Picture of a S-200, NATO codename SA-5 Gammon, a 1980s era missile that was able to shoot down a modern F-16I after a strike in Syria two months ago.
Syria has been the subject of international attention this week due to the recent strike by US, UK and French forces on chemical facilities operated by Syrian President Assad’s forces. Russia, Syria’s ally on the UN Security Council, has put out several statements condemning actions by Western forces, including hinting at an upgrade of Syria’s air defense capabilities if problems persist between the various actors in the region.
Russia has supplied arms to Assad’s forces in their intense fight against rebel forces in Syria. With the high level of equipment being shattered in combat, more advanced Russian combat systems have been replacing lost Syrian Army systems. Much of this equipment is designed for ground combat, including artillery systems designed to exact significant damage on rebel forces. Systems like the Russian T-90 tank is one of the most advanced tanks used in the conflict, replacing many lost T-72 tanks, a weapons system made famous during the 1991 Gulf War by Iraqi Republican Guard units using the 1980s era T-72 as their main battle tank. Russia has also shipped systems like the 2S4 Tulypan to Syria, known as the largest caliber mortar system on the modern battlefield today. While these ground systems are a significant upgrade, they were not active in targeting Western air based munitions during the attack this past week.
Anti-Air systems were the focus of the latest spat between powers in the Middle East this past week, and it is the future of the greater conflict that may be changed as opposed to whether or not chemical or other ground systems will be used in finishing off rebel forces in Syria. Syrian air defense is a mix of systems from an 80s era defense shield, mixed with more recent Russia acquisitions that are meant to target low level aircraft and cruise missile systems. The 1980s era S-125 SA-3 system makes up much of the defensive missiles protecting Syria, along with the S-200 SA-5 system that managed to down an Israeli F-16I recently over Syria, or possibly over Israel itself. More advanced systems like the 1990s era BUK and modern Pantsir-S1 likely were more successful in targeting cruise missiles in the latest attack on Syria, systems designed to combat modern missiles and drones.
Russia has openly discussed up-arming Syria with more advanced missile systems if continued threats challenge the Assad regime. A proposal of possibly arming Syria with one of the more capable versions of the S-300 system would give Syrian air defense a 300km radar range and incredible reach in the region. The S-300 may be able to target and shoot down planes over Israel as well as Turkey if positioned closer to Syria’s border regions, focusing on any type of aircraft and even civilian aircraft. While there has been no intent to target civilian aircraft, a history of mislabelled targets has led to an Iranian airliner being shot down by a US destroyer in the past, as well as a BUK system downing an airliner over Ukraine a few short years ago. The installation of an S-300 system in Syria would likely escalate tensions, a managed response by the Russian government after the US, UK and French attack on Syria. While not the beginning of a wider conflict at this point, the promotion of new systems and strategically significant announcements should be seriously considered.
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In December 2016, the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Constitutional Court ruled in the “Ljubic” decision that elements of the country’s electoral legislation undermines the rights of the country’s Constituent People’s – the Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats – to elect their own representatives, as enshrined in the Dayton Accords. What makes this decision so important? The court ordered BiH’s parliament to amend the election law, but Parliament has so far failed to act, causing the court to completely strike down the election code. If legislators do not enact a new law by May, a full government will not be able to be formed following the October election.
The implications of such a scenario are hard to exaggerate. BiH would be in complete paralysis and could rapidly disintegrate without functioning institutions. Of particular concern – Republika Srpska (RS) where Russia has dominant influence — would be the only BiH entity left with a fully functioning government, giving it every opportunity for its leaders to pursue their long-held goal of breaking away from the rest of the country.
This would have dramatic consequences for the future of BiH and the stability of the entire region. This all would serve’s Russia’s strategic goals to stop European integration. Even worse, this crisis is being caused by the West’s inaction; Russia barely has to lift a finger to create chaos in this scenario.
Russia’s interference in the Balkans has increased considerably in the past several years. Recent reports, including one released by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, highlights its attempts and successes to disrupt the respective ambitions of Balkan nations toward further EU and NATO integration by using military force, cyber warfare, and disinformation campaigns. Russia has also demonstrated its intent to overtly interfere in the political process within Southeast Europe.
As a prime example Russian intelligence was caught attempting a coup in Montenegro in October 2016, where mercenaries had planned to assassinate Milo Djukanovic, the pro-Western leader of Montenegro to prevent it from joining NATO. Further frustrating Balkan EU/NATO integration, Russia transferred six MiG-29 fighter jets to Serbia in 2017, which suggests a newly ramped up military cooperation with Russia. In response, the Engel-Aderholt amendment to the 2017 NDAA directed the Defense and State Departments to submit a report that would analyze the “defense and security relationship between Serbia and the Russian Federation.”
Republika Srpska is one of the main playing fields for Russia’s Balkan disruption campaign. Russia has consistently curried favor with the RS by pushing significant political, economic and military investment to prevent BiH’s NATO bid and the EU accession process. For example, in 2017 President Putin pledged support for the Bosnian Serb’s unilateral referendum pushed by Milorad Dodik to hold a National Day for the RS entity, despite a ruling from the Constitutional Court of BiH that it violated the rights of non-Serbs living in BiH. Taking all of this to account, in January 2017 the U.S. Department of Treasury designated Milorad Dodik as a significant threat to the Dayton Accords (DPA) and imposed sanctions against him.
More recently, Dodik and Russia have taken active measures to deepen RS military ties to Russia and to undermine BiH’s prospects of joining NATO. This includes increased Russian training RS police; Dodik refusing to recognize a BiH Constitutional Court ruling that military property in RS is owned by the Country and not RS; and Russia shipping vast amounts of military supplies to RS and already 2500 automatic rifles this year. The RS National Assembly also held a vote in October 2017 declaring RS’s neutrality, setting up a significant roadblock to NATO membership.
However, Dodik and Russia are not the only ones to blame for this situation. The failure of Bosnian political leaders to find compromise and for Western diplomats to exert their influence on these leaders is creating a situation ripe for Russia to exploit. The failure to reform the election law is the most acute example of this growing instability.
Recently, Croatian political parties, independent think tanks, and the Central Election Commission have all offered solutions to fix the electoral code. However, Bosniak political leaders have rejected all of these proposals without offering any compromise ideas of their own. This scenario of inaction by the FBiH Parliament caused by the unwillingness of Bosniak politicians to implement the Constitutional Court ruling will see the BiH political system collapse from within, leaving a vacuum for further Russian influence.
America has a critical national security interest in a stable and prosperous BiH. Its important for Americans to realize how important Croatians are to the overall multi-ethnic fabric of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and one could argue the glue that can keep this country together. Bosnian Croats of all stripes look West for their future and are profoundly pro-NATO and pro-European.
American and European top diplomats must act urgently to pressure political leaders in BiH to quickly produce new legislation that guarantees the rights of Constituent People to elect their own representatives in the House of Peoples and in the Presidency of BiH. However, Russia would like nothing more than for Bosnia and Herzegovina to suffer a constitutional crisis and fall into further chaos.
The failure for the United States and European Union to take more assertive action, will be devastating for Bosnia and Herzegovina, would allow Russia’s objectives in the Balkans to be further fulfilled, and would seriously weaken the United States and the European Union interests in this region.
Steve Rukavina is President of the National Federation of Croatian Americans Cultural Foundation.
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As we speak, the political situation in Bangladesh is deteriorating for the Hindu community. Millions of acres of Hindu land has been confiscated and redefined as enemy property. According to Shipan Kumer Basu, the President of the World Hindu Struggle Committee, “Local land grabber Manik Miah has occupied the properties of Ballabh Das in Majigacha village of Kachua Upazila in Chandpur district.”
He claimed that 300 Muslims accompanied by musical instruments came in order to destroy the Ballabh Das family home: “They looted many goods such as cash, gold ornaments, silver ornaments, bronze, etc. Now, the family has no place to pass the night. They lost everything except the clothes on their backs. The family asked, why do we suffer such cruel attacks against us? We are Hindus. That is our only crime. Why can’t we also live in an independent Bangladesh while Muslims are permitted to peacefully coexist with Hindus in India?”
According to Bangladesh Sishu Adhikar Forum (BSAF), between January and March of this year, over 55 Bangladeshi children were raped per month with 66 being raped in March alone. He claimed that of the 176 children that were raped over these past 3 months, 15 were between age 1 to 6 years of age and 37 were between 7 to 12 years of age. Although these statistics are low by American standards, Basu stated that these statistics on child rape exceed what existed in the past in the country, emphasizing that the rise of radical Islam in the Middle East has had an adverse effect on the situation in his country. He noted that the rate of Hindu girls who are raped is much higher than the official statistics for the general population and that the rape of Hindu women is generally not recorded in the official records.
“Rape is a heinous violent crime,” the Bangladesh Minority Council noted. “It is used as a war tool through which the invaders subjugate and humiliate the conquered population. A judicial commission concluded that over 200 Hindu women were raped following the 2001 parliamentary election. Rape and other sexual violations of minor girls belonging to the Hindu community, mainly in rural areas, remain rampant. In the conservative society of rural Bangladesh, when a girl is violated in a village, the family is left with no choice but to migrate to India. In addition, in rural areas, pressure to convert to Islam is increasing with every year. In many cases, local authorities ignore such activities because they themselves believe that if they can convert a non-Muslim to Islam, then they will be rewarded after death. This belief has caused an upsurge in the religious conversion of Hindu minors and sometimes even of entire families to Islam.”
Within Bangladesh, many Muslims hold negative beliefs about the Hindu population. According to Basu, many Muslims in Bangladesh claim that the Hindus are not patriotic, alleging that they have never died for the country nor fought a war of liberation. However, he emphasized that such statements are bigoted and simply not true: “Jagatiyoti Das was the first to be called Birshrestha (Best Hero/Fighter) of Bangladesh’s War of Liberation. At the time, Jagatiyoti’s group had 42 people. The group had some freedom fighters operating in Kalyanpur. They fired at the Pakistani Army in Shalla, Ghangia in order to help the freedom fighters in Subal Das’s team.” He claimed that by claiming that the Hindus are not patriotic and merely fled to India, the authorities are encouraging bigoted beliefs against the Hindus in Bangladesh, which can be used to encourage their silent ethnic cleansing from the country as the world turns a blind eye to it.
“The Awami League wants to destroy the Hindu culture in Bangladesh,” he emphasized. “It is very sad that Bangladesh and West Bengal celebrate the Bengali New Year on different dates. But why? The answer is that Sheikh Hasina wants to cleanse Bangladesh of Hindu culture. Her supporters are destroying temples, idols and other symbols of Hindu culture within the country. She has formed a covert alliance with ISIS in order to rid the country of the Hindu minority by slowly ethnically cleansing them from the country via murders, rapes, and looting and land seizures. However, while Sheikh Hasina is forming an alliance with radical Islamists, we Hindus protest against this and seek to establish a secular country who peacefully coexists with other religious groups, such as Muslims, Buddhists, Christians and Jews. We want to be a model for the world. Therefore, this year, we hope that you will speak out about the plight of the Hindus in Bangladesh.”
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What started off as protests spurred on by the deteriorating economic conditions in Iran and the inflation in prices of basic necessities, escalated into a rebellion against the Islamic Republic itself. But to what extent are these protests threatening the theocratic regime, and could such an upheaval foreshadow a second Iranian revolution?
The latest protests, which began in Mashhad on 28 December last year as a backlash to the economic climate in Iran, quickly intensified in nature and in geographical reach, spreading to Kashmar, Isfahan and several other places and lasting well into January 2018.
As the Washington Post explained, there are a number of interrelated factors behind the Iranian protests. Protests were incited by the leak of President Hassan Rouhani’s financial budget plan, which indicated higher fuel prices in attempts to lower government debt. This came on top of rising unemployment for young people, currently at 40%. Set against poor domestic economic conditions, there is growing anger at Iran’s foreign policy, defined by billions of dollars of investments in the Middle East. This includes the supply of weapons and fighters to Syria, as well as financial support to Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah.
In 2015, President Rouhani signed a deal with world powers which resulted in a reduction of Iran’s nuclear activities in return for lifting the crippling sanctions that were already in place. Despite Rouhani’s promise that signing the deal would bolster economic growth, as previously stated this growth has been far from inclusive. And despite initial optimism around Iran after sanctions were lifted, Tehran is still struggling from a lack of investment.
According to CNN, they are the biggest protests since the Green Movement in 2009. Those demonstrations threatened the political stability and legitimacy of the Iranian regime at that time, held in response to the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Consequently, it is important to assess whether the 2018 protests threatening Rouhani’s regime risk escalating into a second revolution.
Significance of protests as a threat to regime stabilityThe important point to note is that these protests were substantially economically driven, whereby frustrations with Rouhani’s political regime were a by-product of economic grievances. In this light, scholar Vali Nasr, writing for The Atlantic, stated that these protests ‘were not a repeat of past urban, secular uprising of affluent citizens demanding social and cultural change, freedom of expression, and political participation.’
Essentially, this differentiates them from the Green Movement in 2009, and the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Both of these past movements were de facto socio-political movements with economic components, rather than vice versa. Socio-political protests threaten regime stability and longevity, whereas economically driven protests are more likely to exert pressure for action from the government.
Many Iranians are seeking improved livelihood which can be achieved through the incumbent regime, especially as the economy has come out of recession since 2015. Economic growth in Iran in 2017 was a solid 5.3% for GDP. There are foundations in place for improved employment and living conditions.
Risk nationally versus internationallyThe scale and geographical reach of these protests is actually much smaller than previous uprisings in the country. Consequently they have not engendered an endemic panic across other regions in Iran. The view of Rouhani himself is that the regime is comfortably equipped to deal with incidents like this.
Part of this composure on the part of the regime is also likely due to their relative receptiveness to the pleas of protesters. Iran’s parliament ultimately rejected the 2018 budget plan that proposed an increase in the price of petrol by 50%, and also rejected any calls for increases in the price of water, electricity, and gas. This apparent and genuine responsiveness from the regime should reduce the risk of future violence or the likelihood of protests escalating into a fully-fledged revolution.
Taking the matter more seriously, President Trump denounced the Iranian regime for inflicting repression on the Iranian people for years. Trump tweeted that Iranians ‘are hungry for food & for freedom’ and that ‘[a]long with human rights, the wealth of Iran is being looted’. This reaction is typical of Western powers’ perception of the theocratic regime as one that suppresses human rights and civil liberties. This perhaps suggests how western media outlets believed it was in their interest to emphasize the intensity and seriousness of the protests in Iran.
Overall, these demonstrations are best viewed as part of Iran’s socio-economic scene. Although twenty people died in clashes with security forces, the latest demonstrations did not reach the intensity or severity of previous protests in the country. In this case, due to the small scale and specific causation of the protests, the risk of a second revolution is highly unlikely. The government has shown it is at least partially responsive to citizens’ concerns, although ongoing economic and social inequality will help to ensure that common grievances do not disappear any time soon.
This article was first published on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Sehr Nawaz.
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After his record landslide victory on 18 March, Russian President Vladimir Putin likely knows he cannot rest on his laurels. With oil prices unlikely to rise anytime soon, national economic stagnation, a still heavily State-and-oligarch-controlled economy and an ever-growing shadow of confrontation with the West, Putin has his work cut out for the next six years.
The turmoil of the Skripal case and the flurry of tensions with the ‘common West’ did not break the spirit of Vladimir Putin’s supporters. Thousands gathered at Manezhnaya Square to celebrate their champion’s historic victory (76.7 %, an increase of 13.1 percentage points since 2012).
But for Russia, nothing has ever been as uncertain as it is today. The question is whether Putin is ready to implement important economic reforms, at the expense of a minority that has backed him since the beginning. In addition, Putin must consider the global ramifications of Russia’s more assertive foreign policy. Finally, with the constitutional limit of two non-renewable terms, the question of Putin’s succession is on everyone’s mind.
Stagnation versus Reform and the limits of ‘Putinomics’However much of an election or, rather, a referendum of public confidence that this presidential ballot was, it will not hide Russia’s stark economic reality. In spite of impressive progress since the Cold War, Russia remains crippled by economic stagnation. The still substantial power of the State apparatus and its enfeoffed oligarchs has led to an undiversified economy, low wages and endemic corruption.
There is no doubt that Putin has achieved substantial success in restoring order over the Russian economy. He has pursued privatization in a much less opaque way than predecessor Dmitry Medvedev, while maintaining control over key industrial and financial sectors. Since 2000, Russia’s GDP per capita has grown by 13%, generating significant improvements in living conditions. Russia’s debt-to-GDP ratio was just 12.6% in 2017, down from a massive 92.1% in 1999. Since the chaotic immediate post-Cold War years in the 1990s, there have been significant improvements in crime rates and public health.
Despite these successes, investment risks remain high. Corruption is still prevalent (with the recent tragic fire in Siberia providing a stark reminder) and remains a serious hindrance to foreign investment. Foreign firms frequently face expropriation, and this lack of long-term legal visibility and security deters investors. The current crisis with the ‘common West’ – as the phrase goes in Moscow – from Ukraine to the Skripal affair, will not help improve the situation.
With low FDI on the one hand, and contained oil prices on the other, stagnation is here to last. In many ways it was precisely through this scheme of economic stagnation, coupled with macroeconomic and political stability, that Putin consolidated his power. For many Russians, no Putin would mean a return to the 1990s, when shops were empty and people queued miles to buy daily essentials.
However, this stagnation/stability dichotomy is increasingly irrelevant. With its worrisome demographic situation, Russian politicians likely understand the need for reforms: the limits of ‘Putinomics’ have been reached. Whomever is appointed Russia’s new Prime Minister, the most probable short-term scenario is an increase in corporate tax (currently just 20%, four points below the OECD average) and personal income tax. Should new economic sanctions be imposed on Russia, a further devaluation of the ruble, albeit softer than Russia’s last devaluation, cannot be excluded either.
A more assertive foreign policyPutin’s re-election sparked a mixed international reaction. Unsurprisingly it was met with tepid response from the West, persistently vocal in its criticism of Moscow’s obstinate behavior on the world stage. But within Europe, the rift between pro-Russia and Kremlin-wary countries is still wide. Not all of Europe joined the UK in its diplomatic retaliation to the Salisbury attack: only fifteen EU member-states decided to expel Russian diplomats. Recent visits to Moscow from Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz and Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel likely influenced both countries to stay neutral. This shows how divided Western countries can be when dealing with Putin, an aspect he can continue to exploit.
Though Putin knows the age of the liberal order may not be over, it is solidly challenged in every corner of the world by authoritarianism and ‘democratorship’ (to quote Swiss academic Max-Liniger Goumaz). China and Turkey, two countries whose leaders have recently consolidated their power, were unsurprisingly the first two countries to congratulate Putin on his re-election. Both will hope for tightened relationships with Russia in the years to come. And with a recent comeback in Africa – an old Cold War battleground – that hasn’t gone unnoticed, Russia must believe that current winds blow in its favor.
Most strikingly, Russia has been wearing down the global system of multilateralism that it has claimed to defend. Russia has long upheld the tradition of multilateralism, which has served its national interests well since 1945. But the 2008 Georgian war (later referred to as Europe’s first war of the 21st century), and later the intervention in Ukraine, reflected a significant departure in this regard. The most likely reason for this departure is nostalgia – not so much for the Soviet Union but for the two-player game.
In a world in which Russia’s ancestral enemy, the US, is still in the game, it is likely not bearable for the Russian elite to step aside, wearing the placard of historical loser. Therefrom, things that were unthinkable some years ago (like the so-called annexation of Crimea) became serious policy considerations. Putin is likely not done yet, having signaled his revived interest in solving Moldova’s Transnistria problem. But what is certain is that despite all of Putin’s flamboyant declarations on the modernisation of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, the West’s concern will lie more in Russia’s serious hybrid and high-tech war capabilities, for which development will surely stand at the top of Putin’s priorities for the next 6 years.
Last term for the Czar, but no end of reignHowever pressing the challenges ahead, with a constitutional amendment highly unlikely, this is almost certainly Putin’s last Presidential term. In 2024, after almost a quarter of a century in power, Putin may even be keen to step back – back, but not out. As a former top Russian diplomat and senior political analyst informed the author several weeks ago, the most plausible scenario would be that Putin’s successor will rule the country under his mentor’s close and sharp eye. The intelligence services will still report to Putin (like during Putin’s premiership under Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency). Moreover, leaving the Kremlin may not mean leaving an official leadership position. The recent revival of the Russia-Belarus Union State represents a possible way out for Putin, enabling him to become President of an even larger entity.
As hinted at previously, it remains unclear where Putin’s heir will come from. One possibility is from the old guard of siloviki (former top officials or men of influence from the Soviet apparatus who accompanied Putin to the top and helped him reinforce his grip on power). Another possibility is from an emerging generation of young and ambitious protégés that Putin has been breeding for some time now, including his former bodyguard. Other uncertainties remain: will they come from Moscow, or from the rural provinces? Will they have a military/intelligence or civil background? Perhaps more than any other science, Kremlinology is an inexact and often surprising one.
This article was first published on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Gregorie Roos.
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US and South Korean army soldiers pose on a floating bridge on the Hantan River during a joint military exercise in Yeoncheon, South Korea, in December 2015. (Photo by AP)
This year’s U.S.-ROK annual joint military drills kicked off on 1 April after a delay of two months caused by the astonishingly fast-forwarded bilateral thaws between the Koreas, U.S. and China. The first part of the drills, Foal Eagle, will involve a field training exercise of 11,500 U.S. and 290,000 ROK troops and the remaining part, Key Resolve, will involve a computer-based-simulation exercise of 12,200 U.S. and 10,000 ROK troops. Although both U.S. and ROK military press releases announced that the intensity of the drills will be similar to that of last year, the drills are expected to be low-key, cautiously reflecting the thaws. The duration of Foal Eagle has been shortened from two months to one, and Key Resolve from one month to two weeks. Plans for U.S. strategic asset deployment have also been altered as the deployment of large-scale nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines has been cancelled. Allegedly, however, such cancellation is offset by the deployment of other assets, including those crucial to the operation of ‘Decapitation Strike’, such as MC-130, as well as those that support marine landing in case of full-scale war, such as the amphibious assault ship group USS Wasp.
Contrary to last year, when he vociferously starred as President Trump’s evil counterpart, Kim Jong-un has remained silent since he expressed that he ‘understands South Korea’s stance’ on the drills during his meeting with President Moon’s convoys on 5 March. Once called ‘Crazy Fat Kid’, Kim Jong-un now appears on TV like any other ordinary global leader with complete disregard for the public’s willingness to accept such anomaly. The bizarre images of him awkwardly shaking hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping and IOC President Thomas Bach credit this fashion terrorist with the egregious hairstyle with rational characteristics and the capacity to run a ‘normal state’. Kim Jong-un’s gawky debut in the global diplomacy theater prior to the end of April meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, followed by the May meeting with President Trump, are, nonetheless, carefully planned attempts to play soft-powered preliminary warm-up.
Many experts agree that Kim Jong-un’s recent pro-diplomacy moves reveal his disguised intent to strengthen negotiation leverage for the May meeting. It is predicted that Kim Jong-un will ultimately demand the withdrawal of U.S. forces and strategic assets from the Korean peninsula through the orderly steps of earning recognition as a normal state, signing the peace treaty with the U.S., restoring diplomatic relations with the U.S., and damaging the U.S.-ROK alliance throughout the process. Backward induction of these future strategic aims, in conjunction with Kim Jong-un’s common ground interests with China and Russia’s emphasis on ‘double-freeze’, also explains the reclusive leader’s real intent, well-observable in his first foreign trip to China. China, vexed with its dwindling influence on the Korean peninsula since the startling U.S.-DPRK thaw, warmheartedly welcomed Kim Jong-un’s visit, which restored China’s seven-year decoupled diplomatic relations with North Korea. In response, Kim Jong-un shared with President Xi his refusal to accept the Libyan denuclearization model and alternatively proposed a procedural, step-by-step model to maximize his stakes. Kim Jong-un’s seemingly desperate yet innately strategic outreach now engages China in potentially alleviating sanctions and enlarging the pie on the negotiation table of the soon-to-be held six-party talks. Such guileful outreach will extend to other stakeholders as well. A number of experts anticipate that Kim Jong-un will soon meet with Russian President Putin to discuss the May meeting.
Can South Korea Save Itself?
The South Korean Moon administration’s subtle predilection for temporary peace over Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Denuclearization (CVID) calls into question whether recent temporary thaws can truly evolve into perpetual peace, given the fact that South Korea cannot defend itself (but such a leftist position is sympathetically understandable considering the doomsday nature of the war with Kim Jong-un). For some Korean conservatives, the emotional aspect of the currently deepening inter-Korean rapprochement seems to blind the Korean people into realizing the realpolitik beneath the thaws, a situation reminiscent of the geopolitical conditions that led to Nixon’s pursuit of Vietnamization during the U.S.-China détente era. Unless South Korea in the divided Korean peninsula has credible capacity to defend itself, the risks involving the incremental approach toward reunification should always be managed with a keen, vigilant reciprocity-oriented mentality.
The Kim dynasty has always taken advantage of the uncertainties arising from frequent regime changes in competitive democracy between the U.S. and South Korea, while the U.S.-ROK alliance has ironically suffered from the certainty shown in the Kim dynasty’s consistent policy pursuit of WMD development. Rewarding the Kim dynasty for its temporary for-aid deception under such uncertainties has always generated more next-level costs than benefits, while the Kim dynasty has repeatedly breached the Agreed Framework by non-compliance. Thus, the Kim dynasty’s abominable past records of repeatedly withdrawing from the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) and KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization)’s failures to certify the Kim dynasty’s commitment to ‘freeze’ plutonium production and programs all lead to one very clear conclusion. Even if the Moon administration’s goal of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula is a procedurally long-term one and the leftist regime does not seek a regime change in North Korea, such aims must reciprocally maximize its negotiation leverage by strategically devising a step-by-step blueprint for consistently punishing and sanctioning Kim Jong-un whenever he displays detracting behaviors.
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A 2-ship of Israeli Air Force F-16s from Ramon Air Base, Israel head out to the Nevada Test and Training Range, July 17, 2009 during Red Flag 09-4. Red Flag is a realistic combat training exercise involving the air forces of the United States and its allies. The exercise is conducted on the 15,000-square-mile Nevada Test and Training Range, north of Las Vegas. Red Flag is one of a series of advanced training programs administered by the U.S. Air Force Warfare Center and Nellis, through the 414th Combat Training Squadron. Flying for Red Flag 09-4 begins July 13 and ends July 24. U.S. aircraft will come from Nellis and Creech in Nevada, South Carolina, Idaho, the United Kingdom, Washington, Oklahoma and Ohio. Aircraft types will include F-15s, F-16s, E-3s and KC-135s. In addition to U.S. aircraft, the Israeli Air Force will be flying F-16C Falcons.
(U.S. Air Force photo/ Master Sgt. Kevin J. Gruenwald) released
Iran has been ratcheting up the rhetoric while Haaretz warns of the consequences of Iran’s ambitions in Syria. It all started back in February, when an Iranian drone and an Israeli F-16 were shot down at the Syria-Israel border. More incidents and additional quarrels over the Iran Nuclear Deal could lead to more grievous confrontations between the parties involved.
The drone and the F-16: the incidentOn 10 February, the Israeli Air Force (IAF – Heyl Ha’Avir) intercepted and shot down an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was flying within its borders. Soon after, the IAFdispatched its F-16I jetfighters in order to destroy the UAV control vehicle in Syrian territory. However, as the F-16Is engaged their targets, an intense barrage of anti-aircraft firewelcomed them. One F-16I was eventually shot down, while the two pilots managed to eject and landed on Israeli territory. In retaliation, Israel conducted surgical strikes against at least twelve Iranian targets within Syria.
A series of new developmentsThe events of 10 February represented a number of unprecedented developments. First, this was the first time that an Iranian drone penetrated Israeli airspace. Previously, Iran’s proxies – such as e.g. Hezbollah – usually carried out these tasks. This marks an upgrade in Tehran’s presence and involvement in operations against Israel. Also, the retaliation unleashed by the downing of the F-16 represented the first Israeli strike against manned Iranian bases. Hence, similarly to the Iranian counterpart, Israeli forces are not steering clear of a direct confrontation with their regional competitor.
Moreover, the IAF losing an aircraft is news in itself. Indeed, Israel had not lost a single jetfighter in a combat operation since the time of the Lebanon War at the beginning of the ‘80s. It is not clear what anti-aircraft weapon system brought the jetfighter down. IAF F-16Is are equipped with electronic countermeasures that give them an advantage against many anti-aircraft systems. There are, however, sophisticated systems in Syria – such as the Russian-made Buk-M1-2 or S-400 – that could successfully engage advanced jetfighters like the IAF F-16Is.
The loss of the jetfighter is noteworthy in another regard as well, as it could change Israel’s course of action. Indeed, Israel has been ceaselessly conducting airstrike in Syria throughout the Civil War, targeting Hezbollah’s supply chain as well as Syrian and Iranian strategic military facilities and bases. This line of conduct might be subject to change in light of these recent events; as an Iranian official commented, “the era of hit and run is over” and his words might ring partially or entirely true.
Leaders send warning from MunichDisplaying a piece of the UAV downed over the skies of Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned Iran from the stage of the Munich Security Conference to not “test Israel’s resolve”. Netanyahu asserted that Israel would not let Tehran proceed with their plans against Tel Aviv, stating that his country is ready to wage war against Iran or its proxies to defend itself.
While Iran rejected all accusations brought forth by Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister might find additional reasons to reinforce his anti-Iranian foreign policies in recent domestic developments. The Israeli police recently claimed to have enough evidence to charge Netanyahu with corruption. Faced with this accusation, the Prime Minister might be strongly motivated to show resolve against Israel’s arch-enemy in order to deflect attention from himself – more so as if he can count on the Trump administration’s unconditional support and even on the assistance of countries equally worried about Iran’s rise, like Saudi Arabia.
Also in Munich, Lebanon’s Defense Minister Yaacoub Sarraf reacted to Netanyahu’s words. Commenting on the Israeli Prime Minister’s promise to go after Iran’s proxies, Sarraf asserted that the government in Beirut is ready and willing to defend its territory against external aggression. Any Israeli operations taking place on Lebanese soil would, therefore, prompt an armed reaction against it. Sarraf’s pledge may well prove empty, as it is hard to imagine Beirut conducting military operations against Tel Aviv. Nevertheless, Israel will feel forced to gauge potential reactions from other neighbouring countries besides Syria. Meanwhile, there have been further revelations about Iran allegedly having up to 10 military bases in Syria, two of them near Israel’s border.
The Nuclear Deal as the final straw?The year 2018 will see an increase in tension between Iran and Israel. This could potentially lead to a limited, regional conflict between Tel Aviv and Tehran’s proxies. Yet, while the anti-Iranian front tightens, a more direct confrontation might arise from the Nuclear Deal. Indeed, the dissatisfaction of Israel and the USA grows, since they believe the Deal is incapable of preventing Iran from getting nuclear capabilities.
At the same time, Iran’s resentment towards the US is increasing. In particular, Iran accusesthe Trump administration of meddling in its business with other countries in order to counter the positive effects that the lifting of the sanctions ensued. Under such circumstances, the Nuclear Deal does not pay off and Iran would benefit from withdrawing. In this regard, Tehran warned its competitors that the world “would face another nuclear crisis, which would be very difficult to be resolved”, if the Nuclear Deal was to be scrapped.
If this is going to be the case, Iran will surely re-embark on its nuclear endeavour with renewed vigour. Simultaneously, Israel, the US, and the rest of the regional powers worried about Iran’s rise, might push for more aggressive solutions in order to deal with the prospects of a nuclear Iran once and for all. If diplomacy loses this round, the probability of a direct confrontation between these parties will increase dramatically.
This article was first published on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Mauro Lubrano.
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Today, some of Europe’s poorest countries are critical to China’s global economic development strategy. Under the 16+1 sub-regional framework, which includes eleven countries from central and eastern Europe and five from the Balkans (CEEC), China is pursuing investment opportunities in infrastructure in order to enhance its connectivity with the European region.
Thus far, Chinese interests have been universally welcomed by the sixteen nations with political elites keen to boost their fragile economies in post-recessionary times. However, as economic cooperation grows between China and its former socialist allies, the political implications are becoming more apparent. As the EU strives to sustain its ‘One-Europe’ policy with China, how some of its members and potentially future members embrace China’s global ambitions could undermine EU cohesion as it continues to endure instability.
The new Silk RoadThe 16+1 framework is a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to integrate the Asian country more deeply into the world economy. The initiative, launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013, underpins the Communist Party’s economic and geopolitical vision to connect China with the world. Considered as the biggest foreign investment by any one country since the US Marshall Plan, the BRI project spans 70 countries and aims to connect Central Asia with Europe, Africa, and Oceania through investment and trade in the areas of energy, infrastructure, and transformation.
Some of the projects include a railway line from Kazakhstan to Iran, a high-speed railway running from Southern China through South-East Asia, oil pipelines connecting Russia and China, a gas pipeline in Pakistan, highways in Hungary, and a railway connecting Budapest with Belgrade. Despite the estimated $4 trillion cost of the BRI, its objectives are not only economic. Enabled by positive economic relations, cultural exchanges between China and BRI participant states have increased with more opportunities for student-exchanges while foreign literature and cinema enters the Chinese market. Most significantly, the BRI is central to China’s political ambitions. Last October, it was enshrined into the Communist Party’s constitution, signalling the centrality of foreign policy to the ruling party and Xi Jinping’s desire to enhance China’s global image. As China’s global influence continues to grow, how will the West, grappling with its own challenges, react to the rising star of the East?
China sees Europe as pivotal to the revival of the old Silk Road, which launched China’s regional development over 2000 years ago. China’s strategic ambitions in Europe are underscored by its economic initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). According to the state-owned news agency, Xinuanet, Chinese investment in the CEE has surpassed $9 billion with $1.4 billion of investment going in the opposite direction. For some of Europe’s poorest countries, Chinese investment could be critical in building and upgrading energy plants, railways, motorways, and airports. Some of the big deals in the CEE involving Chinese investment include a €3 billion expressway connecting Montenegro and Albania; a €1.4 billion linking the Bosnian municipalities of Banja Luka and Mlinište; and a €1 billion project in the Czech Republic to create a Y-shaped canal connecting the waterways of the Danube, the Oder, and the Elbe. Moreover, in November Serbia began construction of the China-funded railway from Belgrade to Budapest worth around €3.2 billion.
The Balkans and Baltic regions are especially critical to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Two routes outline China’s historic project: The Silk Road Economic Belt, which enters Europe through the Baltic corridor, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which passes through the Southern Balkans. In 2016, the Chinese state-owned shipping company COSCO bought a majority stake in Greece’s largest port, Piraeus. Through investment worth hundreds of millions of euros, COSCO aims to strengthen the port’s capacity and trade relations with the EU. In the Baltics, states are competing with one another for Chinese investment and exportsto China have more than doubled in recent years. Chinese tourism to the Baltic region has reached record levels, rising by 57.8% in Latvia in 2016. China sees the Baltics and Balkans as the gateway to the wider EU region and are critical to China’s new Silk Road.
Political consequencesChina’s influence in the CEE transcends economic interests. On the political front, diplomatic relations have strengthened between China and several European countries. In November, China promised $3 billion in investment funds to the CEE at the fifth annual summit of the 16+1 framework in Budapest as Chinese leaders were joined by the heads of the sixteen countries. Hungary, in particular, has been very welcoming to Chinese interests. Its right-wing Eurosceptic prime minister, Victor Orban, claimed that a new world order was forming and that ”the world economy’s centre of gravity is shifting from west to east”.
In the Czech Republic, President Milos Zeman has stressed the importance of relations with China over other actors such as the EU and NATO. In 2014, Zeman travelled to Beijing to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping and in 2016, the same meeting took place in Prague, with Jinping stating that both countries should see stronger relations ”from a strategic viewpoint and long-term perspective”.
Serbia represents another country to benefit from Chinese investment and strong political ties. Serbia, one of the Balkan countries applying for accession to the EU, has welcomed Chinese investment to improve its railways, roads, and energy plants. On his visit in June 2016, Xi Jinping said that Serbia was the point where civilisations of the west and east meet, suggesting the importance of the Balkan country to China’s BRI. In addition, China is one of the few countries to support the Serbian position of not recognising Kosovo.
Although China insists that the sub-regional 16+1 framework is central to the China-EU ”strategic partnership”, the EU is concerned that China is deploying ”divide and rule” tactics to damage European cohesion. The EU has called on all its members to respect the one-Europe policy and speak with one voice to the Chinese government. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her Foreign Minister Sigmur Gabriel conveyed concern over Chinese influence in the EU’s periphery. Merkel stated that the 16+1 group should not contain political strings, while Gabriel warned that ”China will succeed in dividing Europe” if Europe fails to develop a single strategy towards China. China has rejected the notion of a one-Europe policy on political and economic grounds, given that ”the EU is a regional organization composed of sovereign states, not a sovereign country itself”.
There is evidence to suggest that China’s perceived strategy in Europe has caused division between Brussels and some of Europe’s sovereign nations. According to Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov, the Balkans has no alternative but to welcome Chinese investment given the EU’s neglect of the region. Moreover, in 2016, Greece and Hungary compromisedthe EU’s legal stance on China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, while an EUstatement criticising China’s human rights record was blocked by Greece last year.
As parts of Europe continue to suffer the consequences of the financial crisis, Chinese investment is a welcomed opportunity to create jobs, upgrade infrastructure, and enhance economic competitiveness. However, the political impact of China’s economic interests in Europe is creating the most tension, especially in Brussels. For the EU, strong relations between China and the 16+1’s eleven EU members threatens the Union’s one-Europe policyvis a vis Beijing. In addition, five non-EU countries are part of the Western Balkan enlargement strategy, which aims to integrate the region into the EU by 2025. Seeing that the EU views the Balkan’s relationship with China as gaining leverage on Brussels, growing Chinese influence in the region could undermine the future of EU enlargement.
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This article was first published on Global Risk Insights.
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On February 26, a 7.5 magnitude earthquake struck 35 kilometers underneath the Southern Highlands in Papua New Guinea, causing at least fifty deaths. An Australian Air Force plane carrying relief supplies landed five days later amid criticism that aid had been too slow to arrive.
The effectiveness of the Australian response in PNG will only become evident in time. Yet similar criticisms were also made in the response to Cyclone Pam, which hit Vanuatu three years ago. An internal report into Australia’s assistance in the recovery effort by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) found that progress was ‘less than expected’ and the program required ‘restorative action’. Australia committed $35m in long-term recovery money, but how that money was spent is unclear.
Cutting foreign aidThese events are a stark reminder that Canberra has been steadily cutting its foreign aid budget for years. The Abbot government retired AusAid and undermined the internal skills and knowledge built up over the years when the program was absorbed into DFAT. Similarly, the Turnbull government’s 2017 White Paper does not provide a clear guideline for Australian aid and only alludes to the program in the context of broader issues. Australia’s current aid program is consequently the least generous in history. The share of aid to gross national income was .22% in 2016-2017, and Australia’s aid program has dropped to 17th out of 29 in OECD rankings (which measure aid spending as a proportion of GDP).
These declines will be strongly felt in the South Pacific, the destination for most of Australia’s foreign aid. Climate change will adversely affect low-lying Pacific nations sooner, and to a greater extent, than most other places on Earth. Sea levels are expected to rise at least a meter by 2100, and tropical cyclones are expected to increase in frequency and intensity. Over the last ten years inclement weather has caused economic losses equivalent to 15-25%of GDP. The government of Kiribati is seriously considering abandoning the country altogether in the face of declining space and the contamination of freshwater supplies.
Australia remains the dominant donor to Pacific Island states, followed by the United States. Yet much of Australia’s aid program is now run by four private companies; Cardno Emerging Markets, Palladium International, Coffey International Development and ABT Associates, which have together been granted almost $4 billion since 2014 and $461.8 million in the last financial year. Paul Ronalds, chief executive of Save the Children, has said that outsourcing to private companies means ‘less contact’ with aid groups that have experience in local communities. It also reduces the visibility of the Australian government.
China’s growing influenceThere is increasing concern that China will fill the gap. Beijing has been stepping up aid activity across the region in recent years. For example, it has committed a total of $632 million in grants and concessional loans to fund infrastructure in Papua New Guinea, including hospitals, universities, and government IT systems. Interestingly, these IT systems are contracted to Huawei, a Chinese company that was banned from participating in the construction of Australia’s National Broadband Network due to security concerns raised by national intelligence services (the company is accused of having opaque links to the Chinese military). Unlike Canberra, however, the government in Port Moresby is not in a political or financial position to refuse Beijing, as doing so may jeopardise other Chinese aid projects.
The second-largest regional recipient of Chinese aid is Fiji. Beijing is funding the construction of major roads, bridges, and seawalls, and donated 500 tons of essential supplies in the wake of Cyclone Winston in 2016. It has also donated computers to the Fijian military and anti-riot equipment to Fijian police forces in the lead-up to an election. China is now the largest foreign aid donor to Fiji, followed by Australia, and unlike Canberra has maintained ties with the government in Suva following the coup in 2006. Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainarama has said that Fiji’s cooperation with China “reminds [Australia and New Zealand] that countries like Fiji have options”.
The strategic effects of Australia’s cuts to foreign aid funding are not yet clear. However, the Trump administration’s plan to cut foreign aid by a third will only increase the aid gap already opened by Canberra. It is therefore no surprise that Beijing has seen an opportunity to expand its influence. China is set to become the largest foreign aid donor to Samoa and Tonga, and will soon overtake Washington as the region’s second-largest donor. It is also increasing economic and military ties. Trade between China and Pacific island states doubled between 2014 and 2015 alone, and Beijing has signed memorandums of understanding with the Fijian military. It seems that the strategic competition between superpowers is spilling into the blue waters of the South Pacific.
This article was first published by Global Risk Insights, and was written by Ewen Levick.
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A woman is seen near posters placed at a bus stop in support of Brazilian former President Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva, in Brasilia, Brazil, January 22, 2018. A sign reads: “Lula innocent, Lula indecent”.REUTERS/Ueslei Marcelino
While difficult to measure a few months before elections are to take place, major national and regional changes are coming to the Americas, with votes likely determining the future economic and security focus of the region.
When considering NAFTA, it could be that the waves created by Trumps bargaining approach may be less of a challenge than electoral change on the US border. With Mexico having a Presidential election this year, and the next President of Mexico having one term of six years to focus on their policy file, any agreements between NAFTA partners may be re-set depending on who wins the Mexican election. It is really difficult to determine who will win in Mexico, as the current establishment party of the PRI runs a young challenger while dealing with a strong push against corruption and security in Mexico. With the PRI being seen by many as skilled practitioners of corruption historically as well as during their last mandate, the field is open for the combined PAN and PRD candidate as well as Lopez Obrador, former left leaning mayor of Mexico City. Obrador may be an interesting choice as a left leaning popular elected official to determine the future of NAFTA negotiations, but will also likely create more uncertainty where popularly elected politicians have already created mixed reactions to NAFTA talks. The PAN and PRD joint party would be an interesting outcome, as a more regional conservative party linked with a social democratic party would make for some negotiated balance in policy, perhaps acting as a bulkhead against old style PRI institutional politics as well as the election of yet another populist leader. It will be a difficult choice with no stark contenders in this year’s Mexican election.
Brazil looks to be choosing Lula in their election this year, if he does not get banned or put in jail for past accusations of corruption. With the judiciary taking to task the entire elite structure in Brazil, it seems as if everyone has been touched by corruption, and the choice between one candidate and another is like choosing between an apple with worms or an orange with mold. Openly knowing about corrupt practices of a candidate and still being elected has occurred before in the Americas, but it is not a choice a voter would like to have as it is confirming a sense of hopelessness. The law of corruption if it was to be seen as a law of physics is that once it takes hold, it is nearly impossible to remove without an excessive response. With Brazil’s judiciary going above and beyond their role as a separate branch of government, their cleaning out of their elite and institutionalized corruption has also created a political ripple effect where interested parties and have and have-nots have taken to politicize the great purge of the elite. With all of the chaos and uncertainty, it could be that the comfort and stability during Lula’s past terms in office might propel him back into office, even if he was shown to be one of the corrupt elite himself. It seems as if the law of corruption might yet again be proven.
An election in one of the largest and the most indebted region in North America, if not the world, is taking place in Canada’s own Ontario. After 15 years of the same government and massive eye watering debt and a legal sentencing coming for a former Chief of Staff coming this month, the seat of the most skilled practitioners of corruption may have a challenger. With the Premier’s approval rating narrowing towards the single digits, the Liberal Party of Ontario’s leader decided to pile on the debt by promising everything to everyone, costing inexplicable amounts more to which the Auditor General of Ontario took to challenging, along with credit rating agencies as well as citizens in Ontario from Small Business owners to Doctors to those who were recently unable to fund heating their homes a few winters ago. The effect of taking half of Canada’s economy and piling on taxes, debt and accusations against anyone who disagrees with these absurd debt laden promises will have a questionable effect on NAFTA. Raising taxes when you have record debt to preserve the political careers of a handful of failed politicians unmeasured against a US economy with low business taxes is tantamount to ignoring the laws of economic theory when you are applying the laws of corruption. With Ontario also being the economic glue that holds divisive regions together in Canada, targeting the energy industry in Alberta and asking an economically growing Quebec to pay into Ontario’s debt will create fractures in the Canadian Federation mirroring the current state of affairs in Catalonia. Accusing others of taking personal actions to cover bad decisions as well in Ottawa also will not help reduce any of these problems.
With the election of the new President in Venezuela being wholly determined by the current President of Venezuela, corruption clearly demonstrates its path to one party state rule. It is clear where corrupt practices have lead, but to move on from them may prove to be more difficult than just promising everything, looking to the past or just being a bit less corrupt than the next person running for office. As it seems, the laws of corruption tend to stand firmly in place.
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The annual full session of the National People’s Congress, which began on 5 March, sees President Xi Jinping on the way to becoming China’s “Emperor” for life.
Following the party’s Central Committee proposal of eliminating the limits for the country’s president from the constitution – currently set at a maximum of two consecutive terms – Xi is likely to remain China’s leader and rule well beyond 2023, when his five-year mandate would previously ahve come to an end.
A one-man showIn last year’s party congress, it became clear that a new era was born under Xi Jinping and he has no intention of stepping down in the future. His name and political thought theory, Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, were added to the party constitution.
“Xi Jinping has finally achieved his ultimate goal when he first embarked on Chinese politics – that is to be the Mao Zedong of the 21st century.”
– Willy Lam, political analyst at the Chinese University in Hong Kong
Xi’s presidency has been marked by an increasingly powerful cult of personality, along with a dangerous lack of political opposition and a dismal human rights record. In fact, other than being President of the People’s Republic of China, he also serves as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and as Chairman of the Central Military Commission.
As Xi holds the top offices of the party, the state, and the military, and with the previous party congress ending without appointing a clear eventual successor, it is not difficult to see why some describe him as “China’s most authoritarian leader since Mao”.
Since Xi became president of China in 2012, his strongman image has played a key role in determining China’s domestic and foreign policies. At the domestic level, his ruthless anti-corruption campaign has become a stronghold of his consolidation of power. Used to intimidate or eliminate cadres and party members who disagree with him or represent a threat to his political ambitions, Xi Jinping’s campaign has been leading him to finally achieve his sought after one-man show.
Xi’s assertiveness is also evident at the foreign policy level. From showing off China’s hard power in the South China Sea, to its increasingly strong soft power projections in the form of billions of dollars invested in Asia and Africa, Xi Jinping’s China is more powerful and influential than before.
Emperor for lifeThe 64-year-old leader could now be only one step away from tightening his grip on China and stay in office indefinitely. News regarding the presidency term limits broke in a two-sentence article on 25 March, as reported by Xinhua, China’s official newswire:
“The Communist Party of China Central Committee proposed to remove the expression that the President and Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China ‘shall serve no more than two consecutive terms’ from the country’s Constitution”.
If this reform proposal encounters zero opposition at the National People’s Congress, it is fair to accept that China will continue to move forward according to Xi’s thoughts, economic reforms and political strategy. Hu Xijin, editor-in-chief of the party-run tabloid, Global Times, tweeted that the “removal of the two-term limit of the president of PRC doesn’t mean China will restore life-long tenure for state leader”. However, this unexpected announcement is likely only the beginning of an even more prominent crackdown that will affect China’s standing in the international community.
The state propaganda machine, which was immediately put in motion after the announcement to respond to the social media backlash, has not been able to mitigate the concerns of the economic and social risks linked to this reform. Given Xi’s already heavy-handed approach on China’s economy and his government’s clampdowns on freedoms – such as online censorship and human rights abuses – his “emperor for life” status doesn’t come without risks.
Heading towards a “One China, One System”?The next challenge for Beijing will be the aftermath of the Hong Kong elections from March 11th. In the crossfire of criticism for the disqualification of activist Agnes Chow – representative of the pro-democracy party Demosisto, Xi Jinping’s government is accused of infringing the “One China, Two Systems” model that allows Hong Kong to hold a certain degree of political autonomy.
Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, Patrick Nip, agreed to review Hong Kong’s electoral laws in the wake of a recent court ruling that granted officials’ power to ban candidates because of their political views. Beijing’s increasing assertiveness in Hong Kong is undeniable.
During the Party Congress held in October 2017, Xi Jinping reaffirmed Beijing would not allow anyone to “separate any part of the Chinese territory from China”. Fast forward to today, his statement can be interpreted as a constitutional reform by extending Xi’s mandate and, therefore imply a much-feared transformation towards a “One China, One System” model.
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United Kingdom Prime Minister Theresa May switches on No10 Downing Street Lights for visits Brussels, Belgium to meet with Jean-Claude Juncker the President of the European Commission.
The transition agreement between the UK and EU means that although the UK will officially leave the EU in March 2019, it will still remain in the customs union and single market for another 21 months. The deal was struck after several concessions by the UK, indicating the government’s willingness to sacrifice regaining full sovereignty in order to reach a trade agreement at the end of the negotiating period.
The UK’s concessions are indicative of the government’s broader negotiating strategy with the EU. While Theresa May has often claimed that no deal would be better than a bad deal and that she is prepared to walk away from negotiations, in practice, she has been very keen to compromise in order to reach an agreement. The transition agreement was struck almost completely on the EU’s terms.
Negotiations over the transition demonstrate the UK’s desire for reaching a wider withdrawal agreement even if that may mean making concessions on their part. The transition agreement thus increases the likelihood of an orderly withdrawal which would entail at least a limited free-trade agreement. During the transition, EU migrants arriving into the UK will continue to be granted permanent residency and the EU will continue to set fishing quotas. These terms violate May’s red lines of taking back control of borders and laws immediately after Brexit, and reflect a realization that despite May’s rhetoric, the UK would bear the brunt of the economic costs that a no-deal Brexit would bring about.
Muted political backlash from Brexiteers
Given the concessions over EU citizenship rights and fishing, the backlash from the Brexiteers in the Conservative party has been subdued. Jacob Rees Mogg, the head of the pro-Brexit European Research Group (ERG) faction of the Conservative Party previously warned that a transition deal would make the UK a “vassal state,” but now argues that he could live with the transition arrangement as long as the final withdrawal arrangement is satisfactory. There has been no serious threat to rebel against the government or the Prime Minister even though she has violated most of her previous “red lines.”
There are two reasons why Conservative Eurosceptics are still overtly supporting the Prime Minister. First, any attempt to vote against the government in October on the EU Withdrawal Bill might lead to fresh elections. Polls are currently neck and neck, which means that the Labour party has a non-trivial probability of winning. Labour is committed to striking a customs arrangement with the EU, which is anathema to many Conservative Brexiteers. Therefore, this option is highly risky for them.
Second, while the ERG could try to trigger an internal Conservative Party leadership election by instigating a vote of confidence in the Prime Minister, party rules state that a majority of Tory MP’s have to vote against the incumbent leader. This is unlikely to happen because there is no credible alternative candidate who can unite the party’s Remain and Leave camps. Moreover, there is simply no appetite for a leadership election at such a critical stage in the negotiations.
Therefore, Tory Brexiteers are unable to turn their displeasure over the transition deal into concrete action. Their lukewarm opposition to the concessions to secure the transition agreement demonstrates that the Prime Minister is not as beholden to the group of hard-line Brexiteers as previously thought, which makes it more likely that a final agreement with the EU will be reached.
Updated probabilities of final outcomes
Given Theresa May’s greater latitude for action, it is worth reevaluating the likelihood and impact of three of the most probably Brexit scenarios. The most likely of these is the signing of a limited free trade agreement in goods. As the EU runs a trade deficit with the UK of around £95 billion, it would be in its interest to strike a tariff-free goods agreement. The UK, despite demanding the full restoration of its sovereignty while maintaining full access to the single market, has demonstrated an increasing willingness to compromise in these negotiations so far. The Government’s official policy that no deal is better than a bad deal does not have much credibility at the moment.
A comprehensive deal would involve facilitating trade in services, however, trade in services is usually more complex to negotiate. Negotiations are set to complete in October 2018, and there simply might not be enough time to negotiate such a comprehensive deal. Importantly, this means UK financial services will likely lose their “passporting” rights to sell their products across the EU. Given the centrality to financial services to UK’s economy, a limited free trade agreement would entail significant economic costs to the UK. However, it would be preferable to a no-deal scenario under which the UK would fall back on WTO rules.
An obstacle to this outcome is the problem of the border in Northern Ireland. Leaving the customs union would risk creating a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland which would threaten the Good Friday Agreement. The UK government is committed to preventing a hard border, but has not yet laid out how it would achieve this objective if it leaves the customs union.
Alternatively, to solve the Irish border conundrum, the UK could try to strike a new customs arrangement with the rest of the EU. Although the government has ruled out a customs arrangement, there is a pro-customs union majority in Parliament at the moment. If the government does not come up with a solution of its own, it might have to soften its position and aim to strike a customs arrangement, meaning this scenario remains a real possibility.
Finally, if there is no withdrawal agreement, economic risk will be significantly heightened. Trade flows and air traffic will be significantly disrupted and the legal status of EU citizens in the UK and British citizens in the EU would be unclear, while a hard border in Ireland would be likely. However, the recent negotiations over the transition process makes this outcome highly improbable. The UK’s negotiating strategy has followed a clear trend – the further the negotiations go, the more willing the UK has become to compromise to strike an agreement. The domestic political response to the transition has exposed the limited ability of the hard-line backbench Brexiteers to force the government’s hand. Moreover, the transition agreement has also engendered a mood of cautious optimism that a deal can be reached decreasing the chances of this worst case, “no-deal” scenario.
This article first ran on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Aman Navani
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John Bolton speaks at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Oxon Hill, Maryland, U.S. February 24, 2017. REUTERS/Joshua Roberts/File Photo
John Bolton’s alarming return to a position of power, as top aide to the United States’ President, is cause for worry. A die-hard self-described Americanist, Bolton sees the world in black and white. In his thesis, “Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?”, published in 2000, Bolton outlined an America divided between “Globalists,” a small coterie of highly educated academic intellectuals, and “Americanists,” virtually everyone else. In a wide-ranging career in public office, Bolton has un-diplomatically torn into the United Nations, criticized international treaties, backed conspiracy theorists, supported military wars as primary solution to dictate foreign policy, and scoffed at non-governmental agendas like human rights.
Bolton’s resistance to the United Nations, the poster-organization of multilateral decision-making, underlies his studied indifference to international treaties, per se. As recently as last year, Bolton penned an essay, titled “How to Defund the UN”, in the Wall Street Journal. A graduate and undergraduate student of law from Yale University, Bolton disavows the basic tenets of international law. Most lawyers generally agree that international treaties derive their power, or legitimacy, not because they are legally binding by definition, but because they are unequivocally accepted as a legal concept and widely treated as such. For Bolton, however, adherence to international treaties maybe prompted by political or moral motivations, but never by course of legal obligations. More than that, Bolton believes that international treaties constrain the United States from acting in its own best interests.
The United States government, however, has frequently treated international treaties as legally binding for all decades in history. As far back as 1946, when France breached the Air Service Agreement, the United States asserted transgression of an international obligation and applied countermeasures. The countermeasures were upheld by an international arbitral tribunal.
Let’s consider a more recent example. In 1996, Bill Clinton became the first leader to sign onto a pact, called the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, that aimed to curb nuclear proliferation in the world. However, according to a constitutionally directed process, in which all treaties have to abide “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,” the nuclear arms treaty fell into the pits of political decay. Nearly two years later, in 1999, the Senate reviewed and rejected it. Clinton, who saw the decision as a severe setback to his administration, assured allies that he would, according to the Vienna Convention of 1969, which, too, the Senate never signed as party, uphold the intent of the treaty still.
Even though the Senate’s decisions should have been to Bolton’s liking, he was infuriated. In Bolton’s eyes, Clinton should have asserted constitutional supremacy instead of cleaving unnecessarily to external constraints.
When the same treaty banning nuclear arms was revived for discussion in the Senate in 2001, Bolton, then acting as George Bush’s Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, asked the State Department’s legal office if the President could unilaterally withdraw a treaty from the Senate. The lawyers responded, and said—“no.”
In a 1997 testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Bolton claimed that the United States did not have to pay dues “decided by the General Assembly or other governing bodies”; that is, according to the United Nations Charter. Seen in this context, it is hardly surprising that the United States’ invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, in circumvention of the UN Security Council’s authorization, were seen by Bolton as a triumph for the nation.
Now, Trump has appointed Bolton to advise him as his National Security Advisor from April. The increasing “presidentialization” of the position, or the role of an individual alone to exercise influence in politics, and the marginalization of other key positions, like the Secretary of State, is not lost on those working in the administration. Aligned with plenty of ideas consistent with the President’s “America First” vision, Bolton has called for tearing up the Iran nuclear deal, and for preemptively striking North Korea. In the past, Bolton has also floated the idea that Israel should strike Iranian nuclear facilities. Judging by the options that have been floated so far, there is only one question left to be asked—is Bolton’s influence going to remain implicit or made explicit by the administration?
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Sunset in Siberia, 2018. J.Quirk
Reports from Russian announced that Vladimir Putin won over 76% of the votes in his reelection bid March 18, with turnout over 67%.
The view from Siberia was a little different.
OSCE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, sent nearly 600 short-term, long-term, and other election observers to Russia. In its next-day report, OSCE noted that in an environment of state-owned television networks, “television coverage was characterized by extensive and unchallenged reporting of the incumbent’s official activities.” More curiously, OSCE described election day itself as technically competent but ultimately spoiled. “Overall,” it judged, “election day was conducted in an orderly manner despite shortcomings related to vote secrecy and transparency of counting.” The election was run well, it seemed to judge, except for the voting and the counting.
OSCE dispatched more than 200 pairs of short-term observers, each with a local driver and interpreter, all over the country. Some observers had done this many times across the Balkans and post-Soviet space, while for others it was their first mission. Observers included chief elections administrators from cities across the U.S., EU “Former Ministers of Something,” and at least one former member of the U.S. Congress.
A voter in Siberia, March 18, 2018. J.Quirk
My partner and I joined four other teams on an overnight flight to a mid-sized Siberian city; from there we drove four hours to smaller communities. The flat, snowy landscape was broken up only by lines of birch trees and the occasional petrol station. We benefited from the beginning of spring weather and reliable roads. Other teams enjoyed 15⁰C resort-living in the south or the chance for a bit of tourism in St. Petersburg, while some endured flying ten or more hours east, or driving off the road in a snowstorm.
After two days of briefings in Moscow, the short-term observers’ work begins the day before the election. Our responsible driver and informative polyglot kept us safe and on course. We located and inspected the polling stations in a hospital, at a football stadium, at a coal mining company HQ, and in several schools. People were generally finishing or finished with preparations for the next day. Across the towns, there were a few posters and billboards for candidates. Most, though, were targeting turnout with patriotic white, blue, and red calls to vote for “Our country, our president, our choice.”
Voting was brisk in the morning, but we had a question about mobile voting. Large percentages of voters in some polling stations were scheduled to be individually visited, handed a ballot, and have their vote collected in a mobile ballot box. These visits are a nice service for homebound voters, but they are not followed by international or local observers. In cases where mobile voting was intended to serve 20 or 30 percent of the polling station’s list of voters, we were told it was because there were many older voters. But the challenge to visit 200 or 300 voters in a few hours seemed substantial.
“Our country, our president, our choice.” J.Quirk
The counting itself gave us as much pause. It was at the individual polling stations, not regional or central locations, where the actual counting was done. In theory, a ballot box would be emptied on a large table. One by one, each and every ballot would be displayed to the polling station workers and to any observers. (There were observers from several candidates or parties at most polling stations.) “A vote for Candidate X,” and anyone could question it. It would make for a long but accurate count. Instead, the big pile of ballots was divided by four or five poll workers into new piles, one for each candidate. Observers watched from a distance and could see some accuracy but not each ballot. Each poll worker counted her pile (poll workers were overwhelmingly women in our area), and in turn announced simply, “Zhirinovsky, 22”, “Sobchak, 44,” “Putin, 701,” etc. There was no recounting of someone else’s pile, and no obvious reconciliation among the number of the day’s voters and the total of the candidates’ piles. (The next-day OSCE report noted that many observation teams reported this same practice.) These tallies were recorded, entered into a computer, and sent. The ballots themselves were sealed in bags and delivered to the regional center, where we were told they would be locked in a room for a year. There seemed to be no built-in sampling of the bags of ballots, for example – “this one says Yavlinsky, 18 votes, let’s check it for accuracy.”
This doesn’t mean there was fraud at this stage: I watched one woman count her Grudinin pile. I was several feet away, but she seemed to be counting earnestly, flicking the top right corner of each ballot in her pile with her right index finger. She and I got the same number, but she went through the whole pile only one time.
At least one more difference between this election observation mission and others on which I served was the motivation of the host country. In Albania’s 2011 local elections, for example, they needed to demonstrate that they had the technical capacity and political commitment to hold free and fair elections, as one small step on the long road to the EU. Instead, the race for Tirana mayor was extremely close, the national election commission overruled the local ones in some key ways, and Edi Rama launched a series of controversial appeals before officially losing by just 81 votes.
Russia and President Putin didn’t seem to have to appease international observers, only national public opinion. Live Internet webcams inside polling stations across the country captured a number of apparent irregularities, including ballot-box stuffing, that were shown on foreign newscasts around the world. But it seemed to some of us that an inspiring turnout to match the candidate-choice results was a higher priority than impressing temporary guests.
A final note: in some ways, these are not just technical, legal administrative matters, but foreign exchange programs. We met dozens of people working the polls, but also on airplanes, in hotels, in shops and cafes, and elsewhere. Most Russians were met were friendly, cooperative, and interested in doing their work while we did ours. The political atmosphere prevented more opportunities for rich, personal exchanges, but I hope my partner and I were as effective unofficial ambassadors for our countries as so many of the Russians we met were for theirs.
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The Horn of Africa is among the most congested, eventful, and most volatile geopolitical intersections on earth. It is where the West meets the East in a highly competitive game of strategic positioning for economic or hegemonic advantage.
China and Turkey who, more or less, employ similar soft-power strategies have tangible investments in various countries in the region, including Ethiopia. However, the widespread discontent with Ethiopia’s repressive impulses and its ethnic favoritism that led to a particular ethnic minority (Tigray) to exclusively operate the state apparatus has inspired Arab Spring-like mass protests. These protests have caused serious rancor within the ruling party. It is only a matter of time before this haemorrhaging government might collapse.
So, who is likely to gain or lose from this imminent shockwave in the region’s balance of power?
The Nile Tsunami
Ethiopia — a country previously considered as a stable regional hegemon, a robust emerging market, and a reliable counter-terrorism partner — is on the verge of meltdown, if not long-term civil strife.
Today, the Ethiopian government is caught between two serious challenges of domestic and foreign nature: the Oromo/Amhara mass protests tacitly supported by the West, and the water rights conflict with Egypt, Sudan and Somalia.
Ethiopia is claiming the lion’s share on the Nile that runs through it and other rivers that flow from its highlands for the Grand Renaissance Dam – thus presenting existential threats to the connected nations.
For the third time in three years, the Shabelle River has dried up, putting millions of Somalis at risk of starvation.
But the current government is not ready for a substantive change of guard. The longer the mass protests continue and the minority-led government continues to offer artificial or symbolic gestures of prisoner releases — while declaring a second ‘state of emergency’ in two years— the faster Ethiopia will become destabilised and the faster foreign investments will fizzle away.
Worse — though seemingly unthinkable — the ‘favorite nation’ status granted to Ethiopia after becoming the US’ main partner in the global ‘War on Terroris’ is slowly corroding.
Despite this week’s visit from US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the US State Department is gradually turning its back on Ethiopia for a number of reasons; chief among them, is its double-dealings on the South Sudan issue.
Despite the facade of US/China collaboration to end the South Sudan civil war, the geopolitical rivalry between these two giants has been pressuring Ethiopia to pledge exclusive allegiance to one over the other.
With China’s huge investments on Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan’s oil fields – making a choice won’t be too difficult.
The Kenya Factor
Several years ago I wrote an article arguing that the two most stable nations in the Horn (Kenya and Ethiopia) will become more unstable as Somalia becomes more stable.
Today, the Ethiopian government is facing the most serious threat since it took power by the barrel of the gun, and Kenya has a highly polarised population and two presidents ‘elected’ along clan lines.
Kenya — the nerve center of the international humanitarian industry — could just be one major incident away from inter-clan combustion.
The Somalia Factor
The Ethiopian government has launched a clandestine campaign of strategic disinformation intended to fracture or breakup opposition coalitions and recruit or lure potential comrades.
Ethiopian intelligence officers and members of the diplomatic corps together with some ethnic-Somali Ethiopians have been recruiting naive Somali government officials, intellectuals and activists with a Machiavellian disinformation campaign.
Meanwhile, IGAD — Ethiopia’s regional camouflage — calls for an open-borders agreement between member states. Despite broad-based public perception that for a fragile state like Somalia, such an agreement would be tantamount to annexation, some Somali politicians are eagerly carrying its banner.
These kinds of desperate campaigns and the abrupt resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn only underscore the fact that the government’s days are numbered.
The Sudan Factor
Sudan is caught in a loyalty triangle (Ethiopia, Egypt and Turkey) with competing powers. Sudan needs Egypt to address threats faced by the two nations regarding the diminishing access to the Nile by reasserting rights granted through the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.
It needs Ethiopia to protect China’s economic partnership and to shield President Omar al Bashir from Western harassment through IGAD.
It also needs Turkey for development and for a long-term strategic partnership. Sudan has become the second country in Africa to grant Turkey a military base, with Somalia being the first.
The Eritrea Factor
When neocons dominated US foreign policy and the global ‘War on Terror’ was the order of all orders, Eritrea was slapped with sanctions. It was accused of being the primary funder and weapons supplier to al Shabab.
Today, though neither the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia or Eritrea nor any expert free from Ethiopian influence holds such a view, yet the sanctions have not been lifted.
The Ethiopian lobby and certain influential elements within US foreign policy-making circles continue to label Eritrea as a Marxist rogue state that undermines regional institutions such as IGAD and international ones like the UN Security Council; a closed society that espouses a deep rooted hatred towards the West.
Against that backdrop, the UAE has been investing heavily in Eritrea since 2015 or the beginning of the Yemen war that has created one of the the worst humanitarian disasters. The Emirati military (and its Academi/Blackwater shadow) now operates from a military base in Assab. Whether that’s a Trojan Horse or not, is a different discussion altogether.
Ins And Outs
The current wave of discontent against the Ethiopian government is likely to continue. But, considering how the Tigray has a total control on all levers of power, a transition of power will not be an easy process.
Ethiopia has also created an ethnically Somali counterinsurgency force in the Liyu Police. This ruthless force has already been used against the Oromos as they were used against Somalis of various regions that share a border with Ethiopia.
The extrajudicial killings and human rights violations are well documented. Despite all this, the Oromo and Amhara are set to reach their objectives albeit with bruised and bloody faces.
Will their coalition remain or, due to their historical distrust, will each eventually invoke its constitutional right to secede?
Whatever the outcome, any scenario of civil war or chaos in Ethiopia could put the entire Horn in danger and create a potential humanitarian catastrophe, especially in Somalia.
Meanwhile South Sudan is a lightyear away from sustainable political reconciliation especially since the foreign elements fueling the fire are not likely to stop any time soon. Djibouti remains the host of the most intriguing geopolitical circus. So, that leaves Eritrea as an island of stability in the region.
In the foreseeable future, Turkey could divest her investment out of Ethiopia into Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea. China will diversify her portfolio to include Eritrea. And the US — with no new policy — will continue droning her way through geopolitical schizophrenia.
** This article was first published by TRT World
** On Twitter:@Abukar_Arman
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At this critical hour, when the influence of radical Islamist groups such as ISIS, Al Qaeda, the Al Nusra Front, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, the Taliban and Lashkar e-Toiba alongside the oppressive Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi regimes plague the Islamic world, the Hindu, Buddhist, Yezidi, Christian, Druze and Jewish minorities who are presently being oppressed across the Islamic world should unite and stand together against their common persecutors. The minorities of the Islamic world are stronger together than they are divided.
For the radical Islamists and the regimes that support them, it does not matter if one is Jewish, Yezidi, Hindu, Christian, etc. In their worldview, the Hindus are polytheists, the Christians are crusaders, the Yezidis are devil worshippers and the Jews are the sons of apes and pigs. As a result of these perverted beliefs, from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan to the Middle East, Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Ahmadi Muslims, Sufis, Jews, Christians, Buddhists, Yezidis and Druze are presently being gravely persecuted.
In Afrin, Syria, the Yezidis are currently being massacred by Turkish-backed jihadists as we speak. Hundreds of Yezidis have been forced to flee their villages after taking refuge in the Afrin region following the terror implemented by ISIS and other jihadist groups in the country. Turkish-backed jihadists have just arrived in the Afrin region but already, Turkish journalist Uzay Bulut reported that they have destroyed many Yezidi temples and converted others into mosques. There have been reports that Turkey has been ethnically cleansing Afrin of Christians, Kurds, Yezidis and other groups, hoping to replace them with Syrian Muslims who are presently refugees in their own country.
Under ISIS, Yezidi men and women too old to be sexually appealing were massacred. ISIS sold Yezidi women and girls into sexual slavery while indoctrinating young Yezidi boys into becoming ISIS cannon fodder. Over 3,000 Yezidi women and girls are still being held captive by ISIS despite the fall of the Caliphate. Christians under ISIS rule faced a similar fate. However, ISIS is not the only Islamist group to have persecuted Christians. According to Father Gabriel Naddaf, a Christian is slaughtered every 5 minutes in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Islamist groups other than ISIS in Syria have forcefully converted Druze to Islam, destroyed Druze holy sites and forced Druze to sell their properties.
The Islamic Republic of Iran hosts the second largest Jewish population in the Middle East but it is one that is gravely oppressed. In Iranian courts, the testimony of a Jew is worth half that of a Muslim. Muslim principals control what Jewish students learn in Hebrew schools, the Shabbat is not respected as a Jewish day of rest and according to Iranian Jewish author Sima Goel, it is difficult for the local Jewish community to obtain Jewish religious items due to the fear that they could somehow be associated with Israel, an enemy state. The constant fear that Jews can be arrested due to their association with Israel permeates Iranian Jewish society and the fear is justified. Recently, the Times of Israel reported that a Jewish grandmother was sentenced to death in Iran merely for running an underground organization that found housing solutions for women with abusive husbands that could not obtain a divorce. It is very likely that the penalty would not have been that severe had the grandmother been Muslim. As a result of this reality, Iranian dissidents report that Jews in Iran are afraid to protest and celebrate their holidays under wraps, with the Iranian Secret Police ensuring that non-Jews cannot join the festivities.
In Bangladesh, Hindus have been raped, murdered, assaulted, kidnapped, forcefully converted to Islam and had their properties seized and their temples desecrated. The indigenous tribes of the Chittangong Hill Tracts, which are mainly Christian, Buddhist, Hindu and Animist, face an especially horrific predicament. Routinely, the Bangladeshi military backed by Bengali settlers, who have burned down Buddhist and Hindu temples, have slaughtered and gang raped the population to the level that some describe it as genocidal.
While the conflict between the Bangladeshi government and the indigenous tribes officially ended in 1997, grave persecution of the Hindus of Bangladesh continues to date. According to local sources, JMB and ISIS, who are controlled by Sheikh Hasina, are in the process of ethnically cleansing Hindus and other minorities from the country. Not too long ago, a Hindu man and his wife were tortured within the same country. The victim related: “I cannot stretch my arms and legs. I don’t have any place in my body where he has not touched. Where is the law in the country?” In addition, the Dakeshwari Temple Committee reported that temple property was seized from them and handed over to the Muslims in order to destroy the property.
These are only a few incidents of the grave persecution experienced by the Hindu community in Bangladesh. The systematic persecution experienced by Hindus and other minorities such as Buddhists and Christians in Bangladesh is highlighted on a daily basis. For example, a Hindu man in Bangladesh was recently arrested merely for sharing a report on four women wearing a Burka playing cards in Mecca. According to local sources, no Muslim was arrested for sharing this report but as a Hindu, he was. The World Hindu Struggle Committee claims that Hindus are being ethnically cleansed from the entire region, noting that 39 Indian Hindus and Sikhs were killed by Islamists recently on the Indian Subcontinent merely for being born into the wrong faith.
As bad as the situation is in Bangladesh, in Pakistan, the situation is even direr for the minorities. The Blasphemy Law is spreading terror across the country and Christians as well as other minorities have fallen victim to it. Asia Bibi, a Christian field worker, was sentenced to death for no other reason than saying something that the witnesses around her considered blasphemous. In Pakistan, having a Muslim witness say that blasphemy was committed is sufficient evidence to arrest and charge someone. According to CNN, once blasphemy is alleged, Amnesty International claims that the accused is as good as dead for the legal system offers them zero safeguards to protect them against mob violence or to defend themselves in case they are innocent.
There also have been reports that the Pakistani Army is presently ethnically cleansing both the ethnic and religious minorities from the country at a much faster rate than what exists in Bangladesh. Whether one is Sufi, an Ahmadi Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Baloch, Bahai, Buddhist, Zoroastrian or a member of another minority group, the minorities have no future in Pakistan. Nadeem Nusrat, the president of the Free Karachi Campaign, told the Business Standard: “The Punjabi dominated elite of the Pakistani Army have carried out the systematic ethnic cleansing of every minority group in Pakistan and the intensity of the savagery continues to grow with every passing day. Thousands have been extra-judicially killed. Thousands have disappeared after being picked up by the Pakistani security forces and their families are living in a state of an unending fear and helplessness with no knowledge of the whereabouts of their kins.”
According to Shipan Kumer Basu, the President of the World Hindu Struggle Committee, “The Hindu residents of the Sindh Province in Pakistan have suffered a serious calamity. These people from the border areas came to India seeking shelter but no one did anything to let them stay in the country. They have been sent back to Pakistan. Upon being returned, there, they are being pressured to convert to Islam. They are told that if they do not convert, the family members including the women cannot be saved. If they don’t agree, it will be ruthless torture. This is the situation in the Sindh Province, where more than 500 Hindus are being forced to change their religion.”
Israeli Druze diplomat Mendi Safadi, who heads the Safadi Center for International Relations and Public Diplomacy, has emphasized: “The Hindu minority and the other minorities especially those living in the Middle East and in Asia are persecuted and threatened with ethnic cleansing. It is our obligation in the free world to stand against any attempt to harm the Hindus and other minorities such as the Buddhists, Christians, Druze, Yezidis and others.” The time has long since passed for the voices calling for justice in the free world united with the minorities in the Middle East and Asia as one voice seek to end the human rights abuses and to begin a new reality, where minority rights will be respected. As the Passover Haggaddah states, “Now we are slaves. Next year, may we be free men.”
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Talk to them? How?
Whatever the impact of a new national security team, and whether or not President Trump actually meets with Kim Jong Un in the next few months, the fundamental problems with North Korea remain the same. Former U.S. negotiator Evans Revere notes that we have heard Kim’s line before. Still, the atmospherics around around the question are changing, and an unnecessarily negative response risks painting the U.S. as the belligerent party.
U.S. diplomacy might introduce a new note to the discourse with a two-part message. This would start with a fantasy scenario: If somehow North Korea became a state that served its public, our drive to isolate them would start to weaken, South Korea’s fears would abate, and the international community would find dealing with the Kim dynasty less distasteful. Such development of their regime into a responsible state would reduce tensions and make nuclear weapons less important, to them and so to us, whether or not they keep them.
Of course we know full well that North Korea will remain a brutal dictatorship, that its strategic aim has long been to take over the whole peninsula. The purported diplomatic opening is most likely a stratagem or outright ruse.
So the second part of the message would point out the fragility of North Korea’s regime. With or without their nukes, it will be destroyed in any war, probably with a nasty death for Kim Jong Un himself, leaving only the question of how many others are killed in the process.
We should remind Kim that the nature of his dynasty supports our case for economic sanctions, and will help us to isolate them further. We have not mounted a campaign to undermine the dynasty, heinous as it is. But even if the nuclear question is somehow resolved, their brutality and belligerence will still be known; they will remain isolated, with or without nuclear weapons.
This reminder should invoke our half-century military deterrence of the Soviet Union, a much more powerful regime, and how its own tyranny killed it from within. The price for keeping their nuclear program is our concerted effort to inflict costs like those that hastened the Soviet collapse. We may lack the capacity to force North Korea to give up its weapons now, but the regime’s best guarantee of survival is to reduce their repugnance.
We don’t really know what drives former-Swiss-student Kim Jong Un, or any North Korean. In any case, just as rejecting an invitation to dialogue risks making us look belligerent, raising the fantasy scenario clarifies our true motive, to protect free people and advocate freedom. The simple observations of this message suggest a positive long-run possibility while ceding nothing. They are not a negotiating agenda, so raise no questions of reducing our military exercises. They do remind all that North Korea does have another option to ensure their security, however difficult; the onus of rejecting it falls on them.
Kim would have to craft a response. In a world that knows his regime’s tyrannical nature, he would either have to cut its weapons program, initiate real measures to liberalize, or admit to a disdain for any standard of decent government. The regime likely won’t bother with the fantasy scenario, and keep discourse in its current traces. But if somehow they pick up the idea, there may be some basis, over time, for reducing tension and fear.
The message can be transmitted by a President. But the idea cannot be implemented by negotiations in the near term. North Korea’s history does not justify any tradeoff of commitments, to reduce sanctions on our side in exchange for certain policies on theirs. We could not, and should not offer, to tell them how to be more free — which could be taken as imposing our interests. But if the world sees basic commitments to rights, in unfettered views of their society, negotiating anything would become easier.
The idea of course carries risks. One is that North Korea makes enough cosmetic change to loosen South Korean resolve. The South Korean left has pursued conciliatory gestures for political purposes in the past, witness the cash-for-meetings to the north that yielded Kim Dae Jung a Nobel Peace Prize. Another risk is that our other policies worldwide fail to convey the priority we put on freedom and peace. But if credibility in tough talk to North Korea makes us tighten our self discipline, it’s good for America.
Furthermore, the proposed message should resonate for an America aching to revive its moral authority. We are most influential when we project our core nature. Should we move North Korea either to cut its nuclear program or evolve toward responsible governance, so much the better. Nothing else seems to be working.
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People walk by a poster of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi for the upcoming presidential election, in Cairo, Egypt, March 1, 2018. REUTERS/Amr Abdallah Dalsh
Egypt’s President, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, is slated to win elections on March 28. His only contender, Moussa Mostafa Moussa, is someone who has not only called himself a “big supporter” of Sisi, but has also worked as member, until he announced candidacy in the last minutes of a final deadline, on the president’s re-election campaign team. Other contenders, who have been the likes of a former military officer, a former prime minister, and a human rights lawyer, have all either been arrested or forced to back down.
This year’s dummy election is, of course, the last of the anomaly that gives us a glimpse into Sisi’s repressive one-man rule. Under Sisi, the government has passed a series of restrictive laws that has effectively paralyzed civil society. In 2017, for instance, the government passed a law that threatened members of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—like human rights groups—with criminal prosecution if they snubbed or went around restrictive rules.
In 2016, Sisi’s government brutally beat protesters who demonstrated against a deal that transferred Egyptian islands to Saudi Arabia. The demonstrations were especially important because in some ways, it revealed the wishes of Egyptians, who have time and again, expressed their ambition to gain political rights and achieve social justice as much as they have called for an improvement to their standards of living.
When the wave of popular protests of 2011 felled Hosni Mubarak from power, one man, Wael Ghonim, as F. Gregory Gause III noted in Foreign Affairs, appeared as exactly the kind who could succeed in post-Mubarak Egypt. Ghonim spoke both Arabic and English, was educated at the American University in Cairo, and most significantly, worked as an executive at Google. Still, Ghonim traded economic opportunity in exchange for political freedom. He set up a Facebook page called “We are all Khaled Said,” in memory of an Egyptian activist who was beaten to death by the police, and fomented the critical turning that led people to rise against the Mubarak regime.
In addition to people’s demands, there is something to be said of social movements in Egypt, and more generally, in Arab countries. Most social movement theories build on the experiences of the West, and largely ignore critical aspects that punch momentum into movements in other countries. Social movement theorists, over the years, have, no doubt, realigned their thinking and contended to the fact that political opportunities, like the chance for people to act together—and not structural factors, like formal organizations—have been the real harbingers of change. Yet, as Jeff Goodwin, a leading scholar on social movements has explained, protests that entail a good element of “constructionism” or the way in which people construct their own history under circumstances that they are able to make the most of, have been largely underscored in social movement studies. Political opportunity continues to be studied against structural conduits, and social movement theories continue to retain a structural bias. Thus, Islamism, as a social movement that highlights the citizens prolonged efforts to gain political rights, along with their practise of Islam, falls dead on arrival. Neither politicians in Egypt, nor Western policy experts, can grapple adequately with the marriage of Islam and modernity.
The lack of understanding of this concept of social movement, and therefore the lack of support for “alternative modernity” from the international community, can be one way to explain why nascent democratic movements in Egypt have risen as quickly as they have died. The Kefaya movement of 2004 offers an example of this. Although the movement could not sustain itself in the long run, Kefaya, which means “enough” in Arabic, touched on the cornerstone of the people’s movement that ultimately forced Mubarak to open up presidential elections in 2005. It was also the first anti-Mubarak demonstrations in Egypt. Egyptians wanted an end to inheritance of power (Mubarak was set to transfer power to his son, Gamal), and demanded free, fair, and competitive elections (Mubarak held office for four consecutive terms in “yes-or-no” referendums). Kefaya was successful, in the beginning, because it brought people from all swaths of the society, from secularists and Islamists, from people of different social backgrounds, to demand structural change. The movement, like the protests of 2011, built itself from the bottom-up. Leaders communicated with protestors on their cell phones, instead of announcing their agendas from traditional headquarters. However, internal differences, such as differing interpretations of democracy among leaders, ultimately contributed to the end of Kefaya.
Today, Sisi has shown no sign of granting civil liberties to its citizens. Much of the talk lately has focused on Sisi’s agenda to revive the economy, and while he deserves some credit for it, the common man and woman, who have largely borne the brunt of harsh austerity policies, are still awaiting their turn to reap the benefits. The international community, now in disarray, has lost its power to condemn Sisi’s nationalistic tendencies. In that case, Sisi should remember that, the more he presses ahead and suppresses political will, the more likely he drives momentum to the cause.
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In this video grab provided by RU-RTR Russian television via AP television on Thursday, March 1, 2018, Russia’s new Sarmat intercontinental missile is shown at an undisclosed location in Russia. RU-RTR Russian Television via AP
Russia had a bigly moment recently when announcing their new invincible weapons systems that use new nuclear propulsion systems and travel at hypersonic speeds. The claim that these weapons are unable to be intercepted by modern air defense systems could likely be true. Beyond the testing of American THAAD interceptor systems, there are no extremely reliable anti-air systems in the US or NATO arsenal that would give anyone much confidence in preventing a ballistic missile strike. The THAAD and tests to upgrade and perfect its system capabilities are ongoing, and while they have been deployed to counter a possible North Korean missile threat, it is unclear if they would able to stop even lower grade North Korean ballistic threats when multiple warheads are involved.
The tradition of anti-air missiles often was linked with Soviet programs that arose from a generation that had suffered invasion during the Second World War. Defense of life and society during Russia’s Great Patriotic War produced a skeptical outlook on foreign interference in Russia and a dedicated defense strategy during the years of the Cold War. Even today, Moscow is ringed by an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system to counter any ballistic missile threats coming from abroad, and it is most likely the case that their Anti-Ballistic Missile defense ring is fairly effective. From the infamous SA-2 SAM that punished American planes over Vietnam, to the SA-6 that changed strategies during Middle Eastern wars, Soviet and Russian air defense has a long tradition of producing viable missile shields against airborne threats. The motivation for these generations of programs is the belief that invasion is a possibility in the future as it was in the past. Out of necessity, they had to be effective.
The need for reliable defense likely motivated the production of effective Israeli systems like Iron Dome and the new Arrow system, but the added element of maintaining a low conflict scenario also contributed greatly to the political aspects of Iron Dome. When there is an immediate and impossible threat, the ability to stop aggression via missile strikes gives a great deal of breathing room to policy makers who do not want to escalate a conflict past the point of no return. A huge motivation for increased anti-air missile tests does not come solely from Russia’s recent announcement, but allows for the capability of extending a cooling off period in tense situations when there are little to no causalities due to an effective defense structure. While having Sarmat nuclear missiles may place Russia in a better position to strike US targets first, the US will be able to develop similar systems fairly rapidly. What might serve a skeptical Russian side and a nervous American side best is the ability to shoot down missile threats effectively, giving space for political negotiations where negotiations are the only way to achieve a lasting peace.
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A recent article in the Atlantic penned by Eliot Cohen, a former State Department luminary and currently Director of the Strategic Studies Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington DC, lamented the collapse of the global elite and its inability to offer anything of substance to a world in turmoil. He cited the political entropy recently on display at the Munich Security Conference, one of the most anticipated events of the year, at which breathless attendees jockey to be seen.
The picture he paints is of a perennial group of button-down government leaders, solipsistic, superficial policy wonks, and shoulder-rubbing wannabes, most of them oblivious to the notion of being held to account let alone shaking things up with an original idea.
Cohen’s is a weighty name, but his is not the only one to break the silence. In his recent book, The Retreat of Western Liberalism, Ed Luce, chief U.S. columnist for the Financial Times, tore into the World Economic Forum at Davos as “consistently one of the last places to anticipate what is going to happen next”. He opined that it “has made a brand of its blow-dried conventional wisdom”.
If Cohen and Luce are right, it is little wonder that large sections of the Western public have turned their backs. The trouble is that, in principle at least, major international gatherings that bridge government, military and business leaders with policy institutes, media outlets and grass roots organizations should be vital pieces of our democratic architecture. The current stand-off between the people and the elites is unsustainable. We can’t go on like this. What is to be done?
As advisers to the Halifax International Security Forum, North America’s leading foreign affairs and security conference, it is not our place to tell other major international gatherings such as Davos and Munich how to conduct themselves. Nor, by implicit comparison, do we pass judgment on the success or otherwise of Halifax. But there is a clear public interest in getting this issue right. In talking about what Halifax aspires to achieve that is what we are speaking to, and in so doing, we are open about where we ourselves have fallen short of the mark.
A case in point arose a couple of years ago when the Halifax hierarchy was startled to be hit by a tweet, shot right out of the middle of the audience of a plenary session, decrying the all male panel. Ouch. But as Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary General of NATO, pointed out at the most recent conference last November, inclusivity is a strategic imperative. This is not about political correctness, as Stoltenberg’s colleague on that panel, Canadian Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan, added. The (rather obvious) lesson for us was that major conferences earnestly in search of innovative solutions can’t expect people to engage with them if half the planet is excluded from the get-go.
Above all else, Halifax is a values-based forum for democracies. We are all too aware that much of the world’s population suffers under despotism, or inhabits a twilight landscape between democracy and tyranny. But Peter Van Praagh, President of the Forum, and his team are not ignoring the rest of the world by not seeking to replicate the General Assembly of the United Nations. We shouldn’t try to be all things to all people. Inclusivity is not the same as relativism. Democracy is better than tyranny. Halifax, we believe, demonstrates that there are certain debates and dialogues that are best undertaken among interlocutors who share the same core values, ones that support a liberal world order underpinned by a rules-based system.
At such a starting point, there is still a mountain to climb. How can we remain fresh? We are probably not alone in agonizing about that, and agonize we do. Given that every organization ultimately tends towards stasis and inertia, one technique Halifax employs is to hold fast to a policy that at least half of the 300 participants be new to the forum each year. It’s painful to turn away past participants who want to return, and it’s never personal. But fresh thinking and new perspectives require constant renewal.
Obviously, the death knell of freshness is fear of controversy. But stakeholders can sometimes get nervous about contentious topics. Everyone who has run anything from a high school debating society upwards can see the challenge: what if you start saying things your funders dislike? Again, that is where values come in. Criticism is central to a functioning democracy. If you’re frightened of controversy, you’re frightened of what makes a democracy come alive. Don’t accept stakeholders that can’t handle that. Be prepared to take the hit.
Halifax, which celebrates its 10th anniversary this year, has been fortunate in working with myriad governments of different political stripes from around the world. The vital role non-partisanship plays to our mission has been further buttressed over the years by Congressional delegations often led by John McCain for the Republicans and high ranking Democrats such as Tim Kaine, and Jeanne Shaheen.
Nonpartisanship is the right approach, but it is still not enough. One of the great criticisms of political elites is that whether from the Right or the Left, these days they all sound the same. Halifax is sensitive to that, which is why we actively seek individuals unafraid to rock the boat, such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Tawakkol Karman, who took last year’s conference by storm on an all women security panel. Likewise, discussions featuring Google’s Eric Schmidt on how new technologies, from AI to quantum computing, shape the geopolitical landscape inspired spirited debate and challenged entrenched assumptions.
So, yes, there is no doubt that global elites must shoulder their share of responsibility for the daunting challenges that face us, from climate change to the rise of neo-nationalism, and the festering of bloody, regional conflicts. And, of course, gatherings of global leaders alone cannot solve all of the world’s problems. But through open and inclusive dialogue, a commitment to renewal, and earnest debate, hope and progress can yet take stronger root. Later this year, in Halifax Nova Scotia, people who share that commitment will huddle together, working on a brighter future for the democratic world.
Robin Shepherd is Senior Advisor to the Halifax International Security Forum. Dean Fealk, an international attorney, is its General Counsel and a Fellow of Truman National Security Project. Views expressed are their own.
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