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Francisco González Mené and Dušan Švarc, EDA's two recently appointed SME Senior Advisers, participated in their first Member States’ SME Point of Contacts (PoCs) meeting this Thursday 13 October at the Agency premises in Brussels.
The meeting was mainly devoted to taking stock of the implementation of the 2016 priorities of the EDA SME Action Plan and the results of the EDA exploratory study on SMEs. Participants also discussed the progress report on the implementation of the ‘Guidelines for facilitating SME’s access to the defence market’ and EDA future work to support SMEs accessing COSME opportunities.
Both advisors expressed satisfaction about the outcome of their first SME PoCs meeting. "I was impressed by the hands on approach taken by EDA to provide concrete and practical support to defence-related SMEs so that they can access EU funding", said Dušan Švarc. In his view, "the key for EDA's future work in this domain will be to simplify ways, means and procedures for SMEs to benefit from EU funding and other forms of support". Francisco González Mené said he appreciated the increasing role played by the EDA in supporting the development of defence-related SMEs.
It was agreed that at the next SME PoCs network meeting scheduled for spring 2017, the two EDA SME Advisors would share with the group first ideas on how to support defence-related SMEs even better in the future.
Exploring new ideas and initiatives in support of SME
The appointment of the two SME Senior Advisers was identified in the EDA SME Action Plan, approved by the March 2013 Steering Board, as one of many means to promote defence-related SMEs. Following a call for expression of interest and a selection process, Mr Francisco González Mené (Spanish) and Mr Dušan Švarc (Czech) were appointed in summer 2016.
Their main role is to provide strategic advice and support to the EDA top management on policies and actions regarding defence-related SMEs/clusters and to identify new potential ideas and concrete initiatives in support of the defence-related SMEs. Their mandate also included the assessment of ongoing EDA initiatives.
More information:
will take place on Wednesday 9 November, 9:00-12:30 and 15:00-18:30, and Thursday 10 November, 9:00-12:30 in Brussels.
Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply foraccess to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.
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Australia’s long coast is also its border, and they’ve taken an innovative approach to the problem. Unlike, say, the US Coast Guard, Australia has semi-privatized the coastal patrol function, placing contractors under the Customs service. Once intruders are detected, these contractors can then call on pre-arranged support from civil authorities and/or the Royal Australian Navy and Air Force. Contracted services of this nature are becoming more common around the world, but Australia was really breaking new ground when they began Coastwatch on such a large scale in 1995.
Coastwatch was re-competed, and in 2006, Cobham’s subsidiary Surveillance Australia Pty Ltd retained the contract through the A$ 1+ billion next phase, called Project Sentinel. The new contract under Australia’s CMS04 (Civil Maritime Surveillance 04) program has expanded the fleet and addressed some concerns, but there are still areas where Australia lags a bit behind the leading edge. Even so, Coastwatch remain a touchstone program for countries considering a similar path.
Australia has a 38,000 km coastline and an Exclusive Economic Zone of 16 million square kilometres, and faces an increasing level of incursions. Illegal fishing and asylum-seekers who set themselves adrift to take advantage of Australia’s refugee laws (if they survive). As it became clear that its northern approaches held other resources beyond fish, the area’s sovereignty and safety acquired a high priority.
By 2005, the Coastwatch division of the Australian Customs Service contracted for the use of 15 fixed-wing aircraft and 2 helicopters from civil providers, and set annual availability quotas from Customs and Navy patrol vessels (about 1,800 hours) and RAAF AP-3C Orions (about 250 hours) under Operation Cranberry.
Except for contracted AP-3C availabilities from the RAAF, aerial surveillance is carried out by civilian operators. Indeed, the program is the world’s largest aerial civil maritime surveillance operation. It involves 170 personnel, flying 20,000 hours per year from 4 four permanent bases (Broome, Darwin, Horn Island and Cairns) around Australia’s northern coast. As of 2006, the Surveillance Australia fixed-wing aircraft roster included:
As noted above, these contracted assets work hand-in-hand with civil and military authorities to thwart drug runners, people smugglers and illegal fishing. While the surveillance is carried out under the auspices of Customs, several agencies rely on the intelligence gathered, including the Australian Federal Police, Quarantine and Inspection Service, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade and Fisheries.
The New Fleet Coastwatch Q200Under the new 2006 Project Sentinel contract, Cobham companies will provide, operate and maintain an updated fleet of Dash-8 aircraft through to the year 2021, starting in January 2008. The new service based on Bombardier Dash-8 aircraft will double the fleet to provide all-weather, day and night electronic surveillance of Australia’s maritime Exclusive Economic Zone.
The new fleet will change to 10 Dash 8 planes: 6 Q200 aircraft, plus 4 longer-range and larger Q300 aircraft. During the modification program, the Q300s were equipped with additional fuel tanks in the fuselage, providing an additional 4,000 lbs. of fuel capacity in addition to their standard long-range tanks. The Project Sentinel Dash 8 MSAs are equipped with the latest versions of Raytheon’s SeaVue radar, L-3 Wescam’s MX-15 EO system and a new SIM system based on Galileo Avionica’s “ATOS.” SIM will automatically capture and integrate surveillance information from these surveillance aircraft, and transmit in near real time between other aircraft and the National Surveillance Centre.
The Islanders and Aero Commanders were slated for retirement per CMS04’s “all electronic surveillance” guidelines, and the Cessnas may have been retired as well.
Project Sentinel will also operate some helicopters, in order to patrol key areas. Australia’s Customs and Border Patrol has contracted at least 1 Bell 412EP, 1 Eurocopter AS350B3, and 1 Eurocopter EC145 for these roles.
Improving the Fleet Mariner UAV TrialAustralia’s border patrol authorities have been stretched by a flood of illegal fishing vessels, particularly from Indonesia. The influx has led to calls for the establishment of a state-based Coastguard in Western Australia. Meanwhile, more than 8,000 boats have been detected, resulting in at least 200 arrests. Fisheries officers have also expressed concern that the sophisticated radars used by Coastwatch aircraft and patrol vessels have difficulty picking up the small wooden boats used by Indonesian fishermen.
In order to keep Coastwatch capabilities up to date, the successful bidder will be required to improve detection capabilities over the life of the contract. Contenders had also been asked by Justice Minister Chris Ellison to use new technologies such as UAVs, advances in satellite imagery and new-generation radar to improve the reliability and range of Australia’s civil maritime border protection effort.
In 2006, Australia’s Ministry of Defence trialed pilotless spy planes to patrol vital North West Shelf oil and gas reserves off Western Australia. The General Atomics MQ-9 Mariner UAV was used, given the high-altitude, jet powered RQ-4B Global Hawk’s high cost and high demand. As a bonus, the Mariner uses the same SeaVue radar as Australia’s Dash 8s, which allows for good comparisons.
Australia is still debating its maritime UAV needs, and withdrew from the US Navy’s MQ-4C BAMS program in 2009. The withdrawal removes a potential shared asset, which could have helped supplement Coastwatch just as the manned AP-3C fleet does today. Meanwhile, in the trial’s aftermath there has been no movement on contracted UAV services like Mariner, or even Boeing’s smaller ScanEagle, to improve Coastwatch.
Contracts & Key Events 2007 – 2016October 13/16: Australian Armidale-class patrol boats are to receive mid-life upgrades from firm Austal Australia. This month will see the commencement of work on the hull remediation, corrective maintenance and configuration changes of up to seven vessels at Austal’s shipyard in Henderson, Western Australia. Austal is currently providing in-service support to the Australian Border Force’s fleet of eight company-built Cape-class patrol boats and has been contracted to provide in-service support for 19 Pacific Patrol Boat Replacement vessels, which enter service from late next year.
Oct 29/12: Extension. Cobham has reached a GBP 105 million/ A$ 163 million agreement with the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, to extend their existing Sentinel aerial maritime surveillance contract by 2 years. This extension secures the contract until the end of 2021. Cobham plc [PDF].
Oct 1/10: SATCOM certified. Cobham SATCOM announces that their SB800 SwiftBroadband (SBB) System has been certified on CoastWatch’s Bombardier Dash-8 aircraft. With the SB800, Immarsat’s satellite network can be used to transfer the aircraft’s video and other sensor data to a land base for fast analysis.
The SB800 system works with the Immarsat constellation, and consists of an HGA-7001 antenna, SDU-7320 dual-channel satellite data unit, DAU-7060 Diplexer/Low noise amplifier and HPA-7450 High power amplifier. Cobham touts it as the most compact dual channel, class 6 SBB system available on the market. Cobham plc [PDF]
July 3/07: Helicopters. A new Australian Helicopters Pty Ltd Eurocopter AS350B3 Ecureuil arrives, and will replace a Bell Longranger IV in the Torres Strait per the Aug 29/05 contract.
Australian Helicopters Pty Ltd has been operating the Coastwatch helicopter surveillance and response service in the Torres Strait since 1995. They’ll operate the AS350 alongside a Bell 412 twin-engine helicopter, which has been upgraded with new surveillance and communications equipment to provide enhanced capabilities. Australia CBP.
Feb 1/07: SIMS, Helicopters. Australia’s CBP welcomes the first upgraded Dash 8 202 aircraft into service under the Sentinel program, complete with improved surveillance technology.
They also announce that Italy’s Galileo Avionica has won the opportunity to supply the new Surveillance Information Management System for the Dash 8s. SIM will automatically capture and integrate surveillance information from surveillance aircraft, and transmit in near real time between other aircraft and the National Surveillance Centre. The first aircraft will be fitted in October 2008, and the rest will be upgraded over time.
Finally, a new Rapid Response Helicopter service will be based in Gove which brings a new capability to detect and respond to landings or abandoned vessels, and combat illegal foreign fishing in Australia’s north and offshore regions. Helicopters (Australia) will operate a new EC145 twin-engine helicopter from April 2008, but provide a BK-117-B2 helicopter as an interim solution from May 2007 – April 2008. Australia CBP.
SIM & Helicopter contracts
2004 – 2006
MQ-9 trials
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May-September 2006: MQ-9 UAV. Australia’s government announces a September 2006 trial across Australia’s North West Shelf region, using a General Atomics MQ-9 Mariner Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and an Armidale Class patrol boat. Australian DoD release | Spacewar | DSTO mini-site.
May 2006: Australia’s 2006-07 budget proposal includes a number of measures to improve the protection of Australia’s northern borders, including an additional A$ 20.2 million to enable Customs to increase maritime surveillance flights over Australia’s northern approaches by 2,200 hours, and another A$ 338.9 million spread over numerous government agencies to combat illegal foreign fishing. See “Australia to Beef Up Northern Border Protection“.
March 6/06: Q300 order. Bombardier announces a $53 million order for 3 Dash 8 Q300 aircraft, from National Air Support of Adelaide, Australia.
In addition to the 3 new Q300 aircraft acquired from Bombardier, NAS will also purchase and convert 2 Dash 8s (1 Q200 and 1 Q300) from the existing fleet of sister company National Jet Systems. All 5 aircraft will then be delivered to Field Aviation Co. at Pearson International Airport in Toronto, Canada for conversion to maritime patrol.
Dash-8 Q300 MPA InteriorMarch 3/06: Contract. Cobham plc signs the CoastWatch contract with the government of Australia. It’s a 12-year, A$ 1 billion deal.
To fulfill the CMS04 contract’s new requirement for “all electronic surveillance” from January 2008, Cobham notes that the fleet will be augmented to 10 Bombardier Dash-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA): 5 upgraded Q200s, and 5 new Q300s, which are larger and offer longer range. Over time, the fleet will migrate toward this single fixed-wing type as other planes are retired. Each Dash-8 aircraft will be capable of searching an area of more than 110,000 km2 per flight, and the planes will operate from existing bases in Broome, Darwin, Horn Island and Cairns. Cobham plc.
Project Sentinel
Dec 7/05: Preferred bidder. Cobham is named as the Preferred Bidder for the 12-year, A$ 1bn Australian Coastwatch contract, beating Raytheon Australia. This isn’t a contract yet, but it means that negotiations with Cobham will be exclusive. Cobham plc | The Australian.
Aug 29/05: Helicopters. Australian Customs extends their relationship with Australian Helicopters Pty Ltd (AHPL), to provide another 12 years of helicopter surveillance and response service in the Torres Strait region. The new agreement is worth more than A$ 100 million over 12 years, and is also referred to as the Service B portion of the Civil Maritime Surveillance (CMS04) contract.
AHPL has been operating the Coastwatch helicopter surveillance and response service in the Torres Strait since 1995, with the current contract due to expire in June 2007. The new contract would begin in July 2007, and includes 1 new helicopter to replace the Bell Longranger IV in current service. Australian CBP.
CMS04 for helicopters
July 29/04: Extension. Cobham plc and the Australian government announce that the Coastwatch Civil Maritime Aerial Surveillance Contract held by their subsidiary, Surveillance Australia, will be extended to June 30/07 in an A$ 125 million deal. Surveillance Australia will re-compete the program beyond 2007.
CoastWatch has been operating since 1995, and Surveillance Australia’s fleet includes 5 Bombardier Dash 8 Q200 long range surveillance aircraft, 3 Cessna Reims F406 medium range surveillance aircraft, 6 twin-engine Britten-Norman Islanders, and 1 twin-engine Shrike aircraft. Cobham plc.
Additional Readings and Sources Coastwatch AustraliaA little over a year after the temporary fall of Kunduz city to the Taleban, the city has become a battleground again. On 3 October 2016, the Taleban entered during a massive assault from three directions. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), supported by US forces and air power, are battling to recapture the areas they lost, with territory still changing hands. The attack was very similar in tactics to the one last year and was largely staged from the very same areas – despite reassurances by the government that the situation was in hand and despite the many ANSF ‘clearing operations’ (that indeed failed to clear these areas). AAN’s Obaid Ali explains the persistent vulnerabilities that brought the city very close to being overrun by the Taleban for a second time.
The Taleban attack Kunduz city again
On 3 October 2016, the Taleban started their assault on Kunduz city – a little over a year after the city fell in September 2015. The assault was staged from three directions. The first attack started in the early morning, around 4:00 am, from the western areas of Zakhel, Khakani, Bagh-e Sherkat, Kota-ye Gert and Qahwa Khana. These areas are located in the city’s first police district and are only a few kilometres away from the city’s symbolic heart: its main square where several government buildings are located. Insurgents from Chahrdara, the district flanking Kunduz city to the west and southwest, supplied fighters for this front. Chahrdara has been one of the Taleban’s strongholds for the past few years and played a crucial role in last year’s attack on the city. Once Kunduz city’s security cordon had been breached on this side, the Taleban overran the first police district’s head quarters which is located around two kilometres northwest of Kunduz main square, and started moving towards the city’s centre.
The second assault followed shortly after from the east of the city, from an area known as Charkh Ab, which it is around two kilometres away from the main square and situated on the Kunduz-Takhar highway that runs east from the city. As recently as in September 2016, the Taleban had blocked this highway for several weeks (read report here). The Taleban coming in via Charkh Ab were supported by insurgents not only from their strongholds around the Kunduz-Takhar highway which they had established in the past few months (Dokan-e Adam Khan, Kata Khel and Char Sari), but they also received reinforcements from the Aqtash area of neighbouring Khanabad district, which has been mostly under the control of the Taleban since April 2015. From this location the Taleban moved closer to the Kunduz main square, through Khowja Mashad and Nowabad where the militants fought the government security forces.
Once the insurgents had successfully entered the city from the west and east, the third assault was conducted from the northern direction – from the Kala-ye Gaw and Bala-ye Hissar areas, only a few kilometre away from the main square, where the insurgents had built up a strong presence since Kunduz’s first fall in September 2015. This front was supported by fighters from Gortepa, another Taleban stronghold that has been under the group’s control since April 2015.
The initial assaults were quickly followed by explosions inside the city. The first improvised explosive device (IED) went off on University Street, in the first police district, followed by two others on the key road leading to Kunduz airport, south of the city.
According to local sources, the Taleban already had their fighters inside the city in advance, to pave the way for the attacks by providing intelligence to the incoming forces, plant the IEDs and create a chaotic environment within the city. The other objective of the fighters, locals said, was to spread propaganda and (mis)information about the Taleban having arrived in the city’s centre. This put the local government forces on the back foot and prevented them from taking effective and immediate action.
The local government, surprised and disoriented by the complex attack and without a strategy to handle the situation, found itself engaged in several battles inside the city at the same time. Video clips released on social media show police check posts, which presumably could have fought off the attacks, surrendering to the Taleban without resistance. A clip recorded in Qawa Khana, for instance, shows seven Afghan National Police (ANP) policemen who had surrendered and handed their weapons to the Taleban. The men were interviewed by a Taleb who asked their names, places of birth and reason for surrendering the check post. The policemen, who were clearly under psychological pressure, answered that they surrendered because of a lack of government support. The purpose of such was to damage ANSF morale on the ground.
At the time of publication, street fighting had been ongoing in several parts of the city for the past nine days, ever since the Taleban entered. Civilians are caught up in the fighting and many have no access to water or electricity. Residents are often trapped in their houses, too scared to venture outside to try to find what they need. According to Moalem Shams, a resident of Kunduz, all shops and markets are closed and prices for any food still available on the informal market have skyrocketed. The main roads leading to northeastern Takhar and southern Pul-e Khumri in Baghlan – escape routes during the previous siege of Kunduz –have been blocked by Taleban checkpoints for the past few days.
What is notable is this: the areas from where the insurgents started their assault had been vulnerable for a long time. Moreover, when the Taleban overran the city in 2015 their forces came from exactly these areas – Zakhil in the west, Kala-ye Gaw in the east and Bala-ye Hissar in the north (read our previous analysis here). This leads to the question: why was the city still this vulnerable?
Why was Kunduz City still a vulnerable target?
After the fall of the city to the Taleban last year (read our previous analysis here and here), the ANSF conducted several waves of clearance operations in areas largely under Taleban control. But they failed to address the basic vulnerabilities of Kunduz city: even after the operation, Taleban fighters were still present in the villages around the city, or they simply moved back in again as soon as the ANSF retreated.
Moreover, in the past few months the Taleban stepped up their activities again and started regularly establishing checkpoints on the Kunduz-Takhar highway – the only overland route to Badakhshan. This made it dangerous for passengers to travel. Mobile checkpoints appeared in Charkh Ab, Qabr-e Golistan, Lodin and Bagh-e Mir, all villages located only a few kilometres to the east of the city. At these checkpoints Taleban fighters stopped and searched vehicles with the aim of detecting and detaining ANSF and government employees.
For instance in May 2016, the Taleban kidnapped a local police official (see short report here) and abducted passengers from several buses close to the entrance to Kunduz city. Reports suggest that up to 50 passengers were kidnapped and that dozens of them that were identified as members of the government were killed (see reports here and here). The Taleban confirmed the incident, claiming they had detained 26 individuals who were members of the security forces.
Following these incidents, public pressure on the ANSF to keep the highway open and secure the surrounding areas increased and kept the ANSF busy. The security forces started focusing on the areas around the Kunduz-Takhar highway at the cost of leaving areas close to the city unattended to. This may have blinded them to the mounting presence of Taleban around Kunduz city.
Towards the end of the summer, the Taleban increased its pressure on the Kunduz-Takhar highway, engaging ANSF in different parts of this crucial supply route. On 17 August 2016, the Taleban launched a massive attack against ANSF check points on the highway, which caused serious problems for the people travelling between Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan provinces (read a short report here). The only remaining route connecting Kunduz to the northeast was now through Khanabad district. To block this route too, the Taleban conducted a large-scale attack on Khanabad. On 20 August 2016, the Taleban stormed Khanabad’s district centre and took control of it for a day and half (see report here) before being pushed out again.
The Kunduz-Takhar highway remained blocked (read more here and here) for two weeks, until on 3 September 2016 Muhammad Qasem Jangalbagh, Kunduz police chief, declared the highway had been reopened after a clearance operation. The temporary cutting off of the highway affected the whole northeast. Supplies were stuck either in Kunduz or in Takhar and the prices for goods shot up due to the lack of transportation and fears that the highway could remain blocked for a long time.
The continued Taleban presence in southern Kunduz had also long made the Baghlan-Kunduz highway insecure for government officials and ordinary passengers and when the assault on the city started, the Taleban made use of their strategic presence. On 4 October 2016, the Taleban attacked and overran an ANP checkpoint in Jar-e Khosk on the Baghlan-Kunduz highway and blocked the road for reinforcements from Kabul. This negatively impacted the ability of the ANSF to swiftly move in reinforcements or to move them across the northeastern and southern parts of the province.
The Taleban had carried out a similar strategy in the run-up to the first fall of Kunduz city in 2015 (read our previous dispatch here and our analysis about the Taleban strategy to position themselves along major northern highways, here). Last year’s siege, with its very limited and late support for the forces that did stay to fight, had deeply affected the ANSF’s morale. Gholam Faruq, an ANP policeman, told AAN before the Taleban assault on Kunduz city, “My parents advised me that in some instances it is better not to fight the insurgents, because if you get caught or besieged, there will be no reinforcements.” During the latest fighting, Afghan National Army (ANA) service members complained to a local journalist that only ANA soldiers were fighting and that the high ranking officers had all retreated to safe places, like Kunduz airport (see more here).
Why did the government’s clearing operations not work?
After the collapse of Kunduz city in September 2015, the ANSF conducted several battles to try to regain the district centres that had come under Taleban control. These operations largely focused on the districts of Dasht-e Archi, Qala-ye Zal, Imam Saheb and parts of Khanabad. The operations took longer than expected and the district centres of Dasht-e Archi and Qala-ye Zal changed hands, between the ANSF and the insurgents, a few times even – after the ANSF clearance operations.
A few weeks after the government retook control of Kunduz city in 2015, security officials claimed that Taleban’s stronghold in Dasht-e Archi had been destroyed; Gen Murad Ali Murad said all insurgents in Dasht-e Archi had been “eliminated.” In March 2016, the provincial police chief said Qala-ye Zal was cleared of insurgents. However, the government’s control over these districts did not last long and in June 2016 both districts fell into Taleban’s hands again (read our analysis here).
The military operations had also done very little to improve the overall security situation in the province. Even though by the summer of 2016, after several waves of clearance operations in the districts, there was little or no tangible progress, security officials still continued to assure the population that they would stabilise the province and push the Taleban from Kunduz. On 26 August 2016, during a visit to Kunduz, Chief of the Army Staff Qadam Shah Shaem warned the insurgents that they would face the same fate that Daesh had faced in Nangarhar and promised to conduct another large-scale operation. There was, however, no sign of such an operation and if there are any plans to do so now, the Taleban assault on Kunduz city has left little space for them to be implemented.
According to local journalists, the ‘never-ending’ clearance operations in Dasht-e Archi, Qala-ye Zal and parts of Khanabad districts may have actually contributed to the destabilisation of the province. The operations left the security forces overstretched and with insufficient energy to monitor Taleban movements and conduct operations around Kunduz city. It prevented them from establishing permanent strong bases that could have stopped the Taleban from getting so close to the provincial centre. The ANSF’s engagements in Dasht-e Archi and Qala-ye Zal districts left space for the insurgents to expand and exercise their power around both strategic highways and to position more of their men strategically around the provincial capital, without attracting too much attention from the ANSF.
The attack on the city, and the subsequent street-to-street fighting – neither of which could be credibly denied – forced high-ranking security officials to visit the site of the Kunduz battle. On 6 October 2016, Taj Muhammad Jahed, the minister of interior, flew to Kunduz to meet the local security commanders. Taleban shelling, however, disrupted his meeting (see report here) and the minister left for the airport.
The latest attack seems part of a consorted effort by the Taleban to show that their insurgency is strong enough to again overrun a provincial capital, even after another change in the leadership. This is illustrated not only by this second assault on Kunduz, but also by the recent massing of forces for other fierce attacks, including on Lashkargah in Helmand, Tirin Kot in Uruzgan and Farah city. The fall of another provincial capital would mean a huge boost for the morale of their fighters. Even the ability to threaten such a fall, in multiple places at the same time, must make the fighters feel like they are part of a movement that is gaining in strength.
It is worrying that the attack on Kunduz seems to have taken the government by surprise again, after repeated assurances by security officials that the situation was in hand. This shows, not only a continued vulnerability to attack and collapse, but also a lack of awareness about where the main vulnerabilities lie and an inability to effectively respond. The fact that the Taleban could simply replicate its previous strategy – to encircle the city and to cut the reinforcement and supply routes – is worrying, since the government, and the international military, have been keen not to see the city fall again. Although the city did not fall, it is unclear when the fighting will end and how much it will affect the lives of ordinary people. It has become hard to get accurate and detailed accounts of the battle, since many sources have either fled or their phones have run out of battery power since the electricity was cut. After nine consecutive days of street fighting, the Taleban still hold areas in the east and west parts of the city.
IAI’s Bird-Eye 650D: