Defence`s Feeds

The US Navy (USN) shifted the homeport of Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) USS Milwaukee (LCS 5) and USS Detroit (LCS 7) on 22 December 2016 from San Diego, California, on the West Coast to Mayport, Florida, on the East Coast. Mayport will eventually become the home for all of the Lockheed Martin-built

EVENT Criminals killed a national civil police officer (PNC) on 3 January in Las Flores, San Martin municipality, during a firearm confrontation between gangs and police in the first security force death of 2017. About 45 police and 27 soldiers were killed in gang-linked incidents in 2016 as El

AT LEAST two civilians were killed when an improvised explosive device (IED), emplaced by unidentified militants, detonated near the Akhund Baba shrine in Afghanistan's Laghman province on 25 December, Khaama Press reported. No group immediately claimed responsibility for the attack.

AT LEAST six people were wounded when an improvised explosive device (IED), emplaced by unidentified militants, detonated on the highway of Aleosan in the Philippines' North Cotabato province on 28 December, GMA News reported. No group immediately claimed responsibility for the attack.

AN IMPROVISED explosive device (IED), emplaced by unidentified militants, detonated at the Lamitan City Hall in the Philippines' Basilan province on 30 December, GMA News reported. No group immediately claimed responsibility for the attack. Reports did not contain details of casualties.

Americas

• The previously stalled acquisition by Argentina’s Air Force to buy Kfir Block 60 upgraded fighters from Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) is back on the table. While pricing remains one of several stumbling blocks that still lay ahead in any talks, a successful deal would see IAI assemble and upgrade 12-14 Kfir fighters for Argentina. The most recent upgrade includes J-79 engines, Elta 2032 active electronically scanned array radar, and an open architecture that will allow the customer to install custom systems. Colombia, Ecuador, and Sri Lanka are all current operators.

Middle East & North Africa

• Raytheon has been contracted to provide integrated air and missile defense training for the government of Qatar. The $163 million foreign military sale will see Qatar Emir Air Force personnel receive a series of pre-Patriot and Patriot training classes in addition to English language training, ending in April 2020.

Europe

• A bid by Italy’s Fincantieri for a stake in STX France has been blessed by the French government. The French state owns a 33 percent of STX France, based in Saint Nazaire, and is looking to sell off the company as part of a broader offloading of assets following the demise of the South Korean STX shipbuilding group. Paris was hoping a European firm would become the eventual buyer, and is looking to keep the operation based in western France.

• Pilatus has announced $292 million worth of orders for PC-21 turboprop trainer aircraft, with France being the principle customer. Paris will receive 17 for the French Air Force, while two will be sent to repeat buyer Jordan. Finally, two more will be sent to UK company Qinetiq, for use by the Empire Test Pilots’ School (ETPS). Qinetiq’s acquisition comes as part of their selection of trainer aircraft for modernization of the UK MoD’s provision of test and evaluation services, a contract worth $1.26 billion.

• An unnamed customer has contracted Saab to deliver $36 million worth of M3 and M4 variants of the portable Carl Gustaf weapon system. The shoulder-fired multi-role weapon affords operators the option to choose between a variety of ammunitions while remaining light weight. Over 40 governments operate the system.

Asia Pacific

• India is seeking a foreign single engine fighter as their next major procurement program. The choice of single engine jets rules out fighters like Dassault’s Rafale and the F/A-18 Super Hornet, leaving the two likely options the F-16 and Saab’s Gripen. New Delhi also committed to continue supporting the development of the Tejas’ naval variant, but the current one will be just a technology demonstrator.

• An investigation has commenced into why the Indonesian Air Force procured AugustaWestland AW101 helicopters after AW had been earlier ruled out for being too costly. The helicopters were initially eyed as a potential buy for use as a Presidential and VIP transport, however its $55 million price tag was deemed too flashy by opposition lawmakers. The resulting political pressure resulted in President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo abandoning the deal in December 2015. Since then, the IAF has insisted on buying the same type of chopper by reasoning that it was not for presidential purposes, but for military and search and rescue operations.

• Israel’s RADA has received an order to provide its Multi-mission Hemispheric Radar-based (MHR) RPS-42 radar system to an unnamed East Asia/Pacific customer. The system will be used for the development and testing of the buyer’s High Energy Laser (HEL) ground-based tactical weapon system. Of the ten HEL development programs in the Western world, RADA is involved in four.

Today’s Video

RADA’s HEL System:

ADF training
(click to view full)

Guided, portable anti-tank weapons have become a ubiquitous feature of the modern battlefield, but there’s still a role for good old fashioned panzerfaust rockets. For a soldier who needs to take out light vehicles at close range, blast enemy strongpoints, etc., these systems offer all the capability you can ask for, without all of the extra weight and cost. Less weight means more rounds carried, and less cost translates into more rounds bought. Taken together, they ensure more available firepower when it’s needed most. During 1989 operations in Panama, for instance, the 66mm LAW rocket was used so often as a building entry weapon that it was known as the “Ranger Key.”

Saab’s Carl Gustaf system and its range of 84mm rocket shells have become popular all over the world, with over 40 customers. Australia became one in 2009, and has continued to place orders associated with their LAND 40, Phase 2 project. Their system also has one particular twist…

Updates

January 5/17: An unnamed customer has contracted Saab to deliver $36 million worth of M3 and M4 variants of the portable Carl Gustaf weapon system. The shoulder-fired multi-role weapon affords operators the option to choose between a variety of ammunitions while remaining light weight. Over 40 governments operate the system.

April 27/12: Saab announces a SEK 199 million (USD conversion: $29.6 million) order from Australia for more 84mm Carl Gustaf ammunition, under a standing order laced in early 2011. Deliveries will take place during 2013.

Nov 10/11: Saab announces a SEK 160 million (USD conversion: $24.2 million) contract for more 84mm Carl Gustaf ammunition, under a standing order laced in early 2011. Deliveries will take place over the next 6 months.

Nov. – Dec. 2009: Australia signs a contract with SAAB Bofors Dynamics for 437 M3 Carl Gustaf weapons, followed by a December 2009 contract with BAE Systems Australia for 437 Heavy Weapon Thermal Sights. Australia is the 1st country to use both the weapon and sight as an integrated system, which works equally way by day or by night.

Roll-out to entitled units completed in October 2011. Australia DMO. Note that Saab announced a SEK 192 million (USD conversion: $26.8 million) pair of contracts in December 2009 for Carl Gustaf weapons, but would not specify the customer at the customer’s own request. It may or may not have been Australia; Australia’s DoD did not announce the award at the time.

Kfir C2
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Argentina’s air force is having a hard time maintaining its core Nesher/”Finger” fighters, even as the Kirchner regime seeks to take control of the Falkland Islands and their potential offshore oil reserves. That led Argentina to search for new fighter options, as the most reliable way of projecting power to likely exploration zones. Britain’s defenses are also much more run down than they were in the 1980s, and their complete lack of a carrier force leaves ongoing protection of the islands’ surrounding economic zones to just 2-4 Eurofighter Typhoon fighters, an offshore patrol vessel, and part of a regular navy ship rotation.

Argentina’s window of opportunity will close when Britain’s advanced carrier force enters service in 2020, which has added urgency on both sides as Argentina tries to make a deal. Can Argentina find its partner?

Forces Around the Falklands: Situation Report British Breakdown

Gone.

The islands’ inhabitants voted overwhelmingly to remain part of Britain during the referendum. Unfortunately, Britain has lost more than just its carrier force in the intervening years since the Falklands War. The Vulcan bombers and Victor tankers that staged ultra-long range bombing raids are long gone. The Harriers bought after the war ended, and modernized for use in Afghanistan, were retired. So were the Tornado F3 aircraft that were bought in the 1980s for long-range combat air patrols. The Royal Navy’s number of serious surface combatants has sunk to just 19, only 1 of which patrols the South Atlantic and West Africa at any given time. Worse, it has readiness issues with its attack submarines.

All this creates a window of opportunity for Argentina – one that will slam shut decisively around 2020, once Britain’s new 65,000t HMS Queen Elizabeth and its F-35B fighters steam into service.

RAF C-17
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Until then, an Argentinian force with modern jets and enough anti-ship missiles could conceivably open the door for a repeat invasion, by making recapture too risky and difficult. First, however, they’d have to take the island. Britain has extended and considerably reinforced the Mount Pleasant airfield with radars, air defenses, and a rotating infantry battalion. The addition of long-range C-17 heavy jet transports to the RAF makes fast long-range troop & vehicle reinforcement possible, forcing any invader to capture, destroy, or interdict the airfield in order to succeed. Meanwhile, the mere threat of nuclear submarines will continue to keep Argentina’s surface navy, such as it is, out of the picture as always.

That’s why harassment and access denial attempts are far more likely, as Argentina continues to attempt intimidation of any oil & gas companies that will be working in the Falklands’ Economic Exclusion Zone. That sort of gambit is harder to thwart, requiring the British to commit more forces and incur more expense than they would like.

If Britain wants to protect the Falklands this time, the rag-tag state of Argentina’s military is its biggest asset. Their goal is too keep Argentina from acquiring the tools they need to create even a moderately effective anti-access zone. If Argentina gets any new fighters at all, Britain’s goal becomes much harder and more expensive.

Argentina’s Efforts

FAA Super Etendards

Argentina’s Super Etendard fighters, which were used to launch Exocet missiles in the 1980s and still serve, come from France. Its Mirage III/ V/ “Nesher” fighters were originally bought second-hand from Israel and Peru, but they have deteriorated badly. Its A-4R “Fightinghawk” Skyhawk models were sold to Argentina by the USA, and what’s left of those deliveries make up the bulk of their jet fleet.

Despite steadily-worsening relations with Britain under the Obama administration, the USA is not about to sell Argentina jet fighters. British diplomacy has already worked to delay Argentina’s proposed Super Etendard modernization, and also scuttled a reported deal to buy 16 second-hand Mirage F-1M fighters from Spain.

Cheetahs & Gripens
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That leaves Argentina’s original source for the Neshers. Israel doesn’t have any of those left, but they do have their own Kfir design that made structural changes to the Nesher blueprints, added a more powerful American J-79 turbojet, and received progressive modifications to its radar, electronics, and weapons. Those upgrades continued even after the Kfirs were retired from Israeli service in the late 1990s, on behalf of customers like Colombia, Ecuador, and Sri Lanka. Kfir C.10/ Block 60s carry modern radars and electronics on par with F-16 Block 40/50s, and have the ability to use beyond visual range aerial weapons, advanced short range AAMs, and a variety of precision strike weapons. Their combat radius is a bit short, and it would take a brave Kfir pilot to face a Eurofighter Typhoon in single combat. Even so, they’re capable fighters with aerial refueling capability, which makes them well suited to intimidation and presence patrols. Negotiations for a sale are in an advanced stage.

The good news for Britain, such as it is, is that Argentina still has to hang weapons on any fighters they buy. The FAA must either stick with their existing set of old equipment and forego most of the new fighter’s potential, or buy new weapons from the USA or Israel. Any new weapon sales would be a double escalation, making those sales less likely. The most dangerous Kfir-related sale, of Gabriel 3 anti-ship missiles, would make Britain an outright enemy of Israel’s. That won’t happen. The question is whether Britain can pressure Israel to block the Kfir fighter sale in toto – or have it blocked by the Americans, who control the J-79 engines.

If the Israeli sale falls through for some reason, South Africa has already sold similar Cheetah fighters to Ecuador and Chile. Enough were produced to sell 18 more to Argentina, but the best airframes have presumably been taken already. Cheetahs are powered by French Snecma Atar 9K50 engines, instead of the Kfir’s American J-79. That removes a key American veto, but it also means that South Africa would need some level of French cooperation. Given French delays and demurrals around refurbishing Argentina’s French Super Etendards, that cooperation could become problematic.

Chile’s decommissioned Mirage 50 Pantera fighters are similar to the Cheetahs, but Chile isn’t interested in selling any to Argentina.

JF-17 – note C802!
(click to view full)

If those options fail, Argentina faces a shrinking set of choices.

South Korea’s TA-50 and FA-50 light fighters would be more expensive than the proposed Israeli deal, which already strains Argentina’s finances. They also use American F404 engines, requiring US export approval, and can’t mount anti-ship missiles yet.

Swedish JAS-39 Gripen fighters are the subject of talks with Brazil, but they use American F414 engines and British Martin-Baker ejection seats, to name only the most difficult substitutions. Indeed, about 30% of those planes are traceable to British firms – and Britain has stated that they will block such exports.

The only sources free of American or European influence are Russia and China.

Chinese F-8 “Finback-Bs” would be a very cheap used option, presenting no serious threat, but good for harassment patrols and shows of force at range. The question is whether they could be kept in the air. The JF-17 Thunder from China and Pakistan would be a more advanced option and a definite threat, thanks to its ability to carry C802 subsonic and CM-400AKG supersonic anti-ship missiles. Argentina has expressed interest in the JF-17, and has held discussions directly with China.

Russia is the other potential source. They may have used or used/new-build MiG-29S+ multi-role planes to offer, if Putin wants to stick a finger in Britain’s eye for sanctions over the annexation of Crimea. The problem with the MiGs is that even with the extra fuel tanks in recent variants, the fighters have poor range. That makes them less useful to Argentina. SU-30 family planes have plenty of range, but they’re more expensive, and may be out of Argentina’s reach unless Russia really wants to make a point by offering subsidies.

Contracts & Key Events

Shattered Glass

January 5/17: The previously stalled acquisition by Argentina’s Air Force to buy Kfir Block 60 upgraded fighters from Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) is back on the table. While pricing remains one of several stumbling blocks that still lay ahead in any talks, a successful deal would see IAI assemble and upgrade 12-14 Kfir fighters for Argentina. The most recent upgrade includes J-79 engines, Elta 2032 active electronically scanned array radar, and an open architecture that will allow the customer to install custom systems. Colombia, Ecuador, and Sri Lanka are all current operators.

March 11/16: After the breaking off of talks between Argentina and Israel over the sale of 14 Kfir Block 60 fighters, both parties are to resume negotiations. The deal had initially been called off in October, just before contracts were to be signed, as a result of elections in Argentina. The fighters had been previously used by the Israeli Air Force, but have been upgraded with the latest systems, including the Elta 2032 active electronically scanned array radar. They will also have an open architecture to allow the Argentinian air force to install other systems.

December 3/15: Argentina has officially said adiós to the last of its serving Dassault Mirage fighters. A large-scale public air show on November 30 saw the fleet decommissioned after over forty years of service. The Mirage had been the jet of choice in Argentina since 1973, after the government was impressed by its capabilities when used by the Israeli Air Force during the Six Day War. The decommissioning will leave a hole in the Argentinian Air Force’s capability as a replacement for the aircraft has not yet been found. An earlier deal to purchase second-hand Kfir Block 60 fighters from Israel has been put on hold indefinitely amid issues over weapons systems and upgrades. The newly elected government of Maurico Macri will be responsible for obtaining replacement fighters subject to available funding.

November 18/15: Argentina’s drive to replace its aging Mirage fighter fleet with second hand Israeli Kfir Block 60 fighters has come under criticism from Argentine Air Force number three, Brigadier Mario Roca. Argentina had planned to purchase fourteen of the fighters (which included two two-seat traners) with the deal to have cost between $220-360 million. The criticisms arose when the first six fighters would arrive within 18 months, but without weapons systems, and all upgrades needed to be completed in Israel. The deal has for now been put on hold indefinitely with Defence Minister Agustin Rossi deciding to leave the deal to be concluded by the next administration. Opposition politicians have stated that if elected, they would look into replacing the fleet independently.

August 20/15: Argentina is formally retiring its fleet of Mirage fighters, which will leave active service in November. The Argentinian Air Force has been looking for a new fighter fleet for a while now, with reports in July indicating that the South American country may be in negotiations to buy second-hand Israeli Kfir Block 60 fighters.

Dec 1/14: What Now? In the aftermath of Argentina’s short-lived, clumsy attempt to procure aircraft with British parts through Brazil, analysts review what both Argentina and Brazil may do next.

On Argentina’s side, a history of failed negotiations to acquire used aircraft with France, Spain and Israel will make it tough to revive talks with these parties. One possibility would have been to buy the 12 used Mirage 2000s acquired by Brazil from France in 2005 and retired by the Brazilian Air Force at the end of 2013. This may buy time for Argentina but they would need to reinvest in these aircraft, and also find more elsewhere. But it is reportedly because of high maintenance costs and problems with parts availability that Brazil decided to retire aircraft that sported 10,000+ flight hours each. Add the fact Brazil would have needed to secure resell rights from Dassault, and that is a long list of hurdles for Argentina to clear even if the seller is a friendly neighbor. See DID’s coverage of Brazil’s FX-2 program, Aug 5/13 entry.

Another option is to procure used or new jets from China or Russia, and even though the Argentinian Air Force would prefer Western aircraft, Both China and Russia are likely to be more flexible on financing and/or payment in kind than Western countries would, especially as long as Argentina’s financial situation has not been fully normalized on global markets. Fabrica Argentina de Aviones (FAdeA) held initial talks with China about the potential local production of FC-1 fighters back in mid-2013. Meanwhile Argentina and Russia have been getting cozy on diplomatic and energy matters. See the “Argentina’s Efforts” section above for a more detailed discussion of the available options.

Meanwhile Embraer is reportedly worried that the Brazilian government’s decision to develop a strategic partnership with Argentina may curtail technology transfers from Saab and even lead to reprisals by Western suppliers. That the alliance was announced as a government-to-government affair may only partly shield the company from consequences. Is getting along with its weaker, chronically ill southern neighbor worth potential diplomatic and business problems for Brazil? Sources: DefesaNet: “Full of uncertainty, strategic alliance with Argentines can bring damage to Brazil” | Defense News: “Argentina’s Jet Fighter Replacement Options Narrow” | FP: “Keeping Putin’s Hands Off Argentina’s Oil”.

Nov 9/14: Gripen NG. Argentina may want to do a deal with Brazil (q.v. Oct 22/14), but Britain has now publicly said “no.” To be more precise, they reiterate the continued existence of a ban. A spokesperson for the UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skills:

“We are determined to ensure that no British-licensable exports or trade have the potential to be used by Argentina to impose an economic blockade on the Falkland Islanders or inhibit their legitimate rights to develop their own economy…”

About 30% of the JAS-39E/F will be British, from the ejection seats to the radar, landing gear, and a number of electronic systems. Embraer could try to downgrade and substitute, but Argentina lacks the money to finance such an ambitious effort. Now add the fact that a newly-Republican US Senate and House would block export’s of GE’s F414 engines. As knowledgeable observers expected, Argentina will have to look elsewhere. C4ISR & Networks, “Argentina Buying Gripens? Brits Say ‘No Way'”.

Oct 22/14: Gripen NG. During the Embraer KC-390 medium jet transport’s rollout, Argentina and Brazil sign a formal “Alianca Estrategica em Industria Aeronautica.” Argentina is already making parts for the KC-390, and they need a larger partner for a number of other reasons. The FAB’s releases add that Argentina is also thinking of buying JAS-39E/F Gripens from Embraer, whose Brazilian factory will assemble at least 36 of the advanced Swedish fighters under the pending F-X2 program:

“El Gobierno nacional decidio iniciar una negociacion con la administracion de Dilma Rousseff para la adquisicion de 24 aviones Saab Gripen dentro del programa denominado FX 2…”

Regional export rights are also expected to be part of the $5+ billion deal, which is signed on Oct 24/14. That could get interesting, because the Gripen has systems from the USA and Britain in it. You might be able to replace electronics, but it’s expensive – and ejection seats and engines are a lot tougher. Sources: FAB NOTIMP, “Argentina quiere comprar 24 cazas supersonicos”.

Kfir, improved

March 23/14: Kfir. A high-level Argentine delegation has reportedly visited Israel to finalize the sale of 18 Kfir jets. Most sources mention the “Block 60” version, which is very similar to the Kfir C10 that has been sold to Ecuador and Colombia, and reports also mention the EL/M-2032 radar. Once again, however, this is a proposed deal that comes despite issues with Argentina. Ha’aretz:

“…Kirchner government made [a deal] last year with Iran to jointly investigate the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Buenos Aires Jewish community building that killed 85 people and is widely believed to have been carried out by Hezbollah with Iranian backing.”

That may cause controversy in Israel, and British pressure can be expected as well. On the other hand, Israel was less than pleased by Britain’s recent role in ending sanctions against Iran for its nuclear weapons program. A fighter sale to Argentina would certainly be one way to attach significant consequences to Britain’s actions, without the anti-ship capabilities that would mark a huge escalation. The British do have one big lever left, however: the Kfirs’ J79 turbojets need American approval for re-export. America needs British support regarding Russia right now, so despite past snubs, the Obama administration will find it inconvenient to alienate Britain further.

Finally, note that Ha’aretz is wrong about Kfirs being sold to South Africa. Israeli expertise was likely transferred, but they are not interchangeable in a fleet – Cheetahs use different engines than the Kfirs, and South Africa did modify its Mirages locally. Is basic fact-checking and editorial oversight too much to ask? Sources: Ha’aretz, “Argentina buying 30-year-old Israeli fighter jets” | LU22 Radio Tandil, “Avanzan las negociaciones para la compra de aviones Kfirs Block 60 a Israel”.

March 10/14: Super Etendard. Argentina’s efforts to upgrade 10 of its 11 remaining Super Etendard fighters have hit a bit of a snag in France:

“The Argentine Navy still wants 10 SEM kits for its Super Etendards, but has to date received no indication from France as to how or when this order might be filled.

Moreover, military relations between the two states have cooled due to a deal last year between France and the UK that could create roadblocks to France’s selling the kits, and an updated version of the Exocet missile, to Argentina…”

Sources: IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Argentine Super Etendard modernisation hits major snags”.

Super Etendard modernization stalls

Colombian Kfirs
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Jan 23/14: Kfir. Argentina has reportedly opened discussions with Israel about selling up to 18 refurbished Kfir fighters. The proposed deal is reportedly worth about $500 million, with 6 jets to be refurbished in Israel. Another 12 would be shipped to Argentina along with modernization kits, for local assembly under Israeli supervision.

“Brazilian journalist Roberto Lopes, who specializes in defense issues was the first to reveal that Israel/Argentina deal negotiations caused concern in the government of PM David Cameron and allegedly representatives from the UK Defense ministry asked their Israel counterparts “for a detailed description of the electronic systems and avionics” of the 18 Kfir…. London fears the aircraft could be used to track and intimidate vessels involved in the Falklands oil and gas industry development…. Lopes also reveals that “the issue is being monitored since the end of 2013 by Brazil’s Itamaraty (foreign ministry) and defense ministry”.”

IAI’s offer had reportedly been made earlier, but the proposal was reportedly pursued only after Spain declined to pursue the Mirage F1 deal any further. Sources: MercoPress, “Argentina after Israeli fighter planes; concern in London and Brasilia, says defense expert”.

Jan 2/14: Mirage F1. Argentine sources tell IHS Jane’s that the Spanish Mirage deal has stalled and could be cancelled.

“Local media reports indicated that the Argentine Air Force (FAA) has begun analysing other options, including second-hand Dassault Mirage 2000s from France or Brazil, but appears to be leaning towards an Israeli offer of 18 IAI Lahav Kfir Block 60 multi-role fighters for USD500 million, with a possible delivery date some 15 months after a contract signature.”

While Spain’s economic situation made them receptive to Argentina’s request, Spain could lose much more if relations with Britain become problematic. Sources: IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Argentine Mirage F1 buy reportedly stalls”.

No Mirage F1s

Oct 6/13: Kfir. IAI and even the Israeli Air Force begin to talk about the new “Block 60” Kfir variant, which is based on Colombia’s refitted C10 aircraft:

“The Kfir Block 60 offers a robust and versatile Mach 2+ multi-role jet fighter, carrying 5.5 tons payloads on nine hard-points under the wings and fuselage. The weaponry is enhanced to include Python 5 and Derby. Kfir Block 60 has also completed the integration of RAFAEL Spice autonomous guided weapon, (second platform offering that capability, after the F-16). Conforming to NATO standards, Kfir Block 60 supports Link-16 datalink protocol. The aircraft has combat radius of 1,000 km (540 nm) unrefueled. With refueling the aircraft can fly to a range of 1,100 nm.”

Whether or not Israeli Kfir C2s could carry Gabriel Mk.III anti-ship missiles, Argentina doesn’t have any, and any sale by Israel would have serious diplomatic repercussions. Refurbished Kfirs are reportedly restored to 8,000 safe flight-hours hours under warranty, meaning the plane can easily serve for 20-30 years. “Sources: Defense Update, “At 40 Years of age, Kfir Turns into a “Networked Fighter”” | Israeli Air Force, “Roaring Back”.

Spanish F1M
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Oct 1/13: Mirage F1. After several months of advance reports, Argentina has reportedly come to an agreement with Spain to buy 16 used Mirage F1s. Iraq’s F1EQ-5 jets were modified to carry the Exocet anti-ship missile, but they required modifications. Spain upgraded their F1Cs to F1Ms, but it isn’t clear whether their planes ever added Exocet capability.

The deal is something of a surprise, given the Argentine government’s 2012 seizure of Spanish oil major Repsol’s majority stake in Argentina’s national YPF oil company. Respol’s international legal claim is for $10 billion, but the Spanish government is facing depression-level economic conditions, and has few other options to sell those planes. Sources: MercoPress, “Argentina buys 16 Mirage F 1 from Spain; half have air-refuelling capacity” | UPI, “Argentina goes for second-hand jets for air force”.

Mirage F1 deal

Aug 5/13: Mirage F1. Spain is reportedly working on a deal with Spain for its recently-decommissioned Mirage F1 fighters, which have been replaced in Spain’s service by the Eurofighter:

“The only real hard news and from Spanish defence media, is that Spain is effectively decommissioning the last eight Mirage F 1 –which have been on service for 35 years–, to be replaced by the Eurofighter, and is looking for buyers and among the countries named are Argentina, Egypt and Ecuador…. The Argentine air force currently has an estimated 25 Mirage 5 and Mirage III with over thirty years in service…. However according to Argentine sources the aircraft are virtually out of use because of lack of spares and an adequate maintenance.”

Depending on how one counts, it has been more like 22 years of service since their deep modernization to F1M status. The RAF won’t give an on-the-record response, but British newspapers are told by unnamed sources that “If the Argentines start playing games and escalate the tension we will see more RAF aircraft being deployed to the Falklands.” That would help prevent a takeover, but unless Britain adds a lot of fighters, it may not quite stop intimidation flights against energy companies working in the Falklands EEZ. MercoPress, “Falklands and the Mirages: playing with the Islanders worst memories” | Daily Express, “Jet fighter threat to the Falkland Islands” | Daily Mirror, “Falklands alert as Argentina strikes £145 million deal for 20 Mirage warplanes” | Israel’s Globes, “IAI selling upgraded Kfir jets for $20m”.

June 27/13: JF-17. Argentina is reportedly in talks with China concerning the FC-1/ JF-17 fighter, a joint project with Pakistan whose performance lies somewhere between a Mirage F1 and an F-16. It can use radar-guided air-to-air missiles, but its most important asset is the CASIC CM-400AKG supersonic anti-ship missile, with a range that’s longer than France’s sub-sonic Exocets. Its is also shown at air shows like Farnborough with China’s C802 sub-sonic anti-ship missile, which is very similar to the American Harpoon.

“Speaking at the Paris Air Show in mid-June, officials from Fabrica Argentina de Aviones (FAdeA) told IHS Jane’s that the company has had multiple discussions with Chinese officials over co-producing the fighter in Argentina. Although the FC-1/JF-17 is already jointly built with Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, FAdeA officials stressed that they are dealing solely with the Chinese…. While discussions are said to be far from over, if realised they will open up a wide panoply of Chinese weapon systems to Argentina…”

Sources: IHS Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, “Fighter talks may afford Argentina advanced Chinese missile systems”.

Additional Readings

Up above, DID asked of Ha’aretz, “Is basic fact-checking and editorial oversight too much to ask?” Sometimes, that comes back to bite. Thanks to readers who wrote in to us about local defensive measures and options in the Falklands that we had not covered. We had good discussions, but the plain fact is that some of the omissions were important items. They have been added to the article, with our thanks – and our apologies.

Readers with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

• Wikipedia – Argentine Air Force.

Background: Aircraft

• Airforce Technology – F-21 Kfir Fighter Jet, Israel. F-21 was the American designation for used Kfirs flown by its Aggressor training squadrons. Some private firms, like ATAC, still use it for this purpose.

• ACIG – Kfir C.10. In service with Ecuador and Colombia, and the base for the “Block 60”. Kfir C.12s don’t have the EL/M-2032 radar.

• DID – Cheetahs and Mirage 50s for Ecuador.

• DID – Pakistan & China’s JF-17 Fighter Program. If Britain blocks the Kfir sale, could they be setting themselves up for something worse?

• RAC MiG – MiG-29/MiG-29UB/MiG-29SE.

• Wikipedia – Dassault Mirage F1.

News & Views

• MercoPress (March 22/14) – The Falklands/Malvinas: Brazil’s next regional headache? Stability in the region has been a key goal for Brazil.

• Defense Update (Oct 6/13) – At 40 Years of age, Kfir Turns into a “Networked Fighter”. Kfir Block 60.

• Israeli Air Force (Sept 25/13) – Roaring Back. Includes information about Colombia’s C10/C12 upgrades, and makes vague references to the Block 60.

• Globes (Aug 6/13) – IAI selling upgraded Kfir jets for $20m.

The Environmental Control and Life Support Systems Development division of Airbus Defence and Space (Airbus DS) is a manufacturer of air contamination control devices to absorb carbon dioxide and odours in closed compartments on submarines.

Indian shipbuilding company Goa Shipyard is building two 105m advanced offshore patrol vessels (AOPV) for the mission requirements of the Sri Lankan Navy.

The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) has decommissioned its ship, Pyeongtaek (ATS-27), which was the last US ship transferred to the ROKN.

Beadwindow has an international reputation as an established provider of bespoke solutions that meet the specific operational needs of naval personnel in an ever-changing world.

BAAINBw, the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support, has signed a contract with Atlas Elektronik to upgrade the last three class 332A minehunters to new technical standards for the German Navy.

US-based off-grid solar power provider Ameresco has secured a contract from the US Naval Facilities Engineering (NAVFAC) and Expeditionary Warfare Centre (EXWC) for energy savings at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) in Parris Island, South Carol…

Americas

• The USMC has issued a $60 million contract to Raytheon for TOW missiles. Delivery of the missiles is expected to be completed by December 28, 2018. The weapons are designed to help ground forces engage armored targets like tanks and can also be mounted to land platforms such as the Styker and Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

• Further orders for Oshkosh’s Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) have been made by the US Army. 409 of the vehicles will be produced in a $179 million contract, with work expected to be completed by this December. Initial low-rate production of the JLTV began last year, as the US Army and USMC look to replace their Humvees.

Middle East & North Africa

• Turkey’s Aselsan and Saudi Arabia’s Taqnia have formed a joint venture focusing on military electronics. Known as SADEC, the venture will include the building of a factory in Saudi Arabia on the idea of “creating the most advanced available technology.” Radars, electronic warfare suites and electro-optical technology will be developed and manufactured with a view to selling them to the Saudi and Gulf markets.

• Qatar is looking at the Turkish armor industry for the provision of 1,000 armored vehicles, as Turkish industry aggressively pursues markets in various parts of Asia. A joint venture including Turkish manufacturer BMC, Germany’s Rheinmetall and Malaysia’s Etika Strategi are involved in the negotiations for various armor platform configurations, although specifics on models sought by the Gulf kingdom remain undisclosed.

Europe

• The Russian Navy has stated that the Ka-52K is slated to replace all current fleets of Ka-29 assault transport helicopters as well as inducting ship-based UAVs as part of long-term naval plans. Russian naval aviation chief, Maj. Gen. Igor Kozhin, made the announcement on Monday, adding that “carrier-based fighter aviation units will get MiG-29K and MiG-29KUB fighter jets in 2017-2020.” The 4++ generation fighters can destroy targets at sea and ground with high-precision guided weapons day and night, in any weather conditions.

Asia Pacific

• Japan is looking to sell Kawasaki P-1 and C-2 maritime patrol aircraft to New Zealand in what could be Tokyo’s first major arms sale. Classified data on both platforms was provided in September, as Wellington gathers information on other potential acquisitions from US and European competitors. Any deal will involve maintenance of the aircraft and New Zealand might get a chance to produce certain components for the planes under a technology transfer.

• During his New Year’s speech, North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un announced that his country will test an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads this year. Reuters reported a senior US military official as saying that although Pyongyang appears able to put a miniaturized nuclear warhead on a missile, the missile re-entry technology necessary for longer range strikes is still a serious obstacle to their weapons development. Needless to say, the international community has condemned it.

• Korea Aircraft Industries (KAI) has secured a $523 million contract to provide KUH-1 Surion transport helicopters to South Korea’s marines. The deal covers the production and delivery of 30 helicopters, expected between 2017-2023. Modifications found on the marine variant include foldable blades, emergency floats that can deploy with the press of a button, optional long-range fuel tanks, as well as the ability to carrying nine fully equipped marines in addition to four crew members.

Today’s Video

2016 naval aviation year-in-review:

KHP/Surion rollout
(click to view full)

South Korea currently owns around 700 helicopters, but more than half are considered outdated, and they need to be replaced. December 2005 marked the endgame for a South Korean competition to produce about 245 utility transport helicopters, which would be developed and produced as a semi-indigenous program. The KHP/ Surion is in the 8-tonne class, and is designed to carry 11 troops. Industrial offsets were also important, as the program is designed to boost Korea’s ability to design and build its own rotary-wing aircraft. EADS Eurocopter was chosen as the cooperating partner.

The Korean government gave its final approval of the contract in June 2006, and the project is underway. Note that while company releases place the program’s value at $6-8 billion, the program hasn’t reached that level yet. The initial contract was for KRW 1.3 trillion ($1.3 billion), and is for research and development only. That development finished in April 2013, and the main production contract is next. It will proceed in parallel with additional contracts to develop Surion specialty versions for Korea’s federal police and Marine Corps, and all of these models will be offered for export through a joint venture with Eurocopter.

The KHP (now KUH) Program

In February 2005 the Ministry of National Defense announced that would launch a multi-billion-dollar procurement project to build utility helicopters in December 2005. A total of 5 trillion won ($4.5 billion) was budgeted for this Korean Helicopter Program (KHP), including research and development expenditures.

The project is aimed at producing hundreds of “Korean Utility Helicopters” (KUH) to replace the aging UH-1H Hueys currently in service. Industrial offsets are also important considerations, as the program is designed to boost indigenous industrial manufacturing capability for rotary-wing aircraft.

Making Surion
click for video

This was a cut-down project from the original effort, which aimed to create a core platform that could have utility or attack helicopter sections built onto it, creating a pair of helicopter types with significant commonality. That original effort was not necessarily an overstretch; the US Marine Corps new UH-1Y Hueys and AH-1Z attack helicopters already embody a high-commonality approach.

The KUH/attack approach does add complexity risk, however, and South Korea ended up buying the AH-64E Apache to address their attack helicopter needs. At the lower end, KAI is developing a Light Armed Helicopter, but commonality is limited to “utilizing technology acquired through KUH development.”

Program and Industrial

DAPA: KUH
click for video

The KUH programme was formally launched in 2006. As of October 2007 the KHP project began to take the name “Korean Utility Helicopter,” and its July 2009 rollout saw reports that began to refer to it as the “Surion” (suri = eagle, on = perfection).

Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) is the prime contractor. As the primary partner, EADS Eurocopter will provide technical assistance, and supply the rotor mast, transmission, and autopilot subassemblies. Eurocopter has a stake of 30% in the development phase, and 20% in the production phase.

The initial contract was worth KRW 1.3 trillion ($1.3 billion at the time), and covered research and development only. By the time development finished in 2013, it had spent just KRW 1.2 billion, despite running a bit more than a year past its deadline.

Contracts for the KRW 4.1 trillion production project will be struck separately. Full scale production was expected to begin in 2012, but development wasn’t finished until April 2013.

Initial market expectations were stated as 250 helicopters, indicating a very limited market beyond South Korea’s order. Eurocopter later revised this to 300 machines, and the business plan changed again when the partnership decided that they would offer a civilian version after 2011. This was a significant move, as the design would compete with existing Eurocopter offerings like the new 7 tonne EC 175. By 2013, expectations had grown again, to 400 civil government and military machines in South Korea alone.

In the military market, South Korea’s Yonhap News agency quoted an anonymous government source in July 2009, who said that:

“Seoul also aims to win 300 overseas orders for the KUH in the next 25 years, a government official said on condition of anonymity. That is roughly 30 percent of the projected global demand for Surion-type choppers, which are larger than the UH-1 Iroquois but smaller than the UH-60 Black Hawks.”

As of April 2013, KAI is still using those figures as its export target, even though the competitive field has become more crowded. That’s a tall order if you’re up against competitors like the AW189, Bell 525, and EC175, plus slightly larger de facto competitors like the EC Puma family, Mi-17, NH90, and Sikorsky H-60 family.

KAI’s Surion

KUH Surion
(click to view full)

Some initial sources indicated that their KHP project bid would be based on the Dauphin-derived EC155/ AS 565 Panther, and the diagram initially provided in local media reports appeared to bear that out. The final design bears some similarities to the EC155 and the Puma family, but many differences.

The KUH Surion is 15m long x 2m wide x 4.5m high, with a maximum takeoff weight of 8.7 tonnes. It’s powered by 2 of GE’s popular T-700 turboshaft engines, and incorporates HUMS prognostics throughout the helicopter to provide constant monitoring and advance warning of mechanical issues. Range is reportedly around 480 km.

The cockpit and frame will be armored to handle 7.62mm strikes, while the fuel tanks will be armored up to resist 12.7mm or 14.5mm rounds. More active warning and protection systems are provided by a partnership between EADS Cassidian and South Korea’s LigNex1, and include the widely used AN/AAR-60 MILDS missile warning system.

Expected personnel capacity is 2 crew plus up to 9 fully-armed soldiers. There are some online sources that give the helicopters 4 hardpoints and weapons up to wire-guided TOW missiles, but KAI’s own materials say nothing about that, and there have been no reports of weapon trials.

Contracts & Key Events 2016 – 2017

Surion ATH
(click to view full)

January 4/17: Korea Aircraft Industries (KAI) has secured a $523 million contract to provide KUH-1 Surion transport helicopters to South Korea’s marines. The deal covers the production and delivery of 30 helicopters, expected between 2017-2023. Modifications found on the marine variant include foldable blades, emergency floats that can deploy with the press of a button, optional long-range fuel tanks, as well as the ability to carrying nine fully equipped marines in addition to four crew members.

September 26/16: It’s back to the drawing board for KAI’s KUH-1 Surion as the Korean-made utility helicopter failed a number of extreme climate tests in the USA. If successful, the testing would have given the Surion an international standard and boosted export chances. Several parts will now be redesigned to rectify the defects found during the testing, which puts the helicopter through very challenging humid and freezing temperatures.

2012 – 2013

ROK certifications; Development complete; ROK orders maritime version.

Oct 16/13: Sub-contractors. Elbit Systems announces a follow-on contract for full production of improved ANVIS/HUD 24 Helmet Mounted Displays to equip production Surion helicopters. The initial order that made them part of the project (q.v. March 25/09) was for the system development phase, which ended in March 2013. Sources: Elbit Systems: ANVIS/HUD 24T brochure [PDF] | Oct 16/13 release.

April 16/13: Surion ATH. South Korea’s DAPA procurement agency announces a KRW 800 million (about $733 million) project to develop the ROK Marine Corps’ transport and utility helicopter, which will be a Surion variant. KAI is scheduled to complete development by the end of 2015.

The helicopters will serve on the ROKS Dokdo LHD, and the ROKN also possesses LST ships whose helicopter decks may be able to accomodate the 8-ton class machines. DAPA projects that the Surions “will help double the Korean military’s independent landing operation capability,” while offering greater range than their existing UH-1 Hueys.

KAI’s release is optimistic, forecasting a potential Korean demand of up to 400 helicopters over the 20 years for the ROK’s Army, Marine Corps, Police (vid. 2011 entry), a future MEDEVAC variant, and orders/variants for South Korea’s Coast Guard, Fire Department and Korea Forest Service. They’re also holding to their original forecast of 30% share within global segment demand of over 1,000 helicopters, even though several competitors have entered this segment since the Surion began development.

If KAI’s accompanying graphic looks realistic, that’s because they photoshopped a Surion on top of a real 2010 picture, replacing the USN SH-60F Seahawk that was actually flying over ROKS Dokdo. But they didn’t strip the picture’s metadata, which is actually kind of honest. KAI.

Surion naval utility: system development

March 28-29/13: KAI announces that the KUH/ Surion has completed its development, making South Korea the 11th country in the world to develop a helicopter. The firm says that total investments from KAI, DAPA, and the ROK Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy totaled KRW 1.2 billion (around $1.1 billion). The program involved a combination of KAI, Eurocopter, and government research bodies; and included 98 local vendors, 49 foreign partners, and 28 colleges/research institutes. Overall, about 62.5% of the KUH project budget was “localized” in Korea.

The 4 prototypes successfully completed around 2,700 hours of flight tests, and checked about 7,600 test requirements. KAI.

Surion base model development complete

Feb 21/13: Testing. The Surion finishes low-temperature testing in Alaska, USA. South Korea gets plenty of its own cold weather, but you might as well go where you’re guaranteed ultra-frigid conditions. The tests involved about 50 flights. KAI.

June 2012: Certified. South Korea bestows airworthiness and military certifications on Surion. That seems like an odd thing to do before development is complete. Even if it’s necessary to allow deliveries, certification often means that subsequent fixes are the government’s responsibility. Source: KAI.

2008 – 2011

Surion rollout and 1st flight; Police version SDD; Export JV established.

KUH Surion-Police
(click to view full)

2011: Police version. KAI’s English press release is unclear, but they refer to an apparent agreement with the Korea Police Agency to develop a Surion version for them. The KNPA is a national police force under the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, and they have 10 “squadrons” of SWAT teams whose tasks include counter-terrorism and hostage rescue. Source: KAI | Shephard Media.

Police version

July 13/11: Sub-contractors. EADS Cassidian announces a “multi-million euro” contract from Korean Aircraft Industries to supply 24 of its AN/AAR-60 MILDS (Missile Launch Detection System) missile warning systems, with deliveries continuing until 2013. Each system uses about 4 passive sensors, which detect the ultraviolet radiation signature of approaching missiles. Cassidian was working with Korea’s Lig Nex1 to develop the helicopter’s overall electronic countermeasures system, and delivered 36 sensors during the development phase.

MILDS is widely used on a number of helicopter and aircraft models, and EADS’ cooperation in the Surion’s design made it an almost certain choice here.

May 3/11: KAI-EC. Korean Aerospace and Eurocopter establish the KAI-EC joint stock company, based in Seoul to export the Surion helicopter. KAI.

KAI-EC export JV

June 22/10: Official maiden flight. The official maiden test flight is conducted at KAI’s facility in Sacheon, South Chungcheong. Another 3 test helicopters will be built, and test flights will continue through September 2010. This will be followed by “mass production” beginning in March 2012, and “full-scale production” beginning in June 2012. DAPA Commissioner Byun Moo-keun reiterated the program’s core rationale during his speech:

“Despite the fact that our military ranks in seven in the world in operating the number of military helicopter, we have been relying on foreign countries in importing major technologies in developing functions and maintenance… The successful development of Surion has not only led in operating the military tactics efficiently but also formed the basis in improving our own aerospace industry technology.”

See: South Korean MND.

March 10/10: Fly! The Surion has its 30-minute 1st flight at Sacheon, including taxi, hover turns, and a stationary hover at 30 feet. KAI says the flight test program will see the helicopter flying at 140 knots and 2,000 feet by April 2010, and an official ceremony of the first flight will take place in May 2010. Defense News | Shephard Group.

1st flight

ANVIS/HUD
(click to view full)

Nov 2/09: Sub-contractors. Elbit Systems announces that KAI has named them as one of their top 4 Elite Suppliers for the Korean Utility Helicopter (KUH) program, during the firm’s supplier symposium. Elbit supplies the helicopter’s ANVIS/HUD Helmet Mounted Displays, Vehicle Information systems (VIS) and a Data Transfer Systems (DTS). They’re also a subcontractor to KAI for systems engineering and integration of the entire KUH avionics system.

Oct 1/09: KAH delayed. The South Korean government decides to delay its proposed Korean Attack Helicopter program, which was expected to share some 60-70% commonality with the KUH/ Surion. Flight International.

July 31/09: KAI formally unveils the first KUH helicopter, at a ceremony in the southwestern city of Saechon. Attending dignitaries include South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. The new helicopter will be called the “Surion,” and the Yonhap News report says that it sources 60% of its parts from local manufacturers, including the rotor blades and its prognostic health and usage monitoring systems (HUMS). The prototype is due to fly early in 2010, and will eventually be joined by another 3 flight test aircraft. Lee Jae-hong, head of the South Korean Ministry of Knowledge Economy’s machinery, aerospace and defense industry division, adds that:

“Even though it is a military helicopter, the KUH already satisfies 96% or 2,363 of the 2,460 international operational standards for civilian helicopters.”

KAI and Eurocopter also plan to pursue civilian sales beginning in 2011, in order to improve their return on investment. Yonhap | The Korea Herald | The Korea Times | Flight International | Rotorhub.

KUH rollout

March 25/09: Sub-contractors. Flight international reports that Elbit Systems has received a contract from Korea Aerospace Industries to supply “advanced helmet-mounted display systems” for the KUH program. The initial contract covers those development aircraft due to be delivered in 2009-10, but continued cooperation could lead to follow-on orders to equip the entire KUH fleet, and possibly other Korean helicopters as well.

Elbit’s ANVIS/HUD combines day and night vision goggles with key flight symbology, allowing “head up, look-out flying at all times. It has been used by the US military since the mid-1990s, and has equipped more than 5,000 helicopters belonging to 20 countries. Integrated platforms include the H-60 series, CH-53, CH-47, CH-46, V-22, AH-1, UH-1, Super Puma, Cougar, and others. Elbit’s HeliDASH system is a higher end choice.

The KUH HMD fits somewhere in the middle. Elbit personnel describe the Korean order as “…the ANVIS-HUD24 with additional capabilities which I am not at liberty to specify.”

2005 – 2007

Eurocopter wins deal; Contract approved; MoU for joint venture; Innovative fuel bladders; Defensive suite picked.

Later KHP concept
(click to view larger)

Oct 18/07: Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and Eurocopter sign of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to create a Joint Venture (JV) Company for the worldwide sales and marketing of the Korean Utility Helicopter (KUH). It will be in operation by 2010. With a shareholding structure of 51% for KAI and 49% ownership for Eurocopter. Eurocopter role is to provide technical assistance for the development of the helicopter as well as certain sub-assemblies, the transmission, and the autopilot. About 40 Eurocopter engineers are housed at Sacheon (Korea) with KAI.

The Eurorcopter release sets expected Korean orders at about 250 KUH helicopters, while estimating KUH production at “an order of 300 helicopters.”

Oct 15/07: Sub-contractors. EADS Defence & Security announces that it will equip the KHP helicopter with its MILDS AN/AAR-60 self-protection system. Over 5,000 AN/AAR-60 units have been produced and installed aboard a wide variety of rotary wing and wide body aircraft, often as part of a multi-spectral suite of sensors; a version for fighter aircraft is under development.

This advanced, passive imaging sensor detects and tracks the ultraviolet emissions of approaching missiles. All approaches have advantages and disadvantages. As Aramada Magazine’s “Fighting an Invisible Threat” explains, ultraviolet seekers tend to be more effective at lower and slower targets, and are less vulnerable to false acquisitions such as decoys. The sensors are also smaller, lighter and require less cooling. On the flip side, they are more vulnerable to atmospheric conditions, and tend to have poorer sensitivity and resolution than other options such as infrared.

EADS DS will provide the equipment for the development phase, but from 2008 onward the sensors will be integrated by the Korean company LIGNex1 into the KHP self-protection system.

Oct 15/07: KOIS reports that a real-size model of the KHP/KUH transport helicopter will be on display at the Seoul 2007 air show that opens in Seongnam Oct 16-21/07. This will be the first time the helicopter’s form and interior design will be unveiled publicly. The development program is now code-named “Korean Utility Helicopter (KUH),” and aims to produce a prototype in 2009 and begin mass-production in 2012. KOIS adds:

“Under the 1.3-trillion-won ($1.38 billion) program, Korea aims to produce 245 advanced transport helicopters. The DAPA also expects exports of the envisioned helicopters, each priced at around 15 billion won. The 14.7-meter helicopter can carry two gunners and nine other troops, along with two pilots.”

March 1/07: Sub-contractors. GKN Aerospace announces that they have been selected by Hanwha Corporation to supply fuel bladders for the Korean Helicopter Programme (KHP). This contract, awarded by Hanwha Corporation, has a value approaching $3.5 million and is the culmination of a lengthy collaboration. Phase 1 of the contract involves completing the development activity which will be finalized this year, followed by testing and initial production during 2008. Phase 2 commences in 2009, with preparation and first assembly activities at Hanwha’s facilities in Korea.

The fuel bladders will be manufactured using a GKN developed, MIL spec material, which is far more flexible than current materials. This flexibility eases and speeds installation and greatly reduces the potential for damage to the bladder during the installation process. The material is also lighter than current products and, critically, offers a faster self-sealing capability in the event of damage during helicopter operations. GKN release.

Initial KUH Concept
(click to view full)

Oct 31/06: MEP solicitation. KAI release:

“For the Korean Helicopter Program (KHP) propelled by Republic of Korea Government, notice of solicitation for korean/foreign industries participation is hereby issued in the area of Mission Equipment Package (MEP) whose development efforts will be led by Agency for Defense Development and procurement activities will be led by Korea Aerospace Ind., Ltd. (KAI) or Nex1 Future Co., Ltd.”

Full solicitation [PDF].

June 2/06: Final approval. The Korean government gives its final approval of the KHP/KUH contract.

Approval

April 12/06: DAPA OK. South Korea’s DAPA (Defense Acquisition Program Administration) formalizes the decision to acquire 245 utility helicopters to be developed by Korea Aerospace Industries Limited in partnership with Eurocopter, and produced as from 2011 onwards. EADS release.

Dec 12/05: Korean Aeronautics Industries (KAI) announces that it has wrapped up KHP negotiations with the French-German manufacturer Eurocopter, as opposed to Bell Helicopter of the USA or the Anglo-Italian firm AgustaWestland. The Chosun Ibo reports that “The Defense Ministry will finalize its decision after consulting a committee on the KAI recommendations and investigating the potential for technology transfer.” The next day, EADS Eurocopter’s release confirmed a win on the 245 helicopter contract, adding:

“The 6-year KHP development phase will run from 2006 to 2011; In the following 10-year production phase, 245 helicopters are to be manufactured… The KHP helicopter is in the 8 metric ton class and is capable of carrying 2 pilots and 11 troops with an endurance of well over two hours. The helicopter is equipped with the very latest technological advances.

Eurocopter and KAI have agreed to set up a 50/50 subsidiary to market the export version of the KHP helicopter. Forecasts needs for this utility helicopter on the world market are set at 250 machines over 20 years.”

Development actually takes until April 2013.

Eurocopter wins KHP

Additional Readings & Sources

• KAI – KUH-Surion

• Army Technology – KAI Surion Light Utility Helicopter, South Korea

• GlobalSecurity.org – Korean Helicopter Program

• Wikipedia – General Electric T700

• DID (Dec 14/05) – Korean E-X & Helicopter Competitions Reaching Endgame?

• The Dong-A Iibo (Dec 1/05) – As Ties Wane, So Does Taste for US Arms

Retronic is an ISO 9001-certified company based in Hamburg, Germany. It has been a project-oriented partner for more than two decades, designing and producing highly reliable electronic systems, with a particular emphasis on power conversion.

The Taleban movement is winning ground in the northern province of Badakhshan, a province that was never conquered when the Taleban were in power in the 1990s. Over the past two years, a new generation of largely Tajik Taleban has come to pose a serious challenge for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) : a number of districts have changed hands between the ANSF and insurgents, and two strategic districts are now insurgent strongholds. Its success seems partly due to a recruitment policy that – in contrast to the 1990s – favours local non-Pashtuns for key provincial positions and as fighters. In this provincial case study, AAN’s Obaid Ali analyses the Taleban’s new recruitment policy and how it has strengthened the movement (with input from Borhan Osman and Thomas Ruttig).

In 2004, as the insurgency began to gather pace, setting up a shadow administration was one of the Taleban’s major political strategies for controlling both territory and population. Over the years, in the Tajik and Uzbek-dominated provinces in the north, the movement increasingly appointed local non-Pashtuns, from shadow governors – both at the provincial and district level – to judges and heads of provincial committees. In Badakhshan, a Tajik-dominated province, most Taleban posts are now occupied by Tajiks.

The shift in the movement’s recruitment strategy seems to have had a visible impact on its battlefield gains in Badakhshan. To put this into historical perspective, a comparison of the Taleban’s recruitment in Badakhshan during the current insurgency period and the movement’s years of rule, is useful.

Badakhshan’s contribution to the Taleban regime during the 1990s

During the Taleban regime in the 1990s, there were no more than a handful of high-ranking Taleb figures from Badakhshan. They were:

• Mawlawi Sayed Ghiasuddin, a Tajik from Badakhshan who served among the Taleban leadership soon after the formation of the movement in the mid-1990s;
• Qari Din Muhammad Hanif, a Tajik originally from Yaftal district in Badakhshan. During the Taleban regime he served as the Taleban minister for Planning and Higher Education. Now, Qari Din Muhammad is a member of the Taleban office in Qatar (read more background here) and was one of the first official Taleban representatives to publicly explain his movement’s position with regards to peace talks, which he did during an academic conference in Kyoto in 2012 (see AAN analysis here);
• And, less well known, Mullah Zaher, Shaber Ahmad and Mullah Nur-ul-Huda, who operated as military commanders, although not in their home province.

While the Badakhshanis’ representation within the Taleban leadership was limited, the province did produce hundreds of Taleban fighters. A sizeable number of religious Badakhshani students who had been studying in madrassas in Peshawar and Karachi joined the movement’s ranks and constituted one of its largest non-Pashtun groups. These Badakhshani fighters suffered hundreds of casualties during the Taleban’s Emirate.

The first significant incident involving the Badakhshani Taleban was a clash between the Taleban and Northern Alliance fighters in Topkhana, an area in Zebak district near Badakhshan’s border with Pakistan, in 1998. Hundreds of Taleban fighters led by Mullah Sharif, a commander originally from Warduj district, stormed check points controlled by Northern Alliance commanders in a cross-border attack from Pakistan. After overcoming minor resistance, the Taleban took control of the area. This first appearance of the Badakhshani Taleban was a warning to the Northern Alliance. Its local commanders, particularly the most famous Jamiat-e Islami commander of the province, Sayed Najmuddin Waseq, took steps to repel Mullah Sharif’s fighters and prevent further Taleban infiltration in the province. He gathered hundreds of fighters to retake control of the Topkhana area, and inflicted heavy casualties: according to locals, hundreds of Taleban fighters, mainly Badakhshanis, as well as their commander, were mercilessly killed.

This incident affected many families in the province, who lost their pro-Taleban young sons. It also created a rift among Badakhshani clerics from both warring sides. The clash in Topkhana amounted to a failure of early Taleban attempts to infiltrate Badakhshan, demonstrating that the province was a Northern Alliance stronghold, impossible for the Taleban to take. Indeed, Badakhshan was one of few places the Taleban never controlled during their regime. Recent events illustrate how much this dynamic has changed, with the Taleban now successfully implementing a strategy not only to infiltrate but also to seize and to hold ground in Badakhshan.

The new non-Pashtun Taleban leadership in Badakhshan

After the reemergence of the Taleban in 2004, the movement invested its energy in recruiting a larger number of non-Pashtun Taleban in Pakistani madrassas in order to strengthen its support among the local population in those provinces. This shift in approach reflected (and still reflects) the movement’s changed attitude towards Afghans of non-Pashtun ethnic backgrounds, which had evolved from essentially seeking to exclude them from most leadership positions, even in areas where they constituted the majority to a more inclusive approach. This shift may also have been a manoeuvre by the Taleban leadership to portray the movement post-2001 as a national rather than a Pashtun-dominated one. In this strategy, the Taleban created more space for other ethnic groups to join the movement, not only as fighters, but also as local Taleban officials.

These Taleban were mainly from rural areas in northern Afghanistan. After 2001, thousands of students from Badakhshan flocked to madrassas in Peshawar and Karachi to take advantage of the free food and accommodation, as well as the religious teaching – a remarkable increase compared to the time of the Taleban regime. As a result, the movement has gained a particularly significant recruitment base from among the students from conservative Warduj, Argo and Jurm districts. This has translated into influence in these areas. It was from Warduj where the Badakhshani Taleban launched their first serious attack. In October 2006, they ambushed a German PRT patrol in the district; the attack lasted for four hours and only ended after US air support was called in.

From 2008, and in sharp contrast to behaviour exhibited during the Taleban regime (1994-2001), the Taleban leadership council offered most local posts to this new generation of local Taleban, instead of merely using Badakhshani recruits from Pakistani madrassas as foot-soldiers.

While the Taleban’s recruitment of the Badakhshani students exploited their radicalisation from Pakistani madrassas, not all those who joined the movement’s ranks did so for ideological reasons. The Taleban’s success in recruitment also seems to have banked on Badakhshan’s fragmented politics. The political dynamics in the province have long been defined by a struggle between local powerbrokers. This provided the Taleban with various opportunities. For instance, Jamiat commanders in Jurm and Kuran wa Munjan districts competed for control of smuggling routes and natural resources and used a small group of armed men, whom they described as Taleban, to threaten each other. On a number of occasions in 2008, powerbrokers granted safe passage to insurgents seeking to reach their battlefields in Takhar and Kunduz. In return the insurgents avoided fighting in those areas of Badakhshan where they received safe passage. In fact, in 2008 the Taleban were not strong enough to pose a threat to the powerbrokers in Badakhshan but the deal helped them to secure safe transit routes. Until 2009, Taleban efforts in Badakhshan still primarily consisted of “travelling recruiters trying to influence local mullahs and perhaps a few small pockets in the process of formation, but without yet much of an impact,” according to this earlier AAN report.

While the Taleban’s strategy of recruiting locally in Badakhshan dates back to 2004, it accelerated from 2012 onwards. Since then, a new cadre drawn mostly from a younger generation has been appointed to lead the insurgents’ fronts in the province. One example of this type was Qari Shamsuddin in conservative Warduj district. Shamsuddin received a religious education in Pakistan. At first he led a small group of around 20 fighters in Warduj, but later he expanded his influence into the neighbouring districts of Zebak, Baharak and Yamgan. In 2012, however, he was killed following a US airstrike. As AAN previously reported (see previous AAN paper about power structures in Badakhshan here), the Taleban received support “from those parts of the population excluded from the provincial patronage networks since the late 2000s” in Badakhshan.

In 2013, the Taleban appointed Qari Fasehuddin from Isterab village in Warduj district as shadow governor and head of the military commission in Badakhshan. Fasehuddin is a young cleric from a well-known religious family. He received his education during the Taleban regime in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Fasehuddin’s father, Mawlawi Saifuddin, served as an imam in the 1980s in Warduj. He was not only highly respected and influential there but also in the other conservative districts, such as Yumgan, Jurm and Baharak. Since 2013, Qari Fasehuddin has been known as one of the most prominent commanders in the province.

In the same year, the shadow governor appeared for the first time in a Taleban propaganda film, speaking about the security situation in Badakhshan (the link is no longer available). Thereafter, Fasehuddin, a talented speaker, released a series of videos in which he discussed the virtues of jihad and accused the government of being a puppet to the infidels. In 2015, pro-Taleban social media activists released a video clip of Qari Fasehuddin addressing surrendered Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers in Yumgan district (see this media report), during which he referred to the 2012 Quran burning at the US base in Bagram (read more here) and asked, rhetorically, whether it was fair “to shot dead those who protest against the burning of the holy book”. He appealed to all ANA soldiers not to trust the US and the promises they had made over the past decade.

It is hard to estimate the Taleban’s precise military strength in Badakhshan. However, a source close to the Taleban told AAN that the shadow governor leads more than a thousand fighters. Gholam Sakhi Ghafuri, Badakhshan’s police chief, estimates that there are around 2,000 Taleban fighters and that the number of militants in the province has increased over the past two years. It is not only foot soldiers that Badakhshan has generated: in a remarkable sign of the changes since the time of the Taleban regime, the province has also produced a sizeable number of well-known commanders.

The shadow governor has established administrative and military structures in the province that are run mostly by the new generation of local Taleban. One example is Mawlawi Amanuddin, the head of their Special Operations Unit (Qeta-ye Khas-e Amalyati) in the province, which, according to a source close to the Taleban, consists of 300 to 400 fighters and is tasked to lead most of the local special operations against the ANSF. Mawlawi Amanuddin, who previously served as an imam in Badakhshan’s Baharak district, joined the insurgents in 2013. Locals say he had begun criticising the Afghan government for its servitude to foreigners during his tenure as a government-paid imam, and had expressed his openness towards the Taleban.

The shadow provincial governor also brought in a number of other local commanders capable of challenging the security forces across the province. For instance, Mullah Hafez, a young Tajik commander, serves as the shadow district governor of Baharak. Meanwhile, Matiullah Khalil, the shadow district governor of Yumgan, Mawlawi Mahbub, the head of the Taleban’s provincial education committee, and Mawlawi Saber, the head of the judicial committee, all belong to Badakhshan’s young, local and religiously-educated new cadres. The new policy of accelerated local recruiting and the shadow provincial governor’s comprehensive understanding of local dynamics has helped the insurgency in Badakhshan to become more effective.

The effect of the local Taleban on the battleground

The ‘localisation’ of appointments has enabled the insurgents to expand their influence. Over the past few years, Badakhshan’s Taleban have conducted several large-scale offensives against the ANSF. At the moment, two out of 28 Badakhshani districts (Yamgan and Warduj) are entirely under Taleban control. At least four more districts (Baharak, Raghistan, Argo and Zebak) have changed hands several times, while four others (Jurm, Shohada, Tagab and Kuran wa Munjan) are heavily contested. Taleban activity has also been reported by several Afghan media sources in Khash, Darayem, Teshkan and the district of the provincial capital, Faizabad where, according to one report, the insurgents have a “strong presence” in the village of Spingul, only two kilometres away, whence they threaten the important Baharak-Faizabad road.

The ANSF have conducted several counteroffensives, but with limited effect. In early September, for example, they claimed that the Taleban had been pushed out of an important gold mine in Raghistan; it seems, however, that the mine in fact is not fully controlled by either side. Residents of the districts have also reported that in this case the local Taleban are “Tajik insurgents”. And in late November, the ANSF reported that the district of Tagab had been retaken from the insurgents “after nine months” – the only problem being that the district’s fall had never been reported, and it had been ‘retaken’ from the Taleban once before, in January 2016.

Meanwhile, Taleban insurgents attacked security forces in the Baharak district of Badakhshan in October 2015 and temporarily took control of the district centre (read short report here and here). In November 2015, the Taleban took control of the Raghistan district for almost three days (read report here). The ANSF soon drove the insurgents out of both district centres, but the failure to protect them in the first place reduced the locals’ confidence in the ANSF. At the same time it boosted the insurgents’ morale, and increased their motivation to continue targeting district centres. The collapse of the district centres, even for a short period, has become a “lesson learned”, not for the ANSF, but for the insurgents who now seek to maintain permanent control of the district centres they hold.

Since then, the Taleban have continued to expand their presence in the two strategic districts of Yumgan and Warduj with a series of assaults. Indeed, Warduj was the place where the Taleban first sought to establish a stronghold in Badakhshan (1). From there, the insurgents can threaten the districts of Eshkashem to the northwest, Zebak to the south, Baharak to the northeast and Jurm to the east. Warduj has been known for its militancy since the first phase of the anti-Soviet war in the 1980s, and continued to be a stronghold of Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan, the party led by the late Burhanuddin Rabbani, both during the remainder of the war against the Soviet occupation and during the resistance against the Taleban regime.

In October 2015, the Taleban stormed Warduj district centre, which fell with minimal resistance into the insurgents’ hands. The Taleban started their attack from Pol-e Ghalchian, an area located ten kilometres to the southeast of the district centre, where, once the security cordon had been breached, the insurgents entered the district centre (see here). According to district governor Dawlat Muhammad Khawari, local government forces made no effort to retake the district centre. He told AAN that the Taleban have now set up administrative and military structures there. Further, he said, the Taleban have recruited a large number of fighters in Warduj. After a month of controlling Warduj, the Taleban then pushed forward in order to gain further territory in Badakhshan.

In November 2015, the Taleban conducted a large-scale attack against Yamgan district. Again, the ANSF failed to protect the district centre and the Taleban were able to overrun it after only minor resistance. The Taleban’s propaganda website released video footage of Yamgan’s fall. The video contained footage of government officials being detained by the Taleban.

Speaking to AAN, Imran Paiman, Yumgan’s district governor, confirmed that the district was still under insurgent control. Further, he told AAN that the central government has promised to deploy forces in order to retake it; however he denied giving further details about the fate of those government officials, who, according to the Taleban propaganda video, had been detained. He told AAN that his appointment took place after the collapse of the district. Separately, provincial police chief Ghafuri stated that security in Badakhshan has improved – although he conceded that some parts of the province still face insecurity. He confirmed that the two districts of Warduj and Yamgan are entirely out of government control but that the security forces plan to conduct a counteroffensive to recapture these districts.

The Taleban strategy of appointing non-Pashtun cadres in Tajik-dominated areas has not only yielded success on the battleground but also politically. The insurgents’ propaganda website has repeatedly featured footage and speeches by Badakhshani Tajik commanders in order to portray the insurgency as a nation-wide, supra-ethnic movement (see, for instance here). This portrayal of the insurgency has in turn helped generate new leaders at the local level, and continues to produce fighters among non-Pashtun ethnic groups (2).

With the mobilisation of local fighters and commanders, the Taleban have managed, over several years, to turn once strongly anti-Taleban Badakhshan into what is, at the very least, contested ground – despite the fact that government forces still continue to hold the majority of the district centres.

Editing by Sari Kouvo, Borhan Osman and Thomas Ruttig.

 

(1) Philipp Münch wrote in a report for AAN (slightly edited):

In Warduj valley, the most influential local anti-Taleban commander, Ashur Beg, was said to have demobilised most of his fighters after the fall of the Taleban. This may be why this area, especially the area of Tirgaran, became a hotbed of the insurgency in the following years. Other reasons were that the area was ecologically degraded, saw many returning refugees and received few state resources – as visible in the low number of students. According to one study, during the drought of 2001 up to 95 per cent of the farmers had to sell or mortgage parts of their land, making them more dependent on landlords. This was fertile ground for Arab Salafists and politically active mullahs to call for resistance against the government, as they had done in the 1980s and 1990s.

The information about Arab Salafists in the area is attributed to information from German intelligence, but not confirmed by AAN.

(2) Structure of the Taleban in Warduj and Yumgan districts, as of October 2016

Warduj’s shadow district governor Haidari, a Tajik from Warduj  

Head of Warduj’s military committee

  Aminullah (from Warduj) previously served as head of the Haj department for Zebak district; he also leads the Taleban’s ‘special unit’ in Badakhshan  

Head of Warduj’s judicial committee Mawlawi Abdulhamed, a Tajik from Warduj  

Yumgan’s shadow district governor

  Matiullah Khalil, a Tajik from Yamgan district  

Head of Yumgan’s military committee

  Ashor Muhammad  

Head of Yumgan judicial committee

  (unknown)

 

 

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