Defence`s Feeds

will take place on Monday 28 November, 15:00-18:30 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply foraccess to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

Further information
watch the meeting live
Access rights for interest group representatives
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

On the 11th hour, of the 11th day, of the 11th month, the guns ceased. Today, the British Commonwealth countries remember those who came before, and those who came after, and all who have given in their nation’s service. Americans know this day as Veteran’s Day, and a number of European countries know it as Armistice Day.

On this day, DID offers background and worthy official sites related to Remembrance Day and Veteran’s Day. Readers may be interested in seeing the slight differences as well as the similarities – gaining new perspectives which may come in handy in project, liaison, or foreign posting situations.

Remembrance Day

Remembrance Day is generally celebrated throughout the countries that were part of the British Commonwealth during World War I. One notable wrinkle is that many Commonwealth countries include The Boer War, aka. The South African War, in their monuments and remembrances.

• Here’s an excellent audio rendition of The Last Post (QuickTime), traditionally played at the close of Remembrance Day ceremonies.

• The traditional poem that signifies this day is In Flanders Fields, first published in England’s “Punch” magazine in December, 1915. Flanders sits in Belgium, and there is a museum there with an interactive site.

• The symbol of the poppy on this day is nearly universal, reflecting the poppies that grew over the mass grave that Flanders Fields became. While John McRae got the tradition started, the wearing of the poppy to keep faith was a multinational effort that included an American named Moira Michael, the French secretary Madame Guerin, and the British Legion. Today, it is present as a symbol in America but not emphasized nearly as prominently as it is in the Commonwealth countries.

• The Royal British Legion’s Poppy Appeal

Veteran’s Day

Note that America has both Veterans Day and Memorial Day. The distinction is sometimes confusing for outsiders, but it’s simple. Memorial Day is specifically focused on those who gave their lives in the service of their country; Veterans Day honors all who serve or have served in America’s armed forces.

• Americans play Taps at the end of remembrance ceremonies and military funerals. Read an article at West Point Connection if you want to understand what’s behind these 24 notes.

• US Department of Defense: Veterans Day 2016.

• The US Library of Congress Veterans History Project collects and preserves stories of wartime service.

• US Department of Veterans Affairs: Veterans Day pages.

• Veteran’s Support Foundation

• Wounded Warrior Project

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

If Hillary Clinton had won Tuesday’s race for the White House, the world would now have a good sense of who her top officials would be and what her foreign policy would look like. With a Secretary of State-turned-president, Afghanistan could have expected business to carry on pretty much as normal. With Donald Trump coming into office in January, however, nothing is certain. The US is Afghanistan’s main backer in terms of funding and foreign troops and also has a substantial continuing influence on government policy. Whatever readers may think about the US role in Afghanistan, any major or sudden shift in US policy would be bound to have huge repercussions. So, despite AAN being the Afghanistan, not the America, Analysts Network, senior analysts Thomas Ruttig and Kate Clark have had a first attempt at working out what the Trump presidency might mean for Afghanistan.

Foreign policy was not exactly a key issue in the election campaign and Afghanistan – where America is fighting its longest war ever – barely featured at all. It got one (factual, rather than policy) mention in the first Clinton v Trump televised debate (see video in this article) and failed to make it into the second and third  debates at all. Associated Press has tried to find a reason why this happened:

The next president will face a new set of tough choices on Afghanistan early in his (…) term, including whether to increase or reduce U.S. troop levels and, more broadly, whether to continue what might be called Obama’s minimalist military strategy. The difficulty of these choices may explain, at least in part, why Trump and Clinton have been largely silent on Afghanistan.

The most striking mention of Afghanistan probably came when Trump campaign spokeswoman Katrina Pierson appeared on CNN in October 2016 and, speaking about 2007, said: “Remember, we weren’t even in Afghanistan by this time. Barack Obama went into Afghanistan.” Perhaps, she mistook the ‘surge’ for the 2001 invasion. During a campaign event in September 2016, Trump also used Afghanistan rhetorically, comparing it favourably with US inner cities – said: “You can go to Afghanistan. You can go to war-torn countries and you will find that it’s safer than being in the middle of some of our inner cities.” (The numbers were unpacked and found wanting on the BBC’s programme on statistics in the news.) (1)

The president-elect and his camp’s lack of foreign policy experience and, apparently, knowledge or memory of the continuing US ‘mission’ in Afghanistan is frightening. He has not spoken about Afghanistan much, but what he has said is picked through below. There are a few caveats. Firstly, Trump has made some strong, but often superficial and sometimes contradictory, statements about a whole range of foreign policy or foreign policy-related issues. Some of these were also later retracted, or toned down – such as blocking Muslims from entering the US (see the BBC’s collection of “30 things Donald Trump believes”).

Also Trump will not be ruling alone, of course, and US presidents have far less direct power than leaders in many other systems (the constitution aims to check, balance and, in many cases, delay presidential powers). Also, although Senate, House of Representatives and president will all soon be Republican, many elected Republican politicians did not support his candidacy, so that may also curb his power to act. On the other hand, as Newsweek argues, for example, “the views of Congressional Republicans may not even be relevant, given the executive’s dominance of foreign policy.”

Much of what Trump does, as well, will depend on who he appoints to key positions. About this, there is, as yet, little clarity. The influential blog, Politico, has some names but says that, first, “Trump’s divisive campaign may make it difficult for him to attract top talent, especially since so many politicians and wonks openly derided the president-elect over the past year,” and, secondly, that his transition team has stepped up identifying candidates, but holds its cards very close to its chest.

Reading Trump

There is a compilation of the ‘positions’ of the Trump-Pence campaign on its official website (2) in bullet-point form, entitled “Foreign Policy and Defeating ISIS.” Under the sub-heading “Donald J. Trump’s Vision”, a number of principles can be found, culminating in the following: “Advance America’s core national interests, promote regional stability, and produce an easing of tensions in the world.”

Peace, the website says, would be “peace through strength.”

The title shows that the war against the Islamic State (IS, ISIS or Daesh) is Trump’s priority, apparently equal to all other foreign policy issues. Although the emergence of Daesh did galvanise Obama into getting involved more fully in Syria and (again) in Iraq, and to sign off (an increasing number of) airstrikes against the group’s Afghan-Pakistani chapter, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) (AAN analysis here), in Afghanistan again, the outgoing president’s foreign and Afghanistan policies have encompassed far more than just addressing the Daesh threat. Obama has also massively increased the drone war in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, (although not all targets are suspected Daesh fighters). Trump, however, has repeatedly said the US military under his presidency would “quickly and decisively bomb the hell out of ISIS.” However, Trump was also speaking more about the Middle East here, rather than Afghanistan; he linked bombing ISIS with stopping Syrian refugees entering America (elsewhere he has promised to kick out any Syrian refugees who were already in the US). Although military lawyers would be unable to sign off anything that broke Geneva Conventions, Trump’s sentiments are clear.

In general, Trump wants to “rebuild our military, enhance and improve intelligence and cyber capabilities.” The US media expects that military spending will increase under Trump, so much so that, in March 2016, the investment magazine Fortune was already recommending the defence industry as their best buy: “Here Are the Stocks to Buy if Donald Trump Becomes President.” On 11 September 2016, there were reports that the shares of large armament companies had risen by up to over ten per cent.

On the other hand, Trump also wants to save money on some other aspects of military spending. He finds NATO a “rip-off” because US allies pay too little of its budget, although, in general, he was “all” for the alliance. He also announced a desire to collect “reimbursements” from countries protected by US troops (he singled out South Korea, Germany and Saudi Arabia. He has also been quoted as saying that his government would not automatically come to the aid of the Baltic states in case of a Russian attack. (He, though, tried to reassure Poland.)

This brings us to Afghanistan. If Trump does not want to risk American soldiers’ lives even for NATO allies, then why for Afghanistan? There are indeed some tweets from his official account – some though from 2013 – suggesting he is in favour of dropping US support to the country:

Let’s get out of Afghanistan. Our troops are being killed by the Afghanis [sic] we train and we waste billions there. Nonsense! Rebuild the USA.

And:

It is time to get out of Afghanistan. We are building roads and schools for people that hate us. It is not in our national interests.

Interviewed live on CNN in October 2015, he again said completely different things in almost one go: “We made a terrible mistake getting involved there in the first place.” And: “I’ve never said we made a mistake going into Afghanistan.” He also asked whether US troops were “going to be there for the next 200 years?” – only to descent partly into incomprehensiveness: “At some point what’s going on? It’s going to be a long time.” And:

OK, wouldn’t matter, I never said it. Afghanistan is a different kettle. Afghanistan is next to Pakistan, it’s an entry in. You have to be careful with the nuclear weapons. It’s all about the nuclear weapons. By the way, without the nukes, it’s a whole different ballgame.

On his website’s foreign policy part, there is no trace of Afghanistan. ISIS is featured and “nuclear Iran,” which he called “the single gravest threat, national security threat” in a campaign speech (quoted here) and “the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism.” He said the 2015 international deal to curb Iran’s nuclear programme could lead to a “nuclear holocaust” and, in a speech to the pro-Israel lobby group AIPAC in March, declared that his “Number-One priority” would be to “dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.” He later did concede it would be hard to destroy a deal enshrined in a United Nations Security Council resolution and, in August 2015, retracted his threat to “rip up” the deal, adding that he would “police that contract so tough they don’t have a chance.”

Although Afghanistan is, in the terminology used on Trump’s website, among the “fully operational” Daesh branches “in 18 countries,” ISIS in Afghanistan only gets a specific mention as the birthplace of both the father of the perpetrator of the June 2016 Orlando gay night club killings (the father was also said to have “supported the oppressive Taliban regime”) and the young Afghan refugee who attacked train passengers in Germany in July this year. In other words, Afghanistan features as a place where migrants come from who could have ISIS connections and might end up killing Americans in America.

‘Nation-building’, torture, Guantánamo

The Trump foreign policy ‘positions’ do contain an ambition to “end the current strategy of nation-building and regime change,” another hint – as in his tweets – that he sees a lot of the US spending in Afghanistan as futile. Whatever one might think of US spending in Afghanistan ­– and it can rightly be criticised for waste and its contribution to systemic corruption in the country – the US is by far the largest spender on the Afghan armed forces and government. Without US financial support, it is difficult to imagine the state, in its current form, surviving. The US also plays a political role, for example as wedding broker between Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah after the bitter Afghan presidential run-off, and mid-wife to their National Unity Government agreement in 2014. US ambassador Mike McKinley, Secretary of State John Kerry and occasionally Barak Obama by telephone have also continued to provide ‘marriage guidance counselling’ to the two Afghan leaders. Would the government still be standing without that pressure and cajoling?

Also likely to drop from any US agenda under a Trump presidency is support for democracy and democrats, and human rights and their defenders. For example, Trump told CNN that he believes the situation in both Libya and Iraq is “far worse” now than it ever was under Muammer Gaddafi and Saddam Hussain and that he would not pressure Turkey’s President Erdoğan over his crackdown on civil liberties. He has also praised the autocrat Russian president, Vladmir Putin, as a strong leader, “far more than our president has been a leader,” “a talented person” who had “great control over his country.” One hundred Republican ‘security leaders’ said, in an open letter published in March 2016 (more of whom below), Trump’s “admiration for foreign dictators such as Vladimir Putin is unacceptable for the leader of the world’s greatest democracy.”

On torture and the fate of the war on terror detentions camp at Guantánamo Bay, Trump has also taken extreme positions. Unlike Obama, he wants to keep the detention facility there, where there are five remaining Afghan inmates open and has even talked about adding to the inmates there, including US supporters of ISIS. He has praised the use of torture. He said, for example he liked waterboarding, eventually outlawed by President Bush in 2006 as potentially illegal and ineffective, “…a lot. I don’t think it’s tough enough.” Even if it did not work, he said, he would authorize it because “they deserve it anyway for what they do to us.”

In September 2016, a groups of former US military commanders, special representatives and ambassadors to Afghanistan as well as think tankers – including some with Republican and others with Democratic leaning – wrote to an open letter they called “Advice to the next U.S. president” to both candidates suggesting to stick to the “enduring partnership with Afghanistan” in the magazine The National Interest (full text and signatories here). They argued that:

The very enormity of that U.S. investment to date, and the value of Afghanistan in the broader struggle against jihadi extremism, argue strongly for trying to sustain—and build on—the progress we have collectively achieved so far.

The new president would have, they continue, “an opportunity to settle Afghan policy onto a more durable, more effective, and less demanding course… for a long-term American—and coalition—role in the country that avoids the recent pattern of nearly annual reassessments of whether the United States should stay, militarily and as a major donor,” “publicly-announced withdrawal timelines” and “unconditional” commitment – although referring to the 2015-2024 “decade of transformation.” At the moment, from what Trump has said, the experts’ thinking would seem to be a long way from his ‘natural’ response to the 16-year US involvement in the country.

Another collective statement, this time to the possibility of a Trump presidency from one hundred senior Republican ‘security leaders’, came in the already mentioned March 2016 open letter. They said Trump was unfit to be commander-in-chief and that he was “fundamentally dishonest.”

His vision of American influence and power in the world is wildly inconsistent and unmoored in principle. He swings from isolationism to military adventurism within the space of one sentence.

His advocacy for aggressively waging trade wars is a recipe for economic disaster in a globally connected world.

His embrace of the expansive use of torture is inexcusable.

His hateful, anti-Muslim rhetoric undercuts the seriousness of combating Islamic radicalism by alienating partners in the Islamic world making significant contributions to the effort. Furthermore, it endangers the safety and Constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of American Muslims.

Some personnel issues

Given Trump’s inexperience, The Washington Post and The Guardian suggest that the new president might just leave the job “to select personnel and coordinate policy” to his Vice-President Mike Pence whom the Post calls “at the very least a known quantity, [as] a former member of the House [of Representatives…] and a straight shooter” or “delegate foreign policy to Republican insiders such as Stephen Hadley, George W Bush’s national security adviser who is rumoured to be interested in reprising his role.” (3)

The Daily Beast has reported that when it comes to security positions in particular, Trump is already having trouble building a transition administration:

Team Trump is struggling to fill numerous key slots or even attract many candidates because hundreds have either sworn they’d never work in a Trump administration or have directly turned down requests to join, multiple current and former U.S. officials with direct knowledge of the transition efforts told The Daily Beast. Team Trump didn’t expect to win until the campaign’s internal polling a month before the election signaled a possible victory. That’s when senior Trump officials went into overdrive, trying to build a bench of experienced national security candidates with top secret clearances willing to work for a Trump presidency—and they met resistance across the landscape of experienced [Republican] national security professionals.

Those men who signed the anti-Trump letter, The Daily Beast contended, would not be offered jobs in the new administration.

Those who are known to be onside with Trump include retired Navy commander and campaign security adviser, Jeffrey D Gordon, who served for four years as a spokesman under Defence Secretaries Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates and General Michael T Flynn, a former Democrat who ran the Defense Intelligence Agency under Obama from spring 2012 to autumn 2014 and was Trump’s “top military advisor” during the campaign. Flynn had been a contender for the vice-presidency, although it finally went to Pence. Politico calls Flynn “Trump’s favorite general”; The New York Times writes that, “No one else on Mr. Trump’s national security team comes with the pedigree of General Flynn.“

This includes a number of tours in Afghanistan when he served as director of intelligence in the following units and organisations: in Combined Task Force 180 that directed all Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) operations in the country (until July 2002), at the Joint Special Operations Command, US Central Command (CENTCOM; June 2007 to July 2008) and the joint staff of ISAF and the US Forces-Afghanistan (from July 2008 to June 2009) and for all ISAF (from June 2009 to October 2010) when he spoke out publicly about how poor US human intelligence in Afghanistan was. Since then, however, he has moved away from the mainstream. In 2014, he was sacked as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, according to the White House because of ‘leadership issues’, but according to Flynn himself because of “the stand I took on radical Islamism and the expansion of al-Qaeda” vis-à-vis a “politicized” intel system. He tweeted that “fear of Islam is rational” and has said, “We are at war with a radical component of Islam and the way I believe it is that Islam is a, is a political ideology based on a religion.”

Other names coming up for senior positions, according to Politico, include Republican politicians such as Tennessee Senator Bob Corker or current chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich for Secretary of State and Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions for Secretary of Defense. Jeff Sessions was in charge of talking to the media in Trump’s defence plans (see here). Trump is also reported to be eyeing former US ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton, famous for his deep dislike of the UN.

There is also talk in Washington about a more familiar figure to Afghans (he introduced Trump at an event, but maybe that was because he was chair of the hosting board (a video of that here)…:

…Zalmay Khalilzad, an ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations under President George W. Bush, may be in line for a position. Khalilzad, who introduced Trump before a foreign-policy speech in Washington in April, did not rule out serving in a Trump administration in a recent CNN interview.

Afghan reactions

In Afghanistan, the country’s two leading politicians, President Ashraf Ghani and CE Abdullah (press releases here and here), have, as is diplomatically usual, congratulated the winner. Both, in not too different words, emphasised the US’ importance as a “strategic partner“ to Afghanistan, particularly, as the Ghani statement put it, in the development of the country and fighting terrorism. Two former intelligence chiefs, Amrullah Saleh and Rahmatullah Nabil, were a bit more open in expressing what many Afghans hope for – that, in Nabil’s words, the US would “tackl[e the] save heaven/supporter of terror [i]n Pakistan.“

Former president Hamed Karzai, who continues to speak out on political issues and is sometimes suspected of continuing to harbour political ambitions (see for example here), joined in the congratulations quickly, although Trump, in a 2013 tweet when Karzai was refusing to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement said, “Can you believe that ‘President’ Karzai of Afghanistan is holding out for more, more, more and refuses to sign deal. Tell him to go to hell!” After the Trump win, Karzai tweeted that he hoped for “change in the US policy towards Afghanistan and the campaign against ‪#terrorism. Focus on sanctuaries beyond #Afghanistan.”

Afghanistan has always also had a US Republican fan base which believed the Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld ‘war on terror’ was exactly what the country needed, only more of it – to smash the Taleban militarily and, even more so, make Pakistan give up supporting them. So, there also currently illusions might prevail.

The Taleban, unsurprisingly, asked Trump to withdraw “all US forces” from the country as the “most important” issue. Their statement continued (via direct quote from Pajhwok’s Pashto service):

Our message to America’s the new president is that he should draft government’s future policy in a way that does not mute the independence of other peoples in the world and does not seek [US] self-interest through other nations’ destruction and detention, so that the whole world can be in security and ongoing crises can find an end.

Hazards for Afghanistan

Issues that may rebound on Afghanistan from a Trump presidency would include his openly hostile attitude towards Muslims and Muslims coming to America and his dislike of the Iran nuclear deal. Whether or not he could or, in office would still want to dismantle that deal, is not clear, but if he did, that would constitute a real hazard for Afghanistan, increasing the danger of a war in the region.

Trump’s strong element of isolationism is deeply relevant to Afghanistan. If that element prevails, Afghanistan might lose both military support and financial transfers. This, as the ‘experts’ letter to the future president quoted earlier argues, would mean, in practice, that the 2001-16 one trillion dollar US investment in Afghanistan would have to be written off. That might be difficult, particularly as cutting support would be at odds with his criticism of Obama’s withdrawal from Iraq and if it looked like the US was turning tail and fleeing the Taleban. Trump, keen to promote an image of the US becoming “strong again” surely would not want that. However, given what he has said on ‘nation-building’ and ‘ungrateful’ Afghans, it is not impossible to imagine such a withdrawal of support. A reduction in spending looks even more possible. Given that Afghanistan is more dependent on US largesse than almost any other country, what Trump finally decides will be his Afghan policy will have a large influence on the country’s fate.

 

(1) Trump was not the first to pull off a bad comparison. In 2010, a high-ranking NATO official in Kabul stated that “Here in Kabul and the other big cities [in Afghanistan…], the children are probably safer (…) than they would be in London, New York or Glasgow or many other cities.“ He later said the comparison “wasn’t very well put.“

(2) Be prepared to prove that you are not a robot when accessing the website.

(3) The man serving as the Trump transition team director for presidential appointments, William Hagerty, does not seem to have any specific Afghanistan-related background. He was an economic adviser to President George H Bush and transition team director of Mitt Romney’s presidential campaign in 2012.

 

 

 

The US Marine Corps' (USMC) F-35B Lightning II aircraft has successfully completed the first power module and engine swap at sea aboard the US Navy’s amphibious assault ship, USS America (LHA 6).

BAE Systems has been awarded a $192.68m-worth US Navy contract for work on the USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) and USS Michael Monsoor (DDG-1001) guided missile destroyer warships.

The global naval vessels, surface combatants, and associated maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) market is anticipated to record a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 3.31% during 2016-2026, according to a report by Strategic Defence Intelligenc…

Airbus Defense and Space has been contracted to provide TRS-4D naval radars for the US Navy's littoral combat ship (LCS) programme.

The Centre for Security Governance (CSG) is pleased to present a new three-part blog contribution from CSG Senior Fellow David Law which provides a security sector perspective on the ongoing crisis in Mali and focuses on stabilization and security sector reform challenges to address in this context. Introduction In late 2011, Mali was plunged into a

For the UN, the Mali deployment has been politically one of its most important to date, one of its largest in terms of numbers of deployed personnel, and one of its most deadly in terms of personnel losses.  At the time of writing, MINUSMA also appears to have been one of the least successful. Overall,

The African, European and International Responses to the Crisis After 2012, several different external military and civilian operations were deployed to Mali. The first major external deployment to the region was the French-led Operation Serval, initiated in January 2013 with some 5000 soldiers, 80% of them French, following an enabling resolution of the United Nations

Background In the 1990s, Mali was often put forward as a model of African democracy. It is not hard to understand why. Following an extended period of authoritarian rule after becoming independent in 1960, Mali held three elections as of 1992 in which power passed to the winner. An anomaly among the Sahelian states during

EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq closed today's Annual Conference 2016 with a call for "cooperation to generate innovation".

In his final remarks wrapping up a "very insightful and constructive conference", Mr Domecq thanked all the speakers for their interesting contributions: Federica Mogherini, Head of the Agency, High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission, Commissioner Bieńkowska, Slovak State Secretary Ondrejcsák and Mr. De Spiegeleire. He also expressed gratitude to the members of two panels "who brought their insights, expertise and assessments to the table today".
 

Main takeaways

Mr Domceq singled out a number of takeaways from this year's EDA conference, in particular:

• in our increasingly challenging security environment, innovation in research, planning and funding is paramount; therefore, safeguarding leadership in strategic technologies is more pressing than ever. Especially fields like biotechnology, nanotechnology and deep intelligence will have a profound impact on Europe’s ability to develop strategic assets
• at the same time, new technologies and new innovation will require a new mind set: to seek out and import commercial sector innovations and quickly develop new concepts of operation; to tap into innovation in the private sector and channel it into defence; and also to achieve cross-border competition which is speciually important to SME's and start-ups in Member States which do not have prime defence companies
• we have to find a balance between not suffocating SME's and start-ups and taping their knowledge for defence and, on the other hand, provide our governments with assurances that these new players will respect the specificities of the defence and security world
• European collaboration generates innovation and "remains the best guarantee for achieving value for money and developing cutting-edge defence capabilities". "Cooperation is voluntary but it is a need" 
• the main challenges arising from a third industrial revolution are to integrate future innovations into development and production cycles, gain awareness of emerging leap-ahead technologies, access non-traditional sources of innovation, and ensure the reliability of trusted supply chains
• innovation does not come for free: the massive decline in budgetary terms of our defence R&T efforts is a matter of the highest concern because capabilities of the future are at stake here and the competitiveness of our defence industry is at risk. Therefore, fresh funding and the reinforcement of our R&T and innovation efforts will be key to structure European cooperation
• to reap the benefits, and not just adapt, to a third industrial revolution, Member States should make systematic use of the programmatic, financial and policy instruments offered by the EU which can support defence research, identify key enabling technologies and support testing and experimentation in view of potential uptake in defence products
• the EDA is looking to get ahead by also working “up-stream”, notably by facilitating Member States’ convergence on identifying and prioritising research topics
• without a strong incentive, the current momentum may tail off. We must incentivise the right actions and the right programmes
• cooperation in defence is still not part of Europe’s DNA. Yet, it remains the most efficient and cost effective way to ensure Europe’s strategic autonomy
• strategic autonomy and a committment to a strong relationship with our partners are two sides of the same coin; otherwise, the technological gap will create a political gap 
• as a hub for innovation, collaboration and action, EDA will continue to engage with industry and R&T innovators as valuable partners in providing technology and solutions which address the needs of Member States.

 
EDA : "At the service of Member States"

Mr Domecq concluded the Annual Conference 2016 by recalling "EDA's mantra: at the service of its Member States". However, "the Agency's output depends entirely on Member States input. So, view this agency as a crucial and natural partner. Use our resources and expertise".
 

More information

• Federica Mogherini opens EDA Annual Conference 2016 / speech / video
• Listening to the supply & demand sides: EDA Annual Conference panels deliver interesting insights
• Slovak EU Presidency at EDA Annual Conference: "Common solutions are needed on defence"
• Commissioner Bieńkowska outlines upcoming European Defence Action Plan at EDA Annual Conference

Elżbieta Bieńkowska, the European Commissioner for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, today delivered an interesting 'outlook speech' at the European Defence Agency's (EDA) Annual Conference 2016 in which she described the main pillars of the Commission's upcoming European Defence Action Plan (EDAP). 

"There is a clear political momentum to move towards more defence integration and we have to seize it", the Commissioner said.

The objective of the Commission's EDAP which will be presented on 30 November is to provide support to the whole supply chain of European defence. Mrs Bieńkowska briefly outlined the main pillars of the EDAP: supporting defence research with the launch of the Preparatory Action on defence research in 2017; unlocking EU tools to invest into the whole European defence supply chain (especially SME's); working towards a possible European Defence Fund; improving the functioning of the Single Market for defence. 

The actions taken by us do not undermine Member States' national sovereignty nor the cooperation with NATO, the Commissioner stressed.

Mrs Bieńkowska welcomed the good cooperation between the Commission and the EDA.
 

More information

• Federica Mogherini opens EDA Annual Conference 2016 / speech / video
• Listening to the supply & demand sides: EDA Annual Conference panels deliver interesting insights
• Slovak EU Presidency at EDA Annual Conference: "Common solutions are needed on defence"
• EDA Annual Conference 2016 closes with call for cooperation on defence innovation

Speaking today at the EDA Annual Conference 2016 on behalf of the Slovak EU Presidency, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence Dr. Róbert Ondrejcsák called for “common solutions” on European defence.

In his keynote speech, Dr. Ondrejcsák praised the publication of the new EU Global Strategy as “the strongest impetus the CSDP received in terms of strategy since 2003” and recalled the implementation work launched since then, notably the High Level Conference on EUGS Implementation organised by the Slovak Presidency and also attended by High Representative Mogherini. “The debate since then shows how diverse positions of the EU Member States are in defence domain”, he said.
 

“Important to find common solutions on defence”

Dr. Ondrejcsák stated: “Consensus is well reached on the main principles of the level of ambition, such as responding to external conflicts and crises, building the capacities of fragile partners and protecting the Union and its Member states, but when it comes to details, the unanimity is far more difficult, or impossible to reach. Despite the common goal, we still diversify in visions and plans concerning defence cooperation, financing CSDP missions and operations, EU Battle Groups and form of support of our partner countries. Slovakia is not an exception, of course. But it is important that at the end of the day we find common solutions, agreeable to every Member State”.
 

Active role for the EDA

The work of the European Commission is seen by the EU Presidency as “of great importance for the current CSDP context”. In this respect, the upcoming European Defence Action Plan, as part of the wider package, “also creates a space for an active role for the European Defence Agency”, Dr. Ondrejcsák said.

He continued: “We support fostering European defence industry and defence research creating a basis for modern capabilities to maintain security and defence needs of the EU. The initiative with its funding instruments should be open to all beneficiaries with a close focus on small and medium enterprises. We also welcome special attention the European Defence Agency pays to defence industry in Central and Eastern Europe. I am referring to an extensive analysis about measures to enhance balanced defence Industry in Europe, which identifies obstacles and proposes solutions for defence cooperation among central and eastern European countries. The Agency regularly offers room for national armaments directors from the Visegrad 4 countries to seek possibilities for collaborative projects”.
 

European Defence and Technological and Industrial Base

“In times of increasingly fast-changing environment of creating new technologies and the continued need for innovation and the creation of new business models, the European defence sector needs to cope with these changes to remain an important part of the global defence market and remain relevant”, the State Secretary said. “This means preparing for an age of relative uncertainty that can be highly diversified, hybrid and flexible and can well require from the defence sector to adapt quickly to changing innovation patterns, new mind-sets and corporate cultures. In this strategic context, an innovative and competitive European industry is a strategic asset to support EU Global Strategy implementation and be at the centre of development of defence-related capabilities, skills and industrial manufacturing capabilities”.

He added: “At present, we are still situated in an environment of significant economic restrictions in the defence sector. Member States' budgets cuts, increasing prices of defence products and new players on the global military equipment and technology market impact the European defence industry. Therefore, it is necessary to change the approach. If not, the EU and its Member States will face reduced military effectiveness and the defence sector declined military business opportunities. If we use funds more efficiently, combine our efforts and share common capabilities, we can achieve the high effect for less money spent”.
 

Defence R&T

Another risk Europe faces is the lack of Research and Development (R&D) funding, lack of innovation and procurement of new military equipment and defence systems. “In reality it means that Europe and its Member States will no longer be able to afford sophisticated modern military capabilities that would necessarily need to fulfil the tasks determined. It creates a risk for the European defence industry, which will face an increasing competition from companies producing military equipment in the third countries”.

“Pooling requirements and achieving significant savings from economies of scale would enable Member States to acquire the necessary military capabilities that would otherwise could not afford individually. Some activities can be done also on bilateral basis, such as common maintenance, training, exercises and joint research and development. The creation of a common European market for defence would strengthen the European defence industry and would also help Member States to develop military capabilities they need to fully perform its tasks in accordance with the CSDP”, he stated.
 

More information

• Federica Mogherini opens EDA Annual Conference 2016 / speech / video
• Listening to the supply & demand sides: EDA Annual Conference panels deliver interesting insights
• Commissioner Bieńkowska outlines upcoming European Defence Action Plan at EDA Annual Conference
• EDA Annual Conference 2016 closes with call for cooperation on defence innovation

Michael Kofman and I wrote a short piece for the Monkey Cage on the potential impact of the election on U.S.-Russian relations. Go read the whole thing, which also includes contributions from a number of other scholars.

——-

Donald Trump’s victory has the potential to fundamentally reshape U.S.-Russian relations, but whether such a realignment will actually take place will depend on how Trump chooses to learn and appreciate the past failures of several U.S. attempts to engage Russia. It remains to be seen whether he will be willing to follow the advice of professionals, or if he will strike off on his own. U.S.-Russian relations are founded on a complex history, with structural differences among national elites that will prove difficult to bridge through personal rapport among the national leaders. Trump’s first problem will be that other than a small number of close advisers who share his instincts to engage Putin, most of the policy establishment is likely to hold hardened views of Putin’s Russia, ranging from distrustful to confrontational. Rapid change is unlikely to come quickly, despite the personal attention of the president-elect, because the bureaucracy will initially take an obstructionist position.

Having said that, we can make a few predictions regarding policy initiatives that are likely to be undertaken by President Trump. First of all, he is likely to restore the full range of government contacts, including between the two countries’ military establishments. Second, he will pursue more extensive cooperation with Russia in Syria, against ISIS but also against other anti-Assad groups that could conceivably be described as Islamist. Most likely there will be a complete abandonment of the existing policy formulation that there is a moderate Syrian opposition and viable alternatives to Assad, which will closely bridge the U.S. position with that of Moscow’s. And finally, the active sanctions policy against Russia is likely to end, though existing sanctions will not be lifted without a quid pro quo.

…..

Click here to read the rest of the article.

Length of video : 17'
You may manually download this video in WMV (161Mb) format

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Length of video : 84'
You may manually download this video in WMV (772Mb) format

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

After HR/VP Federica Mogherini's capturing opening speech and an inspiring presentation by Stephan De Spiegeleire of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies on innovation and research as part of a wider vision for a future European defence, the attendees of the EDA Annual Conference 2016 witnessed two lively and interactive panel debates moderated by Graham Muir (Head of EDA's Strategy & Policy Unit) on the opportunities and challenges from the supply and demand sides.

 

Panel 1: Supply side

High-level panelists in this first roundtable were Lowri Evans (Director General DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SME's at the European Commission), Heikki Allonen (former CEO and President of Patria Oyj, the Finnish national defence induystry group), Dr. Kurt Braatz (Senior Vice President at Krauss-Maffei Wegman), Pedro Sinogas (CEO of Tekever) as well as Prof. Witold Holubowicz (CEO of research/consulting company Itti Ltd.).

The panel raised and discussed a number of crucial questions related to the future of the European defence industry, such as 'Are Europe's defence industrial models suited for the future?', 'How best to bring innovation closer to defence?', 'Is enough being done to capitalise on civil and military synergies?' and 'What measures can the European Commission bring to support innovation in defence?'.

A particular emphasis was put on how the role of SMEs and Start-Ups in the defence supply chain could best be maximised and how their full potential as a source of innovation and a key enabler for competitiveness can be realized. In this respect, the need was stressed to promote SME's access to defence research pogrammes and to encourage their greater involvement in EU funding programmes.

 

Panel 2: Demand side

The second panel debate in the afternoon saw high-profile representatives from national governments and EU institutions sharing their views on implications for the defence sector at large: whole-of-government policies in support of strategic innovation, emerging risks and vulnerabilities in terms of technology control, interface with industry, impact on acquisition choices and life-cycle management.

The four high-level panelists were: Rear Admiral Matteo Bisceglia (Director for Naval Armaments, Italy), Ioan Mircea Paşcu (Vice-President of the European Parliament and former Defence minister of Romania),Vice Admiral Mark Mellett (Chief of Defence, Ireland) and Alexander Weis (Vice-Director of the Bundeswehr Planning Office, Germany).

Among the questions discussed were the following: 'Are the current procurement processes of Defence Ministries best adapted to the challenges and opportunities presented by innovation?', 'How important is continued and sustained national investment in research & innovation?', 'What do policy-makers need to do to provide the best possible environment to foster the technological innovations required?', 'How can Europe respond to the US Third Offset Strategy?' and 'How to overcome fragmentation of demand?'.

There was broad consensus on the EDA's role in defence R&T and innovation: the Agency should continue to act as a "catalyst" by identifying innovation gaps and potential collaborative opportunities, bringing interested Member States together and facilitating collaborative R&T projects. However, it was stressed, R&T initiatives need to be driven by capability requirements. The objective is not to fund industrial policy, said Mr Weis. "The EDA has to make sure that R&T projects are capability driven, be it national or EU capabilities".
 

More information

• Federica Mogherini opens EDA Annual Conference 2016 / speech / video
• Slovak EU Presidency at EDA Annual Conference: "Common solutions are needed on defence"
• Commissioner Bieńkowska outlines upcoming European Defence Action Plan at EDA Annual Conference
• EDA Annual Conference 2016 closes with call for cooperation on defence innovation

The European Defence Agency (EDA) Annual Conference 2016 entitled 'A third industrial evolution or revolution in defence?' was opened Thursday morning (10 November) in Brussels by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini, who is also the Head of the Agency.

Addressing a 500 strong audience coming from the whole European defence spectrum - governments, armed forces, industry, EU institutions, NATO, think tanks and media - Mrs Mogherini said in her opening speech that time had come to make urgent and concrete steps towards a stronger and more efficient European defence, and to do it “the European way”.

We don’t need another theoretical and endless debate about a potential EU army or treaty change but what is needed are "very concrete actions" to be delivered in the next months to make sure Europe can protect it citizens and become a global security provider. This is what citizens expect now that Europe is facing a "security crisis", she stressed. “There are no excuses, we have to do it and we have to do it now”.

March 2017, when Europe will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, will be a good moment to have a concrete implementation process up and running and to deliver on defence integration. "Sixty years ago, the founding fathers and mothers of our European Union believed that a united Europe had to be built on two pillars: a European Economic Community, and a Defence Community. They knew that a true Union could not simply rely on the integration of the markets. They were right, and yet they failed. Sixty years later, I believe the original intuition has become even more relevant", Mrs Mogherini stressed.

To move ahead towards a defence union, Europe has not to start from scratch because the Treaty of Lisbon already offers all the tools that are required. “We just need to use them. This is a matter of political will, stated Mrs Mogherini adding that she saw now a “clear window of opportunity” to achieve concrete results in the coming months.

She recalled the three parallel processes currently ongoing, namely the implementation of the EU Global Strategy, the Commission’ upcoming European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) and the follow-up on the recent joint EU/NATO Declaration. These three processes have to be complementary, she insisted. We have to advance quickly, “we have to run”, to make sure that those processes lead to first concrete results by spring 2017. In this respect, the European Defence Agency can act as a pivot between the Commission and Member States on European defence, Mrs Mogherini said.
 

Capabilities are crucial

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission put a special emphasis on the need to make sure Europe has the required capabilities to play its role in defence. Capabilities have to be up to the task. "And here, Europe has to be very careful, I believe, very careful, that the investment gap is not translated into an ever wider technology gap. Because a technology gap would then lead to an interoperability gap. And if left unchecked, this could translate into a political gap which would clearly not be in our interest. And I would add, this would also have economic implications for our continent".

There will be no strategic autonomy and defence role for Europe without a strong and smart and innovative European defence technology and industrial base, Mrs Mogherini concluded.
 

More information

• Speech of the HR/VP Mogherini / video
• Listening to the supply & demand sides: EDA Annual Conference panels deliver interesting insights
• Slovak EU Presidency at EDA Annual Conference: "Common solutions are needed on defence"
• Commissioner Bieńkowska outlines upcoming European Defence Action Plan at EDA Annual Conference
• EDA Annual Conference 2016 closes with call for cooperation on defence innovation