Defence`s Feeds

Americas

• The USMC has issued a $60 million contract to Raytheon for TOW missiles. Delivery of the missiles is expected to be completed by December 28, 2018. The weapons are designed to help ground forces engage armored targets like tanks and can also be mounted to land platforms such as the Styker and Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

• Further orders for Oshkosh’s Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) have been made by the US Army. 409 of the vehicles will be produced in a $179 million contract, with work expected to be completed by this December. Initial low-rate production of the JLTV began last year, as the US Army and USMC look to replace their Humvees.

Middle East & North Africa

• Turkey’s Aselsan and Saudi Arabia’s Taqnia have formed a joint venture focusing on military electronics. Known as SADEC, the venture will include the building of a factory in Saudi Arabia on the idea of “creating the most advanced available technology.” Radars, electronic warfare suites and electro-optical technology will be developed and manufactured with a view to selling them to the Saudi and Gulf markets.

• Qatar is looking at the Turkish armor industry for the provision of 1,000 armored vehicles, as Turkish industry aggressively pursues markets in various parts of Asia. A joint venture including Turkish manufacturer BMC, Germany’s Rheinmetall and Malaysia’s Etika Strategi are involved in the negotiations for various armor platform configurations, although specifics on models sought by the Gulf kingdom remain undisclosed.

Europe

• The Russian Navy has stated that the Ka-52K is slated to replace all current fleets of Ka-29 assault transport helicopters as well as inducting ship-based UAVs as part of long-term naval plans. Russian naval aviation chief, Maj. Gen. Igor Kozhin, made the announcement on Monday, adding that “carrier-based fighter aviation units will get MiG-29K and MiG-29KUB fighter jets in 2017-2020.” The 4++ generation fighters can destroy targets at sea and ground with high-precision guided weapons day and night, in any weather conditions.

Asia Pacific

• Japan is looking to sell Kawasaki P-1 and C-2 maritime patrol aircraft to New Zealand in what could be Tokyo’s first major arms sale. Classified data on both platforms was provided in September, as Wellington gathers information on other potential acquisitions from US and European competitors. Any deal will involve maintenance of the aircraft and New Zealand might get a chance to produce certain components for the planes under a technology transfer.

• During his New Year’s speech, North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un announced that his country will test an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads this year. Reuters reported a senior US military official as saying that although Pyongyang appears able to put a miniaturized nuclear warhead on a missile, the missile re-entry technology necessary for longer range strikes is still a serious obstacle to their weapons development. Needless to say, the international community has condemned it.

• Korea Aircraft Industries (KAI) has secured a $523 million contract to provide KUH-1 Surion transport helicopters to South Korea’s marines. The deal covers the production and delivery of 30 helicopters, expected between 2017-2023. Modifications found on the marine variant include foldable blades, emergency floats that can deploy with the press of a button, optional long-range fuel tanks, as well as the ability to carrying nine fully equipped marines in addition to four crew members.

Today’s Video

2016 naval aviation year-in-review:

KHP/Surion rollout
(click to view full)

South Korea currently owns around 700 helicopters, but more than half are considered outdated, and they need to be replaced. December 2005 marked the endgame for a South Korean competition to produce about 245 utility transport helicopters, which would be developed and produced as a semi-indigenous program. The KHP/ Surion is in the 8-tonne class, and is designed to carry 11 troops. Industrial offsets were also important, as the program is designed to boost Korea’s ability to design and build its own rotary-wing aircraft. EADS Eurocopter was chosen as the cooperating partner.

The Korean government gave its final approval of the contract in June 2006, and the project is underway. Note that while company releases place the program’s value at $6-8 billion, the program hasn’t reached that level yet. The initial contract was for KRW 1.3 trillion ($1.3 billion), and is for research and development only. That development finished in April 2013, and the main production contract is next. It will proceed in parallel with additional contracts to develop Surion specialty versions for Korea’s federal police and Marine Corps, and all of these models will be offered for export through a joint venture with Eurocopter.

The KHP (now KUH) Program

In February 2005 the Ministry of National Defense announced that would launch a multi-billion-dollar procurement project to build utility helicopters in December 2005. A total of 5 trillion won ($4.5 billion) was budgeted for this Korean Helicopter Program (KHP), including research and development expenditures.

The project is aimed at producing hundreds of “Korean Utility Helicopters” (KUH) to replace the aging UH-1H Hueys currently in service. Industrial offsets are also important considerations, as the program is designed to boost indigenous industrial manufacturing capability for rotary-wing aircraft.

Making Surion
click for video

This was a cut-down project from the original effort, which aimed to create a core platform that could have utility or attack helicopter sections built onto it, creating a pair of helicopter types with significant commonality. That original effort was not necessarily an overstretch; the US Marine Corps new UH-1Y Hueys and AH-1Z attack helicopters already embody a high-commonality approach.

The KUH/attack approach does add complexity risk, however, and South Korea ended up buying the AH-64E Apache to address their attack helicopter needs. At the lower end, KAI is developing a Light Armed Helicopter, but commonality is limited to “utilizing technology acquired through KUH development.”

Program and Industrial

DAPA: KUH
click for video

The KUH programme was formally launched in 2006. As of October 2007 the KHP project began to take the name “Korean Utility Helicopter,” and its July 2009 rollout saw reports that began to refer to it as the “Surion” (suri = eagle, on = perfection).

Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) is the prime contractor. As the primary partner, EADS Eurocopter will provide technical assistance, and supply the rotor mast, transmission, and autopilot subassemblies. Eurocopter has a stake of 30% in the development phase, and 20% in the production phase.

The initial contract was worth KRW 1.3 trillion ($1.3 billion at the time), and covered research and development only. By the time development finished in 2013, it had spent just KRW 1.2 billion, despite running a bit more than a year past its deadline.

Contracts for the KRW 4.1 trillion production project will be struck separately. Full scale production was expected to begin in 2012, but development wasn’t finished until April 2013.

Initial market expectations were stated as 250 helicopters, indicating a very limited market beyond South Korea’s order. Eurocopter later revised this to 300 machines, and the business plan changed again when the partnership decided that they would offer a civilian version after 2011. This was a significant move, as the design would compete with existing Eurocopter offerings like the new 7 tonne EC 175. By 2013, expectations had grown again, to 400 civil government and military machines in South Korea alone.

In the military market, South Korea’s Yonhap News agency quoted an anonymous government source in July 2009, who said that:

“Seoul also aims to win 300 overseas orders for the KUH in the next 25 years, a government official said on condition of anonymity. That is roughly 30 percent of the projected global demand for Surion-type choppers, which are larger than the UH-1 Iroquois but smaller than the UH-60 Black Hawks.”

As of April 2013, KAI is still using those figures as its export target, even though the competitive field has become more crowded. That’s a tall order if you’re up against competitors like the AW189, Bell 525, and EC175, plus slightly larger de facto competitors like the EC Puma family, Mi-17, NH90, and Sikorsky H-60 family.

KAI’s Surion

KUH Surion
(click to view full)

Some initial sources indicated that their KHP project bid would be based on the Dauphin-derived EC155/ AS 565 Panther, and the diagram initially provided in local media reports appeared to bear that out. The final design bears some similarities to the EC155 and the Puma family, but many differences.

The KUH Surion is 15m long x 2m wide x 4.5m high, with a maximum takeoff weight of 8.7 tonnes. It’s powered by 2 of GE’s popular T-700 turboshaft engines, and incorporates HUMS prognostics throughout the helicopter to provide constant monitoring and advance warning of mechanical issues. Range is reportedly around 480 km.

The cockpit and frame will be armored to handle 7.62mm strikes, while the fuel tanks will be armored up to resist 12.7mm or 14.5mm rounds. More active warning and protection systems are provided by a partnership between EADS Cassidian and South Korea’s LigNex1, and include the widely used AN/AAR-60 MILDS missile warning system.

Expected personnel capacity is 2 crew plus up to 9 fully-armed soldiers. There are some online sources that give the helicopters 4 hardpoints and weapons up to wire-guided TOW missiles, but KAI’s own materials say nothing about that, and there have been no reports of weapon trials.

Contracts & Key Events 2016 – 2017

Surion ATH
(click to view full)

January 4/17: Korea Aircraft Industries (KAI) has secured a $523 million contract to provide KUH-1 Surion transport helicopters to South Korea’s marines. The deal covers the production and delivery of 30 helicopters, expected between 2017-2023. Modifications found on the marine variant include foldable blades, emergency floats that can deploy with the press of a button, optional long-range fuel tanks, as well as the ability to carrying nine fully equipped marines in addition to four crew members.

September 26/16: It’s back to the drawing board for KAI’s KUH-1 Surion as the Korean-made utility helicopter failed a number of extreme climate tests in the USA. If successful, the testing would have given the Surion an international standard and boosted export chances. Several parts will now be redesigned to rectify the defects found during the testing, which puts the helicopter through very challenging humid and freezing temperatures.

2012 – 2013

ROK certifications; Development complete; ROK orders maritime version.

Oct 16/13: Sub-contractors. Elbit Systems announces a follow-on contract for full production of improved ANVIS/HUD 24 Helmet Mounted Displays to equip production Surion helicopters. The initial order that made them part of the project (q.v. March 25/09) was for the system development phase, which ended in March 2013. Sources: Elbit Systems: ANVIS/HUD 24T brochure [PDF] | Oct 16/13 release.

April 16/13: Surion ATH. South Korea’s DAPA procurement agency announces a KRW 800 million (about $733 million) project to develop the ROK Marine Corps’ transport and utility helicopter, which will be a Surion variant. KAI is scheduled to complete development by the end of 2015.

The helicopters will serve on the ROKS Dokdo LHD, and the ROKN also possesses LST ships whose helicopter decks may be able to accomodate the 8-ton class machines. DAPA projects that the Surions “will help double the Korean military’s independent landing operation capability,” while offering greater range than their existing UH-1 Hueys.

KAI’s release is optimistic, forecasting a potential Korean demand of up to 400 helicopters over the 20 years for the ROK’s Army, Marine Corps, Police (vid. 2011 entry), a future MEDEVAC variant, and orders/variants for South Korea’s Coast Guard, Fire Department and Korea Forest Service. They’re also holding to their original forecast of 30% share within global segment demand of over 1,000 helicopters, even though several competitors have entered this segment since the Surion began development.

If KAI’s accompanying graphic looks realistic, that’s because they photoshopped a Surion on top of a real 2010 picture, replacing the USN SH-60F Seahawk that was actually flying over ROKS Dokdo. But they didn’t strip the picture’s metadata, which is actually kind of honest. KAI.

Surion naval utility: system development

March 28-29/13: KAI announces that the KUH/ Surion has completed its development, making South Korea the 11th country in the world to develop a helicopter. The firm says that total investments from KAI, DAPA, and the ROK Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy totaled KRW 1.2 billion (around $1.1 billion). The program involved a combination of KAI, Eurocopter, and government research bodies; and included 98 local vendors, 49 foreign partners, and 28 colleges/research institutes. Overall, about 62.5% of the KUH project budget was “localized” in Korea.

The 4 prototypes successfully completed around 2,700 hours of flight tests, and checked about 7,600 test requirements. KAI.

Surion base model development complete

Feb 21/13: Testing. The Surion finishes low-temperature testing in Alaska, USA. South Korea gets plenty of its own cold weather, but you might as well go where you’re guaranteed ultra-frigid conditions. The tests involved about 50 flights. KAI.

June 2012: Certified. South Korea bestows airworthiness and military certifications on Surion. That seems like an odd thing to do before development is complete. Even if it’s necessary to allow deliveries, certification often means that subsequent fixes are the government’s responsibility. Source: KAI.

2008 – 2011

Surion rollout and 1st flight; Police version SDD; Export JV established.

KUH Surion-Police
(click to view full)

2011: Police version. KAI’s English press release is unclear, but they refer to an apparent agreement with the Korea Police Agency to develop a Surion version for them. The KNPA is a national police force under the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, and they have 10 “squadrons” of SWAT teams whose tasks include counter-terrorism and hostage rescue. Source: KAI | Shephard Media.

Police version

July 13/11: Sub-contractors. EADS Cassidian announces a “multi-million euro” contract from Korean Aircraft Industries to supply 24 of its AN/AAR-60 MILDS (Missile Launch Detection System) missile warning systems, with deliveries continuing until 2013. Each system uses about 4 passive sensors, which detect the ultraviolet radiation signature of approaching missiles. Cassidian was working with Korea’s Lig Nex1 to develop the helicopter’s overall electronic countermeasures system, and delivered 36 sensors during the development phase.

MILDS is widely used on a number of helicopter and aircraft models, and EADS’ cooperation in the Surion’s design made it an almost certain choice here.

May 3/11: KAI-EC. Korean Aerospace and Eurocopter establish the KAI-EC joint stock company, based in Seoul to export the Surion helicopter. KAI.

KAI-EC export JV

June 22/10: Official maiden flight. The official maiden test flight is conducted at KAI’s facility in Sacheon, South Chungcheong. Another 3 test helicopters will be built, and test flights will continue through September 2010. This will be followed by “mass production” beginning in March 2012, and “full-scale production” beginning in June 2012. DAPA Commissioner Byun Moo-keun reiterated the program’s core rationale during his speech:

“Despite the fact that our military ranks in seven in the world in operating the number of military helicopter, we have been relying on foreign countries in importing major technologies in developing functions and maintenance… The successful development of Surion has not only led in operating the military tactics efficiently but also formed the basis in improving our own aerospace industry technology.”

See: South Korean MND.

March 10/10: Fly! The Surion has its 30-minute 1st flight at Sacheon, including taxi, hover turns, and a stationary hover at 30 feet. KAI says the flight test program will see the helicopter flying at 140 knots and 2,000 feet by April 2010, and an official ceremony of the first flight will take place in May 2010. Defense News | Shephard Group.

1st flight

ANVIS/HUD
(click to view full)

Nov 2/09: Sub-contractors. Elbit Systems announces that KAI has named them as one of their top 4 Elite Suppliers for the Korean Utility Helicopter (KUH) program, during the firm’s supplier symposium. Elbit supplies the helicopter’s ANVIS/HUD Helmet Mounted Displays, Vehicle Information systems (VIS) and a Data Transfer Systems (DTS). They’re also a subcontractor to KAI for systems engineering and integration of the entire KUH avionics system.

Oct 1/09: KAH delayed. The South Korean government decides to delay its proposed Korean Attack Helicopter program, which was expected to share some 60-70% commonality with the KUH/ Surion. Flight International.

July 31/09: KAI formally unveils the first KUH helicopter, at a ceremony in the southwestern city of Saechon. Attending dignitaries include South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. The new helicopter will be called the “Surion,” and the Yonhap News report says that it sources 60% of its parts from local manufacturers, including the rotor blades and its prognostic health and usage monitoring systems (HUMS). The prototype is due to fly early in 2010, and will eventually be joined by another 3 flight test aircraft. Lee Jae-hong, head of the South Korean Ministry of Knowledge Economy’s machinery, aerospace and defense industry division, adds that:

“Even though it is a military helicopter, the KUH already satisfies 96% or 2,363 of the 2,460 international operational standards for civilian helicopters.”

KAI and Eurocopter also plan to pursue civilian sales beginning in 2011, in order to improve their return on investment. Yonhap | The Korea Herald | The Korea Times | Flight International | Rotorhub.

KUH rollout

March 25/09: Sub-contractors. Flight international reports that Elbit Systems has received a contract from Korea Aerospace Industries to supply “advanced helmet-mounted display systems” for the KUH program. The initial contract covers those development aircraft due to be delivered in 2009-10, but continued cooperation could lead to follow-on orders to equip the entire KUH fleet, and possibly other Korean helicopters as well.

Elbit’s ANVIS/HUD combines day and night vision goggles with key flight symbology, allowing “head up, look-out flying at all times. It has been used by the US military since the mid-1990s, and has equipped more than 5,000 helicopters belonging to 20 countries. Integrated platforms include the H-60 series, CH-53, CH-47, CH-46, V-22, AH-1, UH-1, Super Puma, Cougar, and others. Elbit’s HeliDASH system is a higher end choice.

The KUH HMD fits somewhere in the middle. Elbit personnel describe the Korean order as “…the ANVIS-HUD24 with additional capabilities which I am not at liberty to specify.”

2005 – 2007

Eurocopter wins deal; Contract approved; MoU for joint venture; Innovative fuel bladders; Defensive suite picked.

Later KHP concept
(click to view larger)

Oct 18/07: Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and Eurocopter sign of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to create a Joint Venture (JV) Company for the worldwide sales and marketing of the Korean Utility Helicopter (KUH). It will be in operation by 2010. With a shareholding structure of 51% for KAI and 49% ownership for Eurocopter. Eurocopter role is to provide technical assistance for the development of the helicopter as well as certain sub-assemblies, the transmission, and the autopilot. About 40 Eurocopter engineers are housed at Sacheon (Korea) with KAI.

The Eurorcopter release sets expected Korean orders at about 250 KUH helicopters, while estimating KUH production at “an order of 300 helicopters.”

Oct 15/07: Sub-contractors. EADS Defence & Security announces that it will equip the KHP helicopter with its MILDS AN/AAR-60 self-protection system. Over 5,000 AN/AAR-60 units have been produced and installed aboard a wide variety of rotary wing and wide body aircraft, often as part of a multi-spectral suite of sensors; a version for fighter aircraft is under development.

This advanced, passive imaging sensor detects and tracks the ultraviolet emissions of approaching missiles. All approaches have advantages and disadvantages. As Aramada Magazine’s “Fighting an Invisible Threat” explains, ultraviolet seekers tend to be more effective at lower and slower targets, and are less vulnerable to false acquisitions such as decoys. The sensors are also smaller, lighter and require less cooling. On the flip side, they are more vulnerable to atmospheric conditions, and tend to have poorer sensitivity and resolution than other options such as infrared.

EADS DS will provide the equipment for the development phase, but from 2008 onward the sensors will be integrated by the Korean company LIGNex1 into the KHP self-protection system.

Oct 15/07: KOIS reports that a real-size model of the KHP/KUH transport helicopter will be on display at the Seoul 2007 air show that opens in Seongnam Oct 16-21/07. This will be the first time the helicopter’s form and interior design will be unveiled publicly. The development program is now code-named “Korean Utility Helicopter (KUH),” and aims to produce a prototype in 2009 and begin mass-production in 2012. KOIS adds:

“Under the 1.3-trillion-won ($1.38 billion) program, Korea aims to produce 245 advanced transport helicopters. The DAPA also expects exports of the envisioned helicopters, each priced at around 15 billion won. The 14.7-meter helicopter can carry two gunners and nine other troops, along with two pilots.”

March 1/07: Sub-contractors. GKN Aerospace announces that they have been selected by Hanwha Corporation to supply fuel bladders for the Korean Helicopter Programme (KHP). This contract, awarded by Hanwha Corporation, has a value approaching $3.5 million and is the culmination of a lengthy collaboration. Phase 1 of the contract involves completing the development activity which will be finalized this year, followed by testing and initial production during 2008. Phase 2 commences in 2009, with preparation and first assembly activities at Hanwha’s facilities in Korea.

The fuel bladders will be manufactured using a GKN developed, MIL spec material, which is far more flexible than current materials. This flexibility eases and speeds installation and greatly reduces the potential for damage to the bladder during the installation process. The material is also lighter than current products and, critically, offers a faster self-sealing capability in the event of damage during helicopter operations. GKN release.

Initial KUH Concept
(click to view full)

Oct 31/06: MEP solicitation. KAI release:

“For the Korean Helicopter Program (KHP) propelled by Republic of Korea Government, notice of solicitation for korean/foreign industries participation is hereby issued in the area of Mission Equipment Package (MEP) whose development efforts will be led by Agency for Defense Development and procurement activities will be led by Korea Aerospace Ind., Ltd. (KAI) or Nex1 Future Co., Ltd.”

Full solicitation [PDF].

June 2/06: Final approval. The Korean government gives its final approval of the KHP/KUH contract.

Approval

April 12/06: DAPA OK. South Korea’s DAPA (Defense Acquisition Program Administration) formalizes the decision to acquire 245 utility helicopters to be developed by Korea Aerospace Industries Limited in partnership with Eurocopter, and produced as from 2011 onwards. EADS release.

Dec 12/05: Korean Aeronautics Industries (KAI) announces that it has wrapped up KHP negotiations with the French-German manufacturer Eurocopter, as opposed to Bell Helicopter of the USA or the Anglo-Italian firm AgustaWestland. The Chosun Ibo reports that “The Defense Ministry will finalize its decision after consulting a committee on the KAI recommendations and investigating the potential for technology transfer.” The next day, EADS Eurocopter’s release confirmed a win on the 245 helicopter contract, adding:

“The 6-year KHP development phase will run from 2006 to 2011; In the following 10-year production phase, 245 helicopters are to be manufactured… The KHP helicopter is in the 8 metric ton class and is capable of carrying 2 pilots and 11 troops with an endurance of well over two hours. The helicopter is equipped with the very latest technological advances.

Eurocopter and KAI have agreed to set up a 50/50 subsidiary to market the export version of the KHP helicopter. Forecasts needs for this utility helicopter on the world market are set at 250 machines over 20 years.”

Development actually takes until April 2013.

Eurocopter wins KHP

Additional Readings & Sources

• KAI – KUH-Surion

• Army Technology – KAI Surion Light Utility Helicopter, South Korea

• GlobalSecurity.org – Korean Helicopter Program

• Wikipedia – General Electric T700

• DID (Dec 14/05) – Korean E-X & Helicopter Competitions Reaching Endgame?

• The Dong-A Iibo (Dec 1/05) – As Ties Wane, So Does Taste for US Arms

Retronic is an ISO 9001-certified company based in Hamburg, Germany. It has been a project-oriented partner for more than two decades, designing and producing highly reliable electronic systems, with a particular emphasis on power conversion.

The Taleban movement is winning ground in the northern province of Badakhshan, a province that was never conquered when the Taleban were in power in the 1990s. Over the past two years, a new generation of largely Tajik Taleban has come to pose a serious challenge for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) : a number of districts have changed hands between the ANSF and insurgents, and two strategic districts are now insurgent strongholds. Its success seems partly due to a recruitment policy that – in contrast to the 1990s – favours local non-Pashtuns for key provincial positions and as fighters. In this provincial case study, AAN’s Obaid Ali analyses the Taleban’s new recruitment policy and how it has strengthened the movement (with input from Borhan Osman and Thomas Ruttig).

In 2004, as the insurgency began to gather pace, setting up a shadow administration was one of the Taleban’s major political strategies for controlling both territory and population. Over the years, in the Tajik and Uzbek-dominated provinces in the north, the movement increasingly appointed local non-Pashtuns, from shadow governors – both at the provincial and district level – to judges and heads of provincial committees. In Badakhshan, a Tajik-dominated province, most Taleban posts are now occupied by Tajiks.

The shift in the movement’s recruitment strategy seems to have had a visible impact on its battlefield gains in Badakhshan. To put this into historical perspective, a comparison of the Taleban’s recruitment in Badakhshan during the current insurgency period and the movement’s years of rule, is useful.

Badakhshan’s contribution to the Taleban regime during the 1990s

During the Taleban regime in the 1990s, there were no more than a handful of high-ranking Taleb figures from Badakhshan. They were:

• Mawlawi Sayed Ghiasuddin, a Tajik from Badakhshan who served among the Taleban leadership soon after the formation of the movement in the mid-1990s;
• Qari Din Muhammad Hanif, a Tajik originally from Yaftal district in Badakhshan. During the Taleban regime he served as the Taleban minister for Planning and Higher Education. Now, Qari Din Muhammad is a member of the Taleban office in Qatar (read more background here) and was one of the first official Taleban representatives to publicly explain his movement’s position with regards to peace talks, which he did during an academic conference in Kyoto in 2012 (see AAN analysis here);
• And, less well known, Mullah Zaher, Shaber Ahmad and Mullah Nur-ul-Huda, who operated as military commanders, although not in their home province.

While the Badakhshanis’ representation within the Taleban leadership was limited, the province did produce hundreds of Taleban fighters. A sizeable number of religious Badakhshani students who had been studying in madrassas in Peshawar and Karachi joined the movement’s ranks and constituted one of its largest non-Pashtun groups. These Badakhshani fighters suffered hundreds of casualties during the Taleban’s Emirate.

The first significant incident involving the Badakhshani Taleban was a clash between the Taleban and Northern Alliance fighters in Topkhana, an area in Zebak district near Badakhshan’s border with Pakistan, in 1998. Hundreds of Taleban fighters led by Mullah Sharif, a commander originally from Warduj district, stormed check points controlled by Northern Alliance commanders in a cross-border attack from Pakistan. After overcoming minor resistance, the Taleban took control of the area. This first appearance of the Badakhshani Taleban was a warning to the Northern Alliance. Its local commanders, particularly the most famous Jamiat-e Islami commander of the province, Sayed Najmuddin Waseq, took steps to repel Mullah Sharif’s fighters and prevent further Taleban infiltration in the province. He gathered hundreds of fighters to retake control of the Topkhana area, and inflicted heavy casualties: according to locals, hundreds of Taleban fighters, mainly Badakhshanis, as well as their commander, were mercilessly killed.

This incident affected many families in the province, who lost their pro-Taleban young sons. It also created a rift among Badakhshani clerics from both warring sides. The clash in Topkhana amounted to a failure of early Taleban attempts to infiltrate Badakhshan, demonstrating that the province was a Northern Alliance stronghold, impossible for the Taleban to take. Indeed, Badakhshan was one of few places the Taleban never controlled during their regime. Recent events illustrate how much this dynamic has changed, with the Taleban now successfully implementing a strategy not only to infiltrate but also to seize and to hold ground in Badakhshan.

The new non-Pashtun Taleban leadership in Badakhshan

After the reemergence of the Taleban in 2004, the movement invested its energy in recruiting a larger number of non-Pashtun Taleban in Pakistani madrassas in order to strengthen its support among the local population in those provinces. This shift in approach reflected (and still reflects) the movement’s changed attitude towards Afghans of non-Pashtun ethnic backgrounds, which had evolved from essentially seeking to exclude them from most leadership positions, even in areas where they constituted the majority to a more inclusive approach. This shift may also have been a manoeuvre by the Taleban leadership to portray the movement post-2001 as a national rather than a Pashtun-dominated one. In this strategy, the Taleban created more space for other ethnic groups to join the movement, not only as fighters, but also as local Taleban officials.

These Taleban were mainly from rural areas in northern Afghanistan. After 2001, thousands of students from Badakhshan flocked to madrassas in Peshawar and Karachi to take advantage of the free food and accommodation, as well as the religious teaching – a remarkable increase compared to the time of the Taleban regime. As a result, the movement has gained a particularly significant recruitment base from among the students from conservative Warduj, Argo and Jurm districts. This has translated into influence in these areas. It was from Warduj where the Badakhshani Taleban launched their first serious attack. In October 2006, they ambushed a German PRT patrol in the district; the attack lasted for four hours and only ended after US air support was called in.

From 2008, and in sharp contrast to behaviour exhibited during the Taleban regime (1994-2001), the Taleban leadership council offered most local posts to this new generation of local Taleban, instead of merely using Badakhshani recruits from Pakistani madrassas as foot-soldiers.

While the Taleban’s recruitment of the Badakhshani students exploited their radicalisation from Pakistani madrassas, not all those who joined the movement’s ranks did so for ideological reasons. The Taleban’s success in recruitment also seems to have banked on Badakhshan’s fragmented politics. The political dynamics in the province have long been defined by a struggle between local powerbrokers. This provided the Taleban with various opportunities. For instance, Jamiat commanders in Jurm and Kuran wa Munjan districts competed for control of smuggling routes and natural resources and used a small group of armed men, whom they described as Taleban, to threaten each other. On a number of occasions in 2008, powerbrokers granted safe passage to insurgents seeking to reach their battlefields in Takhar and Kunduz. In return the insurgents avoided fighting in those areas of Badakhshan where they received safe passage. In fact, in 2008 the Taleban were not strong enough to pose a threat to the powerbrokers in Badakhshan but the deal helped them to secure safe transit routes. Until 2009, Taleban efforts in Badakhshan still primarily consisted of “travelling recruiters trying to influence local mullahs and perhaps a few small pockets in the process of formation, but without yet much of an impact,” according to this earlier AAN report.

While the Taleban’s strategy of recruiting locally in Badakhshan dates back to 2004, it accelerated from 2012 onwards. Since then, a new cadre drawn mostly from a younger generation has been appointed to lead the insurgents’ fronts in the province. One example of this type was Qari Shamsuddin in conservative Warduj district. Shamsuddin received a religious education in Pakistan. At first he led a small group of around 20 fighters in Warduj, but later he expanded his influence into the neighbouring districts of Zebak, Baharak and Yamgan. In 2012, however, he was killed following a US airstrike. As AAN previously reported (see previous AAN paper about power structures in Badakhshan here), the Taleban received support “from those parts of the population excluded from the provincial patronage networks since the late 2000s” in Badakhshan.

In 2013, the Taleban appointed Qari Fasehuddin from Isterab village in Warduj district as shadow governor and head of the military commission in Badakhshan. Fasehuddin is a young cleric from a well-known religious family. He received his education during the Taleban regime in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Fasehuddin’s father, Mawlawi Saifuddin, served as an imam in the 1980s in Warduj. He was not only highly respected and influential there but also in the other conservative districts, such as Yumgan, Jurm and Baharak. Since 2013, Qari Fasehuddin has been known as one of the most prominent commanders in the province.

In the same year, the shadow governor appeared for the first time in a Taleban propaganda film, speaking about the security situation in Badakhshan (the link is no longer available). Thereafter, Fasehuddin, a talented speaker, released a series of videos in which he discussed the virtues of jihad and accused the government of being a puppet to the infidels. In 2015, pro-Taleban social media activists released a video clip of Qari Fasehuddin addressing surrendered Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers in Yumgan district (see this media report), during which he referred to the 2012 Quran burning at the US base in Bagram (read more here) and asked, rhetorically, whether it was fair “to shot dead those who protest against the burning of the holy book”. He appealed to all ANA soldiers not to trust the US and the promises they had made over the past decade.

It is hard to estimate the Taleban’s precise military strength in Badakhshan. However, a source close to the Taleban told AAN that the shadow governor leads more than a thousand fighters. Gholam Sakhi Ghafuri, Badakhshan’s police chief, estimates that there are around 2,000 Taleban fighters and that the number of militants in the province has increased over the past two years. It is not only foot soldiers that Badakhshan has generated: in a remarkable sign of the changes since the time of the Taleban regime, the province has also produced a sizeable number of well-known commanders.

The shadow governor has established administrative and military structures in the province that are run mostly by the new generation of local Taleban. One example is Mawlawi Amanuddin, the head of their Special Operations Unit (Qeta-ye Khas-e Amalyati) in the province, which, according to a source close to the Taleban, consists of 300 to 400 fighters and is tasked to lead most of the local special operations against the ANSF. Mawlawi Amanuddin, who previously served as an imam in Badakhshan’s Baharak district, joined the insurgents in 2013. Locals say he had begun criticising the Afghan government for its servitude to foreigners during his tenure as a government-paid imam, and had expressed his openness towards the Taleban.

The shadow provincial governor also brought in a number of other local commanders capable of challenging the security forces across the province. For instance, Mullah Hafez, a young Tajik commander, serves as the shadow district governor of Baharak. Meanwhile, Matiullah Khalil, the shadow district governor of Yumgan, Mawlawi Mahbub, the head of the Taleban’s provincial education committee, and Mawlawi Saber, the head of the judicial committee, all belong to Badakhshan’s young, local and religiously-educated new cadres. The new policy of accelerated local recruiting and the shadow provincial governor’s comprehensive understanding of local dynamics has helped the insurgency in Badakhshan to become more effective.

The effect of the local Taleban on the battleground

The ‘localisation’ of appointments has enabled the insurgents to expand their influence. Over the past few years, Badakhshan’s Taleban have conducted several large-scale offensives against the ANSF. At the moment, two out of 28 Badakhshani districts (Yamgan and Warduj) are entirely under Taleban control. At least four more districts (Baharak, Raghistan, Argo and Zebak) have changed hands several times, while four others (Jurm, Shohada, Tagab and Kuran wa Munjan) are heavily contested. Taleban activity has also been reported by several Afghan media sources in Khash, Darayem, Teshkan and the district of the provincial capital, Faizabad where, according to one report, the insurgents have a “strong presence” in the village of Spingul, only two kilometres away, whence they threaten the important Baharak-Faizabad road.

The ANSF have conducted several counteroffensives, but with limited effect. In early September, for example, they claimed that the Taleban had been pushed out of an important gold mine in Raghistan; it seems, however, that the mine in fact is not fully controlled by either side. Residents of the districts have also reported that in this case the local Taleban are “Tajik insurgents”. And in late November, the ANSF reported that the district of Tagab had been retaken from the insurgents “after nine months” – the only problem being that the district’s fall had never been reported, and it had been ‘retaken’ from the Taleban once before, in January 2016.

Meanwhile, Taleban insurgents attacked security forces in the Baharak district of Badakhshan in October 2015 and temporarily took control of the district centre (read short report here and here). In November 2015, the Taleban took control of the Raghistan district for almost three days (read report here). The ANSF soon drove the insurgents out of both district centres, but the failure to protect them in the first place reduced the locals’ confidence in the ANSF. At the same time it boosted the insurgents’ morale, and increased their motivation to continue targeting district centres. The collapse of the district centres, even for a short period, has become a “lesson learned”, not for the ANSF, but for the insurgents who now seek to maintain permanent control of the district centres they hold.

Since then, the Taleban have continued to expand their presence in the two strategic districts of Yumgan and Warduj with a series of assaults. Indeed, Warduj was the place where the Taleban first sought to establish a stronghold in Badakhshan (1). From there, the insurgents can threaten the districts of Eshkashem to the northwest, Zebak to the south, Baharak to the northeast and Jurm to the east. Warduj has been known for its militancy since the first phase of the anti-Soviet war in the 1980s, and continued to be a stronghold of Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan, the party led by the late Burhanuddin Rabbani, both during the remainder of the war against the Soviet occupation and during the resistance against the Taleban regime.

In October 2015, the Taleban stormed Warduj district centre, which fell with minimal resistance into the insurgents’ hands. The Taleban started their attack from Pol-e Ghalchian, an area located ten kilometres to the southeast of the district centre, where, once the security cordon had been breached, the insurgents entered the district centre (see here). According to district governor Dawlat Muhammad Khawari, local government forces made no effort to retake the district centre. He told AAN that the Taleban have now set up administrative and military structures there. Further, he said, the Taleban have recruited a large number of fighters in Warduj. After a month of controlling Warduj, the Taleban then pushed forward in order to gain further territory in Badakhshan.

In November 2015, the Taleban conducted a large-scale attack against Yamgan district. Again, the ANSF failed to protect the district centre and the Taleban were able to overrun it after only minor resistance. The Taleban’s propaganda website released video footage of Yamgan’s fall. The video contained footage of government officials being detained by the Taleban.

Speaking to AAN, Imran Paiman, Yumgan’s district governor, confirmed that the district was still under insurgent control. Further, he told AAN that the central government has promised to deploy forces in order to retake it; however he denied giving further details about the fate of those government officials, who, according to the Taleban propaganda video, had been detained. He told AAN that his appointment took place after the collapse of the district. Separately, provincial police chief Ghafuri stated that security in Badakhshan has improved – although he conceded that some parts of the province still face insecurity. He confirmed that the two districts of Warduj and Yamgan are entirely out of government control but that the security forces plan to conduct a counteroffensive to recapture these districts.

The Taleban strategy of appointing non-Pashtun cadres in Tajik-dominated areas has not only yielded success on the battleground but also politically. The insurgents’ propaganda website has repeatedly featured footage and speeches by Badakhshani Tajik commanders in order to portray the insurgency as a nation-wide, supra-ethnic movement (see, for instance here). This portrayal of the insurgency has in turn helped generate new leaders at the local level, and continues to produce fighters among non-Pashtun ethnic groups (2).

With the mobilisation of local fighters and commanders, the Taleban have managed, over several years, to turn once strongly anti-Taleban Badakhshan into what is, at the very least, contested ground – despite the fact that government forces still continue to hold the majority of the district centres.

Editing by Sari Kouvo, Borhan Osman and Thomas Ruttig.

 

(1) Philipp Münch wrote in a report for AAN (slightly edited):

In Warduj valley, the most influential local anti-Taleban commander, Ashur Beg, was said to have demobilised most of his fighters after the fall of the Taleban. This may be why this area, especially the area of Tirgaran, became a hotbed of the insurgency in the following years. Other reasons were that the area was ecologically degraded, saw many returning refugees and received few state resources – as visible in the low number of students. According to one study, during the drought of 2001 up to 95 per cent of the farmers had to sell or mortgage parts of their land, making them more dependent on landlords. This was fertile ground for Arab Salafists and politically active mullahs to call for resistance against the government, as they had done in the 1980s and 1990s.

The information about Arab Salafists in the area is attributed to information from German intelligence, but not confirmed by AAN.

(2) Structure of the Taleban in Warduj and Yumgan districts, as of October 2016

Warduj’s shadow district governor Haidari, a Tajik from Warduj  

Head of Warduj’s military committee

  Aminullah (from Warduj) previously served as head of the Haj department for Zebak district; he also leads the Taleban’s ‘special unit’ in Badakhshan  

Head of Warduj’s judicial committee Mawlawi Abdulhamed, a Tajik from Warduj  

Yumgan’s shadow district governor

  Matiullah Khalil, a Tajik from Yamgan district  

Head of Yumgan’s military committee

  Ashor Muhammad  

Head of Yumgan judicial committee

  (unknown)

 

 

For more than 20 years Retronic has been a project-oriented partner for the design and production of highly reliable electronic systems, with a focus on power conversion.

Shipbuilding and heavy engineering company Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) will supply 100 warships to the Indian Navy.

The US Navy will deploy a third Nimitz-class supercarrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) Strike Group in Asia to add to the fleet of two carriers already patrolling the South China Sea.

The US Navy’s newest Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the future USS Rafael Peralta (DDG 115), has successfully completed its acceptance trials after spending two days underway off the coast of Maine.

Australia selects DCNS for $39bn submarine development contract, North Korea tests hydrogen bomb, while UK Parliament votes in favour of £40bn Trident renewal programme. Naval-technology.com wraps up the key headlines from 2016.

Americas

• And we’re off! The USAF has released the final request for proposals (RFP) for their T-X trainer competition. Not deviating much from the draft RFP released in July, the request encompasses a total of 350 aircraft, including delivery of the initial five test aircraft, contract options for LRIP lots 1 and 2, and full-rate production of lots 3 through 11. A decision on the $16.3 billion program is expected later this year.

• Boeing will provide Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) integration services for the US Navy’s EA-18G aircraft in a deal worth $308 million. Work ordered in the contract includes the program’s engineering phase, as well as the design and manufacturing tasks for 12 ECP 6472 kits, NGJ pod testing, and additional supporting equipment. The NGJ is a Raytheon-led effort to improve airborne electronic warfare capabilities while replacing the existing AN/ALQ-99 pods used by EA-18G Growler aircraft. Industry partners are aiming to reach initial operating capability for the new pods in 2021.

Middle East & North Africa

• The Turkish military is expected to receive satellite-communication (SATCOM)-equipped Anka-S medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAVS in 2017. Ten ground systems will be delivered to the armed forces, with deliveries set to be completed by 2018. Manufactured by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), the Anka’s development commenced in 2004, making its maiden test flight in December 2010.

Europe

• Leonardo-Finmeccanica finished out 2016 by announcing the first successful flight of their Aermacchi M-345 High Efficiency Trainer. The December 29 flight lasted 30 minutes; more tests of avionics, engine, and flight envelope expansion projects to enhance the plane’s speed, altitude, and maneuverability will continue throughout 2017. The company has also followed through on their planned name change, being referred to simply as “Leonardo” from January 1.

• State trials of the new MiG-35 fighter will commence next month. Based on further development of the MiG-29M/M2 and MiG-29K/KUB, trials had been planned to commence during the summer but did not occur. It’s also believed that a batch of the prototype fighters ere expected to be delivered to the Russian Defense Ministry by the end of 2016.

Asia Pacific

• A new tender for close-air support (CAS) aircraft for the Philippines has been released following Manila’s failure to select a winner last year. Interested parties have until January 27 to apply for the tender to supply six aircraft, destined to either replace or compliment the Philippine Air Force’s fleet of Rockwell OV-10 Bronchos. Embraer’s A-10 Super Tucano is an early main contender with other offerings expected to come from Beechcraft’s T-6 Texan II, the L-39 from Elbit Systems, and KT-1 Woongbi from Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI).

• Taiwan has announced the successful test of their ship-based variant of the Tien Kung (Sky Bow) III ballistic missile defense interceptor. Earlier plans to test the missile had been postponed due to both bad weather and the presence of Chinese and US reconnaissance aircraft in the area. Developers at the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) are also waiting on the granting of export licenses from the US for vertical lift launchers, to help aid them in their research and development.

• Lockheed Martin has been contracted $450 million to perform additional Lot 10 F-35 Lightning II Air System integration work for South Korea. The deal will include non-recurring engineering work. Seoul plans to procure 40 of the next-generation aircraft, and expects deliveries to begin in 2018 and conclude in 2021.

Today’s Video

Cockpit footage of the Boeing T-X’s maiden flight:

EA-18G Growler
(click to view full)

The US Navy owns the only operational tactical jamming fighters in the world, but the AN/ALQ-99 pods they depend on use analog technologies, are hard to maintain, and have reliability issues. All-digital technologies and modern transmit/receive electronics offer huge leaps ahead in capability and availability, which is why the US military is working on a Next-Generation Jammer (NGJ) replacement for the pods on its tactical strike aircraft.

The EA-18G Growler will be the NGJ’s first platform, but the flexibility of modern technologies mean that it may not be the last.

Next-Gen Jammer: The Program

EA-18G systems
(click to view full)

The current jamming system used in the Fleet is the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System (TJS), which Northrop Grumman has modernized to the ICAP III standard. The overall system was designed in the late 1960s, and fielded with the introduction of the EA-6 Prowler in 1971.

The same pods (2 mid-band, 1 low-band) equip US Navy EA-18G Growler fighters, which began delivery to the fleet in 2008.

A 2002 Airborne Electronic Attack System of Systems Analysis of Alternatives (AEA SoS AoA) determined a compelling need to move beyond the ALQ-99’s capabilities and maintenance record. The US Navy began funding in FY 2010, and aims to develop an NGJ mid-band system for that will enter low-rate production in 2018. Fielding to the US Navy would begin in 2020. The current timeline is:

The broader aim is to develop a more cost effective AEA system with better performance against advanced threats through expanded broadband capability for greater threat coverage against a wider variety of radio frequency emitters, faster collect-analyze-jam loops, more flexibility in terms of jamming profiles that can change in flight, better precision within jamming assignments, and more interoperability.

The 1st step is to replace the mid-band ALQ-99 pods on US Navy EA-18Gs. NGJ Increment 1 would offer better mid-band jamming capabilities, where most current threats reside, at reduced operations and sustainment cost. Digital technologies offer easier upgrades, and the 1st NGJ increment also emphasizes a Modular, Open System Approach (MOSA) to the electronics, in order to lay those foundations for future improvements and deployments.

The AN/ALQ-99 low-band pod on the centerline was recently modernized, and is expected to remain in the fleet for some time, but NGJ is eventually expected to add those functions as Increment 2. Whether this will be done as a separate pod, or integrated into the existing NGJ, is undetermined. Later Increment 3 upgrades are expected to add higher band jamming capabilities, which the Navy doesn’t currently possess.

EC-130H Compass Call
(click to view full)

Future deployments may involve thinking beyond the pod. The eventual goal for the next-generation jammer involves moving beyond the EA-18, and becoming a modular set of gear that could be installed in F-35 variants, or in other aircraft. Larger planes like bombers and special mission EC-130 Hercules could certainly benefit from a modern jamming option.

So, too, could stealth fighters, who would have their cover completely blown by EA-18Gs alongside. Or by pods hanging from their wings. Configuring future NGJ options for internal carriage on stealth fighters could benefit other platforms, too, but initial estimates for F-35 integration costs were very high.

That has led the US Navy to focus on the EA-18G. With a 2020 fielding date expected, senior sources have indicated that it could take until the late 2020s for the US military to look at internal/F-35 integration again. That will leave the USMC’s 4 EA-6B squadrons without an in-service replacement as they retire, shifting the AEA mission entirely to the Navy. There has been some talk of using UAVs as an interim step, and jet-powered MALD-J loiter & jam decoys could be integrated with USMC fighters if the service believes that they needed an interim capability.

Then there’s the question of exports.

In 2012, Australia became the 1st American ally to select a tactical jamming fighter. Forthcoming orders will buy both 12 new EA-18 fighters, and a full set of their accompanying ALQ-99 pods and equipment. Australia will be interested in next-generation jamming pods for the same reliability and performance reasons that they interest the US Navy. Outside of co-development programs, however, clearance for export discussions usually isn’t available until Milestone C allows low-rate production.

If, indeed, the new pods are made available to Australia at all. They remain one of the USA’s closest allies, but new tactical jamming technology tends to be especially sensitive.

Next-Gen Jammer: Budgets

Contracts & Key Events FY 2014 – 2017

GAO protest sustained, but Raytheon wins again.

January 3/17: Boeing will provide Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) integration services for the US Navy’s EA-18G aircraft in a deal worth $308 million. Work ordered in the contract includes the program’s engineering phase, as well as the design and manufacturing tasks for 12 ECP 6472 kits, NGJ pod testing, and additional supporting equipment. The NGJ is a Raytheon-led effort to improve airborne electronic warfare capabilities while replacing the existing AN/ALQ-99 pods used by EA-18G Growler aircraft. Industry partners are aiming to reach initial operating capability for the new pods in 2021.

April 15/16: Raytheon has won a $1.01 billion contract for the design, manufacture, integration, demonstration, and test of 15 Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) engineering development model pods. The contract is in support of the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the NGJ program, a pod-based tactical jammer that replaces the 40-plus-year ALQ-99 jammer system on the EA-18G aircraft. Raytheon will also manufacture 14 NGJ aero-mechanical test pods, which will be used to verify aircraft flying qualities and pod safe separation from the host aircraft; provide equipment needed for system integration laboratories; and mature manufacturing processes.

April 13/16: The Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) Increment 1 (Inc 1) has been approved to enter the Engineering & Manufacturing Development Phase. The announcement was made after the approval by Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, on April 5. During the EMD phase, the pod will undergo further development prior to a system-level critical design review in early- to mid-2017 and then eventual production. Once produced, the pod will replace the AN/ALQ-99 tactical jamming system currently integrated on the EA-18G GROWLER aircraft.

November 16/15: Raytheon has announced its completion of the US Navy’s Preliminary Design Review for its Next Generation Jammer program. The NGJ is set to replace the ALQ-99 jamming pods on the EA-18G and it is hoped to have reached operational capabilities by 2021.

July 14/14: Testing. At Farnborough 2014, Raytheon officials say that they’re preparing to fly a prototype Next-Generation Jammer pod aboard a Gulfstream jet in September 2014. Sources: DefenseTech, “http://defensetech.org/2014/07/14/raytheon-prep-to-test-new-electronic-jammer/”.

April 23/14: TD Phase. Raytheon in El Segundo, CA receives a $12.6 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification to provide additional funding for NGJ’s Technology Development Phase.

$10 million is committed immediately, using FY 2014 RDT&E budgets. Work will be performed in El Segundo, CA (63%); Dallas, TX (21%); and Fort Wayne, IN (16%), and is expected to be complete in February 2016. US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-13-C-0128).

April 1/14: GaN R&D. Raytheon announces that its efforts to replace conventional Silicon Carbide chip substrates with synthetic diamond have taken a step forward, thanks to the DARPA Thermal Management Technologies program’s Near Junction Thermal Transport project. Diamond offers 3-5x higher heat conductivity, allowing a 3x increase in transistor power density without frying the circuit. The NGJ will be using GaN circuits, and that kind of power boost would be a huge help.

Data was obtained using a 0.1 mm x 1.25 mm GaN on diamond HEMT, a device representing a unit cell for constructing Power Amplifier MMICs (Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuits) that serve as foundations for solid-state RF transmitters and AESA electronics. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon hits another major milestone with GaN”.

March 31/14: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2013, plus time to compile and publish.

NGJ’s estimated program total is FY14$ 6.336 billion, including $2.895 billion total for R&D and 9 initial pods, followed by $3.443 billion for 114 production NGJ mid-band pods. System development beyond the Technology Demonstration phase is expected to begin in Q2 2016.

Note that if the Navy gets 22 more EA-18Gs in Fy 2015, it will also have to order another 22 mid-band pods, and the same will be true for Increment 2 low-band and Increment 3 high-band pods as well.

March 4-11/14: FY15 Budget. The US military slowly files its budget documents, detailing planned spending from FY 2014 – 2019. The GAO protest has moved all of the NGJ’s milestones back, and the FY 2014 – 2015 period has $181.9 million cut from the R&D budget. See the article budget and timeline charts for revised details.

Jan 24/14: Raytheon, Again. The US Navy reaffirms Raytheon’s contract award after carrying out a new cost and technical analysis of all 3 original bids. NGJ technology development efforts resume, after a 6+ month delay to the entire program. Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute writes that the NGJ mid-band pod and AMDR radar wins are a watershed for Raytheon:

“Coming as it does on the heels of Raytheon’s victory in another pivotal Navy competition to develop a next-generation air and missile defense radar, the jammer re-award seems to confirm that the company has ascended to the top tier of system integrators. Although Raytheon has a long history of innovation in military electronics and guided missiles, it traditionally has been regarded as a subcontractor rather than a top-level system integrator. Under Chairman & CEO William Swanson, though, Raytheon has moved up the technological food chain and is now beating companies once thought to be more capable in competitions to integrate complex systems.”

Sources: Defense Systems, “Raytheon back to work on Next Generation Jammer” | Forbes, “Raytheon Prevails Again In Jammer Contest” | Reuters, “UPDATE 2-Raytheon to keep next-generation jammer contract -U.S. Navy”.

Raytheon re-confirmed

Dec 23/13: Flight Global reports that the US Navy is “taking corrective action by reevaluating proposals and performing and documenting a new cost/technical tradeoff analysis” of the various proposals. They could still find that Raytheon offered the best value, and uphold the contract. Otherwise, the Navy could either choose to terminate Raytheon’s contract and switch the award, or change the RFP in whatever way they deem necessary and ask for re-submission of bids. All of this is pretty much standard procedure. Sources: Flight Global, “US Navy reexamines electronic jamming contract following BAE protest”.

Nov 13/13: GAO decision: the GAO sustained portions of BAE’s protest (see July 18/13 entry), on the basis that:

“the Navy failed to reasonably evaluate technical risk in accordance with the terms of the solicitation, failed to adequately document its evaluation, and improperly credited the awardee with outdated experience. The protester raised various other protest allegations which were denied. GAO’s decision recommends that the Navy reevaluate proposals and properly document the evaluation record. At the conclusion of the reevaluation, GAO recommends that the Navy make a new source selection decision, and document its cost/technical tradeoff analysis with the rationale for the decision.

The GAO legal decision takes no position on the relative merits of these proposals, as assessments of merit are reserved for the agency. Rather, the decision is based on a review of the evaluation materials, the proposals, and the arguments raised by all of the parties during the course of the protest.”

This GAO decision was delayed by 2 weeks because of the government shutdown in October. A redacted version of the decision will be made available publicly after the interested parties have chimed in.

Protest sustained

FY 2013

Raytheon wins Technology Development phase.

ELISRA on AEA Trends
click for video

Aug 20/13: GAO Report misses the forest for the trees. At the US Senate’s request, the Congressional Government Accountability Office auditors review the NGJ program for potential duplication with other Airborne Electronic Attack programs. The GAO’s core problem is simple: they’ve done their standard report, answering the question asked. Even as technology developments ensure that their framework doesn’t make much sense. It’s an auditor’s answer to a Chief Technology Officer’s problem.

GAO itself admits that there’s no duplication in the jammer’s primary air defense suppression (SEAD) role. Their concern involves “secondary” roles, like irregular warfare. The Navy’s counter-point is that these capabilities come at very low cost because their requirements aren’t driving the NGJ’s design.

Electronic systems have become very flexible, and those capabilities are now extending to jammers. NGJ’s possible secondary roles could involve an extremely wide range of collection or jamming tasks. In many cases, the cost of adding them is limited to software development, and in some cases no work is needed. EA-6B Prowlers were used to jam cell phone frequencies in Iraq, for instance, blocking remotely-detonated land mines while flying overwatch for Army convoys. The problem gets bigger when one considers that the mainstreaming of AESA radars is introducing very flexible base hardware for other systems. So the duplication will be coming from both directions, and is inherent to the systems themselves.

There is one small section on the importance of an open systems approach, but even that addresses physical transfer to other platforms, rather than developing new capabilities that are portable across platforms, having common libraries of threat systems and waveforms, etc. Nor is it involved in GAO’s 2 main recommendations, both of which involve more justifications and paperwork re: duplication.

There was probably a time when GAO could have written a report about computer hardware purchases, asking for studies to ensure that they avoided duplication of secondary tasks. With the benefit of 2013 hindsight, we can all see that as lunacy. First, it would have strangled the Personal Computing revolution, missing the operational issue of having flexible assets on hand to perform a growing number of needed tasks, and the managerial issue of using less expensive assets to free up more expensive ones. On the procurement side, it would have utterly missed the real procurement issues of compatibility and standards in networking and in software capability development, as well as the secondary issue of overall system security. Similar trends are at work in the Airborne Electronic Attack space, raising similar issues – but the GAO stuck to its explicit task, and missed them. GAO Report #GAO-13-642.

July 25/13: Stop-work. Raytheon CEO William Swanson, discloses that the US Navy has issued a stop-work order regarding the NGJ. He says that Raytheon is “comfortable” with their ability to retain the contract. Navy spokeswoman Captain Cate Mueller confirmed to Reuters that the Navy issued the order on July 18/13.

That’s standard procedure when a protest is filed, though there have been examples like the Afghan Light Air Support contract, where the relevant service cites a priority need and elects to keep the contract running during the protest period. The LAS case used a provision in the Competition in Contracting Act for that purpose, and it was upheld by a court. Reuters.

July 18/13: Protest. BAE Systems launches a bid protest against the US Navy’s NGJ award to Raytheon. The GAO must hand down a ruling by Oct 28/13.

Until then, the standard approach is to freeze contract spending until the protest is decided. Boeing’s EA-18G work, which needs to happen no matter who wins, has better odds of continuing. GAO Protest Docket | Lexington Institute | Reuters | DID: “How the US GAO’s Bid Protest Process Works and Why Defense Contractors Abuse It.”

July 17/13: EA-18G mods. Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives a $17 million cost-plus-incentive-fee, cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order for phase I of the NGJ pod’s EA-18G hardware integration. $10 million is committed immediately. As noted earlier (q.v. July 10/12) the EA-18G will need a number of minor changes in order to work with the new pods.

Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO, and is expected to be complete in October 2014. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-11-G-0001, #2049).

July 8/13: TD Phase. Raytheon in El Segundo, CA wins the down-select, and walks away with a $279.4 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for the Next Generation Jammer’s Technology Development phase, which will run to March 2015. The 22-month TD phase is the next step in bringing mature components together into testable subsystems that meet requirements, as well as developing a preliminary design for the new jamming pods. $50 million in Navy FY Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy contract funds is committed immediately.

Work will be performed in El Segundo, CA (55.99%); Ft. Wayne, IN (13.36%); Dallas, TX (11.12%); Torrance, CA (9.94%); Clearfield, UT (2.72%), McKinney, TX (2.36%); Tucson, AZ (1.56%); Marion, VA (2.37%); Goleta, CA (0.02%); Forest, MS (0.18%); and Andover, MA (0.38%). This contract was competitively procured via an electronic request for proposals, and 3 offers were received by US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-13-C-0128). It was only 3 because Northrop Grumman and ITT Exelis teamed up at the end (q.v. Nov 1/12 entry).

Raytheon makes the EA-18G’s AN/APG-79 AESA radar, which could be recruited to become part of the jamming array, and also makes the planes’ AN/ALR-67(V)3 radar warning receivers that are integrated with its radar-killing AGM-88 HARM missiles. Even some of the jamming hardware on the ALQ-99 is Raytheon’s. Off-board, the firm’s jet-powered ADM-160 MALD-J jammer decoys will be carried on Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, and could be carried on EA-18Gs if the inboard pylons weren’t needed for fuel. The TD contract will provide Raytheon will opportunities to integrate and leverage all of these components, and more.

If all goes well, flight tests on the EA-18G will take place in the follow-on Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase, which is expected to last 4 1/2 years. Low-Rate Initial Production would start in 2018 under current plans, and the Navy intends to begin fielding the new pods in 2020. US NAVAIR | Raytheon | Defense Tech | Nextgov.

Raytheon wins Technology Development phase contract

June 3/13: ITT. ITT Exelis announces the end of the 33-month NGJ Technology Maturation phase, adding that “technologies that were effectively demonstrated in a laboratory environment include advanced receiver controlled jamming, digital radio frequency memory and mid-band aperture. The Exelis team also proved the effectiveness of its power generation and control systems.”

Throughout the technology maturation phase, work was performed at Exelis facilities in Clifton, NJ, and Amityville and Bohemia, NY. See also Jan 25/12 and Dec 19/11 entries. ITT.

FY 2012

Added TM contracts for all 4 vendors; Program shifted later, removes F-35 from near-term plans; New pods will be sub-sonic; Testing & demonstrations; ITT breaks up with Boeing, adds Northrop Grumman.

NGC’s NGJ
click for video

Nov 1/12: New Team. NGJ competitors Northrop Grumman Corporation and ITT Exelis announce that they are joining forces for the Next Generation Jammer Technology Development phase bid. ITT had been teamed with Boeing, but that team broke apart by mutual agreement at the end of the Technology Maturation phase (q.v. April 16/12 entry). NGC.

July 27/12: NGC. Northrop Grumman announces successful completion of the NGJ Technology Maturation phase. Their work included mission and operational analysis and trades, preliminary design of the pod and Ram Air Turbine, many hours of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis, multiple design refinements, construction of the prototype pod, and wind tunnel verification.

Their efforts then went a step farther, and included in-flight demonstrations of their prototype pod and prime power generation (PPG) system, using a Calspan Gulfstream III business jet from Niagara Falls International Airport, NY. The flights validated the pod’s aerodynamic performance, as well as the ram air turbine’s ability generate the vast amounts of power needed to meet the Navy’s requirements. The firm says that all test objectives were successfully met, and that the demonstrated power generation performance exceeded initial estimates.

The firm adds that they received a $24.7 million contract to further advance the critical technology development elements of its Next Generation Jammer solution and mature the concept demonstrator design. If one assumes that this is a refined total for the April 30/12 contract, rather than an additional award, the firm’s announced NGJ contract total would rise to $72.7 million. NGC.

July 10/12: TD RFP. US NAVAIR releases the solicitation for NGJ’s Technology Development Phase, which aims to commit up to $288 million from FY 2013 through 2015. The TD phase will include: (1) Technology Readiness Assessments to confirm Technology Readiness Level 6 (prototype demonstration in an operational environment) status for critical Increment 1 technologies; (2) System Designs to a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) to establish the functional and allocated baselines for Increment 1; and (3) Refining technical trade space including those to improve affordability, system efficiency, and host platform compatibility.

The EA-18Gs used for testing may need some modifications, in order to make proper use of the new gear. NAVAIR acknowledges possibilities that include improved fiber networks and switches on board; plus modifications to NGC’s ALQ-218 onboard tactical jamming receiver, mission computer and stores management system, digital memory devices, mission planning software, and specialized jamming equipment including the EIBU, EAU, and Jammer Technique Library.

The US military eventually intends to buy Engineering Development Model (EDM) shipsets at an average of $23.6 million each from 2015 – 2019, and 9 Low Rate Initial Production Lot 1 shipsets at an average of $24.0 million each that will be ordered in 2018.

Tech Development RFP

May 11/12: No F-35. Flight Global talks to Captain John Green, the USN program manager for airborne electronic attack. NAVAIR moved away from their original desire for a single pod, and acknowledged that the initial EA-18G deployment will be a 2-pod solution, focused on the mid-band range where most of the threats are. The USN has a relatively new low-band jammer, whose planned upgrades can keep it relevant. Ultimately, NGJ will add high-band jamming capability, and probably low-band as well.

The technology base will involve an Active Electronically Scanned Array, as expected, and will also use new Gallium Nitride (GaN) semiconductor chips rather than the standard Gallium Arsenide (GaAs). Green touts “at least” a 10x performance jump for these purposes, based on “very, very good numbers” seen in tests to date.

Planned F-35 integration costs also showed very high numbers, and those costs have led the Navy to focus on the EA-18G. Green says that focus could remain until the end of the 2020s.

The other important piece of information is that the Navy has dropped supersonic carriage requirements. The performance (read: fuel and range) penalty was too great, which means the Next-Generation Jammer will probably be limited to the same Mach 0.95 as the previous ALQ-99 pods. Heavy range penalties mean that strike aircraft don’t spend a lot of time at supersonic speeds, and the Navy doesn’t have any planes that can supercruise, but the limit will still have tactical implications for strike packages with EA-18G escorts. Flight Global.

F-35 postponed, No supersonic carriage for pods

April 30/12: TM extensions. The other 3 NGJ contractors receive 1-year extensions to their Next-Generation Jammer Technology Maturation contracts from US NAVAIR, following on the heels of Raytheon’s March 21/12 extension. Work will continue until April 2013, and contracts include:

$20.6 million to BAE Systems Information and Electronic Systems Integration, Inc. in Nashua, NH. Work will be performed in Nashua, NH (39%); Melbourne, FL (25%); Cincinnati, OH (14%); Lansdale, PA (14%); and Baltimore, MD (8%). BAE’s announced NGJ contract total is now $68.2 million (N00019-10-C-0070).

$20.2 million to ITT Corp. in Clifton, NJ. Work will be performed in Clifton, NJ (59%); Amityville, NY (21.8%); Bohemia, NY (11%); Irvine, CA (4.9%); and Langley, VA (3.3%). ITT’s announced NGJ contract total is now $68.4 million (N00019-10-C-0071). See also ITT release.

$20.2 million to Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems – Eastern Region in Bethpage, NY. Work will be performed in Linthicum, MD (55%) and Bethpage, NY (45%). NGC’s announced NGJ contract total is now $68.2 million (N00019-10-C-0072).

April 16/12: Breakup. ITT Exelis announces that their alliance with Boeing will end when the Technology Maturation phase does:

“This amendment was made based on recent acquisition changes and streamlining of the NGJ program. The Exelis-Boeing NGJ team has concluded that to best serve the U.S. Navy’s overall electronic attack capability objectives, Exelis will continue to focus on developing technologies critical to the NGJ program. Boeing will concentrate its efforts on integration of the jammer on the EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft.”

ITT Exelis ends up joining forces with fellow competitor Northrop Grumman for the TD Phase bid, while Boeing removes itself from contention.

March 21/12: TM extension. Raytheon Electronic Warfare Systems in Goleta, CA receives a $21.3 million modification to their NGJ Technology Maturation contract (q.v. July 13/10 entry). It extends work for 1 year, to April 2013.

Work will be performed in El Segundo, CA (30%); Goleta, CA (25%); Dallas, TX (25%); Fort Wayne, IN (15%); and Andover, MA (5%). Raytheon’s announced NGJ contract total is now $68.8 million (N00019-10-C-0073).

Feb 13/12: Program shift. The USA’s FY 2013 budget documents include materials re: NGJ, which transitioned to a Block approach for development, and changed their Acquisition Strategy. OPNAV rephased program funding in POM 13, resulting in the following schedule changes:

• Milestone A moved from 2nd QTR 2012 to 3rd QTR 2013
  
• Technology Development (Block 1) contract award moved from 3rd QTR 2012 to 3rd QTR 2013
  
• Test and Evaluation Master Plan moved from 1st QTR 2014 to 3rd QTR 2014
  
• Technology Development (Block 2) was added in 2nd QTR 2015
  
• Milestone B (Block 1) moved from 1st QTR 2015 to 3rd QTR 2015
  
• EMD (Block 1) Award moved from 1st QTR 2015 to 3rd QTR 2015
  
• Integrated Testing start moved from 1st QTR 2016 to 3rd QTR 2016
  
• Milestone B (Block 2) added in 1st QTR 2017
  
• EMD (Block 2) added in 2nd QTR 2017
  
• First EDM Delivery moved from 4th QTR 2016 to 4th QTR 2017
  
• Technology Development (Block 3) was added in 4th QTR 2017
  
• Milestone C moved from 4th QTR 2017 to 2nd QTR 2018.

It’s still very early days, and some shifts are to be expected at this point.

Jan 25/12: ITT. The ITT Exelis/ Boeing team touts successful testing of critical NGJ array transmitter components. Tests included Digital Beam-Forming for broadband electronically steerable antenna arrays, performance of the Gallium-Nitride based Mid-Band and High-Band Power Amplifiers, and the required packaging and cooling. Just like the computer on your desk, more power = more cooling, or improved design that keeps the electronics cool in other ways. ITT Exelis.

Dec 19/11: ITT. ITT Exelis and Boeing tout successful wind tunnel testing of a full-scale pod model at NASA’s Langley Research Center in Hampton, VA. In addition to generating figures for drag, the tests also ensure that airflow projections for the proposed ram air power turbine check out. ITT Exelis.

Dec 13/11: Raytheon. Raytheon touts successful tests of a critical power generation subsystem within their jammer design, during a series of sea and altitude level wind tunnel tests at Arnold AFB in Tullahoma, TN. The tests involved full power generation, transient load switching and effective thermal control of the unit in operationally relevant environmental conditions. Raytheon.

FY 2009 – 2011

Initial concept development & Technology Maturation contracts; BAE allies with Cobham, ITT with Boeing.

EA-6B: “Magnum!”
(click to view full)

July 13/10: TM Phase 2. US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD issues additional Technology Maturation contracts to all 4 firms. All use a cost-plus-fixed-fee structure, which is common for R&D. The added funds will take the initial concepts to the next stage as concept demonstrators, and also refine some of the critical technologies that the contractors are proposing to use. High-power jamming demands lots of electrical power, so power generation will be an important technical challenge. The contracts will run until April 2012:

BAE Systems Information and Electronic Systems Integration, Inc. in Nashua, NH receives $41.7 million. Work will be performed in Nashua, NH (32%); Cincinnati, OH (27%); Lansdale, PA (25%); and Melbourne, FL (16%). BAE’s release says that their bid also involves Cobham (q.v. Feb 22/10), GE Aviation (whose technology currently generates all of the F/A-18E/F’s electrical power), and the radio mavens at Harris Corporation (N00019-10-C-0070).

ITT Integrated Electronic Warfare Systems in Clifton, NJ receives $42.5 million. Work will be performed in Clifton, NJ (44%); St. Louis, MO (38%); and North Amityville, NY (18%). They’re partnered with EA-18G manufacturer Boeing (N00019-10-C-0071).

Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems – Eastern Region in Bethpage, NY receives $42 million. Work will be performed in Linthicum, MD (60%); Bethpage, NY (34%); Rockledge, FL (5%); and Mojave, CA (1%). NGC’s release adds that the Technology Development phase is expected to start in 2011, but the actual date turns out to be mid-2013 (N00019-10-C-0072).

Raytheon Electronic Warfare Systems in Goleta, CA receives $42 million. Work will be performed in Goleta, CA (25%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Dallas, TX (25%); Fort Wayne, IN (10%); Indianapolis, IN (7%); Torrance, CA (5%); Fairfax, VA (2%); and Anacortes, WA (1%). See also Raytheon release (N00019-10-C-0073).

Technology Maturation phase contracts

Feb 22/10: BAE. BAE Systems and Cobham form a strategic alliance on their proposal for the U.S. Navy’s NGJ. Cobham has worked with the existing ALQ-99 pods, an area where BAE didn’t have any traction. Cobham also brings about 20 years of experience in providing high-power broadband transmitter sub-systems and electronic warfare microwave electronics to the US Navy. BAE Systems.

Nov 6/09: NGC. Northrop Grumman Corporation announces that they’ve submitted their proposal for the Technology Maturation phase in the U.S. Navy’s competition to develop and field the NGJ.

Jan 16/09: TM contracts. US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD issues 4 firm-fixed-price Technology Maturation contracts for Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) research, to developing innovative system-level solution concepts (as opposed to component level technologies). The 4 winners were:

BAE Systems in Nashua, NH gets $5.9 million. BAE is the mission systems integrator for the EC-130H Compass Call jamming aircraft, provides the electronic warfare suites for the F-22 and F-35, cooperates with ITT on the IDECM aircraft protection system, and also makes individual countermeasures units (N00019-09-C-0013).

ITT Corp. in Clifton, NJ gets $5.7 million. ITT makes the full AIDEWS and IDECM electronic protection suites for aircraft, ground-based jammers, and the EA-18G’s INCANS system. INCANS lets pilots use their jammers without blanking their own ability to communicate, something that’s a problem on the EA-6B (N00019-09-C-0082).

Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY gets $6 million. Northrop Grumman has been involved in Electronic Attack for a while – the EA-6A Prowler was a Grumman aircraft modified by the company. NGC is responsible for the latest ICAP III variants of the ALQ-99 jamming pod on EA-6Bs and EA-18Gs, and has deep AESA radar experience (N00019-09-C-0084). NGC release.

Raytheon Co. in Goleta, CA gets $5.5 million. Raytheon already makes full aircraft self-protection systems like ACES, as well as individual self-protection electronics, and has deep AESA radar experience (N00019-09-C-0085).

Work is expected to be complete in July 2009. These contracts were solicited under an electronic Broad Agency Announcement, and 4 offers were received. See also Flight Global.

NGJ Concept development contracts

Additional Readings Next-Generation Jammer

• US NAVAIR – NGJ Technology Development Phase solicitation.

• FBO.gov (Sept 12/08, #N00019-08-R-0101) – Next Generation Jammer (NGJ). Original Technology Maturation solicitation.

• Raytheon – Next Generation Jammer. Winner over BAE, ITT/NGC.

Related Technologies

• DID FOCUS – EA-18G Program: The USA’s Electronic Growler

• DID – Raytheon’s APG-79 AESA Radars. They equip the EA-18G, and their characteristics would allow them to be used as receivers and jammers themselves.

• Raytheon (Feb 13/13) – Inside the Diamond Mine: Synthetic Gems Get the Military’s Attention. Diamond conducts heat better than almost any material, which is incredibly useful for heat-producing systems like NGJ. They’re working on bonding synthetic diamond to GaN chips, and making progress.

• ITT Exelis – Next Generation Jammer. Teamed with Boeing, then with NGC. 2013 snapshot.

• Northrop Grumman – Next Generation Jammer. Eventually teamed with ITT. Both manufacture ECM systems for other fighters. 2013 snapshot.

Official Reports

• US GAO (Aug 20/13, #GAO-13-642) – Next Generation Jammer: DOD Should Continue to Assess Potential Duplication and Overlap As Program Moves Forward.

• US GAO (Mar 29/12, #GAO-12-175) – Airborne Electronic Attack: Achieving Mission Objectives Depends on Overcoming Acquisition Challenges.

News & Views

• YouTube (June 27/13) – Future Airborne Electronic Warfare [EW] Systems [Aero India 2013]. Presentation by Elbit Senior Director, Mr. Uri Shatit.

• Breaking Defense (Dec 6/12) – Navy Bets On ‘Baby Steps’ To Improve Electronic Warfare; F-35 Jamming Not Enough. Answers the question: why NGJ?

• Aviation Week, via Military.com (Oct 11/10) – US Navy Mulls NGJ Architecture Choice. 3 pods (low-band centerline +2), or 4? And what about the role of UAVs?

• Avionics Today (Sept 1/10) – Jammer Next.

• Aviation Week, via WayBack (April 13/09) – Growler EW Upgrades On The Way.

• Worldwide War Pigs (May 6/08) – Not much Grrrrrr! for the Growler. Eric Palmer points out a number of shortcomings in the planned EA-18G, based on March 2002 NAVAIR slides. Mostly it points out that the gear adds a ton of drag, and that the pods will need to begin their upgrade cycle as soon as they’re fielded. Both true.

• Air Power Australia (1989) – The Anatomy of the TacJammer. They’re quite partial to the USAF’s EF-111 design, which carried its gear internally. That would also be the model if NGJ is installed on stealth fighters.

Swedish Volvo FMX 8x8 Heavy Utility Truck

TOP 10 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

Under the aegis of the African Union, the 54 states will set up a "Schengen-like" borderless area in 2017 to boost trade. Negotiations for the establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) in Africa were formally launched in June 2015 at the African Union Summit in Johannesburg. A year later, a boost seems to be given to the project, although the project exists since the signing in 1991 of the Treaty of Abuja.

Why now ? In a context of global economic crisis, African states are somewhere forced to accelerate the pace. In 2015 the Tripartite Initiative involving COMESA, EAC and SADC was launched, with a view to the preparation of a large free trade area from Cairo to Cape Town. The Tripartite Initiative, the largest free trade agreement involving 26 countries from three regional economic communities (RECs), Comesa, CEA and SADC, with a total of 530 million inhabitants for a gross domestic product Total of $ 630 billion, more than half of Africa's economic output. This initiative has rekindled the interest of African leaders in broadening the continental free trade area.

Intra-African trade must be saved because it accounts for only 10% of trade on the continent, while in the EU, Asia and North America, intra-regional trade represents respectively 70 %, 52% and 50% of trade. Moreover, the share of Africa in world trade is even more derisory since it represents only about 2%. Implementing such an Africa-wide FTA could boost intra-African trade to the tune of US $ 35 billion annually by 2022. A review of the genesis and functioning of this area of free movement of more than one billion people.

The CFTA is a priority initiative of the AU Agenda 2063. The objective of the CFTA is to create a single continental market for goods and services, to establish the free movement of business people. It also aims to pave the way for the acceleration of the establishment of the customs union in 2022 and an African economic community by 2028. This gradual approach is justified by the fact that integration should be consolidated at regional level, through the creation and the strengthening of regional economic communities (RECs). The RECs would ultimately merge into the African Economic Community. (There are 8 RECs : UMA, CEN-SAD, CEDEAO / ECOWAS, UEMOA, MRU, CEEAC, SADC, COMESA, IGAD.)

The current intra-African trade situation is disappointing. Despite the fact that the free movement of persons, the right of residence and the right of establishment are the founding principles enshrined in Chapter VI of the Abuja Treaty, a truck that delivers supermarkets in Southern Africa needs 1,600 documents, permits and licenses to legally cross borders.In the future, the continental free trade area could just as well require the removal of barriers such as the imposition of visa requirements that restrict the movement of people across national borders. Far from being settled, remains the issue of labor mobility among African countries, one of the most contentious issues for African leaders due to security or political instability problems.

Trade and industry are catalysts for African development for the African Union, once the establishment of the CFTA, the competitiveness of industrial products would be increased by exploiting the potential of economies in a wider continental market . The initiative would also help diversify and transform the African economy, improve resource allocation, reduce prices in countries and make Africa less vulnerable to external trade shocks. In addition, regional integration of the continent should integrate regional markets with efficient infrastructure to attract investment and improve access to better products and services.

Twenty million dollars were raised to finance the initial CFTA projects in the areas of goods and services, investment and intellectual property. Of the amount so far obtained from development partners, the AU Member States contributed $ 3 million for 2016 and $ 4.9 million for 2017.
CFTA can be a paradise for international and african criminality and smuggle, like the Schengen area? Planned for 18 July 2017, the release of an African electronic passport should enable nationals of the 54 African countries to travel visa-free across Africa. For now, the initiative only concerns heads of state, government and foreign ministers. In practice, African citizens would retain their national passports and would be issued an African e-passport by the AU. A first on the world scale. But the billion African citizens will have to wait until 2025 to benefit.

Tag: african continental free trade areaCFTASchengenTripartite InitiativeAbuja Treaty

AAN researchers, individually, each follow the topics that interest us – although we also keep an eye on overall output to make sure we keep our coverage broad and our topics various. But what about you, our readers: what are you interested in? Three years after re-vamping the AAN website in 2014, we took a look back to see which of our dispatches had been the most widely-read. The results appear to show that we have a very ‘well-rounded’ readership. War-related publications and pieces to do with major political developments generally got the highest number of readers, but ‘quirkier’ or esoteric topics – to do with how ethnic groups are studied, or aspect of Afghanistan’s culture and wildlife ­– also featured strongly in the top 50 most-read AAN dispatches. AAN’s Kate Clark reports (data from Sudhanshu Verma).

At AAN, we try to cover not only the big events, but also ‘slow-burn’ developments and issues of minority interest. To make sure we get a nicely broad coverage, we also set ourselves to report on seven key themes:

• War and Peace
• The Political Landscape
• International Engagement
• Economy and Development
• Rights and Freedoms
• Regional Relations
• Context and Culture

By category of dispatch, the percentage breakdown of the most-read dispatches was: war and peace 33%, political landscape 28%, context and culture 25%, economy and development 7%, rights and freedoms 4%, and international engagement 3%. (Regional relations did not feature in the top-50.) It suggests AAN’s readers turn to AAN for what we also perceive as our strengths – in-depth analysis of politics and security and an ability to put events into context.

Looking more closely at the list of our most-read dispatches, it seems that dispatches on major events that are not straightforward to understand attracted readers: why did Kunduz fall in 2015 (and continue to be troubled thereafter)? What did the death of Taleban leaders Mullah Muhammad Omar and then Mullah Akhtar Mansur mean to the insurgent group? What is Daesh? Indeed (as we also asked), why Daesh? In this category, although not war-related, appeared to fall AAN’s reporting on certain controversies, for example, the ethnic-based responses stirred up by the routing of the TUTAP electricity supply line, or the responses of mullahs and women’s rights activists to the mob killing of Farkhunda in 2015. In these pieces, we tried to give more detail and nuance to major events and explain the often complex responses of different parts of Afghan society.

Anything with biographies or information that is of lasting interest appeared to go down well, such as details of the new cabinet, or who was killed in a particular suicide attack, or what was in the Bilateral Security Agreement (signed in 2014 by the United States and Afghanistan).

Other popular dispatches were more surprising hits and may be related to a dearth of information from other sources. Two pieces, one on the study of Afghan ethnic groups, and another on how Uzbeks are reported on were both in the top 50, as was a look at the rise of a new Shia leader in Afghanistan.

Dispatches in our ‘Context and Culture’ category also featured heavily: the history of the pakol, films in which Afghanistan appears, the most useful foraging plants and the story of a houbara bustard tragically suspected of being a bird suicide bomber.

Here then is the list of the 50 dispatches which were most read by the AAN audience, 2014-2016.

• The Park Palace Attack: More losses for Afghanistan (updated with a list of the dead)
 – 14 May 2015: 
The Taleban attack on a Kabul guesthouse which killed 15 people (not 14, as earlier reports said) on 13 May 2015 was aimed, the Taleban claimed, at “invaders”, specifically an “important meeting” of “important people from many invading countries, especially Americans.” In this update of our earlier dispatch, AAN’s Kate Clark identifies all the dead: all were civilian and eight were aid workers, five, Afghans from the regions who had been visiting Kabul for training.
• Finally Towards a Complete Afghan Cabinet? The next 16 minister nominees and their bios (amended)
 – 24 March 2015: 
Six months after the inauguration of the National Unity Government and two months after the last attempt to introduce cabinet members to the parliament, there is now a new list of nominees.
• The Shadows of ‘Islamic State’ in Afghanistan: What threat does it hold?
 – 12 February 2015
: The Islamic State (IS) group, also known by an Arabic acronym, Daesh, has gained a toehold in Afghanistan, although with the loss in a drone strike of its most prominent and recently appointed commander, Rauf Khadem, that toehold is looking precarious.
• New Faces Versus Old Structures: Afghanistan’s national unity cabinet (amended)
 – 12 January 2015: 
Finally, Afghanistan has a cabinet, pending parliament’s approval of course, three and a half months after Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah were inaugurated as president and chief executive officer (CEO) of a national unity government.
• From Alexander the Great to Ahmad Shah Massud: A social history of the pakol
 – 3 January 2014: 
The flat, woollen, rolled-up hat called a pakol is nowadays one of the undisputed symbols of Afghanistan.
• The Study and Understudy of Afghanistan’s Ethnic Groups: What we know – and don’t know
 – 10 September 2014: 
From voting blocs to the share of power in government ministries to the composition of the insurgency, references to ethnic groups are frequently made in reporting and analysis.
• Power to the People: How to extend Afghans’ access to electricity – 
3 February 2015: 
More than four billion dollars have, to date, been spent on Afghanistan’s power infrastructure.
• Rambo Was Too Late: Afghanistan in Western films (part I), from 1909 to 2001
 – 23 December 2014
: Afghanistan has rarely featured in western films, especially when compared to other foreign locales – from countries in Africa to Latin America to East Asia.
• The Fall of Kunduz: What does it tell us about the strength of the post-Omar Taleban?
 – 30 September 2015
: The capture of Kunduz by the Taleban has surely written off any idea of the movement having been seriously undermined or fractured by the death of Mullah Omar and the leadership dispute that followed.
• Taleban in Transition: How Mansur’s death and Haibatullah’s ascension may affect the war (and peace)
 – 27 May 2016: 
The killing of Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansur in an American drone strike has deprived the Taleban of their official, and before that, de facto leader of six years.
• Taleban Closing in on the City: The next round of the tug-of-war over Kunduz
 – 2 September 2014
: Within the past two months, the Taleban have managed to secure additional territory around the provincial capital of Kunduz and have been closing in on the city itself.
• The Islamic State in ‘Khorasan’: How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar
 – 27 July 2016: 
The Islamic State’s local franchise in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), has claimed responsibility for the suicide attack on the TUTAP protests in Kabul on 23 July 2016.
• Afghanistan in World War I (1): Afghans in the Kaiser’s jihad
 – 27 July 2014:
 A hundred years ago, on 28 July 1914, the First World War started when Austro-Hungary declared war on Serbia after a group of young pro-independence Serbian terrorists shot dead the Austro-Hungarian crown prince in Sarajevo one month earlier.
• To Say It Like It Is: Norway’s evaluation of its part in the international intervention
 – 23 August 2016: 
Norway has published the first comprehensive evaluation of one country’s contribution to the international intervention in Afghanistan.
• A new Afghan Shia Leader: Return to quietism versus political Islam?
 – 2 November 2014: 
A new leader is emerging in Afghanistan’s Shia community, one who so far has chosen to abstain from any presence or involvement in the religious or political affairs of the country.
• Power to the People (2): The TUTAP protests – 
16 May 2016: When protesters interrupted President Ashraf Ghani’s speech in London three times on 13 May 2016, the heated controversy surrounding the route of TUTAP, a main electricity grid initiative, received even international attention.
• Toward Fragmentation? Mapping the post-Omar Taleban
 – 24 November 2015: 
The Taleban movement has entered its third decade with infighting threatening its – up till now – remarkable unity.
• The Murree Process: Divisive peace talks further complicated by Mullah Omar’s death
 – 5 August 2015
: News of Mullah Omar’s death was leaked just a day before a second meeting between Taleban and Afghan government representatives was supposed to have taken place.
• From ‘Slavers’ to ‘Warlords’: Descriptions of Afghanistan’s Uzbeks in western writing
 – 17 October 2014: 
From the early 1800s to the present day, western writers have explored Afghanistan either in person or from a distance, their publications providing a view of Afghanistan’s governments and people to the wider audience in Europe, the United States and the west.
• Three Birds with One Stone: Signing the BSA and NATO SOFA to project reliability
 – 6 October 2014
: By signing long-delayed security agreements with the US and NATO on the second day of its existence (30 September 2014), the new Afghan leadership has hit at least three birds with one stone.
• On the Cultural History of Opium – and how poppy came to Afghanistan
 – 11 January 2016: 
Mention drugs or Google the word ‘opium’ and the link to Afghanistan will never be far away.
• The Kabuliwala of Kolkata: Photo exhibition about a community longing for Afghanistan that once was home – 
22 March 2015: 
In the suburbs of Kolkata, India, lives, in seclusion, a little known community of migrants who once came from Afghanistan – the first of them around the year of 1840.
• An “Afghan Exodus” (1): Facts, figures, trends
 – 14 November 2015
: The on-going “exodus” of Afghans – now the second largest group entering the EU – has contributed to the increasing refugee numbers across Europe.
• Elections 2014 (51): Finally, a deal, but not yet democracy
 – 21 September 2014: 
After more than three months of audits and behind-the-scenes negotiation, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah signed a deal today to set up a government of national unity.
• The Failed Pilot Test: Kunduz’ local governance crisis
 – 5 June 2015: 
The fighting in Kunduz is only one side of the problem.
• Helmand (1): A crisis a long time coming
 – 10 March 2016
: The rapid fall of entire areas of Helmand to the Taleban during the second half of 2015 and early 2016 has left the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) scrambling to hold the line and try to push back, and led to international forces deploying troops to the province.
• The New Taleban Deputy Leaders: Is there an obvious successor to Akhtar Mansur?
 – 10 February 2016: 
Reports of the alleged killing of new Taleban leader Akhtar Mansur in December 2015 as well as his subsequent disappearance from public view have raised the question as to who might be next-in-line and whether there exists an internal, legitimate mechanism for succession.
• A Taleb Lost in a Polish Forest and More: Afghanistan in western films (part 2), 2001 to 2015
 – 11 September 2015: 
Since 2001, there has been a relatively large number of western films that feature Afghanistan – either briefly or, in some cases, for the entire length of the movie.
• From Mullah Omar to Mansur: Change at the Taleban’s top leadership
 – 31 July 2015: 
After almost two days of silence, the Taleban have finally admitted that their supreme leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar Mujahed, as they call him, has died.
• The 2016 Insurgency in the North: Beyond Kunduz city – lessons (not taken) from the Taleban takeover
 – 30 January 2016: 
In the last two months of 2015, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) conducted a significant counteroffensive to remove the Taleban from areas just outside Kunduz city as well as from a number of its outlying district centres.
• To Syria, not Afghanistan: Central Asian jihadis ‘neglect’ their neighbour – 
8 October 2014: 
Since the American and Northern Alliance defeat of the Taleban and their Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) allies in northern Afghanistan in late 2001, the arrival of would-be fighters from the former Soviet countries of Central Asia to Afghanistan has been a very small trickle.
• The Refugee Dilemma: Afghans in Pakistan between expulsion and failing aid schemes
 – 9 March 2015: 
Nearly 52,000 Afghans living in Pakistan have, within the past ten weeks, packed their belongings and crossed the border back into Afghanistan – more than twice as many as in the whole 12 months of 2014.
• Messages in Chalk: ‘Islamic State’ haunting Afghanistan?
 – 17 November 2014: 
Rumours of the presence of Islamic State (IS) elements in Afghanistan have repeatedly made it into the media over recent months, sparking public debate and adding to the anxiety about what course the insurgency might take.
• Chechens in Afghanistan 1: A Battlefield Myth That Will Not Die
 – 27 June 2016:
 In 2001, as the United States and other allied military forces attacked Taleban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, numerous soldiers, journalists and Afghans allied to the Americans relayed stories of a fearless and deadly opponent, incomparably worse than any other enemy: the Chechen.
• The Start into the Better Governance Marathon: Ghani’s first days – 
11 October 2014: 
New president Ashraf Ghani has proven himself a man intent on not losing time – after so much of it had been lost in post-electoral counting, auditing and political wrangling since April 2014.
• Going in Circles: The never-ending story of Afghanistan’s unfinished Ring Road
 – 16 January 2015: 
Since the presidential campaign and during trips abroad President Ashraf Ghani has been promising to turn Afghanistan into an “Asian roundabout” for regional trade and transit.
• From Point Zero to ‘New Warmth’: Russian-Afghan relations since 1989
 – 8 August 2014: 
After the Soviet occupation years, Afghan-Russian relations were on absolute zero.
• The Cabinet and the Parliament: Afghanistan’s government in trouble before it is formed
 – 20 January 2015: 
President Ashraf Ghani has introduced his cabinet to the parliament, which now has to confirm or reject his candidates.
• The Killing of Farkhunda (2): Mullahs, feminists and a gap in the debate
 – 29 April 2015: 
From ultra-conservative Salafis to secular-minded feminists, an astonishingly diverse range of voices have found their heroine in Farkhunda, the young woman who was lynched by a mob in Kabul on 19 March 2015.
• The IEC Announces 2016 Election Date – but what about electoral reform?
 – 18 January 2016
: In a brief press conference on Monday 18 January 2016, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced the date for Afghanistan’s next vote: 15 October 2016.
• ANSF Wrong-Footed: The Taleban offensive in Kunduz – 
3 May 2015
: The Taleban’s first major onslaught in their ‘spring offensive’ this year took the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by surprise.
• Security in Kunduz Worsening Further: The case of Khanabad
 – 28 October 2014
: Kunduz has had the worst security environment of any province in the north for the past few years.
• Shame and Impunity: Is violence against women becoming more brutal?
 – 30 November 2014
: A father raping his daughter over almost ten years without the family daring to intervene (except to help with abortions); a woman burnt after a family fight; another woman mutilated because her husband enjoyed doing so – these are just some of the cases of violence against women and girls that have been reported in Afghan media over the past months.
• Hazaras in the Crosshairs? A scrutiny of recent incidents
 – 24 April 2015: 
Eight abductions of groups of people have been reported since late February by officials, activists or media as having targeted ethnic Hazaras.
• Stanakzai Goes from Peace to War: For Afghanistan, finally a defence minister? – 
28 May 2015: 
The national unity government is making its fourth attempt to appoint a minister of defence.
• Bird Bomber: Police kill ‘dangerous’ houbara bustard (amended)
 – 5 December 2014: 
Police in Faryab have shot a wild bird which had an antenna attached to it, fearing it had been sent by the Taleban to target them.
• The 2015 Insurgency in the North (3): The fall and recapture of Kunduz
 – 16 October 2015
: It took 15 days of fierce fighting for Afghan government forces and their US allies to push the Taleban back out of Kunduz city.
• Plants of Afghanistan 2: the Koh-e Baba Foraging Top Ten (amended)
 – 11 June 2012: 
Wild rhubarb (chukri or rawash) is surely one of the delights of the Afghan spring.
• Far From Back to Normal: The Kunduz crisis lingers on
 – 17 August 2016
: The Taleban’s recent takeover of both Qala-ye Zal and Dasht-e Archi’s district centres is the latest episode in the long-running battle for possession of Kunduz province.
• Taleban in Transition 2: Who is in charge now?
 – 22 June 2016
: The new Taleban leader, Mullah Haibatullah, is being closely scrutinised to see if he will try to shape the goals and methods of the insurgency.

 

Russian PKM Machine Gun

After nearly a decade of support for civilian police in Afghanistan, the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) officially closed its activities today, Saturday (31 December 2016) at midnight. In fact, the mission has already slowed down its activities for a few days already. A meeting marking the end of the mission was organized, Wednesday, December 14, a few days after the official end of the mission.

Source

Tag: EUPOL AfghanistanCSDP

China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has for the first time deployed its Liaoning carrier group beyond the First Island Chain. The carrier group is thought to have commenced its transit into the West Pacific on 23 December and passed through the Miyako Strait south of the Japanese island of

AT LEAST ten Ansar Allah militants raided and stole furniture and televisions from the closed Al Jazeera Network office in Yemen's capital Sana'a on 26 December, Al Jazeera reported. No casualties were reported.

Austal USA delivered the future Independence-class trimaran hull USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10) to the US Navy (USN) on 23 December 2016. Gabrielle Giffords is the ninth littoral combat ship (LCS) and the fifth of the Independence variant to be delivered to the USN. Commissioning of Gabrielle