I asked for more information on the activity of the mission and Iooked for an interview with the EULEX Kosovo mission. Several e-mails signed by no one have arrived : conversation with no-names, unable to understand my request and my questions.
People who treat us as idiots who do not know the sites of the European Union (www.eeas.europa.eu and www.europa.eu). Poison pens who do not dare to sign a letter, people who do not dare to take responsibility. Which simply "did not feel like" transferring questions to the right people. Answers from an EU mission`s information service with visible evidence of not wanting to help. I have never encountered such a situation concerning an EU, UN (etc.) mission or operation...
(I have not had any other choice because unfortunately there is no more e-mail address on the site.)
We strongly doubt the importance of these information services funded by European citizens. They would be obliged to answer us.
They have webpage whose links do not work anymore. (I can imagine the thousands of euros that were paid for this.) But they do not stop creating advertising for themselves, in the name of genderism, book about the biography of the female mission`s members and the other things really very, very important. (In this case, no problem with urls.) Unbelievable.
My books and university textbooks about CSDP and EU missions are used by several universities all over Europe in Africa and elsewhere in education. In our next book on the Balkans this case will be mentioned.
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Dear Mr. Türke,
As already mentioned on 2 and 9 August 2018, we do not have the resources to meet each request for information.
Having explained the above, we hereby inform you that we will not respond to any further inquiries on this matter.
Yours sincerely,
Office of Chief of Staff
EULEX Kosovo
From: Dr. TÜRKE András István [mailto:(...)]
Sent: Wednesday, September 5, 2018 10:33
To: EULEX Kosovo Information
Subject: request for additional informations II.
Dear Office of the Chief of Staff,
Please forward my e-mail towards competent persons, who are able to answer to my questions, like Ms. Alexandra Papadopoulou or Mr. Bernd Thran.
Thanks a lot.
Best regards:
Andras Istvan Türke
director
—
Europa Varietas Institute
www.europavarietas.org
Le 2 août 2018 à 10:13:23, EULEX Kosovo Information (eulexkosovoinformation@eulex-kosovo.eu) a écrit:
Dear Mr Türke,
Thank you for your email and interest in EULEX Kosovo.
Unfortunately, we do not currently have the resources to meet each request for information. While we regret not being able to accommodate your request for information, we would kindly direct you to the EULEX website (www.eulex-kosovo.eu) which contains information about the Mission, its work, press releases, EU in Kosovo, EU External Action, CSDP, and other relevant data. We would also kindly direct you to the websites of EEAS and EU, www.eeas.europa.eu and www.europa.eu respectively for more information.
Yours sincerely,
Office of the Chief of Staff
EULEX Kosovo
From: Dr. TÜRKE András István [mailto:(...)]
Sent: Thursday, 19 July 2018 10:18
To: EULEX Kosovo Information
Subject: request for additional informations
Madam / Sir,
I am director of the independent Swiss based Europa Varietas Institute.
I am writing a book about EU diplomacy and mission in the Western Balkans (1991-2018) and I request for some additional informations about the activity of EULEX Kosovo.
I read a lot of very critical books about EULEX activity during the period 2008-2013, the mission was accused to being biased towards former UCK members.
I would like to know how far the mission has been changed since them.
What are the on-site experiences, the most important challenges to overcome?
What are the lessons learned compared to other EULEX missions?
I would like to have information that is beyond the official EU texts.
---
I need some lists
- about prosecutors investigated 400 war crimes
- about the 150 drafted laws
- about EULEX HoMs with period of activity
Other interesting documents are welcome.
I need also these documents but impossible to download, there are a lot of bugs on your site :
http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/docs/justice/judgments/criminal-proceedings/D...
http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/docs/justice/judgments/criminal-proceedings/D...
(+ other and older verdicts)
Thanks a lot.
Best regards:
Andras Istvan Türke
director
—
Europa Varietas Institute
www.europavarietas.org
Rosemount Aerospace is being tapped to provide the Navy with angle of attack (AoA) transmitters for its F/A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft. The company will procure a total of 360 transmitters at a cost of $7.1 million. The AoA transmitter is is mounted on the fuselage with the sensing probe extending through the aircraft fuselage. The probe provides an AoA indication by sensing the direction of local airflow. Navy planes usually have to perform takeoff and landing operations from a very short aircraft carrier runways; during those operations the transmitter measures the AoA directly and help the pilot fly close to the stalling point with greater precision. Work will be performed in Burnsville, Minnesota and is expected to be completed in September 2019.
General Dynamics is being contracted for work on the USS Bonhomme Richard. The awarded firm-fixed-price contract has a value of $218.7 million and provides for a combination of maintenance, modernization, and repair work on the Wasp-class vessel during its docking phased maintenance availability. From 2012 to earlier this year the USS Bonhomme Richard was stationed in Sasebo, Japan and served there as the flagship of the Amphibious Force 7th Fleet’s expeditionary strike group. The Landing Helicopter Dock amphibious assault ship is designed to deploy helicopters, landing craft, supplies and personnel. The Richard is capable of embarking Harrier and F-35B fighter jets. Its one of eight Wasp-class vessels. Work will be performed in San Diego, California and is scheduled for completion by May 2020.
ATK Launch Systems is being contracted to keep the US land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) in shape. The contract has a value of $86.4 million and provides for component testing, evaluation, engineering support and disposal for all stages of Minuteman and Peacekeeper systems. ICBMs have been part of the US primary strategic deterrence capability for the past 50 years, as part of a nuclear-armed triad that also includes submarine-launched ballistic missiles and long range heavy bombers. The Minuteman III entered service in 1970 and is currently the only operational ICBM. The Peacekeeper, also known as MX was introduced in the 1980’s as a first-strike weapon capable of carrying up to 10 nuclear warheads to destroy Soviet missile silos. Work will be performed in Utah.
Alliant Techsystems Operations and General Dynamics are set to compete for each order of a $1.8 billion contract. The companies will provide the US military with 20mm, 25mm, 30x113mm, and 30x173mm medium caliber ammunitions. 20mm rounds are the standard load of many US aircraft like the F/A-18 which is equipped with a M61A1 six-barrel Gatling gun. 25mm ammunition fired by the Bushmaster cannon which can be found on Navy ships and the Bradley. The AH-64 Apache fires 30×113 mm rounds from its M230 Chain gun, while 30x173mm rounds are fired from the GAU-8 Avenger minigun installed on the A-10 Thunderbolt II. Work locations and funding will be allocated with each order. The contract is set to run through September 2023.
Middle East & AfricaThe Kingdom of Jordan is strengthening its bilateral relationship with the Philippines. The two countries recently signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on Defense Cooperation between the Jordan Armed Forces-Arab Army and the Department of National Defense of the Philippines. Under this MOU, Jordan will transfer two of its $18 million AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters to the Philippines as means to support the country’s ongoing counter-terror efforts. The helicopters will be turned over to the Philippine government in July 2019 after the training of Filipino pilots.
EuropeFrance is joining the 21st space race amid growing fears of a future conflict. French Defense Minister Florence Parly plans to invest a total of $4.2 billion to renew and upgrade French military satellites and to protect its highly sensitive networks from prying eyes. “We will install surveillance cameras on our satellites so we will know who is approaching us,” Parly said during an interview with a French TV station. Last Friday Parly openly accused Russia of eavesdropping on secure military communications and said the Russian satellite has “big ears” and is “well-known but a bit indiscreet” and added “France is and will be a space power.” On June 28, the French parliament adopted a bill on military planning for 2019-2025, envisaging the increase of defense spending up to 2% of the country’s GDP. The French investment plan comes weeks after US President Donald Trump announced a plan to create a “Space Force”, a new branch of the US military by 2020.
Asia-PacificThe Taiwanese government plans to significantly boost its F-16 budget. The Ministry of National Defense will need about $4.6 billion to maintain parity between the upgraded F-16s and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s tactical fighters. A large chunk of the budget will be spend on a variety of air-to-air missiles and automated ground collision avoidance systems. The ROCAF has a total of 115 F-16s, of which 24 are out of service for upgrades at any point and 16 are in the USA for training at Luke AFB. By 2023 Taiwan will have an updated fleet of F-16Vs. The latest variant of the fighter jet integrates advanced capabilities as part of an upgrade package to better interoperate with fifth-generation fighters, including the F-35 and the F-22. The Viper can be deployed in suppression of enemy air defense missions, air-to-ground and air-to-air combat, and deep interdiction and maritime interdiction missions.
Today’s VideoWatch: RARE MOMENT: HMS Queen Elizabeth meet USS Iwo Jima in the USA
After the defeat of a self-proclaimed ISKP group in Jawzjan in July 2018, focus has shifted to neighbouring Sar-e Pul. Russian media in particular have alleged that there are more pro-ISKP groups active in this province. AAN’s Obaid Ali (with inputs from Thomas Ruttig) has looked into Sar-e Pul’s insurgency landscape and found no indication of any group associated with the IS or its Afghan franchise, ISKP. There is, however, a small number of Central Asian fighters who operate alongside the Taleban movement under the label ‘Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)’.
There is no evidence in Sar-e Pul province of the presence of any group affiliated to the Islamic State (IS, locally called “Daesh”) or its recognised branch in Afghanistan, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). These findings are the conclusion of a short AAN survey of security sources, local officials and civil society activists, both in Sar-e Pul and Kabul, to check claims of recent media reports, mainly emanating from Russia, that such groups are present in this province. These reports also quickly spread on the internet (see one of the reports here).
Mawlawi Naqebullah, head of the provincial High Peace Council and who knows the insurgency’s dynamics in Sar-e Pul well, told AAN that there was no evidence of ISKP’s presence in the province. Masuma Ramazan, a provincial council member in Sar-e Pul, said there were some foreign fighters in remote Kohistanat district. Their nationality, affiliation and number, she said, are unclear. According to her, certain locals refer to this group as having links with ISKP but others just call its members “Uzbekistani”, ie originating from Uzbekistan. One civil society activist from the province, Haji Payenda, told AAN that some social media activists talk about ISKP in the province. But, he said, “It is fake news.”
After the defeat of a self-proclaimed ISKP group in Jawzjan in late July 2018 (AAN analysis here), some locals spread reports that these self-proclaimed ISKP fighters had fled to Sar-e Pul province. In fact, all the Afghan fighters among the group surrendered to the Afghan government, while the foreign fighters, mostly Central Asians, surrendered to the Taleban. According to various sources close to the Taleban in northern Afghanistan, 19 foreign fighters including 14 Central Asians surrendered to them. The Taleban claim they moved them to Faryab province and that they were still in their custody.
Confusion surrounding black flags, again
The apparent cause for the confusion is a small number of around 25 Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) fighters and 15 family members, mentioned by Mahsuma Ramazan, who have been operating alongside the local Taleban in Sar-e Pul since 2015.These fighters entered Afghanistan after the Pakistani army’s military operation, named Operation Zarb-e Azb, in northern Waziristan in 2014. Several local sources told AAN that the majority of these fighters were of Uzbek ethnicity and from Uzbekistan. Their exact number is unclear.
Nur Agha Nuri, a provincial council members representating Kohistanat district, told AAN that the Taleban’s shadow provincial governor Mawlawi Ataullah provided shelter for them in Sufak, a remote village in the south of that district. Kohistanat, a remote district itself, fell into the Taleban’s hands in June 2015.
These IJU fighters are part of an independent front named ‘Imom Buxoriy Katiba’ (Imam Bukhari’s Battalion) that the IJU has established in northern Afghanistan. The Imam Bukhari Battalion (in the transcription that would be used in Afghanistan) also operates in some parts of Badakhshan and Takhar provinces in the northeast of the country. It is named after a famous Central Asian second Islamic/ninth Christian century religious scholar who authored one of the most important hadith collections, called Sahih al-Bukhari.
Sar-e Pul, a remote province in the northwest, is highly contested by the Taleban. They control half of the province, largely its western and southern parts and some areas of the southeast: apart from Kohistanat parts of Sayyad, Balkhab and Sancharak districts. Most of the Taleban posts in those areas are run by local Afghan Uzbeks and Tajiks (read our previous analysis here).
IJU, a global jihadist group and an ally of the Taleban, displays a black flag similar to that of ISKP’s, but with a different logo. The IJU flag has the sentence, “There is no God except Allah and Muhammad is his messenger,” the profession of faith for every Muslim, with a sword at the bottom. The ISKP’s black flag has the first part of this sentence in the top-half of the flag and the second half of the sentence in the lower half inside a white circle. Confusing both flags, some locals see the IJU as an ISKP-affiliated group (see AAN’s reporting on similar confusions of small insurgent groups with IS/ISKP from 2014 here).
Who is IJU?
IJU was founded by Islamic fundamentalists from Central Asia. Until 2002, the group operated within the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an umbrella militant group for Central Asian fighters that joined the Taleban’s Emirate in the 1990s. Regarding its affiliations in Waziristan, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) wrote in a 2009 research paper that the group “appears closely connected [and] to cooperate closely with a group of Arab fighters which was led, until his death [in 2008], by the al-Qaida-affiliated Abu Laith Al-Libi,” one of Bin Laden’s most important field commanders, and with the Haqqani network. In June 2015, IJU was added to the United Nations Security Council Sanctions List as as being associated with al-Qaeda and the Taleban. The US Department of State designated it a “global terrorist group earlier, in 2005” (read more here).
Between 2007 and 2009 while still in Waziristan, the group allegedly accommodated European, particularly German, jihadist fighters, and was accused of having planned terrorist attacks in Germany (media reports here: and here, in German).
The IJU online
The main sources for IJU activities and reports are social media where the group frequently releases statements and videos. IJU produces high quality propaganda videos featuring both the Taleban’s and the Central Asian fighters’ activities in the north. AAN has been tracking militant groups in northern Afghanistan over the past few years. IJU seemed to be the most active foreign militant group in Afghanistan fighting alongside the Taleban and with its active presence on social media.
According to these social media sources, IJU has frequently taken part in military operations with the Taleban, fighting against Afghan security forces. According to the Kavkaz Centre, a pro-jihadi website based in Chechnya, Haroun Abu Muhammad, introduced there as one of the group’s military leaders, stated “When we plan for a joint operation sometimes the Emirate provides us with ammunition, shelter and food” (read the interview here). In December 2015, IJU released a video showing its fighters attacking an Afghan security forces’ convoy in Badakhshan province. It also showed “Muhammad,” an IJU commander, instructing fighters how to target the Afghan forces.
IJU’s main social media channels are Badr al-Tawhid and al-Sadeqin (or al-Sodiqlar in Uzbek, meaning ‘The Truthful’). Both channels are run by IJU but for different purposes. Badr al-Tawhid releases videos featuring both the Taleban and IJU on the battleground, while al-Sadeqin focuses on religious scholars’ speeches on jihad. It is unclear whether the IJU’s social media channels are run from Afghanistan or from abroad. The group’s Facebook page, which has a lot of followers in Afghanistan, is sometimes blocked but then quickly reactivated. The group also regularly uses other social media channels, such as Telegram.
IJU occasionally podcasts Taleban videos, from ‘Voice of Jihad’, the Taleban’s official website, as well as speeches by religious scholars with Russian transcripts.
What does the Sar-e Pul IJU group do?
The IJU group in Sar-e Pul largely offers military training for the newly recruited local Taleban in the province. It offers basic military training such as shooting rifles and how to target Afghan forces’ check points. IJU’s limited number of fighters in the province as well as the fact that they are in a remote area makes it difficult for them to take an active role in the fighting in this province.
Some members of the group, according to sources close to Taleban, have longstanding military experience. They also bring their own interpretation of religious values from Northern Waziristan, mostly focusing on global jihad. This is an issue infrequently raised by the local Taleban. “Taleban and locals called them Ustad (teacher),” said sources close to Taleban.
More recently, in October 2017, Badr al-Tawhid, released a video featured training exercises allegedly carried out in northern Afghanistan. The video contained physical training in a compound and shooting rifles. The fighters are also seen practising how to storm buildings, clear rooms and take hostages.
Another IJU video collection released by al-Sadeqin apparently filmed in Sar-e Pul province is named ‘Voice of the People’ (‘Sada-ye Mardon’ in Dari) and features the Taleban’s takeover of Kohistanat in 2015. In this collection the group interviewed a number of locals in the district. One interviewee is filmed saying that “men, women and children” in the province support the Taleban. Another interviewee, a Taleban fighter, points to a military vehicle and weapons seized from the Afghan security forces.
Conclusion: the IJU is a staunch Taleban ally
IJU’s presence alongside the Taleban in some parts of the North, including Sar-e Pul, as well as the group’s circulation of Taleban or pro-Taleban videos on the internet show that both organisations maintain a strong connection.
Looking at IJU’s activities and its small number of fighters, the group does not represent a serious threat to Central Asian states so long as it remains in its alliance with the Taleban. By far the smaller of the two groups in this alliance, it cannot go against Taleban policy and practice, which is notto operate in neighbouring states but concentrate on regaining control in Afghanistan. Even if the Taleban are involved in smuggling activities across the Tajik border, which can lead to cross-border violence (see a report about an incident in Darqad district in Takhar province in late August, here), this is part of the war economy and therefore substantially different from the kind of threat IS tries to project against regimes in the region.
The Taleban’s larger presence and their strong resolve to prevent ISKP’s infiltration into northern Afghanistan leaves limited potential space for the ISKP to establish a foothold in Sar-e Pul. IJU’s pro-jihad campaign on social media as well as its efforts for global jihad, however, might attract newcomers from abroad. But IJU would not be able to host them or facilitate fighters of militant groups hostile to the Taleban in northern Afghanistan. Therefore, Sar-e Pul remains a province free of ISKP fighters. IJU is a Taleban – and not an IS/ISKP – ally.
Edited by Thomas Ruttig