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Hamid Karzai may have handed over the reigns of power in September 2014, but his influence on Afghanistan’s politics did not end. His calls for a Loya Jirga, as the National Unity Government approached its two-year anniversary, represented a danger to that government. However, political groups and influential individuals, even those who had previously been his closest allies, did not take up his call. Rather, some of his recent comments have met clamorous pushback and the expressions of support he did receive, mainly from people in government, only increased the controversy that surrounds him. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili (with parliamentary reporting from AAN’s Salima Ahmadi and input by Thomas Ruttig) looks at a number of recent incidents, their fallout and what they tell us about Karzai’s political clout.

Ever since he left office in 2014, former president Hamid Karzai has maintained a shadowy presence on Afghanistan’s political scene. In his compound not far from the presidential palace, he frequently meets those who feel belittled by the National Unity Government (NUG), or who have an axe to grind with it, often hosting elaborate luncheons. (The new president, Ashraf Ghani, has abolished such practices in the presidential palace.) There are rumours that the former president has been tacitly conspiring against the NUG (see this July 2016 Los Angeles Times article or this June 2015 Radio Free Europe article, both by Afghan authors), an accusation he has denied. More overtly, he has frequently granted interviews to the international media, opining on a wide range of topics. He told the German news agency dpa there were ‘no tensions’ between himself and his successor Ashraf Ghani, but that he would make his voice heard “when he had the feeling that the country was moving in a wrong direction on essential issues.”

“Death to Karzai”

Over the last few months, Karzai has been involved in a fair share of controversy. The most notable incident took place on 30 September 2016 in the Loya Jirga tent in Kabul, during the commemoration of the fifth anniversary of former president Burhanuddin Rabbani’s death. Rabbani was killed on 20 September 2011. (This year’s ceremony was held ten days after the date itself due to preparations for the signing of a peace deal with Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami, on 29 September 2016; see AAN analysis here and here). Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah and his two deputies, Vice-President Muhammad Sarwar Danesh, several cabinet members, jihadi leaders and other politicians, including Karzai, participated in the ceremony.

The incident took place during the speech of former MP Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf – a key Karzai ally and former ‘jihadi leader’, now head of the Council for the Protection and Stability of Afghanistan (CPSA) or Shura-ye Herasat wa Sobat-e Afghanistan (see this AAN analysis ) – which focused on the virtues of the jihad and the mujahedin. A participant stood up and started shouting “Death to the Taleban” and “Death to Karzai.” The tent erupted into chaos. When Sayyaf finally managed to calm the crowd, he said this was “not a gathering for abuse and insult, but of honour and homage.” When another participant loudly demanded that the man be thrown out of the tent for insulting his ‘elders’, things in the tent once again became chaotic. Karzai, flanked by security personnel, mounted the platform and tried to quieten the crowd.

When Karzai later took the stage to deliver his own speech, he was again heckled several times. Karzai urged the crowd to “let them [the hecklers] speak”, saying there was freedom of speech in the country and “the Americans chanted ‘Death to Karzai’ every day.” He went to great lengths to show his respect for Rabbani, apparently in an attempt to mollify an emotional audience. (Karzai succeeded Rabbani as head of state following the 2001 Afghanistan conference in Bonn. Rabbani stood down only after some pressure, including from his Jamiat party’s own ranks.) At the end of his speech, Karzai called the man who had shouted at him to the platform. He hugged him, saying, “This is Afghan unity. Foreigners should know that they cannot divide us.” The man was asked to apologise, which he did, and subsequent speakers, such as Atta Muhammad Nur, a leading Jamiati and governor of Balkh province, said they were sorry for the incident and praised Karzai for his bravery and for handling the incident the way he did.

The incident reverberated throughout the press and on social media. In Afghanistan’s political culture, where leaders and elders are generally shown public respect and where arguments tend to be couched in polite words, this was a rare public insult – showing how emotions ran high with regards to the former president and his statements.

Coming to Karzai’s defence, but not helping

In the days following the incident, several government officials came to Karzai’s defence. One of them was the powerful police chief of Kandahar, Abdul Razeq, who owes his position to Karzai. He became the strongman of the ‘Greater Kandahar’ region following the assassination of Karzai’s brother and Kandahar ‘proconsul’, Ahmad Wali, in July 2011. In an interview on 1 October 2016, commenting on the incident in the Loya Jirga tent, Razeq said, “It was a very bad incident. We no longer allow such things. We will follow up and ask why it happened.” (1) He then went on to criticise the leading mujahedin of the anti-Soviet and anti-Taleban struggle (he did not name names, but it was clear who was meant). In contrast, he described Mullah Omar and Mullah Dadullah as “the best and most deserving mujahedin.” This surprised many, given Razeq’s militant anti-Taleban stance on the battlefield. It strongly suggested that his remarks, apart from being an emotional statement of loyalty to the Karzais, also had an ethnic dimension (although he did also praise the late Jamiat commander, Ahmad Shah Massud). Karzai, Razeq and the two aforementioned Taleban leaders – both now dead – are Pashtuns, whereas many of the mujahedin leaders he implicitly criticised are not.

Next, the office of the National Security Council (NSC), led by Hanif Atmar, released a formal statement on 3 October 2016, hailing Karzai as one of the “effective and honourable personalities of the country’s contemporary history [who], as a former president and national leader, has special respect among the people, the National Unity Government and with current President Ashraf Ghani.” The statement further lashed out at the anti-Karzai sloganeers at the Rabbani commemoration, saying that the Afghan value of respect for elders was being trampled on by “specific circles … hired and paid by foreign intelligence services.” The circles, the statement claimed, had “started a chain of efforts towards the character assassination of our national elders and personalities” and warned that this “will not have good consequences.”

The NSC’s statement specifically mentioned that Karzai had been at the commemoration ceremony as a guest, although, according to a statement by Jamiat-e Islami, he was not an invited one. This statement, that was posted on Foreign Minister Salahuddin (son of Burhanuddin) Rabbani’s Facebook page, among other places, said that Karzai had expressly not been invited to the event, due to a series of controversial comments he had made with regard to the Taleban. (2) When Karzai came to the ceremony anyway, politeness demanded he not be shown the door. Jamiat further requested that the NSC office share details on its claim that specific circles were supported by foreign intelligence services, saying the NSC statement was “unnecessary and not in line with national interests” – thus politely rejecting the accusation that anyone in their ranks had foreign backing. It finally called on the NSC office not to “raise the voice of division and factionalism from the address of national institutions.”

Karzai’s earlier remarks about the Taleban

In the months leading up to the incident in the Loya Jirga tent, Karzai had, on several occasions, made comments that seemed to imply verbal support for the Taleban. While in power, Karzai had often referred to the Taleban as “disgruntled brothers” who had to be brought back into the fold, often hinting that the real enemy was elsewhere. Washington Post journalist Joshua Partlow, in his recently published Karzai biography, quoted the former president as reacting to the fall of a remote town to the Taleban by quipping, “So it was liberated.” (3) Recently, Karzai has become even more explicit. One of his most controversial comments came in response to the requests for the honourable reburial of the remains of Amir Habibullah II (‘Kalakani’), which prompted dismissive reactions in some Pashtun circles (see an AAN’s report here). In a video dating from early September 2016, Karzai responds to a person asking for his views on the reburial by saying: “Was Mullah Muhammad Omar a shah [king] or not? Where is he? Bring and bury him with honour, too.”

Given the fragile security situation and concerns over politicians’ increasing tendency to frame their grievances in ethnic terms, his comments did not go down well with many people. Expressions of outright anti-Karzai sentiments in some sectors of the media and the political arena, especially among Jamiat-e Islami supporters, reflected competing historical narratives about the country’s chequered past and the role of the Taleban. On 7 September 2016, in a speech commemorating the anniversary of Ahmad Shah Massud’s death, Chief Executive Abdullah also responded to Karzai’s comments, saying:

Mullah Omar, unlike Mr. Karzai’s claim, was not and is not the king of Afghanistan and the people had not accepted and do not accept him as their king. Mullah Omar was a criminal and a murderer, and, just like today the Taleban hold sway over parts of the country, at that time too they had occupied parts of the country.

Karzai’s second lot of controversial remarks were made during an interview with the BBC on 24 September 2016, in which he said that the Taleban were “an Afghan force that [can] come and capture a territory” and that the Afghan National Security Forces, also an Afghan force, did not have the right to retake that territory from the Taleban: “If we are all Afghans, why should one Afghan tell another Afghan that you cannot capture this area?”

The remarks prompted another round of anti-Karzai responses. For instance, on 2 October 2016, Hasht-e Sobh’s columnist, Ferdows, wrote that Karzai hurt the sentiments of the entire anti-Taleban constituency, describing this constituency as:

…not only the areas of influence of politicians such as Atta Muhammad Nur, Salahuddin Rabbani and Dr Abdullah Abdullah. The whole urban and law-abiding population of Afghanistan is against the Taleban and Talebani culture. The educated class, democrats, the media, civil society organisations, human rights activists as well as a significant segment of the general public of Afghanistan constitute the anti-Taleban constituency.

In parliament, on 28 September 2016, Ghor MP Sayed Nadir Shah Bahr asked how a political figure who had ruled the country for more than a decade could say that the Taleban had the right to capture any place they wanted, while large parts of the population supported the government’s armed forces? He added that such remarks would weaken the morale of the country’s security forces and asked that the government prosecute Karzai for his sympathy towards the Taleban – a call that was repeated by a few other MPs. Others called on the government to cancel his financial benefits. Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, the Speaker of the House, declared that the security forces who were fighting the insurgents and sacrificing their lives for their homeland, were the true sons of the country and that the Taleban were the enemy.

The Panjshir Young Elites Council (Shura-ye Nokhbegan-e Jawan-e Panjshir), a group of Tajik youths from Panjshir and Shomali, went a step further and issued a statement accusing Karzai of altering the constitution and making the national anthem monolingual, releasing Taleban prisoners (when they should not have been released) and having a hand in the assassination of figures like former Deputy Interior Minister General Muhammad Daud (in May 2011) and even Rabbani, himself (in September 2011). They called for his name to be removed from the title of Kabul’s international airport and launched a social media campaign to that effect (the name of the airport was changed to Hamid Karzai International Airport during President Ghani’s first cabinet meeting). Jombesh-e Islami, the party led by first Vice-President Abdul Rashid Dostum, joined the chorus with a statement on 19 October 2016 that, among other things, seemed to describe Karzai as the original plotter of the extension of the Taleban’s war into the north.

In response to these fierce and sometimes ridiculous denunciations, Karzai sought to clarify his remarks. In an interview with Voice of America, he said:

The question was about air strikes [saying] that you [Karzai] are against US air strikes, while the current government is in favour of them. I told them that I was against air strikes from the very first day of my government and I am still against them. I have said this and have not denied it until today, my position has not changed. Then I was asked, if the Taleban capture some parts of Afghanistan, are you still against that, I said, yes, I am [still] against the air strikes. But if the Taleban capture parts of Afghanistan and establish their government there, I am [also] against that. If I had been in favour of that, I would have accepted the Taleban’s flag [to be raised over their liaison office] in Qatar. I do not want the Taleban to capture parts of Afghanistan. But I am against war. (For details on the argument surrounding the opening of the Qatar office, see AAN’s previous reporting here).

Karzai’s political position

In his September 2016 interview with the BBC, Karzai seemed to have chosen Ghani’s side in the on-going impasse with the National Unity Government. When asked whether the NUG would still be legitimate after the NUG agreement’s original ‘expiry date,’ he said:

The constitution of Afghanistan elects the president for five years, the people of Afghanistan vote for the president for a period of five years. So based on Afghanistan’s election, the term of Ashraf Ghani’s government and presidency is not coming to an end [now]. But the agreement that Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah reached between themselves with the US intervention, [about] their government‘s term, the term of this arrangement that they made between themselves that one be the president and other the chief executive, should at the end of, or during, the two years be reconfirmed by calling a Jirga or [the country] returned to the presiden[tial system].

In a September 2016 interview with German Phoenix TV, he further clarified: “It must be clearly shown again that the responsibility for governing rests with the President.”

Karzai’s comments on the term of the NUG and, implicitly, on Abdullah’s position as chief executive, hit a nerve. The Abdullah camp still considers Karzai an accomplice in what it sees as the pro-Ghani electoral fraud in the 2014 elections. (4) On 18 October 2016, Mandegar Daily, which supports Abdullah, wrote that in 2004 and 2009 Karzai “derailed the elections from the path of integrity and transparency.” It further said that he “turned the elections into an insulting drama of democracy and a demonstration of ethnic inclinations” and that President Ghani and former president Karzai collaborated to “bring a big scandal to the 2014 presidential elections.”

While Karzai has maintained connections with different political, quasi-opposition groups, most of them have not adopted his position regarding the NUG, nor have they rallied behind his call for a halt to air strikes by US forces. Karzai particularly tried to influence Sayyaf’s Council for Protection and Stability of Afghanistan, but it did not embrace his agenda. The incident in the Loya Jirga tent led to a further souring of relations between Karzai and Sayyaf, with Karzai accusing Sayyaf of creating bad press against him. (This occurs after a decade-long close political alliance, as a result of which Sayyaf became the key player in Karzai’s informal jihadi leaders’ council. This council was regularly convened in the presidential palace during crucial debates, the aim of which was for religious leaders to be seen to be bolstering the president’s standing.)

Karzai’s former chief advisor and foreign minister, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, who accompanied him on his September 2016 trip to Germany, criticised Karzai’s Taleban statements during an intervention at an international conference in Herat. In an interview with an Austrian magazine in September this year, Spanta also admitted that “Karzai’s tolerance vis-à-vis corruption was really very big,” although he maintained that Karzai had not been “the centre of all corruption” in Afghanistan.

Instead of rallying around Karzai, most political ‘opposition’ groups appear to have accepted the current status quo. Some are even taking a mediating role in the continuing rift between the president and the chief executive’s camps, as well as with First Vice-President Dostum, who has been showing growing public discontent with the president. On 31 September 2016, Sayyaf’s CPSA formed a committee led by its member and former Karzai intimus, Muhammad Omar Daudzai, that aimed to persuade government leaders to put aside their differences “for the good of the country.” In one of his latest interviews on 19 November 2016, Daudzai even alluded to possible participation in the NUG, saying, “The government has opened the consultation door since four months ago. It consults [with CPSA], on different levels, on big national issues. If consultation ultimately culminates in participation, there is not any fear [of that]. It is our own country. It is our own government.” Similarly, on 1 October 2016, Sebghatullah Mojaddedi’s High Council of Jihadi and National Parties (Shora-ye A’ali Ahzab Jihadi wa melli) held a press conference in which Mojaddedi and Karzai’s former vice president, Muhammad Karim Khalili, sought to downplay the rift within the NUG. (For more details on the various political ‘opposition’ groups, see AAN’s previous reporting here).

A narrowing appeal

Prior to the NUG’s second anniversary on 29 September 2016, Karzai’s challenges loomed large on the political horizon. He relentlessly pushed for a traditional Loya Jirga, which he hoped to use to his advantage, perhaps in order to stage a comeback as some sort of ‘father of the nation’ figure, should the NUG fail to resolve its internal deadlock or, indeed, collapse. His latest remarks – the ones that were interpreted as pro-Taleban, and those that directly called into question the position of chief executive – prompted a strong backlash, particularly in the circles around the chief executive himself. The clamour that followed the shouts of “Death to Karzai,” seems to have further dented his reputation as a national leader and to have cost him more allies.

Afghanistan’s semi-opposition groups, more often than not, are conglomerates of disaffected politicians hoping to secure government positions, rather than being clear-cut groups with a political programme of their own. As a result, they tend to avoid burning all bridges with the government. In the end, Karzai was not able to exploit the two-year anniversary of the NUG to his own advantage and his rallying cry for the moment looks to be less appealing for the other political groups. However, Hamid Karzai should not be written off too soon. His nationalist, anti-US statements do resonate with sections of the population and elites and, most importantly, political allegiances can change rapidly in Afghanistan. A much-speculated possible adoption of some of Karzai’s allies into the cabinet, on the heels of the recent parliamentary interpellation of ministers, indicates that he might be recasting his outright confrontation to carve out influence within the government. And rather than challenging the whole NUG, he may now be slowly throwing his weight behind one of the two camps.

Edited by Martine van Bijlert and Thomas Ruttig

 

(1) General Razeq’s remarks were largely in response to the speeches at the ceremony, especially by Sayyaf who stressed the differences between the mujahedin and “the Taleban and other terrorists.” Regarding the anti-Karzai slogans, Razeq said:

It was a very bad incident. We no longer allow such things. We will follow up and ask why it happened. First he [Karzai] himself made a mistake to raise these incompetent people and bring them up to this stage. … We know all these mujahedin. They nod their heads and thump on the desks claiming to be mujahed. They are neither mujahed, nor they should nod their head to claim to be mujahed. Mullah Omar was the best mujahed who overthrew the five governments they had established; one had tied a scarf around his head in the western part and controlled five provinces, the second was in the Mazar region, who had worn tie and established a government for himself. Jalalabad was a separate government. One government was in Chahar Asyab and Maidanshahr. Karta-ye Naw, Wazir Akbar Khan Hill and Paghman and “Company” were other separate governments. To see all these [shows] Mullah Omar had a very good government and provided best services to country.

For more details, see also here.

(2) The Jamiat statement, which was posted on Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani’s Facebook page among other places, stated that:

After Hamid Karzai, former president of Afghanistan, recently expressed his position about the Taleban in an interview, a wave of objections and concerns about this position developed in society and was widely reflected in the media and social networks. That is why Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan, realising the sensitivities created among the people, did not invite the former president to the fifth anniversary of the martyrdom of the leader of jihad and resistance, which was attended by more than five thousand people. His name was not included in the agenda prepared by the commission for holding the anniversary, chaired by Vice-President Sarwar Danesh; but Hamid Karzai himself was kind and came in, requesting [that he be given a chance] to deliver a speech, which unfortunately led a number of the participants in the ceremony to chant slogans against him.

Yusuf Saha, Karzai press secretary told AAN that Karzai had received an invitation, but he had not been sure whether the commission organising the anniversary, which was chaired by Vice-President Danesh, or by Jamiat, had sent it. Copies of the invitation have since then been published on social media, see for instance here.

(3) Joshua Partlow, A Kingdom of Their Own: The Family Karzai and the Afghan Disaster, Knopf: New York 2016. Karzai quote from a review in The Economist.

(4) In an address to his supporters immediately following the elections on 8 July 2014, Abdullah said:

During the last days, as we fully believed and believe in the clean votes of the people of Afghanistan, we made our last efforts to separate the fraudulent votes from the clean ones; but the triangle of the Palace [Karzai], the election commission and one election campaign team [Ghani] decided to announce the results. I assure the conscious, right-centric and brave people of Afghanistan that we will never accept the result of this fraud, not for one day, not for one month and not for two months.

The Indian Navy has inducted four underwater sensor systems; Abhay, Humsa-UG, NACS and AIDSS, which have been developed by the country’s research and development arm, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

Damen Shipyard Group has been contracted by the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) to deliver two new Stan Patrol 4207 vessels, as part of a fleet renewal programme.

The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has started funding the development of a second test vehicle under the tactically exploited reconnaissance node (TERN) programme.

Americas

• Sources close to the Canadian government claim that Ottawa is still hoping to acquire approximately 20 F/A-18 Super Hornets without the need for an open competition. It’s believed that the procurement, intended as an interim solution to replace their soon-to-be retired fleet of CF-18s, could move the need for a new fighter selection process for another decade. It’s been just over a year since Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party took office, and they vigorously campaigned for the cancellation of Ottawa’s participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program during ithe election campaign. Trudeau deemed the jet too expensive and not necessary to Canadian defense requirements.

• The Brazilian government has finally contracted South African firm Denel to integrate the A-Darter missile on the Brazilian Air Force’s new Saab Gripen E/F fighters, alleviating fears that the program was off track. While Brazil has been heavily involved in the fifth-generation munition’s development, fiscal woes along with political turmoil and a change in government resulted in the official nod to finance the procurement being delayed. The missile will also be integrated on South African Gripens as well as their Hawk Mk 120 lead-in trainers.

Middle East & North Africa

• With the Obama administration entering its final weeks, the US State Department has cleared a number of big ticket foreign military sales to Qatar and Kuwait. Destined for Qatar are 72 Boeing F-15QAs in a $21.1 billion deal that includes weapons and related support, equipment, and training. Also included is the building of a Lead-in-Fighter-Training unit to be located in the US. A $10.1 billion sale will see Kuwait receive 32 F/A-18Es and 8 F/A-18F, including systems, training and support.

Europe

• While defense firms are always looking for high-tech solutions to the problem of rogue UAVs, the French Air Force is currently training eagles to engage drones that may be utilized by terrorists. The low tech high-talon method follows that of the Dutch police, who announced earlier this year that the birds of prey were being trialed to tackle nuisance drones. France, having just experienced a year of devastating terrorist attacks at the hands of jihadists, are concerned that mini-UAVs may be used to drop explosives, similar to those used by IS militants, currently on the defensive in Iraq.

• Armata tanks being built by Russia’s Uralvagonzavod will now come with a tethered drone, dubbed Pterodactyl. Equipped with a tether management system, the drone will provide full data protection and improve the tank’s situational awareness and aid in guiding rounds. With a flight range of 100 metres, the drone can be launched from the Armata’s hull and is capable of maintaining the tank’s speed.

• Gulfstream is the latest beneficiary of increased Polish defense spending, with the company to provide two G550 business jets configured for VIP transport duties. Delivery of the jets is scheduled for 2017, at the end of a lease between Warsaw and the national carrier LOT Polish Airline for two Embraer 175s. With their transport fleet mostly consisting of older Russian models, there has been a push to modernize transport aircraft following the 2010 crash of a Tupolev Tu-154 which killed 96 people, including the nation’s then-president, Lech Kaczy?ski.

Asia Pacific

• The site for THAAD‘s deployment on the Korean peninsula has been settled with Seoul agreeing to a deal with the Lotte Group. A well known Korean cheabol, Lotte owns a golf course in Seonju county, identified as a potential deployment for a THAAD battery site during the summer. Under the agreement, a land swap will take place of lands owned by the Ministry of National Defense for the golf club, while valuators will assess whether the government needs to give a bigger parcel of land or make up any disparity with cash.

• F-16s operated by the Taiwanese Air Force will receive upgrades to the V model, with work to be undertaken by Aerospace Industrial Development Corp (AIDC) and overseen by Lockheed Martin. Four fighters will initially take part in the conversion program, dubbed Phoenix Rising, with the government aiming to upgrade 25-28 of the fighters every year. With 144 A/B variant F-16s set to be upgraded, the retrofitting will cost approximately $3.45 billion.

Today’s Video

Su-33 launched from the Admiral Kuznetsov via ski-jump:

A-Darter model, 2012
(click to view larger)

There’s a new advanced dogfighting missile coming to town, and it won’t be coming from any of the standard players. Denel Pty Ltd.’s missile/UAV subsidiary Denel Dynamics has entered into a joint development agreement with Brazil’s Ministry of Defence and Forca Aerea Brasileira for the A-Darter short range air-air missile (SRAAM), signed as a government to government agreement via South Africa’s Armscor. The original contract was apparently signed in July-August 2006, but the formal cooperation launch was announced at the April 2007 Latin American Aerospace and Defence exhibition in Brazil.

With the SRAAM export market already crowded by high-end products like the AA-11/ R73 Archer (Russia), AIM-9X Sidewinder (USA), AIM-132 ASRAAM (UK), IRIS-T (Germany & European), and Python 4/5 (Israel), one may legitimately wonder where the Agile-Darter’s capabilities, design philosophy, and market positioning fit within this array. This article addresses the A-Darter, and those market issues.

The A-Darter Program A-Darter
(click to view larger)

The A-Darter missile uses common LAU-7 type launchers, and is designed to work with standard MIL-STD-1553 databus systems. At the same time, it’s expected to be a 5th generation weapon. Reports indicate modern thermal imaging technology with a wide “boresight angle” for targeting, reportedly a 90-degree look angle with cockpit-selectable seeker scan patterns. Track rate is reportedly about 120 degrees per second, and target acquisition is said to be quick. Denel also worked to avoid using aluminum in the rocket propellant, in order to minimize the smoke trails that both warn enemy aircraft, and point back to the launching fighter.

One important similarity with MBDA’s AIM-132 ASRAAM is a streamlined design with few control surfaces, in order to minimize drag and maximize range. To take maximum advantage of that design decision, lock-on after launch capability will allow A-Darter to fly to a specified area before acquiring the target with its seeker head, using an inertial navigation system from BAE Systems (now divested as Atlantic Inertial Systems) for pre-lock navigation. There is no word, however, on whether the missile’s datalink is intended to allow for updates in flight, in order to prevent accidental engagement with the wrong target.

Denel Dynamics leads the industrial effort. The FAB’s Aerospace Technical Centre (CTA) is in charge of the Brazilian industrial end of the deal, and missile manufacturer Mectron is the lead company on the Brazilian side. the missile is expected to enter service in 2016.

Denel has also planned a product roadmap. An A-Darter Mk.II would reportedly feature seeker acquisition, target tracking, and decoy countermeasures upgrades. A-Darter Mk.III would be full a mid-life update, and is likely to add extended range.

Platforms & Exports South African JAS-39D
c. Gripen International
(click to view full)

In such a crowded SRAAM market, where integration of a non-standard weapon can be a difficult and expensive endeavor, a new missile is a difficult sell. A clue to its positioning may be provided by the 2007 statement of Denel’s spokesperson Joe Makhafola:

“The co-development of the missile… not only brings much-needed skills, training and technology transfer to the country, but reinforces the South-South co-operation initiated by President Thabo Mbeki and his counterpart.”

This industrial strategy seeks to boost the indigenous aerospace industries in both Brazil and South Africa, and fits into the IBSA cooperation framework. It may also be a lead-in to the missile’s market positioning in many 3rd world countries, as a weapon without political strings attached, due to its so-called non-aligned political positioning.

Whether this marketing approach will be successful remains to be seen. First, the missile’s development must itself succeed. After that, a new weapon’s market reach depends on the breadth of platforms that carry it.

FAB F-5EM
(click to view full)

In South Africa, the A-Darter will equip the SAAF’s Hawk Mk. 120 trainer/ light attack jets and JAS-39 C/D Gripen fighters. In Brazil, the A-Darter will begin serving on leased JAS-39C/D Gripens in time for the Rio 2016 Olympics, before transferring to the F-X2 program’s JAS-39E/F Gripen NGs once deliveries begin. A-Darters will also replace indigenous Mectron MAA-1 Piranha and AIM-9H Sidewinder missiles on some Brazilian aircraft, beginning with the FAB’s upgraded A-1M AMX subsonic fighters.

That may be as far as things go in Brazil. The FAB’s handful of Mirage 2000s retired in December 2013, leaving Brazil with upgraded F-5EM/FM supersonic light fighters, and “A-29” Super Tucano turboprops. The F-5s had been touted as the A-Darter’s base platform, but their coming demotion to secondary fighter status took most of the impetus away. The F-5Ms will do just fine with the FAB’s healthy stock of Israeli Python-3 and advanced Python-4 missiles, and the photo above seems to show one with AIM-9J/N/P Sidewinders. Those SRAAMs will accompany its medium-range, radar-guided RAFAEL Derby missiles.

For the Super Tucanos, a joint venture program between Mectron and EADS Cassidian is about to begin producing the MAA-1B upgrade of the Brazilian-designed Piranha SRAAM. The good news for A-Darter is that the deep involvement of Elbit Systems’ AEL subsidiary in Brazilian military aviation is giving their modernized AMX “A-1M” and F-5M jets, and A-29 turboprops, a very similar set of avionics. That will make common missile integration easier.

Beyond the 2 partner countries, Hawk integration is the biggest pointer to a larger export market. Hawks are very popular around the world as trainers, and many countries use them in a secondary role as light fighters and air policing aircraft. Even NATO planned to use them as airfield defense planes, in the event of a Soviet invasion. An integrated A-Darter would offer operators of advanced Hawk models a significant SRAAM upgrade over existing options, and might even become a reason to upgrade older Hawk models.

Contracts and Key Events 2015 – 2016

Qualification phase; Deal to manufacture in Brazil. A-Darter concept cutaway
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November 21/16: The Brazilian government has finally contracted South African firm Denel to integrate the A-Darter missile on the Brazilian Air Force’s new Saab Gripen E/F fighters, alleviating fears that the program was off track. While Brazil has been heavily involved in the fifth-generation munition’s development, fiscal woes along with political turmoil and a change in government resulted in the official nod to finance the procurement being delayed. The missile will also be integrated on South African Gripens as well as their Hawk Mk 120 lead-in trainers.

April 21/16: A joint South African and Brazilian development of the 5th generation A-Darter infrared short-range air-to-air missile (AAM) is in trouble, as the latter may be pulling out of the project. Despite development work already being done on the missile, only South Africa has put in a production order, with Brazil citing financial troubles to be able to further integrate the missile on the JAS 39 Gripen E fighter. South Africa has signed commitments to order the missile for the next five years, while Brazil is looking at existing missiles that are cleared for carriage on the latest variant of the JAS 39.

November 3/15: The South African Air Force will receive the first batch of A-Darter short-range air-to-air missiles in February 2016, following a six-month delay in development testing. The co-developed missile, a product of Brazil’s Mectron and South Africa’s Denel Dynamics, has reached a Production Baseline certification following the conclusion of a series of critical design reviews. The missile has been jointly funded by the Brazilian Air Force and the South African National Defense Force, with the project formally launched in April 2007.

Feb 13/15: The Brazilian Air Force is bragging (Portugese) about a successful test firing of an air-to-air A-Darter missile developed with along with South Africa. The news release appeared geared to an export market, noting that other missiles with similar technologies aren’t allowed to be exported from those producing countries.

2011 – 2014

Qualification phase; Deal to manufacture in Brazil.

July 7/14: South Africa’s defenceWeb looks at Denel Dynamics’ growing array of missiles and guided weapons. With respect to the A-Darter:

“On the A-Darter air-to-air missile front, Denel Dynamics is planning improvements for this weapon, including extended range and targeting. An A-Darter Mk II would feature improved acquisition, target tracking and countermeasures upgrades while an A-Darter Mk III would feature a mid-life update (MLU).”

Sources: defenceWeb, “Denel Dynamics upgrading missile range”.

May 16/14: South Africa’s defenceWeb reports that A-Darter is in its final stage of development, with testing complete for the SAAF’s JAS-39C/D Gripens, production expected to begin in 2015, and expected service entry by 2016. That means it would be in time to serve on Brazil’s leased JAS-39C/Ds as well. Integration on the SAAF’s Hawk fleet is expected to take about 2 years. They also report that cooperation could extend beyond A-Darter:

“One project that is moving forward is the joint development of a new air-to-air missile with a range of up to 100 km. Called Marlin by Denel Dynamics, the new weapon will feature a radar seeker head and will be developed into an all-weather surface-to-air missile (SAM) that can be used by South African and Brazilian Navies.

The Marlin technology demonstrator programme was contracted by the [South African] Department of Defence through [state conduit] Armscor and will result in a missile that is launched at a target in three to four years’ time. Marlin technology will subsequently be used for Navy, Army and Air Force applications, with synergy achieved due to common subsystems. The missile will use some subsystems and system architecture from Denel’s proven Umkhonto [link added] surface-to-air missile and the A-Darter.”

Brazil hasn’t formally signed on to anything yet, and South African defense budgets can’t even maintain their existing military. That leaves the Marlin project with little margin for error, absent a significant commitment by Brazil. Sources: “SA and Brazil to collaborate on missiles post-A-Darter”.

Dec 6/12: Infrastructure. The FAB signs a R 1.4 million (about $672,000) contract with Denel to prepare for a missile-building factory in the Sao Jose dos Campos industrial park. Production is expected to begin some time in 2015.

The release also discusses some of the thrust-vectoring missile’s characteristics, touting the 2.98 meter, 90 kg weapon as having capacity for 100g maneuvers, and the ability to hit targets behind the aircraft like other 5th generation SRAAMs. It also specifies Brazil’s upgraded A-1Ms and winners of its F-X2 competition as the designated platforms. FAB [in Portuguese] | Flight International.

Nov 7/12: Brazil. Brazil’s air force chief of staff, Gen. Aprigio Eduardo de Moura Azevedo, offers some missile program updates at IQPC’s International Fighter conference in London, UK. The A-Darter is in its prototype performance verification phase, with qualification scheduled to begin in Q2 2014, production and manufacturing baselines scheduled to be fixed by mid-2015, and production to commence in Q3 2015. That would place FAB operational service somewhere in 2015-2016. Flight International adds that:

“Once operational, the A-Darter will arm the Brazilian air force’s upgraded Northrop F-5EM/FM fighters (above), operations of which are expected to continue until 2025, and the service’s future F-X2 combat aircraft, as well as the South African Air Force’s Saab Gripens.”

Gen. Azevedo also says that Mectron’s MAR-1 radar-killing missile is now involved in final flight tests of a new software update, aboard an AMX fighter. Low Rate Initial Production of the missile is scheduled for Q3 2013. Flight International.

April 18/12: Argentina? Argentina’s defense minister Arturo Puricelli reportedly expresses interest in the A-Darter missile, as part of a wider range of proposed cooperation on military programs. The most likely candidate within Argentina’s limited air force would be its A-4AR Skyhawks, which could be done as a joint program that also upgraded Brazil’s carrier-based fighters.

Despite a long history of strained relations with Brazil, Argentina has already signed an MoU to participate in Embraer’s KC-390 medium tactical transport program. Puricelli was also reportedly interested in Brazil’s SATCOM-equipped version of Elbit’s Hermes 450 UAV, and in modernization of Argentina and Brazil’s stocks of Exocet missiles to the MM40 variant. defesanet [in Portuguese].

March 7/12: Testing. As the program enters its 5th year of development, South Africa’s DefenceWeb reports on a successful series of undisclosed A-Darter guided launches in January 2012, against Denel Dynamics high sub-sonic Skua aerial target drone. Denel’s Business Development Manager for Air-to-Air missiles, Deon Olivier, provides confirmation. The report adds that:

“The programme has now entered its qualification phase, and is well on its way to completion by next year (2013), with the ultimate goal of being production-ready by the end of that year. The initial fighter aircraft for integration are the Hawk and Gripen for the South African Air Force (SAAF), and the Northrop F-5M for the Brazilian Air Force. It is likely that A-Darter will enter into operational service in both air forces in 2014, Denel Dynamics said in a statement released at the Defence and Security Asia 2012 show in Thailand.”

June 7/11: South Africa. Jane’s Missiles and Rockets reports that the SAAF is likely to retain both the A-Darter and the IRIS-T missiles for its Gripens, while making A-Darter the main air defense weapon for its Hawk Mk120s. The pilots liked the design’s inherent range, and the unofficial SAAF web site summarizes that:

“Specific aspects of the A-Darter mentioned to by SAAF pilots include the absence, under favourable atmospheric conditions, of the tell-tale (aluminium oxide particle based) smoke trail (no aluminium is used in the rocket propellant), giving opposing fighter pilots no visual warning other than a very discrete launch flash… a 90-degree look angle; the availability of cocpit-selectable [sic] seeker scan patterns; quick target acquisition, which “rarely needs a second scan cycle”, was told; after-launch scanning for lock-on-after-launch engagements, which is particularly valuable in “over the shoulder” engagements; and the 120-degrees per second track rate.”

2006 – 2010

Program launch, tests. SAAF Hawk Mk.120
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Sept 22/10: Market. Reuters Africa quotes Denel Dynamics CEO Jan Wessels, who sees a bright market future for the A-Darter. He’d hardly say it was rubbish, but for the record, here’s his take:

“In 10 years time I predict that a significant percentage of the missile business in the developing world will be kept among themselves, with many of them getting their sourced technology from South Africa… We will see as a percentage of the missile market the developing countries share possibly doubling to 20 percent, and importantly they are no longer buying from traditional suppliers but keeping the business among themselves…” [Wessels] cited the A-Darter air-to-air missile, a joint development with Brazil, as one example.”

July 21/10: Testing. The 1st A-Darter firing takes place from a South African Air Force JAS-39D Gripen, at the Overberg test area in South Africa. Magnus Reineholm Project Manager for the integration of A-Darter at Saab:

“The A-Darter and the Gripen aircraft have worked beyond our expectations and we are extremely pleased with the test firing results.”

See: Saab.

April 23/10: South Africa. The South African Air Force reportedly intends to fit A-Darter missiles to its fleet of 24 BAE Hawk Mk. 120 lead-in fighter trainers and light attack aircraft, as well as its 26 JAS-39 C/D Gripen Fighters.

The move will give Denel Dynamics a larger market within South African and also abroad – Hawk aircraft are flown by about 18 countries. South Africa’s Defence Web.

April 22/10: Testing. The A-Darter missile program has completed a series of ground- launched flight tests, and Denel Dynamics executive manager for air-to-air programmes, Denise Wilson, says the project will be ready for full production by 2012. Denel is reportedly working toward a 2011 date to supply early unarmed training missiles for the SAAF.

Program manager Deon Olivier is quoted as saying that the project is now at the stage “where uncertainties have decreased considerably,” thanks to increased confidence in the seeker stemming from December 2009 – January 2010 seeker tests. Step 2 was a series of ground-based test shots to evaluate the missile’s aerodynamics and control, followed by guided shots in which all the components were tested together in flight. March 2010 saw the completion of carriage clearance tests of the A-Darter missile on the JAS-39C/D Gripen, at up to 12g instantaneous maneuver and 45,000 feet/ 13,700m.

Future tests include imminent ground-launch programmed tests for aerodynamics and flight control evaluations, followed by firing clearance from the Gripen aircraft to test missile and seeker performance. Johannesburg Business Day.

April 16/09: Tech transfer. Defense News covers a presentation from Denel Dynamics at the 2009 Latin America Aerospace and Defense (LAAD) conference. Col. Ian van Vuuren, director for the A-Darter program at Denel Dynamics:

“…gave a basic “how-to” seminar on establishing a framework for technology transfers between countries. “One of the typical problems with technology transfer is everybody agrees to do it, [but] it takes two and a half years for the client receiving the technology to put the establishment team in place in his own country,” van Vuuren said. In that time, knowledge is lost and training loses its effectiveness… Van Vuuren’s presentation focused on the process Denel and the governments of South Africa and Brazil used to establish a framework for the technology transfer as part of the A-Darter program. Key to the process is having over-arching government support, formalized in cooperation agreements, and creating a joint contracting body to award the contract to companies.”

IRIS-T on Gripen
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May 28/08: South Africa. Diehl BGT announces that the South African Air Force has picked the IRIS-T short range air-to-air missile to equip their Gripen fighter aircraft “as an interim solution until the local missile development – the A Darter – will be operational.” This makes them IRIS-T’s 2nd export customer outside the original 7-nation consortium.

The South African arms acquisition organization Armscor placed a contract order for the IRIS-T missiles “in the second half of May 2008,” and the missiles will become operational on SAAF Gripens in 2009. Industrial offsets are also involved, which will be tricky given the A-Darter’s explicit status as a future competitor.

April 26/07: Formal Launch. The A-Darter program is formally launched at the April 2007 Latin American Aerospace and Defence exhibition in Brazil.

The firm adds that it expects to employ at least 200 engineers over the duration of the contract, and hopes to use the program to attract young engineers to the company. while this is an excellent long-term strategy, it would have development implications if implemented. Meanwhile, 10 Brazilian air force members have begun work on the program at the Denel Dynamics plant, to be joined by another 20 people from “the Brazilian defence companies.”

Denel spokesperson Joe Makhafola said that current contracts amount to ZAR 1 billion [about $145 million], and that future export contracts are expected to add another ZAR 2 billion over the program’s 15 years. Denel | The Arms Deal Virtual Press Office.

Formal project launch

Aug 11/06: Contract? South Africa’s Engineering News reports that the A-Darter agreement was signed “a few weeks ago,” and that a team of 5 specialists from the FAB’s Aerospace Technical Centre (CTA) is now in South Africa to participate in development.

The contract is between the Brazilian Ministry of Defence and South Africa’s Department of Defence, though the government contacts will involve Brazil’s FAB dealing with South Africa’s Armscor. A certain amount of development has already taken place in South Africa, and the rest of the development will be divided 50/50.

Brazil has reportedly allocated $52-million, but estimates of the final cost could reach $100 million or more. The FAB currently expects the missile to enter service in 2015, nine years from now. Brazil’s CTA is known to be holding talks with missile-maker Mectron; rocket, missile and armoured vehicle maker Avibras; and strategic systems software house Atech for Brazilian participation.

Feb 14/06: Initial agreement. South Africa and Brazil have agreed in principle to a ZAR 300-million (about $57.5 million) project to finish developing Denel’s A-Darter short-range air-to-air missile. The investment was disclosed in an extract of an “exemption from tendering” notice published on Jan 27/06 in Brazil’s Official Daily of the Union. Subsequent inquiries lead to descriptions of the agreements as being “80 percent to 90 percent there.” So they’re not a signed contract yet, more like agreement in principle.

Reports indicate a government-to-government agreement, involving the Brazilian Air Force’s department of research and development and South Africa’s Armscor agency for defence acquisition, disposal, research and development. Meanwhile, Denel has created a “Denel do Brasil” subsidiary office in the city of Sao Jose dos Campos. South Africa’s IOL.

Additional Readings

• Mectron – Armamentos Inteligentes [in Portuguese]. Includes MAA-1 Piranha variants as well.

• SAAF (unofficial) – Weapon – Air-to-Air – V3E A-Darter

• DID – Brazil’s F-X2 Fighter Competition

• DID – Brazil’s F-5BR Fighter Fleet Upgrade Program. The F-5BR program produces F-5EM/FM fighters.

• DID – Enhancing Brazil’s AMX Light Attack Fighters. They’ll become A-1Ms in Brazil.

North Korean Type 88 Assault Rifle

The Afghan parliament’s lower house has sacked seven ministers in a new wave of interpellations (estizah). It is not clear who instigated the estizah motions, MPs themselves or Palace intrigue, or who will come out as the winner (the president has told the ministers to stay in their posts and called on the Supreme Court to reverse the MPs decisions). But the affair shows that the long-standing conflict between the two camps within the government is far from over. The estizah affair is compounded by additional rifts within the Jamiat party and the long-standing conflict between the executive and parliament. Thomas Ruttig (with input from Ehsan Qaane and Salima Ahmadi) looked into the various levels of conflicts and concludes that another painful process of appointments – and wrangling over them – could be restarted, further bogging down the government.

Seven ministers voted off

The Wolesi Jirga, the Afghan parliament’s lower house, voted seven members of the cabinet out of office last week. MPs scrutinised 16 ministers in five sessions held every day, an unusual although not unique pace of work (a 17th minister who was on the original list had already resigned for – genuine – health reasons and was exempted). Usually, the Wolesi Jirga only convenes on Saturdays, Mondays and Wednesdays and struggles to reach a quorum (see AAN analysis here and here), but for these sessions over 200 out of the current 235 MPs participated in each one.

The procedure is called estizah (interpellation) and the power of the MPs to deliver such motions to call ministers to account is enshrined in the constitution. Use of that power, however, has often proved detrimental to government; it has regularly interrupted both the work of the cabinet and parliament itself (which could have devoted its time to more urgent legislative matters). For the National Unity Government (NUG), which took a painstaking two years to establish a full cabinet that finally completed in June 2016, this is the second estizah round this year. The previous motion, against the women’s affairs minister, Delbar Nazari, in July 2016, failed. The government had also managed to get its security minister candidates through parliament relatively smoothly, in April and June 2016, and it had looked as if MPs had become tired of toppling ministers – prematurely, it seems now.

Officially, this time the MPs called those ministers to account who had not been able to spend more than 70 per cent of their ministries’ development budget for the financial year of 1394 (2015). (Afghanistan’s budget consists of two parts, the budget for running costs and the development budget for all other projects and investments.) This was not a first: in 2013, during the last year of President Hamed Karzai’s era, 11 ministers came under estizah for the same reason. However, this time the ministers were voted out of office for this reason (in 2013 all survived). The threshold was different this time: while in 2013, all ministers that had spent 50 per cent or less of their development budgets were summoned, this was now increased to 70 per cent. (1)

On the evening of 12 November, after the first estizah session, in which all three ministers were voted off – Salahuddin Rabbani for Foreign Affairs, Mahmud Balegh for Public Works and Nasrin Oryakhel for Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled – the government intervened for the first time. The president and the Chief Executive invited the MPs to send a delegation to discuss the situation and suggested that they suspend the summoning of the ministers. The MPs accepted the invitation but declined to postpone the estizah sessions.

The president then called an emergency cabinet meeting on 14 November 2016 and turned to the Supreme Court with a query as to the legality of the estizah (see here, here and here). In 2007, then President Karzai had asked the court for a similar judgment, after parliament had fired his foreign minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta after he had unable to block the deportation of a huge number of Afghan refugees from Iran; the court declared the parliamentary decision invalid and Spanta continued in his job. It can be safely assumed that Ghani is hoping for a similar outcome.

The cabinet meeting was attended by both the president and chief executive, the latter after a long absence due to disagreements with Ghani. The president instructed the dismissed ministers to continue their work until the Supreme Court’s verdict. As a result, starting on 13 November 2016, the votes in Parliament were taken in the absence of the ministers concerned.

Ministers who lost the votes of confidence:

• Salahuddin Rabbani, Foreign Affairs (12 November); nominated by Abdullah
• Mahmud Balegh, Public Works, (12 November), nominated by Ghani
• Nasrin Oryakhel, Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (12 November), nominated by Ghani
• Assadullah Hanif Balkhi, Education (13 November), nominated by Abdullah
• Muhammadullah Batash, Transport and Civil Aviation (13 November), nominated by Ghani
• Farida Momand Higher Education (14 November), nominated by Ghani
• Abdul Razeq Wahidi, Telecommunication (15 November), nominated by Abdullah

Ministers who secured the votes of confidence:

• Eklil Hakimi, Finance (13 November), nominated by Ghani
• Sayed Sadat Mansur Naderi, Urban Development (14 November), nominated by Ghani
• Abdul Basir Anwar, Justice (14 November), nominated by Abdullah
• Assadullah Zamir, Agriculture (15 November), nominated by Ghani
• Salamat Azimi, Counter-Narcotics (15 November), nominated by Ghani
• Ali Ahmad Usmani, Water and Energy (15 November), nominated by Abdullah
• Sayed Hussain Alemi Balkhi, Refugees (16 November), nominated by Abdullah
• Abdul Sattar Murad, Economy (16 November), nominated by Abdullah
• Firuzuddin Firuz, Public Health (16 November), nominated by Abdullah

(For the exact numbers of votes, see the annex.)

The pressure of the presidency seems to have worked at least partially: the number of the ministers voted out by parliament declined over the week; in the last estizah session, on 16 November, all three ministers survived.

The most important estizah victim in the Dr Abdullah camp was foreign minister Salahuddin Rabbani, as he is also the current leader of Jamiat-e Islami. Jamiat is one of the most powerful parties in the country. It is also the main support base for the president’s partner in the National Unity Government, Chief Executive Dr Abdullah, (although there were always some Jamiat leaders who were less than enthusiastic in their support). Salahuddin Rabbani has held the Jamiat lead ever since the assassination of his father, former president Borhanuddin Rabbani, in 2011, although still officially in an interim role.

Apart from these seven ministers, there is an additional need to find three other ones: Border and tribes minister Gulab Mangal has just been appointed governor of Nangarhar province, Information and culture minister Abdul Bari Jehani stepped down for health reasons and the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum is currently being run by the former deputy minister, Ghazal Habibyar-Safi, after the previous minister, Daud Shah Saba resigned in March 2016.

Development budget expenditure as a criterion

Formally it makes sense to measure the performance of cabinet members by looking at the spending of their development budgets, as one yardstick. With the division of the budget of Afghanistan’s government institutions, the spending of the development budget, which is fed both by domestic and external sources, reflects how much money ministries and similar institutions invest in their ‘real’ work, for example, in expanding services for the population in the provinces. (The other part of the budget covers salaries and other running costs only.)

Spending figures, though, are a quantitative – and possibly over-simplified – criterion, as they do not reflect the quality, usefulness or effectiveness of what the money has been spent on. The discussions during the estizah sessions also did not constitute systematic performance evaluations of the ministers by the MPs, which could have been done even in the ministers’ absence. As in former years, ministers who did attend the session cast doubt on the figures used by the MPs. For example, foreign minister Rabbani claimed – albeit in vain – that his ministry had in reality spent 73 per cent of its development budget (which would have safeguarded him from estizah).

Whether or not expenditure of development budgets is a fair or accurate way to measure ministers’ performances, it can be assumed that other criteria influenced MPs’ decisions. The usually outspoken Kabul MP Ramazan Bashardost, a former planning minister, indicated that bribes had been handed out to vote or not vote for particular ministers. When he urged fellow-MPs to “stop exchanging money,” his words also indicated that there were both ‘givers’ and ‘takers’ among them. A pro-Ghani MP told AAN that the president himself had encouraged MPs to vote down ministers who did not spend their development budget and had even proposed a threshold of 80 per cent. As always, these accusations are difficult to pin down (although AAN has tried). If budget spending had been the MPs’ point, Bashardost argued, then all ministers below the 70 per cent threshold should have been fired, without exception.

The multidimensional power-struggle behind the estizah

It is not clear who instigated the estizah motions – MPs themselves or Palace intrigue. There are strong rumours in Kabul that the president was planning a cabinet reshuffle anyway and that a caucus of MPs had intervened on his behalf to engineer it through the Wolesi Jirga. But it was clear that various conflict lines converged over the past week and influenced the outcome of the estizah sessions.

First, the estizah motions represent a new round of the on-going power struggle within the NUG. Ostensibly, Ghani and Abdullah had ended their conflict before the Brussels donor conference. For a long time before that, the NUG had presented an unappealing image of disunity which was harming its chances of securing ongoing foreign funding. Harmonisation was achieved, but only on the surface. The underlying problem remained unsolved: Abdullah’s side complains about Ghani’s management style and tendency to micromanage, versus the Ghani camp’s view that Abdullah and his team block reform. Ghani, so one theory wented, wanted to break out of the impasse by reshuffling his cabinet and weakening Abdullah.

Ghani was, reportedly, particularly unhappy with both foreign minister Rabbani and refugee minister Alemi Balkhi. Both had refused to sign (see here and here) the government’s deal with the European Union on the return – both voluntary and involuntary – of rejected Afghan asylum seekers, on which a number of western governments had made the continuation of development aid before the Brussels conference tacitly conditional.

The unhappiness was not one-sided: Rabbani had opposed the president’s appointment of relatives and allies into key ambassadorial positions. These included Ghani’s uncle Qayum Kuchai as ambassador to Moscow, former finance minister Hazrat Omar Zakhilwal, to Pakistan and, particularly, Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani as ambassador to Spain, a post held for many years by the long-time aide to late commander Ahmad Shah Massud, Massud Khalili, who was retiring. Appointing Nuristani meant replacing not just an ally, but a close friend of Abdullah with someone from the opposing camp (who had moreover been in charge of the Independent Election Commission during the bitterly-disputed 2014 presidential elections). After these complaints, an MP told AAN, Ghani had asked Rabbani to resign, who had refused and said that he had come from the Abdullah camp and the president could not ask him to vacate his post.

Sources close to the presidential palace and foreign minister Rabbani have told AAN they had the impression that the president was trying to push Abdullah aside in favour of acting Balkh governor, Atta Muhammad Nur. (The New York Times picked up the same rumours, read here, although it also reported that a presidential advisor had rejected the rumours.) The reshuffle, if it happened,  would represent a realignment of the Ghani camp with a different faction within Jamiat, rather than a complete drop of the party. (Playing one Jamiat faction against the other would be similar to former president Karzai’s approach; AAN analysis here.) The same sources, spoke about Ghani’s desire to have nine ministers reshuffled; this was also reflected in some Afghan media,  including in Sarkhat daily, which is considered close to National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar, on 13 November. In this context, President Ghani might not have been unhappy about parliament voting some ministers out of office.

Secondly, the two camps in the government are also competing in parliament to muster majorities, particularly so they can secure votes of confidence for ministers and other appointees they support, for example during estizah sessions. Parliament also has the power to delay laws and, by that, important political projects, as the on-going debate on the electoral law demonstrates. This is further complicated in a house without formal party-based factions, where MPs can switch sides easily.

While Abdullah’s Jamiat party has a relatively stable foothold in the Wolesi Jirga – although nothing close to a majority, the president has even less guaranteed influence, as he lacks an organised power base (such as a party or a movement) of his own. Over the past two years, the president and his allies – particularly Atmar – have worked among MPs to convince a number of them to cooperate with the Palace and to establish what amounts to an informal, pro-presidential caucus in the Wolesi Jirga.

On 14 November 2016, a group of at least 16 MPs (3) collected signatures and asked the speaker of the house to postpone the estizah sessions and urged their fellow MPs to vote for in favour of their proposal. They are ethnically and politically mixed, including both Jamiatis and members of Hezb-e Islami. The most active MPs include Nazir Ahmad Ahmadzai, who is from the president’s tribe in the southeast, as well as a southern, western and another southeastern: Lalai Hamidzai, Muhammad Saleh and Kamal Nasir Osuli. Furthermore, there is Haji Almas, an influential former Hezb-turned Jamiat commander from Parwan province, who is a Tajik and, for now, in the president’s camp. But this group failed in parts of their task, illustrating that the president is still far away from commanding a reliable support base in the Wolesi Jirga.

The debate about whether and when to hold estizah sessions also reflects a continuation of the rocky relations between the executive and legislative branches of government, a legacy of the Karzai years (AAN analysis here), and attempts by parliament to assert itself as an independent body vis-à-vis the presidency.

Inner-Jamiati intrigues

Thirdly, jostling over the still vacant leadership in Jamiat has  influenced the balance between the Ghani and the Abdullah camp in the NUG. Atta – who leads Jamiat in the country’s populous north and large parts of the northeast and who became head of the party’s Executive Council, replacing Ahmad Zia Massud, in 2013 – is said to aspire to the overall leadership of the party, wishing to wrest it away from its traditional leaders. They have traditionally been, on the military side, Panjshiris (Ahmad Shah Massud and his commanders) and, on the political side, Badakhshis (Rabbani and son). Abdullah belongs to the Panjshiri faction.

A number of MPs thought to be close to Atta – including Assadullah Sharifi and Farhad Azimi, both from Balkh – had been campaigning against the younger Rabbani and for close Ghani ally Eklil Hakimi (currently finance minister), AAN was told by sources close to the governor. This would, if true, have been part of a quid-pro-quo between Ghani’s and Atta’s supporters. An MP who asked not to be named, told AAN that a person had come to him “before the voting process started and asked me to give a vote of no-confidence to Rabbani” and later “called me to [tell me to] give a vote of confidence to Hakimi.”

Atta rejected these reports in a statement released on his Facebook page on 12 November 2016, condemning the MPs for their “wrong” decision on Rabbani and assuring Jamiat he would do everything to keep their leader in his ministerial position. Earlier, on 2 November, he had confirmed though that he was engaged in negotiations with President Ghani (which he said Abdullah was aware of), but called claims in the Afghan media that he was about to leave his position in the north “incorrect.” There have been long standing rumours that he aspires to a cabinet post, as a staging post for a possible run in the 2019 presidential election (already in 2014, he tried to assume the role of king maker, see AAN analysis here). Atta’s strategy could be to try to weaken Abdullah and replace him as Ghani’s key Tajik ally.

Bringing in new allies?

The other rumour in Kabul is that Ghani wants to create space for ministers from Hezb-e Islami, after a peace treaty was concluded with its leader in late September. The deal may well have made such rewards necessary, although nothing official has been said. Hezb is the traditional competitor of Jamiat, although the mutual tensions eased in 2014 when the then leader of Hezb’s legalised, non-insurgent wing, Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, supported Abdullah (and lost his cabinet post when Ghani won) and Abdullah chose as his running mate, former Hezb-e Islami intelligence chief Khan Muhammad. The party is already represented in government – apart from Khan there are, for example, two cabinet ministers – but not, of course, from within its insurgent wing. Both Hezbi ministers remained in their positions: Justice Minister Anwar won his vote, while rural Development Minister Nasir Ahmad Durrani was not summoned.

Ghani might even seek to placate his predecessor Karzai by making some of his allies minister. Karzai, over many months, has become one of the major critics of the NUG, pushing for a Loya Jirga to decide the fate of the government and in particular the future of the position of chief executive, and regularly commenting on current events in ways seen as critical of the government. A partial rapprochement, bolstered by cabinet posts, could take some steam out of that uneasy relationship (more on this in a forthcoming AAN dispatch).

A mixed outcome

Politically, the outcome of the week-long estizah sessions was mixed. In terms of numbers, the president and his camp (including for example, Vice President’s Dostum’s Jombesh party) lost four ministers: Balegh, Batash, Oryakhel and Momand. Abdullah lost three: Rabbani, Assadullah Balkhi and Wahidi. (2) However, in terms of clout, Ghani’s key ally, finance minister Hakimi, was saved from sacking (Abdullah has reportedly long wanted his nephew, currently deputy minister of finance, Muhammad Mustafa Mastur, for this job), while the Abdullah camp lost Rabbani (foreign affairs). Murad (economy), another key Jamiati, did survive, however.

EU countries will also have noticed with interest that refugee minister Alemi Balkhi – nominated by the Abdullah camp, but more of an independent – survived. He has proven a difficult partner in talks on migration issues and one not always agreeing with the president.

Next round: the budget

The dismissal of more Ghani allies than Abdullah allies, and the loud protests by most MPs on the second day of the estizah sessions against the government’s attempt to postpone them, made it plain that the president’s work in parliament is not yet where he wants it to be. The circle of pro-presidential MPs still does not command a majority. The Abdullah camp continues to have a lot of influence, but cannot command a majority either. The middle ground – vulnerable to political pressure and plain bribery – is too wide, and it is too lucrative for MPs not to be there.

The estizah sessions may have been a cunning plan that backfired. If the president had indeed intended to reshuffle his cabinet, the estizah possibly came too early. Either way, whether the summonings came at his instigation or the MPs’, parliament has again proved it is unpredictable and has its own will. The president was left having to do damage control yet again.

But even if the estizah had been successful in getting rid of exactly those ministers he considers in the way of his policies, the president would have alienated key partners in the NUG – while possible new allies, such as Atta, would have had demands, too, including on appointments. And there would again be no guarantee that the new people would be more effective than those who are now in positions and who cooperate with the president on his reform plans.

The estizah motions have revealed what everyone suspected, that the internal problems of the NUG are far from over. All the intrigues and rumours that were part and parcel of the latest developments – even if the rumours were false – create further mutual distrust, rather than enhance cooperation. The fragmented character of Afghan institutions (including not only the party-less parliament, but also parties such as Jamiat) results in unpredictability for all sides and continues to produce mixed results. In the end, it is difficult to judge who gains and who loses. Moreover, the bad relations between the executive and legislative branches in an over-centralised presidential system, part of the Karzai legacy, continues to stand in the way of smooth political work.

There is more to come, and probably very soon. If overruled by the Supreme Court on behalf of the president, an unhappy parliament might block the budget for the 1396 (2017) fiscal year which it has to vote on next week. That has been threatened already by one MP, Zazai Watandost, speaking to AAN earlier this week (and publicly repeated by influential eastern MP Haji Qadir). It will also be very time-consuming to again fill the vacant cabinet positions. Appointments have been the main bone of contention between Ghani and Abdullah, and there is no reason to believe the two men will suddenly be able to agree on new appointments without rancour or endless delay.

Edited by Kate Clark

 

(1) The new threshold had been set in the Wolesi Jirga’s plenary session on 2 November 2016, after the representatives of its 15 permanent commissions failed to agree on one in a joint meeting in the second half of October.

Only four ministers escaped estizah by spending more than 70 per cent of their development budgets: Minister of Commerce and Industries, Humayun Rasa from Abdullah’s team; Minister of Interior, Taj Mohammad Jahed from Abdullah’s team, who secured his position after the fiscal year in discussion (1394/2015) had ended; Minister of Women Affairs, Delbar Nazari from Abdullah’s team; and the Minister of Haj and Endowments, Faiz Muhammad Usmani. The Ministry of Defense does not have a development budget.

(2) Out of the women ministers, Oryakhel and Momand were voted out, but Salamat Azimi, the Jombesh-affiliated Minister of Counter-Narcotics survived. Usually, women are particularly vulnerable to votes of no confidence.

(3) This group of MPs included: Engineer Zikria, Nazir Ahmad Ahmadzai, Hashem Rahmani, Saheb Khan, Kamal Nasir Osuli, Eqbal Safi, Muhammad Reza Khoshak Watandost, Obaidullah Kalimzai, Masuda Karokhi, Haji Almas Zahed, Munawar Shah Bahaduri, Saleh Muhammad Saleh, Sayed Muhammad Akhund, Qazi Abdul Rahim, Lalai Hamidzai and Haji Abdul Majid.

 

Annex: The estizah votes

No. Ministers Positive Negative Blank Invalid Results

1

Foreign Minister 58 140 6 3 Dismissed

2

Labour and Social Affairs Ministers 56 144 5 2 Dismissed

3

Public Works Minister 33 164 5 2 Dismissed

4

Finance Minister 85 112 2 5 Remained in his position

5

Minister of Education 68 131 3 2 Dismissed

6

Minister of Transport 51 142 6 5 Dismissed

7

Urban Development Minister 135 59 2 5 Remained

8

Justice Minister 95 101 1 4 Remained

9

Higher Education Minister 63 131 3 4 Dismissed

10

Telecommunication Minister 49 147 3 2 Dismissed

11

Agriculture Minister 131 62 4 4 Remained

12

Counter-narcotics Minister 72 114 9 6 Remained

13

Water and Energy Minister 60 115 23 3 Remained

14

Minister of Refugees 105 90 3 3 Remained

15

Minister of Economy 114 81 4 2 Remained

16

Minister of Public Health 170 28 2 1 Remained

Taiwanese T91 Assault Rifle

Last week (8-11 November), and for the second time since December 2015, the European Defence Agency (EDA) provided cyber awareness training to more than 100 staff from EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA at the mission’s Operations Headquarters (OHQ) in Rome, Italy.

The seminars covered important aspects such as mission-specific cyber threats, the legal framework applicable to cyberspace, common vocabulary and best practices when using communications and information systems. They also served to inform participants about the development and establishment of EU cyber defence capabilities for CSDP military operations and missions.

The seminars also allowed the command team of OHQ Rome and the EDA to exchange views on the next steps to be taken to enhance the cyber defence capabilities for EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia and other EU-led military operations.

The seminars were conducted with the support of the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) in Tallinn and from SYMANTEC Corporation.
The EDA started organizing Cyber Awareness Seminars in 2014 in support of EUFOR RCA as a valuable contribution to raising cyber awareness for all the personnel of activated Headquarters (HQ) for EU-led military operations.

 

Background

The EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, as adopted by the Council on 18 November 2014, states that “Cyberspace is often described as the fifth domain of military activity, equally critical to European Union (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) implementation as the domains of land, sea, air, and space. The successful implementation of CSDP has been increasingly dependent on the availability of, and access to, a secure cyberspace. Robust and resilient cyber defence capabilities are now required to support CSDP structures and CSDP missions and operations”. The Policy Framework puts strong emphasis on cyber education and training.

 

EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia

EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia is only one element of a broader EU comprehensive response to the migration issue, which seeks to address not only its physical component, but also its root causes such as conflict, poverty, climate change and persecution.

The mission core mandate is to undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers, in order to contribute to wider EU efforts to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean and prevent the further loss of life at sea.

Since 7 October 2015, the operation has moved to phase 2 International Waters, which entails boarding, search, seizure and diversion, on the high seas, of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking.

Last June , Operation Sophia’s mandate was extended until 27 July 2017 and also reinforced by adding two supporting tasks:

• training of the Libyan coastguards and navy;
• contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.

On 30 August and 6 September 2016, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) authorized the launch of the capacity building and training task, and the start of the mission’s role contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo respectively.

 

More information:

• Support to operations (EDA factsheet)
• EDA provides cyber defence support to operation EUFOR RCA (webnews September 2014)
• EEAS website on EUNAVFOR MED      

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has begun one of its largest maritime warfare activities, Exercise Ocean Raider, at locations off the coast of New South Wales, Australia.

Huntington Ingalls Industries' Ingalls Shipbuilding division has launched the US Navy's future Arleigh Burke-class (DDG 51) guided missile destroyer, Paul Ignatius (DDG 117).

The US Naval Sea Systems Command has awarded a $125.18m-worth engineering services contract modification to Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems.

CACI International has secured a prime position on a $192m indefinite delivery / indefinite quantity contract to provide training and curriculum development to Naval Education and Training Command (NETC).

Americas

• An agreement has been signed between Airbus and the Chilean government to pursue collaborative business development in the defense and aerospace industry. Both sides will cooperate on manufacturing and maintenance for future projects while exploring further possibilities. The Airbus deal is one of several agreements Chile has made with defense firms which includes a contract with Lockheed Martin to produce spare parts for C-130 aircraft.

Middle East & North Africa

• The Turkish Defence Minister Fikri Isik stated that the first two of a batch of 24 more Lockheed Martin F-35 aircraft will be delivered in 2018. 24 of the Joint Strike Fighter will be ordered over the next three years, of which six, including the two expected in 2018, had already been ordered. Ankara has committed to procuring a total of 115 F-35s.

Europe

• Greece has taken delivery of three second-hand CH-47SD heavy-lift helicopters. The transfer of the ex-National Guard Chinooks was completed on November 11. Seven more are expected by the end of 2017 as part of a $120 million deal with the US.

• European Defense Ministers agreed to raise the budget of the European Defence Agency (EDA) ending a six-year freeze. While small, the increase will see 2016’s $32.7 million increased to $33.1 for 2017’s activities. All 27 EU members gave their resounding support for the measure and will use the extra funds to develop and procure additional aircraft and other defense materials.

• Spain’s Air Force has received its first A400M transporter from Airbus. Aircraft MSN44 carried out its maiden flight from Airbus’s Seville final assembly site in September, and is the first of 27 examples on order for Spain. The delivery came days after Airbus announced that two A400Ms had successfully demonstrated the in-flight transfer of fuel using a fuselage-housed hose-and-drum unit.

Asia Pacific

• South Korean investigators have raided the offices of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA). An official from DAPA is suspected of leaking confidential information on military equipment to BAE Systems during a mismanaged project to upgrade the KF-16 fighter jet. The 2011 modernization award with the company has since been dissolved.

• Boeing is eager to sell its KC-46A aerial refueling tanker to India. The Indian Air Force has yet to procure a capability to refuel its C-17 and P-8I aircraft, and New Delhi has eyed up the Pegasus to fill such a role. A laborious search has been underway to fill a six multi-role tanker capability soon to be vacated by their aging IL-76 aircraft. Earlier attempts to procure Airbus A 330 MRTT never came to fruition.

• The first flight of India’s Rustom-II UAV has been successfully completed. Conducted by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), the drone accomplished all main objectives during the test, including takeoff, bank, level flight, and landing. While this marks a good milestone for the program, officials maintain that a lot more evaluation and testing needs to be done before operational evaluation and eventual entry into service with India’s military branches can take place.

Today’s Video

Live demonstration of South Korea’s K30 Biho twin 30 mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun:

Taiwanese T86 Assault Rifle

Rustom-H mockup
(click to view full)

India has not been left out of the global UAV push. The country operates Israeli Searcher tactical UAVs, and Heron Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) UAVs, placing an additional Heron order in 2005. It has also undertaken development programs for a smaller UAV, the “Nishant”. With its “Rustom” program, however, India hopes to offer a UAV in the Heron/ Predator/ Watchkeeper class of MALE UAVs.

It had also hoped to begin to change a culture and tradition of wholly state-owned development of military hardware, which has not always performed well, or served India’s needs. A recent award has selected a winner, and moved the project forward. It may also serve as a reminder that bureaucracies are very difficult to change.

The Rustom family of UAVs Rustom-1 scale model
(click to view full)

“Rustom” translates as “warrior,” and may remind some readers of the great hero in Persia’s classic The Shah-nameh. Reports indicate that India’s UAV is named after a more contemporary personality, however: Rustom Damania, a former professor of IISc, Bangalore, who led the National Aeronautical Laboratories’ light canard research aircraft (LCRA) project in the 1980s.

The LCRA is reportedly the initial basis for the DRDO ADE’s 1,100-1,800 kg UAV design, which aims for a maximum altitude of 35,000 feet and a range of 300 km/ 240 miles, with endurance around 24 hours. This will be the Rustom-C/H, with the “C” variant expected to carry weapons as well as surveillance gear.

A lighter “Rustom-1” looks more like Burt Rutan’s Long-EZ design, with canards up front, winglets on a squared delta wing, and a pusher propeller in back. It will act as a test platform, and could fill a tactical UAV slot, with endurance of only 12-14 hours, maximum altitude of 22,000 feet, and a range of around 250 km.

Procurement & the Private Sector: India’s Struggles

In some ways, Rustom’s naming is also a fine encapsulation of India’s defense industry struggles. Given the sensitive nature of defence projects, private firms have generally been limited to step-and-fetch roles as component suppliers or sub-contractors on projects designed and managed by state-owned agencies or firms such as DRDO, NAL, HAL, BEL, et. al. Many of those projects have fared poorly, leaving India with gaps in critical defense capabilities that then had to be filled by buying foreign equipment as a “temporary” measure. Which would frequently become permanent mainstays for India’s forces.

In 2002, India took the first steps toward changing its procurement model. It opened up defence equipment production to private sector companies, and even allowed up to 26% foreign direct investment in such ventures. In 2006, “India’s DRDO Rethinking the Way it Does Business” covered changes in government statements, and even grudging DRDO admissions that more private sector involvement was necessary, if India’s industry was to develop and deliver the equipment a rising power needs. Subsequent moves by the government on a number of fronts, from aircraft to tanks, are opening up a far larger role for global defense firms in supplying India’s needs.

The problem is that bureaucracies are entirely uninterested in changing their long-standing and comfortable models, especially if those changes promise reduced future roles for those bureaucracies. Domestic development remains largely the bailiwick of existing agencies and bureaucracies. In those competitions so far, Indian firms partnered with experienced foreign suppliers like Thales, IAI, et. al. continue to lose to state-owned Indian firms whose overall record in the sectors under competition is shallower, and arguably adds development risks to these projects.

That appears to have been the case with Rustom.

IAI Heron UAV
(click to view larger)

DRDO intended to move away from its traditional model of developing and finalizing the system itself, then handing the designs and technology over to a production agency. Instead, they would introduce concurrent engineering that involves the producing firm, and initial design efforts also take into consideration production issues. This production agency development partner (PADP) was whittled down from 23 firms to 4 finalists: Larsen and Toubro Ltd. (L&T), Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Tata Advanced Systems Ltd. – and a joint bid from state-owned firms Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Bharat Electronics.

The accompanying maritime patrol radars and electro-optical systems were expected to come from Israel, whose systems equip current UAVs and aircraft. The engine is also expected to come from a selection process, rather than being a product of new R&D.

So far, that’s an improvement. Unfortunately, Rustom’s reported contract structure is a fine illustration of the time and performance blindness that has crippled so many indigenous Indian efforts. LiveMint describes an agreement that involved INR 4 billion investment in prototypes and trials, over a decade or more. All in a field where major new designs are being fielded, now, in 2 year cycles – and where the capabilities India seeks already exist in several fielded platforms. One hopes that is a reporting error.

The Rustom development contract also contains no guarantee of an order from the armed forces once it is complete. That’s normal in India, and not unusual in many countries that used staged-gate approval processes for weapons. What’s unusual is the combination of no commitment plus partnership financing requirements, which is a poor fit for the private sector. The HAL official who confirmed these arrangements for LiveMint asked the logical question: “If there is no assurance of an order [and such a high investment target], why should the private industry come forward and invest?” Yet some firms did make that offer, in conjunction with experienced foreign partners. They lost to HAL, whose history of aviation production does not extend to UAVs of this size and complexity.

What is clear, is that India’s efforts to build up its private sector defense industry beyond a mere conduit for foreign firms’ industrial offset programs is off to a slow start. N.S. Sisodia, director general of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, is typically diplomatic in his survey of the broader situation. He is also correct:

“The process does take a little time. There are efforts made in DPP (the defence procurement procedure) to involve private industry. But I think much more can be done.”

Contracts & Key Events

November 18/16: The first flight of India’s Rustom-II UAV has been successfully completed. Conducted by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), the drone accomplished all main objectives during the test, including takeoff, bank, level flight, and landing. While this marks a good milestone for the program, officials maintain that a lot more evaluation and testing needs to be done before operational evaluation and eventual entry into service with India’s military branches can take place.

November 23/15: The long awaited death of India’s indigenous Nishat UAV program has come to pass. The final of four UAVs in use by the Army has crashed less than a week after the program was officially cancelled. The final nail in the program’s coffin occurred earlier this month after a third UAV crashed amid technical problems cited by the Indian Army. However, these claims have been refuted by the Defence Research & Development Organization (DRDO), who claim army incompetence and poor handling by the army. While the blame game continues, we do know that we won’t be seeing any more Nishats in the Indian sky.

November 18/15: The Indian Army has decided to cancel a two decade long indigenous Nishant UAV program after the third of four in use by the army crashed near the city of Jaisalmer on November 4. The Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) had been developing the Nishant UAV since 1995 with the aim of developing India’s own reconnaissance and intelligence gathering abilities. Phase 1 had seen four of the UAVs introduced in 2011 and continuation would have seen 8 more orders of the UAV by the army. The announcement comes shortly after Prime Minister Modi’s recent push to increase development within India’s private defense industry and the sharing of indigenously designed Rustom UAVs by the government. In the wake of the Nishant duds, these companies may be best served looking elsewhere for design ideas.

September 25/15: In a bid to spur development in the country’s private defense industry, the Modi government has decided to share designs of indigenously-developed unmanned aerial vehicles with private firms. Developed by the Indian state-owned Defence Research and Development Organisation, details of the Rustom family of UAVs were until now kept secret from the private sector. As the Indian government looks to develop its defense industrial base domestically, it has also recently relaxed joint venture restrictions on foreign companies in a bid to build expertise through collaborative working. However, foreign companies still face stringent offset policies and investment restrictions, despite slow progress.

November 2013: Rustom-II. India Strategic quotes Honeywell Aerospace India President Pritam Bhavnani as saying that:

“As well as propulsion, our technology portfolio across these [American UAV] platforms spans electrical power systems, Auxiliary Power Units, navigation, air thermal systems, fuel controls, pneumatics, wheels and brakes and high integrity controls…. Rustom II is an exciting development in the evolution of India’s defence capabilities. I cannot give any specific details today regarding our involvement with the program…”

Sources: India Strategic, “Rustom II: An exciting opportunity for Honeywell”.

May 8/12: Test flight 14. India’s MoD:

“Indigenously designed and developed RUSTOM-1 made 14th successful flight this morning at Kolar with attainment of about 11,500 ft AGL (above ground level) and speed of above 140 Kmph during 2 hrs 10 minutes of cruise. It may be noted that this unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), developed by Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE), a DRDO lab at Bangalore, had its maiden flight in Nov 2009. Mr. PS Krishnan, Director ADE stated that the flight was successful. All the parameters were achieved by the UAV which weigh around 690 Kg and the total performance was satisfactory.”

Nov 11/11: Test flight 5. India’s government announces that the 661 kg Rustom-1 UAV had made its 5th test flight, at 100 knots and 2,300 feet above ground level near Hosur. The release adds that: “This UAV can attain a maximum speed of 150 Knots, 22,000 ft of altitude and endurance of 12-15 Hours with an operating range of 250 Kms when fully developed.”

May 24/11: DRDO’s Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) has flown an upgraded version of “Rustom-1” from TAAL’s airfield near Hosur. It’s reported to be a converted manned aircraft, and the goal is an endurance of 14 hours and altitude ceiling of 8 km/ 26,000 feet. ADE reports it was happy with the flight, conducted as a precursor to flights with payloads. DNA India.

Prahlada, chief controller of research and development (aeronautics programme), said “with the successful accurate flying of Rustom 1, ADE is geared up for integration of payloads with the Aircraft within next three months, to demonstrate performance of payloads and necessary secure data-link to the users.”

Rustom 1st flight
(click for video)

Oct 26/10: Rustom-1’s first flight.

April 25/10: State-run Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) and Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) win the bid to design and build Rustom. The award marks the 3rd large Indian defence project in which private firms have lost out to public sector rivals, after the Saras light passenger plane and the Army’s tactical communication system project. That trend is causing some questioning of the government’s sincerity regarding its pledges to advance private Indian defense firms. Larsen & Tourbo aerospace and defence VP M.V. Kotwal, whose firm bid on all 3 contracts, is quoted by LiveMint:

“This is a disappointment for us since we had been told that the projects would be open for participation by the private sector on a competitive basis… Otherwise we would not have spent the time and efforts in preparing for the bids. Detailed plans for execution had also been presented as required…”

That last statement alludes to DRDO chief controller of R&D Prahlada’s statement that “HAL-BEL gave us a clear road map for manufacture” as the reason for their victory. LiveMint.

Nov 16/09: DRDO’s Rustom technology demonstrator crashes at the Taneja Aerospace Air Field near Hosur, during its 1st flight. The taxiing and takeoff went as planned, but “due to misjudgment of altitude of the flight, the on-board engine was switched off through ground command…”

That’s not generally a good thing. On the flip side, DRDO says the shortened flight was useful for establishing more confidence in the UAV’s aerodynamics, redundant flight control, engine and datalink. Defense News.

Aug 6/09: India’s Tata Group signs a wide-ranging joint venture agreement with Israel Aerospace Industries, the builders of India’s Searcher and Heron UAVs. The agreement finalizes a commitment made in February 2009 by IAI CEO Itzhak Nissan and Tata Sons Chairman Ratan N. Tata.

Under the terms of the MoU, the new Company will develop, manufacture and support a wide range of defence and aerospace products, including missiles, UAVs, radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems and home land security (HLS) systems. The new company will also perform offset work for IAI and other defence and aerospace programs in India. domain-b.

May 15/09: Larsen and Toubro Ltd. (L&T), Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd., and Tata Advanced Systems Ltd. bid to develop India’s Rostam MALE UAV. The 4th bidder is a joint effort by state-owned defence equipment makers Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) and Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL).

The Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) is testing a technology demonstrator. Once a vendor is selected, ADE and that vendor will design an enhanced version; a selection is expected later in 2009.

ADE’s tender expects that the cost of producing one set of 5 Rustom vehicles with 5 sets of spares, plus payload and ground handling/control equipment, would be around INR 2.5 billion (just under $50 million). India Defence.

Sept 22/08: The first low-speed taxi tests of ADE’s Rustom technology demonstrator take place.

Additional Readings

• Air Force Technology – Rustom Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Chitradurga

• DID – India’s DRDO Rethinking the Way it Does Business.

• iHLS (July 5/13) – Indian desire for UAS results in home production

• DID (June 10/10) – Private Shipbuilding Firm Wins Indian OPV Contract. It’s a slow opening in an important military sector.

• India Defence (March 12/09) – DRDO’s Rustom UAV To Roll Out Soon

Russian SKS Semi-Automatic Rifle