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The European Defence Agency (EDA) today launched the EDA Defence Innovation Prize rewarding companies and research entities who will propose innovative and ground-breaking technologies, products, processes or services applicable in the defence domain.  The prizes are especially (but not exclusively) aimed at non-traditional defence industries (civil or dual-use producers) and researchers as they play a growing role in inventing and creating the disruptive capabilities that our armed forces will need tomorrow.

There will be two different EDA Defence Innovation Prizes of 10,000 euros each to be awarded for the most innovative ideas addressing the following topics:

• Integration of multi-robot swarming concepts in support of future defence capabilities in the area of Guidance, Navigation and Control (GNC)
• Autonomous detection, identification and monitoring/sampling/analysis through sensor and platform networking in the area of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) protection technologies and techniques

The prize winners are expected to propose innovations which, if implemented between now and 2035, would help improve and enhance Europe’s defence capabilities in the two afore-mentioned domains.
 

A contest open to all types of industries and research entities 

The rules of the contest and the criteria for participation are included in the rules of contest available here. 
No specific defence background is required to participate in the contest which is open to innovators from ALL types of industries and research institutions in Europe: defence & civil/commercial producers, large companies & SMEs, defence-related & civil research communities. Applications from dual-use and civil/commercial innovators and researchers are even particularly encouraged.
 

Deadline for submissions: 16 April 2018

Information on how to apply can be found in the contest documentation under the link above. The deadline for the receipt of applications is 16 April 2018 (5pm Brussels time). 

The prize winners will be notified by the EDA around the end of May. 

An EDA Defence Innovation Prize award ceremony is scheduled to take place in Brussels in June.
 

More information:

• Call for applications
• EDA Defence Innovation Prize webpage

 

31 January was the deadline for victims of Afghan war crimes to share their experiences and opinions with the International Criminal Court (ICC). Based on information so far released by the ICC, the Court has received 345 representations on behalf of more than seven hundred thousand victims. These representations are important as they will factor in to the ICC’s assessment about whether prosecuting war crimes and crimes against humanity that have been committed in Afghanistan over the past 15 years is in the interests of justice. While those submissions may be enough, says AAN’s Ehsan Qaane (with input from Kate Clark), to convince the ICC that launching a full investigation is in the interests of justice, the ICC’s call for victim statements revealed worrying failures in its capacity for outreach and communication in Afghanistan.

Why do victims’ experiences and opinions matter for the ICC?

On 20 November 2017, Fatou Bensouda, the ICC Prosecutor, announced that she had requested the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorise a full investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Afghanistan since May 2003, ie from when the ICC gained jurisdiction in Afghanistan (see AAN’s previous report). Based on the Court’s regulations, victims normally have 30 days to submit their “representations”, ie their “views and concerns” to the Court (see regulation 50 of the ICC Regulations). Referring to the insecurity and the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan, the ICC Victims Participation and Reparation Section, which is responsible for receiving the representations asked for an extension of 42 days. The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber agreed to an extension, but only until 31 January. That deadline was passed last week.

The victims’ representations are important for when the ICC decides if prosecutions are in the interest of justice. So far, the ICC prosecutor has sought to show that crimes meeting the ICC threshold have been committed in Afghanistan and that the Afghan and United States governments have been neither willing nor able to prosecute these crimes (AAN’s report here). For the ICC to move to a full investigation and thereafter prosecution, the Pre-Trial Chamber needs to be convinced not only by the prosecutor’s submission, but also that opening a full investigation would be in the interest of justice (ICC statute, art. 53 and art 15). According to the ICC’s Policy Paper on Victims’ Participation, developed by the Office of the Prosecutor in 2010, the “interests of justice” means the “interests of victims.” Consequently, for the Court, it is not so important how many victims agree with prosecutions, but it would be important if many victims said that they did not want them.

The ICC Registry published a form – in Dari, Pashto, English and Arabic – on which victims’ representations could be submitted. It had 12 questions focusing on identifying victims and the harm they had suffered. The victims were also asked if they agreed or disagreed with an ICC investigation, ie if they believed an ICC prosecution was in the interests of justice or not.

What is known about the victims’ representations?

According to information on the ICC’s website (link now removed), the ICC Registry has submitted six tranches of victims representations to the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber. Five have been posted in redacted form: on 7 and 21 December 2017, 11 January and 2 and 5 February 2018. The ICC has received 345 representation forms in total, on behalf of slightly more than seven hundred thousand victims (715,015). They were in Dari, Pashto, English and Arabic. From all these victims representations, just two families, comprising 20 victims, and 30 other individuals said they did not want an investigation. (1)

The ICC has not released the content of these submissions or the identity of the victims or their representatives; such information might jeopardise their security. However, it said that both individual and collective representations were submitted, including one from an organisation saying it represented “more than five hundred thousand” potential victims of Rome Statute crimes. (2)

Over the past month, a handful of those submitting representations have chosen to speak to the media. They may or may not be typical. They include:

* Mujib Khelwatgar, the chairperson of Nai, Supporting Open Media in Afghanistan, said at a press conference on 22 January 2018 that his organisation had reported to the ICC about the murder of 48 journalists and the injuring, kidnapping and threatening of 142 others by the Islamic State for Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Taleban, including the Haqqani network (see here).

* Fatima, speaking to the BBC, said she had submitted a representation about her mother, a cook at an orphanage in Kabul who was killed in a Taleban suicide bombing in July 2017. The BBC also reported that Ahmad Eshchi, governor of Jawzjan in the 1990s (more about him here) had submitted a representation accusing First Vice-President General Abdul Rashid Dostum, of detaining him in December 2016 and ordering nine bodyguards to torture and sexually assault him. (A court in Kabul sentenced seven of the bodyguards to 8 years in prison in November 2017, but no case has been filed against Dostum in any court.)

* The British legal campaign group Reprieve told AAN that it had submitted representations on behalf of three clients: Pakistani Ahmad Rabbani and Yemeni Khaled Qassim were both detained and allegedly tortured by the CIA in Afghanistan before being rendered to Guantanamo (where they remain) and Pakistani Yunis Rahmatullah who was detained by British forces in Iraq and transferred to the US military, which transferred him to Bagram, Afghanistan, (in breach of an agreement with the UK) where he was then held for a further ten years. Reprieve also submitted a representation concerning US drone strikes in Pakistan, arguing that the US treated both it and Afghanistan as one conflict zone (and therefore it was covered by the ICC investigation) and that the US had illegally killed civilians.

* A man from Helmand (who did not want to be named) told AAN he had sent his representation to the ICC on the day of the deadline, 31 January 2018. He alleged that, in 2004, he had been detained and tortured for nine days by the then provincial governor of Helmand, Sher Muhammad Akhundzada (for his bio see here) and that one year before, the governor’s guards had killed one of his cousins and injured one of his brothers while they attended a peaceful protest against the government’s anti-narcotics policy in Helmand.(3) “Afghan investigators,” he said, “had not even registered my complaint.”

The ICC will need to decide whether the representations submitted are crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction, ie war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes of aggression and that they meet the ICC’s ‘gravity threshold’. (4)

Was the ICC’s communication and outreach sufficient?

Afghans have had more time than most nationalities to submit representations. The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber agreed to double the normal period given to 72 days. However, that is still very short for a country where information about the ICC has been scarce, where there is an ongoing conflict that hampers access to many of the areas where war crimes have occurred, where many people are illiterate, do not have internet or electricity and – for good reasons – have learnt to be careful about the information they share.

The ICC does not have a field office in Afghanistan through which it could have communicated directly with media, victims and other stakeholders. According to its website, its Registry trained some Afghan civil society activists and through them contacted victims. The actions of these individuals appear to have been crucial for enabling many victims to submit forms (see footnote 1). As to other outreach, from the date of the Prosecutor’s announcement to the deadline for the collection of victims’ representations forms, the ICC communicated with Afghan journalists just twice, both times in the form of press releases. On 20 November 2017, the Prosecutor announced her request to open a full investigation into the situation in Afghanistan and on 19 January 2018 emphasised to journalists that the ICC was ready to answer any questions they might have (AAN was also emailed both press releases by the ICC).

Some Afghan and international media, mostly print and online newspapers, did report Bensouda’s November 2017 request for a full investigation and the ICC’s call for victims’ representations (for example, here and here). However, victims who are illiterate and live in remote areas had no access to these reports. For example, the author, attending a training session for war victims in Herat, one of the four largest cities after Kabul, found that none of the 11 victim trainees, who were from Herat, Farah and Ghor provinces, had heard of the ICC or knew of the Prosecutor’s announcement.

Moreover, among most Afghan war victims, it is common to feel that if they take any step against perpetrators, they will not see justice, but also their safety will be jeopardised. In the case of the ICC, victims feared the perpetrators might be able to access the representation forms and bring further harm to them. That fear made outreach by the ICC particularly crucial; it needed to explain to Afghans what the ICC is, what it is doing and, crucially, that it assures confidentiality for victims.

Those trying to help victims have described facing many difficulties in helping victims to make representations, some of them a product of ICC failures to communicate its mission. Aziz Rafiee, for example, the head of Afghanistan Civil Society Forum and a member of the Transitional Justice Coordination Group, whose organisation helped victims in the north of the country to fill out and submit their representations to the ICC, told AAN on 31 January 2018: “Some of the victims did not trust the ICC because they had not heard of it and did not know what it was.”

Difficulties were not just to do with poor communications however; the exceptionally tight time constraint also exacerbated other problems. Homaira Rasuly, chairwoman of an NGO working for women’s rights, Medica Afghanistan, who also works with a group of lawyers, told AAN that her organisation had sent a letter to the ICC on 28 January, requesting an extension of the deadline to 28 February 2018. The ICC replied that this was not possible. Yet, Rasuly argued, women victims are a vulnerable group who were facing additional troubles submitting representations; they often lack access to the internet and cannot go out of their homes without an accompanying male relatives. That means, Rasuly said, “They need support [to make representations] from people like us who can go to their homes. However, in December and January traveling to the remote areas is difficult as the roads are closed by snow.” She told AAN that she understood that few of the victims who had submitted representations to the ICC were women.

What happens next?

The judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber, based on the information provided by the Prosecutor (5) and the victims representations, now have to decide whether to authorise a full investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity in Afghanistan. The Prosecutor had said in November 2016 that there was a “reasonable basis to believe” that the US military, CIA and government forces had committed the war crime of torture and that the Taleban, including the Haqqani network, had committed a range of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population, humanitarian personnel and protected objects; conscripting children and killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary. It also appears that ISKP may be added to those who could be investigated (see footnote 5).

If authorisation for an investigation is given, the Prosecutor will then have to decide which specific individuals the ICC will make cases against. In the period of investigation, victims may also share their representations in more detail and, if asked by the Prosecutor, provide evidence and documents. The investigation would not be limited to those who have recently made representations.

Providing an opportunity to victims to share their views with the ICC in the pre-trail stage should be the first step to engaging victims in the judicial proceedings of the ICC. Early engagement of victims can contribute a sense of ownership of the proceedings to victims. This is particularly important in Afghanistan as the ICC, its rules and its headquarters in The Hague remain unknown for most citizens. Yet, until the ICC Prosecutor sent her request to open an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan to the ICC pre-trail chamber, the ICC had mainly engaged with the Afghan government (AAN’s dispatch on the ICC-Afghanistan communications). The past couple of months’ efforts by the ICC to collect victims’ representations is the first time the Court has sought to engage directly with Afghan media, civil society and public.

The fact that at least 345 representations on behalf of more than seven hundred thousand victims were sent to the Court by the deadline does show that there is an interest in ICC proceedings in Afghanistan – and that Afghans do not want to forget the crimes that have been committed in Afghanistan. Also, the fact that, at least in the submissions we know about, only 50 individuals have said they did not want an investigation should help to convince the Pre-Trial Chamber that an investigation would be in the interests of justice.

At the same time, the ICC’s very limited outreach to media and through civil society organisations to victims does raise concerns about the Court’s understanding of how to work in Afghanistan and what is needed to engage with victims, especially in the conflict-ridden areas of the country. Should the Pre-Trial Chamber decide that the Prosecutor can open a full investigation, the ICC will need to learn from this first exercise and commit many more resources and thought to communication and outreach.

Edited Sari Kouvo and Kate Clark

(1) Five out of the six submissions have been reported:

5 February submission

165 victims representation forms submitted on behalf of 211,925 victims, including 787 families and 26 villages. 114 out of 165 were sent via email and 51 were submitted online. 136 representation forms were collective (language breakdown not given).

One individual representation and nine collective representations, submitted on behalf of a total of 29 individuals, said they did not want an investigation.

2 February submission

138 victim representation forms submitted on behalf of approximately 501,306 victims and 94 families. 64 online and 74 were collected and sent via email, the majority of them by interlocutors that the Victims Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS) had previously met during its information and training sessions. 80 were collective. 34 forms were submitted in English, 45 in Dari, 2 in Pashto and 57 in Dari, together with English translations.

One family of six requested no investigation.

11 January 2018 submission

28 victim representation forms submitted on behalf of approximately 350 victims, seven online and 21 collected and sent via email by civil society representatives. 23 were collective. Three forms were submitted in English, three in Pashto, one in Dari and 21 in Dari or Pashto together with English translations.

One family of 14 requested no investigation.

21 December 2017 submission

Seven victim representation forms were submitted on behalf of 1031 victims, six online and one sent by email. Four were collective. Six were in English and one in Arabic.

All requested investigations

7 December submission

Five victim representation forms submitted online on behalf of a total of 514 victims. Four were collective. Two forms were submitted in English, one in Dari and two in Pashto.

All requested investigations.

(2) As regards the representations, the ICC Registry has noted that the information provided is, as yet, insufficient to give the exact number of victims. However, it does consider it sufficient for a preliminary assessment to find out if those represented are victims according to the definition of victims provided in Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC (see here). After this assessment, the number of ‘victims’ may be fewer.

(3) The Helmandi a former investigator, said he met former Afghan Attorney General, Ishaq Aloko, and submitted his complaint to him. He said Aloko told him that he could not investigate such a powerful man. In December 2017, he met the current attorney general of Afghanistan, Farid Hamidi, who was his former colleague at the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission before he was appointed as the Attorney General, and gave him his complaint letter. Hamidi’s legal advisors told him his case was barred by the statute of limitations based on current Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code (ie no criminal acts can be investigated ten years after they were allegedly committed).

(4) When examining the gravity of crimes, the Prosecutor looks into “the scale, nature, manner of the commission of the crimes, and their impact.” For a better understanding of the gravity threshold the example of the Prosecutor’s decision not to investigate the ‘flotilla case’ is useful. On May 31, 2010, the Israeli Defense Forces intercepted a humanitarian flotilla of eight boats en route to the Gaza Strip. In the course of boarding and taking control of the vessels, the IDF killed ten people and injured approximately fifty. The Prosecutor said it did not pass the gravity threshold.

(5) Another order from the Pre-Trial Chamber, preparatory to its decision whether or not to launch a full investigation, was made on 5 February. It called on the Prosecutor to provide additional supporting materials, noting gaps in the materials already provided with respect to the structure, organization, and conduct of Afghan Forces, the structure and organization of the Islamic State operating in Afghanistan, and the structure, interrogation policies, and conduct of US forces. The material requested from the Office of the Prosecutor was as follows:

1. Any publicly available report from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (“UNAMA”) on the treatment of detainees, apart from the reports from 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017 already submitted;
2. “Any publicly available report from the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (“AIHRC”) on torture, apart from the report from 2012 already submitted;
3. The United Nations (“UN”) Secretary-General reports to the General Assembly on the topic: “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security”, from the years 2003, 2004, 2010, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2017;
4. Any publicly available report from the UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the topic “Children and armed conflict in Afghanistan”, apart from the report from 2008 already submitted;
5. Further clarification and information, to the extent possible, about the structure and organisation of the Islamic State operating in Afghanistan; and
6. Further clarification and information, to the extent possible, about the structure of the US forces for the time period after 2008; for the interrogation policies of the US forces for the time period after 2006; as well as for the conduct of the US forces for the time period after 2011.

There are tight deadlines for this: the Pre-Trial Chamber wants information about points 1-4 submitted by 9 February ad that for points 5 and 6 by 12 February.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hanyang CQ260 General Utility Truck

Swiss Saurer 10DM Heavy Utility Truck

Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA), met with Johann-Dietrich Wörner, Director General of the European Space Agency (ESA) on 2 February. 

At the bilateral meeting, Chief Executive Domecq and Director General Wörner discussed ongoing and future cooperation between the two Agencies. The EDA and ESA signed an Administrative Arrangement in June 2011 with the aim of providing  a structured relationship and ensuring mutually beneficial cooperation through coordination of their respective activities. This cooperation fosters coordinated research, technology and demonstration activities and facilitates the realisation of  synergies between existing EDA and ESA programmes and their future evolution. The Administrative Arrangement has led to the agreement of a number of  Implementing Arrangements on a variety of topics.

Between December 2017 and January 2018, three Implementing Arrangements were signed:

• Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS): A joint study will assess the technical and business viability of potential services based on space and UMS that could support a variety of operational activities such as the protection of critical maritime infrastructure or maritime surveillance and explore the combination of UMS and space technologies in terms of service provision as compared to other existing technologies.
• GOVSATCOM: The EDA and ESA aim to maximise synergies between their respective activities in the field of Governmental Satellite Communications (GOVSATCOM) and support the European Commission in its efforts for preparing an EU GOVSATCOM initiative. EDA activities focus on operational aspects and on the acquisition and implementation environment of GOVSATCOM via its GOVSATCOM Pooling & Sharing Demonstration Project.
• Earth Observation: A joint study will elaborate mission concepts and a roadmap of technologies needed for future security Earth observation missions.

Between 20 and 29 January 2018, there were five high profile attacks in major cities and districts in Afghanistan. The three by far largest ones happened in the capital Kabul. This feeds into a month-long period of such attacks that began in late December 2017. Altogether, almost 250 people, most of them civilians, were killed in these attacks. Three of them (and half of the attacks countrywide) have been claimed by the Islamic State and two by the Taleban, but with the changing dynamics of the Afghan conflict is it becoming increasingly difficult to trust the claims of responsibility or to attribute responsibility. AAN’s Thomas Ruttig – with input from the AAN team – tries to make sense of the attacks and what they mean for the continued conflict and politics in Afghanistan.

1. What happened and who claimed responsibility? 

The current wave of attacks represents a new peak of the urban terrorist campaign carried out by the Taleban and by local IS-affiliated groups. Since 28 December 2017, there have been eight attacks in three major cities, Kabul, Jalalabad and Kandahar.

The list of the attacks in major urban areas:

• On 28 December 41, mainly young, Shia civilians were killed by a suicide bomber among the audience at a Shia education centre Tote in West Kabul. The attack was claimed by the local branch of the Islamic State (IS), its ‘Khorasan province’ (ISKP), through an IS centre-related news channel.
• On 31 December, 18 people were killed by a bombing at a politician’s funeral in Jalalabad. There were conflicting reports as to whether a suicide bomber or a motorcycle bomb caused the explosion. The Taleban denied their involvement, an ISKP claim was reported.
• On 4 January, 11 people, mostly police personnel, were killed by a suicide bomber during a protest involving shopkeepers in eastern Kabul, Jalalabad Road. ISKP claimed responsibility (see here.)
• On 20 January, 40 people were killed by armed gunmen who stormed Kabul Continental Hotel. Those killed included mainly government IT specialists, crew members of a private Afghan airline and other Afghan and international hotel guests. This is the only attack where all the victims were not Afghan. 15 of those who died and several of those injured were foreigners. The Taleban claimed responsibility.
• On 23 January, five people were killed when armed attackers stormed the Save The Children office in Jalalabad. The attack was claimed by ISKP.
• On 27 January, four people – two police and two civilians – were killed during a suicide attack in Kandahar City, near the Aino Mena housing scheme, when a suicide bomber struck a police vehicle. The Taleban claimed the attack.
• On 27 January, 103 people were killed when a car bomb exploded in Kabul’s Sedarat Square. This attack was claimed by the Taleban.
• On 29 January, 11 soldiers were killed when gunmen stormed a base of the Afghan National Army’s 111th division in Kabul. Again, ISKP claimed responsibility for it.

High-profile attacks in urban areas tend to overshadow ongoing fighting in provinces. However, there has also been simultaneous fighting in a number of provinces outside Kabul over this period. On the days of the biggest attacks alone, 20 and 27 January, media and other reports registered fighting and other security incidents in seven other provinces.

ISKP claimed four attacks, the Taleban claimed and denied their involvement in one. However, it is increasingly difficult to assess the claims and to attribute responsibility. There are indications that the diverse pro-IS groups are claiming attacks that have not been carried out by them. There are also indications that the Taleban are denying their involvement in attacks when there are particularly high numbers of civilian casualties. (The Taleban’s notion of civilians is discussed below). For example, the Taleban denied their involvement in the 31 December attack in Jalalabad that killed 18 people. According to Al-Jazeera ISKP claimed responsibility for it.

For the Taleban, or the semi-autonomous Haqqani network, it might be convenient that the IS claims attacks that have resulted in considerable loss of civilian lives.

In Kabul, there also might be an infrastructure, logistics and possible personnel (‘terrorists to hire’) that can be utilised by the Haqqani network or other Taleban groups, splinter groups now sailing under an IS banner, and violent Pakistani sectarian (anti-Shia) groups.

2. What accounts for this peak in attacks? What are possible motives?

This is not the first peak of attacks over recent years. There have been an earlier series of and extremely fatal single attacks, such as the April 2016 truck bomb claimed by the Taleban (AAN report here) and the one on 31 May 2017 near the German embassy when some 150 people were killed. This latter attack was not claimed by any group, and the Taleban denied their involvement. On 7 August 2015, three attacks happened on one day in Kabul, including another truck bomb – again denied by the Taleban and not claimed by any group – which killed some 50 people killed and wounded several hundred (media report here). The period between 16 and 21 October 2017 saw a series of countrywide, mainly Taleban, attacks on districts centres and government forces installations, with one IS-claimed suicide attack against a Shia mosque in Kabul (AAN analysis here).

The July 2016 suicide bomb attack against a peaceful demonstration of mainly Hazaras (media report here) and the September 2016 attack on the American University in Kabul – again not claimed by any group – indicated that ‘soft targets’ were being attacked more frequently (AAN analysis here).

At least five factors have contributed to the current peak:

1. All parties to the conflict have been stepping up their campaigns. The Taleban have done so various times, during the US surge from 2009 to 2012, and again since 2014, when most of Western combat troops withdrew. Although the Taleban gained some more territory in 2017 (for more detail, see here), they lacked the spectacular success of catching a provincial centre, such as Kunduz in 2015. Afghan government troops are carrying out its own anti-insurgent operations (see statement here), but were unable to gain the initiative so far. They have had difficulties in holding the territory from which insurgents were expelled. The US are sending in more troops and are increasing airstrikes to roll back Taleban gains and turn the general trend.
2. The next phase in the Kabul Process, an ongoing initiative to mobilise, particularly regional, countries to support a peace process for Afghanistan, is set to take place in late February. So far, this process has excluded the Taleban. As a result, the Taleban feel marginalised and as though they are not treated as an actor in their own right. Therefore, they are applying pressure to be included in talks and may, therefore, want to disrupt initiatives unless this happens.
3. Terrorist attacks in urban centres do not directly change the balance of power on the battlefield, but do have propaganda impacts. Both groups want to send a signal to the Afghan population and government that they are capable of carrying out such attacks, even in the highly secured capital. There also seems to be an element of competition between the Taleban and IS, with IS being a relatively new player on the Afghan conflict scene and a competitor for funding and local support. Both groups need to show off their military capabilities to donors.
4. Pakistan continues to support the Taleban as a card in its regional power game; although it denies this vehemently. It is clear that at least parts of their leadership structure are there and that Pakistani authorities are aware of their whereabouts. This is reflected by periodical arrests and releases of Taleban-related individuals. They are also not prevented to gather and publicly raise funds. Often when there is talk about attempts to open the door for peace talks there is an upsurge of highly visible terrorist attacks. This discredits the Taleban as a reasonable partner in such talks in the eyes of the population. However, negotiations are on the table as one option for ending the war, also on the Taleban side. The Taleban’s Qatar office has been established and authorised to explore this option.
5. The Taleban might also try to capitalise on the on-going government crisis and its new peak in the wake of the dismissal of Balkh governor Atta by President Ghani. They might hope to further undermine the government at a moment when it is dealing with considerable internal power struggles.

3. What are the targets and who the victims of the attacks?

An estimated 232 people have been killed in the eight attacks since 28 December 2017. Although members of the security forces and private security guards (in the Kabul hotel attack) were among the victims in all attacks, most of them were civilians, according to preliminary media information. This was the case in the Kabul education centre bombing, the Jalalabad funeral bombing (even if police were also there), the Kabul hotel attack (see above) and the ‘ambulance’ bomb in Kabul, as well as the attack on Save The Children (four of the organisation’s staff and one policeman dead). Also see this video of the 27 January explosion’s impact inside Jumhuriat Hospital as shared on social media.

The Taleban have denied official figures and insist that, for example, most of the ‘ambulance bomb’ victims were police. This followed repeated declarations that they do not target ‘civilians’. In their 28 January 2018 statement (here, in Dari here) they claim most casualties were “officers and workers (mansubin wa karkonan) … inside the old Ministry of Interior building.” Kabul daily Etilaat Roz also quoted eyewitnesses that three cobblers and two street children were amongst those killed.

The reason for this discrepancy is that the Taleban definition of civilian does not correspond with that of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The Taleban allow, for example, attacks, not only on military targets, but also on civilian government installations and those of what they call “invaders.” It is also clear that the use of an emergency van rigged with explosives as a car bomb, as on 27 January in Kabul, contradicts the international humanitarian law. In their already quoted statement, the Taleban justified their recent attacks as a reply to the US strategy:

If you want to play power politics and talk through the barrel of the gun, then do not expect roses from the Afghans either and await such replies.

 UNAMA’s most recent reports show that the number of Afghan civilian casualties has also risen again as a result of US and Afghan airstrikes. Even excluding those that are awaiting investigation results, these attacks could amount to war crimes, and there is no justification for any party to commit such acts.

The IS acts more indiscriminately. It also attacks government and allied installations, particularly the Shia community, arguing that members of that community are involved in fighting the IS in the Middle East. After the 28 December Kabul attack, it issued a statement that the attacked facility was a “recruitment centre” for the Afghan (mainly Hazara) Fatemiyun militias fighting in Syria for the Assad regime, posted by Afghan IS watcher Mussa Imran (here; see also AAN analysis here); for the Fatemiyun, see AAN reporting here and here). In areas under ISKP control, it suppresses everyone who is in disagreement with it. There have been numerous executions of tribal elders, videos of which have been repeatedly posted online.

4 . What does the past month’s violence say about the security situation in Kabul and the conflict in Afghanistan?

As noted above, this peak of attacks does not – yet – constitute a major shift in the conflict or the modus operandi of the Taleban. However, every new attack adds new victims to the war and every new battle, especially in the provinces, causes more people to flee their homes. This contributes to the feeling of a worsening security situation and the feeling that the government and its security organs are incapable of stopping terror attacks. UNAMA has shown in its most recent civilian casualty reports that in 2016 and 2017 Kabul has experienced a rising number of attacks and casualties resulting from them. Also the UN’s downgrading of Afghanistan in its mission review from post- to in-conflict country reflects the general deterioration of security in the entire country.

Parts of the political opposition are trying to capitalise on the growing fear and rage over the carnage. They criticise the government for its alleged failure to protect the population from the attacks, with some groups demanding its resignation. This is similar to the events during the June 2017 protests that had also been partly caused by an IS-claimed bombing (see AAN analysis here). Protests demonstrations have been announced again. In fact, key government critics have been in governmental positions themselves, some until recently, when similar attacks (see above) happened. Experience shows that governments, even in much more stable countries, from Indonesia to France, have not proven themselves able to prevent terrorist attacks.

5. What does this mean for the prospects of peace (talks)?

The Taleban’s recent wave of highly fatal attacks, causing many civilian casualties, has not made the idea of a negotiated end to the war through talks with them more popular. The US president now has also ruled that out in a reaction to the attacks. The IS seems to be out of bounds for any negotiations anyway.

So, the dilemma remains: Can there be a military solution to Afghanistan’s many problems? Many observers agree there cannot, looking at the failed attempt during the 2009-12 US troop surge that both failed to defeat or force the Taleban to the negotiating table, with up to 140,000 foreign and some 300,000 government troops and police. However, many in the Afghan political class and the wider population seem to entertain the hope that a military solution could be achieved. This is shown by a number of reactions on social media, including from well-known Afghan politicians, to president Trump’s hardened stance toward Pakistan and his latest rejection of talks with the Taleban show. A local shura in Logar province reportedly awarded a bravery medal to him for his stance on Pakistan.

Given the current, much lower, number of foreign troops – around 15,000 now – with only elite parts of the Afghan forces with improved fighting skills, this remains doubtful. The entire Afghan force will still take years to be able to take over full security responsibility in practice. Also, the current US strategy has been presented so far as an attempt to prevent a Taleban take-over (AAN analysis here), which would require subsequent talks. The American ambiguity stands in the way of developing a clear-cut strategy to end the conflict.

As we have written recently, 2017 was a lost year for peace talks and the outlook for 2018 remains bleak on this, as the Afghan parties, and now the US, build new hurdles for a political resolution, being determined to escalate the war at the same time. Under these circumstances, the choice for Afghans – civilians, government and insurgents – is between talks with an opposite party they despise, or years of continued bloodshed.

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The European Defence Agency (EDA) held a workshop on capability development trends in Maritime Surveillance on 1 February as part of a more structured dialogue between Member States and industry.

More than 50 representatives from Member States, industry and other institutions shared information on capability development for Maritime Surveillance. Based on a call for papers issued in October 2017, nine industries were selected to present their views in three panels dedicated to mid-term, long-term and industry & market perspectives on maritime surveillance.

The workshop is part of the EDA’s approach towards establishing a structured dialogue and enhanced engagement with industry, based on a set of priority actions derived through the Capability Development Plan (CDP) and the recent Maritime Research Agenda contributing to the implementation of the European Maritime Security Strategy. The aim of the process is to enrich the CDP long-term views with inputs on the industrial and technological outlook for specific capability areas.

This was the second workshop in this format, following the one addressing Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) which was held on 12 September 2017.  Feedback received on these two workshops will be taken into account in envisaging additional workshops with industry participation in the second semester, once the EU capability development priorities resulting from the on-going CDP revision will have been agreed by Member States. 

 

More information:

• Capability Development Plan
  
  
  

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As this dispatch was finalised, the Pakistan government had not made any last-minute extension to the ‘Proof of Registration’ identity cards for Afghan refugees residing in the country. Those cards were due to run out on 31 January 2018. Without an extension, a huge number of people could be forced to go back to Afghanistan in the middle of winter and to a volatile security situation. Pakistan has been a generous host to Afghan refugees for almost four decades, but in the last couple of years, it has displayed increasing inhospitably towards them. In 2016, it pushed out over a half a million Afghan refugees to Afghanistan, and as AAN’s Jelena Bjelica and Ali Mohammad Sabawoon report, there are now fears of a repeat of that forced exodus.

Late on Wednesday, 31 January 2018, the Pakistan cabinet approved a 60-day extension in the Proof of Registration Cards for Afghan refugees. (see here, here and here).

In June 2016, Pakistan pushed back over a half a million Afghan refugees, many with only a few days’ notice, as AAN reported at the time (see here). This expulsion was linked to the authorities’ decision not to extend the Proof of Registration (PoR) cards, the temporary identity cards that some Afghans residing in Pakistan have had access to since 2007. (Afghans with PoR cards are called ‘registered refugees’; those without are called ‘undocumented’ and are often treated like illegal migrants by the Pakistani authorities; for a full explanation, see this AAN dispatch).

2018 seems to have started with equally harsh intentions. “There will be no extension [of the Proof of Registration] after 31 January and they [refugees] will have to go to their country,” a senior official in the State and Frontier Region (Safron) ministry told the Pakistani newspaper Dawn in the mid-January.

Politics and PoR cards

Pakistan’s position on not extending the PoR cards, according to the Pakistani newspaper Tribune, was taken in view of both the increasing hostile attitude of Kabul and the pressure tactics of Washington towards it. Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, the ambassador of Pakistan in the United States, also commented on 19 January 2018 on Afghan refugees in Pakistan, saying they had turned into a security threat for their hosts. “Their youths are rented by terrorist groups,” he said. “We will deport both Haqqanis and Taleban to their own country including the Afghan refugees living in Pakistan.”

The turn in US policy towards Pakistan – President Trump said there should be increased efforts to persuade Pakistan to stop supporting the Taleban (see this AAN analysis) – and its deployment of more troops to Afghanistan, coupled with Kabul’s strengthening ties with India (see this AAN analysis here), all appear to have fuelled Pakistan’s reluctance to extend the PoR cards, hitting where it hurts, when it can hurt. Afghan refugees may well feel like pawns in a situation they have no control over.

A brief history of the extensions of PoR cards

In 2016 and since then, Afghan refugees have been on increasingly shaky ground when it comes to knowing how long they might be able to stay in Pakistan. Islamabad started providing Afghans with individualised computerised identity cards called Proof of Registration (PoR) in 2007, making them ‘documented refugees’. Although the cards were granted for only limited periods, they did enable holders to open bank accounts, purchase mobile phone SIM cards and get driving licenses. Most importantly, they provided a legal protection from arbitrary arrest, detention or deportation under Pakistan’s Foreigner’s Act. This improved the lives of many Afghans in Pakistan. In the beginning, the Pakistani government issued Afghan refugees with PoR cards for a period of two years or longer. The first PoR cards issued in 2007 were valid until December 2009. The second extension was until June 2013, the third until December 2015.

The PoR cards issuance policy became more ad-hoc and erratic in 2016 when the Pakistan government started extending the cards for only short periods of time, first, until June 2016 and, then, December 2016 (see this AAN analysis). In December 2016, under pressure from the international community, Pakistan extended PoR cards until March 2017. Just before the PORs were due to run out, on 24 February 2017, the Ministry of States and Frontier Region announced that the cards would be extended until 31 December 2017. The last one-month extension was granted by the Pakistani cabinet on its 3 January 2018 meeting. It allowed registered refugees to stay in Pakistan only for the rest of that month, until 31 January 2018. If it is not extended, the former card-holders refugees will have no legal protection from deportation.

Reactions to the 31 January deadline

In light of this Pakistan’s approach to Afghan refugees, the Afghan High Council on Migration held a meeting last week, at which President Ghani said that the refugees’ probable imminent return should be classed as a national emergency. The international organisations working with refugees and returnees have also been making efforts to help the Afghan and Pakistani governments reach a deal on this issue. Deputy head of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) Sarah Craggs told AAN that IOM and other international organisations were still hopeful that Pakistan would extend the PoR cards, especially after months of significant high-level international pressure to do so. “There is some indication from Pakistan that they want to ensure dignified and voluntary returns,” Craggs said. “If extended,” said Craggs, “the PoR cards are likely to run through July 2018.” If that extension does not happen, she said it would put Afghanistan and its people “in a very vulnerable situation.” She called an extension “pretty critical,” saying if it does not come, “it will be extremely destabilising.” Craggs said that in 2016, “when there was a significant increase in returns, the humanitarian community launched a Flash Appeal and we may need to consider similar, depending on the situation.” She said that “returns over the past few years have already stretched resources, and there is a consideration of the absorption capacity…Most people [who have already come back] don’t have land and access to basic services.”

How many Afghan refugees have returned so far?

Already, since 2001, more than 3.6 million Afghan refugees have returned home from Pakistan. There was, initially, a huge push by UNHCR, international donors and the Afghan government to bring the refugees back ­– the homecoming was cast as proof that the new regime was popular. Also, in the first years after the Taleban regime was overthrown, conditions in Afghanistan seemed amenable to people re-starting their lives there. Over 1.6 million people returned from Pakistan in 2002. Between 2003 and 2015 between 50,000 and 400,000 returned each year. Then in summer of 2016, a huge number, on a scale not seen for over a decade, of over 600,000 Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan (see this AAN analysis). Between July and early November 2016, UNOCHA reported, it was not uncommon to see as many as 4,000 people – sometimes more – pass through the border crossings at Torkham and Spin Boldak in a single day. Many were forced to return at short notice, after receiving 48-hour and/or a week’s notice to leave the country. They included those who had been living in Pakistan since the Soviet occupation (1979-89) when millions of Afghans sought refugee across their country’s borders. The younger ‘returnees’ comprise many who have never lived in Afghanistan. Some are even the children of those who have never lived in Afghanistan. Many of the returning Afghans have found themselves in a desperate situation in their homeland, with neither jobs nor proper housing.

The reasons for the mass returns in 2016, according to United Nations agencies and human rights organisations were fear of harassment and oppression by the Pakistani authorities (see this Human Rights Watch report (here and here), or in the case of undocumented refugees, fear of expulsion, as they are seen as illegal migrants and often subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or deportation under Pakistan’s Foreigner’s Act. The first-ever Afghan government media campaign called Khpel Watan, Gul Watan (“One’s own homeland, a dear (literally flower) homeland”) aimed at encouraging Afghans to return ‘home’, also contributed to increased numbers of returns. (See this AAN analysis).

Last year, fewer refugees returned from Pakistan – 57,411 in total, according to UNHCR who supported them. In July 2017, however, the UNHCR, together with the Pakistan and Afghanistan governments, launched a programme to register undocumented Afghans living in Pakistan, estimated to number between 600,000 and one million. They should receive Afghan Citizen (AC) cards, which provide them with legal protection from arbitrary arrest, detention or deportation under Pakistan’s Foreigner’s Act. The AC cards also allow Afghans to stay in Pakistan for the time being, until they can be issued documents, such as passports, by the government of Afghanistan. The initiative was a significant step aimed at regularising the stay for many Afghans at a time when return to their home country may not be possible.

Since 1 January 2018, only 1,573 undocumented Afghans returned from Pakistan. There has not been any return of documented refugees because the UNHCR repatriation programme is closed during winter.

This all adds up, according to IOM estimates, to about 2.4 million Afghans still residing in Pakistan: 1.3 million are refugees, ie people registered with Pakistani authorities and in possession of PoR cards; 1.1 million undocumented of which 900,000 have been registered with AC cards, but not all them have been granted yet, and 200,000 people still in limbo with neither PoR nor AC cards.

Impact of a push back on Afghanistan Pakistan

Following Pakistan’s decision of 3 January 2018 to extend the PoR cards for one month only, IOM’s Craggs told AAN that the Afghan government came up with a contingency plan, which includes ‘proactive diplomacy’ and ‘advocacy for gradual voluntary return’. Proactive diplomacy included the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) approaching the Pakistan government with a request for an extension. Rohullah Hashimi, the advisor for international affairs at MoRR told AAN that they asked Pakistan “not to mix humanitarian issues with politics.” He added that they were waiting to see “how much the Pakistani government was serious in its decision.” He insisted MoRR did have plans for returnees, including providing settlements for some within existing communities and opening camps for others in provinces bordering Pakistan. “We have already talked to UN agencies and international NGOs in Afghanistan and they promised to assist us,” Hashimi told AAN. However, the Afghan government does not have a good track record on supporting returnees; in 2016, despite openly inviting refugees to come back to Afghanistan, primary services like health and education in border provinces were not prepared for the influx of people (see this AAN analysis).

The return of a huge number of Afghan refugees would definitely put enormous pressure on Afghanistan. The Afghan government has been struggling to provide services to those that returned in 2016. Any returnees in 2018 would need not only food, employment, shelter and basic services, but a secure environment in which all of these services can be delivered (see this AAN analysis about 2017 security trends).

Any push back of Afghan refugees will also have some impact on Pakistan. Despite the fact that the majority of the refugees living in Pakistan are poor and Pakistan sees most of them as an economic burden, they, nevertheless, contribute to Pakistan’s economy with their skilled and unskilled labour. In 2016, when Pakistan decided to push Afghan refugees back to Afghanistan, a newspapers from Balochistan province in Pakistan wrote that, after the Afghans refugees withdrew their money from their bank accounts, in just a few days, the banks were emptied.

Instead of a conclusion: People’s concerns

Afghans residing in Pakistan are worried about a possible push back. The fact that the PoRs have not been extended beyond January is particularly problematic as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) voluntary repatriation programme, a key mechanism that provides for the returnees documented with the Pakistan government with some help to return, is closed during the winter months. The programme, that has been running since 2002, provides 200 USD cash per individual holding PoR cards. Children under the age of five are not entitled to cards, but are marked on the backside of one of their parent’s card and also receive the same amount.

Nur Muhammad, a shopkeeper living in Loralai district of Quetta is in a typical position for an Afghan refugee in Pakistan. He told AAN that if he is forced to return, he does not know what he will do with his business. “I have a business of nearly six million Pakistani Rupees (approximately 55,000 USD) and have already paid the annual rent of 360,000 Pakistani Rupees (approximately 3,500 USD) for 2018 to the owner of the shop,” he explained. If pushed back to Afghanistan, he said, “What should I do with this money and business?” He said the government of Pakistan had given them a one-month notice and when we spoke to him, on 29 January, there were just two days to go and no news as to whether it might extend their PORs. “If the Pakistani government wanted us to go to our country, it would have been better if they had warned us at least four months in advance.” He has additional worries: Faryab is insecure, he said, and he would not dare to transfer his family and shop there now.

Some local civil society organisations are also expressing their worries. The Afghan refugees committee from Peshawar, for example, asked the Pakistan government to allow for at least a one year extension. They highlighted that Afghan refugees in Pakistan are afraid of “insecurity, night raids by American forces, the presence of Daesh and Taleban.” These, they said, are the main factors hampering people’s decision to return. The Norwegian Refugees Council (NRC) also recently published a report calling on the different refugee hosting countries, including Pakistan, not to deport Afghan refugees at a time when security is deteriorating in Afghanistan.

Both refugees and agencies are worried about a possible mass push back of people across the border at a time when Afghanistan is not safe, services and employment opportunities for returnees are not evident and they would not have had time to prepare themselves. The question is whether these humanitarian concerns are equally important to those with the power to decide their fates.

 

Edited by Sari Kouvo and Kate Clark

 

 

 

Establishing the European Defence Industrial Development Programme aiming at supporting the competitiveness and innovative capacity of the EU defence industry - Rapporteur Ioan Mircea Paşcu
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Defence: EU to support development of military equipment
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will take place on 26 -27 February 2018 in Brussels.

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item 7 - Exchange of views with Major-General Pascal Chiffoleau, Commander of the European Air Transport Command (EATC) - Presentation by Major-General Pascal Chiffoleau
item 8 - China's global military power projection: Presentation by Eva Pejsova, Senior Analyst, EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)
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