Diplomacy & Crisis News

In early August, I visited Kfar Aza—a kibbutz in southern Israel only two kilometers from the Gaza Strip. This is a community where residents have mere seconds to seek refuge once loudspeakers go off, signaling an imminent Hamas rocket or mortar attack. One of these residents, Chen Kotler Abrahams, invited my colleagues and me to her home, served lemonade, and pulled out body-height remnants of these rockets for us to see. Despite the grim conversation, life in Kfar Aza appeared fairly normal: children played in groups, adults gardened, and the like.

As of the time of this writing, there is a chance that many of the people I met are dead.

As many recall, Israel was caught off-guard fifty years ago during one of its holiest days, Yom Kippur. The war that followed was one of the hardest fought in Israel’s history, with repercussions that still shape the Middle East today. Half a century later, history has a grim way of rhyming, if not repeating. Today, on the holiday of Simchat Torah, as Jews worldwide were completing the annual reading of the Torah and dancing in celebration, Hamas launched an unprecedented and massive surprise attack on Israel from the Gaza Strip.

This operation has sent shockwaves around the world. This isn’t just another episode in the Israel-Hamas conflict or a bold attack by terrorists; it is a watershed moment that might reshape the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape.

Yom Kippur War Redux

The situation is still unfolding, but developments thus far have been shocking. Hamas fired over 5,000 rockets, overwhelming Israel’s Iron Dome system. Multiple Israeli communities near the Gaza border, including two military bases (Re’im and Kerem Shalom), faced not only the terror of rocket fire but also on-the-ground incursions. Dozens of Israeli civilians have been killed in their homes and communities, with graphic recordings of these heinous acts circulating on social media as gruesome propaganda. Meanwhile, an undetermined number of Israeli civilians and soldiers—including, supposedly, an Israeli general—have been kidnapped and reportedly taken back to Gaza, amplifying the atmosphere of terror. That this attack came on a Jewish religious holiday devoted to celebrating the Torah—a vital part of the Jewish connection to God and, by extension, their historical connection to the land of Israel—makes it more than a military maneuver; it’s a symbolic gesture.

Yet, unlike the Yom Kippur War, which was a conventional conflict involving state actors, this Simchat Torah offensive is marked by the asymmetric warfare that has come to define the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in recent years: Hamas fighters taking off from Gaza in paragliders and descending onto Israeli settlements, drones dropping bombs on vehicles and guard posts, and more.

Why now? Why on this particular day?

The answer lies in the realm of geopolitics. Hamas’ attack, besides its obvious goal of inflicting pain on Israel, aims to “veto” the budding rapprochement between Israel and other Muslim Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Though in its nascent stages, the recent thawing of relations between the countries is a monumental shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. For decades, the prevailing trend set Israel and the Arab states on opposing fronts. But shared concerns, especially about the United States’ military drawdown from the region and Iran’s growing influence, have made former adversaries reconsider their stances.

For Hamas itself, the assault is due to a variety of reasons. The group has long positioned itself as the uncompromising vanguard of the Palestinian cause but has seen its legitimacy questioned and regional influence wane in recent years. Moreover, any hint of normalization between Israel and Arab states is regarded as a betrayal and a death knell for the Palestinian cause. By launching this brazen, massive attack and taking numerous hostages, Hamas has not only proven its resilience and competence as a fighting organization and put its political rival, the Palestinian Authority, on the back foot, but also it has placed Arab states under the spotlight—especially if Israel launches massive retaliatory attacks. Moreover, the 1973 conflict holds an iconic status in the Arab psyche. It is seen as a moment when Arab forces, even if momentarily, regained their dignity against the Israeli military might. By choosing this symbolic date, Hamas aims to rally the wider Arab world around its cause, invoking memories of past glories.

There’s another layer to this strategy. By striking on Simchat Torah, Hamas seeks to challenge the spiritual narrative of the Jewish state. They aimed not just at bodies but at souls, attempting to dampen the spirit of a people celebrating their divine covenant. This act reveals the deep-seated ideological battle at play.

Moves and Countermoves

As Israel begins its retaliation and the search for its kidnapped citizens, there’s a realization that the Middle East stands at the cusp of another potential large-scale conflict. In a move that underscores the gravity of the situation, Israel has authorized a massive counterattack. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in a televised address to the nation, declared, “Citizens of Israel, we are at war. Not an operation, not a round [of fighting], at war!” The country’s defense minister, Yoav Gallant, has stated, “We will change reality on the ground in Gaza for the next fifty years. What was before, will be no more. We will operate at full force.” The gloves may be coming all the way off.

For years, Israel has hesitated from launching a full-scale operation to take Gaza, primarily due to the sheer military cost, the international repercussions, and the humanitarian concerns such an assault might trigger. But the scale and audacity of the recent attack may have shifted the calculus in Jerusalem. Netanyahu’s coalition government, composed of hard right elements, will not accept anything less than the destruction of Hamas. Moreover, Israel’s political and military establishment now feels pressured to restore its reputation and prestige. The scale and audacity of Hamas’ operation raise alarming questions about the massive intelligence failure by Israel and, to some extent, the United States. For an operation of this magnitude, planning would have spanned weeks, if not months. How was it that the Israeli defense establishment missed the brewing storm on their doorstep?

At the same time, any actions Israel takes must take into account the protection of the diplomatic gains; winning the immediate war will not amount to much in the long run if Israel is once again left isolated in the region with an Iran that is growing ever stronger.

The Arab world, particularly the governments of the Gulf states that have pursued improved ties with Israel, is in a tricky situation. At present, the Gulf states have called for de-escalation (the UAE), restraint (Oman), or blamed the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar). This response must be understood in a broader context; if Israel’s past responses to Hamas attacks are any guide, then the Israeli response will be great and terrible, with casualties in thousands, if not greater. Urban warfare, particularly in a densely populated area like Gaza, is fraught with difficulties. Civilian casualties are practically impossible to avoid in such circumstances, especially if they—along with any kidnapped Israelis—are used as human shields by Hamas. Gulf states would be hardpressed by domestic politics to respond to the deaths of so many fellow Arab Muslims.

Saudi Arabia, in particular, is in a precarious position. Riyadh’s recent overtures for Israel have been driven by mutual concerns over Iran, along with a desire to access Israeli technology. A stable relationship with Israel could serve as a bulwark against Tehran’s regional ambitions. But the Kingdom, with its deep-seated historical support for the Palestinian cause, will find it challenging to navigate the currents without alienating its populace.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies are “assessing” the situation and testing boundaries. If Israel appears weak, then there is a strong chance these groups will also attack Israel via Lebanon and, to a lesser extent, Syria. This would create a second front for Israeli forces and possibly set off a broader regional war.

Israel’s operation presents a double-edged sword for the Palestinian Authority, which has been losing its grip on power and influence to Hamas. On one hand, the weakening or removal of Hamas could restore the PA’s primacy in Palestinian politics. On the other, any large-scale humanitarian crisis in Gaza resulting from the Israeli incursion will undoubtedly stoke anti-Israel sentiments, making its own situation all the more challenging.

The United States, traditionally Israel’s staunch ally, is also in a precarious situation. That Washington also didn’t see this attack coming speaks ill of its intelligence capabilities, especially in signals intelligence. The Biden administration will find itself under fire. Only mere days ago, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan argued that “The Middle East region is quieter today than it has been in two decades now.” On the same day, Semafor revealed that Iran built a significant influence network that reached deep into the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. Finally, the administration’s decision to release $6 billion to Iran in exchange for five American hostages hostage will only face harsher criticism in the coming days; it is not unlikely that some of that money funded or otherwise supported Hamas’ current operation. Pressure to support Israel will be immense, complicating an already delicate situation with a public already tired of supporting conflicts abroad.

Perhaps the worst off are Gaza’s civilians, who’ve endured years of blockade and conflict, along with their own share of suffering under Hamas’ rule, and are now once again caught in the crossfire. Much like the broader Middle East’s, their future hangs in the balance, dependent on the choices and actions of regional and global powers in the coming weeks.

Coming Apart at the Seams 

It’s hard to guess what will happen to Kfar Aza, the kibbutz I visited two months ago. According to the latest reports, a baby was found alive but alone amid the community's charred remains.

Likewise, it is difficult to ascertain what will come next for the Middle East. With Israel’s announced intention to take Gaza and obliterate Hamas, the Arab world finds itself at a crossroads. Will they condemn Israel’s actions and risk derailing the recent diplomatic warmth? Or will they, even tacitly, support Israel’s move, viewing the eradication of Hamas as a pathway to a more stable Middle East? Either choice carries with it massive geopolitical implications. But now, it feels as if the Israeli/Palestinian situation is about to be resolved, one way or the other. 

This, perhaps, is what is truly terrifying Western policymakers: the sense that the Western-led, rules-based world order, such as it is, is coming apart. The previous constraints imposed on states are no longer as constraining. The war in Ukraine, the retaking by force of what remained of the Karabakh Armenian breakaway entity by Azerbaijan, heightening tensions over Taiwan, growing instability in the Balkans, military coups in Africa, and myriad other events are all grim portents of this trend. Which domino will fall next?

The Simchat Torah War, as this conflict will soon likely be called, is thus not just another skirmish. It’s a turning point, one with vast implications that heralds a coming age of disorder. The world watches with bated breath. 

Carlos Roa is a contributing editor and former executive editor for The National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock. 

Rarely have two major democracies descended into as ugly a diplomatic spat as the one now unfolding between Canada and India. With the traditionally friendly relationship already at its lowest point ever, both sides are now engaging in quiet diplomacy to arrest the downward spiral, using the United States, a Canadian ally and Indian partner, as the intermediary. But even if the current diplomatic ruckus eases, Canada’s tolerance of Sikh separatist activity on its territory will continue to bedevil bilateral ties.

The latest dispute began when Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau sensationally claimed that there were “credible allegations” about a “potential link” between India’s government and the fatal shooting in June of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Sikh separatist and Canadian citizen, on Canadian soil. India’s government fired back by demanding that Canada reduce its diplomatic staff in India, suspending new visas for Canadians, and accusing Canada of making “absurd” accusations to divert attention from its status as “a safe haven for terrorists.”

Nijjar was hardly the only Sikh separatist living in Canada. In fact, the country has emerged as the global hub of the militant movement for “Khalistan,” or an independent Sikh homeland. The separatists constitute a small minority of the Sikh diaspora, concentrated in the Anglosphere, especially in Canada. Sikhs living in India—who overwhelmingly report that they are proud to be Indian—do not support the separatist cause.

With British Columbia as their operational base, the separatists are waging a strident campaign glorifying political violence. For example, they have erected billboards advocating the killing of Indian diplomats (with photos), honored jailed or killed terrorists as “martyrs,” built a parade float on which the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was re-enacted, and staged attacks on Indian diplomatic missions in Canada. They have also held referendums on independence for Khalistan in Canada.

But, much to India’s frustration, Canada has been reluctant to take strong action to rein in Sikh separatism. Trudeau’s first official visit to India in 2018 turned into a disaster after it was revealed that a convicted Sikh terrorist who had spent years in a Canadian prison following the attempted assassination of a visiting Indian state cabinet minister had made it onto the Canadian guest list. At last month’s G20 summit in New Delhi, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave Trudeau a dressing-down for being soft on violent extremists.

It was against this tense backdrop that Trudeau made his allegations about Nijjar’s murder. When countries have linked foreign agents to a domestic death—for example, in 2010, when the Dubai police chief accused Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service, of killing a Hamas commander in a local luxury hotel—they have typically presented video, audio, or forensic evidence. And they have mostly avoided blaming the government that the foreign agents represent.

Trudeau, by contrast, cast blame directly on the Indian government without presenting a scintilla of evidence. He says the allegations are based on credible intelligence, apparently from a Five Eyes partner country (Australia, New Zealand, the UK, or the US), but refuses to declassify the information or share it with Indian authorities.

Trudeau apparently hasn’t provided “any facts” even to Canadian opposition leader Pierre Poilievre, a member of the Privy Council. And, according to the premier of British Columbia, the province where the killing occurred, the intelligence briefing he received on the matter included only information “available to the public doing an internet search.”

Meanwhile, Canadian investigators haven’t made a single arrest in the case. This has left many wondering to what extent Canada’s powerful but unaccountable intelligence establishment controls the country’s foreign policy.

In any case, there’s no doubt that Sikh radicals wield real political influence in Canada, including as funders. Trudeau keeps his minority government afloat with the help of Jagmeet Singh, the New Democratic Party’s Sikh leader and a Khalistan sympathizer. According to a former foreign policy adviser to Trudeau’s government, action was not taken to choke off financing for the Khalistani militants because “Trudeau did not want to lose the Sikh vote” to Singh.

Canada must wake up to the threat posed by its Sikh militants. Rising drug trade profitability and easy gun availability in British Columbia have contributed to internecine infighting among Khalistan radicals in the province. The volatile combination of Sikh militancy, the drug trade, and gangland killings has serious implications for Canadian security, but it is not only Canadians who are in danger.

Under the premiership of Trudeau’s father, Pierre Trudeau, Canada’s reluctance to rein in or extradite Sikh extremists wanted in India for terrorism led to the 1985 twin bombings targeting Air India flights. One attack killed all 329 passengers, most of whom were of Indian origin, on a flight from Toronto; the other misfired, killing two baggage handlers at Tokyo’s Narita Airport. With Khalistani militants continuing to idolize Talwinder Singh Parmar—the terrorist that two separate Canadian inquiries identified as the mastermind behind the bombings—history is in danger of repeating itself.

By reopening old wounds, not least those created by the Air India attacks, Trudeau’s accusations have created a rare national consensus in fractious and highly polarised India. Many are calling for New Delhi to put sustained pressure on Ottawa to start cleaning up its act. But more bitterness and recriminations won’t restore the bilateral relationship. For that, both sides must use effective, cooperative diplomacy to address each other’s concerns.

Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the New Delhi–based Centre for Policy Research and fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s new battleground. He tweets at @Chellaney. 

This article was originally published in the Australian Strategic Polic Institute’s journal, The Strategist.

Image: Shutterstock.

In January 2024, Taiwan will hold its presidential election to choose its next leader. President Tsai Ing-wen, currently in her second term, will soon conclude her tenure as mandated by the constitution's two-term limit. Her tenure has been marked by several noteworthy developments, with one of the most pivotal decisions being the launch of the New Southbound Policy in 2016. This policy was designed to broaden Taiwan’s economic engagement and strengthen its foreign relations. It encompasses eighteen countries from South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania, focusing on eight key target countries.

With the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) at the helm, Taiwan has successfully raised its regional profile, and Taiwan’s foreign policy is no longer solely focused on the West or China. Since 2016, a noteworthy development has been the continuous effort to foster strong relations with its immediate and extended neighbors. 

Taiwan’s Window to Asia

There have been several tangible benefits that Taiwan has achieved through the implementation of the New Southbound Policy. It would not be an overstatement to describe this policy as a holistic approach to Taiwan’s foreign relations. The initiation of this policy has meaningfully enhanced the institutionalization of Taiwan’s engagements with countries to its south, particularly those that had previously received limited attention from Taiwan. Before the initiation of the policy, Taiwan, as an Asian country, had fewer substantial ties or linkages within its geographical region. Taiwan’s implementation of the New Southbound Policy and its utilization of medical diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic have significantly enhanced Taiwan’s engagement with the countries in the region.

Furthermore, the New Southbound Policy also served as a gateway to the Indo-Pacific region. During the 2022 Yushan Forum, an annual dialogue dedicated to Taiwan’s relationships with New Southbound Policy countries, President Tsai connected the New Southbound Policy with the country’s broader Indo-Pacific strategy. She affirmed, “The New Southbound Policy is at the center of Taiwan’s own Indo-Pacific strategy. Through this policy, we are working to bolster our security and economic ties with partners across the region.”

A Unique Response to China’s Aggression 

Seven years since its inception, the New Southbound Policy has consistently delivered striking outcomes in trade and investment. For instance, between 2016 and 2022, the overall bilateral trade between Taiwan and the New Southbound Policy countries surged by an impressive 88.2 percent, with investment demonstrating similar notable growth. In 2022, Taiwan’s investments in the New Southbound Policy partner countries surpassed those in China. Even more significantly, the New Southbound Policy has actively and effectively enabled Taiwanese businesses to generate higher profits than those earned from China.

Government-led initiatives have furthered the establishment of regional networks, including Bilateral Investment Agreements, mutual recognition agreements, memorandums on the avoidance of double taxation, investment guarantee agreements, educational cooperation, talent development, and fostering quality enterprises, among other areas. These accomplishments have enhanced Taiwan’s ability to withstand China’s aggressive tactics and deepened its multifaceted partnerships with Indo-Pacific neighbors.

While the New Southbound Policy has its share of shortcomings and there is still much room for improvement, it has provided a unique and nonconventional response to China’s escalating aggression and its attempts to limit Taiwan’s international space. However, despite this obvious objective, the New Southbound Policy goes beyond the China factor. Through the policy, Taiwan has attempted to convey to the New Southbound Policy partner countries that Taiwan is much more than China and engagement with the government is mutually beneficial. This is one of the major reasons the New Southbound Policy is not focused on the security and political aspects of Taiwan’s foreign relations. Since many of the New Southbound Policy countries have been exercising caution to avoid crossing China’s perceived redlines, Taiwan’s strategic approach within the New Southbound Policy framework, which prioritizes enhancing economic cooperation, facilitating regional connectivity, promoting resource sharing, and fostering talent exchange, enables these countries to cultivate closer ties with Taiwan without being unduly concerned about the China factor.

What’s Next?

With the West increasingly focusing on the Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan must engage with Asia comprehensively. The New Southbound Policy has provided Taiwan with a valuable avenue due to its alignment with the policy objectives of several other countries, including India’s Act East Policy. As the upcoming election draws near, there is ongoing deliberation about the fate of this policy. While there still has been a lack of enthusiastic response to the New Southbound Policy, its mere existence has given Taiwan a structured framework for engagement. The multifaceted, non-security, and nonpolitical nature of the policy has allowed Taiwan to develop a blueprint that is well suited for the New Southbound Policy countries as well. 

Since the onset of the pandemic, Taiwan has garnered renewed attention. This has presented a prime opportunity for Taiwan to bolster its engagement with and presence in Asia, and the policy framework has proven to be a valuable tool. As Taiwan enters a period of election frenzy, it becomes imperative not to overlook Taiwan’s crucial engagement with several significant Asian countries. Taiwan has become a focal point for both political and nonpolitical reasons in recent years, and the progress made should serve as a foundation for further development. To enhance its prominence in the region, Taiwan must maintain and advance the New Southbound Policy consistently. Given China’s consistent defiance of the rule of law and its threats to the rules-based order, it becomes increasingly vital for Asia to mirror Taiwan’s eagerness for engagement.

Alan H. Yang is a Professor at the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies and Executive Director at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation (TAEF). 

Sana Hashmi is a Fellow at TAEF and George H. W. Foundation for U.S.-China Relations. She tweets @sanahashmi1. 

Image: Shutterstock.

It would be the most transformative moment in world history since the end of the Cold War, a mega-deal that could change everything. So say the advocates of the proposed grand bargain among the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. In outline, the deal entails a U.S. defense pact with Saudi Arabia, the recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia, and the accompanying transformation of the security and economic environment. The deal would promote the creation of an integrated U.S. air defense system across the Middle East (directed at Iran). It would spur investment in a new shipping and rail corridor (IMEC) linking India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Israel with Europe. Israel and Saudi Arabia, in effect, would reconcile over their shared fear of Iran. They would do so under the protective mantle of the United States. 

In return for the recognition of Israel, the Saudis are said to want four things: a formal U.S. guarantee of their security, like the bilateral treaties signed with Japan and South Korea in the Cold War; U.S. help in building civilian nuclear reactors; better access to U.S. arms; and Israeli concessions to the Palestinians. 

It is widely accepted among the commentariat, among both those who support and oppose the deal, that all these demands or “asks” are to be taken at face value as signifying a package that the Saudis really want and believe they can get. I think that is highly unlikely. Something else is going on. No one has a beeline into the brain of Saudi Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman, including U.S. officials, but their theory—that MBS really wants a security treaty and is willing to give a lot to get it—strikes me as highly implausible. Please consider the opposing theory that the Saudis don’t want a tighter alliance with the United States and that these negotiations are part of their preparations for a world without that. 

The Revolution in Saudi Policy

The assumption underlying the grand bargain is that the Saudi position is inherently weak and vulnerable, requiring American succor. The Saudis long for renewed embrace today, though Biden hated on them yesterday. Saudi actions of the past two years suggest a far more independent stance. Consider these steps:

They agreed to a truce in Yemen.

They thumbed their noses at American requests to increase oil production in 2022, nullifying Biden’s releases from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve by barrel-for-barrel cuts of their own. In 2023, they coordinated with Russia in reducing production further (by, respectively, 1 million barrels a day and 500,000 BPD), spurring an increase in the oil price from a low of $64 a barrel in the summer to the $80-$90 range today. 

In December 2022, they gave a lavish welcome in Riyadh to Chinese president Xi Jinping, heralding an “epoch-making milestone” in China’s relations with the Arab world. As part of that summit, the Saudis agreed to a memorandum that called for Huawei, the US-sanctioned Chinese firm, to build cloud computing and high-tech complexes in Saudi cities.  

They led the effort, over considerable opposition, to readmit President Bashar al-Assad of Syria into the Arab League last May and want to work with China in rebuilding the country.

They have shown a keen interest in developing ties with both BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in both of which Russia and China play key roles. 

They reduced their holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds, contributing their might to the ongoing U.S. funding crisis. 

Last but not least, they agreed in March 2023 to restore diplomatic relations with Iran under the auspices of China. 

Taken together, these initiatives amount to a revolution in Saudi policy. Yemen apart, each was strongly opposed by the United States. The White House went ballistic over Saudi oil policy in the fall of 2022, charging collusion with Vladimir Putin and putting the White House and the Democratic Party “on a mission to punish the kingdom.” U.S. leaders have vehemently opposed the normalization of ties with Assad. They have feared and protested growing Sino-Saudi trade and investment ties. U.S. leaders want the Saudis to continue pricing oil in dollars and to park their surpluses in U.S. Treasury bonds. They don’t want the Saudis to have any sort of military relationship with China or Russia.  

The grand bargain, in effect, seeks to reverse the bold new Saudi foreign policy of the last year. Biden began his presidency by treating MBS as a pariah whom he could trash talk. Then it gradually dawned on him and his advisors that the outcome of the epochal conflict with Russia and China could turn on the struggle for influence in the Middle East, making Riyadh the pivotal player in that great game. So a lot is at stake. The administration’s means of getting the Saudis to reverse course is the U.S. security treaty.

Treaty Ally? 

There are lots of things that are passing strange about this proposed bilateral pact. It almost certainly couldn’t get the approval of sixty-seven U.S. senators. When the administration chose New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman to reveal (on July 27) that Biden was weighing a big Middle East deal, Friedman wrote that Biden himself hadn’t fully committed to it, though the president is now said to be an enthusiast. MBS pretty much reviles the supposed guarantor. He refused to take Biden’s phone calls for over a year. He made fun of Biden in private. MBS is vilified in Congress as often as Putin or Xi, among Democrats and Republicans alike.  Treaties are matters of trust. Trust is lacking between Saudi Arabia and America.  

Here’s another oddity, which is that the treaty would simply affirm what was, over many decades, seen as a key pillar of U.S. policy in the region. The distinction between the historic commitment and the proposed new commitment has garnered virtually no discussion in the press, but there are a few obvious questions. If the old commitment is no longer in existence, when did it go away? If the commitment went away before, couldn’t it go away again? If so, what’s it worth?

In fact, the traditional U.S. commitment has been worth something to Saudi Arabia, but that something has rested not on U.S. affection for the Saudis but on fear and loathing of Iran. So long as hostility to Iran is the centerpiece of U.S. policy in the region, as it seems likely to remain, the Saudis achieve about as much “security” as they would under a formal treaty. Whereas the United States has been irresolute in its commitment to its clients—it abandoned Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak; it double-crossed Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi; it turned tail in Afghanistan—its enmity with Iran is eternal. This factor is far more important for the Saudis than vague words on paper about mutual protection.

That applies also to all the lesser “guarantees” that have been bruited about, including a mutual defense understanding that would be “less than a full treaty” or an executive agreement that would bypass Congress (practically impossible given the inherent congressional prerogative to block aspects of any deal). Whatever form the guarantee might take, there is no possibility of it being truly “iron-clad,” as the Saudis are said to want. A future White House or Congress would interpret its terms as they liked.  

China Interposes

In the history of the grand bargain, the news of three Saudi “asks”—a formal security treaty, a civilian nuclear program, and guaranteed arms sales—broke on March 9, 2023. A few hours later, to the apparent surprise of Washington, Iran and Saudi Arabia announced their diplomatic rapprochement under Chinese auspices.  

This was a significant development, most unwelcome in Washington, and a “lose, lose, lose” for the neoconservatives. But good relations with China are essential for Saudi security because China is vital to Iran, giving China sway over decision-making in Saudi’s chief rival. The isolation from much of the world that the United States has imposed on Iran makes China an especially vital lifeline for it. 

Assistant Secretary of State Barbara Leaf insisted that China’s role in the deal was insignificant; the agreement “was not brokered by the Chinese; they hosted it.” That’s not Salman’s view. “We had a few obstacles,” Salman noted in his interview with Fox News. “China come in and solve it.” 

What China likely told Iran and Saudi Arabia was that it would not stand for either side infringing on the vital interests and national rights of the other. Saudi Arabia has in China a lever to restrain Iran. This is worth just as much, if not more, than the U.S. threat to blow up Iran’s nuclear installations. Given that the Saudis would be deeply exposed in the event of a U.S.-Israel attack on Iran, a peaceful route to Iran’s restraint sponsored by China probably looks more promising to the Saudis than the bellicose U.S. approach.  

Palestine: On Back Burner? 

A central part of the grand bargain is an apparent solution, but not really a solution, to the Palestinian question. Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland told PBS that the deal will ensure that “the prospect of a two-state solution stays vibrant and strong.” As that “solution” has been dead and buried for many years, existing solely in speech as a fraught hypothetical, Nuland’s formulation is bizarre. Events on the ground—above all, 700,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank—have long pointed toward no settlement that respects Palestinian rights. The last two decades showed that the Israelis didn’t want an independent Palestinian state and that the Americans couldn’t or wouldn’t make them want it. 

Even before the savage October 7 attack by Hamas on Israel, the prospect of a real settlement was remote. Factors barring a settlement include the most extreme government in Israel’s history, a fractured Palestinian leadership, continued Palestinian terrorism, and what critical observers call a “second Nakba.” For the Israeli government, the issue is only a “checkbox that you have to check to say you’re doing it.” That is, it is to be without substantive meaning. The Biden administration apparently intends to win the consent of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu with sweet talk but no threats. That seems unlikely to work in the future. It has never worked on Netanyahu in the past.  

Will the Saudis consent to a fig leaf? Their formal position is, no, they won’t. According to Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan, “There is no way to resolve the conflict other than by ensuring the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.” It must “return to the forefront.”  The foreign minister was yet more emphatic in his September 23 speech to the UN General Assembly. MBS did say in his recent interview that “every day we get closer” to an agreement, but the Saudis have not publicly retreated from their 2002 peace plan.  The Saudi response to the October 7 war was to recall “its repeated warnings of the dangers of the explosion of the situation as a result of the continued occupation, the deprivation of the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights, and the repetition of systematic provocations against its sanctities.”

Insiders say that the Saudis will accept far less—a settlement freeze, formal disavowal of annexing the West Bank, more Palestinian control over a few parcels in the West Bank—but even these limited steps pose insuperable obstacles for Israel. Netanyahu can’t accept them without breaking his coalition. A national unity government could be formed in response to the October 7 war, but it is most unlikely to favor concessions to the Palestinians.  

Even if Israel’s acquiescence is miraculously secured, it is difficult to see why the Saudis should break so radically from past policy. Overwhelmingly, Arab and Islamic public opinion opposes such recognition if it simply ratifies existing realities of Israeli annexation and Palestinian dispossession. That includes Saudi opinion. The United Arab Emirates, the most important Arab signatory of the Abraham Accords, complains of Israel’s violation of its limited commitments under the accords and the new conditions the United States imposed on selling it F-35s (the breaking of relations with Huawei), causing the arms deal to fall apart. The Saudis have watched closely the UAE experience with the Abraham Accords. They don’t like what they see. 

Recognition of Israel bears on Saudi security. Underwriting the Israeli dispossession of the Palestinians could potentially constitute a threat to the security of bin Salman and his regime, as it might well work to undermine his legitimacy at home and his leadership position in the Muslim world. A refusal to recognize Israel, unless it consents to an independent Palestinian state, protects MBS from the accusation that he is complicit in the unjust treatment meted out to the Palestinians. 

The critical Saudi dependency on U.S. arms—much of its air force could not operate without U.S. logistical support—is often taken as a source of considerable U.S. leverage on Saudi Arabia. Still, it is also true that the U.S. defense industry is critically dependent on the Saudis, who are responsible for $13 billion in U.S. arms sales between 2016 and 2020.  The leverage works both ways. The Saudi dependency on U.S. support for key weapons systems also constitutes a good reason for diversifying away from the United States. According to MBS, it would “cause headaches” if the Saudis were forced to seek new arms suppliers, but he wants those U.S. arms without the conditions Washington wishes to impose. 

That’s probably their bottom line on a civilian nuclear industry, too. The Saudis have put this forward as something comparable to U.S. help in building its military, but they have also made clear that they are open to competing offers from China, itself on the cusp of agreement with Turkey to build a new nuclear power plant. The U.S.-Saudi negotiations are shrouded in secrecy, so it is challenging to assess the state of play with respect to these offers, but it seems evident that a Saudi deal with China would be less subject to subsequent cancellation than one with the United States. The United States, under pressure from Israel and Congress, would probably insist on conditions so onerous—it’s on your soil, but under our control—as to make the U.S. offer appear unattractive.

To the Dustbin of History

So, the grand bargain is destined to flop. There are half a dozen deal breakers. The United States has wildly overestimated the leverage a formal offer of American protection affords it. The failure of the negotiation will, in turn, underscore the limitations of U.S. power and influence in the region. 

The U.S. reversal toward MBS, from odious pariah to best new pal, has painfully demonstrated the Biden administration’s new-found appreciation of Saudi power and independence. Alarmed by the new Saudi diplomacy, the United States has been making a last-ditch effort over the past six months to get them to reverse it.  The Saudis have responded by stating conditions that they know the Americans cannot satisfy. 

Instead of taking the Saudi demands at face value, we should infer that what MBS really wants is the demonstration that the United States cannot deliver on most of the agenda he has set forth. That demonstration would justify his refusal to yield ground on Israel and his desire to maintain good relations with Russia and China while not wholly alienating the United States. Saudi diplomacy today is not about the ways and means of reaffirming its status as an American protectorate but about accumulating points for the blame game to follow the collapse of the negotiations. 

David C. Hendrickson is President of the John Quincy Adams Society and emeritus professor of political science at Colorado College. You can find out more about his work at davidhendrickson.org. He tweets at @dhendrickson50. 

Image: Shutterstock.

As cyberattacks grow exponentially—an insecure computer can suffer 2,000 attacks per day—Artificial Intelligence (AI) is now imperative to deal with the massive volume of breaches. Yet, it seems that AI developers and researchers are behind the curve. Namely, the number of AI developers eclipses those that deal with its safety thirty to one. Moreover, AI-focused cybersecurity solutions only rose after 2016.

Figure 1: Annual distribution of research papers presenting a novel AI for cybersecurity solution

As governments are increasingly under pressure to both deploy and regulate AI, policymakers need to understand what types of AI are available for cybersecurity purposes. As Max Smeets wrote: “Discussing the use of AI in cyber operations is not about whether technology or humans will be more important in the future. It is about how AI can make sure developers, operators, administrators, and other personnel of cyber organizations or hacking groups do a better job.” Policymakers are hungry for sound academic advice clarifying the political and legal implications of a complex and complicated technology.

Thus, we offer a foundational overview of the use cases of AI for cybersecurity. Namely, we look at the publicly available unique AI algorithms (700) and use a rudimentary NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) framework to determine for what cybersecurity purpose (identify, protect, detect, respond, or recover) distinct types of AI algorithms (reasoning, planning, learning, communications, or perception) are being used.

First, we dispute findings that only looked at the sheer number of publications, as we look only at novel AI solutions for cybersecurity. Hence, when one takes this deeper perspective, one sees that it is not China that leads the way in developing AI for cybersecurity, but rather the United States. The majority of the authors are affiliated with institutions within the United States or the European Union.

Figure 2: Geographic distribution of research papers presenting a novel AI for cybersecurity solution

Second, analyzing 700 unique AI for cybersecurity solutions according to the five NIST categories, we see that 47 percent of them focus on detecting anomalies and cybersecurity incidents. The second most popular category, with 26 percent, is protection, followed by identify and respond, 19 percent and 8 percent, respectively. This comes as a surprise as we see a gradual shift towards Cyber Persistent Engagement Strategy: comparing the U.S. National Cybersecurity Strategy of 2018 and 2023 or comparing the development of EU member-states strategies, political initiatives, and rhetoric.

Figure 3: Distribution of research papers presenting a novel AI for cybersecurity solution according to the cybersecurity purpose

There are several dimensions in answering this puzzle. Cyber Persistence Theory does not map well onto the NIST framework, as the latter does not include anticipation—a key feature of Cyber Persistence Theory. The latter “redefines security as seizing and sustaining the initiative in exploitation; that is, anticipating the exploitation of a state’s own digital vulnerabilities before they are leveraged against them, exploiting others’ vulnerabilities to advance their own security needs, and sustaining the initiative in this exploitation dynamic.” Hence, linking Cyber Persistence Theory to response within the NIST framework distorts its meaning. Furthermore, states are risk-averse, and letting machines decide when and how to respond to a cyber-incident might be too escalatory, similar to self-driving cars, where the liability considerations are too high for such vehicles to be operational. Finally, AI models need a lot of training data before they can be deployed. However, appropriate data to prepare a response AI cybersecurity algorithm is scarce.

Third, less surprising is the distribution of AI algorithms developed for cybersecurity according to their nature. Almost two-thirds of the AI-based cybersecurity solutions use learning methods (64 percent), followed by communication (16 percent), reasoning (6 percent), planning (5 percent), and a hybrid format, using a combination of the two or more aforementioned methods—7 percent.

Figure 4: Distribution of research papers presenting a novel AI for cybersecurity solution according to the nature of the AI algorithm

When we cross-tab both dimensions—the purpose and the nature—of a unique AI solution for cybersecurity, we see that machine learning algorithms dominate all five cybersecurity functions. They are primarily used for intrusion and anomaly detection, malicious domain blocking, data leakage prevention, protection against distinct types of malware, and log analysis.

Curiously, we have also found that some well-known cases of AI applications for cybersecurity do not have many unique AI algorithms developed—e.g., penetration tests and behavior modeling and analysis. Future research should indicate if this is due to the satisfactory performance of the existing ones, so much so that there is no demand for new ones.

Cyberspace and AI are both means and platforms for great power politics. As both are rapidly evolving, regulation may, in fact, unintentionally lead to overregulation, as lawmakers cannot guess the direction of the rapid development. In turn, overregulation would have a damp effect on the development and deployment of digital technologies. Hence, minimizing the regulation of AI in cyberspace would empower the United States and give it an edge in global power politics. However, the United States must also find a way to safeguard its democratic values, norms, principles, and civil liberties when dealing with these new technologies. Therefore, transparency guidelines are in order for the ethical use of AI for cybersecurity, as well as strengthening public oversight of the intelligence and security agencies’ use of AI in cyberspace.

Igor Kovač is a researcher at The Center for Cyber Strategy and Policy at the University of Cincinnati and The Center for Peace and Security Studies at the University of California, San Diego. His research focuses on the intersection between political economy and security studies. He served as the foreign policy advisor to the Slovenian Prime Minister from 2020 through 2022.

Tomaž Klobučar is the head of the Laboratory for Open Systems and Networks at the Jozef Stefan Institute. His main research areas are information security and technology-enhanced learning.

Ramanpreet Kaur is a researcher at the Jozef Stefan Institute.

Dušan Gabrijelčič is a researcher at the Jozef Stefan Institute.

While security experts and policymakers cry foul at the recent U.S.-Iran hostage exchange, the $6 billion in unfrozen assets that will be used by the Iranian regime, as a result, pales in comparison to assets smuggled by ships around the world dodging already-existing sanctions. 

Like North Korea, Iran has long used ships flying the flag of another country to skirt sanctions and fund their governments. By dodging sanctions that target key industries, highly sanctioned regimes are able to continue to fund nuclear weapons programs, terror organizations, and other threats to U.S. interests. To effectively sanction Tehran, Washington needs to crack down on asset smuggling, especially now that Iran has billions of dollars to retool its smuggling operations.

These “flags of convenience” are mostly registered to countries that have open registries that don’t require owners to be citizens of the country. Some allow registrations online, requiring only a payment. Panama, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Hong Kong, and Singapore are the top flag of convenience states, accounting for 77 percent of all vessels registered under flags of convenience. 

Under Panamanian-flagged ships, Iran has smuggled sanctioned oil. North Korea has used flags of convenience vessels to smuggle heroin to fund their military operations, while Russia and Venezuela also use flags of convenience for their vessels to deliver up to 2 million barrels of oil daily to China. 

Ships flying flags of convenience are easy targets for smuggler operations. Since most of the countries with open registries have little or no naval security forces to protect their own, their ships are vulnerable. Hostile nations can seize control of ships and crew members to be used in hostage negotiations. Just this summer, the U.S. Navy stopped Iranian vessels from seizing two oil tankers, one Marshall Islands-flagged ship and another flying the Bahamian flag. 

The Iranian military has repeatedly seized ships as retaliation for the U.S. sanctions enforcement against their country. In the last two years, Iran has taken control of five ships in international waters. In April, Iran took control of an oil tanker traveling to the United States flagged under the Marshall Islands and is still holding it in port. Iran’s ability to seize energy supplies and disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz can be used to threaten oil supplies and shipments to both the United States and allied nations. 

Most flags of convenience states have registries that are privately managed or poorly maintained. Countries with weak economies are incentivized to offer lax registration requirements. The Marshall Islands, one of the worst offenders, is currently renegotiating the Compact of Free Association (COFA), which provides the island nation with financial assistance. U.S. negotiators should prioritize mandating that the Marshall Islands clean up its shipping registry in exchange for more generous aid packages. This would be a win-win, ensuring strict enforcement of U.S. sanctions and granting the Marshall Islands stronger economic aid.  

America’s multimillion-dollar aid to Liberia should be similarly contingent upon a crackdown on its ship registry. For wealthier countries like Panama, the United States should expand penalties for sanctions-dodging.

The United States should not wait for the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Secretary-General to improve its sanctions regime. The UN’s IMO elected Panamanian Arsenio Antonio Dominguez Velasco as its next Secretary-General in July. As long as countries like Panama, the Marshall Islands, Liberia, and, more recently, landlocked Mongolia maintain corrupt shipping registries, regimes like Iran will continue to evade sanctions and pursue their interests. 

To defend U.S. sanctions, policymakers should target the flag of convenience states. With the $6 billion in unfrozen assets now aiding Iran’s sanction-dodging efforts, time is of the essence. 

Roy Mathews is a Writer for Young Voices. He is a graduate of Bates College and a 2023 Publius Fellow at The Claremont Institute. He has been published in the Wall Street Journal, National Review, and Law & Liberty. You can follow him on Twitter here.

Image: Shutterstock.

The limits—and hidden strengths—of Washington’s new partnership.

What America can offer a country stuck between China and Russia.

Moscow is bringing Washington’s enemies together.

Switching out Nairobi’s foreign minister will grant President William Ruto greater power over international affairs.

Kim Jong Un has made it clear in everything he has said and done that he has no intention of getting rid of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability – the “treasured sword” that he regards as essential to the survival of his regime. He states repeatedly that the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons is irreversible and non-negotiable. Its permanence is even written into North Korean law.

Why North Korea Wants Nuclear Weapons

For Kim Jong Un, nuclear weapons are a vital asset. North Korea’s initial motivation for seeking nuclear weapons may have been defensive – to deter foreign (mainly U.S.) interference or attack. This motive persists, as North Korean leaders remain deeply suspicious of U.S. intentions toward the DPRK.

But whatever the North’s initial motivation, Kim Jong Un may feel emboldened by his expanding nuclear and missile capabilities to pursue more offensive goals, including intimidating South Korea, undermining the U.S.-ROK alliance, and engaging in increasingly aggressive provocations. Kim won’t want to give up the nuclear arsenal that supports either these defensive or offensive objectives.

There are other reasons why North Korea won’t part with its nuclear weapons. They have been a source, one of the only sources, of legitimacy and pride for the regime and have been used to justify the sacrifices of the North Korean people. They are one of the few reasons the world pays any attention to North Korea, and they provide leverage for Pyongyang with other countries. And not least, they have helped secure the loyalty and support of key domestic constituencies, including the military and nuclear establishments, for Kim family rule.

If North Korea were ever to give up its nuclear weapons, it would be the result of either a fundamental transformation of the policies and values of the current regime or the collapse of that regime. Neither outcome can be dismissed altogether, especially the eventual collapse of the regime.

But we can’t count on either one, at least not in the near term. Realistically, we will have to live with North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.

But that doesn’t mean the United States and its allies should accept North Korea as a permanent and legitimate nuclear-armed state. It acquired nuclear weapons illegally and deceitfully. Accepting the DPRK’s nuclear capability would set a dangerous precedent damaging to the global nonproliferation regime.

What America and Its Allies Must Do

So, the United States and its allies should continue to adhere to the ultimate goal of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, however remote that goal may be.

But at the same time, it should be prepared to engage with North Korea on more modest, near-term steps that can limit the North Korean threat, and especially reduce the risk of intentional or inadvertent armed conflict that could escalate to the nuclear level.

Robert Einhorn is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. From 2009 to 2013, he was Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for Nonproliferation and Arms Control and a member of the U.S. negotiating team for the Iran nuclear negotiations.

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

As these words are written, North Korea has halted the operation of the five-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. This move is most likely intended to extract plutonium for weapons-grade enrichment and provide fissile material for more nuclear weapons. Late in September, North Korea amended its constitution to enshrine the goal of accelerating the production of nuclear weapons. Its focus remains on building up a significant force of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. These, it claims, are meant for deterrence. Nevertheless, Pyongyang could easily employ them for compellence and coercion.

Pyongyang continues a series of missile tests for weapons suitable to deliver nuclear warheads against South Korea, Japan, and United States military forces in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as against the continental United States itself. It has also unveiled a new conventionally powered but nuclear-armed submarine designed to give it a basic second-strike capability.

The Biden Administration isn’t really engaged with Pyongyang, even indirectly, in discussions on achieving the goal of comprehensive and verifiable nuclear disarmament of North Korea. If Donald Trump regains the White House after the 2024 Presidential election, it is unlikely that he will make meaningful progress toward that goal. Moreover, there will be no restoration of personal summit diplomacy, especially after the failure of the 2019 Hanoi summit.

Finally, lingering concerns remain that Pyongyang could conduct a nuclear weapons test, mainly to perfect the design of tactical nuclear weapons. If Russia follows through with its implied threat to withdraw from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and then tests a warhead, expect a North Korean test to follow soon after.

So what does this mean for North Korea’s future operational nuclear posture, and what are the implications for regional nuclear stability? Indeed, the nuclear dynamics will likely grow more dangerous and complex.

Of particular concern must be Pyongyang’s focus on tactical nuclear weapons designed for battlefield use on the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang must recognize the growing qualitative conventional imbalance with the ROK and seek to rely on tactical nuclear weapons to counter the conventional military superiority of South Korean forces. But it’s also conceivable that Pyongyang could choose to use the threat of tactical nuclear weapons coercively in a crisis—much as Russia has done regarding NATO during the war in Ukraine while relying on its strategic nuclear forces to deter American retaliation.

Such a scenario would likely prompt South Korea to look at its own nuclear weapons option, with President Yoon having already hinted that a South Korean independent nuclear weapons capability has been considered. Yet, in a crisis, Seoul is unlikely to have time to build a bomb. The concern in Seoul now must be that a change of administration in Washington could raise uncertainty about American extended nuclear deterrence security guarantees to both Seoul and Tokyo. Pyongyang, perhaps backed by Russia, might exploit such a scenario to challenge U.S. strategic influence in northeast Asia and coerce Seoul.

In a future scenario of weaker U.S. extended nuclear deterrence security guarantees, South Korea would likely need to move quickly to get nuclear weapons to avoid becoming vulnerable to nuclear coercion from North Korea. This would need to be followed by a similar Japanese move.

From Beijing’s perspective, such a nuclear future would complicate its strategic outlook immeasurably. Still, it would also emphasize a need for Beijing to move more rapidly and preemptively in its own nuclear modernization and expansion efforts to encompass a greater emphasis on sub-strategic and even tactical nuclear weapons as part of a move away from the traditional “no first use” and “minimum deterrent” force posture of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force.

Dr. Malcolm Davis is a Senior Analyst in Defence Strategy and Capability at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. His main research focus is on defense strategy and capability development, military technology, and the future of warfare. He tweets at @Dr_M_Davis.

Image: Shutterstock.

John Maynard Keynes famously wrote, “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?”

Now that the economic facts are rapidly changing for the worse, the Federal Reserve would do well to heed Keynes’s observation. Maybe then it would back down quickly from its current mantra that interest rates need to stay high for longer to bring down inflation. If, despite these new facts, the Fed persists with its hawkish monetary policy stance, we should brace ourselves for a hard economic landing.

Among the more disturbing new facts is the sudden loss of investor appetite, both at home and abroad, for long-term U.S. Treasury bonds. Investors are becoming increasingly concerned that the budget deficit is heading towards 8 percent of GDP at a time when the country is close to full employment. 

They are also concerned that given the political dysfunction in Washington, there is little prospect that this budget deficit will be reduced anytime soon.

The question investors are asking is: who will fund the government’s long-term borrowing needs and at what price? This question becomes all the more poignant at a time when the Fed continues to reduce the size of its balance by $95 billion a month by not rolling over maturing Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities.

It also becomes poignant at a time when we know that both China and Japan are reducing the size of their Treasury bond holdings.

The net upshot of this change in investor sentiment is that in the short space of two months, the all-important Treasury bond yield, on which many other interest rates are benchmarked both at home and abroad, has shot up from less than 4 percent to around 4.75 percent or their highest rate in sixteen years. This spike has already caused thirty-year mortgage rates to jump to close to 8 percent, making housing all the more unaffordable to the average American household. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. housing market and the auto market can withstand such high interest rates. 

Another major change in facts that the Fed will do well to heed is the cracks that are now appearing in the banking system. Already at the start of the year, we had the second and third largest bank failures in U.S. history when Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic Bank failed. These two banks failed mainly because of the damage that higher interest rates inflicted on their long-term bond and credit portfolios. With long-term interest rates now spiking even higher, the banking system is bound to take another big hit to its balance sheet from falling bond prices.

It also hardly helps that it is now all too apparent that we will have a wave of real commercial estate loan failures next year. That is when property developers will have to roll over $500 billion in loans at markedly higher interest rates at the very time that they are suffering from unusually high vacancy rates in a post-Covid world. This could constitute a significant blow to the regional banks, whose exposure to commercial property lending is close to 20 percent.

When he was Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan observed that no country is an island to itself in today’s highly integrated world economy. This is why the Fed would do well to pay heed to the rapid deterioration in the world economic outlook. China, the world’s second-largest economy, is now experiencing the slowest economic growth in decades in the wake of the bursting of its outsized housing and credit market bubble.

Meanwhile, Germany has already experienced three consecutive quarters of negative economic growth as it struggles with the combined impact of a Russian-induced energy shock and the slowing of the Chinese economy. With the European Central Bank raising interest rates at a time of economic weakness, it must only be a matter of time before the rest of the European economy succumbs to recession.

All of this would suggest that in setting interest rate policy, the Fed should be forward-looking and consider the major negative shocks at home and abroad with which the U.S. economy will have to grapple. Unfortunately, in clinging to its backward-looking, data-dependent policy, the Fed shows no sign of changing policy course anytime soon. By so doing, the Fed risks setting us up for a harder economic landing than would be needed to contain inflation.

American Enterprise Institute senior fellow Desmond Lachman was a deputy director in the International Monetary Fund’s Policy Development and Review Department and the chief emerging-market economic strategist at Salomon Smith Barney.

Image Credit: Reuters. 

Last week, a user on the War Thunder gaming forum named BarteG98PL posted a complete technical manual for the AH-64D Apache Longbow – a modernized iteration of the long-serving helicopter gunship that entered service in 1997 and continues to fly for the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and several other nations. Based on our research, this could be as high as the 30th time a document of this sort has found its way into War Thunder’s forums.

With yet another batch of restricted documents now apparently leaked on forums associated with this popular game, these breaches of security have gone from semi-comedic novelty to what sure seems like a legitimate threat to the national security of more than one nation… But are they really?

In this era of internet trends collecting steam as they roll down the hill of online hyperbole, it can be difficult to assess just how grievous these breaches truly are, let alone how or why these leaks keep happening. But based on our findings, the ever-growing tale of War Thunder leaks seems to be less of a story about secrets being revealed by gamers, and more like media outlets and social media users really liking the idea of secrets being revealed by gamers.

WHAT IS WAR THUNDER ANYWAY?

War Thunder touts itself as “the most comprehensive free-to-play, cross-platform, MMO military game” available on various computer operating systems and console platforms. That modern acronym, MMO, stands for Massively Multiplayer Online, which denotes the ability to play in a single server shared with a large number of other real players.

The game advertises the player’s ability to control a wide variety of very real military platforms, ranging from aircraft to armored vehicles, to various warships and more. And it’s that ability to simulate combined-arms combat, along with its apparent dedication to realism, that has inspired a loyal fanbase since its initial beta release in 2012, followed by a mobile version of the game released for smartphone users just this year.

“The game is great for a combination of realism for some players, and arcade for others,” explains U.S. Army Sergeant First Class Ethan Long. Long is a Patriot Fire Control Operator and Maintainer by day, and a popular TikTok and YouTube content creator who goes by the name Habitual Line Crosser by night.

War Thunder‘s ability to pit vast numbers of real people against one another in highly realistic combined-arms battles, as well as the ability to play the game for free, has cultivated a massive player community. According to the gaming statistics site ActivePlayer.io, War Thunder sees a jaw-dropping 500,00 to 700,000 players each day. But War Thunder‘s online presence extends far beyond the confines of the game itself, with countless digital communities devoted to game-related discussions found throughout the world’s digital common areas like Steam, Reddit, and, of course, War Thunder’s official forum.

At the time of writing this piece, the official forum on Warthunder.com has a stated 31,885 users, and the War Thunder subreddit has more than 391,000. And despite writing this at 11 AM on a Wednesday morning, Steam not only shows more than 100,000 discussion threads related to War Thunder, but a mind-boggling 82,667 users currently playing the game through its platform and 3,000 more in the game’s group chat.

War Thunder users on Steam as of 9/29/23 at 11:07 AM EST

It’s safe to say that, while the MMO aspect of this game may scare off some old-timers like me, War Thunder has a massive following that includes many military technology enthusiasts and even many who are currently serving or have served in military forces around the world. But while its realism serves as a big part of War Thunder‘s international allure, it can also become the subject of some seriously heated debates within the game’s various online communities.

WHY DO LEAKS KEEP HAPPENING ON WAR THUNDER FORUMS?

War Thunder

For most players like Long, War Thunder’s realism adds to the fun of the game.

“The realism and simulation modes take [War Thunder] to the next level,” Long tells us. Aside from managing his growing media empire and serving on active duty, Long is also an avid gamer. “Level of penetration, weapons range, angle of the target, location of ammo storage… All of these things are taken into account.”

Long says that players who study real military systems often excel during gameplay, but for a handful of obsessive players, any departure from that realism can quickly become a sore spot… or even, an obsession. Debates about system capabilities are commonplace in the War Thunder forums, and sometimes, these debates lead to players posting restricted documents as proof that they’re right.

As far as we’ve been able to ascertain, there have been between 11 and 30 leaks of restricted documents in War Thunder forums so far (depending on how you count them), with the earliest dating back to July of 2021 and the most recent occurring just a few days ago. The problem has become so prominent that the War Thunder Wikipedia page has an entire section devoted to these leaks, though, to date, only 11 of the leaks we’ve identified are listed within it.

Of course, not all of the leaks that we could confirm to date came as a result of digital mudslinging. Some of these leaks came from motivated players who wanted to see their favorite platforms hurried into the game. They hoped that by providing very real technical data to the programmers at Hungarian-based Gaijin Entertainment – the developers behind War Thunder – they could expedite the process of getting them fielded on the virtual battlefield.

Gaijin, it is worth noting, may be headquartered in Budapest, Hungary these days, but it was actually founded in Moscow in 2002 by twin brothers Anton and Kirill Yudintsev. In 2012, the firm expanded into Germany and has since opened additional offices in Latvia, Cyprus, Armenia, and the United Arab Emirates. More than one gamer has accused War Thunder of embellishing the capabilities of Russian military hardware to give them an advantage, though these claims are hotly disputed by others within the player community.

The company was accused of providing indirect financial support to Russian-backed separatists in Eastern Ukraine in January of 2021 after logos for War Thunder and another popular Gaijin game, Crossout, were seen in a video tied to these groups. The company denied any involvement in the video in a statement released soon thereafter.

“We do not provide political support to anyone anywhere. We know nothing about politics and prefer to stay out of it. Our agency that ordered an ad in the video in question took it down when they realized they might drag us into a political discussion. We have nothing more to comment regarding this, we prefer to talk about games and games only,” reads the Gaijin statement.

So, with all that context out of the way, let’s run through each of the leaks to date, the systems or platforms that were compromised, and the severity of the breach in security to see if we can’t assess if the War Thunder community poses a serious threat to national security… or if it’s just prime headline and meme-fodder in a world full of sensational takes.

I want to make sure to credit Steam user VoidVexy, as his list of leaks in Steam’s War Thunder guide was the most extensive I could find in my research.

ALL OF THE WAR THUNDER LEAKS SO FAR (AND HOW SERIOUS EACH WAS)

UHT-665 Eurocopter Tiger

Date of Leak: Possibly 7/16/2021

System’s Nation of Origin: France/Germany

What was leaked: According to media sources, the armor layout of the Eurocopter Tiger. This leak is particularly difficult to nail down, as the post has been deleted and different media sources claim the leak occurred in July of 2021, while other sources claim it occurred in late 2022.

Severity: Because this rotorcraft has been in service across multiple nations over the span of two decades, it’s unlikely that adversary nations do not have any reference material regarding its armor layout, but without more information regarding exactly what was leaked, assessing its strategic value is difficult.

Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank

Date of Leak: 7/17/2021

System’s Nation of Origin: U.K.

What was leaked: A player who self-identified as a Challenger 2 Tank commander in the UK military posted excerpts from the tank’s AESP (Army Equipment Support Publication) to prove that the game developer didn’t “model” the Challenger 2 properly in the game. The AESP is, for lack of a better term, a user manual of sorts, which outlines things like maintenance and repair operations for operators.

The player claimed to be a Challenger 2 tank commander out of the Tidworth garrison in Wiltshire, which is the home of a Challenger 2 regiment. He also claimed to be a former member of the UK’s Armoured Trials and Development Unit and a qualified instructor in armored fighting vehicles and tank gunnery among other things.

The user wrote:

“Linking those screenshots with the following edited image from the AESP’s which is meant to show the relationship of the various components. The image isn’t exactly to scale as its only meant to show the position of components relative to each other but it works for the point I’m trying to make here. The trunnion’s sit centrally of the rotor. The trunnions support the rotor in the turret structure and the GCE sub components as previously stated are all mounted to the rotor.”

According to multiple sources, the documents had the words, “UK RESTRICTED” crossed out, with an “unclassified” stamp over them, and did have some portions covered over.

According to a forum moderator, they received written confirmation that the images posted remained classified at the time. They posted the following response:

Severity: While certainly restricted, the document leaked was, in effect, the Challenger 2’s user manual, which is fairly widely distributed to all Challenger 2 crewmen and maintainers both within and beyond the UK’s borders. As such, it’s somewhat unlikely that this leak provided adversary powers with information they were not already able to gain access to during the quarter-century this tank has been in service.

LeClerk Main Battle Tank

Date of Leak: 10/6/2021

System’s Nation of Origin: France

What was leaked: During a debate about the turret rotation speed of the LeClerk main battle tank, one user – who claimed to be a LeClerk crewman in the French Army – resorted to posting portions of the tank gunner’s manual along with some details about the speed in which the turret in the LeClerk Series 2 tank they served in could rotate.

After the user’s claims were not taken at face value during the debate:

The same user then returned to post portions of the platform’s gunnery manual in an attempt to prove that they were correct.

Within a few hours, the document was taken down and the moderators served up a heap of admonishment for the breach of security.

Severity: Once again, despite the information in this manual being restricted, the manual itself is fairly widely distributed among tank crews and maintainers. As a result, it’s unlikely that adversary nations gained any new insight into the platform or its performance as a result of this leak.

DTC10-125 Armour-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS)

Date of Leak: 6/5/22

System’s Nation of Origin: China

What was leaked: In the first leak to emerge in the War Thunder forums from a non-NATO nation, a debate about the penetration capabilities of the Chinese DTC10-125 tungsten penetrator, a tank-killing round leveraged by a variety of China’s tanks, one user posted an image of the round resting atop what appears to be a previously unreleased technical diagram of the weapon.

Severity: Although the technical diagram shown in the image does not appear to have ever been released to the public, we were able to verify that most of the information visible has been released in various foreign sales brochures and similar documentation (though to be clear, it’s possible that some of this information hadn’t been previously).

Likewise, we found multiple reports that this image had been shared on other websites previously, particularly some within Chinese internet websites, but we were unable to conclusively prove it. However, because we were able to verify much of this information was already publicly available rather quickly, it seems unlikely this leak truly compromised secret details about this weapon.

F-15E Strike Eagle

Date of Leak: 1/18/2023

System’s Nation of Origin: U.S.

What was leaked: In what may be among the largest leaks of restricted documents, a slew of Operational Flight Program (OFP) software manuals for various F-15E Strike Eagle systems were all uploaded at once by an overzealous user. The list included manuals for the AN/APG 70 radar, as well as more specific manuals for the radars operating in air-to-air and air-to-ground modes, among others.

Severity: All of these documents were dated between 1998 and 2000, and to be clear, they’re all from Operational Flight Program Suite 3, which has been subject to a series of updates and replacement efforts in the years since. The Air Force fielded OFP Suite 9.1 in the Strike Eagle in Fall, 2022 – making these documents rather dated. That does not, however, mean there are no commonalities between the dated systems and their more modern iterations.

The documents themselves were declassified, though their distribution is still considered restricted. Nonetheless, because of the age and fairly widespread dissemination of these documents, it’s unlikely they produced any revelations for adversary nations.

F-16A Fighting Falcon

Date of Leak: 1/18/23

System’s Nation of Origin: U.S.

What was leaked: Shortly after the F-16 Fighting Falcon was introduced to the game, one user took to the forums to highlight something about how the F-16A leveraged America’s long-serving radar-guided AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air missile, or AMRAAM, along with documents to support his position.

“Interesting thing I found during my research. During early AMRAAM testing you can see how F-16A would equip the AIM-120 and use TWS on the non-MFD stores control panel “SCP”,” the user wrote.

In this context, TWS stands for “track while scan,” MFD stands for “multi-function display,” and SCP stands for “Stores Control Panel.” The Stores Control Panel has since been replaced by the Multi-Function Display.

Severity: As you might imagine, documentation associated with the F-16A, which is the earliest iteration of the fighter that began production more than 45 years ago, is rather dated – and the documents themselves have been declassified. However, moderators argued that sharing these documents still amounted to a violation of America’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) export manual.

With 25 or so countries operating the F-16 and these documents being both widely distributed and rather dated, it’s unlikely this leak resulted in any actionable intelligence for foreign adversaries.

Shenyang J8-B

Date of Leak: 1/31/23

System’s Nation of Origin: China

What was leaked: Despite entering service in 1980, China’s J8 can be thought of, to some extent, as an enlarged and improved version of China’s previous J7 – itself a licensed copy of the Soviet MiG-21 that’s been flying since the 1950s. The J8-B, however, saw significant reworking, incorporating more modern design elements borrowed from aircraft like the MiG-23 and F-4 Phantom to keep it competitive.

This time, the leak came as a result of a user’s complaint about the game’s depiction of the J8-B’s avionics – specifically, its ballistic computer in the Heads Up Display lacking a Constantly Computed Impact Point (CCIP) to show the pilot where their ordnance would impact.

Along with his argument, the user also posted a file called “Printout for the modification of J-8II, pt. Flight Operations,” said to be “composed by Institute 601, Ministry of Astronautics Industry.”

Severity: Despite being rather dated, the J-8 is actually still in service, transitioning from its original interceptor role to serve as a “scout aircraft” in China’s air force. Because these aircraft have not been sold to foreign operators, it stands to reason that documentation regarding its avionics may be limited, so it is possible this leak resulted in some gained insight into the fighter’s onboard systems, but significant value remains unlikely, particularly since the aircraft’s radar and fire control systems were updated in 2000.

Eurofighter Typhoon DA7

Date of Leak: 8/30/23

System’s Nation of Origin: France/Germany

What was leaked: In a first for War Thunder leaks, this time a restricted document wasn’t uploaded to win an argument, but instead because the user really wanted another aircraft added to the game as a playable platform. To expedite that process, the user uploaded a complete 730-page manual for a specific Typhoon prototype known as Development Aircraft 7 (DA7). The DA7 prototype was built for testing by the Italian Armed Forces.

Severity: Once again, nothing in the document posted was considered “classified,” with seven of its pages marked as “NATO Unclassified” and the rest marked as “NATO Restricted” – denoting that these portions were not meant to be shared outside of NATO member nations.

This specific document has been available online in other places for a few years now, which is likely where the user got his hands on it in the first place. As such, it’s unlikely this leak resulted in any actionable intelligence for adversary nations.

F-117 Nighthawk

Date of Leak: 9/11/23

System’s Nation of Origin: U.S.

What was leaked: According to multiple media sources, one user in the War Thunder forums leaked a series of screenshots taken of the F-117A’s flight manual, allegedly showing engine specifications, sensor locations, and more. Unlike in previous instances, where moderators simply removed the documents uploaded, the entire thread was taken down after the leak was identified.

Severity: Once again, this leak was not of “classified” materials, but rather material that is generally considered to be restricted, despite its availability to the public. In fact, a simple Google search for the F-117’s flight manual produces a number of interesting results that share more information than could be gleaned by these War Thunder leaks.

AH-64D Apache Longbow

Date of Leak: 9/15/23

Nation of Origin: U.S.

What was leaked: The Apache Longbow began production in 1997 and remains in service for a long list of nations including the United States. Once again, a debate between users prompted one to post a link to the helicopter’s technical manual in an effort to prove a point. The post was once again taken down by moderators and the user who uploaded it has been suspended.

Severity: Once more, the document uploaded is considered unclassified, though the documents themselves are said to have been marked “DOD AND DOD CONTRACTORS ONLY.” However, once more, you can easily find this manual in its entirety online with the right search terms, suggesting the intelligence value of this leak was all but moot.

MiG-29 and Su-57

Date of Leaks: 12/22 – 1/23

Systems’ Nation of Origin: Russia

What was leaked: In the first leak out of Russia, debate about the capability of the nation’s 4th and 5th generation fighters ultimately led to the posting of two different documents. One of these leaks highlights the Sukhoi Su-57’s radar cross-section, while the other focuses on the radar system capabilities of the MiG-29.

Severity: Once more, despite the restricted nature of at least one of these documents, the information contained within was hardly groundbreaking. While the thread has been taken down, the document showing the Su-57’s poor stealth performance was likely the Sukhoi patent paperwork that has been making the rounds on the internet for some time. Likewise, the excerpts from the MiG-29 user manual are equally easy to come by. In fact, the entire manual itself is available for download from multiple sources online.

SO, WHAT’S THE REAL STORY WITH THE WAR THUNDER LEAKS?

As is so often the case when stories about military technology reach the mainstream media, the real driver behind media coverage of these “leaks” isn’t their technical value at all, but rather, the public’s general interest in the story as a seemingly endless source of highly meme-able hot takes.

Throughout our research into these War Thunder leaks, we have been unable to identify anything that might provide foreign adversary nations with any truly valuable intelligence. In fact, aside from a few cases where the language barrier may have inhibited our ability to search through foreign websites, we were able to locate alternate sources for these documents all over the web. Often, these alternate sources had been hosting the documents for years, and in many, the documents remain available even after War Thunder moderators nuked the leaks on their forum.

Of course, that isn’t to say that posting these documents in an online forum is a good idea. It, of course, isn’t. But the truth is that national governments devote significant resources to gaining access to legitimately classified documents and designs, scour digital spaces for actionable intelligence, and go to great lengths to manipulate program insiders into revealing the latest breakthroughs in Defense technology.

For these War Thunder leaks to have real value to adversary nations, it would suggest that these nations have access to the War Thunder forums… but not the rest of the internet where these documents remain available.

At the end of the day, the War Thunder leaks story is an exploration into how pop culture shapes media coverage — with a number of outlets bending over backward to infer the severity of these leaks, but few making much of an effort to determine their actual severity at all. In a real way, a great deal of the coverage associated with these leaks could be summed up by the old adage, “Never let the truth get in the way of a good story.“

Of course, as our friend Habitual Line Crosser puts it, serious or not, “the cyber training guy would be very disappointed in War Thunder players.“

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: Jason Wells / Shutterstock.com

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