You are here

Defence`s Feeds

New chip developed under EDA project gets award

EDA News - Fri, 19/01/2018 - 14:09

Picture copyright © Teledyne e2v (UK) Ltd 2018

A new chip developed under the European Defence Agency’s THIMS project (Technology for High speed Mixed Signal circuits) has received the 2017 Elektra award for ‘Semiconductor Of The Year - Analog’ by Electronics Weekly, a reputed and longstanding UK-based electronics magazine and website.

The Digital-to-Analog Converter (DAC) EV12DS460 developed by the French entity of Teledyne e2v based in Grenoble (France) was one of the main outcomes of THIMS project which ran at the EDA till January 2016.

The aim of this project, funded by France and Germany, was to address the key issue of establishing a secure access to high speed mixed analogue and digital circuits, and to strengthen Europe’s defence technological base in this critical domain through exploitation of high speed circuits.

Another objective of THIMS was to increase the conversion bandwidth, reduce the size of circuit areas and cut power consumption. More specifically, the target was to design a DAC for radar applications with high spectral purity (low harmonic spurs) and ultra-wideband (here 7GHz). The outcome of THIMS is the world’s first K-band capable Digital-to-Analog Converter. This component is critical for applications in high purity direct digital frequency synthesis(1), especially for the new generation of radars and software defined radio. It also has great potential for civil, industrial and space-related applications.

The THIMS consortium also included Airbus Defence & Space (defence electronics activities, now Hensoldt GmbH) as well as Thales Airborne Systems.

The chip was developed using Infineon’s Bipolar technology, meaning the whole cycle, from design to production and application, is based on European know-how.

Electronics Weekly runs the annual awards ceremony called ‘The Elektra Awards’ since 2002. The aim of the awards is to reward the achievements of individuals and firms across the European electronics industry.

(1) see articles of French Mod at the IFCS 2017 “Wideband and low phase noise up-converted direct frequency synthesis using high frequency DAC and Oscillator”
 

More information:
Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Coopération "Lancester House II"?

CSDP blog - Fri, 19/01/2018 - 09:33

(French version below)

France and the United Kingdom strengthen military cooperation : A new phase of the Lancaster House Agreement in 2010

French President Emmanuel Macron and the British PM Theresa May announced Thursday, January 18, 2018 a strengthening of Franco-British cooperation in the areas of migration and defense. The United Kingdom has just announced the availability of "heavy" helicopters to support French operations in the Sahel and Sahara. The United Kingdom has indeed agreed to make available to French forces in Mali three of its military helicopters "Chinook". This is precisely the tool that is missing most French infantry in the Sahel and Sahara.

Barkhane aligns well 17 helicopters, but none can carry thirty men and their equipment in one fell swoop. The United Kingdom will also provide 56 million euros of additional aid for the alliance for the Sahel. In recent years, UK and France have worked side by side to combat the global threat posed by the Ebola virus. The peries will increase our efforts in the Sahel to prevent Islamic extremism from increasing instability and insecurity that feeds the migration crisis.

London could also announce a contribution to the financing of the joint G5 Sahel force (FCG5S) at the Brussels meeting on 23 February. Paris and London are also announcing increased support in East Africa, particularly through AMISOM, the African Union Mission for Somalia.

The two capitals announce that the Combined Joint Expedition Force (CJEF), launched after the Lancaster House agreements, will be ready to be deployed in the most demanding operations by 2020. This force has obtained its certification final spring 2017, during Exercise Griffin Strike. In addition, now some 50 officers are inserted into the respective armed forces.

French officers were deployed on British operations and British officers on French operations. (We are very moved about the "incredible speed" of the setting up of such a force by 2 West European states whose armed forces are the most important: 10 years!)Finally, on the industrial side, France and the United Kingdom confirm their willingness to cooperate in the field of submarine UAVs and in the future air combat systems.

-------

La France et le Royaume-Uni renforcent leur coopération militaire : Une nouvelle phase des Accords de Lancaster House en 2010

Le président français Emmanuel Macron et le PM birtannique Theresa May ont annoncé jeudi 18 janvier 2018 un renforcement de la coopération franco-britannique dans les domaines des migrations et de la défense. Le Royaume-Uni vient ainsi d'annoncer la mise à disposition d'hélicoptères « lourds » pour appuyer les opérations françaises au Sahel et au Sahara. Le Royaume-Uni a en effet accepté de mettre à disposition des forces françaises au Mali trois de ses hélicoptères militaires « Chinook ». C'est précisément l'outil qui manque le plus aux fantassins français au Sahel et au Sahara.

Barkhane aligne bien 17 hélicoptères, mais aucun ne peut transporter d'un seul coup une trentaine d'hommes et leur équipement. Le Royaume-Uni fournira aussi 56 millions d'euros d'aide supplémentaire pour l'alliance pour le Sahel. Ces dernières années, le Royaume-Uni et la France ont travaillé côte à côte pour combattre la menace globale que représente le virus Ebola. Les perties vont augmenter nos efforts dans le Sahel pour empêcher l’extrémisme islamique d'augmenter une instabilité et une insécurité qui nourrissent la crise migratoire ».

Londres pourrait aussi annoncer une participation au financement de la force conjointe du G5 Sahel, (FCG5S) lors de la réunion de Bruxelles le 23 février prochain. Paris et Londres annoncent aussi un soutien accentué en Afrique de l'Est en particulier via l'AMISOM, la mission de l'Union Africaine pour la Somalie.

Les deux capitales annoncent que la Force expéditionnaire commune (CJEF - Combined Joint Expedition Force), lancée après les accords de Lancaster House sera prête à être déployée dans les opérations les plus exigeantes d'ici 2020. Cette force a obtenu sa certification finale le printemps 2017, lors de l’exercice Griffin Strike. Par ailleurs, désormais quelque 50 officiers sont insérés au sein des forces armées respectives.

Les officiers français ont été déployés dans le cadre d’opérations britanniques et des officiers britanniques dans le cadre d’opérations françaises . (Nous sommes très émus concernant la "vitesse incroyable" de la mise en place d`une telle force par 2 Etats ouest-européens dont les forces armées sont les plus importants : 10 ans!)
Enfin sur le volet industriel, la France et le Royaume-Uni confirment leur volonté de coopérer dans le domaine des drones sous-marin chasseurs de mine et dans les systèmes de combat aérien du futur.

Tag: CJEFG5 Sahel

Australia confirms additional Bushmaster sales to Japan

Jane's Defense News - Fri, 19/01/2018 - 01:00
Australia and Japan have outlined an intention to expand defence equipment collaboration, building on Canberra’s newly confirmed deal to sell additional Bushmaster multirole protected vehicles to the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF). The pledge to increase bilateral co-operation in
Categories: Defence`s Feeds

EU’s infrastructure bank gearing up – cautiously – for security and defence lending

Jane's Defense News - Fri, 19/01/2018 - 01:00
Europe’s investment in R&D, including that in security and defence, is “sub-optimal”, according to the European Investment Bank (EIB), the EU’s infrastructure and innovation-financing wing, which says it is preparing in 2018 to support the two sectors as never before.
Categories: Defence`s Feeds

JTIC Brief: Greek anarchist group Rouvikonas’s direct action tactics offer a potential alternative model for anarchist militancy

Jane's Defense News - Fri, 19/01/2018 - 01:00
Key Points The Greek anarchist group Rouvikonas, active since 2015, has claimed 87 instances of demonstrative vandalism, temporary occupations, and attacks resulting in property damage. By opting for unarmed attacks, and symbolic transgressions of the law, the group has reached large audiences and
Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Study - A stable Egypt for a stable region: Socio-economic challenges and prospects - PE 603.858 - Committee on Foreign Affairs - Subcommittee on Security and Defence

Seven years after the 2011 uprising in Egypt, a combination of domestic challenges, together with instability in the Middle East and North Africa region has stalled the country’s ongoing transition. Stability in Egypt is key for the region, and the country’s international partners such as the EU have a clear interest in helping move the country towards stability and prosperity. To that end, this study investigates the main challenges facing Egypt, focusing on social, economic, political and environmental challenges. The study analyses the implications of these challenges for Egypt’s stability in the coming decades. The study then examines the key drivers of EU-Egypt relations and provides a number of policy recommendations on how the EU can support Egypt’s longer-term stability. The study argues that the EU’s economic and security engagement with Egypt should not come at the expense of supporting democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The study also argues that EU programmatic assistance to Egypt should focus on youth, women, education, and entrepreneurship. Finally, the study also argues that the EU’s engagement is likely to be more successful if EU member states are more unified in their approach towards Egypt.
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

'Saif Sareea 3' to see 4,500 UK military personnel exercise with Omani forces

Jane's Defense News - Fri, 19/01/2018 - 00:00
Key Points ‘Saif Sareea 3’ in Oman later this year will involve around 4,500 UK military personnel The joint exercise will be the largest training activity in the region for 17 years Major UK joint manoeuvres with Omani forces in the Middle Eastern country later this year will involve
Categories: Defence`s Feeds

India issues RFI for six Next Generation Offshore Patrol Vessels

Jane's Defense News - Fri, 19/01/2018 - 00:00
India’s Ministry of Defence is acquiring a new class of offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) to improve the navy’s maritime surveillance and interdiction capabilities, and has issued a request for information (RFI) to finalise specifications of the programme. The platform, which will be known
Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Indonesia puts KC-46A Pegasus, Airbus A330 in frame for aerial tanker requirement

Jane's Defense News - Fri, 19/01/2018 - 00:00
Key Points Indonesia is studying the Boeing KC-46A, and the Airbus A330 MRTT to improve its aerial refuelling capabilities Programme is expected to be the next major logistics aircraft acquisition undertaking after the Airbus A400M The Indonesian Air Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia –
Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Pentagon nominees call for more prototyping, experimentation in acquisition

Jane's Defense News - Fri, 19/01/2018 - 00:00
Key Points A pair of nominees for top Pentagon positions called for more prototyping in acquisition They believe this will enable faster, and better, fielding of critical warfighting capabilities A pair of nominees for top Pentagon positions called for additional prototyping and experimentation
Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Top US Air Force official warns further CRs could affect B-21 deliveries

Jane's Defense News - Fri, 19/01/2018 - 00:00
Key Points The USAF undersecretary warned further CRs could affect B-21 deliveries The B-21 is one of the service’s highest priority programmes A top US Air Force (USAF) official warned that further stop-gap spending measures known as continuing resolutions (CRs) could delay delivery of the
Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Russian Military Intervention in Kazakhstan

Russian Military Reform - Thu, 18/01/2018 - 16:05

I’ve written a short report for an American Enterprise Institute project on possible Russian interventions in neighboring states. I was asked to discuss possible reasons for and trajectories of a Russian intervention in Kazakhstan. You can access the full report through AEI, but here’s an excerpt.

Key Points

  • Kazakhstan’s size and Russia’s lack of significant military presence in the region make outright invasion unlikely.
  • Nevertheless, the death or deposition of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev could generate regional instability, which may prompt Russia to intervene in support of a new regime or to undermine a newly empowered Kazakh nationalist one.
  • The likeliest cause of intervention would be to put down an Islamist insurgency, either with or without a request from Astana.

Introduction

Although a Russian military intervention in Kazakhstan is fairly unlikely, there are scenarios under which it could occur. This report first describes several possible scenarios that might result in such an intervention, considering potential Russian responses that range from providing assistance at the request of Kazakhstan’s government to an outright invasion. It then briefly examines the forces Russia could bring to bear in a conflict in Central Asia, looking in slightly more depth at the likeliest scenario—a Russian intervention to suppress an Islamist incursion or uprising.

Possible Scenarios for Intervention in Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan’s size would make Russia reluctant to undertake a full-scale military intervention. Still, there are circumstances under which the Russian leadership would feel pressure to use force to intervene in Kazakhstan.

The greatest potential threat to political stability in Kazakhstan would come from the death or incapacity of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Such a situation could be followed by a succession crisis, with multiple groups jockeying for position.

If prolonged government weakness or conflict ensues, radical Islamist groups connected to the Taliban or the Islamic State could seize the oppor-tunity to launch an armed insurgency, potentially combined with an incursion from the south. A weak or divided Kazakhstan government might prove incapable of resisting a well-organized insurgency, especially if the anti-government forces are able to draw on the support of local inhabitants in the more religious (Islamic) southern parts of the country. In such a situation, Kazakhstani leaders might request assistance from Russia. Russia might also intervene on its own without a request for help, but only if Kazakhstan were largely engulfed by instability and Russia wanted to protect its borders or ethnic Russians living in areas near Russia that were under threat.

Although the threat from religious extremist groups is real, it requires some degree of state weakness or division to develop. While scholars have long argued that a crisis precipitated by the death of an aging leader could provide such an opportunity in any of the Central Asia states, the two cases so far of leaders dying in office in Central Asia (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have both resulted in fairly smooth leadership transitions.

A second, though relatively unlikely, possibility is that Nazarbayev’s death coincides with a difficult period in Russian domestic politics for the Vladimir Putin regime. Whether because of economic problems or political weakness vis-à-vis younger politicians, Putin and his circle might choose to reenact the Crimea scenario in Kazakhstan. The goal would be to boost the regime’s popularity through another injection of militarized patriotism by annexing a territory with a predominantly Russian population. Such territories are located in the north and northeast of the country, directly adjacent to Russian territory. Counting on support from at least some of the local ethnic Russians, Moscow could seek to annex the territories around Petropavlovsk and Kustanay in the north or the territory around Ust-Kamenogorsk in the northeast.

Somewhat paradoxically, a third scenario for Russian intervention could follow a smooth transition of power. In this case, Nazarbayev could be succeeded by a leader who begins to implement a Kazakh nationalist agenda, acting aggressively to remove Russian language from the public sphere and ethnic Russians from positions of authority inside the country. Government policies under such a leader might also shift financial resources away from the northern and eastern parts of the country where ethnic Russian inhabitants predominate.

The leadership might undertake policies to reduce Kazakhstan’s ties to Russia, perhaps going so far as to suspend membership in the Eurasian Union. In doing so, the leadership would bank on expanding already close economic ties with China into the political and security spheres. Such a development would worry Russian leaders, who are comfortable with a division of influence with China in Central Asia as long as Russia continues its primacy in the security sphere—they would be concerned about a Kazakhstani government bent on severing political and security ties to Moscow.

Finally, Russian intervention might also be triggered by mass protests leading to a color revolution, similar to Georgia in 2003 or Ukraine in 2004–05 and 2013–14. The population might be outraged by corruption and repression during tough economic times. As in the first scenario, Kazakhstan’s leadership would need to precipitate the intervention by requesting assistance from either Russia directly or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Russian leaders would then act in support of this request.

Read the full report here

EDA sets-up collaborative RPAS training

EDA News - Thu, 18/01/2018 - 10:41

On Thursday 18 January 2018, the European Defence Agency (EDA) achieved a significant milestone within its Education, Training and Education portfolio with the deployment and linking of Medium Altitude, Long Endurance, Remotely Piloted Air Systems (MALE RPAS) desktop simulators in France and Italy. The deployment to Italy completes the first tranche of up to nine systems, which will be distributed across European military RPAS Schools and Centres of Excellence that will allow networked collaborative training. The aim is to build over time a European MALE RPAS community of interest to improve procedures, tactics and to harmonise training approaches.

The project was developed by the EDA under the mandate of the European MALE RPAS Community (DE, EL, ES, FR, IT, NL and PO) and is a joint effort with the European Air Group (which also includes BE and UK) in which the EDA is delivering the RPAS training technology demonstrator equipment and the EAG is producing training schedules to exploit the new system. This will enhance interoperability between Member States who currently field MALE RPAS platforms and those that aspire to the capability within a 5-10 year timeframe. The roll out of the systems will run in parallel with an increasingly ambitious virtual exercise programme that will provide opportunities for joint training and the cross-fertilisation of training approaches as instructors will teach lessons across the network to students at the dispersed sites.  The project will run for four years initially as a Training Technology Demonstrator and has already attracted additional interest from other Member States.

The EDA has for some time supported Member States ambitions in several areas of Education, Training and Exercise activity. The Agency is not a long-term training provider as such, but  operates as a training consultancy, establishing business cases underpinning new initiatives for Member States to consider  and setting up contracts on their behalf as required. Once initiatives have reached a sufficient level of maturity and are consolidated, they are transferred to a Member State or multinational organisation willing to take over administrative responsibilities and to ensure their longer term development. The Agency has achieved notable success in advanced helicopter exercises and training, airlift, energy management, armaments cooperation and its latest venture into training for unmanned systems.

  More information:
Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Afghanistan Election Conundrum (4): New controversies surrounding the appointment of a new electoral commissioner

The Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) - Thu, 18/01/2018 - 10:09

The need to appoint a new member of the IEC came after its chairman, Najibullah Ahmadzai, was sacked by President Ashraf Ghani on 15 November 2017. The president ordered the Selection Committee, a body responsible for shortlisting candidates for membership of the IEC and ECC, to be reconvened. The body shortlisted three candidates, from which a panel, including the president, chose its favourite on 13 January 2018. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili looks at the controversy surrounding this selection, and asks what happens next.

This is part four of a series of dispatches about the preparations for the elections. Part one dealt with political aspects and part two dealt with a first set of technical problems: the date, the budget and the debate regarding the use of biometric technology. Part three dealt with the dilemma of the electoral constituencies.

A new IEC member is appointed

On 13 January 2018, President Ashraf Ghani’s office announced that Sayed Hafizullah Hashemi had been appointed as a new member of the Independent Election Commission (IEC). The IEC is made up of seven members, all of whom were appointed in November 2016 (see AAN’s previous report here). One of them, Najibullah Ahmadzai, who also served as its chairman, was dismissed by President Ghani on 15 November 2017. This was due to pressure from political groups amidst widespread controversy surrounding a number of issues, from the preparation of the next parliamentary elections, which is the IEC’s current main task, to the issue of electoral reform. There are also serious doubts as to whether the elections can be held in 2018 (see ANN’s previous report here). Since Ahmadzai’s dismissal, his seat in the IEC had remained vacant. Hashemi was picked by a panel that included President Ashraf Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, Second Vice-President Sarwar Danesh, Chief Justice Yusuf Halim and Attorney General Farid Hamidi. The panel interviewed three candidates introduced by the Selection Committee.

Hashemi was appointed for a five-year term. (Of the seven IEC members, four are appointed for five years and the other three for three years.) It was expected that the new member, Hashemi, would also replace Ahmadzai as the IEC chair, although this will be determined by the IEC members themselves through a process of election. Yet, there are obviously ways and interests to influence this from the outside.

The Selection Committee, which the president reconvened on 28 December 2017, submitted a shortlist of three candidates to him on 11 January 2018. Apart from Hashemi, there were two other candidates: Abdul Qader Zazai Watandost, an MP from Kabul, and Awal-ul-Rahman Rodwal, former head of the IEC’s Kabul office. Watandost’s chances of getting the IEC seat were particularly slim given that he had strongly advocated against the presidential legislative decrees to amend the electoral laws when they were discussed and put to vote in the Wolesi Jirga in June 2016. (See AAN’s previous report here). (1)

The spokesman for the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and its representative in the Selection Committee, Belal Sediqi, told AAN that while the 57 applicants represented various ethnic groups, all three candidates proposed by the committee were Pashtun. Article 16 of the electoral law (2) states that any new member should be introduced with due consideration to the ethnic and gender composition of the body. It can be surmised, therefore, that this choice was made in a bid to retain the IEC’s previous ethnic composition, ie to replace the former head of the IEC (who was a Pashtun) with another Pashtun. However, according to Sediqi, even some Pashtuns were unhappy with the choice, as, in their view, Hashemi is a Sayed and not ‘a pure Pashtun’. A person’s ethnicity matters very much in Afghanistan, particularly with respect to appointments. It is often a deeply sensitive issue.

Biographical controversy

Sayed Hafizullah Hashemi is a Pashtun. He is also a Sayed, a particular group that claims descent from the family of the Prophet of Islam. While some believe they constitute a separate ethnic group in their own right, there are Sayeds among all ethnic groups in the country. Hashemi was born on 19 Hamal 1349 (8 April 1970) in Laghman province and holds a Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration (BBA) from Washington International University (2008). On 16 January 2018, Hashemi told AAN that he obtained his degree through a distance learning programme. He also holds a Master’s degree in Business Administration (MBA) from Islamic Azad University, Kabul Branch (2015). He told AAN that he had also enrolled as a PhD candidate at Ferdawsi University in the Iranian city of Mashhad but that he had pulled out for logistical reasons. Hashemi told AAN that he had worked with the commission on the drafting of the constitution in preparation of the Constitutional Loya Jirga that took place at the end of 2003 / beginning of 2004. He then joined the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) as a warehouse manager, a position he left when preparations for the 2005 parliamentary election got underway (it is unclear, though, why he left at such a crucial time). Following this, he worked in several capacities in the former president’s office and, since 2012, as the head of the Meshrano Jirga’s secretariat. (See his biography on the Meshrano Jirga’s website here, Hashemi speaks Pashto, Dari, Arabic and English.

Following Hashemi’s appointment, social media was abuzz with comments that his education documents were allegedly fake. Social media activists in particular referred to his Bachelor’s degree, which, according to his biography on the Meshrano Jirga website, he obtained from Washington International University, a university that these activists claimed to be notorious for selling degrees. (See this media report here). Another confusion was that, according to the English version of his biography), he obtained his Master’s degree from Khpelwak University in Kabul, which does not exist. Hashemi told AAN that this was a mistake by his (former) colleagues in the Meshrano Jirga, who had translated the name of Daneshgah-e Azad Islami (Islamic Free University) into Pashto. (“Khpelwak” means free or independent.).

On 15 January 2018, Sediqi (from the Selection Committee) told the Kabul daily Etilaat Roz that Hashemi’s education documents had been approved by the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE). He said the criterion for the applicants’ education documents’s credibility was whether they had been approved by the MoHE. Arefa Paikar, the spokeswoman for the MoHE, was quoted by the daily as saying that Hashemi’s documents had been processed for approval based on a specific procedure. This, she said, includes whether or not the university is among the list of universities recognised by UNESCO; sending an email to the relevant university for confirmation; and checking the exit and entry date stamps on the applicant’s passportPaikar confirmed to AAN on 17 January 2018 that Hashemi’s Bachelor’s degree from Washington International University had been attested by MoHE in 1387 (2008) and that she had found a copy of it in the MoHE, which, she said, also had the attestation stamp of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She was unsure, however, as to whether this same procedure was adhered to at the time, or whether it had been followed when verifying the validity of Hashemi’s degree. According to article 16 of the electoral law, IEC member/members can be dismissed if it turns out that they have faked their education documents.

 Controversy over the selection committee

There is also ongoing controversy surrounding the body that selected Hashemi and the procedure leading up to the current composition of the IEC. The mechanism for the selection of members of the IEC and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) is a Selection Committee. (see AAN’s previous reports about its background here and here). The Selection Committee was first introduced in 2013 based on recommendations from civil society organisations and political parties. Since then, it has been enshrined in the electoral law with the responsibility of vetting and shortlisting applicants for membership of both the IEC and ECC, although its composition changed every time the law was amended, often in an effort to include or exclude certain institutions (see previous AAN reporting here).

The electoral law (article 13.1) that was passed by a legislative decree in September 2016 and has since governed electoral bodies and processes (see the changes in the law in AAN’s previous report here) specifies the composition of the Selection Committee as follows:

For the purpose of verification of documents and determining competence and qualification of the candidates for membership of the Commission, the selection committee is established with the following composition: 1- Competent representative (Judge) of the Supreme Court, with the approval of the High Council of the Supreme Court, as the Chairperson of the selection committee. 2- One member of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, as elected by that commission as a member. 3- One member of the Independent Commission of Oversight of Implementation of the Constitution of Afghanistan, as elected by that commission, as a member. 4- An elected representative of the civil society organizations related to elections, as a member. 5- An elected representative of the civil society organizations advocating for the women rights, as a member.

The new Selection Committee set to work on 28 September 2016. It comprised the following people: Jawid Rashidi (Pashtun), a member of the Supreme Court, as chair; Yusuf Rashid (Pashtun), representing election-related civil society organisations; Mary Akrami (Tajik), representing women’s rights organisations; Muhammad Zia Langari (Sayed), a member of the AIHRC; and Abdullah Shafai (Hazara), a member of the Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution. Following more than a month of deliberations, on 9 November 2016 the committee submitted a shortlist of candidates to President Ghani. Jawid Rashidi, who, as representative of the Supreme Court and who is the head of the Selection Committee by default according to the electoral law, said that, out of a total of 720 applicants, the committee had selected 21 candidates for the IEC and 15 for the ECC. The president-led panel mentioned above interviewed these candidates and on 22 November 2016, the 12 new electoral commissioners (seven for the IEC and five for the ECC) were sworn in at the presidential palace. (See AAN’s previous report here).

On 15 November 2017, President Ghani fired IEC chairman Najibullah Ahmadzai, after divisions within the IEC that led to five of Ahmadzai’s fellow commissioners to write to the president asking for his dismissal. According to article 16 of the electoral law, in case of termination or resignation or death of an IEC member, the president must appoint a new member from the list of the remaining candidates introduced by the Selection Committee. This is according to article 14 of the law, according to which the Selection Committee, from among the candidates for the IEC membership, introduces “21 persons to the president that meet the highest and most appropriate legal standards, while taking into consideration the ethnic and gender composition.” (3) The president then appoints seven out of these 21 candidates.

However, the president ordered the Selection Committee to be reconvened, arguing that none of the remaining candidates on the list were eligible. The decision to reconvene the Selection Committee was opposed, including by members of the committee itself. Yusuf Rashid, the executive director of the Free and Fair Election Forum of Afghanistan (FEFA) who represented election-related civil society organisations to the (former) Selection Committee, argued, as reported by Afghan media, that there was “no legal justification for the committee to resume its work.” (Read the postscript in AAN’s previous report here).

On 29 November 2017 the election-related civil society organisations issued a statement boycotting the Selection Committee. (4) They said that they had reviewed presidential decree number 503 dated 4 Qaws 1396 (25 November 2017) on the reconvening of the Selection Committee and “arrived at this collective agreement that the decree is against the electoral law.” However, this argument appears to be somewhat tenuous, as it also disregards the practical need to fill the IEC’s vacant seat – unless critics are able to prove, countering the argument made by the president’s office, that there is indeed an eligible candidate among the remaining candidates. On 8 January 2018, Rashid told Etilaat Roz newspaper that the government had held a few meetings with him, one being with Second Vice-President Danesh. Rashid said that he told them that he did not see any legal justification for reconvening the Selection Committee. Rashid further said that from his meeting with the vice-president, he realised that there had not been any issues regarding the eligibility of the remaining candidates, but that the problem was a political one, namely the lack of agreement among government leaders on one of those candidates. He claimed he had advised that finding a solution to the political problem should not remain confined to the president or the chief executive, and that all the political groups inside and outside the government should be engaged in the discussion. Sources from the international community told AAN that President Ghani had taken a strong stance against earlier advice to engage more political groups in the process of appointing a new member for the IEC. The president’s reaction might stem from the assumption that involving a large number of actors makes decision-making more difficult and thus further complicating and possibly delaying the process.

Article 13 of the electoral law, on the establishment of the Selection Committee, states in paragraph two that, as two different categories, civil society organisations related to elections and to advocating for women’s rights each should introduce one representative to the Selection Committee within seven working days of the date of notification. Otherwise, it is stipulated, the three other members (representing the Supreme Court, AIHRC and ICOIC) should introduce three candidates from each of the two civil society categories to the president, who will choose and appoint two of them to represent these two groups to the Selection Commission. (5) The women’s rights groups sent their representative and as a result of the election-related organisations’ boycott, their representative was chosen by the president. On 30 December 2017, a member of the Selection Committee told AAN that, according to paragraph two of article 13 of the electoral law, they introduced three people to the president, one of whom, Muhammad Asef Safi, was approved.

Safi is the head of the Fair Law Organisation for Women (FLOW). Oddly enough, FLOW was one of the signatories to the 29 November 2017 CSO boycott statement. On 15 January 2018, Rashid of FEFA told AAN that the CSOs summoned Safi and told him that he would not represent them. Rashid speculated that Safi had changed his position because the government had exerted influence on him as he (as well as the two other candidates, Roshan Tseran, director of Training Human Rights for Women Association, and Muhammad Shoaib Naseri, director of Organisation of Fast Relief and Development (FRD) is part of the Open Governance Forum established by the government and that this change of position came after a recent trip he had undertaken with Vice-President Danesh to Indonesia. Safi confirmed these facts in a conversation with AAN on 16 January 2018 but rejected the allegation that he had been influenced by the government. He argued it was normal to participate in a conference which is attended by both government and non-government officials; instead he asserted that he participated in the Selection Committee “to break the stalemate over the process.”

There was also controversy over AIHRC spokesman Sediqi’s participation in the Selection Committee’s choice of Hashemi. Sediqi is not a formal member; he was replacing Langari, who was unwell, and it is not clear whether this was fully legal, given that the electoral law quoted above specifies “one member of AIHRC” to be part of the committee. Like Safi, Sediqi also asserted that he had participated in the committee to break the stalemate.

More manoeuvres

The president’s order to reconvene the Selection Committee in spite of legal concerns by some stakeholders was read by many observers of the Afghan election process as a statement in favour of a particular candidate. For instance, on 9 January 2018, Fazel Ahmad Manawi, a former head of the IEC and close ally of the chief executive, said “They [the government] once again established the committee. It means they want to pave the way for their favourite candidate to become the IEC chief.”

The name of Abdullah Ahmadzai, currently the head of the country office of The Asia Foundation, emerged in particular as a strong candidate for the job, as he seemed to have the support of key international stakeholders. Abdullah Ahmadzai had already served as the head of the IEC Secretariat during the 2010 parliamentary elections. (See AAN’s previous report here).

On 10 January 2018 in conversation with AAN, Abdullah Ahmadzai confirmed that he had indeed been “approached by a few people from the [g]overnment in November 2017 following [the] removal of Mr. Najibullah Ahmadzai from the IEC [c]hairmanship.” However, he had not applied for the vacancy after the Selection Committee called for applications. Ahmadzai wrote to AAN that the electoral law “only provides for selection of a replacement for the vacant position of a commissioner from the list of [the] remaining fourteen applicants previously interviewed by the President, CEO and other panel members. Since there is no provision in the current legislative decree for an alternative, any call for new applications is in contradiction with the current electoral law/legislative decree. Therefore, a consensus-based approach is required, if NUG leaders are looking for alternatives and are unable to select a candidate from the existing roster of 14 applicants for the IEC.”

A source from the international community told AAN that Ahmadzai had been annoyed by the fact that his name was made public for the position before there had been any formal agreement and that he was not in favour of opening another selection process, meaning he expected to be appointed directly, given that the legal procedure had not been adhered to (ie the appointee would not be from among the earlier round’s remaining candidates).

What next?

Based on article 15 of the electoral law, which is about oath-taking, the new member should be sworn in by the chief justice of the Supreme Court in the presence of the president. (6) On 16 January 2018, Hashemi told AAN that he had just been sworn in (see also this press release from the president’s office), but is still waiting to be officially introduced to the IEC by the second vice-president. Paragraph four of article 16 of the electoral law says that if the dismissed (or resigned or deceased) member is also the chair or deputy or secretary of the IEC, there should be a new internal election by the IEC. The IEC will now need to hold an internal election, not only to elect its chair but also its deputy chair for operations, deputy chair for administration and finance, as well as its secretary, who also serves as spokesperson for the IEC as the terms for those in these positions expired almost two months ago. However, IEC members could not hold elections in a situation while the seat of its chair remained empty. (7)

Therefore, on 26 December 2017, the IEC issued a statement saying that in the absence of one member, the election of the chair and other members of the administrative board of the commission remained ambiguous “which undoubtedly visits serious impacts upon the preparations for holding the elections on scheduled date.”

Hashemi told AAN that the IEC’s internal elections would be held next week (namely, after 19 January 2018) and that he would run as a candidate. However he refused to specify for which position and said that he would decide this in consultation with the six other IEC members.

There is one more vacancy at the IEC. On 21 October 2017, Afghan media reported that the president had sacked the head of the IEC Secretariat (also known as the chief electoral officer), Imam Muhammad Warimach. (See this AAN report here) This move, though, was not publicly confirmed by the president’s office. On 8 November 2017, IEC member Maleha Hassan confirmed to AAN that the president, in a meeting with IEC members and representatives of the International Community, had informed Warimach that he was a respected person but could not work for the IEC as its procurement was “in crisis” and appointments were “problematic.” She further said that the IEC had not yet received any official dismissal letter for Warimach, who continues to work in his position.

On 26 December 2017, the IEC issued a statement saying that following the president’s verbal dismissal of the head of the IEC Secretariat, the IEC sent an official letter to the president on 18 November 2017 asking him to send his written instruction to this effect as soon as possible. Following that, on 19 December 2017, the IEC proposed another acting head of the IEC’s Secretariat to the president, but did not receive a response to either of the two letters, according to the above statement. The IEC further said that ambiguity about the fate of the CEO would delay different election-related processes, including recruitment of secretariat staff. (8) On 17 January 2018, IEC spokesman Gula Jan Sayyad Badi told AAN that the person they had introduced to the president was Shahla Haque and that the president had approved this introduction the day before. He further said that Shahla was introduced as the acting CEO and that Warimach had bid farewell to his IEC colleagues. The IEC now needs to introduce three candidates to the president, who will appoint one as the CEO. According to Sayyad, the IEC will start the process after it holds its internal elections (next week).

Conclusion: internal divisions and trust deficit

Prior to the dismissal of the former IEC chairman, the IEC was already suffering from clear internal divisions which were first revealed by IEC member Maleha Hassan on 14 August 2017 during an event held by FEFA. At that time, she alleged that some IEC members had been “marginalised,” decisions were taken “secretly” by a small circle of commissioners and information was intentionally not shared with other IEC members. More than a month later, another IEC member, Mazallah Dawlati, also asserted that chairman Najibullah Ahmadzai, Abdul Qader Quraishi (the deputy for finance and administrative affairs), Gula Jan Badi Sayyad and Rafiullah Bedar were part of a group of IEC members who made decisions “secretly” excluding Hassan, Dawlati and the deputy for operations, Wasima Badghisi. Later on, however, five commissioners jointly wrote to the president asking for Ahmadzai’s dismissal, which the president heeded. (See AAN’s previous report here). Since Ahmadzai’s sacking, the remaining IEC members seem to be working together quite well. It remains to be seen whether the new member joining the IEC will reopen internal divisions or heal them for good.

This also depends on how outside pressure from diverse political groups plays out. Starting in early September 2017, they had increasingly voiced their mistrust in the IEC. Things reached a climax on 7 October 2017 when an umbrella group called “The Understanding Council of Political Currents of Afghanistan” came together and said that the IEC in “its current composition” did not have the “ability to hold transparent and fraud-free elections and is not trusted by the people or the political currents.” It called for the dismissal of all IEC and ECC members and appointment of new members in agreement with political parties, civil society organisations and political figures. (See AAN’s previous report on the members of the group and its demand here).

On 16 January 2018, Shiwa-ye Sharq, the head of Mehwar-e Mardom’s media committee, which is part of the Understanding Council in a conversation with AAN, criticised the selection process as a “unilateral approach” taken by the president, saying that the Understanding Council would soon come up with a statement on the selection committee and appointment of the new IEC member. According to him, the Council would reiterate its demand for the replacement of all electoral commissioners and an inclusive observation framework that should include all political groups.

This shows that the public discussion on the legitimacy and composition of Afghanistan’s key electoral institutions is far from over. The Understanding Council combines some heavyweight politicians and political groups, and its influence should not be underestimated. However, the choice, ultimately, is between speeding up the procedures to hold parliamentary elections as soon as possible or to renew the composition of the two commissions, which will certainly cause further controversy and delay. There are also political forces, such as Hezb-e Islami, who oppose changes to the electoral bodies and insist on elections this year, the feasibility of which is very much in doubt (see part one of our series here). This is probably a question that needs to be solved through the involvement of political parties, civil society organisations and other political figures.

 

(1) On 16 January 2018 Belal Sediqi, a member of the Selection Committee representing the AIHRC, told AAN that initially 88 potential applicants had obtained application forms from the Selection Committee’s secretariat, but only 57 candidates had submitted completed forms and other required documents. In an earlier announcement, the Committee had given a four-day deadline for applications, from 31 December 2017 to 3 January 2018 (see here). The electoral law does not specify the timeframe for applications and defers to the Selection Committee to do so, which should not take more than seven working days.

Paragraph two of article 12 of the electoral law says:
Candidates eligible under paragraph (1) of this article, shall submit their curriculum vitae, educational documents and citizenship Tazkera to the selection committee within the timeframe determined by the mentioned committee.

This timeframe cannot take more than seven working days.

(2) Article 16 of the electoral law:

1     A member of the Commission can be terminated from job in the following circumstances:

1.1-     Faking of the educational documents.

1.2-     Deprivation of civil rights on the order of a competent court.

1.3-     Conviction for committing crimes of misdemeanor or felony.

1.4-     Having membership in political parties during membership of the Commission.

1.5-     Breaching provisions of the Constitution of Afghanistan, this law and other laws enforced in the country.

1.6-     Suffering from an incurable or long-lasting disease which impedes performance of duties.

1.7-     Continuous absence from job for more than twenty days without justifiable legal reasons.

1.8-     Non-observance of provisions of Article 17 of this law.

2     Member of the Commission may tender his/her resignation in written to the president.

3     In case of resignation, termination or death of one or more members of the Commission, the President, within seven days, shall appoint new member (s) from amongst the remaining candidates stipulated in paragraph (2) of the Article (14) of this law; with due consideration to the ethnic and gender composition.

(3) Article 14 of the electoral law reads:

  • The selection committee will examine the documents mentioned in paragraph (2) of the article 12 of this law, and in case of any suspicion for the sake of ensuring its accuracy, refer them to the relevant authorities. The relevant authorities are obliged to provide complete information within three working days.

In case the suspicion is proved, the provider of the document shall be referred to the legal and judicial authorities.

  • From among the candidates, the selection committee shall introduce 21 persons to the president that meet the highest and most appropriate legal standards, while taking into consideration the ethnic and gender composition.
  • From among the candidates mentioned in paragraph (2) of this article, the president shall appoint members of the Commission, while respecting the ethnic and gender composition, having at least two female members for the first round, in the following order:
  • Four members for a period of five years.
  • Three members for a period of 3 years.
  • Members of the Commission in the following terms shall be appointed for a period of five years.
  • Meetings of the selection committee shall take place in an open manner in accordance to a separate procedure, to be adopted by its members.

(4) Those who signed the statement included FEFA, ADDO (Afghanistan Democracy and Development Organisation), Afghanistan Youths Social and Educational Organisation, Election and Transparency Watch Organisation of Afghanistan (ETWA), FETWO, FLOW and IDEA. On 8 January 2018, another group of civil society networks and organisations led by the Transparent Elections Foundation of Afghanistan (TEFA) held a press conference and consequently issued a statement regarding the Selection Committee and the general situation regarding the elections, calling on the president to dissolve the on-going selection committee process, which, it said, was illegal and should adhere to article 16 of the electoral law. It also said that the government’s interference in the working affairs of civil society was “a big blow to democracy and rule of law,” which needed to be avoided. They were referring to the appointment of Safi as representative of civil society organisations to the Selection Committee.

The signatories on the statement included: TEFA, Afghanistan Peace House, Afghan Civil Society Elections Network (ACSEN), Watch on Basic Rights of Afghanistan, Training Human Rights Association, Women Coordination Network, Civil Society Joint Working Group, Women and Children Legal Research Foundation (WCLRF), Afghanistan Youths Social and Educational Organisation, FRD, Election and Transparency Watch Organisation of Afghanistan (ETWA), and Civil Society Development and Growth Organisation.

(5) Article 13 of the electoral law reads:

  • For the purpose of verification of documents and determining competence and qualification of the candidates for membership of the Commission, the selection committee is established with the following composition:
  • Competent representative (Judge) of the Supreme Court, with the approval of the High Council of the Supreme Court, as the Chairperson of the selection committee.
  • One member of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, as elected by that commission as the member.
  • One member of the Independent Commission of Oversight of Implementation of the Constitution of Afghanistan, as elected by that commission, as the member.
  • Elected representative of the civil society organizations related to elections, as member.
  • Elected representative of the civil society organizations advocating for the women rights, as member.
  • Civil society organizations mentioned in sections (4 and 5) of the paragraph (1) of this article are obliged to introduce their representatives for the membership of the selection committee within seven working days of the date of notification. Otherwise, members stated in sections (1,2 and 3) of the paragraph (1) of this article will introduce 3 persons each from the organizations mentioned in sections (4 and 5) of the paragraph (1) of this article to the president; and the president will appoint two persons representing the two organizations as the members of the selection committee.

(6) Article 15 of the electoral law states:

Before occupying their position, members of the Commission shall take the following oath, in the presence of the President, administered by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court:

“I swear to Allah the Great to perform, as member of the Independent Election Commission, all assigned duties honestly, with integrity, independently, fully impartially and neutrally in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of Afghanistan this law, and other laws of the country.

(7) On 27 November 2016, the IEC elected Najibullah Ahmadzai as its chairman, Wasima Badghisi as the deputy for operations, Abdul Qader Quraishi as deputy for finance and administrative affairs, and Gula Jan Badi Sayyad as secretary and spokesman. (See AAN’s report for the members’ biographies here). According to paragraph two of article 11 of the electoral law, the chairperson is elected for a period of two years and six months, and the deputies and secretary (spokesperson) for a period of one year.

Article 11 of the electoral law states:

  • For the purpose of administration and supervision of every kind of elections and referral to the general public opinion in the country, the Commission comprised of seven members is established in accordance to this law:
  • The Commission shall have a Chairperson, Deputy (Operations), Deputy (Admin and Finance) and a Secretary (Spokesperson) that are elected from among the members of the Commission by themselves through free, secret, and direct elections in the following manner:
  • Chairperson of the Commission, for a period of two years and six months.
  • Deputies and secretary (spokesperson) of the Commission for a period of one year.
  • Chairperson, Deputies and Secretary of the Commission may nominate themselves for the next rounds as well.
  • Scope of duties and authorities of the deputies and secretary (spokesperson) shall be determined in the internal regulation to be adopted by the Commission.

(8) The IEC has indeed announced vacancies for various posts, including for the positions of 24 provincial electoral officers; and deputy head of the secretariat and seven heads of IEC departments. This is important, as, without these staff, the IEC cannot implement voter registration, which is another highly crucial step in preparation for the next elections. On 28 November 2017 the IEC announced that it planned to recruit 24 people for the positions of provincial electoral officers through open competition, which included Kabul, Maidan Wardak, Sar-e Pul, Khost, Jawzjan, Panjshir, Baghlan, Zabul, Nimruz, Logar, Kunar, Faryab, Kapisa, Herat, Balkh, Helmand, Samangan, Farah, Nuristan, Badghis, Ghazni, Laghman, Paktika and Kunduz. On3 December 2018 it announced another set of vacancies, which include important positions of deputy head of secretariat for operations, chief of staff of the IEC chair, heads of departments of policy and plan, public information and outreach, foreign relations, training, legal affairs, information technology, finance and accounting. In early January 2018, the IEC announced another 55 positions of grade three to seven to be filled (see the list here). A source from the IEC told AAN that the process had been delayed due to the dismissal of the IEC’s chairman.

All of these issues have caused delays and make holding the elections on 7 July 2018 almost impossible, despite the fact that on 2 January 2018, the IEC issued a statement saying that the upcoming elections would be held on the scheduled date. It rejected the news that the IEC was considering a fall-back date as “baseless.” The statement asked the people to trust the IEC as it was taking steps, which, it said, included the completion of the polling centre assessment (this will be discussed in a separate dispatch) and sending a voter registration plan to the government.

 

 

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

EU funding for defence stakeholders: EDA launches ‘ERASMUS+ platform’

EDA News - Thu, 18/01/2018 - 10:08

Strategic Research Agendas in defence and their Technology Building Blocks (OSRA-TBBs), as well as Key Strategic Activities (KSA) often build on specific defence-related Key Skills and Competencies (KSC). The cooperative development and enhancement of any KSC for defence can be concretely supported by EU funding programmes, among them, the “Erasmus+ 2014-2020”.

To raise awareness, transfer know-how and build autonomous capacity about the Erasmus+ opportunities for defence, the European Defence Agency (EDA) published the “EDA’s ERASMUS+ platform”.
This is a new user-friendly gateway providing potential defence-related stakeholders (such as Ministries of Defence, defence-related industry, research-and-technology organisations, academia, clusters) with:
• a swift and simple introduction to funding opportunities for Defence under the Erasmus+ programme; 
• an interactive analytical mapping on ‘sources’ of calls for proposals (and contact details of the relevant Agencies in charge of funding allocation).

For the EU budgetary framework until 2020, the Erasmus+ delivers more than 14 billion euros and can co-fund defence-related projects in support of:

  • the mobility of individuals (students / trainees / apprentices) acquiring competences, knowledge and skills;
  • the development, testing, implementation and transfer of innovative educational/training practices, by encompassing transnational training as well as the planning of professional development (also for Defence staff, thereby increasing the capacity to work at international level and exchange experience / know-how);
  • entrepreneurial skills in defence for graduates and employees.

More information:

 
Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Airbus CN235 crashes in Turkey, killing three

Jane's Defense News - Thu, 18/01/2018 - 02:00
An Airbus CN235 on a training flight from the 1st Main Jet Base Command in Eskisehir, central Anatolia, crashed on 17 January at a remote location in Isparta province, southern Turkey, killing its two pilots and technician. The Turkish Chief of General Staff’s office gave no information
Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Brazilian marines bolster amphibious capability

Jane's Defense News - Thu, 18/01/2018 - 02:00
The Brazilian Navy Marine Corps is significantly boosting its ability to conduct amphibious operations as it prepares to receive 23 AAV7A1 RAM/RS amphibious assault vehicles (commonly called the CLAnf in Brazil), This tranche includes 20 AAVP7A1 RAM/RS transports, two AAVC7A1 RAM/RS command posts,
Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Expected legalisation of private military companies would formalise and facilitate their contribution to Russia’s hybrid warfare capabilities

Jane's Defense News - Thu, 18/01/2018 - 02:00
Event On 17 January 2018, a senior Fair Russia party member of parliament in the State Duma, the lower chamber of the Russian parliament, said that his committee would introduce a bill that would legalise the activities of private military companies (PMCs) within one month. PMC is a term applied
Categories: Defence`s Feeds

IDF developing C2I smartwatch for field officers

Jane's Defense News - Thu, 18/01/2018 - 02:00
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are set to introduce a new portable command, control, and information (C2I) system for its ground forces, which for the first time will serve all field officer ranks, from platoon to brigade commanders. Called Shaked (Hebrew for ‘almond’), the new system
Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Pages