Foreign Policy Blogs

Tesa May to deliver Brexit speech in Italy as talks with EU stumble. UN General Assembly meets. German elections likely to keep Merkel in power. Saudi Arabia embraces tech reform. All in The Week Ahead.

This Friday, British Prime Minister Theresa May will deliver a speech in Florence to discuss the progression of Brexit and the vision she has for a post-Brexit arrangement between the UK and the EU. This follows last week’s postponement of the most recent round of negotiations between the UK and EU on Brexit. The May spokesmen have been cagey on what exactly she intends to say, which is likely due to the three players in this saga with frequently contradictory goals: the hard Brexiters principally in May’s Conservative Party who desire a totally clean break from the EU; the soft Brexiters and those opposed to Brexit entirely that wish to maintain cohesion with the EU which includes most businesses; and EU negotiators who must contend with the EU block’s goals and desire to not discuss any post-Brexit arrangement without addressing every issue leading up to Brexit.

One of the things EU Brexit negotiators will be looking for in this speech is whether the May government intends to follow through on its “divorce bill” to pay for EU budgetary requirements — the May government has waffled on this issue, contesting both the bill itself as well as the estimates offered by EU negotiators. Equally as likely — if not more likely given rumors the speech won’t address the divorce bill —  is a more ambivalent speech calling for some maintenance of the status quo in a transitional arrangement, given her precarious majority in Parliament.

This Tuesday, the UN General Assembly General Debate will convene, with the theme “Focusing on People: Striving for Peace and a Decent Life for All on a Sustainable Planet.” Already, side discussions are slated to discuss climate change, with one meeting scheduled for Monday between White House advisor Gary Cohn and a slate of representatives from other major economies. In addition, the continued plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar with over 350,000 fleeing to Bangladesh in the past 2 months — which has been cited by multiple sources as ethnic cleansing — will be discussed among UN members, making Aung Sang Suu Kyi’s absence from the Assembly debate notable. President Trump is also slated to hold a meeting on Monday on reforming the UN, including strengthening the Secretary-General again. He is also slated to criticize the level of contribution the US is providing to the UN, which is likely to ruffle feathers. The presidents of Russia and Mexico are not expected to attend, denying the ability of one-on-one discussions between the US president and either of his counterparts.

On Sunday, voters will head to the polls to elect Germany’s next Chancellor and members to the 630-member Bundestag. It will represent the first election since Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to let in nearly 900,000 Middle East refugees. It will also represent the first opportunity for Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) to contest seats at the national level after securing seats at the state level.

From March until now, the main opposition party SPD has steadily lost support while support for Merkel’s conseravtive CDU/CSU has risen. Polling from last week placed the conservatives with around 37% support, while the SPD remained 14 points down at 23%. Far-left Die Linke was at 10% while the far-right AfD was close behind at 9.5%. As a result, the likely outcome is for the CDU/CSU to emerge with a commanding lead, followed by the SPD and left and right leaning parties vying for 3rd place. The shape of a Merkel coalition may end up similar to the current “grand coalition” between the CDU/CSU and SPD, or a coalition between the CDU/CSU and some smaller parties such as the FDP and Greens.

Merkel is likely to lock out the AfD from any coalition: a current government minister last week called the AfD manifesto unconstitutional, and a leaked email from an AfD leader calling for  “genetic unity” has sent tremors throughout mainstream German political parties on left and right. Blocking the AfD would prove similar to moves by the Dutch, Italian, and British governments in past instances to keep out far-right political parties from coalitions, even at the expense of ideological preferences.

This week, the Saudi Minister for Communications and Information Technology will permit WhatsApp, Skype, and Viber to operate within the kingdom after the video calling apps were blocked by the Saudi government in 2013. Included in this arrangement is an agreement that these companies will provide quarterly reports of customer complaints, while government agencies will heavily monitor the three sites. The agreement between the tech companies and the Saudi government is part of a larger initiative called Vision 2030, which aims to improve technology in the Kingdom and move the country to a more digital society. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s initiative to diversify the Saudi economy on the government’s terms has run into some challenges, although it looks to the UAE as a model for technological and social liberalization without political mobilization. In addition to consumers being able to rely on these services, businesses operating in Saudi Arabia will be able to operate more smoothly in an international context. The UAE still blocks Skype and has given indications it will continue to do so.

The Week Ahead provides analytical foresight on the economic consequences of upcoming political developments. Covering a number of future occurrences across the globe, The Week Ahead presents a series of potential upside/downside risks, shedding light on how political decisions affect economic outcomes.

This edition of The Week Ahead was written by GRI Senior Analyst Brian Daigle.

The post The Week Ahead appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A letter to the many distinguished visitors from abroad in NYC for the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly:

​(*apologia – a defense; profundis – out of the depths)

You may well be visiting New York City for the first time in awhile–perhaps not since last year’s 71st Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

If so, you may be wondering: Is this America? Yes, it has changed.

As a native New Yorker and as a proud, engaged American of ripe age, please let me explain the case of President Donald Trump at the 2017 United Nations General Assembly. I hope to assuage your concern about America, its potential effect on your country and the world.

The headline of this apologia might well have been: Please be patient with us. We are coming back.

Consider:

Donald Trump is not “America”–not by a long shot. Yes, he was elected constitutionally. You may know, however, that our seriously outdated electoral system doesn’t necessarily reward the presidency to the candidate winning the popular vote. That’s what happened in 2016. More than 65 million Americans voted against him.

Mr.Trump doesn’t have a “base”; he has a “core” of supporters: Trump’s Tangle of Rhetorical Inadequacy. His approval rating has declined precipitously since inauguration. And recent polls indicate that his “America first” world view is increasingly unpopular Analysis The pillars of Trump’s nationalism are weakening .

​America has numerous institutions to restrict an authoritarian president. Many are hard at this right now. Mind the commitment and progress being made by investigative journalists; non-governmental organizations; opposition within his political party and in opposing parties; civil society; religious and academic institution; and members of the legal profession.

Americans are fully aware that he is unreliable, unethical and unstable. A large majority is greatly disturbed being represented by an uninformed opportunist. He honed a strategy of bluff and bluster replete with “U-turns” and “S-swerves” in amassing a real estate empire often requiring bankruptcy protection and legal chicanery.

He has brought this style–creating mass uncertainty and anxiety–to national governance, most recently with our Dreamworks Act, but also as with national health insurance and many foreign affairs policies. He believes that such mendacity and confusion is sustainable in the U.S. Presidency. He is wrong.

We acknowledge that one of the most upsetting international prospects we now face is the Trump threat to remove the U.S. from the historic 2015 six nation nuclear deal with Iran. The most cogent summary of this potential dangerous reversal in U.S policy can be found in the following New York Times article “A Devious Threat to a Nuclear Deal“.

Above all, America is a nation of laws and the Trump administration is now under scrutiny on many issues in many venues. As we know, the arc of justice does bend slowly. But many Americans are working diligently to see to it that it does indeed bend to justice–and harmony–in our beloved country.

For these and many other reasons, yes, please be patient with us. America will come back. And we will once again be a responsible, contributing member of the world community.

Written by John Paluszek, Executive Editor, Business in Society

www.businessinsociety.net

@Biz_in_Society

The post Apologia de Profundis re Trumpus appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Donald and Ivanka Trump with Dubai partner Hussain Sajwani

President Donald J. Trump’s global conflict-of-interest problems just got a little bit bigger. As McClatchy DC reports in detail, Trump and a Dubai property development partner have hired a shady Chinese government construction firm to build a part of the Trump International Golf Club Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This news comes “despite a pledge from Donald Trump that his family business would not engage in any transactions with foreign government entities while he serves as president.”

Trump’s partner in Dubai is DAMAC Properties (داماك), headed by billionaire Emirati property developer Hussain Sajwani (حسين سجواني), pictured above with Donald and Ivanka Trump. Sajwani has been called the “The Donald of Dubai,” and has raised conflict-of-interest concerns among Trump’s critics by openly trading off of his relationship with the U.S. president. The Chinese firm in question is majority state-owned China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC, 中国建筑工程总公司), awarded a $32 million road construction contract for the “AKOYA Oxygen” residential portion of the Trump Dubai project, where residential units will be priced up into the millions of U.S. dollars.

CSCEC is clearly a Chinese Communist Party-led organization: CSCEC chairman Guan Qing (官庆) doubles as the company’s party secretary. CSCEC president and general manager Wang Xiangming (王祥明) likewise doubles as the company’s deputy party secretary. CSCEC’s deputy general managers are also party members. As in other Chinese state-run organizations, CSCEC staff regularly take part in mandatory Communist Party political education and party-building programs. The party’s objectives differ sharply from U.S. policy goals in the “Greater China” and Asia-Pacific region.

Trump’s Dubai golf venture presents possible overseas conflicts of interest on two fronts: One with the UAE’s “Donald of Dubai,” and the other with China’s corrupt one-party dictatorship. As The Atlantic observes, “Trump’s relationship with Sajwani certainly creates the impression that this venture could give special benefits to the Emirati businessman and, by extension, other investors who have Sajwani’s ear.” Moreover, Trump “will be profiting from business interests [in the UAE that] could jeopardize his ability to make objective and effective decisions about policy that will affect the U.S., the UAE, and the Middle East overall.”

As McClatchy further observes, China’s state-run CSCEC “was one of several [Chinese companies] accused by the World Bank of corruption for its role in the bidding process for a roads project in the Philippines and banned in 2009 from World Bank-financed contracts for several years.” CSCEC also appears in documents from the notorious Panama Papers leak, drawing scrutiny for possible tax evasion and/or money laundering. For the President of the United States to be entangled with such a firm raises obvious concerns.

The Trump-Kushner family’s Chinese conflicts of interest have been previously noted, including valuable Chinese trademarks for Trump businesses, manufacturing in Chinese sweatshops for Ivanka Trump fashion products, and Chinese investment in Trump-Kushner real estate projects from the controversial EB-5 “visa-for-sale” scheme for wealthy investors. Any of these dealings could influence Trump administration policy decisions with regard to China.

Trump business ventures abroad also come at significant cost to taxpayers: When Trump’s sons Eric and Donald Jr. traveled to Dubai for a February 2017 ribbon-cutting ceremony at the Trump International Golf Club, the Secret Service shelled out nearly $17,000 for agents’ hotel bills alone (Add this to the nearly $100,000 the Secret Service spent on hotel bills for Eric Trump’s business trip to Uruguay in January, the more than $50,000 for Eric and Tiffany Trump’s business trip to Vancouver in February, and the many other taxpayer-funded business and pleasure expenses for the most costly First Family in U.S. history).

American voters might wish to consider all of this very carefully before deciding ever again that a “businessman president” is what America needs most.

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Amidst recurring bullish predictions and rhetoric of Asia’s rise we should be careful of falling into complacency. Despite years of high economic growth, Asia faces many serious challenges. Regional political relations, economic health, water-security and demographic trajectories will push many key Asian nations towards instability.

Western leaders have watched, with envy and concern, the rapid growth rates of countries in Southern and Eastern Asia.  Many commentators agree that the Asian Century is upon us, and merely debate whether it will be Chinese or Indian.  The balance of power is certainly adjusting.  Last December, China seized a US monitoring drone  in the international waters of the South China Sea, with impunity; an act unimaginable two decades ago.  However, for all their bluster, the continued rise of the Asian Tigers is far from assured. A great many problems remain which could undermine their growth.

On July 24th, Vietnam pulled the plug on a $300 million gas-drilling expedition in a disputed area of the South China Sea after China threatened to attack Vietnamese bases in the Spratly Islands.  Setting aside these familiar tensions in the South China Sea, Asia has many other serious territorial disputes affecting most Asian nations.  Japan has disputes with all of its neighbours, and China is engaged in 13 territorial disputes with 8 neighbours.  These disputes impact business and investment and can spark conflict-generating economic and political instability.  Concerningly, despite improving multilateral cooperation over the last two decades, there is still no effective regional political community and there are few political mechanisms to manage crisis.  These disputes also become scapegoats for a host of domestic problems – such as slowing economies, water-security, and demographic problems – which constitute de-stabilising threats in their own right.

Asia’s economic health should be watched as growth slows, particularly in China.  Slowing growth has led to unsustainable debt increases in many countries, such as Singapore and Taiwan.  Japan’s aging population and weak productivity have generated a 234.7% GDP-to-debt ratio; the highest in the world.  Beijing’s repeated use of cheap credit to stimulate growth caused China’s gross debt to surpass 304% of GDP in May 2017; links between state-owned companies and banks heighten the economic risk inherent in this debt.  A default in the heavily indebted corporate sector could send shockwaves through state-owned banks and trigger a systematic crisis.  Further, China’s efforts to transition from an export-led economy to one driven by domestic spending, has had limited success.  This is clearly reflected in economic statistics – consumer spending only makes up 37% of China’s GDP, far below the United States (68.1%), Japan (58.6%), or even Russia (51.9%).

Drought in India.

Asian water-security is being pressured by climate change, water management, and economic and population growth.  Water shortages disrupt economic production and generate political unrest.  Given their economic and demographic significance, scarcity in India and China are particularly concerning.  Between 2003 and 2009, northern India lost water at the fastest rate in the world according to NASA.  The livelihood of 600 million Indians depends on agriculture and almost 2/3 of India’s cultivated land relies on rainfall rather than irrigation. India is also uneconomic with its water, using 28% more freshwater than China despite a smaller population and economy.  India’s water stress explains, in part, the tension between India and Pakistan in Kashmir in which major rivers – namely the Punjab – begin.

There is also a growing water-security crisis in China.  The glaciers that feed the Yangzi and Yellow River are melting, even as experts predict that Chinese water demand will outstrip supply by 2030.  As of 2014, North China holds two thirds of Chinese agriculture but only one fifth of its water, and 45% of GDP is in regions with a similar water resource per capita as the Middle East.  China’s water issues will inevitably drive it to strengthen control over its watershed.  The major rivers that feed the Asian sub-continent and South East Asia start in the Tibetan Himalayan glaciers; dashing any hopes of an independent Tibet.  Chinese exploitation of Tibetan water will create conflict with downstream nations; in the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia which rely on these rivers.

After World War II,  commentators thought the Japanese economy would soon dominate the world as its equity market soared and Japanese businessmen purchased US trophy properties such as Pebble Beach.  Yet, in the 1990s, Japan’s economy stagnated, due in part to the burden posed by its aging population.  Most developed Asian countries, such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, are facing aging populations which will increase dependency ratios and dampen economic performance.

In particular, China will likely become old before it becomes rich.  China’s One Child Policy enabled a ‘demographic dividend’ by decreasing the amount of dependents average earners needed to support. This has underpinned China’s economic rise, and accounted for up to one quarter of China’s per capita GDP growth since the mid-1970s as the working share of the population rose from 55% to 73%. But this rise has now peaked and China’s developing economy now faces a glut of aging workers without the affluence to support strong social care.  This will cause economic and social stress as a smaller working share of the population will yield a lower per capita living standard, and savings and investments will fall.  Huge economic gains have helped the Chinese Communist Party to contain dissent, yet China already suffers 200,000 protests a year of varying sizes. China is perhaps less stable than many realise.

Given Asia’s importance, the diversity of risks that face it must be understood.  Asia could dominate the 21st century for the wrong reasons – as a source of political turmoil and economic instability.

This article was originally published on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Ban Abbs.

The post Are the “Asian Tigers” Hamstrung by Hidden Flaws? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

As China and India continue to face off over a tiny patch of Himalayan highland, Bhutan is caught in the middle with the dispute as much about Bhutan’s foreign policy as it is about territory.

Beijing and New Delhi have been facing off over the 34 square kilometres that constitute the Doklam (called Donglang in China) region close to the tiny Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan. China and India have a difficult legacy of border disputes and the standoff over Doklam adds another to this list. Interestingly, the two chief actors in this saga are Bhutan and China, not India. Indeed, India has not expressed a claim on the region, but rather has acted on behalf of Bhutan (according to New Delhi) and intervened in protest to what it considers Chinese expansionism. Conversely, China claims that Bhutan informed Beijing that it did not know about Indian troop movements in the region, nor had it asked India into intervene on its behalf.

The spark for this entire confrontation was the entry of Chinese road workers and troops into the Doklam region on June 16th, which is claimed by both Bhutan and China. India saw these movements as a threat to both Bhutanese sovereignty and Indian security interests, sending military forces across the border to occupy the region in response. With regards to security, India is concerned about an increased Chinese presence in, and access to, the Doklam region, as it is near the strategically vulnerable Siliguri Corridor connecting India’s northeastern regions with the rest of the country. A Chinese military advance of some 130 kilometres would cut off the north east of India (and some 50 million people) from the rest of the country: such an eventuality took place during the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

Along with allegations that India is demolishing the aforementioned road, Beijing was angered by Indian military forces crossing an established border (namely the Indian-Chinese border) to intervene in the affairs of a third country. In response, India claims that China’s road building efforts on contested land are illegal. It has since emerged that the road in question has been there for over a decade, and that China was likely widening it. India’s involvement is also predicated on one interpretation of 1890 Convention of Calcutta which delineated the border between British Raj and Qing dynasty China in Sikkim and Tibet.

According to Article 1 of the Convention, the border begins at Mount Gipmochi, with the same article going on to state that the border will follow the watershed. The problem is that Mt. Gipmochi does not lie on the watershed. Accordingly, the border ought to start six kilometres north of said mountain at Batang La. This was reinforced by a British map from between 1907-1913 that showed the border starting at Batang La.

What this all means is that “if Mt.Gipmochi is the starting point, Doklam is in China, but if Batang La is the real starting point, then Doklam is in Bhutan and China has no right to build a road there.” Unsurprisingly, China and India cite the two opposing interpretations as justifications for their actions. Nevertheless, even if India’s preferred interpretation is the correct one, this does not sanction its intervention into Bhutan’s affairs.

What is interesting is that both India and China are clinging to a treaty signed by two defunct predecessor states (British India and imperial China). It also interesting to note China’s adherence to a treaty signed during the country’s ‘Century of Humiliation’ – a perennial sore spot for China’s politicians and public. Intriguingly, on June 30th, the same day that China emphasized the 1890 treaty it also stated that the 1984 Hong Kong treaty signed with the UK regarding the territory’s fate out to 2047 was a “historical document that no longer has any realistic meaning.”

The problem facing both India and China is that the longer the standoff persists the less appealing any unilateral draw down becomes for either side. Chinese rhetoric is ratcheting up in the run-up to the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, scheduled for this fall. This uptick in rhetoric before a major gathering is a familiar trend, but it does mean that the issue is likely to remain unsolved until after the Congress, when Xi Jinping no longer needs to rally party cadres to action.

Indeed, this is one of the plans tendered by India: wait out the fall and winter, as weather concerns will limit any activity in the region, and seek a quick diplomatic solution in 2018. Another option is to replace Indian troops in the area with Bhutanese ones, de-escalating the standoff that way and drawing down troops levels. This provides China with a face-saving measure, as it would have stood its ground against India, while working with non-threatening Bhutan to resolve the issue according to China’s own ‘Good Neighbour’ framework.

Interestingly, Bhutan is China’s only neighbour that does not have diplomatic relations with Beijing. Indeed, Bhutan does not have diplomatic relations with any of the UNSC’s P5 members. It is one thing to try and forge a limited diplomatic path free of great power intrigue, but quite another when you happen to be surrounded by them. Bhutan’s close ties to India but minimal, semi-formal ones with China are a legacy of its close orbit around New Delhi, yet one which does not make full use of the potentially productive relationships landlocked Bhutan could cultivate.

India’s bipolar role in Bhutan’s young democracy

Sandwiched between the world’s two largest nations, Bhutan’s efforts to engage China complicate its longstanding ties with India. India has long viewed Bhutan as firmly within its orbit; a veritable protectorate. Having inherited Britain’s paternalist legacy regarding the various Himalayan nations, India maintained a cooperation agreement with Bhutan which saw New Delhi exercise considerable power over the former’s security and foreign policies from 1949 to 2007.

When Bhutan reportedly made unilateral concessions to China in 2005 (then still obliged to consult with India on foreign affairs) India was aghast and scrambled to undo the ‘damage’. Said damage likely entailed China settling for a small concession in Doklam in exchange for larger Bhutanese gains in the north and east. Two years later, India reneged on its role in Bhutan’s affairs, as the country transitioned towards constitutional monarchy. India also expressed great displeasure in 2013 after Bhutan announced its intentions to pursue a “balanced foreign policy” including establishing relations with China; a seemingly commonsense aspiration to outside viewers, but anathema to New Delhi’s interests.

The Bhutanese military in its modern incarnation was brought about with substantial Indian support in 1951 following China’s absorption of Tibet. While Bhutan stood by India during the 1962 war, and was one of the first nations to support Bangladesh’s independence, New Delhi’s loss to China and the inconclusive result of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War called into question India’s pledge to protect Bhutan. Moreover, Indian arguments pointing to China’s annexation of Tibet as a threat to Bhutan were drastically undermined after India’s incorporation of Sikkim in 1975.

Ironically, India has been the largest supporter of and also largest threat to Bhutan’s democracy since the transition from absolute monarchy in the mid 2000s. Alongside the structural problems facing Bhutan from decades of dependence on India, New Delhi continues to meddle in Bhutan’s politics. Specifically, the upcoming 2018 election will see New Delhi rooting for Bhutan’s pro-India prime minister Tshering Tobgay as he seeks re-election. Tshering ousted pro-China Jigme Thinley in 2013, thanks in part to (alleged) Indian support.

Despite being one of the biggest proponents of the country’s transition to democracy, India was quickly accused of back-seat politicking. Specifically, India abruptly cut gas and kerosene subsidies (along with a host of other harsh measures) just days before the 2013 election, throwing Bhutan’s economy in turmoil. Jigme went on to lose the election, and many doubt claims that the cuts were a mere coincidence.

Having been accustomed to decades of overarching influence, India has often neglected relations with Bhutan: a similar failing has estranged Nepal and pushed that country closer to China. India’s “colonial-style approach of buying loyalty through economic aid may no longer work,” notes former Indian ambassador P. Stobden.

60% of Bhutan’s government expenditure is spent on Indian imports, with 75% of all imports stemming from India, as well as 95% of Bhutan’s own exports destined for India. India’s economic shadow looms large over Bhutan, as witnessed by the rupee devaluation, which sent Bhutan’s economy into shock as an unintended (and perhaps overlooked) consequence of New Delhi’s surprise monetary decision.

Bhutan is also facing a growing debt crisis as government borrowing has seen the country’s debt to GDP ratio climb to 118%. Lopsided trade relations (mainly with India) and extensive hydro-power expansion (accounting for 77% of debt to GDP) both highlight India’s ongoing influence. Firstly, “90 to 95% of what Bhutan borrows from India goes back to India,” with Bhutan’s main export – hydro power – chiefly benefitting India. Add to this the fact that India is Bhutan’s largest creditor – responsible for 64% of Bhutan debt – and the situation is clear: India effectively controls both ends of Bhutan’s economic cycle.

With a hydro-power potential of some 30,000MW (of which only 5% is developed) and less than a million people, Bhutan stands to greatly benefit from its energy wealth: Bhutan’s projected GDP growth rate for 2017-19 is a staggering 11.1%. Specifically, hydro-power accounted for 32.4% of Bhutan’s exports and 8% of GDP in 2016. With plans to develop 10,000MW by 2020, Bhutan stands to gain from feeding China and India’s energy needs. India’s influence in the country means that it is wary of Bhutan becoming closer to Beijing, and it’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) framework.

In another ironic twist, India has been whispering to Bhutan for years that OBOR is a debt trap, even as it continues to hold the majority of Bhutan’s debt. Meanwhile Bhutan is viewing OBOR as a means to diversify investment and move away from its reliance on Indian funding. China for its part would be more than willing to supplant India and acquire access to additional renewable energy sources.

In this context, the 24 rounds of border negotiations between Bhutan and China, as well as rumours of closed door territory swaps make India very nervous. Despite not having official diplomatic ties with Beijing, Bhutan has nevertheless made recent overtures to court China and send India a message. Chief among these has been the visit by Bhutan’s ambassador to India to the Chinese embassy to attend the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 90th anniversary. Given the military tensions in Doklam and the fact that it is very rare for an ambassador to attend a foreign country’s armed forces day, this sends a clear signal to New Delhi.

Under the Radar uncovers political risk events around the world overlooked by mainstream media. By detecting hidden risks, we keep you ahead of the pack and ready for new opportunities.

Under the Radar was origionally published on Global Risk Insights and is written by Senior Analyst Jeremy Luedi.

The post Doklam Standoff Highlights India and China’s ‘Great Game’ over Bhutan appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Shipan Kumer Basu, head of the Hindu Struggle Committee, meets with President of India Ram Nath Khovind

The minorities in Bangladesh are in a dire and tragic predicament. According to Shipan Kumer Basu, head of the Hindu Struggle Committee, “The constitution of Bangladesh gives certain rights to the minorities of the country,” Basu says.

“Everyone in the state is supposed to grant equal treatment under the law to all minority communities to enjoy their own culture, practice their own religion and use their own language.

Sheikh Hasina (who has served as prime minister since 2009) has done nothing to develop these principles or give security to the minorities. On the contrary, she has made the minorities live in fear and insecurity. The reason for this is prejudice and bigotry against the minority communities in Bangladesh.”

It is for this reason that Basu is appealing to Israel as a member of the international community to help his people.

“Different forms of violence are reported against the minority communities in Bangladesh in several national newspapers,” he said. For example, it was reported recently that Soma Biswas, a 25-year-old Hindu woman, was gang- raped and burned alive because of her Hindu heritage.

Unfortunately, she is one of many such cases. The plight of Sukhiya is another. After her husband was murdered, the women and girls of her family were raped and abused regularly until she herself was murdered, thus leaving the rest of her family even more vulnerable. “Reportedly, this has all been part of an attempt by some affluent and influential local people to displace Sukhiya and her family so that they can take over the land.” According to the Bangladesh Hindu, Buddhist and Christian Unity Council, “Rape and violence against women is one of the biggest social challenges facing Bangladesh.”

At least in the case of Sukhiya and Biswas, everything is documented and there is a campaign to obtain justice for Sukhiya’s family. “It is important to stress that many more incidents occur that go unreported, especially in the rural areas,” says Basu. “Additionally, violence against women is generally not made public due to cultural and social taboos. Sheikh Hasina is the spearhead and brainchild in giving a strong foothold to ISIS in Bangladesh. They have terrorized the minorities. She has given them moral, administrative and political support to carry out their dreadful activities. A peaceful country has become a killing field for the minorities.”

Sheikh Hasina, Basu says, has placed her people in all government offices and this adversely affects the minority communities: “The higher officials in the police are all her people. They don’t even take the minorities into account. When brutality happens, they turn a blind eye to it and even threaten the minorities”.

“The government has put a few ISIS people behind bars so that they evade the eyes of the world, but their malicious and terrorist activities within the jails continues,” he noted. “Very minor charges are levied against them and they are protected by government functionaries themselves. Leaked reports from inside the jails say that these people belong to an ISIS group trained in Syria and other ISIS strongholds outside Bangladesh.”

He continues: “There are hundreds of examples. Where will all of the minorities go? We are denied peace and tranquility in our own place of birth. We have the right to live, breathe fresh air and to live freely as others do. If we leave our own country and go to India, we are given refugee status. Other countries will also do so to save us.”

According to Basu, however, Bangladeshi Hindus don’t want to leave behind the land of their ancestors, so he wants a solution from inside Bangladesh: “To stop this systematic suppression, killing, murder, rape, land grabbing and terrorizing, I appeal to the whole world to take note of the grave situation that the minorities are facing in their own land and to save the minorities.”

Given the history of the Jewish people being persecuted for thousands of years, Basu believes Israelis are in a unique position to provide support: “Israel has a history of helping people who are in distress throughout the world. Israel is a country full of talent and has vast expertise. Extending their strong helping arms will strengthen our country and the minorities both intellectually and financially.”

This wouldn’t be the first time Israel would be aiding the Bangladeshi people.

“In the 1971 Bangladeshi War for Liberation, then-Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi appealed to Israel for help,” Basu notes. “Israel readily helped with arms and ammunition and thus Bangladesh was born. Israel was the first country to recognize Bangladesh officially. But it did not establish any relations with Israel.”

Some Bangladeshi Muslims are now greatly opposed to this reality. As Kaji Aujijul Haq says: “Why can’t we keep ties with Israel when most of the Arab world is opening up to Israel? Our prophet instructed us to keep ties with the Jews. Have we become more powerful than the prophet himself?”

Basu, who has already asked the Israeli Druze diplomat Mendi Safadi, head of the Safadi Center for International Diplomacy and Public Policy, to help bring the issue to international forums, believes there are many ways Israel can help.

“The voting rights of the minorities have been systematically diminished and, therefore, they don’t have a say in the government. Unless the minorities are empowered, the torture and subduing of minority groups won’t stop,” he says. “If Israel campaigned that the next general election be held with the supervision of a UN peace-keeping force, it would be a wonderful thing loved by the absolute majority of the Bangladeshi population, including the Hindus.”

Basu argues that if the Awami League comes to power again through a showcase vote, it will be a disaster. “All of the minorities will lose the power to vote and then the party will start snatching land, killing people and forcing the Hindus to leave Bangladesh. So, a very neutral election is needed at this time so that both the Hindus and Muslims along with the other minorities can live in peace.”

The post Hindu Rights Activist Seeks Israeli Support for Bangladeshi minorities appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

US President Donald Trump shakes hands with Prime Minister Narendra Modi as they begin a meeting at the Oval Office of the White House in Washington. (Reuters)

Recently, the U.S. has reached out to India to help it stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. This mirrors the U.S.’ efforts to solicit China’s assistance in resolving the North Korean crisis. While these maneuvers acknowledge both India and China’s importance in their respective geographic areas, they simultaneously reduce both India and China’s core strategic interests in resolving these crises to continued beneficial trade relations with the U.S..

The U.S.’ appeal to both India and China alike is an indicator of accelerating multipolarity in the 21st century. After decades of frustration with North Korea, the U.S. has recently turned to China for help. The North Korean situation affects all Northeast Asian states, to include South Korea, Japan, and Russia. However, as the region’s emerging hegemon, China’s interests in resolving the crisis clearly must be taken into account by the U.S. as well.

To date, the U.S. has reduced China’s concern with resolving the North Korean dilemma to that of a potential nuclearized Korean Peninsula and a hypothetical collapsed North Korean state which would lead to a refugee crisis for China. Both of these concerns are certainly valid. However, they are subordinate to China’s primary security concern in having an intact North Korea as a buffer state against any perceived encroachment of U.S. forces, which led to China’s entrance into the first Korean War. Until this overall security interest is acknowledged by the U.S., either publicly or privately, there will be no resolution of the crisis.

Security considerations will outweigh economic ones for all countries, and China is no different in this respect. Therefore, U.S. sanctions against China, threats of further sanctions against Chinese entities suspected of enabling North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and threats of downgrading the U.S.-China relationship are all futile. These threats would have had much more teeth a generation ago when the U.S. economy was much stronger and more singularly indispensable to the global economy as a whole. As this is no longer the case, any reduction in U.S.-China trade would actually hurt the U.S. more, while accelerating China’s OBOR.

Similarly, the U.S. has singled out India to help it in its efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan. Of course, India has always had an overriding security interest in Afghanistan as both South and Central Asia lie within its sphere of influence. However, like China, the U.S. has yet to make the case to India on how exactly it will benefit India’s security interests to assist the U.S.. Also, the U.S.-India trade relationship is being threatened by the U.S. and this is being used as a stick to get India to comply with U.S. wishes.

However, as with China, India is far from being a treaty ally of the U.S. and, as such, has no concrete incentive to follow the U.S. lead in resolving a regional crisis unless its own security interests are acknowledged and taken into account. With India, one interest of concern is surely the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. As India doesn’t already trust Pakistan due to its relationship with China, this mistrust is compounded by Indian uncertainty regarding the exact nature of U.S.-Pakistani ties with respect to terrorism.

A bad situation is made much worse by the fact that the U.S. is now actively seeking Indian and Pakistani help in Afghanistan. Luckily, the Doklam standoff is now resolved, otherwise it could have emerged as a bargaining chip as both China and India might have asked the U.S. which one it truly favored in the crisis as the price of assistance in the North Korean and Afghan theaters of concern respectively.

If this model is to be followed in the future, then the U.S. will continue to seek assistance from regional hegemons to help it resolve local crises. How will this play out in the Syria Crisis? Yes, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are all powerful regional actors with various interests in resolving this particular crisis. However, unlike Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Iran is not a U.S. ally and so therefore will ask the U.S. what concrete benefits will accrue to it for helping the U.S. to resolve this particular crisis. Unfortunately, the U.S. has already shot itself in the foot with sanctions against Iran despite its acknowledgement that Iran is still in compliance with the Iran nuclear deal.

Finally, after so many other crises, there is still the Ukraine Crisis. There is no other regional hegemon the U.S. can deal with to resolve this situation other than Russia. Recent U.S. veto-proof sanctions against Russia, combined with recent talk of arming Ukraine with offensive weaponry, severely undermine its incentive to help resolve this crisis, to say the least. Yet again, decreased economic ties with the U.S. pale in comparison to core Russian security concerns such as NATO expansion.

This particular raft of sanctions also further reduce the incentives for the above Chinese, Indian, and Iranian assistance as they explicitly target global firms looking to benefit from Russia’s oil and gas sector. Additionally, the overall situation is worsened as Russia itself is a key player in the North Korean Crisis, Afghanistan, and the Syrian Crisis and now has absolutely zero interest in helping the U.S. realize its own objectives in these various theaters. Summarily, as long as the U.S. keeps subordinating key regional states’ core security interests to their economic ones, its strategy to resolve various regional crises is doomed to ultimate failure.

The post The U.S.’ Outreach To Regional Hegemons Is Both Right And Wrong appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Last August, North Korea launched what is believed to be a Hwasong-12 military grade ballistic missile towards Japan. This aggressive act towards the US ally is thought to be the latest move in the tit for tat between North Korea and the United States. There is the belief that North Korea is close to being able to place nuclear weapons on its ballistic missile systems, and has already demonstrated that it is capable of reaching targets well beyond its own borders.

Questions come with how the region wishes to progress in the future. In addition, the strategy to achieve this progression and the often unmentioned innocents living in North Korea that are subject to the fate given to them by the response of the two biggest egos in the metaphorical room.

Since the end of the Korean War in the 1950s there has been a cease-fire, but no actual peace agreement was achieved for the last few generations. This allowed North Korea and its ruling family to live and thrive by means of appeasement diplomacy. North Korea’s neighbours had to either walk softly around a large military force run by one individual, or have passively supported the regime so that it would not have to deal with the consequences of millions of North Koreans suddenly ending up with no control or leadership.

Ignoring a problem did not reduce its risk, and while North Korea was being appeased diplomatically, it slowly created its own nuclear weapons program, including semi-sophisticated missile systems to protect its ruling elite.

The risks posed by North Korea is reaching a critical stage where any leverage by the US or its allies have been spent without much definitive progress over the years trying to reduce a weapons program that will now certainly come into existence.

It is not expected that the US or its allies will want to greatly change the status quo, and there is next to no mention of the rights of those living in North Korea as regime change is mostly off the table. In this scenario, neighbours can only hope that North Korea decides they are content keeping the region hostage without a nuclear or conventional weapons strike, and hope that order does not beget chaos within North Korea with a nuclear weapons program ready to launch.

A stronger position would be to take the time to develop a truly effective Anti-Ballistic Missile system, similar to one that forms a defensive ring around Moscow, and hope that shooting down threats diffuses the calls for escalating a situation into a larger conflict. ABM diplomacy would allow US allies to regain a bit of their leverage, but still would maintain a horrific scenario where a nuclear armed and capable North Korea could set off a conflict at the whims of their leader, at the time and place of his choosing.

The end result of years of passive diplomacy over North Korea’s future nuclear threats is coming to a climax, and there are fewer and less viable options as North Korean technology approaches the reality of their spoken threats. With more small nations choosing ballistic missile diplomacy as a means to an end, the ABM diplomacy route may be the best/worst option in maintaining a status quo in diplomacy that has led to the current crisis, and will likely lead to many others.

The post The Need for Anti-Ballistic Missile Diplomacy appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Some ethnic organizations in multicultural Western societies frequently neglect to perform their bridging role between old comers and new comers. These organizations’ missions are often abused to shine the private glory of old comer board members’ social prestige, misrepresenting the political interests of new comer immigrants.

The ramming of identity-politics-based extremism disparately sprouting around the globe has reawakened the totalitarian madness of unrefined mass politics under which religiously or racially shared violent norms dangerously surface into repulsive ‘praxis’. The imminent threats of such hyper-rationalized political action lie in the fact that it could now potentially jeopardize the socially embedded concept of ‘pluralistic equality’ being an essential premise for securing the ‘level playing field’.

In many multicultural Western societies, the evaporation of pluralistic equality might not only imply the breakdown of democratic solidarity but also play an overture for the collapse of the Republican notion of the public sphere where privileged yet responsible civism is supposed to guard the constitution values through inter subjective reasoning.

Why is the order of ‘worldliness’ (borrowing Hannah Arendt’s term) falling? Why do citizens of secular republics distrust the freedom-unleashing works of glorious ‘craftsmen’ and rather violently claim for the quasi-totalitarian group values of a single religion or race instead of those of their cosmopolitan public sphere? In the meantime, why have glorious craftsmen failed to stop the rise of extremism?

Both White supremacists and Islamic extremists have in common that they renounce the crafted secular glories of the public sphere and ignore the social constructive nature of the public sphere. Especially, they reject critical race theories’ assumptions under the intersectionality theory that citizens have multiple social identities that are not mutually exclusive.

What has caused the extremist groups to turn skeptical towards such theoretical assumptions?

One does not dare question the contributions that Hannah Arendt’s political theories and interdisciplinary critical race theory have made to the progress of humanity since the end of the world wars but one must cautiously point out that the theories have some limits in redressing the reality of the 21st century multicultural public sphere.

First, they undermine the motivating role of secular self-realization and self-discipline that guide individuals, especially the masses, towards righteous praxis. Arendt, for example, depreciates the value of French bonheur in her book, The Human Condition, because she considers it a “modern enchantment with ‘small things’” that is “an extraordinary and infectious charm that a whole people may adopt as their way of life, without for that reason changing its essentially private character.” In other words, she sees French bonheur as a mass hyponastic propaganda disseminated by a private organization that dissipates citizens’ political willingness to perform praxis in the public sphere.

Yet, in 21st century reality, it is the unnatural rhythmic coolness of gangster hip-hop and the (George) Bataillean way of squandering social excess that have overwhelmingly brainwashed our young generations’ way of life, not the ‘small things’ emphasis of French bonheur. Such excessively liberally expressed ‘crafts’ are often too existentialist in that they are vaingloriously stimulating, anesthetizing our young generations’ sensitivity in finding intrinsically self-realizing or self-disciplining meanings out of the crafts. One does not mean to say that these crafts have no socially contributing values but the fabricated heroism (cultural elitism) within the crafts entices young generations to falsely interpret the intended ‘unnatural rhythms’ and instead to ironically naturalize the rhythms limitedly for their own existentialist purposes. In so doing, young generations lose their passion to remold the rhythms into a unique one and also to present the remolded rhythm representing their true individuality to the public.

Considering these dysfunctions, today’s ‘craftsmen’ should urgently innovate alternative ways of accommodating secular self-realization and self-discipline other than the above types of ‘crafts’.

The development of happiness, or subjective well-being, studies could shed some light on this future challenge when it is truly understood as a praxis-arousing craft that pro-activates individuals’ community-consciousness as well as self-consciousness.

Second, the theories pay little attention to intra-ethnic power relations in Western multicultural societies. For example, the scholarly frame of critical race theory is mostly in the mainstream institutions vs minority individual context that limits the scope of research into studying how institutionalized racism oppresses minority individuals. Such an approach rarely recognizes the fact that the rise of multicultural elites and the upper middle class in Western societies since the 1980s has deepened intra-ethnic inequality especially between old comer and new comer immigrants. Indeed, the inequality is increasingly observable as a significant portion of minority citizens in multicultural Western societies have cast their votes to extreme rightist candidates in the past few years.

The problem of intra-ethnic asymmetry of information between old comer and new comer immigrants is as important to note as that within mainstream society. The less the degree of the asymmetry of information between old comer and new comer immigrants, the higher the likelihood that new comer immigrants integrate into American society. And the higher the likelihood of such integration, the less the likelihood that conflicts between working class citizens and new comer immigrants arise.

Similar to the way civic organizations as social capitals can ameliorate the problem within mainstream society, ethnic civic organizations as intermediating agencies (e.g. Korean American Associations) can narrow down the aforementioned inequality gap. Unfortunately, in reality, many such organizations neglect to perform their bridging role between old comers and new comers. These organizations’ missions are often abused to shine the private glory of old comer board members’ social prestige, misrepresenting the political interests of new comer immigrants.

Nevertheless, many social clubs and trade associations of successful second-generation or old comer professionals barely pay attention to this kind of intra-ethnic affairs or to the welfare of new comer immigrants unless doing so embellishes their American ivory tower.

Often, it seems like the priorities of the organizations, supposedly the public goods of an ethnic group, are to advertise good pictures that they have taken with vote-seeking local politicians so that they can garner the public image of seating on the top of the intra-ethnic hierarchy. All these dysfunctional intra-ethnic power relations especially within ethnic groups with soaring numbers of immigrants since the 1980s make intra-ethnic institutions in multicultural Western societies nothing more than the reincarnation of the clientelist  political machines of the late 19th century America.

Social costs associated with the asymmetry of information between self-conceited old comer and misinformed new comer immigrants must be reduced. Western governments should therefore find ways to systematically evaluate how ethnic civic organizations substantially play their bridging role between old comer and new comer immigrants.

The post Is Extremism the Sole Reason for the Collapsing Order of ‘Worldliness’? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Summing up the general state of awareness in the world that we are living in, an overwhelming majority of the world seems to be either unaware of or unconcerned about the potentially catastrophic confrontation building up in the last two months in the Himalayas between India and China, the world’s two largest countries, which also happen to be the world’s second and the fourth largest economies, and, most worryingly, two nuclear armed nations that have the world’s most well-oiled defense apparatus.

The standoff, which is threatening to spiral out of control from the Chinese side, started when the one-party led Communist nation’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) started constructing a motorable road from Dokola in the Doklam area towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri on June 16, 2017.

Bhutan, which believes the area is its territory, swiftly reacted, and in a press release issued on June 29, 2017, stated clearly that “the construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory is a direct violation of its agreements with China“.

The Bhutanese foreign ministry further said:

” Boundary talks are ongoing between Bhutan and China and we have written agreements of 1988 and 1998 stating that the two sides agree to maintain peace and tranquillity in their border areas pending a final settlement on the boundary question, and to maintain status quo on the boundary as before March 1959. The agreements also state that the two sides will refrain from taking unilateral action, or use of force, to change the status quo of the boundary. Bhutan hopes that the status quo in the Doklam area will be maintained as before 16 June 2017.”

At the core of the dispute is the question of where the final tri-boundary point — the point at which India, China, and Bhutan meet — lies.

China argues that the India-China-Bhutan tri-junction is at Mount Gipmochi (Gyemo Chen), much south of Batang la, the place that India and Bhutan consider as the tri-junction.  China claims 89 sq km in Doklam (along Gamochen at the border, to the river divide at Batangla and Sinchela, and down to the Amo Chhu River) as its own.

But it is one of only four areas – as per Bhutan – over which China and Bhutan, who do not have diplomatic relations, have a dispute and have had 24 rounds of talks. China, however, claims much more than that and considers a total of seven areas as disputed areas.

China, it may be noted, has territorial disputes with virtually every neighbour of its. And if its conduct in the South China Sea and with Japan over Senkaku Islands is any indication, China does not really believe in giving in to other nation’s claims.

Therefore, much before the official press release by Bhutan, and just two days after the construction work by China began, on June 18, 2017, India sent around 270 troops, with weapons and two bulldozers and stopped the Chinese troops from constructing the road.

In a 15-page document released by the Chinese Foreign Ministry on the same day, Beijing said that “over 270 Indian soldiers, carrying weapons and driving two bulldozers advanced more than 100 meters into the Chinese territory to obstruct the road building of the Chinese side, causing tension in the area.”

It further accused India of raising the number of Indian soldiers to 400.

India’s ministry of defence, however, brushed aside the Chinese accusation of escalation and said that India has been maintaining 350-400 troops at Doklam ever since the stand-off began.

The Indian action is in accordance with the India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship of 1949, which advocated India’s guiding role in Bhutan’s diplomatic and defense affairs.  Though the 1949 treaty was superseded by a new friendship treaty of 2007 that replaced the provision that made it mandatory for Bhutan to take India’s guidance on foreign policy.

The 2007 treaty provided broader sovereign rights to Bhutan by, for instance, not making it mandatory for Bhutan to take India’s permission in matters such as arms imports. But it did not alter much the inherent attached interests of the two nations.

Article 2 of the 2007 India-Bhutan Treaty says:

In keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other.

While sovereignty is the principal concern for Bhutan, the dispute for India beyond just the size of the territory in Doklam.

Picture Courtesy: Indian Defence Review

India is alarmed that if the Chinese do complete the motorable road in the Doklam area, it will give China an imposing access to India’s strategically vulnerable ‘chicken’s neck’ in the Siliguri Corridor, a 20km wide corridor that links India’s seven northeastern states to its mainland.

It may further be noted that Bhutan’s own administrative apparatus can get severely compromised if the Chinese inhabit Doklam as Bhutan’s communications network as it is connected through Siliguri in India.

At the moment, it is a stalemate. India is refusing to pull back its troops from the area that it says belongs to Bhutan. And China is threatening a bigger war every new day.

UPDATE:

As on August 28, 2017, India and China reached a consensus on disengagement of border personnel at the #Doklam faceoff site. A release by India’s ministry of external affairs said:

In recent weeks, India and China have maintained diplomatic communication in respect of the incident at Doklam. During these communications, we were able to express our views and convey our concerns and interests.

On this basis, expeditious disengagement of border personnel at the face-off site at Doklam has been agreed to and is on-going.

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The post Doklam: China’s War Drums and the India-Bhutan Treaty appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

If tolerance and acceptance are not part of the educational system of Iraq, what kind of future does that country have?

While ISIS has been uprooted from most of Iraq, years of bitter struggles and wars have deprived an entire generation in Iraq. According to the Iraqi Institution for Development, in ISIS controlled areas, subjects such as history, geography, literature, art and music were removed from the curricula. They were replaced by Islamic law, physical fitness and jihad education. Military training, religious extremism and recruitment to the terror group was a major component of the ISIS educational system.

For example, a book used for 6-year-old children was titled “The Islamic State is Remaining and Expanding.” The illustrations in this book show children using weapons and wearing ISIS attire. An ISIS math textbook asked children the number of explosives needed to kill a Shia Muslim or an unbeliever in a suicide bombing. Furthermore, the plus sign was eliminated for ISIS claims that it references the Christian cross. ISIS deprived students of basic components to deal with the modern world.

As a result of this curriculum, many Iraqi parents opted not to send their children to school. Also the children who attended ISIS schools are lagging behind in their education and are traumatized from the entire experience of having their childhood robbed from them. There are horror stories of ISIS taking school children to watch executioners crucify and behead people. Aid workers stress that these children have nightmares to date from this experience. As a result, Iraqi children who have been liberated from the yoke of ISIS are several years behind in their studies.

However, there is a huge question mark whether the Shia Popular Mobilization Units that have contributed to liberating Iraqis from ISIS will be much better. Iranian political theorist Reza Parchizadeh noted that Nouri Al-Maliki is close to the Iranian regime: “He incites hatred against Sunnis, Jews and Westerners and has influence on the educational system. It is natural that he should try to advertise the ideological Shiite values that are close to Tehran.”

A report in Al-Monitor also stressed how the Shia Popular Mobilization Units have already made inroads on Iraqi university campuses, where it is feared by some that they could seek to export the Iranian educational model to Iraq. One example of this was provided by Iranian dissident Mohsen Behzad Karimi, who stated that the Shia-led government is indoctrinating students to support martyrdom.

Iraq expert Gilgamesh Nabeel is more concerned about the plight of minorities under the Iraqi Government’s Educational system: “There is a concentration on Shiite Islamic figures. Minorities are marginalized in Iraq’s curriculum. This left students with total ignorance of their fellow citizens.

There is nothing on the Kurds in Iraq’s Central Government curricula. There is no single trace for the history of Christianity in Iraq. Nothing can be read on Yazidis and Mandeans. There is a concentration on the Islamic era in a way marginalizing even the ancient history of Mesopotamia to just a few chapters in the first intermediate grade. Besides, the Islamic look on non-Muslims might create a gap between Muslims and non-Muslims.”

In contrast, areas under the Kurdistan Regional Government teach children to be tolerant and to respect human rights as well as minority communities. As Kurdistan’s Prime Minister Nichervan Barzani proclaimed, “The KRG has been continually working, so that the education sector will have a modern and sophisticated system that is aligned with contemporary international standards, principles and values.” Kurdistan’s Minister of Education Pshtiwan Sadiq added: “Children in the Kurdistan Region are all taught in their mother tongue, depending on their heritage and location, which is a rare phenomenon.” Every year in the Kurdish educational system, they print materials in Armenian, Arabic, Turkamani, Kurdish and also for the Yezidis.

In addition, the KRG coordinated with the Education Ministry in order to avoid extremists having influence in the educational sector. 18 Islamic extremist books are banned in Kurdistan and some versions of the Koran that teach extremism were replaced with peaceful versions of the Quran in the Kurdish school system.

Even though the Kurdistan region has less money to invest in education than the Iraqi Central Government does due to the economic crisis, thanks to the KRG’s efforts, the illiteracy rate in Iraqi Kurdistan has shrunk between the years 2004 to 2017, down from 34 percent to 15 percent. At the same time, the number of students have risen from 534,962 students to a staggering 1,738,521 students. The number of teachers rose from 21, 389 to 136,302. And, the number of schools also increased from 1,320 to 6,789 schools. There are also 278 international schools are in Kurdistan. However, generally, the education sector is something public. It is totally free. To the contrary, ISIS charged students a fortune just to go to elementary school.

According to a UNICEF study, while the Iraqi government has more money to invest in education, the Kurdish educational system is better developed. This is largely due to the efforts of Kurdish Prime Minister Nichervan Barzani, who considers having a top quality education to be his main priority for a healthy education system means a developed society and community. In other words, as the educational system has worsened in Iraq in recent years due to the rise of Islamic extremism, the educational system in Iraqi Kurdistan has vastly improved since the Kurds gained autonomy. In addition, Kurdistan’s Prime Minister has financed giving a rehabilitation education to ISIS children in prison, where they will be able to catch up on their educational gap in special schools.

Having said that, we should remember that education reflects the values of a society. Therefore, looking at the messages conveyed by the educational system teaches us a lot about the beliefs which characterize a society. If tolerance and acceptance are not part of the educational system of Iraq, what kind of future does that country have?

The post Iraq’s Lost Generation: Indoctrinated to Hate appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The medium-term outlook in Spain is under pressure from three issues. Its politicians will have to act judiciously to avoid a constitutional crisis. 

Spain’s minority PP (Partido Popular) government has stuttered since October 2016. Despite the country’s relatively buoyant economic performance this year, the government is under continued pressure from three sides: Catalan separatism, corruption allegations and the durability of its economic recovery. Significant movement in one of these areas could change the country’s political calculus, and the wider region.

Mariano Rajoy’s conservative PP administration has been in power since 2011, and has been one of Europe’s foremost adherents of austerity. After years of painful cuts, however, Spain’s economy has registered 14 consecutive quarters of growth. This year it has exceeded expectations, had its IMF forecast upgraded, and is now the Eurozone’s fastest growing economy. If this trend continues time would appear to be on Rajoy’s side, if real incomes continue to rise ahead of the next election, nominally due in 2020.

What tempers this optimism is the unemployment rate. Although the figure (currently 17.2%) has dropped from an eye-watering 26.3% in 2013, including a steep fall this year, the figure is still unsustainable. There is also a suspicion that the recent improvement is due to temporary – not full-time – jobs, encouraged by the PP’s labour market reforms. The Spanish economy will need many more quarters of growth to bring this figure down, even into single digits. Meanwhile, pressure from Eurozone officials in Brussels is further limiting Spain’s fiscal room for manoeuvre. After receiving a reprieve from a financial penalty last year, the government will have to – and most likely achieve – a budget deficit under 3.1% of GDP in 2017.

Rajoy’s government probably wishes it could focus all its energies on the economy. Other crises, however, present mortal threats to its survival. Corruption scandals have plagued the PP for years. Rajoy became the first serving Spanish Prime Minister to testify in court on 26 July. He denied any knowledge of corruption in the PP. Nevertheless, as leader since 2004 and government minister 1996-2003 he is precariously close to the scandal, which is alleged to date back two decades. Former PP treasurer Luis Bárcenas is the most high profile political casualty so far. The charges include bribes, influence peddling and secret slush funds. Rajoy gave evidence in the so-called ‘Gürtel case’, which is linked to the Bárcenas affair. The PP minority government rely on support from Ciudadanos (Citizens), a new party founded in opposition to corruption and growing Catalan separatism. It is not inconceivable that the scandal could fell the government.

Source: Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom

The final – and potentially most serious – component of this trio of risks is an independence referendum in Catalonia. The Catalan regional parliament, led by Carles Puigdemont, of the pro-independence Catalan European Democratic Party (PDeCAT), has called a referendum on 1 October this year. The central government in Madrid has so far refused to recognise the legitimacy of any plebiscite, stating that it would contravene the 1978 constitution. Both sides seem set on a collision course, driven by brinkmanship. Despite the chaos caused by the Brexit referendum last year, the probability that Madrid would not recognise the result, and that even if independence was declared a fledgling Catalan state would be blocked from joining the EU, opinion polls are currently very close.

Catalonia exceeds the rest of Spain’s economic performance by every measure: higher growth, lower unemployment, higher GDP per capita. Catalan nationalists have eyed an almost perfect opponent in the PP government. Posters have started to appear around Barcelona making the link between a no vote in October and the Franco dictatorship. The current situation in Catalonia is the very essence of political risk. However Madrid choses to approach the referendum, a ‘Yes’ vote – even without recognition – would cause the dominos to fall in a most unpredictable manner.

Spain has registered steady economic growth since the depths of the financial and Eurozone crises. The country has implemented a number of reforms, demonstrating a flexibility less obvious in its other neighbours in South Europe. Nevertheless, Madrid will have to weather a number of other storms if this outward stability is to be maintained.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by Robert Ledger.

The post Three Problems Facing Spain’s Government Today appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Two memories come to mind when thinking about political divisions between neighbors and relatives and the violence that permeates when both sides accept totalitarian ideas as their norm. The death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, a man I was fortunate enough to hear speak in a small meeting, and a separate friend of mine from that same country that lamented factions in that society that sough political legitimacy through continued and unabated violence.

More than twelve years after the assassination of Hariri, Lebanon remains at the brink of another decade of sectarian violence while reasonable agents in Lebanese society beg all sides to remember the last few decades of violence and how it destroyed the country many times over.

Ideology in America today does not have decades of recent sectarian conflict to draw on for modern lessons, and may not be affected even if it did have those recent experiences. Ideology and intentional violence for the sake of violence often lives on the fringes, but ends with a meeting of minds or compromise in the middle. Fascism in all its forms ends with those who actually intend to build society and not continuously burn it to the ground.

The vast majority of us in the middle of the political divide are much like Ralph Fiennes’ characters in the movie Sunshine, where he plays generations from the same family with most of them succumbing to being executed or imprisoned without rights by those on the far right and then far left, just because he lived where he lived and via accusations against the political leanings of generations of his family. Fiennes shows that no matter what you do, think or say, fascists from both sides will label you and seek to dispose of you just because you exist in their world.

Societies that pull themselves to the extremes often have to ignore large swaths of reality to make the mental leap to self-abuse. The operation of actual slavery and organized death by way of rape and torture against many minorities in Iraq and Syria in an actual concentration camp style genocide is almost wholly ignored by international media. Actions done by actual Nazis are being repeated in our generation, and there is next to no response by the “Great Powers” of the world.

In addition, even victims of the genocide are blocked and almost wholly ignored by the international community as they beg to be claimed under otherwise generous refugee programs that by process ignore them as well. The cause of this came from sectarian factions in Iraq and Syria gaining a foothold into the mainstream. The lack of understanding of these issues comes with the almost complete absence of moderate voices from Iraq, and a strong and organized push to never find those voices in western media. An entire university education could be based on listening to those few people who lament violence in their countries, and the world would be better off with a real education that does not promote and legitimize political violence by any faction.

The post The Balkanization of American Society appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The lack of democracy and minority rights in Bangladesh hinder prosperity and stability within the country.

According to former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “If a country does not recognize minority rights, you will not have the kind of prosperity and stability that is possible.” The present reality in Bangladesh highlights that Clinton is correct about this. Former US Ambassador Samantha Power has argued that there is a connection between the economic situation being bad and the horrendous plight of minorities but Bangladesh shows that even if the economic situation is improving, without democracy and minority rights, the plight of the citizens living in that country will continue to be horrendous.

No one disputes that the economic situation has improved recently in Bangladesh with the World Bank calling the Bangladeshi economy stable and claiming that its growth continues to reduce poverty. In fact, some even argue that the plight of the poor in Bangladesh is said to be better than it is in India right now. However, the lack of minority rights and democracy within the country as highlighted by the sham 2014 election results, which illustrates that the country is far less stable and prosperous than it could be given this recent economic growth.

The root of Bangladesh’s ills rests with the lack of democracy. As the East Asia Forum observed in 2014, “The incumbent prime minister has always lost — until now. But now Bangladesh is entering a new phase. In a farce of an election on 5 January, Sheikh Hasina won a second consecutive term as prime minister. She laid the ground for this victory in 2011, by junking a provision added to the constitution in 1996 which had called for neutral, ‘caretaker’ governments to oversee elections. So Zia’s BNP, sitting in opposition, boycotted the poll. For the 20 million-odd voters who showed up (out of 92 million eligible), the choice was even more limited than usual: the only candidates were either in the ruling party or beholden to it. In the majority of seats, no voting took place at all. There is a big difference between two lousy candidates and just one.”

“Nor was the boycott the only problem,” they added. “Before the polling, the government had put Zia under house arrest. Ershad, who leads the third largest party, was held at an army hospital. The next-biggest party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, had been banned from taking part on the ground that its overtly Islamic charter is in breach of Bangladesh’s secular constitution. On the world stage, Sheikh Hasina has joined a short list of leaders who have been elected technically but without an electoral mandate. Like the rest, she has silenced critics in the media, captured the courts and ensured that only her supporters are entitled to a fair hearing.” Shipan Kumer Basu, the head of the Hindu Struggle Committee, stressed that Sheikh Hasina has destroyed Bangladeshi democracy: “153 MP’s was selected out of 300 MP’s and they were not elected. It was just a joke within the nation.”

Alongside the suppression of Bangladeshi democracy, Sheikh Hasina’s government has been persecuting Hindus and Christians within the country. According to Basu, “After being elected in 1996, Sheikh Hasina made clear her stance regarding the minority issue that she’ll also follow her father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s ideology to wipe out the minorities from Bangladesh.” He claimed that the conspiracy to wipe out the minorities from Bangladesh was initiated by Sheikh Hasina’s father during the Liberation War in 1971: “He first started to grab the lands of the minorities. A major portion of the Ramna Kali Temple’s (Hindu Temple) property were declared as government property and renamed ‘Ramna park’. Minority people were threatened and unnecessarily prosecuted. Women and girls were targeted during Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s reign.”

Under Sheikh Hasina, he stressed that the Bangladeshi leader has initiated a policy to wipe out the country’s minorities within a decade or two: “Atrocities, terror, political suppression, rape, land grabbing and destroying places of worship belonging to the minorities is increasing day by day. The Awami League activists and the leaders are doing the evil deeds with the acknowledgement of Sheikh Hasina. It has become quite intolerable especially after the so-called election in 2014. The present government has become quite reckless. You’ll find both the local print and electronic media containing news of killings, rape, land grabbing, death threats, and abductions by the law enforcement agencies as well as judicial harassment, etc. There is no democratic atmosphere at all in our country now.”

There are countless examples of this within Bangladesh. One recent case is that of Haji Ishak Miyan, who was given land to be developed by 3 Christian women. Miyan decided to take the land without paying these women for developing it. To make matters worse, he has threatened to shoot the three Christian ladies like birds with the help of the local Awami League. According to Basu, the ladies have given him a legal notice but got no response and now, they have nowhere to turn to. Also recently, a 12-year-old minority girl was raped by Eliyas Mallik and most of the murderers of Bishwajit Das were either acquitted or received reduced sentences following appeals. Das was a 26-year-old tailor who was murdered by student activists of the Awami League merely for walking by an anti-government demonstration on his way to work.

However, Basu emphasized that the opposition is not much better than the Awami League. According to him, when they controlled Bangladesh, they took revenge on the minority communities for they generally supported the Awami League even though they got nothing in return for their support: “One of the widely discussed persecutions occurred in Bagerhat district (my home district). The local BNP leaders conducted land grabbing, fish project looting, killing missions, destroyed Hindu temples and the Hindu girls and women were raped, which was led by the local MP of BNP named Silver Salem and his younger brother Salam. Mr. Salam is now the District President of BNP. So, BNP can never be the safe shelter for the minorities of Bangladesh.”

Given this reality, one might ponder, what should the minorities of Bangladesh do? Basu argues that the Bangladeshi minorities have to explore fresh options: “They should realize that both the Awami League and BNP are the same for them. Fleeing to India to save themselves is not the solution. Do they have a better life in India? The answer is no.

People accept changes when they find better opportunities. But fleeing to India, leaving their beloved motherland, is not a solution at all. They have to live as refugees of India as long as they live. The minorities will have to fight back. We must live equally and practice our rights and religious freedoms simultaneously as the majority of the nation. The ideology of communal harmony should be strong where all should live together and practice their religions side by side. We want a political party that will protect us from this dreadful situation that we are living now. We will have to choose a party that supports our cause of living in peace and harmony in our own motherland. This is the only option left for the minorities of Bangladesh.”

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China is plagued by a growing water security crisis and its current solutions are far from sufficient. The reverberations of this crisis have already had global implications, notably encouraging the Arab Spring. Further, as the crisis worsens, national, regional, and global political and economic instability will grow.

China has an age-old imbalance. Its agricultural core is in the North whilst its water resource is in the South. As of 2014, North China holds two thirds of Chinese agriculture but only one fifth of its water.  The rise of Mao in 1952 and an interventionist political ideology has cemented this chronic structural issue in the Chinese economy.

Contemporary developments are further pressuring China’s water economy as rapid economic growth has sucked-in water. Agriculture and industry account for 85% of water usage. China has 20% of the world’s population but only 7% of its freshwater resource and a rapidly growing middle class with water-demanding lifestyles; the average hamburger takes 2400 litres to produce. In 2014, eleven out of thirty-one Chinese provinces did not meet the World Bank’s water needs criteria of 1500m3 per person; in 2015 in Beijing for example, water provisions amounted to only 100m3.

China’s artificially low pricing of water has encouraged poor water management by creating a disjuncture between actual and market water prices, promoting highly inefficient use in industry and agriculture, and persistent pollution of scarce freshwater supplies. A 2009 World Bank report stated that China was using ten times more water per unit of production than the average industrialised country, and that pollution has made the water in 19% of main rivers and 35% of reservoirs useless for agriculture and industry.

Climate change exacerbates this situation. The melt-water from the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau significantly feeds the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers; the Yangtze alone supports 584 million people and serves an economic zone that constitutes 42% of GDP. According to The State Laboratory of Cryospheric Sciences in China, run off into the Yangtze decreased by 13.9% during the 1990s.

China’s principal solution has been to commission the very high profile South-North Water Diversion Project, inspired by Chairman Mao. In 1952, Mao stated, “[The country’s] South has lots of water, the North has less, if it were possible, it could borrow a little”.  The core of the project is a 1200 km canal stretching from the Yangtze to Beijing.  It is a political showcase that is temporarily averting crisis by addressing the symptoms rather than the cause, but at a cost of $62 billion, it is an expensive breather that will not resolve the problem.

By facilitating massive water transportation, China is reinforcing an artificial economy. It is encouraging water-intensive industry and agriculture, and promoting a downward spiral of strengthening an insatiable demand whilst failing to combat system inefficiencies.  Long term, this project, combined with state-induced low water prices, climate change, and population and economic growth, will perpetuate economic and water scarcity in Northern China.

China has made strides to find innovative solutions to its water issues. Since April 2015, it has experimented with pioneering urban designs to solve flooding and water shortages, launching a‘sponge city’ program in 16 cities and districts to retain rain water. The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan, announced in 2015, set targets to improve specific polluting industries and has had some success; 50,000 offending companies have shut down or halted operations.  Nonetheless, critics have questioned the effectiveness of enforcement. Ma Jun, Director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, said many factories did not comply and local governments carried out the easier aspects of the legislation rather than tackling larger, more complex problems.  However, these are small solutions to a very major problem.  Experts predict that, if China carries on with business as usual, water supply will outstrip demand by 2030.

Water security issues will have a severe impact on domestic economic stability in the long term. In China, 45% of GDP is in regions that have a similar water resource per capita as the Middle East. China’s electricity generation is reliant on water, as it is estimated that 45% of fresh-water reliant power generation facilities are in water-stressed provinces.  Further, many water-intensive industries, such as fibres and metals, generate 51% of their output in water scarce regions. China’s global competitiveness will likely be affected as industry, agriculture, and municipal use compete internally and with each other.  Businesses should contemplate a future of water price hikes, supply disruptions, pollution, and increased regulation, and seek the opportunities presented by innovative business solutions to solve Chinese water-security issues.

As throughout history, any water-induced economic instability will have significant political implications, nationally, regionally, and, given China’s significance, globally. This has already occurred. The 2011 winter-drought in China’s Eastern wheat-growing province forced China to purchase vast volumes of wheat on international markets. This caused a doubling of global wheat prices. Quickly, a hungry Middle East and North Africa were convulsing in the Arab Spring; in Tunisia, Yemen, and Jordan, protesters waved baguettes in protest, while in Egypt, people were crying out for “bread, freedom, and social justice” (it rhymes in Arabic).

As China moves rapidly away from staple food self-sufficiency, the globalisation of China’s water-security crisis is a serious issue. Such a danger has not gone unnoticed; a report by the USA’s National Intelligence Council registered Chinese water and food shortages, predicted to occur by 2030, as a threat. The implications for the global economy if China’s economy stutters, given it is predicted to account for 17.2% of it by 2025, are self-evident.

As politicians, leaders, investors, and businesses, but ultimately as people, China will wrestle with this challenge, but the world must also take heed of China’s water-security.  The dry throat of the Chinese dragon may induce more than just a sneeze.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by Ben Abbs.

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Trump once labelled NAFTA, “the worst trade deal maybe ever signed anywhere”. This month, he unveiled the NAFTA negotiating agenda, providing a template for trade negotiations yet to occur with other countries – such as China, Germany, and Japan. With an emphasis on tackling tax systems and removing barriers to the US agriculture and manufacturing industries, Asian negotiators will be watching closely.

As the United States Customs and Border Protection prepares to begin construction on the first segment of President Trump’s infamous border wall with Mexico, his administration is anticipating raising trade barriers with their beleaguered southern neighbor.

Trump’s blunt mercantilism, however, risks pushing both Mexico and Canada into China’s open arms. Both countries have already expressed interest in signing a deal with China, and China has reciprocated. With North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations set to begin in August, they have the potential to tilt the global trade balance even further away from Trump.

Given that Trump has defined his mantle, in terms of reducing deficits with a number of major trade partners, including China, Japan, and the EU, the negotiations provide a crucial glimpse into US trade policy moving forward. The US currently runs trade deficits with nine of its 10 top trading partners; last year, it ran a trade deficit of USD 728 billion, ranging from USD 347 billion with China and USD 146 billion with the EU, to USD 63 billion with Mexico.

According to Trump, the deficits are undoubtedly tied to exploitative trading partners, a misplaced trust on the part of an open US economy, and widespread currency manipulation. Earlier this month, the Trump administration released its broad goals for a new and improved NAFTA, demanding increased exports of its dairy products, wine and grains; opened trade in telecommunications and online purchases; an entirely new dispute settlement mechanism; greater access for US banks abroad; and new guidelines for currency manipulation.

There is much riding on an equitable outcome from the negotiations: over 80 percent of Mexico’s trade is with the US, for Canada the figure is closer to 70 percent. There can be no doubt that Canadian and Mexican negotiations face a long, drawn-out battle ahead.

What Trump may have failed to take into account, however, is China’s rising attractiveness as a global consumer and trading partner. As one of the world’s largest oil importers, China is is keen to start talks with Canada over a free trade deal. At the same time, Canada is reaching out to Asian economies in an effort to reduce its trade dependence on the US, as Trump’s unpredictable brand of protectionism keeps economists and corporations guessing.

During a recent visit to Beijing, Canadian Governor General vowed to boost bilateral cooperation between the two countries; and the Ontario Premier has already scheduled her third trade mission to China for November this year. Last month, the two countries signed a bilateral security agreement regarding intellectual property, trade secrets and other confidential commercial information, an agreement may indicate a greater commercial alignment to come.

Mexico has been more explicit about its options regarding the NAFTA negotiations, pointing to an upcoming visit by Mexican officials to China as a sign that the dance card of Latin America’s second largest economy is far from waning. China’s ambassador to Mexico has also hinted at the possibility of a future free-trade agreement with Mexico, citing “no difficulty” from China’s side in broadening ties between the two countries.

Though a trade deal between the two countries would result in lower tariffs, which is a tough sell for Mexican manufacturing jobs, uncertainty over US-Mexico relations would mean that Mexico is accelerating trade talks with other partners, and China might just want a piece of the action.

As the Trump administration goes after China’s trade practices, they risk alienation, as world leaders appear determined to forge ahead with global trade liberalization. The potential impact on major US industries, and the corresponding opportunities for Chinese trade negotiators, is incalculable.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by Joanna Eva.

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Since the 1990s, numerous Islamist groups have emerged in Algeria, but over the years their allegiances and identities have shifted according to geopolitical trends. The Islamic State is the latest group to gain a presence in the country, but it has faced a pushback as the Algerian authorities are no strangers to counterterrorism.

On June 1st, south of the capital Algiers, gunmen attacked a gendarmerie wounding four policemen. It was reported that the attack was orchestrated by individuals acting on behalf of the Islamic State. It was just the latest in a string of incidents which have occurred in Algeria this year. Other high profile attacks claimed by the group include a thwarted suicide attack by two men in the city of Constantine in April, and two months before this a jihadist tried to enter a police station in the centre of the city. On this occasion, a police man on duty succeeded to disarm the bomber’s suicide device by firing on it and the perpetrator was shot.

According to a 2015 report by the US Department of State, some of the most active Islamist groups operating within Algeria include: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); the Mali-based organisation Movement for United and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO); al-Murabitoun, which was responsible for the 2013 attack on the In Amenas gas facility in southern Algeria and Jund al-Khilafa (Soldiers of the Caliphate), which has declared its allegiance ISIS. However, it is estimated that there are many small groups scattered across Algeria´s southern and eastern borders, which each to varying degrees have declared their loyalty to ISIS.

In light of the Islamic State defeats in Iraq and Syria, many foreign fighters are seeking to return home. Unlike in Tunisia or Morocco, where hundreds of young men have been drawn to the fighting, Algerians have proven less susceptible. In fact less than 200 are said to have travelled to the region to fight under Islamic State´s banner. In Algeria, those who have chosen to align themselves with ISIS have often spent years in the field fighting. The group’s operations faced a setback last year after 332 people were arrested across the country for belonging to recruitment and support networks. Nevertheless dampening the desire for young Algerian men to take up radical causes can be difficult given the high rate of unemployment and social inequity that has beset the country for decades. One commentator has noted that Algeria’s only hope going forward is that there is a surge in the price of oil. Currently, the government is required to pay $30 billion USD in subsidies which cover everything from food to education.

However many contend that what is helping to undermine the threat of the Islamic State is that many Algerians carry the memory of the brutal civil war of the 1990s in which an estimated 200,000 people died. The might of the security force also plays a significant role, as the Algerian military consists of over half a million active service members and a national police force of 210,000. They have learnt to cope with the ‘residual’ terrorism that has continued despite efforts in the early 2000s to grant amnesty to Islamist fighters. The country´s Ministry of National Defense denies publicity to militants by purposely refusing to list group affiliations in communiques regarding arms seizures or anti-terror operations. More broadly, the Algerian government is working to support young Algerians by providing tuition, job placements and paid internships, which is part of a deradicalization program.

While the government continues to address the threat internally, the challenge for the Algerian security forces is controlling the country’s porous 4000 mile border and the mountainous terrain in the north east, which has proven ideal since the early 1990s for Islamist guerrillas. To counter this, Algeria actively participates in the US-backed Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which aims to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities among states in the Maghreb and the Pan Sahel region. While such programs are certainly designed to assess the changing nature of the threat across North Africa, for the government of Algeria, what remains certain for the foreseeable future is whether Algerian mujahideen choose to fight under the banner of the Islamic State or Al-Qaeda, the tactics and strategies they adopt remain the same.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by Emily Boulter.

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Reporters Without Borders (RSF) released its annual 2017 World Press Freedom Index which revealed Taiwan as the top place among other Asian countries and ranks no. 45 in the world (nations in black are the least free). (RSF)

In the quest for geopolitical influence, soft power can often augment a nation’s traditional hard power resource of a strong military. The concept of soft power, often associated with Harvard professor Joseph Nye, has been defined as “a persuasive approach to international relations, typically involving the use of economic or cultural influence.” Nations have long used economic incentives or foreign aid to win friends internationally, and the widespread popularity of a nation’s culture, such as Hollywood movies and South Korean pop culture, can also contribute to positive images of a country.

While nations may seek positive images in the quest for soft power, oftentimes the opposite occurs, and nations lose soft power. Two recent examples include the U.S., where the new president has yet to gain the confidence of the majority of the public. According to a new Pew Research Center survey spanning 37 nations, a median of just 22% have confidence in Trump to do the right thing when it comes to international affairs, and favorable views of the U.S. have fallen from 64% to 49%. Inside the U.S., 53% of voters disapprove of the job President Trump’s doing, according to a new Fox News Poll. 

Over in China, President Xi Jinping’s numbers are not much better, with a 28% of those world citizens polled believing Xi would do the right thing regarding world affairs. The reasons behind this low polling are varied, but are arguably influenced by the detention of human rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, who called for political reforms and died on July 13 in custody.

 One nation which recently gained some soft power, whose status remains a bone of contention among Washington and Beijing, is Taiwan. The decision by Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontières) to open its first Asian regional headquarters in Taipei, is a stark departure from original plans to locate in Hong Kong. In explaining its decision, RSF (an advocate for press freedom) cited concerns over increasing media control in Hong Kong and potential infiltration by spies from mainland China.

According to RSF’s global rankings last year, Taiwan has now become the freest country on the Asian continent. At a news conference in Taipei last month, announcing the official launch of RSF, its secretary-general Christophe Deloire said “Taiwan is pure evidence that democracy and press freedom are possible in Chinese culture, and that is really one of the strongest arguments against claims by Beijing authorities their system is really adapted to Chinese culture.”

Soft power gains, such as the location of RSF to Taipei, can in part offset other losses (the recent loss of diplomatic recognition of Taiwan by countries like Panama), are often cost-effective compared to risky foreign investment, and should continue to be pursued as an effective tool in augmenting hard power.

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(Photo Credit: KRG)

On this day, the international community marks the Yezidi genocide. On August 3, 2014, 40,000 Yezidis got stranded on Mount Sinjar. Since that date, horrific stories of sexual slavery, massacres and torture have emerged from the women who managed to escape from ISIS’ grip. On the first day of the genocide, 1,293 people were killed. From the first day of the genocide till the 15th of August, 2014, 6,470 people were kidnapped.

According to Kurdish Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, who delivered a speech on the Yezidi Genocide Memorial Day, the Kidnapping Affairs Office (which is part of the Kurdistan’s Prime Minister’s Office) has managed to rescue 3,092 out of this number with 1,102 of them being women, 335 of them being men and 840 being girls under 18. Kharai Barzani, who represents the Yezidis in the Religious Affairs Ministry and supervises the Kidnappings Office, stressed that 1,600 Yezidi children were trained by ISIS in two ways. They received either ISIS Islamic instruction or military training. Nechirvan Barzani has succeeded to rescue some of them but others are still in ISIS captivity.

Kharai Barzani added that the Yezidi officials asked everyone to help them with the rescue efforts. Nechirvan Barzani opened up a case and that case became an office. Some Yezidis work there to rescue their kidnapped brethren: “We called everyone to help with the rescue efforts but no one came in the international community except Nechirvan Barzani, who has financed the rescue of Yezidis.” On the anniversary of the Yezidi Genocide, Barzani met with 30 girls in Duhok who were rescued by him in order to hear their stories and to ask about their needs.

Kharai Barzani blames the international community for not helping the Yezidis enough: “What happened to the Yezidis is genocide by all definitions. The international community did not do anything to rescue them. Even when Nechirvan Barzani rescues people, the international community does not come to help them. Sinjar is in our zone till now. The Shia militias are also there. Turkey also bombarded the place for the PKK is there. We call on the international community to help.”

However, the lack of response from the international community is not the only issue facing the Yezidis in their struggle to have their genocide recognized. Hussin Hassam is the Yezidi representative for the High Governmental Commission on the Yezidi Genocide that was established by Nechirvan Barzani: “Our commission visited the ICC and a lot of other international organizations to push the international community to recognize as genocide the crimes committed against the Yezidis. Unfortunately, we have been facing a lot of issues for the government in Baghdad is not cooperating with KRG in seeking global international justice for Iraq is not willing to bring groups to The Hague. We need to make a declaration to get the ICC to start a criminal case for these cases and that is why the Prime Minister has decided to do everything possible for the establishment of a special international court like in Rwanda.”

Because not all of the areas where ISIS committed crimes are under the KRG control presently and because the government in Baghdad is not cooperating, the KRG presently is forced to only begin a case regarding what happened in the southern side of the Sinjar Mountains: “This case is still open. We are trying to do our best to get a judicial ruling. We have gotten a lot of recognition of it as a genocide but so far, it was political for it was done by governments and international organizations. However, the KRG wants a judicial case.”

“The KRG still feels the pain of what happened three years ago,” Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani said. “The KRG will do its best to reduce the pain of what happened to our beloved Yezidis. The acts of ISIS went beyond all cruelty.” Nechirvan Barzani emphasized that it was the Iraqi army that failed the Yezidis and other peoples of Nineveh in 2014 by running away instead of fighting ISIS: “It is clear to all that fighting terrorism and protection in Nineveh was the responsibility of the Iraqi forces. They had advanced weapons and all they needed. But when five Iraqi army divisions took off their uniform and ran away, they left behind the best and most advanced weapons to ISIS which they used to attack the Nineveh plains and the beloved Shingal region in particular.” The Prime Minister said that the arms Peshmerga had in possession were no match for the advanced weaponry ISIS had just seized from the Iraqi army: “When ISIS came with those weapons, they were more advanced than our Peshmerga. And with the old weapons they had in their hands, there was no way the Peshmerga could defend Shingal.”

According to Mahma Khalil, the PKK is inhibiting the rebuilding of the Sinjar Region today, stressing that some people cannot go back to their lands due to the PKK creating issues for them. Khalil emphasized that some people are also afraid since the PKK kidnaps children and trains them to join their group. For this reason, between the Shia Militias and the PKK, the Yezidi people in Mount Sinjar are not able to rebuild their lives in their ancestral homeland.

The post Remembering the Yezidi genocide appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

On the road of corruption, there must often be a mechanism or legal shield in order to protect past crimes by individuals, parties or governments that have had their hands in the public purse for their personal gain or that of their party.

Silence may not protect high ranking politicians and corrupt community leaders from prosecution if public outrage and activist judicial authorities are able to break through the barrier of silence and power and find those who have committed crimes against the public interest. Brazil is an example where the powerful have been tied to corrupt practices, and while not a perfect and wholly agreed upon solution, moves towards de-legitimizing corruption in Brazil has begun.

Often the concentration of power to one individual or party comes with the presentation of actions that will improve the public good. Altering an election system to make individual votes more balanced is something that any citizen of any country would approve of, but when it installs one party and one President or Prime Minister indefinitely by legal means, it de-legitimizes the law and assures that a small cabal of powerful people has almost total control of the society with no effective means to remove them from power. In many cases, these actions come on the heels of issues linked to corruption or are formalized in a manner that protects powerful politicians from being subject to transparency.

Another abuse of power that often follows this normalization of corruption is that opposition to the government change in policy is labelled and ostracized so they lose legitimacy in their perspective, or in some cases are outright arrested for working against the state itself.

There are no true international mechanisms to assure that elections will not install corrupt governments when the national legal framework is changed to suit the powerful few over the public. An international standard of legal alterations that would avoid the absolute corruption of a legal and political system would be useful, but would require unified and legitimate political will.

Venezuela as a case in point has legalized a committee that will change their constitution to make it into one that permits a concentration of power into a one party state. Protests have been met with violence, and with the current government’s stockpile of advanced weapons over the last twelve years, there is a good chance that Venezuela will resemble the 2009 mass protests in Iran, with their own Neda and silence from the international community. In 2017, it seems as if international crimes and the natural response to promote justice are limited by illegitimate legal power in places like Venezuela, and silence from most international media while local media is threatened and imprisoned.

This combination guarantees that the worst elements of dictatorships almost always succeed in our current generation.

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