Defence`s Feeds

Super Tucano

Embraer’s EMB-314 Super Tucano trainer and light attack turboprop continues to rack up global orders, solidifying its position as the globe’s pre-eminent manned counter-insurgency aircraft. The latest order set of about $180 million expands the plane’s footprint into 3 African states: Angola, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania. They join Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Indonesia as customers for this aircraft.

The Super Tucano is known as the A-29 or ALX in Brazil, but abroad, it’s the EMB 314 successor to Embraer’s widely-used EMB 312 Tucano trainer. A-29 is better for marketing, though, and Embraer is trying to shift the designation. The Super Tucano offers better flight performance than the EMB 312 Tucano, plus armoring and wing-mounted machine guns, weapons integration with advanced surveillance and targeting pods, precision-guided bombs, and even air-to-air missiles. This makes it an excellent territorial defense and close support plane for low-budget air forces, as well as a surveillance asset with armed attack capability. Brazil uses it this way, for instance, alongside very advanced EMB-145 airborne radar and maritime patrol jet platforms. Meanwhile, in Africa…

Contracts & Key Events

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In March 2012, Embraer announced that the total value of all 3 contracts to Angola, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania comes to “more than $180 million” for around 10 planes. This includes “extensive” support, training, and replacement parts packages.

In April 2013, they announced a 4th customer: Senegal, and Ghana joined that list in 2014.

In January 2015, the United Arab Emirates committed UAE to procure a couple dozen Super Tucanos on behalf of Iraq in a deal that is not quite settled.

Angola

Angolan EMB-314
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Angola sits far down Africa’s southwestern coast. The regime maintains a sizable and advanced fighter force by African standards, at least on paper. Questions abound as to how many of the of those Soviet and Russian fighters are still operational. They have ordered 6 Super Tucanos for counter-insurgency roles, which will join 6 ex-Peruvian EMB-312 Tucanos that were bought in 2002.

Angola is an authoritarian regime, and the country’s economy would be in desperate shape if not for recent oil drilling activity off of its coasts. A 2010 report by the conservative US Heritage Foundation tabbed Angola as China’s #1 supplier of oil, passing Saudi Arabia. As is so often true in Africa, the next question involves how much of that oil wealth is ever seen by the population at large. The country went through a long civil war that lasted from the 1980s to 2002, and the northern enclave of Cabinda is still a focus of separatist activity.

Jan 31/13: The first 3 Super Tucanos are formally handed over to the National Air Force of Angloa, at a ceremony held in Embraer’s Gaviao Peixoto facility near Sao Paulo, Brazil.

These first 3 aircraft were to be delivered in 2012, so they’re a bit late. Angola is far from Mali’s headline making war, but as noted above, the country has its own problems. Embraer.

Burkina Faso

This landlocked country in West Africa had already received their 3 Super Tucanos by the time the arch 2012 announcement was made, and were using them on border patrol missions. Adding the Super Tucanos gives the country operational fixed-wing combat aircraft again, though they’re also an AT-802 Air Tractor customer. The AT-802U variant can easily be reconfigured for armed roles, or act as the locust sprayer the country’s AT-802 was purchased to be. In that part of the world, the locusts are a security risk that can easily measure up to any regional turmoil.

Burkina Faso has a good record of free and fair elections by African standards, and dealt with widespread spring 2011 protests through the political process. Its neighbors are Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, and Togo.

In March 2012, we wrote that “some of [these neighbors] harbor regional turmoil that risks spilling over. The Super Tucanos should help to keep an eye on things, and provide a low-key deterrent to trouble.” Things certainly have spilled over in Mali, and the conflict is not confined to that country’s borders. Burkina Faso is a member of the USA’s Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), and its Super Tucanos are probably fairly busy at the moment.

Ghana

Ghana sits directly south of Burkina Faso, between the Ivory Coast and Togo. Until recently lauded as a model of development among its sub-Saharan peers, the country has been facing rising inflation and public deficits as of late. A mounting backlog of unpaid wages to defense and security contractors has been piling up. Piracy has also been booming in the Gulf of Guinea, with an oil tanker gone missing for a week off the coast of Ghana in June 2014.

Mark Owen Woyongo, at the time Minister of Defense, first said in March 2014 that the acquisition of 6 Super Tucanos was under consideration, for use at a flying school to be built in Tamale, Ghana’s 3rd city. President John Dramani Mahama then confirmed in November 2014 that the country would buy an unspecified quantity of Super Tucanos, along with Chinese Z-9 helicopters, more M-17 Russian helos, and an additional C-295 tactical transport. The Z-9s are expected to be delivered in June 2015 at the forthcoming Tamale training base. The Super Tucanos are meant to be used for training and attack.

Confirmation came on 18 February from President John Dramani Mahama, indicating that five Super Tucanos will be purchased, along with the Z-9s and other equipment.

December 14/15: Ghana is set to increase it’s fleet of Embraer Super Tucanos in 2016. The order of four more of the aircraft will see a previous contract increase to nine in total. The acquisition is also to include logisitical support and training for pilots as well as maintenance training for mechanics. The announcement comes as the Ghanaian government has been improving the capabilities of its air force to support troops participating in UN peace keeping missions in the region.

Mauritania

Mauritanian EMB-314
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This country, which sits on Africa’s northwest coasts, is simply mentioned as a customer that “chose the A-29 Super Tucano to carry out counter-insurgency missions.” The country has a very small air force, and its 3-4 ex-French EMB 312 Tucano aircraft are old. Given the overall order total given, and generally understood costs for the Super Tucano, they may have bought just 1 aircraft.

The country is active in the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), including operations across borders in cooperation with its neighbor Mali, and has fought a number of skirmishes in Mauritania with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. This has been a balancing act for the USA, which has also issued reports citing Mauritania’s Arab rulers for organized repression of its black population, up to and including slavery and human trafficking. That’s a very old pattern for the area, but it’s even more distressing to current sensibilities.

It wasn’t distressing enough to block sales, however, even in a racially mixed country like Brazil.

Oct 22/12: Embraer hands over “the first light attack and advanced training A-29 Super Tucano turboprops to the Air Force of Mauritania”, for use in “border surveillance missions.” The handover ceremony takes place at Embraer’s Sao Paulo facility, and their use of the plural form is interesting. Embraer.

Nigeria

April 11/17: The Trump administration is moving ahead with a plan to sell as much as $600 million worth of A-29 Super Tucano aircraft and related equipment to help the Nigerian Air Force in their fight against the jihadist group Boko Haram. Initial permission had been granted under the previous Obama administration but was put on hold following Nigeria’s bombing of a refugee camp in January. Congress is expected to receive notification on the sale of 12 Super Tucanos and sophisticated targeting gear within weeks, and Trump plans to go ahead with other foreign defense sales delayed under Obama by human rights concerns.

May 9/16: Approval is being sought by the Pentagon for the sale of up to 12 A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to Nigeria in order to increase military support for the West African nation’s fight against Boko Haram militants. Congress, which needs to approve the sale, has not yet been notified of the foreign military sale. Increased support from Washington comes as new Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari moves to reform a government and military notorious for graft and corruption.

Senegal

April 10/13: The Senegalese Air Force signs a contract for 3 A-29 Super Tucano light attack/ advanced training turboprops. The order includes operation and the installation of a training system for pilots and mechanics (TOSS) within Senegal, which will create an independent national training capability – and possibly even a regional capability, if other A-29 customers nearby make arrangements. The cost isn’t revealed, but financing will be handled by Brazil’s BNDES National Economic and Social Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social).

Embraer’s release states that the planes will be deployed on “border surveillance and internal security missions.” Senegal is a former french colony that sits just below A-29 operator Mauritania, on Africa’s west coast. Its other neighbor is Mali, which was recently the subject of a multinational fight against salafist Islamists, led by the French. If you cross southern Mali, you immediately reach another A-29 customer in Burkina Faso. Embraer.

Additional Readings

• DID – Africa: The Next Defense Market Opportunity?

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

French / Italian SAMP/T Medium-Range Air Defense Missile System

Americas

• The Navy’s USS America has successfully shot down a UAV with the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), during live-fire exercises designed to verify the new amphibious assault ship’s defense capabilities. During the test, the UAV posed as an anti-ship missile threat while the RAM utilized its quick-reaction fire-and-forget capabilities to down the drone. The USS America is the first vessel of its class and is designed to accommodate modern fighters such as the F-35B, alongside other vertical and/or short take-off and landing (V/STOL) aircraft and helicopters. It will support US Marine Corps aviation requirements, from small-scale contingency operations of an expeditionary strike group, to forcible entry missions in major theaters of war.

• USAF brass are looking for a next-generation ejector seat to be integrated on existing fighters and bombers, according to a notice posted on the Federal Business Opportunities website. A draft request for proposals is expected for the end of FY 2017 and the service will select two qualified sources and award contracts at the beginning of FY19. A production decision would come in the middle of FY20. The contract could open the door for production of a domestic ejection seat, namely United Technologies Aerospace Systems (UTAS) Advanced Concept Ejection Seat 5 (ACES), and line up a potential competitor to the UK-based Martin-Baker.

• URS Federal Services has received a $3.6 billion USAF contract to deliver various support services for the branch’s UAVs. The deal will see the company provide testing, tactical development, advanced training and operational need missions at several testing grounds in Nevada up until the end of March 2034. The USAF did not disclose which remotely piloted aircraft would be involved with the agreement.

Middle East & North Africa

• The US State Department has given approval to Kuwait to upgrade its Al Mubarak Airbase with US support. Work will be carried out by the US Army Corps of Engineers and its contractors, and will cover the areas of design, construction, procurement of key airfield operations, command and control, readiness, sustainment, and life-support facilities. An operations center, hangars, training facilities, barracks, warehouses, and support facilities will all be built at the airbase, with the estimated total cost expected to reach $319 million.

Asia Pacific

• Bangladesh has been offered a $4.5 billion credit line by neighboring India in order to help it pay for various priority projects, and includes having $500 million earmarked for defense procurements. The announcement was made by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi following a meeting with his Bangladeshi counterpart, Sheikh Hasina, who is on a state visit to India. Modi said that the following cooperation “would include working in the fields of electronics, information technology, cyber security, space exploration, civil nuclear energy, and other areas,” and a government statement added that both nation’s armed forces would be cooperating closely in future.

• Tuo Chiang-class stealth corvettes operated by Taiwan’s navy are to be redesigned in order to give them an anti-air capability. All 11 vessels planned for production will receive the new capability which will see the current design lengthened by 4.6 meters with width to increase from 14 meters to 15 meters. The ships will be armed with the indigenous Tien Chien 2 (TC-2) air defense missile, guided by a 3D radar. Crew size per ship will increase from 41 to 53 personnel. Taipei believes the upgrade to the vessels with a Tien Chien anti-air capability will compliment the current model’s Hsiung Feng II and Hsiung Feng III (“Brave Wind”) anti-ship missiles, allowing for the missile systems to be combined in whatever configuration the mission calls for.

• It’s been discovered that Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has delivered at least 18 Su-30MKI fighters to the Indian Air Force that have been fitted with second-hand engines. A report seen by the Deccan Chronicle stated that “it was noticed while checking the records…that AL 31FP engines fitted in certain aircraft was in Cat B condition at the time of inspection / delivery to Indian Air Force (IAF).” While the Su-30MKI is powered by a pair of AL-31FP turbofan engines, the report found that some of the aircraft were installed with new and old engines. The Indian Defense Ministry has claimed that the second-hand engines were installed by by HAL without its knowledge.

• Raytheon has been selected by the Australian government to deliver a $1.5 billion ground-based air defense system. The new system will replace the country’s 30-year-old short-range capability, which is due to be retired by early next decade, and will be based on the Raytheon/Kongsberg Gruppen ASA National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS) currently operated by the US, Norway, Finland, Spain and the Netherlands. Raytheon Australia will receive a single supplier limited request for tender (RFT) from the government for the ground-based air defense system by the end of June, 2017.

Today’s Video

• USS Gerald R. Ford begins builders trials:

This year’s Nawruz, the Persian New Year on 21 March 2017, also heralded the beginning of the positioning for Afghanistan’s next presidential election, although due only in two years’ time. Atta Muhammad Nur, the powerful governor of Balkh province, used the popular holiday to announce that he will run in 2019. He kept open, however, whether that will be for president or vice-president. Atta also revived the struggle for the leadership of the Jamiat-e Islami party, thereby challenging its most senior representative in the current government, Chief Executive Dr Abdullah Abdullah. He is already facing severe headwind from within the party. AAN’s Thomas Ruttig looks at how Atta’s campaign has so far unfolded and the hurdles that stand in his way, even within his own party (with input by Obaid Ali and Ali Yawar Adili.)

On the first day of the Persian new year, Atta Muhammad Nur, the powerful governor of Balkh province and head of Jamiat-e Islami’s Executive Council (shura-ye ejra’iya), went public on his future political intensions. The key point of his statement that was widely covered by the Afghan media (see for example here) was: “In the near future, after consultation with political allies and [the] people, I will make a decision on my resignation [as governor of Balkh province] in order to participate in the upcoming elections.” As early as December 2016, he had already indicated that he might leave his gubernatorial position, stating “I have been in Balkh for a long time. It is natural that I should open the way for others to take the seat.”

His Nawruz speech was not the first time that Atta (1) has hinted that he might run in the next presidential election. Earlier this year, but less prominently (at least for an international audience), he announced in an interview with BBC Persian on 3 January 2017: “I will [either] be a candidate [on my own] or I will go with one of the tickets [as a vice-presidential candidate]” (watch the video here, in Dari). The latter could indicate that he might be considering joining forces with incumbent President Ashraf Ghani, who, as many Afghan and international observers in Kabul believe, will probably run for a second term.

There were similar rumours of Atta’s presidential ambitions prior to the 2014 election (see this AAN analysis). But Atta eventually decided to support president Ghani’s main opponent, Dr Abdullah Abdullah, and assuming the role of a kingmaker. With his considerable riches and control over large stretches of the populous northern Afghan provinces, Atta was an important contributor to Abdullah’s campaigns in 2009 and 2014, both in terms of campaign funds and voter mobilisation. In 2009, his support for Abdullah led to a crisis in his relations with the then president, Hamed Karzai. This almost cost him his Balkh governorship, as the president was unhappy about someone he had appointed supporting his main rival in the upcoming election. Relations only improved after Atta paid a ‘reconciliation’ visit to the presidential palace in Kabul.

To be (a governor) or not to be

Atta’s announcement that he intends to run in 2019 came after a major political success: a month earlier, on 20 February 2017, he had finally succeeded in persuading president Ghani to renew his appointment as governor of Balkh province (see media report here), with its capital and economic boomtown Mazar-e Sharif. Up to that point, Atta had served in an ‘acting’ capacity, after the president had decreed, immediately after taking office in 2014, that all provincial governors would be replaced (more AAN analysis here). The deal allows Atta to resign as a ‘full-fledged’ governor – if, indeed, he does run in 2019.

The agreement to keep Atta as Balkh governor highlights his importance and specific role in Afghanistan’s power-play, which made trying to replace him so difficult for Ghani. Atta is not a ‘normal’ governor in the sense that, as an appointee of the centre, he is expected to act as the transmission belt of the central government and its policies, as is the case with most new governors appointed under Ghani. Atta became governor of Balkh in 2004, after a protracted struggle with General Abdurrashid Dostum and his Jombesh party for dominance in this key northern province, which he won. (2) He has since cemented his position – both politically, economically (AAN analysis here) and even culturally. He has had monuments of historical figures from northern Afghanistan built all over Mazar-e Sharif – from Zarathustra and Rumi, to Ahmad Shah Massud – and is sponsoring cultural projects, placing himself in the context of Balkh’s long history and artistic tradition (more AAN analysis here). His entrenched position makes him the last of the de facto autonomous former warlords or commanders, who used to rule over key provinces in the early years after 2001 without much interference from the centre – from Ismail Khan in Herat to Sher Muhammad Akhundzada in Helmand, Gul Agha Sherzai in Kandahar and Haji Din Muhammad in Nangrahar.

It is of similar importance as his governorship that Atta belongs to Jamiat-e Islami’s core leadership. Jamiat is not only one of Afghanistan’s oldest and largest political parties (and, based on a wide network of commanders, still one of its most powerful military factions), but also Ghani’s de facto main coalition partner in the National Unity Government (NUG) that came into being after the botched 2014 presidential election and, in contrast to its name, is marred by almost constant infighting. Now also Abdullah, who was the runner-up and Jamiat’s de facto candidate (3) and became the new government’s chief executive (CE), has come under intense criticism from his own camp (see AAN analysis here) for not delivering on the power-sharing deal included in the NUG agreement (full text here) between its two formerly opposed camps.

It cannot have been an easy decision for Ghani keep Atta in Balkh. Not only had Atta openly supported his fiercest rival during the elections, using strong language against Ghani (including personal accusations of mass electoral fraud), but he also initially refused to recognise him as the elected president and had even threatened to unleash mass protests and to form a “parallel government” (quoted here). Atta, on his part, is well aware of his twofold position of strength, as he confidently expressed in the January 2017 BBC interview: “I remain in my position as governor because of my ability to better serve the people, and because of my political position within Jamiat.”

A look back: Atta’s move toward the Jamiat leadership

Atta’s political offensive has a second dimension. On 13 March 2017, about a week before his Nawruz statement, he sharply and publicly criticised his erstwhile political ally, fellow Jamiat-e Islami party member and NUG chief executive, Dr Abdullah. While addressing a gathering marking the third anniversary of the death of former Vice President Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim, another former Jamiat leader, Atta called his decision to support Abdullah in the 2014 presidential race “the biggest mistake [of] his political career” (Afghan media reporting here). He was quoted accusing Abdullah of selfishness, saying that “Abdullah’s huge[st] achievement is getting a salary and appointing advisors [for himself]” and of not achieving a fair share in the government, because he gives in to the president too often on top appointments. Atta even claimed that Abdullah had been removed from his positions in Jamiat:

After two years and a few months [in the CE office], we separated him from the decision making within the party. (…) We moved his responsibilities to other capable people.

This was not the first time Atta had expressed his disapproval of Abdullah, accusing him of dropping the ball on key Jamiati policy aims. These included strengthening the role of parliament, breaking the president’s institutional grip on the election-related institutions and convening the Loya Jirga, which, according to the NUG agreement was supposed to decide on whether Abdullah’s extra-constitutional position as government chief executive should be abolished or turned into a constitutionally-sanctioned permanent prime ministerial post. In a speech to Jamiat commanders and other supporters in Kapisa province on 30 January 2017, Atta had already spoken about his motives for backing Abdullah in 2014: “I invested in [Abdullah] because he served with Amer Saheb [the late Ahmad Shah Massud] and I thought he might approach the people in the way Amer Saheb did. Unfortunately, that did not happen.”

Over the last few months Atta has sought to re-negotiate the NUG deal with the president on Jamiat’s behalf. That he has now publicly opened up the front against Abdullah suggests that he firmly intends to become Jamiat-e Islami’s new leader.

The position of Jamiat leader has been in a transitional state for almost six years now. Since the Taleban assassinated the party’s founding father and long-standing leader, Borhanuddin Rabbani in 2011, Jamiat has been led by his son, Salahuddin Rabbani. When Salahuddin took the position on 4 October 2011, three weeks after his father’s violent death, it was supposed to only be for two months, after which, according to the party’s constitution, a regular congress was to be convened to choose its permanent leadership. The congress did not take place as planned. It was re-scheduled in 2013 for “after the 2014 presidential election” (more background here), but has yet to take place – which means he is overdue for another 30 months, since then.

Atta has been strengthening his inner-party position, with the aim of becoming the party’s leader for many years. After the power struggle over Mazar-e Sharif fell in his favour in 2004, he built an extensive network of followers from this stronghold to cover the northern provinces. He went public for the first time in 2011 on the very day that Salahuddin Rabbani was appointed interim party leader after his father’s death. He was quoted by the media (4) as saying that he was ready to take the lead of the party to prevent it from splitting and that“[t]here has been a lot of support [for me] from senior party members and if that continues I will take the lead” (see more detail here). In 2013 he was appointed chairman of the party’s Executive Council, which runs the party’s everyday affairs on behalf of the larger leadership council (he replaced Ahmad Zia Massud who became one of the two deputies to the party chairman, a position that is officially higher, but of less practical influence than the Executive Council chair; see more AAN analysis here).

Today, the field of contenders for Jamiat’s top leadership position has thinned, which works in Atta’s favour. Abdullah’s position as the highest-ranking Jamiati in government has been weakened, in the eyes of many party influentials because of his failure – in the eyes of many party influentials – to place the expected number of party members in the NUG. Former defence minister and vice president, Muhammad Qassim Fahim – Ahmad Shah Massud’s anointed successor at the top of Jamiat’s armed wing, Shura-ye Nazar – passed away in March 2014. Ismail Khan, although an influential and indeed now Jamiat’s most senior leader (he is a decade or more older than Qanuni, Abdullah or Atta), is too much of an outsider given his base in Herat. And former interior minister Yunus Qanuni has kept a relatively low profile for a long time, without any indications of ambitions for the party leadership. Recently, however, he has moved more to the forefront again, speaking out about one of Jamiat’s key demands: the shift from the current presidential to a parliamentary system. He also participated in the formation of jihadi councils such as the one led by Ustad Sayyaf (see AAN analysis here). (5)

Atta’s current mobilisation

Atta has been working on his campaign for months. He began negotiating with president Ghani in the last quarter of 2016 in the context of the threat he felt to his gubernatorial position in Balkh, in an attempt to strengthen Jamiat in the NUG and to capitalise on a possible success for the competition about the Jamiat leadership (see AAN analysis here and here). He went the extra mile to disperse any impressions that these efforts might be mainly self-serving. In his speech in Kapisa province in January 2017, for example, he stated that he “received promises to serve as the first vice president and to get millions of dollars” (6) but that he “rejected all this” (see also here). Instead, he said he was trying to ensure Jamiat and its allies were better included in “decision-making on national, international and strategic issues.”

Although Atta claimed he had entered into negotiations with Ghani with the consent of the party’s leadership, a close aide, Farhad Azimi, was quoted by Afghan media in early January 2017, saying “talks are progressing slowly because of disagreements between the party members” (or rather party leaders) – singling out Ismail Khan and Ahmad Zia Massud. Ismail Khan, for example, raised concerns about a “lack of trust” between Abdullah and Atta that would jeopardise Jamiat’s unity. Indeed, public backing for Atta’s talks by the Jamiat leadership council only came a month later, in early February 2017. As it came with a two-month timeline, it put Atta under pressure to deliver on his own promises with regard to government positions. (7) This could be difficult, however, as the president’s camp insists that the talks are about Jamiat’s increased political participation in the government, rather than specific government positions (see for instance the statement made by the president’s deputy spokesman, Shah Hussain Murtazawi, on 1 February 2017).

Headwind for Atta from within Jamiat

Although Jamiat came out in support of Atta’s re-negotiation activities, there remains stiff resistance to his ambitions towards the Jamiat leadership within the party’s leadership council (that, according to the party’s constitution, includes its founders, the leader and the heads of its committees). The leadership council has the authority to convene the party congress, where the new leader will be chosen, but members have told AAN that a majority in its ranks is sceptical of Atta and therefore opposed to convening the congress. Unless the party congress is convened, Salahuddin Rabbani will remain at the party’s head.

Another reason for resistance to Atta, according to the Kabul-based daily Hasht-e Sobh, is that some in the party’s leadership council fear that the tensions between Atta and Abdullah, or any other contenders, could lead to a permanent split of within Jamiat.

There are already various factions and sub-factions within the party that are vying for power, some of them with ‘historical’ claims to the party’s leadership. To bring them under one hat will be a difficult task for whoever who wants to become the new, permanent leader of Jamiat.

If Atta does become head of Jamiat, the lead over the party will, for the first time, in the hands of a northerner. Politically, Jamiat has been led so far by the Rabbani family from Badakhshan in the northeast, a distinct region from Balkh that is culturally and historically part of Afghan Turkestan. His son Salahuddin may be considered too young by those still alive in the older leaders’ generation, although they might not say so publicly. (8) There is no other obvious candidate from Rabbani’s province. The important military wing of the party, Shura-ye Nazari, is in the hands of the Panjshiris. Although officially disbanded, it is still a powerful network linked to the memory of resistance hero Ahmad Shah Massud, to which Massud’s brothers as well as Fahim, Abdullah, Qanuni and former defence and interior minister, Bismillah Muhammadi, belong. The surviving Massud brothers, Ahmad Zia and Ahmad Wali, both lack Ahmad Shah Massud’s charisma or are too intellectual for Jamiat’s membership base. Neither do they have his strong credentials as a fighter and commander. And Fahim did not name anyone who would take his place. This factionalism is another major factor for resistance against Atta’s ambitions for the leadership post.

Another 2009 election poster showing Abdullah and Atta – the one that enraged then president Karzai so much. Photo: Thomas Ruttig.

Conclusion: a step-by-step campaign with hurdles

Atta’s push for Jamiat’s leadership appears to be a first step towards a higher goal: the presidency, an ambition that he has long harboured. Now, as laid out above, the conditions to create a platform with and within Jamiat, seem to be aligning. He can play on the hurt pride of many Jamiatis and Tajiks now that, under Ghani and for the first time since 2001, there is no vice-president from their ethno-political group. He alluded to this in a videotaped message released on 28 October 2016, when he stated that Tajiks in Afghanistan had “suffered most” as the main drivers of the resistance, both against the 1980s Soviet occupation and in the struggle against the Taleban regime. He said they now have “the least representation at the top of the power pyramid and in the leadership of the government” (watch the video here).

Atta has been upfront about his ambitions, while keeping it ambiguous how he will proceed. He left the door open for two options: running on his own, as the Tajik and Jamiat’s candidate or running as a vice-presidential candidate on someone else’s ticket. Such an approach is not uncommon in a political environment, where all sides keep their options open until the last possible moment, in preparation for last-minute manoeuvres. In his statements, however, Atta clearly signalled that although he respects the claims of the older Jamiati generation for a leading position both in the party and the government, Abdullah has squandered his chances, and now it is his [Atta’s] turn.

Although he may feel that his chances had never been better, there are still a number of significant obstacles to overcome on his way to the top. The first is Jamiat’s notorious factionalism and the readiness of its leaders to be co-opted by other contenders, as Karzai capably demonstrated in the 2009 elections (when, with Fahim, he had a Tajik/Jamiati running mate, while running against a Tajik/Jamiati contender, Abdullah, thus splitting their vote bank). The second obstacle is the difficulty of building a broader coalition around Jamiat, as Tajik votes alone will not suffice to win the presidency. Given the unreliability of the Uzbek voter base, still controlled by Dostum (who twice, in 2009 and 2014, switched sides from a pre-election opposition alliance to the camp of the later – Pashtun – winner) will make this goal particularly difficult. Thus, success for Atta is all but certain.

Last but not least, the fact that the Balkh governor has opened launched his campaign for the leadership not only of Jamiat, but also for the presidency in 2019, could have another negative side effect: it could well overshadow matters that are more important to most Afghans, namely the country’s socio-economic situation and prevailing insecurity.

 

(1) Although Nur is the governor’s takhallus – the Afghan equivalent of a surname (that can, however, be changed and is not usually passed on to children) – most Afghans refer to him as “Atta.” This is his given or first name, but its use is not deemed as casual as it would be in the West.

(2) Before his appointment as governor, Atta was commander of the (then-) 7tharmy corps of the pre-Taleban and Jamiat-dominated Islamic State of Afghanistan. These so-called “Afghan militia forces” were partly disbanded and partly reorganised and incorporated into the army and police in the years after 2001.

(3) Officially, Abdullah ran for his multi-party alliance, the National Coalition of Afghanistan (Etelaf-e Melli-ye Afghanistan) of which Jamiat was one member. More detail on this coalition and its relationship with Jamiat in this AAN analysis.

(4) Source: “Balkh Governor Eager to Lead Afghanistan’s Jamiat-e-Islami Party“,
 Tolo News, 3 October 2011 (not online, in the author’s archive).

(5) During a seminar on the political discourse in Afghanistan on 19 January 2017, Qanuni said that the presidential system did not meet “the people’s needs, and in some cases added to the problems” (as summarised by 1TV on Twitter here and here) and that he was “against the centralised presidential system and will continue to call for a parliamentary system in the country.”

In 2014, after Fahim’s death and during president Karzai’s last months in office, Qanuni had also accepted the ‘Tajik’ vice-presidential post that had been held by the late Fahim before. Indirectly, this made him the most senior Jamiati in government at that point.

(6) This alleged offer came against the backdrop of the affair surrounding Uzbek leader and First Vice President Abdulrashid Dostum, who stands accused of having his guards rape a political rival and amidst debates of whether that would cost him his job (a media report here). These accusations emerged publicly in December 2016 (media report here).

(8) Salahuddin Rabbani, however, does not seem to have given up. On 22 February 2017, in a speech at Jamiat’s youth organisation, Sazman-e Jawanan Jamiat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan, he spoke in favour of a parliamentary system “as the best method of governance,” and criticised the fact that no seats had been allocated to political parties in the coming parliamentary election, and promised that Jamiat “will come forward on the scene more coherently in the next Wolesi Jirga elections” and that “we will focus more on the internal cohesion of Jamiat in the year ahead.” (It was unclear whether this “we” was a pluralis majestatis, actually meaning himself, or whether he meant the full Jamiat leadership in general.) His speech can be watched in this video.

American M1114 Uparmored HMMWV Light Protected Vehicle

THOR is a sophisticated, versatile, easy-to-use tactical headgear system offering a versatile and modular head-mounted solution for a wide range of military and security personnel for use in an equally wide variety of demanding and extreme battlefiel…

Emirati Nimr Hafeet 6x6 Light Utility Vehicle

From 3 to 14 April 2017 in the Western Mediterranean, 1 000 French soldiers participate in SKRENVIL operational training. This joint exercise between the French Army and the Navy is designed to ensure amphibious deployment procedures.

As part of this operational training, an amphibious group is deployed in the Mediterranean. It is composed of the Dixmude (Projection and Command Ship,BPC), Cassard (Antiaircraft Frigate, FAA), Montcalm (Anti-submarine Frigate, FASM) and the Mediterranean demining group (GPD Med). Command Landing Group / CLG is provided at the 2nd Foreign Infantry Regiment (2nd REI).

A Joint Battle Group (GTIA) of the 6th Light Armored Brigade composed of different units of the 2th REI, 1st REG (Foreign Regiment of Engineers), 1st REC (Foreign Cavalry Regiment), 3rd RAMa (Marine Artillery Regiment) of the 5th RHC (Combat Helicopter Regiment), is created for the occasion. The major equipment involved is 15 VBCI (Armored Infantry Combat Vehicle) and a dozen VAB (Front Armored Vehicle), as well as 4 Puma and Gazelle helicopters.

The amphibious detachment boarded the Diksmuide with its 2 Equipment Chalands (CTM) and a Rapid Amphibious Landing Craft (EDAR).
This training consists of two phases:
- evacuation of nationals,
- followed by a grounding of the GTIA.
In total, some 20 vehicles, maneuver helicopters and attack helicopters will have to land in a coordinated way to make a progression of about 30 kilometers.

This training is characterized by a suitable training ground, the realism of the scenario, the means and the military capabilities. These are all specific features that allow the Army and the Navy to maneuver jointly and to be sufficiently reactive in the event of an amphibious operation.

Tag: SKRENVIL-2017

Yesterday’s US airstrikes on the Al Shayrat airfield near Homs seems to have been calculated to allow the Trump administration to appear to be acting decisively without necessarily getting bogged down in a conflict or creating a serious confrontation with Russia. To this end, the Pentagon warned Russian authorities about the strikes ahead of time and Russia did not take any steps to activate its air defenses in Syria. At the same time, by warning Russia, the U.S. government ensured that the strike would have very little effect on Syrian military capabilities. Damage reports indicate that the aircraft that were destroyed at the air base were under repair. Most likely, Russian officials warned the Syrian government that the attacks were coming and any valuable aircraft at the base had time to depart prior to the strikes.

As Vladimir Frolov highlighted just yesterday, the use of chemical weapons by Syrian government forces has placed Russia in a difficult position. Russian efforts to deny Syrian government culpability in the attacks have strained credulity. At the same time, Russian leaders clearly felt that they could not hang Assad out to dry. Assad’s goal may well have been to scuttle any chances for peace negotiations to proceed, in order to force his somewhat reluctant Russian ally to agree to an offensive that would culminate in the elimination of rebel forces from their area of control around Idlib. Russia is thus put in a bind, as it can neither give up on Assad nor fully control him.

In this situation, the U.S. airstrikes may help Moscow out of its difficult situation. Russian leaders can now turn the focus away from the chemical weapons attack itself and toward the U.S. airstrikes as a violation of Syrian sovereignty. At the same time, Assad has been put on notice that the U.S. is not going to stand idly by if he persists in using chemical weapons, which may make him more reluctant to take that risk again, eliminating that method of putting pressure on Russia from his toolkit.

All in all, Russia is unlikely to take steps in response to the airstrikes beyond the usual Foreign Ministry protestations, as long as the strikes are a one time demonstrative act, rather than the start of a more sustained U.S. campaign against the Assad regime in Syria. If the United States continues to attack Syrian government forces, on the other hand, that will place Russia in a difficult position, where it has to choose between abandoning its ally and risking a serious military confrontation with the United States. How Vladimir Putin would choose to act in this circumstance is very much unclear. The consequences of forcing Russia into this choice could be very risky.

Additive Manufacturing (AM), widely known as 3D-printing, has been identified as one of the key enabling technologies to improve European industrial competitiveness.

Although AM technologies have been developed in the civil sector, it is considered that there is significant potential for additive manufacturing technologies to enhance defence capabilities. Among them, the most likely are mobility, sustainability, effect and protection through e.g. field repair & maintenance, reduced logistic burden and improved sustainability in warfightingand peacekeeping missions. Substantial economic benefits are also expected.

To identify and explore areas where additive manufacturing will have a wider  impact, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has commissioned Fundación Prodintec (http://www.prodintec.es/en/) and MBDA FR (http://www.mbda-systems.com/) to conduct a project on “Additive Manufacturing Feasibility Study & Technology Demonstration”, with expected delivery in December 2017. The study  targets the entire spectrum of European defence and Additive Manufacturing (AM) stakeholders, at all levels of defence and AM supply chains.

The project is composed of three work strands with specific and intertwined objectives: 

• A desktop study to place AM and its potential in a defence context. The main outcome of this work strand will be the identification of opportunities for AM in the European defence sector. At the same time, it will aim to highlight factors preventing European defence forces from reaping the benefits of this breakthrough technology
• The second work strand is a technology demonstration of AM  in a simulated deployment scenario. Its purpose is to demonstrate the feasibility and operational utility of deploying these technologies in support of a military operation
• Following the desktop study and the technology demonstration, the conclusions of this feasibility study, including the equipment used and typical objects and materials produced, will be presented in an exhibition. The objective is to raise the military awareness of AM  technology and to exemplify how it could improve the way operations, logistic support or maintenance of platforms are conducted.

Therefore, this study has the objective of raising awareness in the defence community and of promoting a better understanding of the potential held by these technologies, thereby stimulating their implementation in defence specific areas. By doing so, not only the R&T community will be informed, but also other potential beneficiaries of the technology, linked to the EDA capabilities mentioned above. This will create a synergy between the Materials R&T community and the operational staff, helping the R&T community to understand the requirements from the operational side.

The contractor for the study has recently kicked off the consultation process through different means (questionnaires, interviews, etc.) with all competent stakeholders, such as: participant Member States MoDs, European Commission, European Space Agency (ESA), European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB), and AM related stakeholders (Industry, SMEs and academia).

Ministries of Defence stakeholders are especially invited to take part in the consultation, by replying to the questionnaire from the dedicated link (below), by Thursday, 30 April 2017 at the latest. If you have any technical difficulty or if you need any further clarification, please do not hesitate to contact the EDA contractor via dsg@prodintec.com.

For additional information/clarifications, the contractor’s point of contact Almudena GONZÁLEZ ÁLVAREZ (e-mail: aga@prodintec.com, phone: +34 984 390 060 (Ext: 1505)), while the EDA point of contact is Patricia LÓPEZ VICENTE (e-mail: patricia.lopezvicente@eda.europa.eu, phone: +32 (0)2 504 2890).

 

More information:

• Contractor’s questionnaire on Additive Manufacturing impact on Defence
• EDA letter - support to Additive Manufacturing feasibility study & technology demonstration
• EDA news on the AM kick-off meeting (December 2016)

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