.  Various media outlets have reported that almost 4,000 Azerbaijani citizens still remain missing, with the Armenians refusing to provide the locations of the mass graves to date.

Hikmat Hajiyev, Assistant of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, stated afterwards on Twitter: “ Edilli was used as concentration camp for Azerbaijani hostages by Armenia.”  Speaking to the Turkish media, Namiq Efendiyev, an official from Azerbaijan’s State Commission for Prisoners of War, Hostages and Missing Persons, said that excavations have been ongoing in the region since February in an effort to find citizens who disappeared during the First Karabakh War which ended in 1994.

In a statement issued by the Azerbaijani Diaspora organizations, it was stated: “We stress that the discovery of such graves openly exposes the Armenian Armed Forces’ war crimes rooted in ethnic hatred, which, in gross violation of international law, international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, are accompanied with torture and inhumane acts against Azerbaijani civilians, military personnel, especially the wounded and dead, demonstrates their inhumane behavior and genocide policy. A striking example of this is the numerous videos confirming the multiple facts of brutal killings of Azerbaijani POWs by the Armenian military during the First and Second Karabakh wars with close-range shots to the head and heart area, robbery and dismemberment of soldiers’ bodies, torture and humiliation through acts incompatible with humanity.”  

“We regret to state that along with baseless territorial claims against Azerbaijan, pursuing a policy of extreme hatred on racial, ethnic, religious grounds, instead of taking practical steps to stop the war crimes against our country and bring the perpetrators to justice for the past crimes, Armenia impedes security and the peace process in the region by instigating provocations that lead to confrontations between the two nations,” the statement added.  

According to the statement, “One must also not forget the important fact that the Armenian Armed Forces mined the territory of Azerbaijan, which they kept under occupation for 30 years, and that during the Second Karabakh War, they launched missile attacks on the Azerbaijani cities of Ganja, Barda, Mingachevir, Goranboy and Tartar, located dozens of kilometers from the front line, killing more than 100 civilians. However, in defiance of the trilateral statements signed by the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Russian Federation and the agreements reached in Brussels brokered by President of the European Council Charles Michel, official Yerevan has not yet shared with Azerbaijan the landmine maps and information about the fate of up to 4,000 Azerbaijanis who went missing during the First Karabakh War.”

The statement concluded: “Azerbaijanis of the world strongly assert that the international community must react adequately to these war crimes and bring the perpetrators to justice in order to prevent Armenia from committing similar criminal acts in the future. We demand that Armenia’s war crimes be stopped and call for urgent legal action to bring to justice those responsible for the crimes against peace.”

Ayoob Kara, who served as Israel’s Communication, Satellite and Cyber Minister under Netanyahu, condemned Armenia for slaughtering Azerbaijanis en masse in Edilli and to date refusing to hand over the location of the remaining mass grave locations: “The time has come for Armenia to make peace with Azerbaijan for the sake of regional security.   The first step towards making peace is to take the humanitarian gesture of handing over the location of the mass graves and to hand over all of the landmine maps.   Once that happens, both peoples can look forward to a brighter future.”

According to the statement signed between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia on November 10, 2020, the Armenians were supposed to return the city of Lachin to Azerbaijan within three years. The reason why Lachin was returned so late was that the Armenians living in Khankendi used the road through Lachin. Azerbaijan made an alternative route within 1 year and 8 months and demanded from the Republic of Armenia to evacuate the city of Lachin and return it to the Azerbaijani side on August 5.

However, the Armenians requested more time from Azerbaijan and stated that the city will be evacuated on August 25. Thus, on August 26, 2022, the Armenians left the city of Lachin and the Azerbaijani army entered the area. On September 21, Ilham Aliyev visited the city of Lachin and waved the flag of Azerbaijan on the central street in the center of the city of Lachin.

In response to Armenia’s claim that Azerbaijan is waging war on Armenian lands, Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan has not violated the borders of any state, as there has been no demarcation of borders between the two countries: “If Armenia claims this, then let it show its borders.  Let me reiterate that we are ready for discussions and are treating the work of the Azerbaijan-Armenia commissions with great responsibility. We have collected all the maps. I want to say once again that we have all the maps, including those from the 19th century, the 20th century and even earlier, and those maps clearly show who is located on which land. Therefore, no-one can accuse us in the absence of demarcation.”

Speaking in the city of Lachin, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev emphasized that Armenia committed atrocities in Lachin as well as in other areas of Karabakh, placed about 1,400 mines in Lachin, and destroyed historical and religious monuments even after the end of the war. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan offered to sign a peace agreement with Armenia as soon as the war ended, he noted that the other side not only refused to sign the peace agreement, but also made new provocations.

In his speech, Aliyev also touched on the activities of international organizations such as the UN Security Council and the OSCE Minsk Group, which supported the Armenian side during the thirty years of Armenian occupation of the area in violation of four UN Security Council resolutions and did not impose any sanctions against it.

At the end of his speech, Ilham Aliyev, who spoke about the work done and to be done in Lachin, noted that the construction of the Gubadli-Lachin railway will soon begin in Lachin. Construction of 12 tunnels in the distance from Murov Mountain to Lachin city is also on the list of tasks to be done. In order to prevent problems related to electricity, the construction of Gülabird Hydropower Station in Lachin is also planned.

This speech was made at a time when Azerbaijan’s embassy in France was attacked.  Associate Professor Maxime Gauin noted that there were two attacks, “one on the embassy and one on the Azerbaijani cultural center.  The one against the embassy was an unauthorized demonstration organized by the Dashnaks and the Parisian police did nothing.   They were not aware.   They did not know there was a demonstration that was there because the police did not receive any intelligence regarding the project.”

He continued, “Then, there was a conference on the destruction of Azerbaijani cultural heritage in Yerevan, which was protested by Charjoum.   These people considered the Dashnaks too soft and left them to be their own group.   There, the police knew about the protest and arrived before the Armenians.  They were not allowed to approach the building.    But they were there, nevertheless.”

According to Gauin,    “It reminds me of the situation 50 years ago.  In France in the 1970’s, it was the Dashnak youth who incited the leadership to incite terrorism.   There were also people who left the party who felt it was not revolutionary enough.  These people became the branch of ASALA in France.   In the Facebook page of Charjoum, they make references to ASALA.   People must be careful in monitoring them as the worst may emerge from these persons.”  

The prevalence of violent extremism in the United States poses an increasing threat on national security. Historically, policymakers have focused counterterrorism efforts on external Islamic terror threats. A shift in focus is necessary to address the alarming rise of far-right ideology within the United States following the presidency of Donald Trump. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, racially motivated extremism and anti-government extremism pose two of the biggest domestic threats to U.S. national security. In 2020, white supremacists conducted 67% of all terror plots in the United States.[1] Anti-authority extremists carried out an additional 20%. Popular culture often views Islamic terrorists as the main threat, but Salafi-jihadist groups carried out a meager 7% of attacks in 2020.[2]

White supremacy and anti-government dialogue made its way into mainstream platforms alongside the populist rise of Donald Trump. His 2016 campaign, and subsequent presidency, capitalized on undercurrents of racial resentment. Trump’s focus on “political incorrectness” allowed fringe ideologies to rise to the surface.[3] However, this far-right extremism is not a new phenomenon. Racial hatred has remained a pervasive and damaging issue in America for hundreds of years. With each new decade, this hatred takes on a different shape. Today, far-right extremists fear tactics focused on xenophobia and racism to recruit new members from vulnerable populations.

            In June of 2021, President Biden released the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Extremism. The 32-page report defines domestic extremism as “activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of criminal laws in the US” and are intended to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population [or] influence … a government.”[4] It identifies racially-motivated extremism and anti-authority extremism as the two main domestic terror threats. The report details the extent of the problem, identifies a strategy organized around four main pillars, and then expands on those pillars through a series of strategic goals.

            The National Strategy for Countering Domestic Extremism takes a broad yet multi-faceted approach to counter-extremism policy. It calls for improved research, increased resources dedicated to preventing recruitment, and a more legislative dimension to addressing domestic terrorism. It’s strengths lie with its multi-level approach to information sharing within government institutions, its focus on the vulnerability of veterans to recruitment, and its recognition of the need to address the shifting landscape of domestic threats. However, it faces four major challenges. First, the entire strategy lacks specificity. Throughout an evaluation of the strategy, a lack of specificity plagues nearly every pillar. The first pillar fails to account for the contextual differences between communities. The second pillar needs to better explain how prevention measures will be balanced with respect for civil liberties. The third pillar focuses on legislative reforms that would require a more precise definition of domestic terrorism, which the U.S. government currently lacks. This lack of specificity will not only make the strategy difficult to implement, but it will also make it less consumable for the general public.

The second major challenge for the strategy is that it does not focus heavily enough on addressing the drivers for far-right extremism. Biden’s administration has a firm grasp on the ideology behind the movement, but it fails to tackle the conditions that leave people vulnerable to these ideologies. It addresses the proliferation of social media, which is a major contributor, but lacks programs to tackle systemic issues like poverty, low access to quality education, and xenophobia.

            The third major challenge facing this strategy is its failure to address the gendered dynamics of violent extremism. The approach to countering these ideologies requires a holistic understanding of how far-right extremism impacts men and women differently. Far-right groups appeal to women in unique ways, and understanding all recruitment narratives is crucial for employing CVE policy. Women play a key role in the recruitment of new members, the spread of propaganda, and the organization of far-right groups. They made up 14% of arrests from the capital riots of January 6, 2021.[5] The National Strategy for Countering Domestic Extremism makes no mention of the gendered dynamics of far-right extremism. Biden’s strategy needs an additional pillar solely focused on addressing the recruitment of women.

            The fourth major challenge is the strategy’s failure to address the youth dynamics of violent extremism. Approximately 32% of the U.S. population is below the age of 25. This age group is a sprawling base from which far-right groups attempt to recruit. Young people’s “real or perceived disengagement and marginalization” make them highly vulnerable to recruitment narratives. With expanding access to social media platforms, marginalized youths on the internet are easy targets for far-right. Biden’s plan addresses the prominent role of social media in recruitment, but it needs a tighter focus on the vulnerability of young people.

[1] Jones, Seth. 2020. “The War Comes Home: The Evolution of Domestic Terrorism in the United States.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. October 22, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-comes-home-evolution-domestic-terrorism-united-states.

[2] Jones, Seth. 2020. “The War Comes Home.” Center for Strategic and International Studies.

[3]“Watch How Trump’s War on ‘Political Correctness’ Turned into Hate Speech.” Vanity Fair. August 9, 2016. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/08/donald-trump-political-incorrectness.

[4] “The National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism.” WhiteHouse.Gov. June2021: pg. 8. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/National-Strategy-for-Countering-Domestic-Terrorism.pdf.

[5] Rubin, Olivia, and Will Steakin. 2021. “‘We Did Our Part’: The Overlooked Role Women Played in the Capitol Riot.” ABC News. April 8, 2021. https://abcnews.go.com/US/part-overlooked-role-women-played-capitol-riot/story?id=76924779.

The Ukrainian Army has made dramatic strides in the last few weeks. Ukraine’s tactical commanders have outfoxed their Russian counterparts, and by issuing a feint towards the south the UA has been able to earn substantial gains in the north of their country. The impact of these efforts have been compounded by the steady stream of weapons and equipment from the United States and NATO partners- More specific accounting of the tactical maneuvering is being done by The Institute for the Study of War.

These successes, though important, do not suggest that the war is on the verge of coming to an end. Russian forces still occupy some 34,750 square miles of sovereign Ukrainian territory. More than that, despite prior public statements that Russia was conducting its “special military operation” in order to liberate the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics, Russian collaborators in those regions have promoted referendums are expected to be held between September 23rd and 27th that aimed at integrating those regions with Russia. These machinations have coincided with a (domestically very unpopular) plan to mobilize some additional 300,000 reservists and conscripts. 

These referendums, if passed, would provide Russia with the manufactured casus belli that Ukraine and NATO forces are carrying out attacks within Russian territory, and might therefore allow for a more obvious mobilization effort. Former Russian President Damitri Medvedev is quoted as saying that the referendums were important for their contributions to the, “systematic defense” of Russian territory, and continued that, “an encroachment on Russian territory is a crime.”

Of course, Mr Medvedev is correct- encroachment on Russian territory is a crime. So too is the invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory. Similarly, for all of the reasons that the Ukrainian government should have worked more closely with French and German mediators to follow through on the terms of the Minsk Protocols, the Russian government cannot, without international condemnation, ignore its ethical and legal responsibility to prevent the spread of dishonest information based upon the results of a obviously illegitimate vote. 

While the United States cannot prevent Russian state-media’s attempts at double-speak, American leadership can do much to clarify its own messaging.

In the face of an increasingly multi-polar world (despite Russia’s displayed incompetence and what it might imply about China’s true capacity) the United States and its allies have a delicate line to balance. Little can be done to quell the endless rumors about what was or was not agreed to between Secretary of State James Baker and Mikhail Gorbachev about the future of NATO expansion in 1990- this is no excuse for a lack of clarity about NATO’s potential expansion and mission moving forward.

Similarly, there should be no denying that honest calls for nationhood should be facilitated through a legitimate democratic process. There should also be no denying that the long recognized corruption that marred the Ukrainian government was not somehow cleaned out with the onset of Russia’s attempted invasion. Pretending otherwise makes the United States and its allies appear dishonest and weakens our bargaining positions on other key international issues.

Even more than these things, however, there should be no credible doubt that the humanitarian catastrophe brought on by the Kremlin’s aggression is not in any way justified by Ukraine’s governance issues or slowness in adhering to the Minsk Protocols. International bodies and co-signatories provide a far more effective and ethical way of resolving disputes, and the integrity of those bodies and treaties is dependent on the good-faith and trust of their participants. As such, it is important that the United States and its allies participate in good faith- even in the face of an obviously bad actor like Vladmir Putin.

While it is important that we take the time to recognize, and celebrate, the success of Ukraine’s Army and partisan forces in resisting Russian aggression, it would be long sighted to limit American and NATO armed support to those which can be used for substantively defensive purposes. Towards this end, NATO members should continue to provide the Javelin anti-tank systems and Byractar drones that have proven so effective in slowing the advance of Russian armored columns. Mobile artillery units with a range that surpass their Russian equivalents like the M142 HIMARS have played a dramatic role in disrupting Russian cross-river movements, but ensuring that these NATO provided weapons are not used to strike targets within legitimate Russian territory could prove pivotal in preventing further escalation of the conflict. Similarly, it should not be taken for granted that Ukraine be extended NATO membership in the aftermath of the conflict- such an action would give credence to the idea that the United States resisted Russia’s obvious attempts at empire largely for the sake of extending its own more subtle empire.

In addition to these direct efforts, the United States and its partners should look for non-military means of strengthening their hand against bad actors into the future. These efforts might range from promoting election integrity domestically to diversifying energy sourcing. They most certainly include pushing for increased public awareness about key foreign policy issues and the continued re-staffing of the diplomatic corps as a way of peacefully promoting the cause of Democracy and Liberalism beyond our borders.

While the conflict in Ukraine will likely rage on for months to come, there is some real chance that historians will consider the push that took place in mid-September to represent the turning point of the conflict. In the event that this is true, the United States, Ukraine, and all other concerned parties should do just as much to facilitate a successful peace as they will certainly do to bring about an end to the war.

—

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association. The opinions expressed here are his, and not necessarily those of the Association.

The recent conflict between Russia and Ukraine was taken by many Central and Eastern European countries as a sign of drastic change in a part of the world that had not experienced such a transformation in a generation. The annexation of Crimea was not met with much of a response beyond limited sanctions in 2014, and the war in the East of Ukraine received little long term attention outside of the region, even after an airliner was shot down by a BUK missile system. Recent rapid advances on Kyiv put countries like Poland on intense alert, and assured that their actions in seeking modern Western weapons systems was a reasonable and essential policy direction for the country. Poland is planning to reform its military, and is likely going to become one of the most advanced militaries in Central Europe.

Policies that have come out of the recent conflict in Ukraine ensured large amounts weapons being sent in support of Ukraine as well as historic levels of assistance given to Ukraine and countries bordering the former Soviet Union. In order to give the Ukrainian forces the ability to respond rapidly to Russian advances, weapons systems similar to those that are used by Ukraine’s Armed Forces were sought over more modern Western weapons systems that would have required additional training, time and support. Older Soviet systems like the T-72 and MiG-29 were dedicated or given to Ukraine with an agreement with the US or Germany to displace the older systems with more modern German and American tanks and weapons systems. Central European powers that were using modernised equipment from the Cold War era are now able to obtain many NATO weapons systems if they sent their Cold War era equipment to Ukraine. Those systems are increasingly being seen in videos of the conflict and are already having an effect with Polish made tanks being seen on the field, advancing in the Kherson region and region around Kharkiv.

The weapons displacement program has met some hurdles, but the intent and policy approach has two major benefits. Besides supporting Ukraine with already active equipment, the displacement of the equipment with advanced systems like Leopard 2 tanks from Germany and M1A2 tanks from the US gives countries bordering Russia and Belarus a distinct advantage. Modernising Central European countries with NATO weapons also brings that region closer to the West, and pulls them further from the influence of Russia and their government. Outside of the direct policy approach, the actions and support of Ukraine’s Armed Forces will blunt the ability of Russia to pose a serious threat using conventional arms to former Warsaw Pact nations that have spent much of their post-Cold War freedom pulling away from Russian influence.

While support and weapons from the West and NATO have had a major impact on Russian equipment and morale, it is important not to take recent victories with a grain of salt by pushing polices too widely or aggressively. Like with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, policies that tie NATO long term to a conflict or a specific region may end up causing more strife and end in a long term loss for the West. If done more rapidly, putting Russia in a corner may illicit and overreaction by Russia if they feel they have fewer options in ensuring their own national security. What already seems to be occurring is that support for one conflict may add fuel to the fire towards other conflicts in other parts of the world, creating long term problems outside of Eastern Europe. A holistic and well thought out policy direction is essential, the absence of one is already a catalyst for the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine threatens the existing system of international relations and creates the preconditions for regional conflicts in Europe. In Ukraine, Putin has tested and created a new tool for blurring borders and separating the territories of neighboring countries by creating so-called “gray zones” or “gray enclaves”, the classic examples of which are the “DNR” and “LNR”(“Donetsk and Luhansk People Republics”).

In 2014, the Russian Federation used the tactics of “biting off small pieces” from Ukraine, de facto occupying a significant part of the Ukrainian Donbas. Russia has applied similar schemes in other countries. For example, immediately after the collapse of the USSR, armed conflicts began in Moldova and Georgia: in 1992 in Transnistria and Abkhazia, and this was largely due to the indirect influence of Russia, which in every possible way supported the separatist movements in the post-Soviet space, spreading its influence through them.

But in Ukraine, Russia is testing and scaling up a technology that is extremely dangerous for Europe to form “gray zones” of instability, which, like cancerous metastases, tend to expand and appear in other countries, even those not adjacent to Russia. This tactic is part of the toolkit of the so-called hybrid aggression – a complex, predominantly non-military confrontation with an asymmetrically stronger or numerically stronger enemy, a direct military clash with which is undesirable.

Putin sees the West as such an adversary, which he considers a civilizational enemy. At the moment, for the first time since 1991, Russia poses a direct threat to Europe by creating “gray zones” in Ukraine, where the issue of the continued existence of Western civilization is being decided.

By invading Ukraine on February 24, Putin opened a geopolitical Pandora’s Box, setting off a chain of irreversible processes within the system of international relations. An attempt to occupy a sovereign state is a denial of the principles of the inviolability of borders that were formed after the Second World War, which means the leveling of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, which made it possible to effectively eliminate the prerequisites for the emergence of interstate conflicts in post-war Europe. Putin has disrupted the stability of the existing system of international relations and created global geopolitical turbulence.

The analysis of the mechanism of hybrid aggression, tested by Putin in Ukraine, makes it possible to understand what an unprecedented threat Europe is facing. At the initial level, this hybrid strategy is based on separatist sentiments, which are especially strong in the Balkans, if we talk about the European continent. To reinforce such tendencies, the Kremlin uses its agents of influence and funding so that the proxies sponsored by it not only declare themselves as potentially independent players but also weaken and destabilize the country as much as possible, posing a threat to its integrity and sovereignty.

The tactics of such aggression are quite flexible: if in the case of the Ukrainian Donbas, Russia tried to consolidate its political, economic, and military presence as much as possible, then, for example, in the case of Serbia, which is currently destabilizing the Balkans, unquestioning implementation of the Kremlin’s political instructions is sufficient.

Russian influence can be indirect: it is not necessary to use military force, as happened in 2014 in the Donbas. In the case of Europe, it is enough to have agents of influence who will undermine the socio-political situation within a country or region. The Kremlin’s goal is to destabilize and deplete the object of the hybrid attack, demoralize the population, and create unbearable conditions for life with parallel rampant crime, corruption, etc. As a rule, Russia does not need such “gray zones” as territorial acquisitions. They serve as an instrument of influence. It is precisely the game of separatism that can turn into the presence of Russia anywhere on the continent, and at the moment, seeing that the military arsenal of the Russian Federation is incomparable with NATO, Putin begins to actively apply the tactics of creating “gray zones” in Europe, starting with Ukraine.

Hybrid aggression is carried out mainly by non-military methods, but it cannot exist without a strong army. Therefore, Ukraine is a bulwark of defense of the eastern borders of Europe. And the outcome of this confrontation depends on the full support of Kyiv, the Ukrainian army, which defends not only its country but the whole of Europe from Russian aggression. Ukraine needs Western weapons capable of exhausting and weakening the Russian army that threatens Europe.

Mykola Volkivskyi is an international public figure, fellow of the Lane Kirkland Scholarship, Founder of the Foundation for the Development of Ukraine in Poland, and the IGR in Kyiv.

With the death of Queen Elizabeth II, the United Kingdom now has its first King since George VI more than seven decades ago. Saturday September 10, 2022 is recorded in history as the day Prince Charles was proclaimed as King Charles III. Aside from the challenge of having to (ceremonially) lead a country that is undergoing political and economic turmoil with a Prime Minister—Liz Truss—who has less than  a week of experience in her top executive position, the new king comes with a mixed bag of goodwill and controversy. An international media and tabloid feeding frenzy is already underway.

In his previous role as The Prince of Wales and a monarch of wide international fame, the new King is accused of using his influences to advance UK’s weapons industry deals with his personal friends. He has held dozens of meetings with rulers of repressive regimes in the Middle East since the Arab Spring in 2011. He has “played a key role in promoting £14.5-billion worth of UK arms exports to these regimes.” According to UK Declassified, there is no question that he was a royalty-level salesman for UK arms makers during said period.

The ‘Barack Hussein’ Effect

At the heart of the controversy surrounding the new King is his stance on Islam and Muslims. His affinity with Islam and vision to improve the relationship between the Western and the Islamic world extend for decades. In his speech Islam and the West that was delivered at Oxford in 1993, he said:

“I believe wholeheartedly that the links between these two worlds matter more today than ever before, because the degree of misunderstanding between the Islamic and Western worlds remains dangerously high, and because the need for the two to live and work together in our increasingly interdependent world has never been greater.”

In his previous role, the new King has also taken positions that opposed UK foreign policy. The most notables are: His opposition to the Iraq war and the neocon foreign policy adventures; his disagreement with the notion that those cartoonists who flagrantly offended Prophet Muhammad were merely exercising the democratic value of freedom of expression. Also, his disagreement with the burqa and hijab ban in Europe.

Moreover, the new King is sympathetic to the Palestinian people’s right to an independent state. Granted, as a King, his leadership is ceremonial and his political views must be shelved in his royal bedroom closet, but that will not be enough to tame the usual suspects—Islamophobes and Zionists of all shades—who are determined to ferociously come after the new King to make him an unpopular King by accusing him of being a Muslim in disguise.

In his previous role, the new King has offended some when it became public that he learned Arabic, studies the Quran, and believes that “Christianity can learn from Islam.” Unlike most of the Western leaders, he had no problem offering a counter-narrative to Islamophobia. He refused to accept the so-called clash of civilization thesis popularized by the neocons. “I do not accept the argument that they (the Western and Islamic cultures) are on a course to clash in a new era of antagonism. I am utterly convinced that our two worlds have much to offer each other. We have much to do together. I am delighted that the dialogue has begun, both in Britain and elsewhere.”

And in a speech he delivered in Saudi Arabia 2006, he said: “We need to recover the depth, the subtlety, the generosity of imagination, the respect for wisdom that so marked Islam in its great ages …”

These sympathetic public statements at an era of glorified jingoism and ruthless Islamophobia made then Prince Charles a target. In 2003, two months before President George W. Bush appointed him to sit on the board of United states Institute for Peace, the notorious Islamophobe Daniel Pipes has published a long dossier to implicate Prince Charles as a Muslim in disguise.

King Charles III is set to become UK’s Barack Hussein Obama, at least in being projected as an alien leader. Each, on his own, has undergone an up close and personal experience that inspired him to form his own perspective and narrative on Islam and Muslims. And their respective narratives, needless to say, flies in the face of the traditional aristocrats, the political elite, and the ideologically-driven media.

To bulwark against political demonization, the new King may have to dominate the headlines by taking the moral stance that his late mother—Queen Elizabeth II—failed to take: offer an official apology to all of the countries that suffered exploitation and oppression under the British colonial enterprise. His first step should be that which could be his legacy.

Meanwhile, in a country that virtually drifted away from its religious identity: ‘So what if he is a Muslim?’  

A pair of August elections in Africa produced clear winners, while also sending mixed messages about the strength of each country’s democracy. Meanwhile, two contests in Europe provide potential inroads for right-wing parties.

Kenya 

In Kenya’s August 9 election, Deputy President William Ruto defeated opposition leader Raila Odinga by approximately 233,000 votes, 51–49 percent. 65 percent of registered voters turned out, down from 80 percent in 2017 — and a 15-year low.

Ruto fashioned himself as an anti-establishment “hustler” on the campaign trail, in a populist appeal to Kenya’s disaffected young population. While Ruto is, in reality, an immensely wealthy politician, this outsider branding contrasted him against Odinga (a five-time presidential candidate, former prime minister, and son of Kenya’s first vice president) as well as Odinga’s A-list stump speaker, Uhuru Kenyatta (the outgoing president and son of Kenya’s first president).  

Political dynamics between Kenya’s ethnic groups also played a role. Odinga had hoped to leverage Kenyatta’s influence as an ethnic Kikuyu to gain the backing of Kikuyu voters, the largest bloc in the country. But Odinga is an ethnic Luo, a rival group to the Kikuyu. This derailed Odinga’s plan, as the Kikuyu vote split partially for Ruto, an ethnic Kalenjin, further expanding the deputy president’s base of support. 

This shift in sentiment was partially captured in pre-election polling. On top of the tight topline margins, surveys taken a week before the vote even showed Odinga with a slight lead.

The days following the election, though tense, were markedly less turbulent than the aftermath of other recent contests. In the wake of the 2007 campaign, violence escalated into a months-long ethnic conflict that claimed over a thousand lives. Unrest and frustration erupted again in 2017, when the initial election was annulled and a redo was ordered. But this year, when the Kenyan Supreme Court found no credible evidence of election tampering following a challenge from Odinga, the opposition leader accepted the court’s decision. 

Although there are still concerns about Ruto’s checkered past on human rights, the results of Kenya’s election are, in some ways, an encouraging step for the country. Kenyatta has already promised a smooth transition of power. What’s more, the decisiveness of the court’s ruling could also restore some faith in the functionality, transparency, and independence of Kenya’s democratic institutions.

Angola

Two weeks after Kenyans took to the polls, so too did voters in Angola, a country whose democratic norms are comparatively younger and weaker. For that reason, it can be difficult to draw direct comparisons between the two elections.

The August 24 vote saw President João Lourenço secure a second term after his party, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), defeated the main opposition, Adalberto Costa Júnior and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 51–44 percent. 

The 7-point margin makes this one of the closest elections in Angola’s history and marks a record-low showing for the MPLA, which has been in power since the country gained independence from Portugal in 1975. Notably, the party’s vote share has steadily declined in all four post-civil war elections: it received 82 percent in 2008, 72 percent in 2012, and 61 percent in 2017. 

Most recently, the MPLA’s popularity has waned due to economic concerns and dissatisfaction with Lourenço’s handling of corruption. Indeed, pre-election polling painted a tight race, as young voters in particular seemed to move toward UNITA. Surveys taken throughout the summer varied widely, suggesting everything from a 29-point MPLA win to a 26-point UNITA win, often with large shares of respondents not selecting either party.

Overall, the MPLA’s majority in the 220-seat National Assembly fell by 26 seats to 124. UNITA picked up 39 seats, bringing its total to 90. Three other parties — the Social Renewal Party (PRS), the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), and the Humanist Party of Angola (PHA) — each won two seats. Voter turnout was recorded at 45 percent, down from 76 percent in 2017.

The final results were contested by UNITA, who alleged irregularities in the vote count, but their challenge was swiftly struck down by Angola’s constitutional court. Four of the 16 members of the Angolan National Electoral Commission also refused to sign off on the returns.

Challenges to election results — and concerns over vote tampering — are neither unwarranted nor uncommon in Angola. The ruthless rule of former President José Eduardo dos Santos, Lourenço’s predecessor and Angola’s autocratic leader of 38 years, was defined by the suppression of basic freedoms and the violation of human rights. 

Although dos Santos left office in 2017 and died in July, Angola today remains far from free. The MPLA still has a large amount of control over the electoral process and state media. When it comes to political and civil liberties, Freedom House gives the country a rating of 30 out of 100; Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index scores it one point lower at 29. 

Sweden and Italy

Looking ahead, there are two major European elections in September.

Sweden voted on September 11.

The Social Democrats, led by Magdalena Andersson after the resignation of Prime Minister Stefan Löfven last summer, were looking to maintain control in the Riksdag. Entering the home stretch, pre-election polls showed the Social Democrats ahead by an average of 9 points in a close contest with the conservative Moderate Party, led by Ulf Kristersson, as well as the far-right Sweden Democrats, led by Jimmie Åkesson. In the 2018 election, the Social Democrats outperformed polling expectations by 4 points to win with a 28 percent plurality — the party’s worst electoral showing in over a century.

The election is still too close to call, as of September 12.  With approximately 95 percent of votes counted, the Social Democrats led with 31 percent, the Sweden Democrats earned 21 percent, and the Moderates had 19 percent. This means that no bloc currently possesses an obvious governing majority of 175 seats: the parties supporting the Moderates won a total of 175 seats, while the parties supporting the Social Democrats won 174 seats.

Italy votes on September 25.

Following a falling-out with the left-populist Five Star Movement, Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s unity government collapsed last month, prompting September’s snap elections. The current polling leader is Giorgia Meloni’s right-wing Brothers of Italy, which appears to have enough support from other parties to govern if victorious. Enrico Letta’s center-left Democratic Party is polling in second. Letta would likely continue the current government’s policies, but a right-wing coalition would almost surely ditch Draghi’s direction.

A full summary of both contests will appear in October’s election round-up.

Ukraine has started its advance in the Kherson region in order to reclaim as much territory as possible in the south of Ukraine before Russia attempts to permanently annex large sections of Ukraine’s Black Sea coast. Taking sections of the east of Ukraine would give Russia extra control of Ukraine’s significant agricultural exports. Control in the south of Ukraine would give Russia a great deal of control of much of Ukraine’s shipping along the Black Sea coast. With Russia’s oil and gas industry currently toying with shutting energy exports to Germany and Europe, increased control of these parts of Ukraine would place food security and energy security for much of the world in the Kremlin’s control.

Russia has continued to export to India, is planning an oil and gas pipeline to China to satisfy China’s fuel shortages and is trying to lock in much of the energy exports with ties to Iran while sanctions bite on the Russian economy. With fuel prices slowly dropping, a cut in Europe’s gas supply would likely raise inflation along with the increased need for fuel in the colder months. The rise in fuel prices has buoyed the Rouble despite sanctions, and incentivizes Russia’s further restricting of fuel and increased conflict in Ukraine. While Western weapons supports to Ukraine have been significant, North America’s lacking strategic support of Western Europe’s energy needs has not displaced Russian oil and gas, fuelling Russian Forces instead of heating the homes of their allies. Russia’s ties to other regions and large BRICS economies will give them further control over the world’s food and fuel supplies.

India has taken to protect their own interests in the era of the recent conflict in Ukraine. Russia has always been a large supplier of India’s Defense Forces that are made up of equipment from mostly Russian, French and British made systems to defend its borders with Pakistan and China. India has strong ties in the west, but with US weapons being issued to their adversaries, they have chosen to secure much of their food supplies, energy supplies and military supplies with Russia in order to maintain a power balance in the region. India is well aware that they cannot lose strength in their region, lest be at risk of losing in a greater conflict.

China has taken to increase its military activities around Taiwan and hold relations with Russia and the West to its own advantage. China has ensured much of the financing of Russia and is establishing closer energy ties with Russia in order to remedy their own fuel shortages affecting industry and shipping in China. As with Russia, China has become emboldened after the West abandoned Afghanistan and their allies there, and is well aware of the global chip shortage and Taiwan’s significant contribution to the chip market worldwide. China may now see Russia as a weaker world power after they have witnessed the failure of Russian equipment in the field, but their activity around Taiwan and their concerns with a powerful India keeps China focused on maintaining their own power and control in the region.

Brazil is approaching a fork in the road with an election coming this fall between the current Populist President Bolsonaro and former popular President Lula da Silva. The corruption scandals that rocked the last Presidential election and the question of Brazil’s independence from foreign influence may become the deciding factor of an election that promises to change the future direction of Brazil and Latin America. Inflation after the Olympics and World Cup in Brazil along with corruption tying much of the political class to criminal acts might become the ballot question yet again. Current world issues will exacerbate the problems of four years prior as world inflation and drastic changes for BRICS nations come with their support of the West or Russia and China. The great need for agricultural products and oil and gas will give Brazil a lot of leverage in the global markets. The distrust of international leaders and corporations may swing Brazil away from their traditional markets however, expanding their current business relationship with China and further avoiding criticisms of Russia. This is a complicated question for either candidate it seems and will be of great interest during the upcoming election.

South Africa and much of Africa became very aware of the lacking support from the rest of the world during the Covid crisis. While vaccine policies were supplying Europe, North America and parts of Asia, Africa was one of the last regions to receive Covid vaccines, and this may have contributed to one of the first new strains to be logged coming out of South Africa. With China increasing their influence in the region and South Africa being the mid point of commerce between much of the West and new Chinese investment in the region, their view of their place in the old economies of the West and new economies of the East leaves their future in question. Closer ties with the BRICS may change South Africa, but it will likely become a point of leverage for many large economies, influential regions and global institutions a lot sooner than anyone expected.

BRICS nations have determined that their best interests may not lay in the same policy choices that many of their Western allies have chosen as an approach. Actions that lead Western powers to abandon their allies in Afghanistan will come to be seen as one of the greatest policy determinants of our era. BRICS nations already see what many countries in the West fail to acknowledge from their policy failure. A further limiting of North American oil and gas exports to such a degree that it raised the Rouble and will put Western Europe in an energy shortage not seen since the Berlin Airlift is affecting the world greatly in 2022. BRICS nations have decided to take to classical policy approaches, and will act in a manner that protects their interests and keep their citizens fed and warm as much as possible. Any approach that would hinder those basic needs will end the leadership of any of the BRICS nations rapidly, as it should.

The Integration Center for Georgian Azerbaijanis (GAIM) was opened on April 3, 2019 in the Marneuli region of Georgia.

The opening ceremony was attended by Fuad Muradov, the chairman of Azerbaijan’s State Committee for Work with Diaspora, Shota Rekhviashvili, the governor of Kvemo Kartli region of Georgia, Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, the state minister for reconciliation and civil equality, and other officials.

The opening of the Integration Center of Georgian Azerbaijanis in Marneuli is an important event. The proposal regarding the integration center opened in Marneuli was put forward by local youth living in Georgia in 2018. The opening of the center is a very important project, and it is the solution for a number of issues that concern the local Azerbaijanis in Georgia.  

The main purpose of the establishment of the center is to deepen the existing relations between Azerbaijan and Georgia in the fields of science, education, culture and sports and to support the integration of local Azerbaijanis into civil society. Azerbaijani, Georgian and English languages, as well as the history of Azerbaijan and Georgia, will be taught in the center, and sports clubs will operate.

The center operates in various directions and supports Azerbaijanis living in Georgia. The biggest support was during the Coronavirus pandemic. With the support of the State Committee for Work with Diaspora, they helped foreign compatriots by providing support to low-income and vulnerable population groups, such as Azerbaijani houses and separate diaspora organizations established abroad, by carrying out humanitarian actions. The Integration Center of Georgian Azerbaijanis repeatedly helped low-income and elderly families and elderly people living in social isolation in various cities of Georgia during the quarantine period and distributed food parcels to Azerbaijani families due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The center also organizes events on significant days for both countries. This year, a commemorative event was held at the Georgian Azerbaijani Integration Center in connection with the 30th anniversary of the Khojaly genocide. They laid a wreath in front of the monument in February 2022. Azerbaijani Minister of Education Emin Amrullayev, who was on a visit to Georgia, also visited the Integration Center of Georgian Azerbaijanis in Marneuli.

The “proxy paradox”, namely, the fact that the “Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics”, which for 8 years have been completely subsidized by the Russian Federation, enjoy broad military support and have “authority” totally dependent on the Kremlin, but so officially and not annexed to Russia, suggests that there is a complex and multi-level model of Moscow’s interaction with the “satellites”.

A kind of “food chain” has been formed, in which a “satellite” country or territory can be “sacrificed” for the sake of Russia receiving geopolitical benefits and advantages.

At the lowest level of this “chain” are several well-known countries in Africa, in which both governments and national wealth are controlled by Russian private companies, primarily the infamous Wagner private military company. The socio-economic development of Russia, in essence, is of little interest, despite the traditional declaration of “friendly ties with the countries of Africa.” Much more profitable and interesting is the export of minerals, the “range” of which is very wide, including gold. The presence of PMCs, which do not require large resources, makes it possible to keep local clans “on a short leash”, as well as successfully compete and even squeeze Western countries out of the region, i.e. former metropolises.

“Trojan horses” are Russia’s “gold asset” among the “satellites”, primarily due to the personal loyalty of the leaders, in the spirit of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, or traditional “historical” allied relations, as in the case of Serbia. The main task of the “Trojan horses” is to create a deep split in the West, in particular, the European Union, designated by Russia as a hostile entity. The situation with sanctions has clearly shown that a “Trojan horse” can be used to destroy political unity on conceptual international issues.

The current “energy crisis” in Europe also did not do without the Hungarian “Trojan horse”. Against the background of serious problems in the industry and the growing dissatisfaction of the population caused by a shortage of gas in European countries, Hungary is confidently increasing its pumping, demonstrating to the entire EU the “advantages of friendship with Russia.”

Serbia, whose economic potential is very small, is being used by Russia in its traditional role as an “eternal fuse” in the Balkans. The recent idea to create a military base in Serbia was met with a bang by the local patriotic community, but with great apprehension in neighboring countries. The fears are quite understandable since Russian forces are almost in the center of Europe close to the NATO countries.

Serbia is a “satellite” very vulnerable to pressure. On the one hand, the Serbian economy, and its export potential, are focused on the EU, but on the other hand, the status of a “historical ally” obliges the Serbian authorities and Serbian society to demonstrate loyalty to Russia at all levels.

The “satellite” countries from among the former republics of the USSR traditionally play the role of a “security belt” for Russia. “Setting fire to conflicts” along the perimeter of its borders, Russia is trying to “stop” tension, preventing destructive processes from spreading to its territory. True, with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the “satellites” from the CSTO began to demonstrate intractability and therefore are now considered a cheap source of resources for the war with Ukraine. Mercenaries are being recruited in Central Asia, and Soviet-made weapons are being exported.

Also, “post-Soviet satellites” are considered by Russia as platforms for circumventing sanctions or a profitable exchange with influential players in the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia. The role of PMCs at this level of the “food chain” is performed by the Russian “peacekeeping contingent”, the effectiveness of which is doubted, for example, by all parties to the Karabakh conflict.

Belarus occupies a special place among the “post-Soviet satellites”. In fact, this is a military springboard for Russia’s advance to the West and at the same time a “theater of military operations” that allows you to “export chaos” and take the war out of Russia.

Finally, one more, extremely interesting element of the “food chain” of Russian satellites, is now being actively developed. These are “rogue states”, i.e. Iran, and North Korea. In exchange for economic preferences, they must also ensure the “export of chaos” and blackmail of the West, including nuclear. The special operation in Ukraine made its adjustments to this standard set. Now these “satellites” are also a source of weapons (Russia tried to buy drones from Iran) to continue the war with Ukraine.

Several countries in Latin America, where Russian propaganda is traditionally strong, can also replenish the “food chain”. They are destined for the role of “counterweight” to American influence in the region.

Finally, the BRICS countries. In the literal sense, they are not “satellites” of the Kremlin, but they have a “strange respect” for Russia (like India). This group of countries is a platform for Russia’s attempts to realize the idea of ​​a “multipolar world” and declare a “pivot to the East”, which in many respects has a pure propaganda value.

The entire food chain satellites” is called upon to play an active role in Russia’s struggle with the West. We now have a rather unique situation – what for centuries formed the basis of the existence of the Russian state, namely, opposition to the West, is being implemented at all levels. We hear about the “turn to the East”, about the “predatory aggressive West”, about the “pernicious Western values”. But this was during the time of the dispute between the “Slavophiles” and the “Westerners” back in the 19th century.

Using “satellites”, Russia is testing new technologies for the destruction of Western civilization.

Russian “satellites” are active or potential “grey” zones of instability. The formation of such “zones” is Russia’s calling card. So it was in Georgia, so it was in Syria. Now, this technology is being scaled up in Ukraine, where Russia is trying to turn the occupied Ukrainian regions into mini-satellites. The same scheme is being implemented – control over resources, mobilization of the population, the transformation of the territory into a “theater of military operations”, a barrier that does not let the war directly into the territory of Russia.

The carriers of the “ideology of destabilization” in the occupied Ukrainian territories are both local collaborators and officials who “landed” from Russia. But, most importantly, these are figures from the ruling United Russia party, a kind of “collective Putin”, organizing “referendums” and establishing quasi-state structures in these territories.

There is no guarantee that Russia will not organize such “gray zones” somewhere in Europe. The scheme is quite simple. A country, region, or even a separate city declares itself to be a “satellite” of Russia, due to traditions, historical memory, or the presence of a Russian population, which is allegedly “infringed on their rights.” Further, the current government is declared illegitimate, and an enclave controlled by Russia is rapidly forming with all the attributes of chaos – from the degradation of administrative and economic structures to the emergence of a base of militants, arms, and human trafficking.

The events in Ukraine testify that the “export of chaos” can be organized by Russia anywhere in the world.

Mykola Volkivskyi is a political scientist, fellow of the Lane Kirkland Scholarship, Founder of the Foundation for the Development of Ukraine in Poland, and the Institute for Government Relations in Kyiv. Former Advisor to the Chairman of the Committee of the Ukrainian Parliament.

Artem Oliinyk is a political scientist, President of the IAPSS in Ukraine and research assistant at the Academy of Political Sciences of Ukraine, Director of the Institute for Government Relations (Kyiv).

The recent news that Venezuela will be providing Iran with 1 million hectares of arable land for farming draws further concern from the security circles concerned about the Islamic Republic’s growing influence in the Western Hemisphere.  That follows a rapidly growing energy collaboration between Caracas and Tehran following the Biden administration’s decision to lift oil sanctions on the Maduro regime. This collaboration includes the boosting of Iran’s crude supply to Venezuela for refining, which gives room for an increased export of Iranian oil for sale – and further undermines the impact of sanctions on Iran’s operations.  

There is reason to believe that the recent US government’s foreign policy in Latin America has encouraged a more assertive political and defense cooperation between leftist governments, rogue regimes such as Iran, and its terrorist proxy Hezbullah, as well as assorted criminal enterprises and gangs. 

With the election of the FARC-affiliated leftist president of Colombia, Gustavo Petro, the United States is losing one of its few remaining allies in Latin America. US-Colombia cooperation on drug trafficking and counterterrorism strengthened Colombia against cartels, curtailed the Marxist-Leninist FARC rebels (despite the ill-advised peace deal), limited the spread of Hezbullah and its Venezuelan supporters, and bolstered Israel and Colombia’s security relationship. 

Colombia helped prevent the assassination of an Israeli businessman by Hezbullah, allegedly planned in retaliation for the liquidation of Qassem Soleimani. But stability in Colombia has always been contingent on US political and security support. The refugee crisis in Venezuela, which brought 3.5 million Venezuelans to Colombia, has resulted in economic concerns and risks of destabilization.  Instead of addressing this crisis, the Biden administration has announced the removing of FARC from the Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list. Colombia and the European Union withdrew the “terrorist” label from FARC when the peace agreement was first concluded in an effort to encourage integration, but FARC has factionalized into militias that engage in occasional bouts of violence.  The US administration’s signal that it no longer considers FARC a security threat could embolden the group’s worst elements. With the newly elected President Petro pursuing the policy of decriminalization of cocaine, many fear that the policy will give cover to drug cartels, and Hezbullah to enter the markets under more official covers and embed themselves further. 

The election’s context was one that experts had warned about: despite the formal end of the civil war guerrilla warfare continued. FARC’s political success brought more leftist elements into the government.  Far from renouncing violence, many fear that FARC affiliates will instead use it to further spread and entrench the ideology that caused the civil war and that has already resulted in political and economic crises in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Cuba. All of those countries have several things in common – strong opposition to capitalism, populist distaste for the United States, close relations with narcotraffickers, and alliances with Iran, China, and Russia.  The brazen assassination on a Colombian beach of a Paraguayan prosecutor, Marcelo Pecci, known for his tough positions on corruption, gangs, and Hezbullah, may be a harbinger of the chaos that can be expected should leftist policies so destructive to Venezuela take root in Colombia.  

That episode, however, did little to change the US government’s haphazard approach to Latin America. Over the various administrations, US role in Latin American has vacillated, with Republicans traditionally emphasizing the security-oriented approach and focusing on countering terrorism and gangs, while the Democratic administrations focusing more on human rights and humanitarian assistance. The Trump administration, for instance, has pushed for Hezbullah’s terrorist designation among both left and right-wing governments in Latin America, and has worked with El Salvador to address the border crisis and to clamp down on the MS-13 entry into the US. 

However, none of the US administrations in the past twenty years had developed a broad strategic approach in the Western Hemisphere. Specifically, there has been neither an effort to work with individual target countries to address ingrained economic conditions, political upheavals, and regional problems – such as the impact of Venezuela’s refugee crisis on its neighbors – nor a broader security framework to root out the pro-Iran elements which have grown across the continent thanks to the Cuban/Venezuelan intelligence network, and Iran’s strategic cooperation on economy and defense with Latin American countries. Both Republican and Democrat administrations overall adopted a reactionary approach to specific pet peeves, failing to develop a vision for engagement which would help advance security, prosperity, and peace in the neighboring countries past any specific governments in the US or among their counterparts. 

The relative silence after Pecci’s murder is an illustration of the US government’s overall failure to understand that the security concerns in Latin American require a long-term consistent bipartisan approach. As Joseph Humire, Center for Secure Free Society’s specialist on Transnational Threat Networks in the Western Hemisphere, told the author, Iran has been patiently pursuing a systematic ground game through As Joseph Humire, Center for Secure Free Society’s specialist on Transnational Threat Networks in the Western Hemisphere, told the author, Iran has been patiently pursuing a systematic ground game throughout the continent, slowly but surely expanding its reach, through consistent social, cultural, and economic initiatives and the expansion of alliances with the help of its regional proxies and networks, including assorted criminal elements. 

Some have compared Pecci’s murder with the analogous killing of Alberto Nisman, an Argentine prosecutor who was investigating the leftist Kirschner government’s cover-up of the Iranian orchestrated AMIA bombing by Hizballah. Since the return of leftists to power in Argentina the investigation into these events has gone cold again – and the Iranian presence has grown stronger. Under the current president, Alberto Fernandez, Argentina claims to crack down on Iranian smuggling, but recently allowed a Venezuelan-flagged flight operated by a US-sanctioned Iranian aviator with at least one senior Tehran official on board to land on its soil.  

The US reaction to these incidents has been muted. Low-key policies on leftist politicians in Latin America lie in sharp contrast to the Biden administration’s aggressively interventionist approach with the few remaining right-wing governments, which are also some of the last remaining US allies and opponents of Iran.  The White House, which initially embraced the Guatemalan president Alejandro Giammattei, later parted ways and even tried to impede his efforts to replace an official from the prior administration.  The attack on Nayib Bukele’s government in El Salvador has been far more extensive, public, and potentially destructive to US security interests in the Western Hemisphere.  

After Bukele replaced officials loyal to his leftist predecessors and linked to corruption, the newly inaugurated Biden administration reacted by diverting humanitarian aid to leftist self-styled human rights NGOs connected to opposition parties.  A number of these groups were reportedly receiving funding from past lawmakers, who themselves had served in sanctioned governments. The Biden administration also criticized the Bukele government for allegedly engaging in secret negotiations with notorious gangs, such as MS-13, in a scheme that would have reduced violence in exchange for votes for Bukele’s party, “The New Ideas”. The sole source for this accusation were journalists at the left-leaning Salvadoran opposition-alligned publication El Faro. 

Subsequent events raised questions. Between November 9th and 11th, El Salvador saw a strange increase in gang-related murders (46 in a 72-hours-period) before going back to zero homicides on November 12th. These numbers were provided by local authorities on Twitter on November 13th. “After 24 hours of having launched #DespliegueNacional, we can announce that we have contained the increase in violence during the past couple of days,” Bukele wrote. Later he used the phrase “old enemies and new allies with external financing” when referring to the situation.  

Giovanni Giacalone, senior analyst for the Europe Desk at ITCT, Itstime, and ITSS’ Latin America team, says that “[a]ccording to former ES anti-gang units, Bukele is referring to the right-wing and the left-wing political parties that always provided funds to the Maras [gangs].  Those would be the old enemies.” The cryptic reference to the ‘new allies with external financing’ may reference the flow of weapons into the country that ends up in the hands of these gangsters. Whether that external financing includes Venezuela, whose reach is growing across the region, the US, which has been openly meddling in El Salvador’s domestic affairs while ignoring the flow of weapons into the country, or other parties remains to be investigated. 

The Maras appeared to indiscriminately kill people – including vendors, bus passengers, and market-goers. La Prensa Grafica reported that gang members may have been instructed to leave bodies in plain sight. According to Giacalone, these brief spikes of violence usually occur when the Mara leaders want to send a message to the government. 

In January 2022, a Canada-based digital rights organization called Citizen Lab produced a report attacking the Bukele government for its alleged violations of journalists’ privacy via use of NSOGroup’s Pegasus software. In its reports, Citizen Lab relies on the Biden administration’s El Faro-based claims of Bukele’s collusion with the gangs, but produces no new evidence. It also does not reveal the technical methodology by which it arrives at its conclusion. The Bukele government rejected these claims stating it had no access to Pegasus and that several of its own officials had also been hacked. Pegasus is only sold to specific state-based actors and is reportedly untraceable. Could Citizen Lab also be one of the “new allies with external funding”? 

Curiously, despite this alleged collusion with the gangs and the subsequent cover up, the gangs soon declared open season in El Salvador, challenging the rule of law with unprecedented violence. “The ES government always denied such allegations and its strong actions against the Maras, in prison and on the streets, make it hard to believe that Bukele attempted some secret negotiations,” states Giacalone, adding: “Is it possible that those new allies that Bukele referred to are trying to discredit the government by making the public opinion believe that a deal was made and those sudden peaks are supposed to prove it? If the Mara leaders currently detained had the possibility to order a long-term war against the government, they clearly would. However, we have only seen 72-hours-long peaks of violence, mainly against civilians.” 

Bukele reacted by ordering a special operation and rounding up over 47,300 gang members since the state of emergency was approved by El Salvador’s Congress in April, and was extended for the fourth time the week of July 29th, with minimal losses on either side. The Biden administration reacted by issuing multiple statements of concern and sanctioning several officials for “undermining democratic norms” by passing a law preventing the media from sharing gang communications. Ironically, several Salvadorans added to the list are from the previous left-wing administrations, and are being added in connection to their past corruption and embezzlement. While putting political pressure on President Bukele and openly siding with his opponents, the Biden team reportedly shuttered America’s MS-13 task force and embraced open border policies, increasing the flow of fleeing MS-13 members into the country. 

The likely impact of such policies by the US is easily predictable. First, coupled with domestic reluctance to hold accused violent criminals without bail, the US government’s tolerance of MS-13 and other gangsters encourages the flow of violent crime into the United States. Second, the political pressure on the Bukele government encourages criminal elements and the groups that cover for them, and strengthens whatever links may exist between the leftist opposition and these elements. It is the opposition, and not Bukele, who stand to benefit the most from gang violence. Externally, foreign entities, such as Iran and Venezuela would also gain from the Bukele administration either falling by popular will, which is unlikely as it has a widely popular mandate and has coordinated all of its activities with its Congress, or was destabilized and made ineffectual thanks to US pressure.  

The Northern Triangle is a geographically and geopolitically advantageous area for Iran, Hezbullah, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and the new socialist Honduran administration’s Red-Green Axis. Given its strange passivity in reaction to growing Iranian and Venezuelan interventions across Latin America, and its aggressive position towards Nayib Bukele, one wonders whether a pro-Iran radically leftist Western Hemisphere is in fact the geopolitical goal of the US, or at least, a reality it is willing to tolerate while in pursuit of the Iran deal. One also wonders, why, over the course of the past decades, both Republicans and Democrats have failed to develop an effective outreach and coordination strategy to ensure that the popular will of the voters in Latin American countries and support for improved relations with the US will outlive any particular government of the day. Iran, on the other hand, has been stealthily pursuing that vision of becoming one of the central influencing powers in the Western Hemisphere. 

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security lawyer, a geopolitical analyst, President of Scarab Rising, Inc., and the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider. 

Each of us in the twenty-first century recognizes the negative effects of climate change on the future of the earth and strives to mitigate them as much as possible. The global community is attempting to warn international organizations and states about the magnitude of the disasters that await us in the future by organizing various events.

However, some states, knowing the disaster that awaits the earth as a result of climate change, not only participate in the fight against it but also encourage the acceleration of this process through their actions. The Republic of Armenia’s atrocities in Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent territories are a clear example of this.

Armenia, which has illegally and militarily occupied Azerbaijani lands for nearly 30 years, ignoring all international documents, including four UN Security Council resolutions, was forced to surrender and withdraw from the occupied territories only after the 44-day war that began on September 27, 2020.

Notwithstanding the humiliation and pain that Azerbaijanis have endured over the last 30 years, with 30,000 lives lost and 4000 people missing, the Azerbaijani government and its armed forces treated the Armenians illegitimately settled in Azerbaijani territories humanely, giving them enough time to pack and leave their temporary “homes,” and even extending the time they were given to leave when necessary. But before they left, they packed everything they owned and set fire to their homes. And they will continue to do so. They never considered the places they lived to be their homes. In recent days, Armenians fleeing Azerbaijan’s Lachin district have also begun to burn forests.

The main point to be emphasized here is that the vast majority of the perpetrators are Armenians from Syria and Lebanon, who were illegally resettled in the lands occupied by the Republic of Armenia. By doing this, Armenia also violates paragraph 6 of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War of 12 August 1949.

According to a joint declaration signed by Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, Azerbaijan is set to retake control of Lachin, which lies on the route between the city of Khankendi in Karabakh and Armenia, by the end of this month.

Russian troops and the Armenian population will leave the areas along the “Lachin corridor,” which includes Lachin, Zabuh, and Sus, and it was temporarily placed under Russian control by a tripartite declaration signed on November 10, 2020, after 44 days of the conflict.

As part of the agreement, Azerbaijan constructed a 32-kilometer (20-mile) road around Lachin for the Armenian population in Karabakh to use on their way to and from Armenia.

According to APA, environmental non-governmental organizations in Azerbaijan held an event related to environmental terrorism committed by Armenians illegally settled in Azerbaijan’s territories in Lachin and the surrounding areas.

Many environmental organizations condemned the environmental terrorism committed by Armenians in Lachin and the surrounding areas, stating that all of this is deliberate damage to the environment by burning the forest areas around Lachin. The participants noted that this process is a clear manifestation of the Armenian government’s pathological hatred for Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani people, as well as their hatred for nature, Azerbaijan’s natural resources, and the ecological environment.

According to the appeal, the Republic of Azerbaijan is always working to protect the ecological balance and ensure that its citizens live in a healthy environment, and non-governmental organizations play an important role in this process across the globe.

Russia and Ukraine recently made an agreement so that grain exports would be able to leave ports in Southern Ukraine and make their way to destinations dependent on Ukrainian and Russian Agro exports. This brief agreement likely have more to do with other nations in Africa and Asia entering a grain crisis as opposed to any measures to resolve the conflict in Ukraine, especially in their southern region. While countries like Canada cap oil production and increase the cost of farming and fuel in the middle of these crises, Russia benefits from a lack of displacement of Russian oil and gas. Canada had to change their own laws on sanctions so that Canadian based Turbines supplied to Russia’s oil pipeline could be sent, despite Russia claiming it will limit energy export to Germany anyways. At the same time, Russia and China plan to develop a pipeline to the East while China becomes increasingly aggressive towards US support for Taiwan. Time has become a crucial issue as winter approaches in a few months and a solidification of the battle lines in Ukraine turn into a permanent land grab by Russia.

Ukraine has moved to retake cities and town in the south of the country so that Russia cannot continue to have control of the Black Sea region nor expand their control over to Odessa and the border with Moldova. Ukraine’s push to liberate Kherson has been met with successes, but Ukraine might find itself in a losing position if it puts its tanks and troops in a position where they can be ambushed by Russian anti-Armour weapons while pushing further into the region. Russia looks to have a similar plan as they had done in Crimea in 2014 by holding referendums on whether those regions taken in Ukraine wish the become a part of Russia or become an independent region under Russian influence.

Battle lines in the East of the country seem to mirror the original objectives of Russia, to take the Donbas and Eastern regions that have been under conflict since 2014. With winter coming and the lack of clarity on the ability to supply civilians with heat and fuel in the cold, there has been actions to move innocents westward. It is likely the case that a push by Ukraine to liberate eastern regions would be difficult as long as the south of Ukraine and its ports are essential to Ukraine, Russia and world food exports.

Ukraine’s 2nd city, Kharkiv, had been defended diligently but will likely become a barometer on where the conflict is heading. If Ukraine can secure objectives in the south and Russia is militarily unable to push back in an effective manner, there will not likely be another attempt on the city using ground forces. If Ukraine depletes its forces and is unsuccessful in retaking territory in the south, or loses ground, the push by Russia in the east to take the rest of the Donbas may also include an assault on Kharkiv. With Western powers supplying Ukraine with weapons, a test on NATO equipment may take shape and look similar as when Russian T-72s and T-80s were ambushed assaulting Ukrainian positions. The key to much of the conflict is endurance, and with Western powers still refusing to displace Russian oil, gas and grain, Russia’s army will have the funds to resupply and purchase arms while creating closer financial and export ties to China and other allies.

Russia is likely pushing to solidify its gains with a referendum and cultural dominance strategy. For this reason, a push to regain territory in the south is essential for Ukraine. Immediate benefits in oil price increases and food insecurity benefits Russia in the immediate conflict and via their midterm strategy. Policies by Western countries to allow Russia to provide wealth and equipment to its oil funded war massively affects the conflict.