Defence`s Feeds

Islamabad has signed an agreement with Moscow that will allow Pakistani military personnel to be trained in Russia in a move designed to strengthen bilateral defence ties, according to Pakistani and Indian media reports. “Both countries signed the Contract on Admission of Service Members of

Chinese WPF-89-1 Thermobaric Rocket Launcher

Americas

• The US Army is procuring protective netting kits in support of its MRAP vehicles. Navistar Defense will provide an unspecified amount of rocket propelled grenade netting kits as part of the awarded firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. The three-year contract with no option periods is valued at $29.58 million. The PG Net provides a lightweight solution used as an add-on protection on top of existing armor. It can be used to protect the entire vehicle or apply on specific locations where other types of armor are less effective. The mesh structure is not designed to stop the incoming RPG but to disable it by trapping it in-flight and thus preventing it from detonation. Navistar’s netting kit is similar to the Q-Net offered by QinetiQ. Work will be performed in Illinois and is scheduled for completion by August 4th, 2021.

• Raytheon is set to provide the US Air Force with technical support for its inventory of AMRAAM missiles. The contract modification has a value of $13.1 million and provides for technical services and analysis support. Over the years Raytheon’s family of AIM-120s has become world market leader for medium range air-to-air missiles. The AMRAAM’s advanced active guidance section provides aircrew with a high degree of combat flexibility and lethality. Its mature seeker design allows it to quickly find targets in challenging combat environments. Coupled with modern radars the missile’s guidance approach allows a fighter to launch and control many missiles at once, avoiding a dangerous fixation on one target. Work will be performed at the company’s location in Tucson, Arizona and expected to be completed by September 30th, 2020.

• The Navy is investing in a new Air Wing Training Facility. Straub Construction is being contracted to construct this new facility at Naval Air Station, Fallon at a cost of $16.8 million. The facility will be constructed using structural steel framing and a mix of reinforced concrete, including seismic upgrades. After its scheduled completion by August 2020, the facility will support a number of desk-style aircraft simulators where soldiers will train on platforms such as the Aegis combat system, the F-35 and E-2D. The facility will house F-35 Mission Rehearsal Trainers which are small scale simulators that use the same technology as ‘full-scale’ simulators but do not provide a full 360°-degree home display. NAS Fallon is home to TOPGUN and the virtual aegis combat system environment will train surface warfare officers to track and target air threats as part of the Navy’s general NIFC-CA capability.

• The Air Force’s OA-X trainer competition seems to gain traction again after a series of delays and mishaps. The Air Force plans to request proposals from a limited number of companies including Textron and Sierra Nevada Corp. The announcement follows the trainer experiment that was kicked off last year as means to study the feasibility of using an off-the-shelf platform as a low-cost solution for light attack and close-air support missions. Textron is competing with its AT-6 Wolverine and Sierra Nevada with its A-29 Super Tucano, jointly produced with Brazilian manufacturer Embraer. Earlier this year the second phase of the fighter experiment was cut short when a Super Tucano participating in the effort crashed near Holloman Air Force Base. One pilot died, and another was seriously injured. A formal solicitation is expected to be released in December, and a production contract will be awarded in the fourth quarter of FY 2019.

Middle East & Africa

• Reports suggest that the Iranian Air Force successfully overhauled yet another aircraft. IRGC military technicians spent about 25,000 man/hours of work on the French-made Mirage F1 fighter jet. The F1 performed its first flight in 1966. The F1 is built from aluminum alloy, with substantial use of honeycomb sandwich construction, and some use of steel and titanium. It is powered by a single SNECMA Atar 09K50 afterburning turbojet. The F1C was designed to be easy to maintain and quick to turn around between sorties. Iran acquired the F-1 after 24 Iraqi Air Force officers defected in 1991. After the airframes languished for years, the Iranian government commissioned a refurbishment and upgrade program named Project HABIBI in 2007. The Mirage now joins one overhauled American-made F-14 and F-5 jet, as well as 10 Russian-made Su-22s.

• Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Boeing are currently competing in being the lead vendor in one of Israel’s biggest defense procurement programs. The Israel Air Force is looking to modernize its fleet of tanker aircraft as means to maintain its air-superiority. IAI proposed to buy buying used Boeing 767 aircraft on the open market and converting them for airborne refueling of combat planes, however Boeing is reluctant to grant IAI permits to convert its planes to tanker configuration. Boeing has a clear interest in ousting IAI from the procurement program as it wants to push sales of its newly developed KC-46, which comes with a price-tag of $250-300 million. The Israel Air Force’s current tankers are used Boeing 707s converted by IAI in the early 1980s.

Europe

• The Bulgarian Ministry of Defense is issuing a tender for the general overhaul of two Mi-17 transport and four Mi-24V combat helicopters. The Mi-17 is a medium weight, single rotor helicopter. The aircraft construction primarily incorporates the airframe of a Mi-8 with the power train of the Mi-24, which provides an increase in performance and gross weight over the basic Mi-8. The aircraft is configured with 5-bladed main rotor system 70 feet diameter and uses wheeled landing gear. The multirole helicopter that can be armed with rockets, missiles and guns. The Mi-24V is equipped with a YakB four-barreled, 12.7mm, built-in, flexibly mounted machine gun, which has a firing rate of 4,000-4,500 rounds a minute and its four underwing pylons can accommodate up to 12 anti-tank missiles. The planned procurement has a total value of $22 million of which $6.6 million are earmarked for the Mi-17s and $15.3 million for Mi-24Vs.

Asia-Pacific

• Jane’s reports that the China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics (CAAA) can now offer an improved version of its Cai Hong 804C VTOL UAV. The particularity of this hybrid drone is the installation of 4 rotors on the tail beams attached to the wings, allowing it to take off and land vertically without the need for a track, or an ejection system. The updated vehicle features a redesigned composite airframe that boosts an increased wingspan, a maximum take-off weight of 60 lb. and a payload capacity of 8 lb. The UAV is equipped with an EO/IR ball turret that can detect and identify a tank-sized object at a maximum distance of 1.2 miles and 0.9 miles respectively. The UAV is equipped with an L-band datalink that enables it to transmit and receive data within a 62 miles line-of-sight distance, supporting a data transfer rate of up to 25.6 kbps for telemetry and 4 Mbps for imagery.

Today’s Video

• Watch: The opening of Aviadarts 2018

Live AIM-120 AMRAAM Missile Still Missing with Search Underway. A Spanish Air Force Eurofighter Typhoon combat aircraft accidently fired an AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) while flying near Otepää in Estonia, less than 50 km west of the Russian border. The missile has not been recovered. The last assumed location of the missile […]

Chinese PF-97 Thermobaric Rocket Launcher

The Independent Election Commission (IEC) has proposed a delay in the district council elections, citing a lack of candidates. According to a report from the body, only a tenth of the country’s districts have enough male and female candidates to compete. The IEC listed several reasons as to why so few people wanted to stand: insecurity, lack of a legal framework, a requirement on educational qualifications that was too stringent, lack of clarity on salaries and benefits for councillors and, in rural areas, an unfavourable ‘cultural context’.  In this, the latest dispatch in his series on the preparations for Afghanistan’s elections, AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili assesses these reasons and points also to a hostility towards district council elections from within the state from the outset.

This is part ten of a series of dispatches looking at the preparations for the parliamentary elections. Part one dealt with political challenges; part two with an initial set of technical problems, including the date, budget and use of biometric technology; part three  with electoral constituencies; part four with controversies surrounding the appointment of a new IEC member after its former chief was sacked by President Ghani; part five with a demand by political parties to change the electoral system; part six with the date of the polls and with voter registration; part seven with a deficient polling centre assessment; part eight with controversies over voter registration, and; part nine with controversies over holding elections in Ghazni province.

Setting up district councils should be an important endeavour. They have, potentially, a significant political role to play. In establishing them two important institutions would be completed: according to the constitution, one third (34) of the 102 members of the Meshrano Jirga should be elected by district councils and district councillors should make up more than half of the members of any Constitutional Loya Jirga (the only body which can change the Afghan constitution). District councils could also provide accountability at the local level by checking local administration and district governors (see also this USIP article here). They could contribute to efforts to secure peace with the Taleban and other insurgent groups by providing a platform for local communities to feel included, represented and engaged in local government.

However, despite being mandated by the 2004 constitution, elections for district councils have never been held. This time again, efforts to hold them are failing. On 29 July 2018, the IEC proposed that they should be postponed (they are due to be held on 20 October, together with the parliamentary elections). The IEC argued that only 40 out of Afghanistan’s 387 districts had an adequate number of candidates to compete. (See media reporting here, which quotes the IEC letter On 31 July, the head of the IEC’s field operations department, Zmarai Qalamyar, said that out of three elements necessary to an election – “voters, candidates, and competition” – one was missing; in other words, the number of candidates standing was inadequate. He also said that re-opening a fresh candidate nomination was not feasible at this stage as it would delay the Wolesi Jirga elections.

This is the second proposal by the IEC regarding a postponement of a 2018 election. It had earlier recommended delaying all elections in Ghazni province, arguing that due to the “serious security situation and other problems” in the province, fair and inclusive representation from the entire province could not be ensured (media report here).

Both proposals were made to a committee that has been set up, as stipulated in article 104 of the electoral law which says that if “security situations, natural disasters, and other similar conditions make impossible the principle of general and fair representation,” elections should be postponed for a period of four months, based on a proposal by the IEC and with the approval of the committee. (1) The committee, according to the article, comprises the head and members of the National Security Council, the speakers of two houses of the parliament, the chief justice and the chairperson of the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitutions. Qalamyar said the committee has not decided on the IEC proposal yet.

The Central Statistics Office (CSO) and Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) provided a list of 387 districts to the IEC for planning the district council elections. The statistics that AAN received on 26 July 2018 show the following problems:

• No male or female candidates in 42 districts
• No female candidate in 120 districts
• The number of candidates in 166 out of the 206 districts that have female candidates is equal or less than the number of the seats allocated to women in those districts
• The number of male candidates in 39 out of the 326 districts that have male candidates is equal or less than the number of the seats allocated to those districts (excluding the women’s quota of 25 per cent seats)
• Only 40 districts have an adequate number of male and female candidates

On 30 July, Kabul daily Etilaat Roz also reported similar statistics that it claimed had been prepared by the legal department of the IEC. AAN’s conversations with election specialists privy to the IEC’s internal discussions (as well as Etilaat Roz report quoted above) show that IEC officials have concluded that the reasons for the low number of candidates include: the stringent education requirements, insecurity, the need to resign from civil service and government positions before standing, a lack of clarity on the councillors’ authorities and responsibilities – a problem that also had applied to the provincial councils (AAN analysis here) –, and a lack of clarity on salaries and benefits that councillors will enjoy. However, as I argue below, more overarching factors were at play; the reasons why so few Afghans wanted to stand should be seen as secondary factors in causing a delay – or, in the end, abandonment of the district council elections. There has been hostility by sections of the National Unity Government to holding them at all. That has allowed a basic lack of clarity to linger over various issues which needed to be certain before elections could take place. Among these were the number of districts in the country, that has only recently been clarified between the Central Statistics Office and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (each had previously used different figures) and their boundaries (this issue will be looked at in a separate dispatch).

Earlier pushback against district council elections

The drive towards holding district elections for the first time came from the 2014 National Unity Government agreement. The Abdullah camp wanted to change the constitution and this was agreed to by the Ghani camp. Changing the constitution needs a Constitutional Loya Jirga whose members must include the elected heads of district councils. However, since 2014, some elements of the government have displayed a reluctance to hold these elections. Last year, on 21 August 2017, Vice-President Sarwar Danesh, who was speaking at an event organised jointly by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) and United States Institute of Peace (USIP) on reviewing the constitution, openly said that there was no need for district council elections (or village council or municipal council elections). He argued that four elected institutions (the presidency, Wolesi Jirga, mayoral and provincial councils) were enough. He also said that Afghanistan did not have the money to hold all these elections, nor did it have the expertise to manage the various elected bodies and nor was there any need for them in terms of democracy and popular will.

Vice-President Danesh’s argument for removing district council elections from the constitution ran counter to what the Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC) – the commission that was tasked in 2015 by the government to come up with proposals for electoral reform – had, earlier in late 2015, recommended when it discussed the issue of multiple elections in Afghanistan (see AAN analysis here). The SERC’s recommendations were that the constitution be amended in a way to provide for the indirect election of provincial council members from among the district and municipal councils. It also said that the Constitutional Loya Jirga should reconsider having village council elections. (2) The SERC’s recommendation was based on two things: the desire to reduce the number of elections to make them affordable, and to localise representation. The argument was that district councils would be closer to the local population than the provincial councils and they could just as well be elected indirectly. This system would work in a similar way to the Afghan Senate where one third of the members are elected by provincial councils and one third should be elected by district councils.

Vice-President Danesh’s remarks were noticed with concern by some parties. For instance, on 16 September 2017, Abdul Sabur Khedmat, an MP from Farah province, said: “The second vice president says that we cannot hold the district council elections, but the commission says that we will hold parliamentary anddistrict council elections.” (emphasis added) (see here.)

AAN’s research at the time also showed that officials at the IDLG were arguing against holding district council elections in 2018. These officials pointed to a number of reasons why a delay was desirable: the cost of the elections and the salaries to the elected councillors, and the lack of institutional structures within the IDLG to administer and oversee almost 400 district councils (more on the number of districts below). AAN’s research also showed that the IDLG had suggested to President Ashraf Ghani that district council elections be held together with the next presidential and provincial council elections in 2019. Officials from both the IDLG and the Palace, the author found out, only wanted to hold district council elections at all so as to complete the constitutional requirements to hold a Constitutional Loya Jirga which could then remove district councils altogether. One IDLG official in conversation with AAN argued that district councils could provide a huge network of clients for national powerbrokers and could therefore play a destabilising role in politics.

Remarks aimed at disincentivising potential candidates also came from the IDLG halfway through the period for candidate nomination when, on 4 June, the head of its department for coordination of local councils, Sayyed Ahmad Khamush, told Etilaat Roz that the IDLG did not have the financial ability to pay salaries and benefits to the district council members in the same way it paid MPs and provincial council members. He said that the IDLG intended to build on the experience of developing community development councils (CDCs), which worked voluntarily with the National Solidarity Programme in the past and now with the Citizen’s Charter programme. A week later, on 11 June, he told Tolonews (see here) that there were around 2,800 district council members and the government would need to hire over 800 civil servants to carry out their administrative work. Khamush estimated that around 500 million Afs (around 6.9 million USD) would be needed per annum to pay the district councillors’ salaries and benefits and this, he said, was beyond the government’s financial capability.

These remarks came during the candidate nomination period (for both district councils and Wolesi Jirga elections, this started on 26 May and ended on 12 June.) The IEC extended the period for nominations for district councils for two more days, until 14 June, after it realised that not enough people, especially women, had chosen to stand. AAN’s conversations with different national and international election experts suggest these remarks did dampen potential candidates’ interest and that the possibility that they were deliberately made cannot be ruled out. This suspicion was also flagged by Mohiuddin Mahdi, an MP from Baghlan affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami, who wrote on 27 July in a Facebook post that “the most important reason for women and men’s disinterest in nomination was the government’s untimely – but meaningful – announcement of the district councillors not having material benefits.” AAN has also heard anecdotes indicating that, in certain provinces, candidates had resigned from their government jobs to run in district council elections, but rushed to withdraw their resignations after hearing the remarks from the IDLG.

It seems that, although the IEC did incorporate district council elections into election planning from the very beginning when it announced the election date, there has been no sign of political will or genuine support from the government for holding them, although the president officially stuck to the line that both elections should be held as planned (see for example on his website here).

Some attempts to re-incentivise potential candidates by discussing their salaries and benefits came far too late, after the nomination period was already over. For instance, on 18 June, some MPs signed a proposal and submitted it to administrative board of the Wolesi Jirga to revise the law on the salaries of government officials to include salaries for district council members. Baghlan MP Mehdi, who was part of this effort (a copy of the proposal posted on his Facebook page, told the media that:

District councils are a fundamental foundation stone of democracy as well as a primary component of a Constitutional Loya Jirga. Therefore, I suggested that specific benefits be envisioned for their members. Inter alia, if they are [a government] employee or a teacher, they should be given additional benefits in addition to them maintaining their job and salary, while those who are newcomers and do not have a working background, should be provided with fixed salaries and benefits.

Similarly, it was only on 25 July that, that the issue was clarified at the highest level of government: the High Council of Rule of Law chaired by President Ghani discussed the district council law and salaries and decided that the law be finalised soon and “salaries be set for members of district councils.”

It might also be the case that this late effort on the part of the government was intended to avoid responsibility for the unravelling of the district council elections.

What is the constitutional status of district councils?

A more fundamental antipathy to having elected district councils could be because they are a prerequisite for changing the constitution. They are needed to complete two important institutions: a Constitutional Loya Jirga and the upper house of the parliament. Not having elected district councils could always, therefore, be used as an excuse to reject any demand for convening such a Loya Jirga. The constitution is very clear about this. Article 140 of the 2004 constitution (3) establishes district councils elected by local residents “for 3 years through free, general, secret, as well as direct elections.” A separate law to regulate the authorities and responsibilities of the councils has to be approved by parliament and the president. The IDLG has been reportedly holding consultative meetings in different regions of the country on what roles should be codified for district councils. (media report here) However, as yet – less than three months before the planned elections – nothing has been authorised.

It is article 110 (4) of the constitution that discusses district councillors’ part in any Loya Jirga which, according to the article, “is the highest manifestation of the will of the people of Afghanistan.” A Loya Jirga consists, the article says, of: 1) members of the National Assembly; 2) heads of the provincial councils; and 3) heads of the district councils. The Loya Jirga has crucial functions, as prescribed in article 111 of the constitution: to decide on issues related to the independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and supreme national interests; amend provisions of this constitution and; impeach the president in accordance with the provisions of article 69 of the constitution. None of these three functions can be performed without a Loya Jirga and it cannot be constitutionally convened without having district council elections.

This was the reason why the National Unity Government in its September 2014 political agreement (see here) committed itself to holding district council elections “as early as possible on the basis of a law in order to create a quorum for the Loya Jirga in accordance with Section 2 of Article 110 of the Constitution.” The aim of convening a Loya Jirga was to amend the constitution and consider “the proposal to create the post of executive prime minister.” On 27 July, MP Mahdi, after it was revealed that the IEC was considering proposing a delay in district council elections, called this “the antidemocratic decision” of the government taking “pre-emptive action” against convening a Loya Jirga “to amend and reform the constitution.” He claimed the Loya Jirga was “a demand that recently parties and civil society organisations have strongly insisted on and emphasised.”

Moreover, according to article 84 of the constitution, one third of Meshrano Jirga members should also come from the district councils: “From amongst district councils of each province, one individual [is] elected by the respective councils for a three-year term for Meshrano Jirga.” (5) However, both the previous and current governments have filled this set of Meshrano Jirga seats with provincial councillors. The indirectly-elected two-thirds of senators should outnumber the one-third appointed by the president and could, therefore, provide a stronger check on him (or her), particularly given that the senators elected through the district councils are, in principle, supposed to strongly represent the interests of the rural population.

Given the 387 districts in Afghanistan now agreed upon, the district councils would actually comprise a majority of Constitutional Loya Jirga members. Against the 387 heads of district councils would be 386 others – 250 MPs, 102 Senators and the 34 heads of the provincial councils. Since the district councils would also elect 34 members of Meshrano Jirga, the total number of Constitutional Loya Jirga members coming directly or indirectly from the district councils would be 421, as opposed to 352 others. The district councils’ share of a Loya Jirga membership could further increase as more districts than 387 might be created in the future (more on the number of districts below and in an upcoming dispatch).

Legal requirements and constraints

The low number of candidates for district councils was also caused by too strict criteria for nomination. The 2016 electoral law stipulates what some election experts consider as too high requirements for potential candidates for district (as well as provincial and village) councils which are discussed in this section. This could indicate how random and flawed the – still largely incomplete – electoral reform was.

For instance, while there is no education criterion for Wolesi Jirga candidates who are supposed to enact legislation in a broad range of fields and approve fundamental lines of the country’s foreign policy as well as other international treaties (which should require education), the electoral law sets out completed 12thgrade education (apart from being at least 25 years old) for prospective candidates of the three above-mentioned councils. (6) AAN’s conversation with election specialists and potential candidates as well as the IEC report showed that the legal requirements for the district council candidates have actually harmed candidate nomination. Article 40 of the electoral law sets the following requirements for people to stand in district – and provincial – councils:

A further dampening of enthusiasm may have been article 44 of the electoral law (7) which bans seven categories of people from running, including civil servants. They have to resign before standing for any elected position. Given the lack of clarity on salaries and benefits (and of the chance of being elected), this stipulation may have put off teachers and other civil servants from standing as district councillors.

Districts outside the government control

According to the IEC’s report, insecurity was one of the main reasons for not enough people standing for the district council elections. The government has never cited insecurity as an argument against district council elections. However, as three security assessments showed, it is a real problem. Even if the IEC were to rescind its proposal to delay the district council elections, holding an inclusive ballot looks near impossible.

The US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has been conducting an assessment of Afghanistan’sdistricts since it began receiving ‘control-of-district’ data from the United States military and Resolute Support in November 2015. According to its latest quarterly report published on 30 July 2018, out of the country’s 407 districts, which SIGAR uses as the unit of assessment, as of 15 May 2018, 74 districts were under Afghan government control and 155 others under government influence, a total of 229 districts (56.3%). It said 11 districts were under insurgent control and 45 others under insurgent influence, a total of 56 districts (13.8%). The remaining 122 districts (30%) were contested, meaning they were controlled neither by the government nor the insurgency. In sum, SIGAR found the Taleban to be controlling, influencing or contesting 178 districts (43.7%).

The Long War Journal, which has been tracking the status of Afghanistan’s districts since the summer of 2015, six months before SIGAR, published its own assessment of the districts on 1 May 2018. According to the Journal and its three assessment levels (government-controlled, insurgent controlled, and contested), the Afghan government controls 159 districts (39%), the Taliban 39 districts (9.5%) (8), leaving 200 districts (49%) contested. It said it was not able to determine the status of 9 districts (2%). According to its data, the Taleban controls or is contesting 239 of Afghanistan’s 407 (59%) districts. (see here).

In early May this year, Defense Minister Tareq Shah Bahrami and Interior Minister Wais Ahmad Barmak provided their own security assessment of the districts to the Wolesi Jirga. They considered 216 districts out of 387 districts (55.8%) to be insecure.

There is no sign that the balance between government and insurgency control or influence has significantly changed since these assessments.This is underscored by SIGAR’s new quarterly report published on 30 July which reported that while “the Afghan government halted the insurgency’s momentum in gaining control of Afghanistan’s districts” this quarter, “it failed to improve its own areas of control.” (see here.)

Whatever the exact numbers are, it is clear that much of Afghanistan will be too insecure to hold elections safely, given the conflict and the Taleban’s stated hostility to elections. The IEC was not able even to access 32 districts in 14 provinces due to insecurity when it conducted its nation-wide assessment of polling centres last year (this is according to a list received by AAN from the IEC in early January 2018 – see AAN’s previous reporting here). (9) Then, a day after voter registration was launched, on 15 April 2018, the Taleban called on the “Muslim and Mujahed people to boycott the cosmetic and fake process under the name of election,” making the statement (see AAN’s previous reporting on this here).

Since then, both the Taleban and the Daesh branch in Afghanistan, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), have claimed attacks on election staff and sites. As we reported at the time of voter registration, insecurity was a major factor causing initial low turn-out. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) released a report about election-related incidents and civilian casualties on 10 May. It had, by then, verified 23 election-related security incidents since voter registration began on 14 April 2018. Not all attacks were claimed by or attributed to the Taleban. They had resulted, said UNAMA, in 271 civilian casualties (86 deaths and 185 injured) and the abduction of 26 civilians (read the report here). Since then, more election facilities and personnel have been targeted, see this media report of the Taleban storming a voter registration centre in Chakhansur district of Nimroz, killing seven police officers, and seizing election material after the raid, for example.

Conclusion: no future for district council elections?

The IEC did include district council elections in election planning. It then conducted an unsuccessful candidate nomination operation, with only 10 per cent of the country’s 387 districts producing enough nominations for a sensible and competitive election to be held. This insufficiency of candidates in 90 per cent of the districts has rendered elections politically meaningless, for lack of competition, in a majority of the country’s districts. If the IEC reopened a new candidate nomination process and then prepares the preliminary and final lists, it would cause a delay in the Wolesi Jirga elections, if both elections were not split. Moreover, security has not improved and it is not clear at all whether people will take an interest in nomination in the future. As a result, the IEC has proposed a delay in the district council elections.

The option now is to hold the district council elections together with the presidential and provincial elections, planned for 20 April 2019, as it can be surely assumed that a third election within six months is completely unimaginable. This would give the IDLG some more time to set the legal framework for the district councils. However, holding district council elections with the presidential and provincial council elections as well as the Wolesi Jirga election in Ghazni would severely complicate the presidential election, as would any overspill such as the long-winded disputes which have characterised most previous elections.

The likely unravelling of the 20 October district council elections appears to have stemmed from the government’s lack of clear and firm determination to hold them, exacerbated by contradictory and unhelpful remarks by certain officials. Those who have stood – according to the IEC report, a total of 6221 people (5801 men and 420 women) in districts in 33 provinces (excluding Ghazni; the number of those districts is not mentioned in the report), with 70 candidates (61 men and 9 women) excluded from the preliminary list – number 6,151. They were expecting to stand in and hoped to win their district council election. Some may be locally influential – and not very happy about matters.

The failure to hold district council elections will also delay the holding of any possible Constitutional Loya Jirga and therefore any amendments to the constitution. These may be wanted – whether because of efforts to find peace with the Taleban or because something solid has emerged out of the (interminable) debates about changing Afghanistan’s political system. Adopting any other mechanism apart from a Loya Jirga to amend the constitution would be tantamount to overturning the current constitutional order and starting a new arrangement from scratch. This also would add a significant amount of political instability to an already instable situation.

Edited by Kate Clark and Thomas Ruttig

 

(1) Article 104 of the electoral law sets out following provisions and procedures about postponement and suspension of elections:

• When security situations, natural disasters and other similar conditions make impossible the principle of general and fair representation and undermine the credibility of the electoral process if elections are, the elections should be postponed from the specific date for a period of up to four months. The postponement or suspension is proposed by the IEC and approved by a committee, which should comprise head and members of the National Security Council, speakers of the two houses of the parliament, chief justice, and chair of the Independent Commission of Oversight of Implementation of the Constitution of Afghanistan 
• If the situation mentioned above which led to postponement or suspension of the elections does not improve within the period of four months, the committee may extend the postponement or suspension of elections for a period of another four months.
• The committee takes its decision by majority of votes of its members.
• If the situation mentioned above is limited to one or more electoral constituencies, the committee may postpone holding elections in those particular electoral constituencies till improvement of the situation.
• If elections in an electoral constituency are proved as defective, the IEC may order conducting new elections in that particular electoral constituency.
• If elections are postponed or suspended, members of the elected bodies (for instance the Wolesi Jirga) should continue to serve in their positions until holding of a new elections and announcement of its results. (This does not apply to the delay in district council elections as they have not been elected before, but does apply to the current Ghazni MPs who, according to this provision, should continue to serve in the Wolesi Jirga if the Wolesi Jirga elections are postponed in that province.)

(2) Point eight of SERC’s recommendations on amendment to the constitution says:

Article (138) of the constitution about the provincial council elections should be revised in a manner that their members can be elected indirectly through Districts and Municipal Councils. 

Point nine says:

Based on the statistics provided by the Central Statistics Office, there are 45 thousands villages throughout the country, which constitute 70% of the population of the country. On the other side, conducting secret and direct elections at this number of constituencies in accordance with article (140) of the constitution will have numerous difficulties considering financial, security and logistical challenges. The Commission is recommending that Loya Jirga shall consider easier ways for the implementation of this article.

The idea here was to elect village councils informally, similar to community development councils under the National Solidarity and Citizen Charter programmes.

(3) Article 140 of the constitution reads:

Councils shall be established to organize activities as well as attain active participation of the people in provincial administrations in districts and in villages, in accordance with the provisions of the law. 

Local residents shall elect members of these councils for 3 years through free, general, secret, as well as direct elections. 

Participation of nomads in these local councils shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions of the law.

(4) According to article 110 of the constitution, cabinet ministers, the chief justice and members of the supreme court, as well as the attorney general will also participate in a Loya Jirga sessions but without the right to vote.

(5) Article 84 of the constitution says:

Members of the House of Elders shall be elected and appointed as follows:

1. From amongst each provincial council members, one individual shall be elected by the respective council for a 4-year term;
2. From amongst district councils of each province, one individual, elected by the respective councils, for a 3-year term;
3. The remaining one third of the members shall be appointed by the President, for a 5-year term, from amongst experts and experienced personalities, including two members from amongst the impaired and handicapped, as well as two from nomads.

The President shall appoint 50 percent of these individuals from amongst women. The individual selected as a member of the House of Elders shall lose membership to the related Council, and, another individual shall be appointed in accordance with the provisions of the law.

(6) These are additions to the general requirements of being a voter in Afghanistan according to article 37 of the law: being a citizen and at least 18 years old; not having been deprived of civil rights by the law or a competent court; being registered on the voter list.

Of all these stipulations, what proved most problematic was the education criterion. To put the provision on educational qualification into practice, the IEC put in place even a more rigorous regulation (approved on 6 May) than the law itself for nominations: Prospective candidates had to “present clear and attested copy of graduation certificate from grade 12,” that is, the document had to be first copied and then attested to that “the copy is in accordance with the original” with the stamp of the Ministry of Education. (See the regulation in Dari here).

While this may have been aimed at screening candidates without genuine 12thgrade education, it will have been time-consuming for potential district council candidates to get the paperwork and may have put off some would-be councillors from standing.

(7) Article 44 of the electoral law lays down the following rules:

• the following persons have to resign from their positions before nominating themselves for any elected seats: chief justice and members of the supreme court and other judges; attorney general, prosecutors and professional members of the Attorney General Office; ministers, advisor minister, advisors to the president, deputy ministers, heads of agencies and their deputies, chairpersons and members of independent commissions, provincial governors and their deputies, district governors, ambassadors, and the staff of the political missions of the country resident abroad; military personnel of the Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Interior Affairs and General Directorate of National Security and other ministries and bodies with military set-up; civil servants; temporary or permanent staff of the IEC; instructors of the governmental institutes of higher education and members of the academic cadre of the Academy of Sciences of Afghanistan. If the above-mentioned categories of potential candidates do not win election, they may be re-appointed in accordance with the provisions of the law, except for the civil servants and instructors.
• It also bans persons who are commanders or members of illegal armed groups from participating in elections as a candidate. A separate commission comprising representatives of the Ministries of National Defense and Interior Affairs, General Directorate of National Security and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance to be chaired by the chairperson of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) vets and decides potential candidates’ links to illegal armed groups. The ECC adjudicates any complaint in this regard and its decisions are final.
• If members of an elected body intend to nominate themselves for a seat in another elected body, they should resign from their current seats. (Members of the provincial and district councils who nominate themselves for the membership of Meshrano Jirga or members of Meshrano Jirga who nominate themselves for the membership of provincial or district council are an exception to this provision.)
• If an appointed member of the Meshrano Jirga intends to nominate themselves for an elected seat, they should resign from their current seat.
• No one can nominate themselves at the same time in more than one electoral constituency or for more than one elected seat.

(8) Following is the list of districts that, according to the Long War Journal, are under Taleban control. As seen below, the Journal also provides additional background information about most of these districts (with some additional comment by AAN):

Helmand: 1) Reg (Khaneshin), 2) Dishu: the Afghan government admitted Dishu was under Taleban control in June 2015; 3) Kajaki: the Journal previously identified it as contested. Assessment based on Resolute Support/SIGAR determination; 4) Naw Zad: it is contested between Taleban and Afghan government control. The Taleban claimed to have captured the district on 29 July 2015. Reuters reported the district is under Taleban control in December 2015; 5) Baghran: it has been under the Taleban control since before the US surge began in 2009; 6) Musa Qala: it fell to the Taleban on 26 August 2015. Afghan forces claimed to retake the district four days later. Reuters reported in December 2015 the district was still under Taleban control. It fell back under the Taleban control on 20 February 2016; 7) Sangin: the Taleban overran the district center in March 2017 and paraded their forces there.

Kandahar: 8) Maruf: the Taleban seized control on 16 October 2017. The Taleban previously overran the district centre on 27 September 2017 and seized weapons and other supplies, and then withdrew hours later. 9) Miya Neshin.

Paktika: 10) Wazakhwa: the Taleban has controlled the district since the summer of 2016; 11) Gayan: in May 2017, the Taleban enforced sharia in this district, threatening students with large fines for shaving beards, wearing ties, or contacting the government; 12) Omna: it fell to the Taleban on 5 September after a five day siege.

Ghazni: 13) Nawa: it is a traditional stronghold of the Taleban. The ANA recaptured the district briefly in May 2015, but the Taleban claimed that they retook the district on 15 May 2015. The Afghan government admitted in June 2016 that the Taleban controls Nawa. Afghan media also said on 31 July 2017 that the district was controlled by the Taleban; 14) Andar (also known as Shilgar): the Taleban overran the district centre on 17 October 2017. Afghan forces claimed that they retook the district on 20 October. The district had been contested for years. 15) Zana Khan: seized by the Taleban in August 2017 after clashes with ANSF.

Zabul: 16) Arghandab: the Taleban have controlled the district so thoroughly that in 2015 clashes between rival factions broke out; 17) Kakar (also known as Khak-e Afghan): the Taleban have controlled the district so thoroughly that in 2015 clashes between rival factions broke out.

Farah: 18) Gulistan: The Taleban claimed they took control there on 23 December 2015; 19) Bala Buluk: the Taleban overran the district centre on 14 October 2015; 20) Khak-e Safid: the Taleban captured it on 30 September 2015.

Faryab: 21) Ghormach: the Taleban overran it in August 2017. This remote district has changed hands several times since late 2014; 22) Pashtun Kot: the Taleban overran it on 8 October 2015; 23) Kohistan: it switched several times between Taleban and government control during the summer and fall of 2017. Currently, the Taleban control it.

Jawzjan: 24) Darzab: the district was controlled by a self-declared ISKP group until recently, but the Taleban have wrested back control (AAN analysis here). The government maintains some token presence in the district centre.

Sar-e-Pul: 25) Kohistanat: the Taleban overran it on 28 July 2015.

Baghlan: 26) Dahana-ye Ghuri:  as of 27 October 2016, Afghan troops abandoned several bases in the district and fled to the district centre; 27) Guzargahi-e Nur: the Taleban overran it in July 2017.

Badakhshan: 28) Warduj: the Taleban overran it on 1 October2015. The district has changed hands several times in the past; 29) Yamgan (Girwan): it has switched hands several times. Most recently, the Taleban claimed it recaptured the district on 18 November 2015.

Kunar: 30) Chapa Dara: the Taleban overran it on 25 August 2017.

Kapisa: 31) Tagab: while security forces are present in the district, the Taleban are enforcing sharia there.

Logar: 32) Azra: the Taleban control all but four villages in this district; 33) Charkh: more than 95 per cent of it is under Taleban control, Afghan officials said in December 2014; 34) Kharwar.

Maidan Wardak: 35) Sayed Abad, with some token government presence.

Paktia: 36) Jani Khel: the Taleban overran Jani Khel, a known stronghold of the Haqqani network, in July 2017; situation remains unclear; 37) Zurmat:  it is firmly in control of the Taleban and “they can operate in the open there,” one intelligence official told the Journal. The government maintains some token control and US and Afghan forces resort to airstrikes to target the Taleban operating there.

(9) Following is the district list that AAN received from IEC:

1) Maidan Wardak: Jaghatu; 2) Nangarhar: Hisarak; 3) Baghlan: Dahana-ye Ghori; 4) Ghazni: Zanakhan (under Taleban control), 5) Giro (only district centre with the government) 6) Ajristan (only district centre with the government) 7) Nawa; 8) Paktika: Neka, 9) Gyan and 10) Dela; 11) Badakhshan: Warduj and 12) Yamgan (both are completely under the Taleban); 13) Kunduz: Qulbad and 14) Gul Tape of (both under the Taleban control); 15) Urozgan: Chora, 16) Shahid-e Hassas and 17) Chinarto; 18) Kandahar: Miyaneshin, 19) Shorabak and 20) Reg; 21) Faryab: Kohistan; 22) Helmand: Nawzad, 23) Sangin, 24) Musa Qala, 25) Reg (Khanneshin), 26) Baghran and 27) Disho; 28) Badghis: Ghormach; 29) Herat: Farsi, 30) Zer Koh and31) Pusht Koh; 32) Farah: Bakwa.

 

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 The Taleban have eliminated the self-proclaimed Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) group that had been holding an enclave of territory in the isolated districts of Qush Tepa and Darzab in Jawzjan province for the last three years. It was the only ISKP-aligned group with territorial control outside the east of Afghanistan. The group failed to withstand a concerted, month-long offensive by the Taleban. In the end in an unexpected turn of events, reports AAN’s Obaid Ali (with input from Thomas Ruttig), most of their remaining fighters and leaders were rescued by the government. It has yet to say why it did this.

For the past three years, Qush Tepa and Darzab districts have been strongholds for fighters claiming affiliation with ISKP (also known as Daesh in Afghanistan). Their original leader was Qari Hekmat, a disgruntled Taleban commander from Darzab who took his fighters over to ISKP in 2015 (read AAN analysis here and here). In this dispatch, we describe the group as ‘self-proclaimed ISKP’, rather than just ‘ISKP’ because we have found no solid evidence to claim the group had connection with ISKP in Nangarhar province.  The ISKP there is recognised by ‘Daesh central’ in Syria and Iraq as a branch.

Qari Hekmat’s fighters were largely Uzbek and Tajik, with a small number of Pashtuns and some foreign (Central Asian) fighters. In February 2017, his group killed six staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and kidnapped two others (read media report here). Qari Hekmat led the group for more than two years, before being killed by a United States airstrike in April 2018. The group then appointed Mawlawi Habib Rahman as his successor. Habib Rahman is originally from Sholgara district of Balkh province and joined Qari Hekmat’s group in 2016 (read AAN analysis here). In terms of territorial control, the government has continued to ‘hold’ both district centres, although, according to locals in Darzab, the district  governor had been absent since June this year and the police chief was holed up in a local ANP base. The Taleban hold the districts surrounding the enclave.

Previous Taleban attempts to deal with the group

The dissident insurgent group had been a thorn in the Taleban’s side since it emerged in 2015. Local Uzbek Taleban made a few attempts, in 2016 and 2017, to negotiate a peaceful settlement; they wanted to avoid fighting their fellow Uzbeks. These efforts failed to convince the group to re-join the Taleban. Both Taleban and ISKP accused each other of being ‘puppets of the foreigners’.

Most recently, at the start of July, the newly-appointed Taleban shadow governor for Faryab, Mawlawi Abdul Rahman, who is a prominent Uzbek Taleban figure, sent a written message to Mawlawi Habib Rahman, again asking him to lay down his weapons and surrender (read more background details on Mawlawi Abdul Rahman here). If he did not, Mawlawi Abdul Rahman warned, there would be serious consequences. His offer was rejected and Mawlawi Habib Rahman instead threatened to eliminate the Taleban in Jawzjan province. This rejection paved the way for an escalation of fighting between the two insurgent groups.

The Taleban have also tried to clear the group out of its strongholds by force. In December 2017 and again, in January 2018, they launched major offensives, but failed to oust them (read AAN’s previous analysis on Taleban attacks against ‘ISKP’ fighters here). This time, the offensive was much more massive.

Details of the battle

At the beginning of July, after the self-proclaimed ISKP leader’s refused to surrender, the Taleban began a new offensive to oust the ‘ISKP’ fighters from Qush Tepa and Darzab that lasted for about a month. The leadership tasked Sheikh Matiullah, their newly appointed commander for the northwest zone, and Mawlawi Abdul Rahman, Taleban shadow governor for Faryab to lead the offensives. They were joined by the shadow provisional governors for Faryab, Jawzjan and Sar-e Pul provinces.

Taleban operations started simultaneously from the south and west. From the south, two local commanders from Sayad district of Sar-e Pul province, Sher Muhammad Ghazanfar and Mullah Nader, launched an offensive from Belcheragh district of Faryab province and Sayad district of Sar-e Pul, targeting the self-proclaimed ISKP in its main local base, the Sar Dara area of Darzab.

From the west, Taleban fighters moved in from Khwaja Sabz Push and Shirin Tagab districts of Faryab, targeting the self-proclaimed ISKP fighters in Qush Tepa district. This front was led by Mawlawi Abdul Rahman, the Taleban’s shadow governor for Faryab and Mawlawi Suntullah, their shadow governor for Jawzjan. Aminullah Amin, the government’s district governor for Qush Tepa, confirmed the Taleban’s large-scale offensives and said Taleban from neighbouring provinces, Faryab, Sar-e Pul and Ghor, had been mobilised for the fight. Further, he told AAN that Taleban had been using Humvee vehicles and heavy weapons.

In Qush Tepa, the fight lasted just two weeks, with, local sources said, serious casualties on both sides.  The self-proclaimed ISKP group lost strong positions in Khanaqa, Beg Sar and Chakhma Chaqur villages. Both of its leading local field commanders were also killed. One was Haji Murad, a local Uzbek from Beg Sar village with 200 fighters under his command who had been appointed deputy leader of the group in Jawzjan and put in charge of Qush Tepa district in 2018. He was reportedly killed on 23 July. The other was Commander Zaid, head of the self-proclaimed ISKP’s ‘police unit’. The deaths of these two prominent field commanders demoralised their fighters.

From the south, the Taleban also exerted serious pressure on the self-proclaimed ISKP’s positions in Darzab. The group had strongholds in at least three locations there: Sar Dara, Moghul and Bibi Maryam areas. Multiple sources close to the Taleban told AAN that fighters loyal to these groups planted roadside mines around Sar Dara and Moghul areas of Darzab to protect their positions. This meant the Taleban victory took longer. Local government officials confirmed that fighting had been intense in the district. Speaking to AAN, district police chief for Darzab Muhammad Ismail said the Afghan security forces were not involved in the fight, but stayed in the district centre.

There were earlier reports, however, in April in Afghan media (here and here) of Afghan National Army (ANA) airstrikes and “Afghan and U.S. special operations coupled with U.S. airstrikes” to “decimate the heart of IS-K in Darzab.” This followed the death of Qari Hekmat on 5 April 2018, also as the result of an airstrike.

Not an easy victory

Qari Hekmat’s group inflicted serious casualties on the Taleban, including killing a number of field commanders. On 17 July, two ‘ISKP’ fighters pretended to be Taleban fighters and took part in a Taleb commander’s funeral. They then opened fire inside the dead commander’s house where dozens of Taleban fighters were gathered. As a result, 15 Taleban, including Nur Muhammad and Haji Rahim, both field commanders, and family members of Sher Muhammad Ghazanfar, the Taleban shadow district governor for Sayad district of Sar-e Pul, were killed. A statement released on the Taleban’s official website said 17 Taleban fighters had been killed and 13 wounded. It claimed 153 ISKP fighters were killed, 100 were wounded and 134 ISKP fighters captured. Local sources, however, thought Taleban casualties were far larger. Speaking to AAN, local elders in Darzab said they thought around 100 Taleban fighters had been killed, with dozens more wounded. Initial reports that Ghazanfar himself was among the killed turned out to be incorrect.

Despite inflicting heavy losses, the self-proclaimed ISKP group could not resist the large number of Taleban and the onslaught coming from two directions. The Taleban also enjoyed reinforcements, which the dissident insurgents did not, and managed to retain control over logistics and supply routes, preventing any supplies reaching their enemy.

Surrender

On 1 August 2018, the self-proclaimed ISKP group was ousted from its last positions. In the face of certain defeat by the Taleban, its remaining fighters and leaders were left with only one option and that was surrender: the choice, then, was should it be to the Taleban or the government. The group contacted the Taleban seeking a ceasefire. By this point, however, it was too late to be acceptable. The Taleban’s response was to demand that the fighters hand over their leaders, Mawlawi Habib Rahman, head of the group, Mufti Nematullah Qawim, his deputy and Mullah Suhbatullah, head of finance, before any ceasefire could be agreed. The fighters then split; some preferred to surrender to the Taleban, while others reached out to the government.

Those who feared Taleban punishment for rejecting their earlier call for a peaceful settlement made overtures to the government. According to the head of the Provincial High Peace Council, Mawlawi Akram, some individuals expressed their willingness to “join the peace process.” There was, however, he said, “limited access to escape routes.” Eventually, the group’s leaders reached out directly to the government, seeking protection from the Taleban.

According to Haji Assadullah, a tribal elder in Darzab, Afghan commandos arrived by helicopter late in the night of 31 July and opened an escape route over land for the group. The ‘ISKP’ fighters walked from Mughol village to Darzab district centre, which takes about 20 minutes. From there, they were evacuated by Afghan National Security Force flights to Sheberghan.

Assadullah said that Mawlawi Habib Rahman, Mufti Nematullah, Mullah Suhbatullah and Hussain Qahraman, head of the military unit of the group, along with 200 fighters, were rescued in this way. After surrendering to the government and safely arriving in Sheberghan city, Habib Rahman told media outlets that he was tired of war and had therefore joined the Afghan government’s peace process. “If the government wants, I can work within the government structure,” he said. “Otherwise I start an ordinary live like an ordinary person” (see the interview here). He made no mention of having been driven to surrender by the Taleban’s offensive. Photos posted on social media and, as Tolonews reported, by the local ANA corps (see here) showed Darzab district governor Zabihullah and police chief Ismail Topchi standing with a relaxed Habib Rahman talking on the phone. Both government officials are Uzbeks and belong to Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum’s Jombesh party, and it can be assumed that the shared ethnic background helped in the surrender.

Local government officials in Jawzjan confirmed the surrender of 230 ISKP fighters – among whome appear to be many minors (see photo here) –, but did not explain why they had accepted them. Provincial governor Lutfullah Azizi told media, “Those who committed crimes will be prosecuted based on the Afghan law and those who were not involved in crime will be freed, based on the Afghan government’s general amnesty policy.”

This will be an interesting case of whether the so-called ‘amnesty law’, which gives a blanket amnesty for all those who reconcile, no matter what crimes or atrocities they have committed, will be implemented. The ‘amnesty law’ is anyway controversial because it marginalises victims, overlooking their right to justice, and because amnesties for war crimes and gross human rights violations are no longer considered legal under international law. (For more detail on the law, see AAN analysis here.)  In this case, given that the self-proclaimed ISKP fighters and leaders were forced to surrender, rather than willingly leaving the insurgency, it would be especially strange if the government did grant amnesties. In particular, it will be worth watching to see if the matter of the murder and kidnap of the ICRC staff will be addressed – or overlooked. There have also been accusations of more recent war crimes and demands by local civilians for justice. At the end of July, the media quoted several local women accusing ‘ISKP fighters’ of abducting and raping girls (see here). The New York Times also reported on 1 August that Darzab residents had traveled to the provincial capital, Sheberghan, “to petition the governor to punish the Islamic State prisoners for the crimes they committed while in control of their area, according to local officials.”

Meanwhile, other members of the group, mostly Central Asian fighters, who had contacted the Taleban prior to the Afghan commandos’ arrival, surrendered to the Taleban. According to sources close to the Taleban, 19 Central Asian fighters in Darzab district surrendered and were evacuated, along with their families, to Kohistanat district of Sar-e Pul province.

The Taleban proclaimed victory on 1 August: “During the fight, all areas in Darzab district were cleared from the seditious group of ISKP.” The statement praised the northern fighters for demolishing the ISKP group despite what it said were severe challenges.

Conclusion

Over the past few years, the Taleban have been pushing to expand territorial control in the northern and eastern parts of Jawzjan province, as well as in the strategic areas around the provincial centre. They did not have a strong presence in Qush Tepa or Darzab and neither did the government. Into this power vacuum, came the self-proclaimed ISKP group. The government has carried out no full-scale offensive against the group, despite repeatedly flagging the presence of alleged ISKP and foreign fighters there. Government inaction helped the late Qari Hekmat and his successor to recruit fighters against the Taleban and survive for three years. Neither its long inaction or its decision, in the end, to take action to rescue the remnants of the group have been explained.

The Jawzjan group remained isolated. It failed to establish any strong operational connection with the ISKP in Nangarhar province. Neither its existence, therefore, nor its defeat will affect the ISKP in its Nangarhar strongholds.

However, in Jawzjan, the defeat of the ‘ISKP group’ has made the Taleban the dominant power in Darzab and Qush Tepa again. The way the only visible, self-proclaimed ISKP group outside the Afghan east was eventually wiped out may also be viewed as a lesson by other disgruntled Taleban or potential dissident insurgents in the north. It may make them think again about opposing the Taleban.

Edited by Kate Clark and Thomas Ruttig

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Americas

• General Dynamics is being contracted to provide the US Army with 5th Generation Common Hardware Systems. The hybrid contract has a value of $3.9 billion. According to the Army the CHS-5 contract will enable the rapid procurement of total life cycle system management solutions in support of tactical programs. CHS provides state-of-the-art computing and networking equipment that improves connectivity, interoperability, logistics and maintenance support to soldiers, and is positioned as the Army’s primary organization to oversee commercial hardware for the Army’s tactical network. CHS-5 will support Army and Department of Defense (DoD) requirements to acquire flexible, cost effective, shared, and simplified non-developmental C5ISR solutions. Work is scheduled to be completed by August 2023. All work locations and individual funding will be determined with each order.

• Snowbird Environmental Systems is being tapped to cool down the Navy’s Hovercrafts. The awarded contract provides for the delivery of air conditioner units to be installed on the LCACs at a cost of $14 million. The Landing Craft, Air Cushions are high-speed, fully amphibious hovercrafts, that are capable of carrying a 60-ton payload over water and land at speeds in excess of 40 knots and a nominal range of up to 200 nautical miles. Carrying equipment, troops, and/or supplies, the LCAC launches from inside the well deck of an amphibious warship, then travels the waves at high speed, runs right through the surf zone near the beach, and stops at a suitable place on land. This is a two-year base contract with three one-year option periods is scheduled for completion by the end of July 2023. Work will be performed in Florida.

• The US Special Operations Command is looking to upgrade its SATCOM systems. Tampa Microwave is set to provide SOCOM with its Special Operations Forces Deployable Node–Lite requirement at a cost of $70 million. SDN-L is a deployable secure satellite communication system that provides secure voice, video, and data via a lightweight, commercial air transportable kit. The system provides high-capacity voice, data and video capability to small SOF teams (four to eight personnel) operating self-sufficiently at remote locations. It provides those teams with an essential communication capability needed for situational awareness, mission planning, analysis, collaboration, and real-time mission coordination. Work will be performed at the company’s location in St. Petersburg, Florida and a various USSOCOM mission units. Performance is expected to be completed by August 2023.

• The Navy is currently procuring a large quantity of engine components for its F/A-18 E/F and EA 18G aircrafts. General Electric will provide repair and replacement work for 773 F414 engine components under this order. The firm-fixed-priced, performance-based logistics requirements type contract has a value of $630.5 million. The F414 is one of the US Navy’s newest and most advanced aircraft engines. It incorporates advanced technology with the proven design base of its F404 predecessor. The F/A-18E/F provides a 40 percent increase in combat radius, a 50 percent increase in endurance, 25 percent greater weapons payload, three times more ordnance, and is five times more survivable than the F/A-18 A/C models. These major performance improvements are mainly due to the F414-GE-400 engine. Work will be performed in various General Electric supplier locations and in Jacksonville, Florida. Work is expected to be completed by April 2022.

Middle East & Africa

• The government of Kuwait could soon see a significant boost to its missile inventory. The US State Department is determined to approve a foreign military sale of 300 AGM-114R Hellfire missiles for an estimated cost of $30.4 million. The potential sale would also include missile containers, M261 launchers and spare parts. The Hellfire is the USA’s preferred aerial anti-armor missile. Hellfire II missiles comes in several variants. The AGM-114R is a “multi-purpose” missile that comes with guidance and navigation improvements. The 114R is designed to work well against all 3 target types: armored vehicles, fortified positions, or soft/open targets. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin.

Europe

• The French Air Force is set to receive some mid-life upgrades for its AWACS fleet as part of a US foreign military sale. Boeing is being awarded with a $9.8 million contract modification and will provide the French Air Force’s E-3F fleet with 40 mission-computing software changes and 17 ground-system software changes. France received 4 E-3F AWACS aircraft between 1991-1992 and undertook its own RSIP improvement program from 2002-2006. France intends to fly the platform until at least 2035. Work will be performed in Kent, Washington, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and Avord Air Base, France. The work is expected to be completed by June 30, 2020. The total cumulative face value of the contract is $393,5 million.

• The Netherlands may soon receive more torpedoes for its Navy as part of a US foreign military sale. The US State Department is determined to approve the sale of 106 Mk 54 conversion kits for an estimated cost of $169 million. The Royal Netherlands Navy intends to upgrade its current Mk 46 torpedoes to the Mk 54 with the purchase of these kits. The Mk 54 stemmed from the need for a smaller, lighter, but cost-effective advanced torpedo that could be dropped from helicopters, planes, and smaller ships. To achieve this, it combined the expensive Mk-50’s search and homing system with the propulsion system of the Mk 46 torpedo and added off-the-shelf electronic components. Its size improves its ability to go after targets in shallower littoral regions, but the torpedo is designed to work in both deep water and near-shore or shallow environments. The deal would also include torpedo containers, Recoverable Exercise Torpedoes, air launch accessories for rotary wing aircraft and spare parts. The principal contractor will be Raytheon.

Asia-Pacific

• Jane’s reports that Lockheed Martin is currently is co-operating with the Indian Ministry of Defense to discharge defense offset obligations linked to its sales of C-130J-30 Hercules transport aircraft to the Indian Air Force (IAF). The comments follow media reports in India that the MoD has cashed in part of a bank guarantee from Lockheed Martin in relation to a fine linked to an alleged breach of offset obligations tied to the C-130J program. The offset package under discussion was linked to the US government’s sale of a second batch of six C-130Js announced in 2013, which was costed at $1.1 billion. The IAF acquired an initial batch of six aircraft in 2007 for $962 million, although Lockheed Martin’s offset obligations linked to this program have already been met. Sales of both batches of C-130Js were conducted under the US Foreign Military Sales route.

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