Defence`s Feeds

The new European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) is established today, October 6, 2016.

This successor of the former Frontex (from French: Frontières extérieures for "external borders") is an agency of the European Union headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, tasked with border control of the European Schengen Area, in coordination with the border and coast guards of Schengen Area member states. Frontex was established in 2004 as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, and primary responsible for coordinating border control efforts.

In response to the European migrant crisis of 2015-2016, the European Commission proposed on December 15, 2015, to extend Frontex's mandate and to transform it into a fully-fledged European Border and Coast Guard Agency. On 18 December 2015, the European Council roundly supported the proposal, and after a vote by the European Parliament, the Border and Coast Guard was officially launched on 6 October 2016 at the Bulgarian external border with Turkey.

To enable the Agency to carry out its tasks, its budget would be gradually increased from the €143 million originally planned for 2015 up to €238 million in 2016, €281 million in 2017, and will reach €322 million (about US$350 million) in 2020. The staff of the agency would gradually increase from 402 members in 2016 to 1,000 by 2020.

The European Border and Coast Guard Agency is not a new body. It does not replace Frontex and it retains the same legal personality. What the Commission draft Regulation aims to do is to strengthen the mandate of the EU border agency, to increase its competences and to better equip it to carry out its operational activities. The new tasks and responsibilities of the Agency need to be reflected by its new name. It coordinates its work alongside the European Fisheries Control Agency and European Maritime Safety Agency with regard to coastguard functions.
The permanent staff of the Agency will be more than doubled between 2015 and 2020. The new proposal provides for a reserve of European border guards and technical equipment. The Agency will be able to purchase its own equipment (this is not a novelty). However - and this is new - the Member States where this equipment is registered (this refers mainly to big equipment items such as patrol vessels, air crafts, etc. which need a flag of state) will be obliged to put it at the Agency's disposal whenever needed. this will make it possible for the Agency to rapidly deploy the necessary technical in border operations. A rapid reserve pool of border guards and a technical equipment pool will be put at the disposal of the agency, intending to remove the shortages of staff and equipment for the Agency's operations.

A monitoring and risk analysis centre will be established, with the authorisation to carry out risk analysis and to monitor the flows towards and within the EU. The risk analyses includes cross-border crime and terrorism, process personal data of persons suspected to be involved in acts of terrorism and cooperate with other Union agencies and international organisations on the prevention of terrorism. A mandatory vulnerability assessments of the capacities of the Member States to face current or upcoming challenges at their external borders will be established. The Agency is able to launch joint operations, including the use of drones when necessary. The European Space Agency's earth observation system Copernicus provides the new Agency with real time satellite surveillance capabilities alongside the current Eurosur border surveillance system.

ember States will be able to request joint operations, rapid border interventions, and deployment of the EBCG Teams to support national authorities when a Member State experiences an influx of migrants that endangers the Schengen area. In such a case, especially when a Member State’s action is not sufficient to handle the crisis, the Commission will have the authority to adopt an implementing decision that will determine whether a situation at a particular section of the external borders requires urgent action at the EU level. Based on this decision, the EBCGA will be able to intervene and deploy EBCG Teams to ensure that action is taken on the ground, even when a Member State is unable or unwilling to take the necessary measures.

The right to intervene is a point of contention between a number of EU Members and the Commission, especially those Members whose borders form the external borders of the EU, such as Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Poland. They want to ensure that intervention is possible only with the consent of the Member States, whose external borders necessitate the presence of the ECBGA. Greece’s Alternate Minister for European Affairs, Nikos Xydakis, stated in an interview that while Greece is supportive of a common European action and of changing Frontex’s mandate, it wants the ECBGA to take complete charge of migration and refugee flows.

Tag: FRONTEXEBCG

Finally, after a year of negotiations and some last minute hurdles – including on the Afghan side refusals to sign and an attempt to involve parliament – the European Union and Afghanistan have reached a ‘readmission’ agreement on how to return Afghans who have travelled to Europe and failed in their claims for asylum. President Ghani and Dr Abdullah both backed the agreement, while Minister for Refugees Balkhi said Afghans migrants should be allowed to stay, regardless of whether their claims for asylum were accepted or not. AAN’s Jelena Bjelica explains what happened in Kabul in the run-up to the signing (with parliamentary reporting from AAN’s Salima Ahmadi) and explains what the agreement actually says.

The readmission agreement, optimistically titled Joint Way Forward, was supposed to be launched during a high-level, ministerial dialogue in Brussels on 3 October 2016, during which the EU would also announce an 80 million Euros assistance package for migration-related activities. The launch of the agreement – or declaration, as the Afghan government now insists on calling it (1) – was planned to coincide with the run-up to the Brussels Conference, a high-level aid pledging event. This was supposed to showcase Afghanistan’s willingness to cooperate on taking back Afghans who have failed in their asylum claims and to pre-empt potentially difficult discussions during the conference around continuing development aid for Afghanistan up to 2020. (2) This plan ran into difficulties when it became clear that both the minister for refugees and the minister for foreign affairs did not want to sign the document, after their deputies had finished negotiating it – to great concern and exasperation among European diplomats.

Many European countries have seen a large influx of Afghan asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016, with over a quarter of a million Afghans migrating to Europe in this period (see AAN reporting on Afghan migration here and here). Germany, one of the main countries pushing for a deal, received the bulk of the influx, with 180,000 asylum applications by Afghans in 2015 and 2016. Various European countries had trouble trying to deport failed Afghan asylum seekers and getting the Afghan authorities to accept them back and the EU wanted a commitment from Afghanistan that it would cooperate, as matter of principle. The organisers of the Brussels conference moreover feared that failure to negotiate a readmission agreement with Afghanistan could highjack important discussions at Brussels on aid and would leave member countries reluctant to publicly commit to future funding. So when in the run-up to the conference, it became clear that the key document, the Joint Way Forward, as well as a several bilateral readmission agreements might not be signed at all, the EU and its member states, as well as the presidential palace, all of whom were keen to make the Brussels Conference a success, engaged in a flurry of diplomacy to still get the document signed in time.

The main controversies

President Ghani’s position has always been that Afghanistan should take care of its own citizens. He has repeatedly reassured his EU counterparts that Afghanistan is obliged to accept the readmission of Afghans whose asylum applications have been rejected (see here  and here). Refugees Minister Sayed Alemi Balkhi, however, had a different opinion. Balkhi has repeatedly said he believed “all asylum seekers who have reached their countries of destination” should be recognised without any kind of discrimination (see for example his speech at the 66th Session of the Executive Committee of UNHCR ). By this, he appeared to mean that Afghans arriving in Europe should be granted protected status and not be treated differently from other nationalities, such as Syrians and Iraqis. He also repeatedly argued that forced expulsion was not an acceptable solution for Afghanistan (see for instance here).

As a result, Balkhi has been a difficult man to negotiate readmission agreements with. He has often gone public, showing himself as the ‘guardian of the people’s interest’, most recently in his address to parliament. His position was that a lot of people had sold everything to take the perilous journey to Europe and, if returned, would be left with almost nothing in Afghanistan. He was not impressed by donor promises of assistance linked to such agreements, and according to an advisor at the ministry of refugees, Balkhi has repeatedly pushed back against suggestions by EU member states that future aid could be conditional on Afghanistan’s cooperation in taking migrants back.

The public position of the Chief Executive Abdullah’s camp was that they were in favour of the agreement described in the Joint Way Forward. Javid Faisal, Dr Abdullah’s deputy spokesperson, assured AAN on 21 September 2016 that both wings of the national unity government fully supported the agreement, saying “We know the issues related to migration that Europe is dealing with.” The position held by both the president and the chief executive, he said was that all returns should be on a voluntary bases, that no more than 50 Afghans per flight could be sent back to Afghanistan, that vulnerable categories could not be returned to Afghanistan and that all returnees should be financially supported by the EU. The Joint Way Forward agreement, however, specifically also includes forced returns. Indeed, this was already agreed at the time of Faisal’s interview.

The official line, however, was cooperative and Abdullah himself is said to have been constructive in the various negotiations. It was notable, though, that the two ministers (Rabbani and Balkhi) who could have signed the agreement, and refused to, were both Abdullah appointees and that the ministers and officials the president relied on to ultimately resolve the impasse were all his own appointees (for more background on recent trouble within the National Unity Government, see this recent AAN analysis).

Under international refugee law and international human rights Law, it is not illegal to deport people who have failed in their bids for asylum, (3) provided cases have been judged equitably and the home country is not so dangerous that there is a general ban on returning everyone. At the moment, only two countries are judged to be in this category: the UNHCR had issued non-return advisories for Syria (dangerous for everyone) and Libya (dangerous for foreigners). There is, on the other hand, no legal requirement for Afghanistan to take back its citizens.

An intense week of last-minute negotiations in Kabul

The text of the Joint Way Forward was initialled in Kabul on Monday 26 September 2016, less than a week before the intended ministerial dialogue, by the EU Special Representative to Afghanistan, Franz-Michael Skjold Mellbin, and three Afghan counterparts: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Nasir Ahmad Andisha, Deputy Head of the National Security Council Faizullah Zaki and Deputy Minister of Refugees and Repatriation Dr Alema Alema.

The official signing of the document by Minister Balkhi and EUSR Mellbin had been planned for Thursday 29 September 2016, but it proved impossible for the Afghan side to convince Balkhi to sign. This had already become apparent on 28 September 2016, a German diplomat told AAN, when the German ambassador had been asked to come to the presidential palace to sign the bilateral German-Afghan readmission agreement. He spent an hour outside the meeting room, while Ghani and Balkhi had an intense argument about the signing of the agreement. The episode ended with the German ambassador leaving the palace empty-handed, without the agreement having been signed.

Concern in the European capitals was so high that German Chancellor Angela Merkel called President Ghani on 28 September 2016, asking him to ensure the agreements were signed.

The Wolesi Jirga hearings and some last minute politics

In the meantime, parliament had caught on to the fact that this was a hot issue. On 28 September 2016, the ministers of foreign affairs and refugees and repatriation were summoned to the house to answer questions on the issue of asylum seekers in Europe and preparations for the Brussels Conference.

Parliament was inquorate, as it has been at practically every session since the summer recess and in most before that; only 87 MPs had come to hear the ministers. Salahuddin Rabbani, Minister of Foreign Affairs, told the house, “European countries told us: you should either receive our aid [in the form of aid] to Afghan refugees in our countries, or for development projects in Afghanistan; you can choose between these two options. They asserted very clearly that they cannot help Afghanistan in both areas.” He also told MPs that Afghanistan had prepared a statement that it would present at the Brussels conference, making clear under which conditions and how many refugees could be returned to the country. He did not provide any details on the drafted statement – which by that time had already been finalised and initialled – and instead told the house that the document had not been signed yet and that before signing it, the government would consult the parliament.

Minister of Refugees and Repatriation Sayed Alemi Balkhi also told the house that the document would specify how many asylum seekers would be returned from Europe to Afghanistan and concluded that, “There are major national interests at stake here, as well as Afghanistan’s relations with European and other countries. In view of what was discussed here, as the people’s representatives, you should take a decision in line with the national interests.” Speaker of the House Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi concluded the session by saying that the government was obliged to convince the host countries not to forcefully expel Afghan asylum seekers from Europe.

After the unsuccessful attempt to sign the German bilateral agreement and the strong words spoken during the Wolesi Jirga hearing – with the ministers promising the house it would be consulted, possibly even asked to vote, on an already finalised agreement – the planned signing of the Joint Way Forward in Kabul for Thursday 29 September was put off. The part of the government that was convinced of the need to get the agreement signed, not least due to strong European pressure, was now frantically looking for a solution.

The insistence towards EU negotiators that an official agreement would need to go through parliament and Balkhi and Rabbani’s promises to parliament that it would be consulted seemed aimed at trying to prevent the agreement being signed at all. As parliament rarely has the needed quorum to vote on matters of substance, relying on it for confirmation was doubly unlikely: MPs were hostile to forced returns and, anyway, there are not enough MPs present to be effective on anything.

Resolving the impasse

The first step towards finding a way through this tangled web was to call a second parliamentary hearing, in an attempt to better explain the position of the government and change the MPs’ mood. So on Sunday, 2 October 2016, at the request of the government, the Brussels Conference was again put on the agenda of the Wolesi Jirga. This time, in addition to Rabbani and Balkhi, Minister of Finance Eklil Hakimi (a driving force behind the Brussels conference and de facto co-organiser of the event) and Deputy Head of the National Security Council Faizullah Zaki (one of the three Afghan officials who had initialled the agreed text of the Joint Way Forward) presented it on behalf of the government. This time, the ministers urged the MPs to be patient and at times even defended the EU’s position.

Balkhi, for example explained the need for a new document by referring to earlier Memorandums of Understanding between Afghanistan and various European countries, saying that: “The past documents and MoUs with European countries did not foresee the current problems of these countries, so they had no stipulations regarding the recent policy changes.” (4) This, incidentally, seems to have been a previously agreed talking point within the chief executive’s camp. For example, Faisal had earlier told AAN that, even though Afghanistan has a readmission agreement with the EU, that was signed in 2002 by President Karzai, it was not applicable to the current migrant situation in Europe.

Finance Minister Hakimi again told the parliament that no document had yet been signed on deporting failed asylum seekers, but added that, “partner countries do expect us to cooperate with them on the refugee issue […] The EU countries cannot deal with the refugee crisis alone.” He concluded by saying: “If Afghanistan does not cooperate with EU countries on the refugee crisis, this will negatively impact the amount of aid allocated to Afghanistan. Germany cannot provide aid money and deal with the refugees at the same time.”

Foreign Minister Rabbani reminded parliament that in 2015 the EU had already requested Afghanistan to cooperate on the refugee issue, and added that at the end of the Brussels Conference there would be joint statement between Afghanistan and EU countries “on the deportation of refugees whose cases have been rejected.”

So while the MPs were now being told there would indeed be an agreement on deportations, Balkhi kept insisting that the new document was “a statement, which has less legal weight than an agreement.” He added that “Germany is insisting on this kind of statement.”

One of the issues that was raised in the hearing was the report that the Afghan government had been forced to agree to a deal that would allow the deportation of at least 80,000 Afghans from the EU (see The Guardian’s article here). (5) Balkhi assured the house that this was a rumour and the government had not signed any document that would allow this to happen. He added that all migrants would be individually processed and would have the right to appeal in court. NSC Adviser Zaki confirmed Balkhi’s statement and said that, based on the declaration, deportations would only concern “those who have had their cases assessed and rejected by three courts.” He added that it was expected that no more than 7,200 Afghans would be returned home in the first six months of the agreement.

Speaker Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi expressed the house’s support for the activities of the government undertaken so far concerning the Afghan migrants in Europe.

After the ‘political massaging’ of the MPs, who did not insist on voting on the declaration, Deputy Minister of Refugees Dr Alema Alema – a family friend of the Ghanis who had been asked to help resolve the impasse – quietly signed the Joint Way Forward in a low-key event at the presidential palace on 2 October 2016. George Cunningham, Deputy Head of the EU Delegation, signed for the EU (for the brief, official EU statement see here). The German–Afghan bilateral agreement on readmission was signed at the same time by Dr Alema and the German ambassador, while two other bilateral agreements on readmissions, with Finland and Sweden, were initialled by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Nasir Ahmad Andisha and the two ambassadors.

What the final document says

The final version of the Joint Way Forward, like its earlier versions, lays out its aim as:

…to establish a rapid, effective and manageable process for a smooth, dignified and orderly return of Afghans who do not fulfil the conditions in force for entry to, presence in, or residence on the territory of the EU, and to facilitate their reintegration in Afghanistan in a spirit of cooperation.

The signed agreement is a back and forth between the positions of both sides. It states that, “Afghanistan reaffirms its commitment to readmit its citizens who entered into the EU or are staying on EU territory irregularly […] after due consideration of each individual case by member states.” (emphasis added). It stipulates that, “Afghan nationals who are found to have no legal basis to remain in an EU member state […] can choose to return voluntarily,” but also that, “Afghan nationals who choose not to comply with such a decision on a voluntarily basis will be returned to Afghanistan, once administrative and judicial procedures with suspensive effects [ie legal procedures that suspend a deportation] have been exhausted.”

The agreement says that special measures will be taken to ensure that vulnerable groups (unaccompanied minors, single women and women-headed families, the elderly and seriously sick people) will receive adequate protection, assistance and care throughout the return and reintegration process. Family unity will also be respected.

Regarding the mechanics of return, the agreement stipulates that every Afghan returning to Afghanistan on a voluntary or non-voluntary basis must be in possession of a recognised valid travel document. It specifies that the Afghan authorities will ensure that a passport or a travel document is issued within four weeks following a request made by an EU member state (or if a member state has evidence of the person’s nationality, within two weeks). If travel documents are not issued within these time limits, member states may issue a travel document (ie a laissez-passer). It seems that EU negotiators were well aware of, and unwilling to depend on, the lengthy Afghan administrative procedures, which can sometimes take several months. A humanitarian worker in Serbia, for instance, told AAN in June 2016 about the case of an Afghan minor who wished to return and who had been waiting for more than eight months for travel documents because of confusion as to which Consulate was responsible.

For the return of Afghan migrants, according to the agreement, the EU may use “scheduled or non-scheduled flights to Kabul airport (in existing designated facilities) and any other specified Afghan airports as mutually agreed, including joint flights returning Afghan nationals from several EU member states.” In terms of numbers, it said, “The EU member states understand that there should be limitation to the number of non-voluntary returnees to 50 per flight in the first six months following the signature of this declaration.” Additionally, the EU member states agreed to send details of returnees on non-scheduled flights to the Afghan government at least three weeks ahead of time. The document somewhat accommodates the government’s request for a new terminal for the returns, in exchange for agreeing to the readmission regime, although in rather vague terms, saying that, “both sides will explore the possibility to build a dedicated terminal for return in Kabul airport.”

The agreement further stipulates that, “EU Member States will sign bilateral and multilateral agreements with Afghanistan within the framework of the Joint Way Forward and will negotiate the technical and financial terms of repatriation after Afghanistan receives the data from each country and conducts a needs assessment” (no more details given). As mentioned before, new Finnish, Swedish and German bilateral readmission agreements were also negotiated in parallel with the Joint Way Forward. All bilateral agreements, so far, have come with financial commitments.

Finally, the EU agreement states that, “the return programmes and reintegration assistance are separate from and irrespective of the development assistance aid provided to Afghanistan.”

The ‘way forward’

The current document provides a basis for EU member states to accelerate both the voluntary and involuntary return of Afghans who have not been granted asylum. Critics of the agreement point out that the door is now open for the EU to send back large numbers of Afghans – many of them with large debts and after having spent long years on the road and in bureaucratic limbo – to a very uncertain future. They also point out that Afghanistan is not a safe country, disagreeing with the EU’s insistence that at least some parts of the country are safe enough.

There are obvious concerns on the Afghan side that the EU will not uphold its part of the agreement, in terms of ensuring support for the returnees’ successful reintegration and making sure they are not deporting people back to misery or a life of fear. This is particularly important as the deportation of failed asylum seekers from Europe comes on top of the current forced return of huge numbers of Afghans from Pakistan, and to a lesser extent, Iran. There are also obvious concerns on the European side, that Afghan cooperation will remain reluctant and random, and that public support within Afghanistan will be very thin indeed.

Edited by Martine van Bijlert and Kate Clark.

 

(1) A diplomat involved in negotiations told AAN that the Europeans were told that, if Afghanistan were to sign an agreement, it would have to be first approved by parliament. This is the reason why the government refers to it as a declaration, not an agreement.

(2) Relevant decisions relating to EU-Afghanistan readmission agreements and the current EU-Afghanistan readmission agreement, the Joint Way Forward

The Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (CAPD) between EU and Afghanistan, which was initialled in July 2015 in the presence of President Ghani, states in article 28 that the parties agree to “increased cooperation on migration with the possibility to conclude a legally binding readmission agreement.”

The EU Action Plan on return from 9 September 2015, as communicated by the Commission to the European Parliament and the European Council called for the EU to engage in high-level political dialogues with relevant countries, including Afghanistan, as requested by the European Council on 25-25 June 2015.

On 1 December 2015, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission Mogherini and the Afghan Foreign Minister Rabbani agreed to launch a High-Level Dialogue on Migration.

In March 2016, a leaked EU non-paper on Afghanistan described “possible leverages” across EU policies to enhance returns. The paper estimated that more than 80,000 persons could potentially need to be returned in the near future (which is what The Guardian article, referred to previously, based its numbers on).

The EU Council Conclusions on external aspects of migration from 23 May 2016, noted, “the Council […] is committed to enhanced and more effective cooperation on return with key countries of origin and transit, in particular with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh.”

The Council conclusions on Afghanistan from July 2016, urged “the Afghan Government to cooperate on the return and readmission of its nationals, in full respect of their human rights and in accordance with international obligations and commitments.” The document further stated: “This is the central and essential element of the Joint Way Forward, which addresses the growing pressure of irregular migration in parallel to Member States’ initiatives and agreements aimed at achieving further cooperation on readmission. The EU would support this through reintegration assistance, to help create a conducive environment that can offer Afghan citizens opportunities within the country.”

For a timeline on the general EU response to migratory pressures see here. For the EU’s statement on the EU-Afghan dialogue on migration on 4 October 2016, see here.

(3) The presumption is that anyone who enters another country without permission (visa, passport, work permit etc) can be deported. The exception is if a person lodges a claim for asylum and is judged to be a refugee or given a status on humanitarian grounds. There is no entitlement to enter other states or to stay there.

(4) In the past 15 years, Afghanistan has signed memoranda of understandings on returns and readmissions with several EU/ Schengen members, including France (2002), UK (2002), Netherlands (2002), Denmark (2004), Switzerland (2005), Norway (2005), and Sweden (2006, until 2009).

In addition to bilateral readmission agreements, the EU passed the Afghanistan return plan in November 2002, following the fall of the Taleban regime and the establishment of the interim administration, led by President Karzai, which stated:

The return of Afghans shall first and foremost take place at their freely expressed wish based on their knowledge of the situation in intended places of return and any options for continued stay in the European Union. Afghans, who do not have protection needs or compelling humanitarian needs justifying prolongation of their stay in Member States, but who nevertheless, after the passage of reasonable time, continue to refuse to avail themselves of a voluntary return programme, may be subjected to forced return by those Member States wishing to do so.

The plan was based on a partnership with the relevant Afghan authorities and explicitly said: “The Commission and the EU Presidency shall establish the relevant information exchange with these authorities, and the Council Special Representative in Afghanistan shall in cooperation with the head of the Commission representation in Afghanistan ensure acceptance of the plan by the Afghan authorities.”

President Karzai endorsed this plan.

In 2005, in a joint declaration “Committing to a new EU-Afghan Partnership” signed in Strasbourg on 16 November 2005, both parties agreed to “share a common commitment to facilitating the process of voluntary return of refugees…[this] includes cooperation on programmes supporting the repatriation of Afghan nationals from the European Union.” President Karzai signed this document.

(5) The Guardian article refers to the leaked restricted EU memo from March 2016 that discusses “possible leverages” to enhance returns. The document states that despite a positive trend in asylum application acceptance rates, “more than 80,000 persons could potentially need to be returned in the near future.” The Telegraph had a longer article based on this memo when it was first leaked in March 2016. Earlier AAN migration reporting referred to the leaked document here.

ACO Marine is a member of the international ACO Group with a sales network operating worldwide.

Goods news from our shipyards: EU manufacturers of military vessels and submarines are doing well, especially on international markets where exports are booming. No reason though for the industry to rest on its laurels as it urgently needs to invest in research & technology (R&T) if it wants to stay at the top, as a recent study commissioned by the European Defence Agency (EDA) shows.

This article appeared in the EDA's European Defence Matters
magazine issue 11

Despite difficult conditions on a growingly turbulent global naval market – mainly caused by rising exports from Chinese, Russian and South Korean shipyards - Europe’s naval industry has managed to maintain its position as a highly competitive global player if not a world leader, notably thanks to its technological edge and strong exports, the EDA-commissioned “Study on Industrial and Technological Competences in the Naval Sector” concludes.

The study, which was carried out by a consortium in 2015 and early 2016 (see box below), confirms that European naval industries are very strong in their respective domestic European markets - but also in international markets such as the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin America which all devote growing budgets to defence and often have no meaningful indigenous naval industry. Also due to decreasing defence budgets in Europe (at least over the past decade, whereas the trend has now started to reverse), export markets nowadays account for 42% of the European naval order book value.

 

Healthy successful industrial base, but...

Another positive characteristic of the European naval industry, according to the study, is its ability to design, integrate and produce the whole range of naval ships and almost the totality of its core systems and components. “Considering the complexity and sophistication of the products designed and built by these companies, they can be regarded as ‘system integrators’, dismissing once forever the old image of shipbuilders as mere assemblers of steel blocks”, it says.
The European naval industry’s supply chain is also considered both diverse and complete with no area in which a monopoly exists. Most importantly (with regard to Europe’s strategic autonomy in defence) there are European alternative suppliers and replacement options in place for all systems/components currently procured from outside Europe.

Business diversification is another trump card played by the European naval industry. The majority of the naval players are also successful players in the high-end segments of merchant shipbuilding (e.g. cruise ships and mega-yachts) and in the related maritime activities (e.g. offshore and marine renewable energies). “This diversification strategy has created a favourable cross-fertilization between civil and military technologies (dual-use technologies), both at the Prime Contractors and at the Supply-Chain levels, leading to cost-effective designs and solutions”, the study says.

The study’s overall conclusion could hardly be more encouraging: “The European Naval Industrial Base today is made up of healthy, capable, diversified and successful export-oriented companies”.

 

… more R&T investments needed

However, all forecasts in the study are not entirely rosy. The study also warns that some threats stemming from non-European competitors are on the horizon such as fierce price competition from non-EU countries, especially China, South Korea and Russia. Countries which very actively support their naval industries “as an act both of foreign and industrial policy”.

According to the study, the best way to counter this threat is by maintaining Europe’s technological lead at the Prime/System Integrators level as well as across the full supply chain “through increased, more supported, more coordinated and more focused investments in Research, Development and Innovation (RDI) at national and European level”. In order to increase intra-EU cooperation in the naval defence and security domain, a dedicated area for naval related research should be secured within the next multi-annual Framework for Research, Development and Innovation starting in 2021, the study recommends: “This is essential to the long-term sustainability of the European naval industry”.

The European Commission’s upcoming Preparatory Action (PA) on defence-related research and the Defence Action Plan (scheduled for later this year) could also play a key role as political frameworks to increase the resources devoted to defence research activities, including in the naval domain, the study concludes. “Here, a distinct role of overall coordinator is foreseen and advocated for the EDA”, it says. The study also pleads for a regular exchange of ideas between the EDA and the major players in the naval shipbuilding sector in order to better coordinate and integrate the objectives of the future R&T programmes in this field.

Finally, the study has also led to a list of technologies considered of “primary importance” both to maintain the European competitiveness and technological lead and to ensure the required level of operational superiority. In total 13 high priority topics and 4 new items were identified.

The high priority list includes surface technologies topics (virtual ships, simulation, maintenance, oceanography, environmental protection, supply & support), subsea technologies (hydrodynamics and UxV integration, modularity, UxV integration, vulnerability reduction, propulsor) as well as services and transversal technologies (uninhabited systems, propulsor & propellers).

The identified new R&T topics to be focussed on in the future are 3D printing, high capacity batteries, augmented reality and drones.

 

About the study:

With the adoption of the EU Maritime Security Strategy in 2014 which also encompasses defence-related aspects through its CSDP dimension, the maritime domain has gained renewed focus at EU level. The ability for European nations to implement such a strategy will depend on both the availability of required capabilities for both civilian missions and military operations, and the existence of a competent and competitive naval industrial base. Therefore, in 2015, the EDA commissioned this study – which was conducted by a consortium of Sea Europe (lead partner), Damen, DCNS, Fincantieri, Navantia and TKMS - to acquire a comprehensive picture of the European Naval Technological and Industrial base and its technological priorities.

 

More information:

• Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS) research (EDA project page)
• Maritime Mine Counter Measures - New Generation (EDA project page)
• Modular Lightweight Minesweeping (EDA project page)

Moog Space and Defense Group has developed and tested the Reconfigurable Integrated-weapons Platform (RIwP), designed to be installed on newbuild tracked and wheeled armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) to enhance their firepower. The RIwP has a dual-axis stabilised base platform, which in its

The Pakistan Maritime Security Agency's (PMSA's) Maritime Patrol Vessel (MPV) programme is progressing fast, according to Pakistani media reports. Under the programme six new patrol vessels - now confirmed to be four 600-tonne and two 1,500-tonne platforms - are being sourced from China

Pyongyang will launch retaliatory nuclear strikes against the United States if it determines that Washington is planning a pre-emptive strike against North Korea, the state-run Rodong Sinmun newspaper warned on 5 October. The North's latest threat comes after South Korea and the US carried out

Americas

• AM General has been awarded a $151 million contract to provide High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (Humvees) to Afghanistan, Ukraine, and the US National Guard and Reserves. The deals cover new vehicles, automotive kits, spare parts, and training. Afghanistan will receive 360 M1152A1B2 and 73 M1151A1B1 variants while Ukraine and US forces will receive 40 M1152 and 237 M997A3 ambulance vehicles respectively.

• In order to fill a capability gap before the introduction of what comes from the Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program, the US Army is considering a new block upgrade of the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. This new AH-64F variant will have an improved radar, forward-looking infrared sensor, and a new helmet, according to Col. Jeff Hager, the service’s program manager. However, a better look at the time frame for FVL’s introduction will be necessary in order to judge the need for a full block upgrade.

Middle East & North Africa

• Three US Navy warships have been dispatched to the coast of Yemen following an attack on an Emirati HSV-2 by Houthi forces. The USS Nitze (DDG-94), USS Mason (DDG-87) and the afloat forward staging base USS Ponce (AFSB(I)-15) are now stationed near Bab Al Mandeb strait where the missile attack took place. Prior to its use by the UAE, the HSV-2 was once used by US Military Sealift Command.

Europe

• A pooling initiative is to commence between the French and German defense ministries for the purchase and joint use of C-130J transport aircraft following the signing of a declaration of intent in Paris. Berlin announced plans to purchase between four and six of the aircraft from Lockheed Martin which would be added to those recently ordered by France. The move is part of a solution to fill a German cargo and transport aircraft capability gap caused by delays and limitations of the larger A400M from Airbus and the retirement of their older Transall cargo planes.

• Raytheon and Kongsberg have successfully test-fired an extended range version of Raytheon’s Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) from the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS). By simply pairing the sensor from the AMRAAM to an Evolved Sea Sparrow missile (ESSM) the new variant gives a 50% in maximum range and 70% in maximum altitude. Modifications undertaken to accommodate the new missile include extending the top row of three canisters by a foot, and Raytheon is targeting first deliveries of the missile in the 2020 timeframe.

• A lack of orders alongside a complex production process has seen production of the Eurofighter Typhoon suspended and potentially removed from the German market, at least until 2018. A joint European offering, the Typhoon receives components manufactured at four plants in Germany, Britain, Italy and Spain, which makes the production very complicated and expensive. It’s believed that Spain may soon follow in suspending production but production lines are likely to remain open in Italy and the UK. This is due to orders arranged between Italy and Kuwait as well as UK ambitions to shift Eurofighters to Saudi Arabia.

Asia Pacific

• Disclosures made by a South Korean lawmaker have revealed that the two Green Pine radars bought from Israel’s Elbit Systems have been failing repeatedly. Data submitted to Rep. Lee Chul-gyu showed that the radars have stopped working 21 times over the past three years which resulted in the anti-ballistic missile radars being out of operation for up to nine days at a time. An anonymous air force official said the reason was because moisture entered the radars, condensing inside the antennae. A temporary solution by the service was to install air conditioners inside the units and plans are in motion to house them inside “radomes” next year.

• India is anxious to close a number of defense and nuclear related deals with the Pentagon as the Obama administration enters its final months. Deals including the purchase of 22 MQ-1 Predator UAVs are in advanced stages of negotiations and should be finalized within the coming months. But with a potentially radical regime change on the cards in Washington, New Delhi may want to capitalize on the good relationship between leaders Modi and Obama as the prospect of an “America First” Trump administration may spark a US pullback from Asia.

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The New Zealand Defence Force's (NZDF) future ice-capable fleet replenishment tanker is scheduled to be delivered in January 2020.

The refit programme of the UK Royal Navy’s Duke Class Type 23 Frigate HMS Westminster has been completed.

Hosted by the National Aviation Authority of Portugal (Autoridade Aeronáutica Nacional, AAN), the Annual Military Airworthiness Conference kicked off in Lisbon this Wednesday with keynote speeches delivered by EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq and General Manuel Teixeira Rolo of AAN.

The two-day event (5/6 October) brings together key stakeholders from national authorities, industry, European agencies, NATO and international organisations for presentations and discussions on a variety of topics related to harmonization of military airworthiness requirements , implementation experiences and integration into a global context.

In his speech, Mr Domecq stressed that standardisation, including in the area of airworthiness requirements, was a "key enabler" for the implementation of the EU Global Strategy. "The application of common standards and recommended best practice is a key enabler for defence cooperation and helps strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial base. Most importantly, from a defence perspective, such standardisation would support effective cooperation and improve interoperability", he said. 

He also recalled that since the establishment of the Military Airworthiness Authorities (MAWA) Forum, a lot of work has been done particularly in the area of European Military Airworthiness Requirements, the EMARs. “With the EMARs that are now developed, nations have created a baseline for a common approach to processes like certification, organisational approvals and the preservation of airworthiness”. However, “a real common approach can only be established if EMARs are also implemented in a uniform way, which is a national responsibility of the Member States”, he stressed.

Based on an earlier EDA funded study by Eurocopter, it is estimated that the adoption by Member States of optimised and harmonised military airworthiness regulations through the European Military Airworthiness Requirements would deliver a reduction of up to 50% of the development time and at least 10% of development costs up to initial-type certification. Significant further cost savings could also be achieved during the in-service phase.
 

Positive trend

Currently, the status of implementation of the EMARs varies from nation to nation, and at this stage the application is still mostly limited to some multinational aircraft programmes like A400M. “That said, there are signs that things are moving in the right direction. For example, NAHEMA has decided to use EMARs for the certification framework of its NH90 programme. And the participating nations in the MRTT programme will make use of the EMARs to benefit from a common approach”, Mr Domecq said. In the next years, the focus should be on the standardisation of how the Member States ensure and preserve their military airworthiness, Mr Domecq said.

The ultimate outcome Member States should aim for, he said, should include:

1. a single certification approach for multinational programmes, which would result in less development costs and optimised use of certification resources;

2. the development and application of common agreed industrial standards which would strengthen the position of the European defence industry in the global market;

3. optimised pooling and sharing of spare parts and maintenance resources within a single regulatory and oversight system (of key interest in relation to civil-derivative aircraft, but also with regard to military platforms such as A400M, Eurofighter, NH90 and others);

4. optimised use of oversight resources by collaboration in oversight obligations;

5. minimised gaps or differences between national regulatory and oversight systems, which would in turn minimise safety risks in multinational materiel cooperation programmes.

 

More information:

• EDA project page on European Military Airworthiness Authorities Forum (MAWA)
• MAWA Annual Conference 2015 

This month the Royal Navy is hosting a large-scale demonstration of maritime autonomous systems, which will see 40 participants from industry, academia and defence operating unmanned and autonomous vehicles. Katie Woodward finds out more about the Un…

EDA’s Personnel Recovery Functional Area Service Advanced Technology Demonstrator (PR FAS ATD), a sophisticated information management and Command & Control (C2) tool recently developed within the European Defence Agency to increase the efficiency of personnel recovery actions during military operations and missions, has now started being used by Member States in national PR courses.

Poland broke the first ground with two national Personnel Recovery (PR) courses, one in May and the most recent one from 12-23 September at the National Defence University in Rembertów in which the PR FAS ATD was successfully deployed and used. Organised on a regular basis by the Personnel Recovery Branch of the Polish Armed Forces Operational Command (AFOC), these courses aim at familiarising Polish military staff with PR. More than 60 students were trained on how to collect information and plan the recovery of isolated personnel in challenging and realistic scenarios. EDA facilitated the on-site training of users and provided information and technical support. The demonstrator almost completely replaced the usual ‘table-top’ exercise.
 

Easy to handle

After the courses, students agreed that the demonstrator was easy to use and intuitive. They especially praised its accuracy and considered it an important step in the delivery of PR education and training. “I believe that PR FAS ATD is a very handy tool for exercise purposes and I liked using it” said Major Robert Kietliński, one of the trainees. “Although it is just a technical demonstrator, I can see its potential benefits for real-life missions”.

Lt. Col. Zbigniew Zblewski, the chief of the Polish Armed Forces Operational Command Personnel Recovery Branch, welcomed the new possibilities offered by the demonstrator as a “significant leap forward” in PR training. According to him, “it is time to use the demonstrator on a much wider scale and to introduce it to more students”. “Every piece of available information that matters for PR is centralized in a single tool, everything is stored within the system which is very convenient for students and future controllers alike”, he commented.

The National Defense University in Rembertów was also engaged in the project; its representatives noted that “PR FAS ATD is an important step towards modernizing Personnel Recovery and unifying this field of knowledge within the Polish Armed Forces”. Moreover, an evaluation of the course results showed that students with varying degrees of knowledge of PR consistently found the system to be user friendly and comprehensive; they also concluded that it had improved their knowledge of PR significantly.
 

Demonstrator ready for other deployments

PR FAS ATD is the latest operational output developed in the context of the EDA’s Project Team Personnel Recovery. The tool supports planners and controllers with a number of functionalities and improved situational awareness. While it is usually possible to use the demonstrator through a standard PR FAS physical workstation, an internet-based (on-line) solution was chosen for the Polish course with the connection of six different computers each running an independent system.

EDA has distributed the tool to all its participating Member States (pMS), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the European Personnel Recovery Centre (EPRC). The Capability, Armament & Technology Director, Air Commodore Peter Round, underscored that” the EDA is always ready to provide deployment support and training”. The Agency is also working to address the various aspects of the through-life management of the tool to ensure its operational functionality in the long-term. “An important objective of the EDA is to support member states in the development of the capabilities required to effectively recover isolated personnel and save lives”, Pete Round stated.

 

More information:

• Polish MoD link to PR course
• EDA Personnel Recovery project page
• Hungary hosted EDA Personnel Recovery course (June 2016)

 

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