Defence`s Feeds

A new unmanned influence sweep prototype is intended to clear the way for the restoration of the Royal Navy’s minesweeping capability. Richard Scott reports Minesweeping is a term historically used to describe the clearing of moored contact mines through the use of towed mechanical (wire)

Jordan has received back into service the first of 12 Bell AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters that are being put through an extensive upgrade process. Northrop Grumman, which as a subcontractor to Science and Engineering Services (SES) is updating the avionics of the 1980s-vintage helicopters,

Key Points The plan is for 30 battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 warships to be ready to deploy in 30 days The “four-thirties” plan is to be approved by the NATO summit to be held in Brussels on 11–12 July NATO defence ministers gave the nod on 7 June to a new readiness

Key Points The Organization of American States has agreed to facilitate development of electoral reforms with President Daniel Ortega, the results of which are projected for January 2019, which increases the likelihood of a prolonged government hold on power. If the government rejects reform

The Philippines is looking to acquire a further 12 Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) FA-50PH Fighting Eagle light combat and trainer aircraft to add to 12 already received, national media reported on 8 June. Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana was quoted as saying that the country’s President

MEDIA reports on 1 June stated that within one week of the 13 and 14 May Islamist militant suicide attacks in Surabaya in Indonesia's East Java, security forces had arrested 74 suspected militants in the capital Jakarta, Sumatra, Riau, and other unspecified locations throughout Indonesia, Republika

IN A STATEMENT released on 1 June, chief of police Tito Karnavian stated that 41 people had been arrested in Indonesia's East Java province on unspecified dates in alleged connection to the Islamist militant suicide attacks conducted in Surabaya in East Java on 13 and 14 May, BBC Monitoring

Thailand’s military government has set a defence budget of THB227.67 billion (USD7.1 billion) for fiscal year 2019. Documents published by the government’s Bureau of the Budget show that the new expenditure is an increase of THB9.16 billion – or 4.2% - over actual defence spending

AT LEAST six army personnel - including a junior commissioned officer - were killed and one other was wounded when unidentified militants from Afghanistan's Paktika province launched a cross-border attack in the Shawal Valley area in North Waziristan Agency in Pakistan's Federally Administered

On 7 June 2018, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) co-organised the conference “Military Mobility – Key to European Security” in Brussels. Political and military decision-makers including Federica Mogherini, Head of the European Defence Agency, High-Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission, Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Krasimir Karakachanov, NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller and EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq as well as Ministers and high level officials of Member States and allied countries, EU bodies, NATO, and other relevant stakeholders assessed progress in and exchanged views on European military mobility.

Military Mobility is key to European security. Today’s security environment demands the smooth, efficient and effective movement of military personnel and assets within and beyond the European Union. As a complex and multidimensional issue, military mobility requires a ‘whole-of-government’ approach whilst respecting national sovereignty.

The EU’s Action Plan on Military Mobility, presented by HR/VP Federica Mogherini and the European Commission on 28 March 2018, outlines the steps the European Union is taking to improve Military Mobility. The Action Plan builds on the Roadmap on Cross-Border Military Transportation developed by the European Defence Agency and in close cooperation and coordination with all relevant actors, including NATO.  

In his opening speech, Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Krasimir Karakachanov, said: “The boundaries between internal and external security issues are getting less distinct, the hybrid nature of conflicts is already established as a rule. Improving military mobility is key to the EU's ability to effectively carry out its Common Security and Defense Policy’s operations. Assuring fast and efficient movement of military contingents and materiel, within and outside EU territory, will enable our Union to effectively react to the challenges of the contemporary highly dynamic strategic environment”.

In his closing speech, Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency, emphasized that “Military mobility is not just about defence. A whole of government approach is necessary to achieve results. At EU level we already took our share of responsibility and all relevant EU institutions, agencies and bodies are already working hand in hand to better serve the Member States’ needs. Looking at the European Council at the end of June, it is important for Heads of States and Government to address the issue in order to mobilise a whole of government approach.”

At the conference, high-level speakers from national governments and armed forces as well as NATO representatives and European defence actors discussed the way ahead in key note speeches and two panel discussions focussing on synergies and coordination as well as on military requirements for military mobility respectively. 
 

More information:

• Full conference programme
• EDA Factsheet on Military Mobility
• EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq - closing speech
• Video: speech by Head of EDA - HR/VP Federica Mogherini 
• Speech by Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Krassimir Karakachanov
• Speech Dutch Defence Minister Ank Bijleveld
• Speech NATO Dep.Sec.Gen. Rose Gottemoeller
• Speech by Richard Landolt, Senior Civilian Secretary of Defense Representative Europe and Defense Advisor to the US Mission to NATO
   

 

Studio Leaks Say Kilmer Will Join Tom Cruise in Anticipated Sequel Titled “Top Gun: Maverick” Every Hollywood entertainment news outlet lit up on Wednesday night with the news that actor Val Kilmer would return in the highly-anticipated sequel film “Top Gun: Maverick”. Kilmer played U.S. Navy Lt. Tom “Iceman” Kazansky in the original 1986 “Top […]

The further development of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on arms exports control

Tuesday 19/06/2018 - 9:30-10:30
Paul-Henri Spaak building - room P5B001 - Brussels

The Common position 2008/944/CFSP on arms exports dates back to the pre-Lisbon setup of the EU institutional system.
Since then, developments in the EU's geopolitical environment and geostrategic context have taken place. Technological developments in the military sphere also impact the future of warfare.
In this context, and at the dawn of broader and deeper EU-level defence cooperation, an overhaul of the Common position could be necessary.
The aim of the workshop is to present a forward-looking and stimulating reflection on what could be the evolution of the EU arms export control system, in the context of the current and upcoming developments.

Contacts and registration: poldep-expo@europarl.europa.eu
Further information
Programme workshop
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Americas

• Lockheed Martin is being tapped for work in support of the Air Force’s Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) system. The $9.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order provides for the continued conversion of the JASSM Extended Range (ER) missile operational flight program (MOFP) software baseline. The 2,000-pound AGM-158 JASSM is intended to be a stealthy, inexpensive GPS/IIR guided cruise missile. It’s designed to attack well-defended targets without putting its carrier aircraft in the crosshairs of new long-range surface to air missile systems. The JASSM-ER shares about 70% of hardware and 95% of the software with the normal JASSM. The Extended Range version however comes with an increased range of over 500 nautical miles and is certified for use in environments where GPS is heavily jammed, or not available. A preliminary software design review includes both the MOFP and an integrated flight simulation. Under this contract Lockheed will provide support, source data and analysis so that the government can obtain an authority to operate the C++ version of the JASSM-ER weapon system. Work will be performed in Orlando, Florida, and is expected to be complete by August 2019.

• The Navy is contracting Boeing for design agent and technical engineering services for the AN/USQ-82(V) family of systems. Boeing will provide advanced and highly specialized technical engineering to assist with system sustainment, cybersecurity and system integration under this $15.8 million contract. The AN/USQ-82(V) family of systems include a data multiplex system, fiber optic data multiplex system, and gigabit ethernet data multiplex system. This family has been developed for use on the Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers. The AN/USQ-82(V) family allows for network transfers inputs and outputs for the Burke-class destroyer’s machinery control systems, damage control system, steering control system, Aegis combat system, navigation displays, and interior communications alarms and indicators. It is designed to transfer data via a reliable, redundant, mission-critical network aboard Navy surface warships. It offers enhanced network communication capabilities by providing an IP-based backbone that supports multimedia services such as video and data. The cumulative value of the contract could rise to $82 million if all included options are exercised. Work will be performed at multiple locations, including Huntington Beach, California; Arlington, Virginia and Pascagoula, Mississippi. The contract is expected to be completed by May 2019.

Middle East & Africa

• One of Belgium’s NH-90 transport helicopter has reportedly carried out its first operational mission in Mali. The NH-90 emerged from a requirement that created a NATO helicopter development and procurement agency in 1992. The nearest equivalent would be Sikorsky’s popular Black Hawk family, but the NH-90 includes a set of innovative features that give it some distinguishing selling points. Its combination of corrosion-proofing, lower maintenance, greater troop or load capacity, and the flexibility offered by that rear ramp have made the NH-90 a popular global competitor. The NH-90 TTH base variant for land and air forces can carry between 12-20 troops and can load about 5,500 pounds. The NH-90 Fame MEDEVAC variant adds 2 intensive care bays for treating wounded personnel, on-board equipment, and seats for the medical team. Belgium nation has currently two NH-90s deployed in Mali in support of the United Nations peacekeeping mission. They became operational in March and will be used to transport wounded to specialized emergency stations. Initial deployment is four months, but this can be extended.

• The South African defense manufacturer ADG Mobility has successfully tested its 4×4 and 6×6 versions of the Ural Next range of trucks. The Ural Next series of trucks are the latest versions of Ural trucks that have been in service with Soviet-aligned countries since the early 1960s. The Ural Next is the successor of the Russian Ural-4320 heavy high mobility truck, designed for tough off-road conditions. Changes over the previous Ural-4320 include new cab, new engine and a number of other detailed modifications. However, it uses the same chassis and many automotive components are interchangeable between the Ural Next and Ural-4320. So, the Ural Next is rather an upgraded version than an entirely new design. The URAL 6×6 is also the basis for the Ural Taifun mine-resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle, in use by the Russian military. The main role of Ural Taifun is to carry troops in combat theatres where mines and improvised explosive devices are likely to be encountered. Alternatively, this vehicle can be used as command post or armored ambulance. The South African company imported these vehicles for delivery to the military of South Africa and the armed forces of Southern African Development Community region. The trucks are already in use by the militaries Namibia, Angola and Mozambique.

Europe

• The Italian defense contractor Leonardo has launched a more powerful version of its BriteCloud decoy jammer. This new version has been optimized for the protection of medium and large transport aircraft. The BriteCloud 55-T fits in the same 55 mm chaff and flare dispenser as the fighter variant. It can also be fitted into a square format dispenser using an adapter magazine as required. The system emits a stronger decoy radar signature to mimic the size of a transport aircraft. A BriteCloud decoy is released after an incoming missile has been detected by an aircraft’s radar warning receivers and generates a false radar target which draws the weapon away from its intended target. The BriteCloud 55-T can be installed on C-27J Spartan, A400M, KC-390 and C-130 aircraft. Other assets which could benefit from carrying the expendable decoy include air-to-air refueling aircraft and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, it adds.

• The UK Royal Navy is fitting its Type 45 destroyer with the Shaman communications electronic support measures (CESM) system. The HMS Defender is the first vessel to receive the system which is based on the US Navy’s AN/SSQ-130(V) Ship’s Signal Exploitation Equipment (SSEE) Increment F. SSEE essentially is a signals exploitation system that allows the operators to monitor and analyze signals of interest aboard a variety of ship classes. The Royal Navy has described the Shaman as “an essential information, surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance tool in the delivery of maritime force protection, security and maneuver”.

Asia-Pacific

• The government of Japan is set to receive one E-2D Advanced Hawkeye Aircraft as part of A US foreign military sale. The $135 million fixed-price-incentive contract will be exercised by Northrop Grumman. The E-2D Hawkeye is a carrier-capable “mini-AWACS” aircraft, designed to give long-range warning of incoming aerial threats. Secondary roles include strike command and control, land and maritime surveillance, search and rescue, communications relay, and even civil air traffic control during emergencies. The Hawkeye is based on the same airframe as the USA’s C-2 Greyhound cargo aircraft, with the obvious addition of the 24-foot diameter, frisbee-shaped, rotating radome on its back. It carries a crew of 5 – pilot, copilot, and 3 mission system operators. Work will be performed at various locations inside and outside the continental US including St. Augustine, Florida; Syracuse, New York; Melbourne, Florida and Aire-sur-l’Adour, France. Work is expected to be completed in March 2020.

Today’s Video

• British Army tests its LandCeptor missile.

Daring Class
(click to view full)

The 5,200t Type 42 Sheffield Class destroyers were designed in the late 1960s to provide fleet area air-defense for Britain’s Royal Navy, after the proposed Type 82 air defense cruisers were canceled by the Labour Government in 1966. Britain built 14 of the Type 42s, but these old ships are reaching the limits of their operational lives and effectiveness.

To replace them, the Royal Navy planned to induct 12 Type 45 Daring Class destroyers. The Daring class would be built to deal with a new age of threats. Saturation attacks with supersonic ship-killing missiles, that fly from the ship’s radar horizon to ship impact in under 45 seconds. The reality of future threats from ballistic missiles, and WMD proliferation. Plus a proliferation of possible threats involving smaller, hard to detect enemies like UAVs. Overall, the Type 45s promise to be one of the world’s most capable air defense ships – but design choices have left the cost-to-value ratio uncertain, and limited the Type 45s in other key roles. A reduced 6-ship program moved forward.

The Type 45 Destroyer Program

HMS Southampton
– a Type 42
(click to view full)

A total of 14 Type 42s were built, but no ship lasts forever. HMS Sheffield and HMS Coventry were sunk in the 1982 Falklands War, and Birmingham, Newscastle, Glasgow, Cardiff, and Southampton are no longer in service. Another 2 have been downgraded by removing their defensive Sea Dart missiles as an ‘economy’ measure, and are in reserve, leaving just 5 operational ships.

The Type 45 destroyer project really began when the 8-nation NFR-90 frigate program fragmented into pieces. The USA and Canada elected not to pursue a modern frigate at all. Spain developed the 6,250t F100 AEGIS frigate, which it has now sold to Australia as the future Hobart Class. Holland and Germany developed the 5,700t F124 Sachsen/ LCF De Zeven Provincient Class air defense frigate. The UK, Italy, and France, meanwhile, embarked on the Horizon Class New Generation Common Frigate. In 1999, about 7 years after the initial requirement was floated, Britain dropped out of the NGCF project, citing a need for a larger ship, with wider air defense capabilities, and a British combat management system. Italy and France went on to order a total of 4 (2 each) 6,600t Horizon Class frigates.

Rather than using a modified variant of America’s multi-role 8,000t DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class, whose costs and performance were stable, Britain proposed to develop its own air warfare destroyer, with better high-end anti-air capabilities. The new 7,350t base/ 7,800t full displacement ships would share the MBDA PAAMS system, built on its Aster-15 and Aster-30 missiles, instead of the popular Raytheon SM-2/SM-3 missile family. PAAMS would be complemented by a different set of radar systems on the Type 45, but the Horizon Class had different radar fittings for each country anyway.

Horizon/Forbin Class
(click to view full)

Plans originally called for 12 Type 45s. They would restore Britain’s anti-air capability by replacing the 14 Type 42 destroyers, and supplement Britain’s remaining Type 23 frigates given the Duke Class’ limited ability to cope with the newest threats. In July 2000, Britain approved expenditure of GBP 5 billion, with a maximum acceptable cost of GBP 5.47 billion, to buy 6 Type 45 destroyers out of a planned class of 12. The first ship was expected to enter service in November 2007.

Since then, the project has experienced significant cost increases and delays. At the same time, planned ship buys were cut. The 12-ship plan became 8 Type 45s in 2004. And the program experienced a full contract renegotiation in 2007. Even after that re-negotiation, Britain’s 2008 Defence Equipment Report listed the overall program as 36 months behind schedule and GBP 989 million (almost $2 billion) over budget. In June 2008, the British government declined its option on Daring Class ships #7 and 8.

The NAO’s 2012-13 Major Projects Report places the overall cost for the 9-year Assessment Phase, the 6-ship Demonstration & Manufacture Phase, and initial support at GBP 5.802 billion (about $11.49 billion), plus another GBP 747 million (about $1.48 billion) for long-term support.

Ships of class include:

• D32 HMS Daring
  
• D33 HMS Dauntless
  
• D34 HMS Diamond
  
• D35 HMS Dragon
  
• D36 HMS Defender
  
• D37 HMS Duncan

Aster-30 test,
Longbow barge
(click to view full)

The first of class HMS Daring successfully completed contractor-led sea trials in September 2008, and Royal Navy sea trials in July 2009. D32 Daring was formally handed over to the Royal Navy in December 2009, over 2 years later than planned. and achieved limited operational capability in February 2010. HMS Daring did not fire her 1st air defense missile, however, until May 2011, which makes for an arguable slippage of 3.5 years. HMS Daring’s 1st mission began in January 2012, but full capability for even this 1st ship of class may have to wait until 2014.

HMS Dauntless completed her 2nd set of contractor-led sea trials in summer 2009, was handed over in December 2009, and was commissioned in June 2010 – at which point, the ship’s primary air defense system wasn’t operational yet. She is now considered to be operational.

HMS Diamond began sea trials in October 2009, was handed over in September 2010, and was commissioned in May 2011. She was deemed ready for operations in December 2011.

HMS Dragon’s contractor-led trials began in summer 2010. She arrived in Portsmouth in September 2011, and was commissioned into the fleet in April 2012.

HMS Defender was launched onto the Clyde in October 2009, and completed initial contractor sea trials in November 2011. She completed 2nd sea trials in April 2012, and was commissioned in March 2013.

The 1st construction block of D37 Duncan was moved to berth in January 2010, and Duncan was formally launched in October 2010. First sea trials have taken place, and she sailed into her home port of Portsmouth in March 2013. Commissioning took place at the the end of December 2013.

The Daring Class

Type 45 concept
(click to view full)

The final Type 45 design is 152.4m long and 21.2m wide, with a standard displacement of 7,350t and full displacement of 7,800t. The ships will cruise at 17 knots using all-electric propulsion, powered by 2 WR-21 advanced cycle modular gas turbine engines, with intercooler and exhaust recuperator (ICR) heat exchangers to reduce fuel consumption. Each turbine will provide 25MW of power, and the propulsion systems will be built by a team that includes Rolls-Royce, Northrop Grumman, and Alsthom Power Conversion Ltd. Expected top speed is 27 knots, but in trials, HMS Daring reportedly bettered 30 knots with both turbines engaged. At 190 sailors, the embarked crew will be smaller than previous ships, with better accommodations and provisions for up to 235. The ship will also be able to carry up to 60 Royal Marines.

Daring Class weapons will include the 4.5-inch Mark 8 Mod 1 gun, and a pair 30 mm guns integrated to an Electro-Optic Gun Control System. The ships were not initially fitted with defensive weapons like Raytheon’s 20mm Mk15 Phalanx or Thales’ 30mm Goalkeeper for last-ditch missile defense and close-in kills, but late 2011 will see installation and trials of the Phalanx Block 1B.

For anti-submarine use, the ships will rely on a multi-function MFS-7000 bow sonar, and Stingray anti-submarine torpedoes that must be launched from its helicopters, since the ship carries no torpedo tubes. The ship will also be equipped with the Surface Ship Torpedo Defence System, designed to protect the ship against the threat of advanced current and future torpedoes.

The embarked helicopters will initially be Lynx HMA Mark 8s, but could eventually be EH101 Merlins or AW159 Lynx Wildcats, with all associated weapons. Since the Type 45s will not initially be fitted with any anti-ship missiles, they will also be forced to depend on their helicopters for this capability.

Quick tour
click for video

The Type 45’s main armament is its PAAMS air defense system, now known as “Sea Viper.” Sea Viper has several components.

The ship’s radars are what will really set it apart from previous vessels. BAE’s SAMPSON is an dual-face, active-array, digital beamforming radar that operates in the E/F bands, and can continuously and simultaneously illuminate a large number of targets for surveillance and fire control. It will be supplemented by the Long Range Radar (LRR), which is an evolution of Thales’ SMART-L active array volume search radar. The Thales/Marconi S1850M operates in the D-band, for wide air and surface search that can include ballistic missile tracking.

A digital Vigile DPX R-ESM system from Thales will help the destroyers monitor the electromagnetic environment around them, picking up on key items like incoming missile radars. Thales’ Vigile is designed to operate in electro-magnetically “crowded” environments, like the near-shore littoral zones.

Once targets are detected, BAE’s combat system will be able to call on the ship’s 48-cell Sylver A50 vertical launcher system (VLS). That means a mix of up to 48 missiles that can include medium range Aster-15s with a 30 km/ 18 mile reach; or the longer range, ballistic missile defense capable Aster-30s with an 80-100 km/ 50-60 mile range. Smaller Sylver A43/A35 launchers can quad-pack 4 short-range Crotale NG/VT-1 missiles per cell, but these weapons are not expected to be part of the Type 45’s armament.

Other roles beyond air defense and anti-submarine duties are possible for the Daring Class. These ships will be able to act as a base platform for a deployable headquarters, and will be able to embark up to 60 troops and their equipment, over and above the ship’s normal complement. A modern medical facility is available with surgical facilities, and the ships can take on up to 700 people in support of a civilian evacuation.

Missing From Action

CEC Concept
(click to enlarge)

Cost growth on the Type 45 destroyers has whittled away many of the ships’ planned capabilities, as features and items were removed. These capabilities could be added later, but until they are, the Type 45s will be missing key features one would expect in a top-of-the-line modern destroyer, or even in a high-end frigate.

Offense. The most obvious gap is anti-ship missiles, and their lack means that the Daring Class will require protection of their own from other ships. Britain’s dwindling frigate strength, and complete lack of maritime patrol aircraft with the retirement of its Nimrods, are going to create limitations in the fleet’s ability to cover all of those bases, and will make its naval groups more brittle in the event of losses.

Torpedoes. Another obvious gap involves torpedoes. Type 45s aren’t fitted with torpedo launchers, and their vertical launch cells won’t hold rocket-launched torpedo systems like the USA’s ASROC-VL. The Type 45 is being sold as an advanced anti-submarine platform, which makes this omission rather puzzling. The ships’ only response will involve readying and launching a torpedo-armed helicopter, which may take more time than a ship has in a difficult situation.

The good news is that these may be the easiest gaps to fix. If Britain wishes to sidestep vertical launch requirements, there is some space abaft the PAAMS silos for mounting fixed missile launchers to house anti-ship and/or anti-submarine missiles. Nevertheless, those spaces will be empty when the ships are built and accepted.

Other gaps are less obvious, but equally consequential.

CEC. The ships were originally slated to receive Co-operative Engagement Capability (CEC). This American system gives fitted ships the ability to see what other CEC-equipped ships, aircraft, or land stations see, and to fire at targets the launching ship’s radars cannot see. It’s vital for wide-area anti-air defense, and for ballistic missile defense. Preliminary contracts were issued, but in 2012 the Ministry of Defence decided not to install this relatively inexpensive capability on its ships. The consequence is that the Type 45s will be less effective in their central role of air defense, when compared to ships with less advanced technologies on board plus CEC.

Short Sylver. For other tasks beyond air defense, this ship’s DCNS Sylver A50 launchers are only 5m long, which means they’re not able to carry Scalp (Storm Shadow) vertically-launched land attack cruise missiles, or other strike-length payloads like the SM-3 naval anti-ballistic missile. The 4.5m long VL-ASROC anti-submarine missile/torpedo would fit the A50, but it is designed to work with the Mk 41 vertical launch system and would have to be integrated and tested.

The ships reportedly do have space in front of the 48 cell Sylver A50 system to accommodate another 12-cell launcher, but they will not initially be fitted with one. DCNS’ Sylver A70 is an obvious option, but there has been talk of retrofits involving a BAE/Lockheed Mk.41 strike-length VLS there instead. Either VLS choice would give the Daring Class the space to host land-strike missiles, though Britain’s current naval doctrine assigns that role exclusively to its nuclear-powered fast attack submarines. Choosing the Mk.41 would also allow the ships to add SM-3 missiles, if additional upgrades were made to the ship’s datalinks and combat system.

Type 45: Comparisons

HNLMS Tromp LCF
(click to view full)

The 7,350t Type 45’s VLS holding capacity is smaller than the equivalent American Arleigh Burke Class destroyer’s 90-96 Mk41 cells; indeed, at just 48 cells, it’s equivalent to Spain’s 6,250t F100 AEGIS frigates.

Daring’s missile array is slightly more capable than, and boasts more range than, the RIM-162 Evolved Seasparrow/ SM-2 combination found on many other western anti-aircraft ships. Unfortunately, that performance improvement comes with a penalty: Aster-15s cannot be quad-packed in Sylver launchers, the way the RIM-162 can be quad-packed in the popular Mk41 VLS. As the table above demonstrates, the resulting math is merciless.

On the other hand, Navantia’s F100 is restricted by the 2 SPG-62 radar illuminators available for final targeting of incoming missiles. Fast switching is less than optimal against supersonic missiles with terminal maneuvering, whereas the Sea Viper radar system has the option of continuous tracking and guidance for up to 10 targets, in order to make better use of the missiles that it has against saturation attacks.

The 5,700t German/Dutch F124/ De Zeven Provincien Class air defense frigates might be a better comparison. Against these ships, the Daring Class comes off poorly. The German & Dutch ships use a similar active array radar approach (Thales APAR/ SMART-L), giving them similar defensive capabilities against saturation attacks, but they field more anti-aircraft missiles, as well as a rounded set of naval capabilities. Like Navantia’s F100s, the De Zeven Provincien Class’ ballistic missile defense capabilities and CEC compatibility are partially proven, as they have participated in BMD exercises with the US Navy.

As of 2013, Britain’s CAMM-M/ Sea Ceptor missile offers the Type 45s a way out of this dilemma. Sea Ceptor missiles have shorter range than the ESSM, but they can be quad-packed in Sylver launchers, and their active radar seekers don’t require continuous illumination from the ship’s radar. With Sea Ceptors on board, a Daring Class ship regains competitiveness with its air-defense peers by hosting a formidable 3-tiered defense of 16 long-range Aster-30s, 20 medium-range Aster-15s, and 48 CAMM missiles.

Many of these design differences with their fellow NF-90 spinoffs trace back to the Type 45 project’s fundamental mandate. Britain’s government decided that it preferred to leverage and extend the investments they had made in the PAAMS air defense system before Britain left the Horizon Class project, while pursuing its own destroyer design instead of buying or modifying an off-the-shelf ship type. The choice of PAAMS forced the Sylver/Aster missile combination instead of the Mk. 41, while cost overruns and the need for cost containment on its custom-designed destroyer cut further into the Type 45’s fielded capabilities.

Contracts and Key Events

Editor’s note: this section is not yet comprehensive, and will be expanded.

Vertical launch system. Sensor support.

D35 Dragon
(click to view full) 2018

June 7/18: Updated CESM capability The UK Royal Navy is fitting its Type 45 destroyer with the Shaman communications electronic support measures (CESM) system. The HMS Defender is the first vessel to receive the system which is based on the US Navy’s AN/SSQ-130(V) Ship’s Signal Exploitation Equipment (SSEE) Increment F. SSEE essentially is a signals exploitation system that allows the operators to monitor and analyze signals of interest aboard a variety of ship classes. The Royal Navy has described the Shaman as “an essential information, surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance tool in the delivery of maritime force protection, security and maneuver”.

2013

Dec 30/13: D37 commissioned. The UK announces that:

“HMS Duncan, the Royal Navy’s sixth Type 45 Destroyer, has entered into service four months ahead of schedule. The ship was scheduled to enter service in early 2014, but thanks to the hard work of both the ship’s company and industry since her arrival in Portsmouth, HMS Duncan is ready to take up duties now. The 7,500 tonne vessel will now embark on a programme of trials to prepare the ship and her crew for operational deployment.”

Sources: Royal Navy, “Final Type 45 Destroyer enters service early”.

Sept 10/13: Sea Ceptor for Daring. The UK Ministry of Defence announces the 1st CAMM production contract: GBP 250 million (about $393 million) for the Sea Ceptor/ CAMM-M. Final assembly will take place at MBDA’s Lostock facility, with 9 Tier-1 subcontractors distributed across sites in England and Scotland.

The UK’s announcement of the missile’s platforms is equally significant. Sea Ceptor will be retrofitted to Type 23 Duke Class frigates beginning in 2016, serve aboard the forthcoming Type 26 frigate as its primary air defense system – and complement the Aster missiles on the Royal Navy’s Type 45 destroyers. That seemingly simple addition changes how the Daring Class stacks up against other nations’ air defense ships, as shown in this article’s revised comparison chart. Sources: UK MoD, Sept 10/13 release | Royal Navy, Sept 11/13 release | MBDA, Sept 9/13 release.

Sea Ceptor added

Aug 21 – Sept 10/13: Naval FAC. During her deployment in the Persian Gulf, HMS Dragon conducts a number of exercises with British and American planes, acting as a forward air controller to vector them onto targets at sea. Participating aircraft included RAF Tornado GR4s, USMC F/A-18s, USAF F-15 fighters and B-1 bombers, and H-60 Seahawk helicopters. The ship also worked with ScanEagle UAVs, a British Sea King Mk7 for wide-area aerial surveillance, and a USAF E-8C JSTARS for wide-area surface scans. Sources: Royal Navy, Aug 21/13 and Sept 10/13 releases.

Aug 29/13: Costs. In response to a question from a May 20/13 hearing of the Public Accounts Committee, Britain’s Ministry of Defence provides operating costs figures for a Type 45 Destroyer. The annual Type 45 unit running cost at FY12/13 rates is GBP 48.57 million (about $77.75 million): 8.76 million personnel; 6.41 million fuel, inventory and services; and 33.4 million general ship maintenance.

There are useful caveats to this information. One is that the destroyers are new platforms, which means that operating costs tend to be low. Data will improve as deployments become more routine, but costs will be controlled somewhat by the presence of a “Contracting for Availability” support contract. Sources: HC 113 Public Accounts Committee Session 2013-14, “Written evidence from the Ministry of Defence”

Operating costs

Aug 30/13: Training. While in the Persian Gulf, HMS Dragon works to embark all 3 of the Royal Navy’s helicopter types: AW101 Merlin, Lynx, and the Sea King Mk.7 ASaC airborne early warning helicopter. The Royal Navy release notes that for “lilly-pad” operations:

“The flight deck, which remains unmanned throughout takeoff and landing, also has an automation and signalling system – involved in launching and recovering aircraft – that can land helicopters as large as a Chinook on board.”

July 4/13: Criminal case? The Herald reports that a dispute over Type 45 work could end up in criminal court over false testimony by Tom Stark, the managing director of Wilh Wilhelmsen subsidiary Ticon Isulation in Stepps, North Lanarkshire. Deck-Rite of Bishopbriggs, East Dunbartonshire sued Ticon for GBP 750,000 over work they did insulating the decks of Britain’s Type 45 destroyers. In their defense, Ticon submitted an April 14/04 tender letter that their own lawyers now admit was a fabrication.

While lying in court rarely attracts penalties in America, it’s taken seriously in Britain, and results in criminal prosecution. Mr. Stark could face up to 2 years in prison if convicted. Meanwhile, Ticon also owns a GBP 57 million contract to insulate the decks of Britain’s 2 forthcoming Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers. The Herald.

May 28/13: SSOP. Thales UK signs a 10-year, GBP 600 million Sensor Support Optimisation Project (SSOP) with the Ministry of Defence. It extends the 2003 Contractor Logistics Support deal that covered electronic warfare/ ESM and sonar system support on an array of submarines and surface ships, and the Daring Class falls within its ambit. Read “SSOP: Britain Extends Contracting Innovations into Naval Sensors” for full coverage.

SSOP support contract

May 14/13: Mk-41 + MBDA. MBDA signs an MoU with Lockheed Martin to jointly explore the market for the integration of MBDA naval missile systems into Lockheed Martin’s MK-41 Vertical Launch System, and ExLS VLS/cell insert. They’ll begin with a late 2013 demonstration involving Britain’s new CAMM-M Sea Ceptor missile, which seems to indicate a favored position for the Mk-41 on board Britain’s forthcoming Type 26 frigates.

The implications reach far beyond CAMM. Britain has already been considering adding a set of Mk-41 cells to the Type 45 destroyer, in order to hold SM-3 ballistic missile defense missiles. Adding CAMM to those cells would make the drop-in even more attractive, by giving the Type 45s two things they don’t currently have: snap-launch anti-submarine defenses (VL-ASROC), and a larger array of air defense missiles that offer excellent coverage against saturation attacks (quad-packed CAMM). If the same VLS could fire MBDA’s Aster-15 and Aster-30 missiles, it might even be worth considering a full swap-out of DCNS’ Sylver A50 VLS. Read “CAMM Opener for the Naval Missile Market: MBDA & LMCO’s MoU” for full coverage.

MBDA/ Lockheed Mk-41 MoU

March 22/13: D37. Duncan arrives at her home port of Portsmouth. UK MoD.

March 21/13: D36 Commissioned. HMS Defender is commissioned into the Royal Navy at a ceremony in her home port of Portsmouth. The News.

Jan 10/13: NAO Report. Britain’s National Audit Office releases their 2012 Major Projects Report. With respect to the Type 45 project, figures have become fairly refined. The Demonstration & Manufacture Phase’s expected cost to completion at approval was GBP 4.757 billion, but actual costs will be closer to GBP 5.556 billion, which is a 16.8% increase. The good news is that the final cost estimate dropped about GBP 108 million over the past year. Why so?

“The successful delivery of the above programme milestones has allowed the MoD to retire risk funding and for both Industry and MoD to re-cost remaining activities with greater certainty in the final outturn of the programme.”

Overall cost for the 9-year Assessment Phase, D&M, and initial support comes to GBP 5.802 billion (about $11.49 billion). NAO forecasts another GBP 747 million (about $1.48 billion) for long-term support.

2012

EuroSAM support.

D33 Dauntless
(click to view full)

Aug 31/12: D37. Duncan puts to sea for the first time for trials. UK MoD.

July 25/12: D36. Defender sails into HMNB Portsmouth for sea trials on schedule, before being declared ready for operations in 2013. UK MoD.

July 9-13/12: D35 missile firing. HMS Dragon successfully tests her Sea Viper weapon system against a target drone, at the Outer Hebrides missile range off Scotland. UK MoD.

July 2/12: The Thales/MBDA joint venture EuroSAM signs a 5-year, EUR 360 million Integrated In-Service Support (IISS) contract with the EU’s OCCAR. It’s their 1st joint, multi-system and multinational (Britain, France, Italy) support contract for air defence systems, based on MBDA’s Aster-15/30 missiles and associated combat systems.

The big agreement launching PAAMS/Aster orders was signed in March 2002, but it takes time for development and delivery to make long-term support an issue. It also isn’t easy to get agreement on a support framework that can serve the operational requirements of navy, air force, and army customers, across multiple countries. International customer exchange meetings and an official forum “equal to an “Aster family Users’ Club,” will become part of this arrangement going forward. The combination of a common agreement and common forums is also expected to help ensure some consistency in upgrades and improvements.

MBDA produces the Aster missiles. Thales is responsible for the Fire Control Systems on board France’s Charles de Gaulle nuclear aircraft carrier (SAAM-Fr), France & Italy’s 4 high-end Horizon Class air defense “frigates”, and Britain’s Type 45 destroyers (PAAMS), and 17 French & Italian ground-based SAMP/T air defense systems, which use the Aster-30 missile. They’re also responsible for the Horizon and Type 45’s S1850M wide search radars, derived from Thales’ SMART-L. Note Britain’s complementary Sea Viper support contract, announced on May 17/11. EuroSAM | Thales.

EuroSAM support contract

June 11/12: No CEC. Speaking during question period in the House of Commons, Defence Secretary Philip Hammond said the Royal Navy had identified Co-operative engagement Capability as a “lesser priority” during the Planning Round 12 process, and decided not to spend around GBP 500 million to implement it on their 6 Daring Class destroyers and 12-13 forthcoming Type 26 frigates. Media coverage criticized the decision, and the UK MoD’s blog responded that:

“The MoD’s comprehensive assessment of CEC informed the decision made during PR12 that it was not necessary to commit to purchasing the capability at this stage. As the Defence Secretary made clear last month, the MoD budget has headroom of £8bn over the next 10 years for potential new programmes. The Armed Forces Committee will prioritise which projects to commit to when necessary, and not before.”

The American CEC system gives fitted ships the ability to see what other CEC-equipped ships, aircraft, or land stations see, and to fire at targets the launching ship’s radars cannot see. It is vital for wide-area anti-air defense, and for ballistic missile defense. Daily Telegraph | Defence Management.

No CEC

June 12/12: D34 deploys. HMS Diamond will spend 6 months carrying out maritime security patrols in the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf, replacing her sister ship HMS Daring. UK MoD.

June 1/12: Nice timing. HMS Diamond launches the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee weekend with a spectacular ceremonial entry into Portsmouth, celebrating 50 years on the throne for one of Britain’s greatest monarchs. Royal Navy.

May 1/12: D34 missile firing. HMS Diamond [D34] fires its PAAMS/Sea Viper air defense system, destroying a target drone. The successful test leaves her ready for operations. BFBS | UK MoD.

April 23-27/12: D33 exercise. HMS Dauntless [D33] participates in Exercise Saharan Express off the coast of Senegal. The 11 nation exercise includes France, Gambia, Senegal and Morocco, among others. Next stop, the Falklands (vid. Jan 31/12). UK MoD.

April 26/12: D35 commissioned. HMS Dragon [D35] is formally commissioned into the fleet. UK MoD.

April 26/12: Lord West, who was Britain’s First Sea Lord from 2002-2006, is pushing for 2 more Type 45 destroyers from his seat in the House of Lords. That had been the plan while he held his post, until rising costs and other budgetary priorities led Britain to decline its option on ships # 7 & 8 in 2008. The government’s recent admission that there was ‘no provision’ for the loss of any ships in its SDSR plans appears to have been the catalyst. From Portsmouth’s The News:

“Lord Alan West said a fleet of 19 frigates and destroyers is not big enough for Britain and raised his concern about the lack of a contingency plan if the navy lost ships fighting in a war… I think we are in desperate need of more than 19 ships. It’s just not enough and the government needs to come up with some way to increase that fast. We need at least two more Type 45s.”

Absent huge budget increases, there is no way to increase fleet size quickly, unless Britain were to shift toward lower-end small frigates and corvettes as accompaniments to the Type 45s.

April 18/12: Daring a dud? The Portsmouth News reports that HMS Daring went alongside for 3 days of secret repairs at Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard in Bahrain in March, after she encountered propulsion problems with a starboard shaft bearing off of Kuwait.

“The News has been told the problems are being caused by a propeller drive shaft which is bent out of alignment. A well-placed source said it’s an issue isolated to Daring and was known about before the high-profile ship was commissioned in July 2009.”

If that’s true, it helps make sense of the 2010 (q.v. Nov 19/10 entry) and 2012 incidents, but it’s very bad news for the ship. A bent shaft means a long future of problems ahead, until a very difficult and expensive fix is made.

April 10/12: After a month at trials of her maneuvering, power, and combat systems trials, D36 Defender has completed her 2nd trial set, and remains on track for a July 2012 induction into the Royal Navy. See also Nov 21/11 entry. UK MoD.

April 4/12: SSST test. A GQM-163 Coyote launched from the Mediterranean island of Levant is used as a supersonic maneuvering target for France’s high-end Forbin air defense ship, which shoots it down using an MBDA Aster-30 missile. Her sister ship, FS Chevalier Paul, tracked the target and the missiles fired.

France’s Horizon Class destroyers use a different radar than the Daring Class, but shares the same air-defense missiles and the PAAMS combat system. DGA [in French] | US NAVAIR

Jan 30/12: Digital ESM. Thales UK touts its new fully digital, radar electronic support measures (RESM) digital antennas on board HMS Daring. The new antennas were installed under the UAT MOD 2 program, and are one of the attractions being shown at the DIMDEX 2012 exhibition in Doha, Qatar.

Thales had to develop the direct radio frequency sampling and wideband digital receiver technology that allows the RESM to manage multiple, truly simultaneous signals, and to perform better in dense electronic environments.

March 13/12: D35 Dragon and D36 Defender begin 2nd stage sea trials. UK MoD.

Jan 31/12: D33 1st mission. HMS Dauntless [D33] gets her own initial deployment, to the Falkland Islands. The move comes amidst growing threats and hostility from Argentina, who invaded the islands and then lost a war with Britain in the 1980s. Naturally, the British government denies that there’s any connection. BBC.

Jan 11/12: D32 1st mission. HMS Daring sets sail for the new ship type’s 1st operational mission, to take place “east of Suez.” There’s wide speculation that this means the Persian Gulf, where Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz are focusing global attention.

2011

Long-term support. Phalanx added.

HMS Daring fires
Sea Viper
(click to view full)

Dec 7/11: D34 ready. The Royal Navy declares HMS Diamond [D34] ready for operations, after its crew passes both BOST(Basic Operational Sea Training) and FOST(Flag Officer Sea Training). The culmination is the “Thursday War,” when the crew must deal with simulated incoming missiles, while the ship’s company works in darkness and smoke to handle simulated fires and flooding, loss of propulsion and steering, and other fun times.

HMS Daring [D32], HMS Dauntless [D33], and HMS Diamond [D34] are all scheduled to deploy in 2012. UK MoD.

Nov 21/11: D36. D36 Defender has successfully completed her 1st set of sea trials, testing speed, manoeuvrability, sensors and weapons. Her next step is to return to the BAE Systems yard in Scotstoun, Glasgow, where she was built. The ship has been linked to Glasgow as its patron city, and the crew has been busy forging links.

Defender will return to sea in March 2012 for a 2nd set of trials, and is on schedule to make her debut in her future home of Portsmouth in mid-July 2012. After more trials and training, she’s expected to join the fleet in early 2013. UK MoD.

Sept 13/11: SM-3s? Raytheon announces successful testing for their prototype dual-band datalink, allowing ships that use either Lockheed Martin SPY-1/ AEGIS or Thales Nederland’s SMART-L and/or APAR radars to employ the full range of Standard Missiles for air and ballistic missile defense, including the SM-3.

The firm cites up to 20 eligible ships, including SPY-1/ AEGIS/ MK41 VLS operators in Norway (Fridtjof Nansen) and Spain (F100); as well as APAR/ SMART-L/ MK41 radar operators in Denmark (Iver Huitfeldt), Germany (F124 Sachsen), the Netherlands (De Zeven Provincien); and closely derived S1850 operators in France (Horizon), Italy (Horizon) and the United Kingdom (Type 45).

For discussion of the issues, and the ships Raytheon left out, read “Raytheon’s Datalink: A New Naval Standard for the Standard?”

Aug 27-31/11: D35. Dragon sets sail from BAE’s Scotsun yard on the Clyde River, manned by a combined BAE Systems and Royal Navy crew, for the journey to her new home port of Portsmouth. Formal handover happens in Portsmouth on Aug 31/11, followed by more trials. BAE Systems | UK MoD.

July 12/11: D34 commissioned. Britain’s 3rd Type 45 air defense destroyer, HMS Diamond, officially joins the Royal Navy. UK MoD.

June 27/11: Sea Viper sub-contract. BAE Systems announces a 6-year, GBP 46 million (about $73.5 million) contract from Sea Viper lead MBDA. BAE will support all Sampson radars over its period of performance, including those that have not yet entered service. BAE will provides technical support, a spares and repairs service, maintenance through the joint MBDA/BAE Systems waterfront team in Portsmouth. The team will also provide ongoing support at the Maritime Integration and Support Centre (MISC) in Portsmouth, and at BAE’s Cowes, Isle of Wight radar testing facility. BAE Systems will remain the design authority and designated help desk support for Sampson.

This new arrangement follows a GBP 6 million, 18-month contract in September 2010, and is intended as a forerunner to a full ‘contract for availability’ arrangement. First, however, all parties need to generate data on the radar’s performance, in order to act as a long-term baseline. BAE Systems.

June 21/11: Phalanx added. Babcock International Group announces the pending qualification and testing of Raytheon’s MK.15 Phalanx 1B 20mm close-in weapon system on HMS Daring. The Type 45s were not delivered with secondary defensive systems for use against UAVs, small boats, and incoming missiles, so the pending qualification will help to patch the gaps in their defenses.

Babcock will supervise the installation of 2 systems in HMS Daring at Portsmouth Naval Base, as a lead-in to Naval Weapon Sea Trials (NWST), including a towed target firing. Most British ships have used Thales larger 30mm Goalkeeper system, but the Phalanx is an easier and cheaper as a “bolt-on” addition. Babcock’s previous Phalanx installations have been upgrades on the Type 42 destroyer HMS York, and the fleet replenishment ship RFA Fort Victoria.

MK15 Phalanx CIWS

June 20/11: SM-3s for Type 45s? Raytheon Missile Systems VP Ed Miyashiro is telling journalists that a number of other platforms are being looked at for NATO/European ballistic missile defense, including Britain’s Type 45s. The ship class’ MBDA Aster-30 missiles have just begun land tests against ballistic missiles, but Raytheon’s SM-3 family has both a longer testing record, and an SM-3 Block II that promises very significant performance improvements. For cash-strapped European governments, it also comes with much cheaper missile defense development costs, thanks to American and Japanese advance work.

The issue would be integration. Spanish F100 frigates are the most straightforward, with the same AN/SPY-1D radars and Mk.41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) as American ships. The same AEGIS BMD upgrade set used in American destroyers would suffice. Dutch and German F124 frigates, and the pending Danish Ivar Huitfeldt Class ships, also carry the MK.41 VLS, but use higher-performance Thales APAR and SMART-L radars. That requires additional integration and modification work, but all 3 classes are using a shared core system. The British, French, and Italian ships would be the most work. While they all share a similar core air defense system, they all use different radars, while sharing key electronics and DCNS’ Sylver VLS. That means both electronics work, and physical changes to the weapons array. In his conversations, Miyashiro mentions that they’re looking into the possibility of fielding SM-3 compatible inserts in DCNS’ Sylver A70 VLS, which is the required size for the 6.6 meter SM-3. Britain’s Type 45 Daring Class has space for adding the larger Sylver A70 launchers up front, but Miyashiro has reportedly said that they’re also looking at the possibility of inserting the Mk.41 VLS there.

A Mk.41 VLS would require some combat system integration, in exchange for very wide flexibility beyond the SM-3s. It would also give the Daring Class the ability to use an array of new weapons, including Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles, which current British doctrine will only fire from submarines. Aviation Week | Defense News.

May 25/11: Engine support. Rolls Royce announces a long term Class Output Management contract with BAE Systems to provide guaranteed availability of the Type 45 destroyers’ WR-21 engines. The initial GBP 20 million ($) contract is for 6 years, but options for extensions would cover the entire 30+ year life of the vessels. BAE’s Head of Supply Chain for UK Ship Support Programmes, Chris Curtis, described the contract as “a highly incentivised and cost effective support provision.”

Each destroyer is powered by 2 WR-21 turbines, derived from the firm’s RB211 and Trent engine families that power modern widebody and jumbo jets. Advanced marine features include compressor inter-cooling and exhaust heat recuperation, which recovers exhaust air for heating incoming combustion air. The effect is to reduce fuel consumption by about 27% over similar single-cycle turbines. The WR-21 has also been made very modular, and the gas generator and power turbine consists of 12 interchangeable pre-balanced modules. Because of their size and low weight, these modules can be removed and new modules can be fitted, in order to reduce maintenance costs and down time.

Beyond the engine, Rolls Royce is also providing propellers, shaftlines and bearings, stabilizing fins and low voltage electrical systems for the class.

Long-term engine support contract

May 17/11: D32 Missile firing. The UK MoD announces that HMS Daring has successfully fired its Sea Viper/ Aster-30 air defense system for the first time, joining HMS Dauntless. Photo metadata show that the firing took place on April 18/11.

At the same time, the Navy announces a 6-year, GBP 165 million (about $267 million) contract has to MBDA UK in Bristol and Stevenage, UK, to provide technical assistance to the fleet’s Sea Viper air defense systems. The Project Availability Support Service – Sea Viper (PASS-SV) contract is the first support contract let under the April 2010 Complex Weapons Through Life Enabling Contract, which will cover a range of British missiles.

MBDA will be working with BAE Systems Maritime Mission Systems to support the Sampson radar, while DM Gosport will be responsible for the out-loading of munitions to the Type 45 Class and for processing them at a new Munition Maintenance Facility (MMF) located in Gosport, UK. The MMF is a four year development that will give Britain a native test and repair facility for MBDA’s Aster missiles, and its construction and operation involves a separate contract. UK MoD | Royal Navy | MBDA | Defence Management.

Long-term Sea Viper support contract

May 6/11: HMS Diamond. The Royal Navy commissions D34 as HMS Diamond. The 4th ship of class, Dragon, is due to arrive in at the type’s Portsmouth base for the first time in September 2011, to begin preparations for its own commissioning. UK MoD.

2010

C4 contract. Missile firing.

D36 Defender Launched
(click to view full)

Nov 19/10: Mechanical difficulties. HMS Daring sails back into Portsmouth Harbour. She was forced to go to Canada for urgent repairs, after losing propulsion in the Atlantic. The incident came just 4 months after one of her drivers packed up out in the Solent, during a visit from sailors’ families.

Martin Carter, whose son Philip serves as a marine engineer on Daring, told Portsmouth’s The News that: “They’ve been having lots of trouble with the drivers on the ship. It’s obviously not good but I’m sure they’ll get it all sorted out soon.”

Oct 11/10: D37 launch. Duncan [D37] is launched down the slipway. She is likely to be the last ship to be “dynamically launched” on the Clyde River in the traditional fashion, the final example of more than 22,000 vessels launched from Clyde shipyards. Future ships are likely to use flooding techniques like building them on a barge, or in a drydock. UK MoD | For Argyll, also explains Adm. Adam Duncan’s legacy | BBC [incl. video] | Caledonian Mercury | The Guardian | Glasgow Evening Times | The Scotsman.

Oct 4/10: Missile firing, finally. The UK MoD announces that a Type 45 destroyer fired a missile for the first time at the end of September 2010. HMS Dauntless fired an Aster-30 missile at a navy range in the Hebrides, hitting a target drone.

/changeNav/6568">Royal Navy | UK MoD.

Aster, fired

Sept 22/10: Diamond [D34] arrives in her home port of Portsmouth for the first time, following sea trials in Scottish waters. She is formally handed over to the Royal Navy on Sept 23rd, and will undergo another set of sea trials before commissioning.

HMS Daring [D32] arrived in Portsmouth in January 2009, and HMS Dauntless [D33] arrived in December 2009.

/changeNav/6568">Royal Navy | UK MoD.

June 28/10: Aster-30 tests. MBDA Systems announces that its Aster-30 missiles have added Britain’s PAAMS-equipped “Longbow” barge to the roster of successful test firings using modified missiles.

“Over the last month… The trials were conducted over a range of scenarios of steadily increasing complexity, culminating in a final trial featuring a salvo firing against a sea skimming target performing a high-g terminal manoeuvre. All the trials [by Italy, France, and the UK] were fully successful.”

See also OCCAR release.

June 3/10: HMS Dauntless. D33 is formally commissioned into Royal Navy service, at a ceremony in Portsmouth Naval Base. Neither HMS Daring, nor HMS Dauntless, is operational with its primary air defense weapon. UK MoD.

May 25/10 – June 1/10: Aster fixed? Italy and France conduct test-firings of the Aster-30 missile from their destroyer-sized Horizon Class air defense frigates. The Andrea Doria fires a missile on May 25/10, while France Forbin fires a missile on June 1/10.

The test-firings are meant to ensure that the problems identified in Britain’s test firings from its Longbow test barge have been fixed, and are touted as successful by the French DGA. Renewed firings from the Longbow are expected to begin in a few weeks, leading at some point to actual firings from Type 45 destroyers. Mer et Marine [in French].

April 1/10: Aster flaw. Portsmouth’s The News confirms that the PAAMS test failures have been traced back to a design flaw with the Aster missiles, which are being redesigned.

“An MoD spokeswoman said: ‘Some production weaknesses in the most recent batches of the Aster missile have been identified and these are being corrected through minor re-design work… Portsmouth South MP Mike Hancock, who sits on the Commons defence committee, said: ‘I am very sceptical about this – are we really to believe that a whole batch of missiles was just made wrong for such an expensive system? If you read this in a novel it would be believable, but when it’s a programme that is already late it’s incredible.

‘I think the only way we can be certain that the problem is resolved is when these missiles are fired from a moving ship, and not from a static platform off France.'”

March 22/10: C4 contract. Thales UK announces a 7-year support contract for the fully integrated communications system (FICS) in the UK’s Type 45 fleet. The “multi-million pounds contract” awarded by BAE Systems Surface Ships covers all internal and external communications systems on all 6 destroyers, requires Thales to guarantee the availability of the communications systems, and will run until 2016. In addition to providing support to the vessels themselves, Thales will also provide support for a single shore-based reference system.

Thales already has some experience with availability-based contracts for hand-held range-finding and thermal imaging units, all of which have exceeded the requirements set out in the initial contract. Thales UK release | DID on Britain’s “Future Contracting for Availability” approach.

FICS C4 support

March 18/10: CEC. A $13.7 million modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-08-C-5202) for the design agent and engineering services for the cooperative engagement capability (CEC) system, which helps equipped ships by sharing their air defense picture and targeting. This contract combines purchases for the US Navy (97%) and the government of the United Kingdom (3%) under the Foreign Military Sales program. Work will be performed in Largo, FL (80%); St. Petersburg, FL (19%); and Dallas, TX (1%), and is expected to be complete by September 2011.

A 3% participation share may not seem like much, but the UK has been absent from past CEC contracts, and a firm decision on the Daring Class was expected in 2010. Looks like it was positive.

March 18/10: Dauntless, the 2nd of the Royal Navy’s Type 45 destroyers, and Astute, the 1st Astute Class nuclear powered fast attack submarine, combine on sea trials in the firth of Clyde. Dauntless was handed over to the UK Ministry of Defence by BAE Systems in December 2009 and will be commissioned into the Royal Navy fleet later in 2010. BAE release.

March 12/10:Aster flaws. The French naval site Mer et Marine runs an article [in French] about France’s Forbin/Horizon Class “frigates,” which are really advanced air defense destroyers. In that article, it discusses recent failures of the PAAMS/Aster air defense system.

Apparently, the failures were due to a minor manufacturing defect in the missiles, and a Board of Inquiry will make their findings at the end of Q1 2010, ‘said Laurent Collet-Billon, Delegate General for Armaments. The investigation must also determine if a single missile was defective, or if entire batches could be affected.

2009

Fleet support. Aster flaws.

Daring’s trials
(click to view full)

Dec 18/09: Aster flaws. The News of Portsmouth reports that problems with the PAAMS system could delay HMS Daring’s in-service date:

“The News can reveal that the navy has switched Daring’s in-service date from February 2010 to just 2010 – potentially buying an extra 10 months as technicians try to identify the problems with the Sea Viper missiles… When asked by The News if it was a problem with the missile launcher or the missile itself, the MoD said they did not know. An MoD spokeswoman said… [that] ‘The cost of the technical investigation and any redesign to resolve the issues that emerge during trials, falls to MBDA.’ “

Dec 4/09: Aster flaws. The British MoD responds to media reports regarding the PAAMS system, via its “Defence in the Media” blog:

“The claims that the missiles don’t work are incorrect. The Sea Viper system trials are ongoing with the intention that the missile will be ready to meet the Type 45s’ first operational deployments from 2011. As the destroyers enter service they, along with Sea Viper, undergo a rigorous trials programme to ensure that all systems meet their design specification before the ships deploy on operations.”

Dec 2/09: D33 handover. HMS Dauntless is formally handed over to the Royal Navy in Portsmouth. She was launched from BAE Systems’ Govan shipyard in Glasgow on Jan 23/07, and joined HMS Daring in Portsmouth after extensive sea trials. As part of the hand-over, the BAE Systems company flag was lowered and replaced by the Royal Navy’s White Ensign. UK MoD |

/changeNav/6568">Royal Navy | BAE systems.

Dec 1/09: CEC? Jane’s Naval Forces reports that the Royal Navy will decide whether or not to buy Cooperative Engagement Capability in 2010:

“…for integration into selected Royal Navy (RN) surface ships after concluding a third tranche of Assessment Phase (AP3) studies. This comes five years after initial plans [link added] to integrate the UK CEC system into Type 23 frigates and Type 45 destroyers were brought to a sudden halt as a result of budget pressure.”

Dec 1/09: Aster fail. Aviation Week’s Ares blog reports a test failure of the PAAMS/ Sea Viper system. Final qualification tests are generally the most difficult in any series, and this one is thought to be have been a 2 target engagement. UK Defense Equipment and Support Organization COO Andrew Tyler describes the final test’s failure as a “setback”, and adds:

“We are working extremely hard with the other partner nations and the company to resolve what the problems were with the final firing… [but it is] too early to come up with the diagnosis.”

The Daily Mail adds its own coverage, and The Register adds that:

“The weapons are already so late that the first [GBP] 1bn+ Type 45 has been in naval service for nearly a year – almost completely unarmed.”

Oct 20/09: D36 launch. BVT Surface Fleet’s shipyard at Govan, in Glasgow, launches Defender, the 5th Type 45 anti-air warfare destroyer. The ship is already 65% complete, and the team has outfitted the ship to the maximum weight possible ahead of launch; the electrical systems on board are already live. Focus will now turn to completing systems and commissioning power and propulsion and combat systems, ahead of her hand over to the Royal Navy on schedule in 2012. UK MoD |

/changeNav/6568">Royal Navy | BAE Systems.

Sept 16/09: Fleet support. The UK MoD issues a GBP 309 million (currently $510 million), 7-year support contract for its Type 45 fleet. The majority of maintenance work will be carried out around the class’ home port of Portsmouth Naval Base, and the effort is expected to support about 120 jobs directly. Royal Navy Rear Admiral Bob Love adds that:

“The Type 45 support solution is an innovative contract which sees the prime contractor for the build of the ships providing in-service support… BVT will manage equipment availability to agreed targets, incentivising them to minimise the cost of support by improving equipment reliability. This is the first time this arrangement has been used for a major warship.”

The BAE Systems and VT Group joint venture and shipbuilder BVT Surface Fleet will act as the Class Output Manager (COM) and will co-ordinate all aspects of support delivery to the ship including maintenance, supply chain and design management, managing obsolescence issues, incorporating support-related changes where required, as well as planning and optimizing support to reduce cost and maintenance over time. Built-in contract flexibility will accommodate variations in the operational profile that don’t require any contract changes.

Availability of the ships’ major systems will be handled through BVT partnerships with Thales, BAE Systems Insyte, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine, Ultra and Converteam. UK MoD | BAE Systems.

Class support contract

March 13/09: NAO report. Britain’s National Audit Office (NAO) issues a report covering the Type 45 Daring Class program, which it says has improved since the 2007 contract renegotiation.

With respect to the program’s present and future, its worries are threefold: cost, capabilities, and coverage. With respect to cost, NAO estimates that a program once estimated at GBP 5 billion will now cost a total of GBP 6.46 billion for 6 ships. The NAO adds that the MoD’s decision to create 2 timelines with different official/corporate dates, and “no problems” target dates, can create a time mismatch between project requirements and allocated funds.

With respect to capabilities, HMS Daring reportedly lacks some communications systems over 2 years after its 2006 launch, and will not be fully operational with its main “Sea Viper” air defense system until 2011. Specifically, HMS Daring will enter into service before the Aster missiles are first fired from a destroyer, and before the full on-board PAAMS training package is complete in mid 2011, although the missiles will have been tested on the Longbow barge. Co-operative engagement capability (CEC), which gives fitted ships the ability to see what other CEC-equipped ships or land stations see, and to fire at targets the launching ship’s radars cannot see, will not be present until 2014 at the earliest. It is vital for wide-area anti-air defense, and for ballistic missile defense.

With respect to coverage, the NAO says that “The Department’s policy requirement is to have five ships available for tasking at any time. It will be challenging to meet this requirement, established when the Department intended to buy eight ships [with only 6 ships].” NAO Report | Royal Navy response | BBC News.

Feb 4/09: PAAMS test. The “Sea Viper” PAAMS air defense system is successfully fired from a 12,000t trials barge parked near the Ile du Levant, off the French coast. The target for this 2nd live fire test is designed to simulate a low-level anti-ship missile at close range, and the test is reportedly successful.

The Longbow barge has a full replica of the air defence equipment the new Type 45 destroyers will carry, including long-range and missile- directing radars, a combat control centre and missiles in their vertical launcher silos. Royal Navy.

Jan 28/09: Sea Viper. Britain officially names the PAAMS air defense system “Sea Viper.” The name refers to the combination of the ships’ Sampson fire control radar and S1850M volume search radar, the combat system, the Sylver vertical launch system, and the MBDA’s Aster-15 and Aster-30 missiles carried inside the Sylver cells.

2008 and Earlier

Options declined. First of class.

Dragon’s launch
(click to view full)

Dec 17/08: D33 trials. HMS Dauntless returns from 4 weeks of sea trials, which tested her power and propulsion and Combat System gunnery. Her second set of sea trials is due in July 2009, and will focus on fuller Combat System testing and pre-acceptance activity. Royal Navy

Dec 14/08: Britain’ unofficial Navy Matters site offers its year in review. The overall recap is strongly negative for the Royal Navy as a whole, and it has this to say about the “accelerated” Future Surface Combatant program that is slated to replace the 7th and 8th Type 45 destroyers, as well as Britain’s Type 23 Duke Class frigates:

“At the time of the T45 Batch 3 cancellation it was stated that the MOD was “bringing forward the replacement programme for [the] Type 22 and 23 frigates”, apparently to 2018. This is a quite aggressive timescale but six months later there is no sign that the Future Surface Combatant is about to become a stand alone “Assessment Phase” project, indeed the MOD’s Frigates Integrated Project Team is apparently investigating whether the Type 22 Batch 3 frigates could remain in service until at least 2020 – a five year extension compared to currently announced plans.”

It lists the fact that all 6 Type 45 destroyers are under construction, with 4 already launched, as part of the year’s slim good news section.

Dec 12/08: D34. The Royal Navy provides an instructive update on Diamond, which was launched in November 2007:

“The external appearance is taking shape with the installation of major equipments such as radars, aerials, missile launchers and the installation of the 4.5 inch gun. The internal layout is also progressing nicely with the Operations Room fully fitted out and a large proportion of equipment that support weapon and sensor systems are also in place. The propulsion machinery and integral systems are nearing completion. The diesel generators have been run and load trialled, and the WR21 gas turbines are planned to be run in early 2009, culminating in a Basin Trial at Easter. Installation of the auxiliary equipment is now the main focus, with most of the shipbuilder’s efforts currently on the vast amount of wiring, cabling and optical fibre that goes into a Type 45 Destroyer… The next milestone for the ship will be her first set of sea trails planned for autumn 2009.”

Dec 10/08: HMS Daring hand-over. Daring is formally handed over to the MOD in an Acceptance-off-Contract ceremony at the Scotstoun shipyard on the Clyde. HMS Daring is due to sail to her home port of Portsmouth in January 2009 to undertake 12 months of exhaustive Stage 2 trials and training, before she is declared ready for operational service.

Since being launched by the Countess of Wessex in 2006, Daring has been fitted with elements of the Principal Anti-Air Missile System (PAAMS), and her long range and multi-function radars. UK MoD release.

1st of class accepted

Nov 17/08: D35 launch. Dragon is launched into the Clyde from BVT’s shipyard at Govan near Glasgow, complete with a Welsh Dragon on its bow. The destroyer has yet to receive critical equipment like radar and mission systems, which will be installed during the final phases of construction. Royal Navy.

June 19/08: Options declined. Armed Forces Minister Bob Ainsworth admits in the House of Commons that Gordon Brown’s Labour government has declined the option on the 7th and 8th Daring Class destroyers. So far, HMS Daring has participated in sea trials, while Dauntless and Diamond have been launched. Dragon has all sections fully joined but has not been launched yet, while Defender and Duncan will complete the class. Steel cutting on Duncan began in March 2008.

The Hon. Mr. Ainsworth added that the entire Armed Forces equipment program was being reviewed in light of planned budgets, which most observers believe means cuts in store for the Army (FRES seen as the biggest target) and Air Force (Tranche 3 Typhoon fighters in question). At the same time, Ainsworth said that Britain’s Future Surface Combatant to replace the smaller Type 22 and Type 23 frigates was being moved forward. This may or may not be significant; no timeline was specified, and promises surrounding distant “out-year” programs must always be viewed with great skepticism.

On the industrial front, reaction was muted. This is true in part because Clyde and Portsmouth yards’ immediate future were safeguarded in May 2008 with confirmation that both sites will share in construction of the Royal Navy’s 2 full-size Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers between 2009-2016. BAE Systems and the VT Group, who build the Type 45s, will also share that contract, and are expected to share in future surface combatant construction and maintenance contracts via their forthcoming joint venture.

A navy that has already seen its number of surface combatants sink below the level of the French fleet for the first time since the 17th century will view this as a bitter blow, but the budgetary math is remorseless. The move was condemned by the Conservative Party, who warned that 6 ships were not adequate, and could mean as few as 3 operational Daring Class ships on station at any given time. In an unusual move within the Parliamentary system, prominent Labour Party MP and former chairman of the Defence Select Committee Bruce George also warned that:

“It has now reached the point where, in terms of personnel and in terms of equipment, [the UK armed forces] is inadequate to take the [global missions] stance that is being taken… Lives are lost if equipment is inadequate and wars can be lost if equipment is inadequate.”

Coverage: Daily Mail | Financial Times | Glasgow Evening Times | The Herald of Glasgow | Portsmouth News | This is London | UK Shipping Times. Non-British readers might note that “Six of the Best…” is a double entendre that can also refer to the school punishment of six hits with a cane.

Stop at 6

Nov 27/07: D34 launch. Diamond is launched. Her motto is “Honor clarissima gemma,” (trans: Honour is the brightest jewel).

July 18/07: HMS Daring sails under its own steam for the very first time, escorted by tugs from BAE Systems Scotstoun.

Additional Readings

• Royal Navy – Destroyers.

• Naval Technology – Type 45 Daring Class

• Navy Matters – Type 45 (“D Class”) Destroyer. Comprehensive.

Ancillary Equipment

DID thanks reader Roderick Louis for his tips and translations.

• Navy Matters – SAMPSON Maulti-Function Radar

• BAE Systems – SAMPSON Multi-Function Radar

• Deagel – S1850M [Radar]

• Navy Matters – PAAMS – Principal Anti Air Missile System. Now called “Sea Viper” by the Royal Navy.

• MBDA – ASTER PAAMS / SAAM

• MBDA, via WayBack – Aster 15 & 30 PAAMS: Principal Anti-Air Missile system. A more useful presentation.

• DCNS – Sylver. Stands for “SYsteme de Lancement VERtical,” French for “vertical launch system.”

• Wikipedia – Sylver launcher.

• Navy Recognition – VIGILE DPX Thales Digital Radar Electronic Surveillance for Naval Platforms. Thales R-ESM system.

• Rolls Royce – WR-21 Marine Gas Turbine

• DID – I Think I CAMM: Britain’s Versatile Air Defense Missile. Adding CAMM-M to the Type 45 gives it the quad-packed air defense option it needs, in order to increase its missile load.

• DID Spotlight – CEC: Cooperative Engagement for Fleet Defense. The Royal Navy decided not to include this inexpensive and very valuable capability.

Official Reports

• UK National Audit Office (March 13/09) – Providing Anti Air Warfare Capability: the Type 45 destroyer.

• UK Parliament Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence (Jan 15/01) – Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20 – 39).

 The Taleban have been a persistent and growing force in Farah since 2001, rebuilding their strength quietly after the U.S. invasion and then seizing territory in remote districts. Insurgents now challenge pro-government figures for control of valuable trade and smuggling routes, assisted by the disarray among their opponents as the provincial government is hobbled by frequent changes of leadership and mismanagement. AAN co-director Thomas Ruttig with input from Graeme Smith provides background to the Taleban’s latest attack on Farah.

This is the second of two dispatches that analyse the recent Taleban attack on the city of Farah. The first dispatch, focused on the attack and its immediate aftermath. This second dispatch situates the attack within the broader framework of post-2001 developments in Farah.

Mujahedin stronghold and post-2001 Taleban area of retreat

The Taleban were never fully defeated after 2001, maintaining armed groups in many parts of Afghanistan. This included Farah province, where the Taleban retained a strong presence, particularly in the area of Shiwan village (sometimes written ‘Shaiban’) in Bala Boluk district. According to UN information seen by AAN, “thousands of Taleban” remained there after the fall of their regime in 2001, with “no efforts made by central government or Coalition Forces to disarm these inactive Taliban” (emphasis added by AAN). As in other provinces throughout the country, many Taleban had stopped fighting and returned to their communities, waiting to see what developments would occur under the administration of then-interim leader Hamid Karzai, and whether they might be able to join the political process. (1)

Shiwan is inhabited primarily by ethnic Pashtuns from the Alizai tribe (2) who are known as naqelin, or Pashtuns who migrated from their original home area. Many of them are Alizais forcibly moved from Musa Qala district in Helmand by the Afghan monarchy some 100 years ago and resettled in Shiwan. This explains the close links between the Taleban in Farah and the movement’s strongholds in Helmand (AAN analysis here). Other naqelin from Musa Qala were also moved further north to Shindand district, another hotbed of Taleban activity in neighbouring Herat province. This may explain the Farah Taleban’s close connections to the movement’s leadership in the greater Kandahar region. (3) 

There is a history of revolt in Farah. Bala Boluk district was one of the first areas in the country to rise up against the Soviet occupation that started in late 1979. The so-called Sharafat Koh Front (“mountain of honour” front) emerged, named after a landmark in its area of operation in the district. The area was originally called Lwar Koh, or High Mountain, a range whose highest peak reaches 2,553 metres and cuts through the Ring Road (Highway 1) between Kandahar and Herat. This forbidding geography made the area difficult to control for the Soviets and later the Americans. This same region was also the 2015 birthplace of a self-declared “dissident” Taleban faction under Mullah Muhammad Rasul, a native of adjoining Bakwa district. Rasul had been one of the Sharafat Koh Front’s commanders, associated with the mujahedin organisation, Harakat-e Enqelab-e Islami (see AAN analysis here).

The insurgency’s comeback

During a visit by the author to Farah in 2006, the commander of the local US Provincial Reconstruction Team reported recent shelling of his compound. He said this was the first-ever attack on the PRT compound and it may have been a significant moment for the insurgency in Farah. The commander warned that the province was already a “combat zone”. Local sources confirmed later that the shelling had resulted in the arrest of Taleban commander who had previously been considered ‘inactive’.

In 2006, the Taleban leadership sent missions to Farah to reactivate former fighters, as it had already done in other provinces. In September 2006, Mullah Abdul Manan – not Mullah Omar’s brother but a pre-2001 district police chief in Farah – had established himself as Farah’s insurgency leader with the support of the Quetta Shura, mainly in Bakwa and Bala Boluk districts, but also in Anar Dara. The local drug mafia, linked to Baloch smugglers further south in Nimruz, with their century-old connections with Iran and Pakistan, was already involved in weapons smuggling from Iran, to the benefit of the Taleban. This may have been assisted by the small Baloch minority in Farah.

From then onwards, Taleban activity intensified on an annual basis in a pattern familiar to other provinces, including bomb attacks and assassinations as well as attacks on district centres. The violence steadily closed in on the provincial capital. As early as November 2004, attacks on UN and other aid convoys were already reported in Farah province. The first mid-ranking official was killed in August 2006, as insurgents ambushed Gulistan’s district governor Nesar Ahmad.

In May 2007, the Taleban sent more fighters to their strongholds in Shiwan in Bala Boluk and Diwar-e Sorkh village in Khak-e Safed, and warned local residents to evacuate the area as a clash with government forces was imminent. This led to population movements to villages near Farah city. (3) By the same year, the districts of Bakwa, Gulistan, Bala Boluk, Poshtrud, Delaram (4) and Khak-e Safed, with the exception of their centres, were under Taleban control. On 29 May 2007, the Taleban captured Poshtrud district centre in the first of such assaults, but only for two hours. In November that year, Khak-e Safed, Gulistan and Bakwa were also temporarily held by the Taleban and sections of the Ring Road in Farah were closed “on a daily basis,” according to a report by an international organisation seen by the author. In March 2009, Mullah Rasul was appointed shadow governor of Farah by the Quetta Shura. (5)

An attempt by a joint Afghan-US mission to push the Taleban from their stronghold in Shiwan in May 2009 turned into a disaster, with one of the highest civilian casualty losses of the entire war. Reuters reported, “140 villagers” killed,93 of whom were children “and only 22 were adult males.” Afghanistan Rights Monitor said in the same year that 113 of the killed were civilians, with “at least 26 women and 61 children.” (6) In October 2009, Afghan and US forces temporarily managed to capture Shiwan. In the same year, Taleban in Khak-e-Safed district warned civil servants to step down from their posts.

On 22 June 2010, the Taleban attacked the provincial governor’s compound in Farah city for the first time. They used an IED, injuring the head of the provincial council who was there for a meeting. In July that year, the Taleban organised a spectacular jailbreak from Farah prison. They smuggled in explosives with which inmates blasted open the front gate. In May, July and September 2012, Taleban fighters launched a series of ‘complex’ and bomb attacks on the governor’s compound, killing ten people in total. During this period the insurgents also conducted an assassination campaign in Farah, killing at least five high-profile figures. Among the dead were the controversial former Purchaman district police chief and governor Salim Mubarez; a former Jamiati-turned-Taleb-turned-Jamiati; the NDS district chief of Qala-ye Kah; and two other former Taleban commanders that had changed sides after 2001 and became district chiefs or Afghan Local Police commanders (AAN analysis here). In April 2013, nine Taliban suicide bombers killed themselves and 44 other people in an attack on a courtroom in the Farah governor’s compound where their comrades were on trial.

The Taleban failed twice in their attempts to take over Khashrod district of neighbouring Nimroz province in December 2016 and August 2017 and Bakwa in November 2016, although they temporarily succeeded in Gulestan in December 2015.

Attacks on the outskirts of Farah city began in October 2016 with fighting that lasted for over a week. The Taleban came as close as two kilometres to the city centre, to an area called Bagh-e Pul and had to be pushed back by airstrike. When the Taleban closed in on Farah city in Poshtrud district in early 2018, as reported above, this also had immediate effects on the general situation in the city. The Washington Post reported that “robbery and theft surged in the [provincial] capital as the conflict neared. Families fled to neighbouring provinces amid the chaos, and angry protests broke out.” It quoted a local resident as saying that “we have two governments — one on the other side of the river, and one on this side.” Provincial council members warned that Farah city was “on the verge of collapse.” During this period, locals feared the encirclement of the city as the insurgents took positions to the north and northwest across the Farah River and also about eight to nine kilometres south and southeast of the city, including in the Hasan Ghagh area. 

Misgovernance, factional conflict and drugs

Some of the reasons for the bad situation in Farah were the corruption and rivalry among local pro-government strongmen who have undermined security, as well as the increasing convergence of interests between the drug trade, elements in the local administration and Taleban networks. At that time, there were only 20 to 30 policemen formally assigned to each district centre. Even if the official roster reflected the reality of personnel strength in the field, such numbers would have been too small to protect even the major towns.

The situation was exacerbated from the beginning by factional conflict. In Bala Boluk district, Zabet Jalil rose to prominence in the years after 2001 as the nephew of the powerful Noorzai tribal leader and Wolesi Jirga member Mohammad Naim Farahi. Jalil was pitted against former Taleban commander Mullah Sultan in a conflict over transport and smuggling routes, leading from Herat south to Nimroz and Iran. Ismail Khan in Herat, as the self-declared ruler of western Afghanistan, was vying for control of his neighbouring provinces and took Jalil’s side in the dispute. Jalil became head of the largest transport company in the province, serving mainly the coalition troops. Jamiat-e Islami and Hezb-e Islami competed for influence in a number of districts, making them vulnerable to Taleban infiltration. Armed conflict also erupted over land disputes in Gulistan and other districts. All this led to significant loss of civilian lives. But not too many people in Kabul noticed, as Farah – at the far western border – was remote and there were many more problems near the capital.

The provincial leadership, including governors and chiefs of police, changed on an almost yearly basis. Sometimes the central government appointed leaders from within the province, and sometimes from outside. Nothing worked. By the end of 2009, Farah had had ten provincial police chiefs and seven governors. After that, the frequency of these changes only marginally slowed down.

Farah’s government officials competed over the seven unofficial border crossing points to Iran, at which they collected customs – and apparently pocketed most of it. This allegedly continues. In a programme aired on Ariana TV on 22 January 2018, Homayun Shahidzada, a political commentator from Farah, said every day over 100 tankers of poor-quality oil were imported from Iran through Farah. But the taxes and tariffs paid “do not go to the government, but into pockets of mafia.”

Shahidzada further accused the provincial governor, the chief of police who has now been replaced, the head of customs and the NDS as well as the chairman of the provincial council and some other members of being “part of the mafia.” On 23 January 2018, Kabul daily Etilaat-e Ruz estimated the value of Farah’s total revenues collected at the border as five billion Afghani per year (around $70 million US dollars).

 Over the last years, the Taleban have increasingly taken over some of the ‘taxing’ of the cross-border traffic. They have also been collecting taxes on inland routes. Etilaat-e Ruz reported on illegal mobile ‘customs offices’ on the highway connecting Farah and Nimroz in the south, and toward Herat, in the north (read report here).

The fight for control over transport and smuggling routes is deeply connected to Farah’s drug economy. In Afghanistan’s west, it is the largest and countrywide the seventh largest poppy-growing province. Growing and trafficking the produce is much of the population’s main source of income, particularly in Bakwa, Bala Boluk, Khak-e Safid, Gulistan, Poshtrud and, less significantly, Purchaman districts, according to UNODC. Not coincidentally, those are the districts with the earliest and strongest Taleban presence. According to UNODC figures, the area in the province under opium poppy cultivation rose by almost 40 percent from 2016 to 2017, from 9,101 to 12,846 hectares. (7) This has also spurred on the US military under its new strategy, which now also targets heroin labs as part of an attempt to deny the Taleban key income sources (AAN analysis here). In early April 2018, US and Afghan forces targeted 11 “Taliban narcotics production facilities” in Farah and Nimruz, according to a Resolute Support press release. 

Although the number of security forces in Farah increased from the mid-2000s, to “about 6,000”, as the Washington Post reported in early 2018, (8) this was “less than half the number in next-door Helmand.” But official numbers might still be exaggerated. The article further quoted Abdul Sabur Khedmat, a member of parliament from Farah, as saying “60 percent of the police are ghost officers.”  

Others suggest that Iran has undermined the government in Farah. MP Belqis Roshan, when talking to AAN on 16 May, claimed Iran supported the Taleban with ammunition and other logistics, an assertion that is widespread among local government officials (see here and here). Others, such as governor Salangi, deny this but officials in western Afghanistan told the author as early as in 2006 that they found it difficult to publicly speak against Iran, given its strong influence in the region. 

Although there is no doubt that Iran has been influencing the situation in western Afghanistan for decades and that there is some Taleban presence in Iran, the extent of its involvement is not clear. Some allegations might also serve as a pretext to cover up the shortcomings in provincial and central governance, and might represent an appeal to the current US administration in the context of deteriorating relations with Tehran.

Conclusion: A long build-up to a strong presence

 For some days in mid-May it looked as though the Taleban might take Farah city. This would have been their biggest military triumph since the capture of Kunduz for two weeks in 2015, including some near-misses in 2016 and 2017. The attack in Farah ended without success after three days, but the Taleban maintain their pressure on the city. Continued fragility of the provincial capital and district centres seems likely, as Taleban raids give the insurgency fresh supplies of weapons, ammunition and vehicles. Local insurgent commanders may have greater self-interest in cementing their control of lucrative checkpoints, rather than mounting ambitious assaults on well-defended government centres, but the movement’s leadership will continue to see the overthrow of a provincial capital as a way to show the world the Taleban’s potency. Given that the Taleban were never fully defeated in Farah and that their presence – as well as their capabilities and resources – have been rebuilt over the last decade, they remain a threat and one that is unlikely to be defeated militarily.

 

 

(1) Many of the Taleban remained armed after 2001 — as witnessed by the author in Ghor province in February 2002, for example, as well as in Paktia province, where a Taleban hideout was attacked during Operation Anaconda in March 2002 (see a 2002 Time magazine reportage here).

(2) This tribal affiliation partly explains the intra-Taleban split in 2015 (media report here) and the emergence of the “Rasul faction”. Rasul is an Alizai, a tribe that felt sidelined under the rule of Taleban chief Mullah Mansur (2012-15), an Eshaqzai. Mansur was felt to have promoted members his own tribe at the expense of other tribes in the Taleban leadership. The long-standing enmity between Alizai and Eshaqzai was exploited by the Afghan government, which supported Rasul in his efforts to break away from the Taliban and build a militia that often cooperated with government forces. (more AAN analysis here).

(3) In contrast to the NATO and UN categorisation of Afghanistan’s regions, which puts Farah in the west with its centre in Herat, Farah (and Nimruz) are traditionally seen as belonging to southern Afghanistan, the region sometimes referred to as Loya Kandahar (“greater Kandahar”) now, also encompassing Helmand and Zabul. (Farah’s and Nimruz’s attachment to the west also has to do with western Afghan strongman Ismail Khan’s ambitions in that region.) Even more traditionally, the Kandahar region was known as the southwest, while Loya Paktia was referred to as the south (as, immediately south of Kabul).

(4) This group was led by Mullah Sultan, an influential tribal elder and leader of the post-2001 ‘inactive’ Taleban. He initially refused to join the new insurgency, but involved himself later again, in mid-2005, was arrested and held in Bagram in 2006. He apparently became inactive again following his release in 2007. 

(5) Delaram was listed under Nimroz province in 2013.

(6) Rasul already ran into trouble with the Quetta Shura after the killing of his rivals and leading Farah Taleban commanders during a joint Afghan-coalition operation in August 2009. The Taleban leadership launched an investigation into the possibility that Rasul might have had a hand in the killings.

(7) Report not online, in the author’s archive.

(8) The area under cultivation, however, was higher in previous years, beginning with 2007 (and with the exception of 2009).

(9) According to an Afghan media report, this included two battalions of the Public Order Police from Herat and two from the Herat army commando.

Russian Ural-63704 Tank Transporter

The first F-35B aircraft are expected to land later today to join the RAF 617 Squadron “Dambusters”. Earlier today four Lightning jets of 617 Squadron took of from Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina, where the famous “Dambusters” unit was reactivated on Apr. 17, 2018, to undertake the transatlantic crossing and arrive at RAF […]

Americas

• The Navy is currently procuring support activities for its P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance plane. Under this $24.7 million contract Boeing will provide logistics and engineering data for the Advanced Airborne Sensor Peculiar Support Equipment (PSE). The Advanced Airborne Sensor is a multifunction radar installed on the P-8A. It’s a solid-state, active electronically scanned array radar with multiple functions ranging from a Synthetic Aperture Radar, Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar and Moving Target Indication modes. The externally mounted radar and a follow-on system to the currently deployed Littoral Surveillance Radar System (LSRS). LSRS currently provides a broad range of capabilities against moving and stationary targets at sea and on land. In addition, this contract acquires product support analysis, training information, technical manuals and proof-load documentation, enabling the Navy to organically support the PSE. Work will be performed Richardson, Texas and St. Louis, Missouri. The contract is expected to be completed in March 2022.

• Raytheon is being tapped for repair work on the Navy’s H-60 helicopter platform. The $14 million firm-fixed-price delivery order provides for the repair of the turret and sensor-sight in support of the helicopter. This contract follows a multi-year 2013-2017 contract worth around $11.7 billion. The 15-inch Infirno turret is integrated in the nose of the H-60. It contains high-definition, mid-wave infrared and color sensors, a multi-mode tracker, a laser designator and rangefinder and is equipped with geo-location and advanced image processing capabilities. All work will be performed in Jacksonville, Florida, and work is expected to be completed by January 2019.

• Jane’s reports that the US Navy has officially commenced operations of its MQ-4C Triton UAV. The Broad Area Maritime System platform is deployed with the Unmanned Patrol Squadron (VUP)-19, the Navy’s first unmanned patrol squadron. The “RQ-4N” system chosen by the US Navy was based on the USAF’s RQ-4B Block 20 Global Hawks, but it incorporated a wide range of changes on the way to its unveiling as the MQ-4C Triton. The Triton has been developed to provide the US Navy with a persistent maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability in support of a full range of military operations. Designed for high-altitude, long-endurance ISR tasks, the Triton has a range of about 2,000 n miles and, with an endurance of 24 hours, will be able to cover more than 2.7 million square miles in a single mission. VP-19 now has two Triton UAVs, after training and trials are successfully completed the drones will be stationed in Guam. They are set to operate in concert with the P-8A.

• The Canadian government has reaffirmed its intention to proceed with Leonardo Helicopters-led modernization of its AW101 Cormorant search and rescue rotorcraft, and to potentially increase its fleet size from 14 to 21 examples. Canada and Leonardo are currently during the final finalization stages of outlining the requirements for the CH-149 Cormorant Mid-Life Upgrade program, including fleet augmentation, simulation and training. The Cormorant is a medium-lift helicopter used in both military and civil applications. It is based on AugustaWestland’s AW-101. The potential deal provides for new avionics equipment, electro-optical and infrared sensors, as well as the integration of Leonardo’s Osprey active electronically scanned array radar. Canada has operated the AW101 as its primary rotary-wing search and rescue capability since 2002. Canada aims to extending the lifetime of its CH-149 fleet to 2040 and beyond.

Middle East & Africa

• The African nation of Rwanda has voiced its interest to acquire air-defense systems from Russia. This year, Russia and Rwanda will mark 55 years of bilateral ties. During a visit to the Rwandan capital Kigali, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “the Rwandan security forces, army, and law-enforcement agencies operate our helicopters. There are also Ural vehicles used by the army and the security service, and a whole bunch of small arms. Now the deliveries of air defense systems are being discussed.” Other bilateral cooperation exists in the mining and geological sectors. If the potential deal goes through Rwanda could buy the S-400 Triumf long range surface-to-air missile systems produced by Almaz-Antey. The system can detect stealth aircraft and other targets at all altitudes of their combat employment and at maximum ranges. This air defense missile system can simultaneously engage 36 targets.

Europe

• Austria is set receive several new Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), reconnaissance and all-terrain vehicles two years after the initial contract was signed. The $298 million deal provides for the acquisition of 106 vehicles of three types. Starting in September 2018 the Austrian Army will receive 34 new Pandur Evolution APC, which is developed and produced by the Austrian company Steyr-Daimler-Puch Spezialfahrzeuge, a subsidiary of General Dynamics European Land Systems. The baseline vehicle is armed with a 12.7 mm heavy machine gun. Its modular design allows it to be fitted with a variety of weapon systems, including a 20 mm autocannon and an armored two-man 90 mm gun turret. In addition, the army will soon add the 32 BvS10 Beowolfs to its inventory. The vehicle is designed and developed in Sweden by BAE Systems Hägglunds. The vehicle consists of two parts that are connected by a joint and has been especially developed to be driven in hard to reach places. At last the Austrian Army will receive the Dingo 2 reconnaissance vehicle. The multi-million deal is a substantial investment by the Austrian government that has a yearly defense budget of roughly $3.1 billion.

Asia-Pacific

• India has again voiced its interest in acquiring the Israeli made Spike missile as means to boost its anti-tank capability against arch rival Pakistan. The Indian Army wants to buy the Spike missile as a “stop gap” measure before its defense research agency can develop an indigenous anti-tank missile within the next three years. After a long procurement process, India had terminated its plan to buy $500-million worth of Spike missiles in January 2018. The Spike missile family is designed around 2 key principles: low life cycle cost, and simple but reliable operation. Low life cycle cost comes from keeping prices down for all components by using “good enough” solutions that offer high quality without gold plating. The Spike infantry system consists of a missile in its cannister, a tripod, a Command Launch Unit that contains the optics and firing system, and a battery. It can go from “off” to firing in less than 30 seconds, as the operator lays the cross hairs on the aim point using either the 10x day sight, or the clip-on thermal imaging night sight. Considering the bumpy track-record of Indian defense acquisition, it can currently not be guaranteed that the current acquisition proposal will actually go through.

Today’s Video

• Turkish F-35 Lightning II flying test.

An attack on Farah city had long been feared. For years now, the Taleban have been taking control of the provincial capital’s outlying districts and inching their way towards the central hub. For a few days in mid-May, it looked as though the Taleban were about to take Farah city, which would have been their most significant military triumph since capturing Kunduz for two weeks in 2015. Their strategy of consolidating control over rural areas then digging in at a provincial centre’s outskirts before launching an attack appears to be an increasing trend. While they lost the battle in Farah on this occasion, the Taleban still pose a serious threat to the area. AAN co-director Thomas Ruttig together with Ali Mohammad Sabawoon, Rohullah Soroush and Obaid Ali unpack the attack and its aftermath.

This is the first of two dispatches examining the recent attack on the city of Farah. This first dispatch focuses on the attack and its aftermath. The second contextualises the attack in light of post-2001 developments in Farah.

The Farah attack

The Taleban attacked the provincial capital of Farah (1) in the early hours of 15 May. This was on day 21 of their annual military campaign announced earlier in April and just a few days before the beginning of the holy month of Ramadan. Within a few hours they had pushed through to the central chowk (junction) of the city. According to a local government military spokesman (quoted here), the Taleban set up checkpoints around the city and checked identity cards, trying to prevent people from fleeing. The Taleban had warned citizens over social media to stay indoors “and pray.” Many radio and television channels in the province stopped broadcasting, fearing for their employees’ lives, according to media watchdog Nai.

The Taleban started their attack at around two am from Regi and Chahar Bagh, areas to the immediate northeast and west of the city centre where the Taleban had concentrated their forces (media reports here and here).

During the first attack on 15 May, the Taleban moved towards Zara Ferqa, the old army division headquarters, now defunct, around three kilometres outside the city centre (media report in Dari here), and from there to the provincial headquarters of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), just south of it and located only 800 metres away from the provincial governor’s compound. The same morning, media footage from Farah showed black smoke rising above the NDS compound, although its defenders held out.

All three areas, Regi, Chahar Bagh and Zara Ferqa, are situated on the south bank of Farah River, which runs to the north of the city. It used to be the demarcation line between government and Taleban-held areas. That the Taleban took up positions there and were able to retreat to them and hold them after their attack was pushed back, demonstrates the continued threat to Farah city.

The Taleban also attacked the compounds of Farah’s police districts three and four, south of the NDS and the provincial prison, which is next to the provincial headquarters of the Afghan National Police (ANP). Afghan media reported that they used “heavy and light weapons.” They also employed suicide attackers against the police and, according to local reports, including several US-made armoured Humvee vehicles captured from Afghan forces. They had apparently been able to capture these during previous raids on police posts in Bala Boluk district in February, March and on 11 May 2018 as well as in Farah city on 11 May 2018  (more about the use of this weapon in this AAN analysis) – a clear indication that this attack had not come out of the blue.

Video clips also appeared on social media showing fighters inside the city seizing more weapons, ammunition and military vehicles from Afghan security forces. Most of this footage was filmed the first morning. Photos posted on social media also showed Taleban ‘special forces’ in gear not dissimilartothat of the Afghan army. In January 2018 the governor’s spokesman, Nasser Mehri, told Kabul-based daily Etilaat-e Roz that the local Taleban were equipped with helmet cameras and night-vision goggles.

According to Farid Bakhtawar, head of the provincial council, local government officials did manage to flee the city (see here). There were also reports that provincial governor Basir Salangi, a former mujahedin commander who was appointed in January 2018 (2), had left the city the night before fighting broke out and had relocated to a military base “a few miles from the city”, as the New York Times reported quoting “numerous local officials.” Ahmad Shah Fetrat, a local journalist in the city, told AAN “The city is empty, government offices, schools and shops are closed.” Tolo News quoted a local citizen as saying “people are running from the city.”

The Taleban, however, were unable to capture Farah airport’s runway or prevent reinforcements, particular of Afghan army commandos, arriving from Herat. Police special forces arrived from Kandahar (media report here) and Afghan and US air forces also carried out a number of airstrikes. Local journalists in the provincial capital confirmed to AAN that they had seen US and Afghan helicopters flying over the city, and NATO’s Resolute Support mission also confirmed US airstrikes in the province (read here and here).

In the afternoon of 15 May, government forces managed to push back the attackers to the Regi area (media report here). There were also reports about Taleban sheltering in residential areas within the city’s limits, from which they had driven out residents.

On 17 May, new fighting broke out “in some key parts of the city,” according to Afghan media reports (for example here and here), with attacks on the ANP headquarters, the prison and the residence of the head of the provincial council. According to Reuters, at least one more suicide bomb attack was launched near the police headquarters. The third police district reportedly fell to the Taleban. The same day, the Ministry of Education ordered that all schools in the province remain closed “till the situation has improved”. Fighting subsided after a few hours of battle; the city has been quiet since.

According to governor Salangi, about 300 Taleban, 15 soldiers, ten policemen and five civilians were killed during the first day of fighting. These figures are likely too low, though. The Taleban claimed the number of their casualties was much lower, in the single digits only. Independent sources estimated that 180 people had been killed from all sides, but without differentiating how many from each. The Interior Ministry in Kabul confirmed that provincial deputy police chief Abdul Razeq Sherzad was among the injured.

Salangi said 1,000 Taleban had been involved in the attack, with another 1,000 reinforcements brought in during the day on 15 May. The numbers cannot be confirmed, but AAN heard from several sources that the Taleban had gathered fighters from Farah, Helmand and Herat’s Shindand district (see this AAN analysis).

An attack foretold

An attack on Farah city had long been feared. The Taleban have systematically worked their way towards the city over many years (see the second dispatch), and their efforts have intensified over recent months.

Haji Khair Muhammad Nurzai, deputy head of Farah’s provincial council, told AAN in January 2018 that Mullah Muzammel, the Taleban’s shadow governor during an earlier, failed attempt to capture Farah city in late September/early October 2017, had now become the commander of the Taleban’s south-western military zone. This had given him the means to gather a larger number of fighters. AAN had already heard in January 2018 that 300 to 400 Taleban from the three provinces under the command of a Mullah Daud had started attacking government security posts and establishing makeshift checkpoints on the Herat-Farah road to try to find and sometimes kill government officials or staff working for international NGOs. One such incident was reported by Jamila Amini, a member of Farah’s provincial assembly, who told the media on 6 January 2018 that three or four out of twenty bus passengers had been abducted by the Taleban (she did not give the exact location). According to her, those abducted had been former police and government employees (read here).

On 28 February 2018, the Washington Post reported that the Taleban were “over running several security outposts, killing at least 43 policemen and wounding more than 50,” and crossing “the dried Farah Rud River, a natural barrier to the city, and attack[ing] a suburban outpost.” At that time in January 2018, fighting had already been going on for 20 days, and Gulbahar Mujahed, the province’s acting police chief, had been killed by a roadside bomb. Three days later Muhammad Ismail, intelligence chief of Poshtrud district, was also killed in a Taleban ambush.

A provincial council member warned Afghan media, that “every night five to ten security force members are killed and Taleban seize their equipment. But the government so far has not done anything to tackle the issue” (here and here). Approximately 7,000 families had fled the area, according to the local representative of the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriations.

In late March, Afghan commandos attacked a Taleban commanders meeting in Bala Boluk district, but this did not prevent the 15 May attack on the provincial capital.

In late April 2018, two weeks before the recent offensive, members of Farah’s provincial council expressed concern over the increase in Taleban control throughouttheir province. Deputy council head,Khair Muhammad Nurzai, was quoted by the Afghan media as saying that three districts – Bakwa, Khak-e Safid and Gulestan – were under the Taleban’s complete control, although this claim was later denied by provincial police chief Sherzad. Gul Ahmad A’azami, an MP from Farah,said six districts were largely controlled by the Taleban – Bakwa, Gulestan, Poshtrud, Bala Boluk, Anar Dara and Khak-e Safid – with government presence limited to the immediate district centres. Just before the latest attack on the city in mid-May, local sources had told the author that, in fact, this was the case in all of Farah province’s ten rural districts. In the remaining four districts, Purchaman, Qala-ye Kah, Shib Koh and Lash wa Juwayn, the government was comparatively stronger, according to senator A’azami .

The centre of Anar Dara was briefly overrun by the Taleban in March 2018, as was Shebkoh centre in October 2017. In November 2017, the Afghan army had to use helicopters in Khak-e Safid’s district centre bazaar to repulse a Taleban attack.

A quarter of all provincial centres are under threat

Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defence has indirectly confirmed the Taleban’s strategy of surrounding provincial cities. On 16 May 2018 its spokesman, Muhammad Radmanesh, said with some understatement and reacting to a media query: “Yes. (…) a few cities are under pressure.”

Apart from Farah city, he listed Maimana (Faryab), Pul-e Khumri (Baghlan), Tirinkot (Uruzgan), Kunduz and also Faizabad (Badakhshan). The media report, also added Ghazni. There, intense fighting was reported in two districts on the same day. One of these districts – Zana Khan – is just outside the provincial capital. Fighting in the province continues.

Lashkargah (Helmand) and Sar-e Pul (where incidents are underreported) could also be put into this category, although the immediate pressure on the latter has been somewhat relieved by the military successes of both Afghan and US troops, part of President Trump’s mini-surge (AAN analysis here), by taking back Nawadistrict centre just outside Lashkargah from the Taleban in July 2017 (media report here). This means that more than a quarter of the country’s 34 provincial centres face a threat from the Taleban.

Kabul could be added to this list, although the threat there is of a different nature; while the country’s capital is not close to falling to the Taleban, it is under constant threat of suicide and so-called complex attacks on strategic installations. This assessment has frequently been confirmed by UNAMA’s regular reportingon civilian casualties, which has shown for a few years now that Kabul suffers a disproportionately high number of attacks. In 2017, “16 per cent of all civilian casualties during the year occurring from such attacks in Kabul city.” Kabul province also saw the highest number of civilian casualties of the country’s provinces. Some Afghan politicians, such as Interior Minister Wais Barmak, have spoken about a city “under siege,” and Kabulis definitely feel this (see, for example, this report by Afghan journalist and former AAN colleague Ali Latifi). This has also been confirmed in Europe where some governments are talking security threats down in the context of their policy of deporting rejected Afghan asylum seekers. Recently, on 9 March 2018, the Cournationale du droit d’asile, France’s highest asylum court, has described Kabul as a “high-intensity situation of indiscriminate violence” (see here).

Reports by AAN and others have shown for a long time how the Taleban have implemented their strategy, moving slowly towards and encircling provincial centres. The most successful example was – and still is – Kunduz. Although the Taleban quickly lost control of the provincial capital in 2015 – and only came close to maintaining some control in 2016 and 2017, they haverepeatedly shownthat they have been able to penetrate the city, reaching its very centre. Symbolic snapshots taken at the city’s central chowk (junction) are of symbolic value for them. They did the same at Farah’s central chowk in the morning of 15 May 2018 after sweeping in there.

In Kunduz, the Taleban built a fundament from which they could move forward for years to come. As this AAN report showed, they started creating footholds in Pashtun pockets there as early as 2005 and increased their military activity from 2009 onwards (see how the build-up occurred in this AAN dossier). Establishing positions near important road links has also been part of their strategy, such as near the Ring Road in the districts of Baghlan-e Jadid and Dand-e Ghoriin Baghlan province, to the south of Kunduz (see this AAN analysis), with the aim of creating options to block government troop reinforcements during attacks in Kunduz (see here). This is what happened during their successful attack on Kunduz in 2015 (AAN analysis here).

The Taleban had in fact closed in on Kunduz city before this (AAN report here), as seen by their control over most rural districts, much like in Farah. Repeated government ‘clearance operations’ have been unable to permanently drive them out, even from the city’s outskirts where their positions can be seen with the naked eye (see here). Control over most districts has changed hands frequently between the insurgents and the government. The last Taleban takeover happened in Qala-ye Zal district, again, in mid-April 2018 (media report here; earlier AAN analysis here).

As in Farah, Taleban advances in Kunduz have been made possible by a combination of factors such as factional conflictswithin the provincial administration (AAN analysis here), weak leadership and a lack of cooperation among the different security forces (see here), as well asthe misrule of pro-government auxiliary armed forces (see here). Kunduz’ situation was exacerbated further by ethnic tensions and the settling of old scores along these lines (see an early Human Rights Watch report here).

Although Baghlan’s situation is less acute than that of Kunduz, the environs of its provincial centre Pul-e Khumri have seen a build-up of Taleban control and repeated low-level fighting since 2014 (AAN report here). The outskirts of the town are also where the Taleban blew up a power line pylon in March, which provides electricity to Kabul – power is still patchy as we write (media report here). That the government is still unable to repair the damage is testament to the fact that it does not have a grip on the area. The current fighting over Talawa Barfak district in Baghlan is part of the regional picture, as its centre controls an alternative route between the Kabul region and Kunduz. Talawa Barfak centre was captured by the Taleban on 8 May 2018 and recaptured by governments on 18 May 2018 (media report here), a repetition of events in March 2017 (media report here).

Further south, from Ghazni, the New York Times reported on 9 May 2018 that the city was “on the brink of falling to the Taliban”as“an increasing number of insurgents live openly in the city. Their fighters regularly kill officials [and] a Taliban court claims jurisdiction over the city.” Already in December 2017, the Afghan news agency Pajhwok had quoted Hassan Raza Yousufi, a member of Ghazni’s Provincial Council, that “[b]usinessmen, Provincial Council members, governor house officials and other individuals give taxes to the Taliban.” According to the same report there are frequent attacks on police stations in the city. Deputy provincial governor Muhammad Aref Nuri was quoted as saying in November 2017 (source: BBC Monitoring) that there had been16 assassinations in the past eight months in the city.

The Taleban had raided Ghazni city before, on 14 September 2015 (an AAN’s reconstruction of events here). During that attack, the Taleban did not only storm the provincial prison but they also ransacked the local NDS office, capturing intelligence files. This attack, however, was not a means to take over the city. Given certain parallels, it might suggest that the recent attack in Farah was not designed to capture or hold Farah either, but to strike and show the vulnerability of the Afghan forces and to stay in positions nearby. The Taleban’s modus operandi of only briefly capturing district centres, where government forces have repeatedly been forced to react and recapture, might be part of this strategy. This is not to say the Taleban would be able to hold a large provincial city for a longer period.

Over the past few months, frequent fighting hasalso been reported from Deh-e Yak, Khwaja Omari and Andar district, all three situated just outside Ghazni city. For example, the Taleban laid siege on Andar district in October 2017, attacked Deh-e Yak several times in November 2017, and temporarily overran Khwaja Omari in April 2018, shooting dead the district governor and police chief. AAN heard from locals that they dug a trench across that road, ambushing approaching vehicles of the security forces.

Information AAN received from local sources indicates that the attack on Jaghatu in particular, where the district headquarters was defended by only 15 to 20 police and NDS was orchestrated by the Taleban in order to seize weapons. According to these reports, they took a ranger vehicle and a mortar and burned whatthey could not carry. They set fire to the police HQ building as well. Reinforcements arrived very late, and could only retrieve the bodies of the 11 dead and five injured.

While AAN has covered the situation in Helmand and around Lashkargah in two long dispatches (see here and here) and in Faryab as well as its centre, Maimana, which is surrounded in all but one direction, less information is available for Uruzgan and Sar-e Pul provinces.

But reports of fighting near the two provincial centres, Tirinkot and Sar-e Pul, are frequent. Local reports from Uruzgan indicate that the situation is not greatly different from that in Farah; with most districts – except their immediate centres – under Taleban control and their fighters in the vicinity of the provincial centre. The last media reports are about a – failed – Taleban attempt to take over the centre of Chinartu district in January 2018 (here), both sides suffering consider casualties during fighting near Chora district centre in March and late May. On 31 May, Major Muhammad Sadiq, spokeman for Atal Military Corps 205, a military corp operate in the southern region of the country, told VOA Pashto that they had killed 12 Taleban in their air and ground attacks. He said that they had recaptured a number of areas of Chora district from the insurgents and that there was no risk of Chora district collapsing. The Taleban’s spokesman, on the other hand, tweeted on 30 May that they had captured Chora district. There was also a report in May that most voter registration centres in the province were“closed due to insecurity.”In Sar-ePul, the Taleban have brought relative stability to Kohistanat, a district they have controlled since 2015, while frequently threatening Sayyad district, which is next to the provincial capital, as well as Sancharak district. A rare indication of the complicated situation in Sar-e Pul city was given by the Afghan election observer organisation, the Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan (TEFA) in September 2017, when a representative told AAN (see here) that the Independent Election Commission only managed to access the provincial capital for its polling centre assessment. In general, though, remote Sar-e Pul is more like an area of retreat for Taleban fighters in provinces nearby, including Jawzjan and Faryab.

Finally, it is no coincidence that the three provinces withthe highest number of districts under Taleban control – Uruzgan, Kunduz and Helmand (according to the US military – USFOR-A) – are all provinces where the provincial capital is also under threat (quoted from 30 April 2018 SIGAR quarterly, see here):

USFOR-A identified the provinces with the largest percentage of insurgent-controlled or -influenced districts as Uruzgan Province, with four of its six districts under insurgent control or influence, Kunduz Province (five of seven districts), and Helmand Province (nine of 14 districts), all unchanged since last quarter.

Conclusion: A war of attrition and a waiting game

The Taleban strategy of surrounding and putting pressure on a number of Afghan provincial centres might be a deliberate strategy or just the coincidental outcome of their efforts to ensure territorial gain. Despite some fluctuation in their territorial gains, the Taleban have managed to establish and hold positions that are threat to a number of key population centres and national highways. From there, they can almost strike at will; government troops are mostly on the defensive and constantly forced to react by sending in the few élite troops that they have – which may well lead to their attrition (see AAN analysis here).

The Taleban apply a similar modus operandi to district centres, with a strategy that could be called assault-and-retreat. The fact that the Afghan Minister of Defence recently called (media report here) 216 of the 407 districts “unsecure” reflects that this strategy is both paying off and widespread.

Given the slow pace of the Taleban’s actual territorial gains, around one per cent per quarter according to figures given in the most recent SIGAR quarterly report in April 2018, this kind of war could go on for a long time. It depends on which side can hold its breath for longest, the insurgents or the Afghan government and its allies. It could also depend on which of them may be prepared to take a bold step to break out of this vicious circle, vicious mainly for the Afghan people and the country’s infrastructure.

With regards to Farah, the fact that the Taleban were only pushed back to positions just outside the provincial capital from where they started their attack means that new attacks can be expected. Farah is only one example for a situation that prevails in at least a quarter of Afghanistan’s provinces. It remains to be seen what happens if they acquire the capacity to attack several provincial capitals at the same time.

 

 

 

(1) The capital of Farah is inhabited by between 38,000 to 108,000 people depending on different sources. The lower figure stems from the Afghan Ministry of Urban Development and Housing’s report, “State of Afghan Cities” (2015) – it also gives 5,299 “dwelling units” for the city; the higher figures is from the Afghan Central Statistics Office 2012.

The term “city” for Farah should be taken with a pinch of salt. As many other provincial and most district centres, it does not have much of an urban character, with most buildings being low and many of traditional style. They are more village-like, and – more importantly – there is not much infrastructure that holds them together.

(2) His predecessor had stepped down following local protests regarding corruption and deteriorating security, citinginterference by powerful “individuals” in his work (see here).