KC-46 tanker refueling mission:
Elbit’s Skylark-I mini-UAV has become a popular choice for portable “over the hill” surveillance, as nations like Israel, Australia, Canada, France, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, et. al. adopt it for battlefield use. Bental’s electric propulsion system using brushless permanent magnetic motors is an especial benefit to Skylark operators, as its silent operation avoids warning enemy targets of its presence.
In an effort to build on that success, Elbit soon introduced the larger Skylark-II for battalion level UAV operations, fired from a rail launcher mounted on small wheeled vehicles rather than launched by hand. In exchange for the launcher requirement and a doubling of the crew size to 2, the Skylark-II gains a mission radius of 50-60 km instead of 10 km, and the ability to mount larger sensor packages. Awards soon followed from sources as varied as Popular Science and industry analysts Frost & Sullivan – but awards don’t pay the bills. Fortunately, orders have followed.
Skylark I comes in 2 versions. The standard Skylark I is launched by hand, and flies below 1,000 feet for up to 1.5 hours, with a mission range of 10 km/ 6 miles. Each “system” comprises 3 UAVs, 2 surveillance and targeting payloads, a ground station, an operating console and a communications link. Skylark I competes in the mini-UAV market, and remains a serious international competitor to Aerovironment’s popular RQ-11B Raven.
The new Skylark I-LE (long endurance) increases flight time from 1.5 hours to 3 hours, with a mission range “greater than 15 km.” It can carry the same payloads etc. as Skylark I, usually Controp’s D-STAMP or the new uncooled U-STAMP infrared payload.
The LE Block 2 swaps in a new engine and power system, and touts the performance of a Day/Night sensor payload – which is probably Controp’s M-STAMP.
Skylark-II launchThe larger Skylark II cannot be launched by hand, like its counterparts; it must use a rail launcher instead. The launcher is usually towed by a small wheeled vehicle, and requires 2 crew to operate. The UAV can fly at medium altitudes, with a flight time of around 6 hours, a mission radius of 50-60 km/ 30-36 miles, and larger sensor packages on board. Skylark II competes in the lower tier of the conventional UAV market, alongside models like Boeing’s ScanEagle/ Integrator, Textron AAI’s RQ-7 Shadow, Aeronautics’ Aerostar, IAI’s Searcher, etc.
Its standard mission package is a Micro-CoMPASS turret with a day sensor, cooled infrared night sensor, and a laser illuminator and tracker. An advanced digital communication system from Tadiran Spectralink rounds out its capabilities. Israeli forces will soon be swapping in Controp’s TD STAMP surveillance turret.
There’s also a Skylark II-LE, which could become the standard Skylark II export offering. It moves the engine to the rear, alters the fuselage, and adds a new tail configuration. Endurance has more than doubled to over 15 hours, and with its new datalink, it can operate out to 150 km. This will give it the ability to compete with popular offerings like Boeing’s ScanEagle.
Contracts & Key EventsNote that some sales may not be publicized, or may not be detailed, as is often the case with purchases from Israel. Reports of Skylark buys for Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, and Slovakia have been rumored, but they aren’t reproduced here for lack of confirmation. Israel has also made large sales to countries like Azerbaijan and Georgia, but those sales have not been detailed, so it’s hard to tell if Skylarks have been part of the package.
2015 – 2016
Skylark I-LE Block 2
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August 19/16: Elbit Systems has launched a maritime variant of its Skylark I Mini UAV. Dubbed Skylark C, the new system offers the extended operational capabilities of its land-based counterpart and provides the ability to inspect maritime activities from a safe distance, observe targets, perform reconnaissance over coastal areas, and perform continuous covert surveillance. Those standing to benefit from this latest offering include special forces and other small-scale naval crews.
November 18/15: Uruguay has expressed an interest in purchasing a number of the Elbit Skylark I UAV after watching them being deployed by the Israeli Defence Forces. The UAV has been deployed extensively by the IDF at battalion-level system in support of artillery units and is operational in many militaries worldwide including Australia, Sweden and Canada. Uruguay would deploy the UAV in order to monitor areas which may potentially host terrorist threats. In August of this year, the Al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas captured one of the drones after it fell into the Gaza Strip. They claimed to have been able to make its services operational after checking it wasn’t booby trapped.
2012 – 2013American SUAS ‘win’; Israeli Upgrades; I-LE Block 2 introduced;
Jan 3/13: SUAS 2013-2017. U.S. Army Contracting Command in Natick, MA awards a 5-year, $248 million multiple-vendor fixed-price Small UAS contract. From FBO.gov:
“The Army currently has fielded 1,798 RQ-11B systems and 325 RQ-20A systems and has a requirement to sustain and maintain this existing fleet. The Army has met 92% of the RQ-11B Army Acquisition Objective (AAO), and has met 83% of the anticipated need for RQ-20A (required by USFOR-A-issued JUONS). Additionally, the current [DID: RQ-11B & RQ-20A] fleet has pre-planned spiral upgrades such as the Gimbal payload, which will be competed and retrofitted under this effort. The need exists to complete the AAO; maintain, sustain and upgrade the fleet; and procure future SUAS Systems as required by DoD, Other Government Agencies (OGA) and foreign countries.”
Vendors will compete for each order, and work can include full Unmanned Aerial Systems, upgrades, testing, packaging, marking, and storage and shipping. Work location will be determined with each order, and the contract runs until Dec 20/17. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with 5 bids received. All 5 qualified to compete:
The AECV contract expires in 2013, so this appears to be the follow-on. See also: AeroVironment | Elbit Systems | Gainesville Sun.
SUAS multi-vendor
Dec 13/12: Israel. Israel’s Artillery Corps already employs Skylark I-LE UAVs within its “Sky Rider” unit. The unit is upgrading to the Skylark I-LE Block 2, with the “Version 10” operating system and new communications links. Artillery units are getting a new “Tamoon” command and control system, and the new UAVs will be compatible with Tamoon and with the Army-wide DAP (Digital Army Program). Once the UAV is attached to the DAP, Sky Rider Commander, Lt. Col. Uri Gonen says that battalion commanders will be able to pinpoint a UAV’s location on their screens, and determine the area it is observing.
The Artillery Corps is also looking at a brigade-level UAV, and has held some initial trials. That might be an opportunity for the Skylark II-LE, but there are a number of other UAVs within Israel that could compete for this role. This is Israel, so they expect the winning UAV to be in the field within 18 months. Source: Ba’Machane (official IDF magazine), via Elbit Systems. Note that the translation here is “Sky Rider,” not Sky Raider.”
Aug 2/12: I-LE block II. Elbit Systems announces that it will showcase the new Skylark I-LE Block II at this month’s AUVSI conference in Las Vegas, NV. The new UAV can be built in the USA, and adds a new engine and power system, plus an improved day/night sensor turret.
June 11/12: Sweden. AeroVironment announces that they’ve won Sweden’s competition, and will supply 12 SUAS systems in a mix of RQ-20A Puma AE and Wasp III air vehicles, plus a set of common ground stations, training, and logistics support. Contract options could increase the buy to a total of 30 systems. The firm adds a roundup of foreign RQ-11 Raven, RQ-20 Puma, and Wasp customers, which demonstrates why they’re Elbit’s top competitor:
“In addition to Sweden, other international governments that have purchased AeroVironment small UAS include Australia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Italy, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, Uganda, and the United Kingdom.”
Swedish loss
May 23/12: Airbag issues. Flight International:
“Israel Defense Forces confirms that operations of the mini-unmanned aerial vehicle have been halted until further notice, pending the completion of work to determine what caused its airbag to be deployed in flight several times during recent weeks… Flights… will resume immediately after the issue has been resolved, with the aircraft mainly used by artillery units to provide an “over-the-hill” intelligence capability.”
2008 – 2011Wins in Israel, France; Canada goes another way; Skylark I-LE introduced.
Skylark-I LE
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Dec 13/11: Sweden. Sweden bought 6 Skylark UAV systems in 2007, but it’s looking to replace them with a follow-on buy. Their FMV is reportedly looking to buy a 2-tier system with ranges of 10 and 20 km, respectively, plus associated common ground control stations.
That could open the door to a buy of Skylark 1LE and Skylark II UAVs, but it also introduces new competitors into the mix. Shephard Media.
Dec 1/11: The UAS Dynamics joint venture ends, as Elbit Systems USA buys General Dynamics’ share. It was marketing Elbit’s Skylark I/II, Hermes 90, and Hermes 450 UAVs in the USA. Elbit Systems.
UAS Dynamics
Dec 20/10: Elbit Systems Ltd. announces a $16 million contract from the Polish Ministry of National Defense to supply a testing set of mobile multi-sensor monitoring and surveillance systems for Poland’s Rosomak, a variant of Patria’s 8×8 AMV wheeled Armored Personnel Carrier. The systems include Skylark UAV integration. Read “Poland & Elbit to Cooperate on Rosomak APC Surveillance Upgrade” for more.
Poland
Aug 3/10: Canada. Canada, previously a Skylark customer, buys [PDF] 5 of Prioria Robotics Maveric mini-UAV systems for use in Afghanistan. See also Nov 19/06 entry.
March 8/10: France. France’s DGA delivers Skylark I and Wasp-III mini-UAVs to French Special Forces, less than 3 months after contracts were signed for Elbit Systems’ Skylark (Oct 18/09) and Aerovironment’s Wasp-III (Nov 4/09), following verification and testing.
The DGA says that the Skylark delivery completes a set, following earlier DGA deliveries in 2008 and 2009. The Wasp-IIIs, on the other hand, will be entering an operational evaluation phase to assess their future value. DGA [in French].
Jan 26/09: Israel. Elbit Systems issues a clarifying release [PDF], adding that that the Israeli “Sky Raider” contract is worth approximately $40 million.
Dec 16/08: Skylark I. Elbit systems announces that Israel’s Defense Ministry has picked the Skylark I-LE to fill the battalion-level “Sky Raider” IDF tender. The IDF has been operating Skylark Is since 2005, but this purchase will supply mini-UAVs for all IDF Ground Forces battalions, including training and logistics support battalions. When the non-linear battlefield makes front lines irrelevant, and your country is 15 km wide at its narrowest point, that’s a smart decision.
Defense Update reports that the IDF intends to buy up to 100 systems at an estimated cost of $50 million, and Flight International states that options could raise the deal’s value to $100 million equivalent. Each system comprises 3 UAVs, 2 U-STAMP uncooled surveillance and targeting payloads developed by Controp, plus a ground station, an operating console and a communications link.
Elbit’s Skylark I LE had to compete with several Israeli UAVs, owing to the country’s strength in that sector. Competing options included IAI’s Bird’s Eye 400/600; Aeronautics Defence Systems Ltd’s Orbiter, which has won some export success; RAFAEL’s shoulder-launched Skylite A and the larger 2-man Skylite B; and Top I Vision/Rotem’s Casper 250.
Note that Defense Update and Flight International have different accounts regarding the competitors and deal value. While DID respects Flight International, Defense Update has earned its reputation as the top source for developments in Israel. Elbit Systems release | Defense Update | Flight International.
Israel’s Sky Rider artillery UAV program
Sept 1/08: Skylark I. Elbit Systems Ltd. announces [PDF] a contract to supply Hermes 450 and Skylark 1 UAV systems to “a country in the Americas” for the total of approximately $25 million. All UAVs are to be delivered within a year.
New information points to Mexico as the customer, with 2 complete Hermes 450 systems and a complete Skylark system.
Mexico
Skylark-I, ADF in IraqAug 3/08: Skylark I. Australia places its 3rd Skylark I mini-UAV order, valued at “several million dollars.” Elbit informs DID that these are standard Skylark Is, not the new Skylark I-LE model.
Australia is also working with Boeing to lease ScanEagle UAV services as its mid-tier solution, instead of the canceled Project JP129 Elbit Systems release [PDF].
3rd Aussie order
June 18/08: Upgrades. UV-Online reports that Elbit has made significant changes to its line of Skylark UAVs:
“Meanwhile the work on the company’s Skylark UAVs has vastly improved the performance of both the Skylark I and II. The company has changed some of the elements of the airframe structure, integrated a new battery and looked at power management. According to officials the new Skylark I-Long Endurance (LE) and Skylark-II LE can now stay aloft a lot longer.
The Skylark I-LE has doubled its endurance from 90 minutes to three hours with a mission range greater than 15km. The Skylark II-LE is almost completely a new system in its outward image with a much changed aerostructure. The engine has bee moved to the rear, the fuselage has been altered and there is also a new tail configuration. The endurance has more than doubled to over 15 hours and with a new datalink it can operate out to 150km.”
March 24/08: Skylark I. Elbit Systems Ltd. announces [PDF format] that it has won “a tender involving 10 of the leading UAV manufacturers worldwide,” and will supply Skylark I UAV systems to France’s Special Forces. This contract marks Elbit Systems’ first UAV contract with France.
France
2005 – 2006Wins in Australia, Canada, South Korea; Problems with Canadian UAVs; Skylark II introduced.
Skylark II concept
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Dec 17/07: Skylark II. Elbit System announces that the Skylark-II has been selected by the South Korean military as their “preferred solution” in ” a tender involving extensive technical tests and including UAV manufacturers from all over the world.” The first phase of the contract includes one comprehensive Skylark® II system. Additional systems are expected in the future.
The UAVs will be equipped with their standard-issue payload: Elbit subsidiary Elop’s advanced 8″ Micro-CoMPASS turret with a day sensor, cooled night sensor, laser illuminator and tracker; and an advanced digital communication system from Tadiran Spectralink, which is about to be wholly merged [PDF] into Elbit Systems. Elbit release.
South Korea
June 17/07: Recognition. Elbit Systems Ltd. announces that business research and consulting firm Frost & Sullivan has presented them with a “Best Innovative Product Award” for 2007 in the Aviation & Defense Category, for their Skylark-II. It is praised for bringing the capabilities of more expensive UAVs to a smaller and cheaper vehicle. Philadelphia Examiner | Israel Times.
Nov 19/06: Skylark I. Israel’s Globes business daily relays a Flight International report re: Canadian experiences with the Skylark I in Afghanistan:
“The British weekly quotes a technical director in the Canadian Army interim small UAV programme, Captain Rob Sanders as saying, “Most of them aren’t flying in Afghanistan. For some reason, in some parts of the country it will fly great, or today it will fly. The same one, at a separate time tonight, won’t fly. So they have grounded them all trying to figure out what is going on. We are sending a couple of specialists over there to sort that out.”
Despite requests, Elbit declines to provide updates concerning the resolution of this problem. On April 6/09, Boeing subsidiary Insitu receives an award to provide “small unmanned aerial vehicle (SUAV) services” to support the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere, using its ScanEagle UAV.
Canada problems, loss
Nov 8/06: Recognition. Elbit Systems Ltd. announces [PDF | HTML via Shepherd] that its Skylark II UAV has received a “2006 Best of What’s New” Award from Popular Science Magazine in the Aviation and Space category. If you haven’t heard of this feature before, the magazine explains:
“Each year, the editors of Popular Science review thousands of new products in search of the top 100 tech innovations of the year; breakthrough products and technologies that represent a significant leap in their categories. The winners – the Best of What’s New – are awarded inclusion in the much-anticipated December issue of Popular Science, the most widely read issue of the year since the debut of Best of What’s New in 1987. Best of What’s New awards are presented to 100 new products and technologies in 10 categories: Automotive, Aviation & Space, Computing, Engineering, Gadgets, General Innovation, Home Entertainment, Home Tech, Personal Health and Recreation.”
Oct 3/06: Skylark I. Canada joins Australia in choosing Elbit’s Skylark. The UAV was first ordered on a temporary basis, as part of the $200 million set of emergency purchases for Operation Archer in November 2005.
It was picked more formally as Canada’s future mini-UAV in October 2006, following a competition that reportedly included IAI’s I-View 50 with its unique parafoil landing system, and Boeing’s larger ScanEagle UAV. Thales Canada will act as the prime contractor.
Canada
June 13/06: Skylark II. Elbit Systems formally introduces the Skylark II “close range class tactical UAV system.” Release.
Skylark II
Nov 3/05: Skylark I. Australia chose Elbit’s Skylark as its mini-UAV, to complement Israel Aerospace Industries’ larger I-View 250 and some Boeing ScanEagles used at battalion and brigade levels.
Australia
Additional ReadingsBelarus unveils its brand new Russian “Protivnik-GE” 59N6-E mobile 3D surveillance radar:
Northrop Grumman Space and Mission Systems of Clearfield, UT received a contract modification for $176.2 million, exercising the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Propulsion Replacement Program’s (PRP) final full rate production (year 7) option. NGC tends to sub-contract large portions of this work to ATK Thiokol; the Minuteman III PRP began in 1998 as a Joint Venture between ATK and Pratt & Whitney, but all work content was transitioned to ATK in the 2003-2004 timeframe following a contract restructure. DID has covered related contracts in November 2006 ($222.5 million), March 2006 ($541 million) and January 2006 ($225.2 million). Presumably, the ICBMs’ Environmental Protection Agency certification has been taken care of by now.
The purpose of PRP is to ensure MM Flight Reliability and supportability of the USA’s LGM-30G Minuteman III nuclear ICBMs through 2020 by correcting identified mission threatening degradations, sustaining existing reliability, and supporting Minuteman Life Extension Efforts. America chose to retire its larger, newer, and more capable MX Peacekeeper missiles in 2005, in compliance with arms control treaties it has signed. This contract action will purchase the remaining 56 Minuteman III booster sets, making a total of 601 sets acquired during the PRP. At this time, $51.6 million has been obligated. The 526th ICBM Systems Wing at Hill Air Force Base, UT holds the contract (F42310-98-C-0001). See also Northrop Grumman release.
UpdatesAugust 18/16: The Pentagon and the USAF have run into issues over the latter’s plan to replace the LGM-30G intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Concern over cost estimates given the USAF have been expressed by Washington, who found that the flying branch’s figure differs greatly from that of the office of independent cost assessment. The disparity stems from the fact that the US hasn’t built new ICBMs in decades, and nuclear spending over the next 30 years could exceed $1 trillion.
January 26/16: An investigation into a “mishap” involving a Minuteman III ICBM causing $1.8 million worth of damage has been released. The heavily redacted report cited crew inexperience as the main factor, after they were sent to fix an error that arose during a routine diagnostic test, causing damage to the missile after failure to follow procedures. While investigators said they found four contributing factors to the cause of the incident, only two could be found in the report itself. The majority of the blame seems to rest with the crew leader in charge of the troubleshooting, who failed to first follow technical guidance, and then lacked the the adequate proficiency level to anticipate the consequences of his actions during the incident. The report follows the recent debates over the spending of billions of dollars on upgrading and maintaining these strategic missiles which are coming to be seen as an antiquated defense mechanism.
The Taleban’s recent takeover of both Qala-ye Zal and Dasht-e Archi’s district centres is the latest episode in the long-running battle for possession of Kunduz province. It follows the spectacular takeover of Kunduz’s provincial centre by insurgents in late September 2015, the hard-won recapture by pro-government forces two weeks later and the government’s unsuccessful counter-offensive in the province’s districts. Lola Cecchinel, a regular AAN guest author, examines the Taleban’s latest gains and the dismantling of government structures outside of the provincial capital (with contributions by Thomas Ruttig and Obaid Ali).
Two of Kunduz’s district centres, those of Qala-ye Zal and Dasht-e Archi, fell to the Taleban once again on 20 July 2016. In Qala-ye Zal, the government temporarily retreated to a local teacher training college in the village of Aqtepa while the administration centre itself was held by the Taleban until 8 August 2016. The Taleban then also overran the district’s security headquarters. With the local government officials still trapped in the training centre, the Taleban is effectively in charge of the district.
In Dasht-e Archi, government officials retreated to an area in Qarloq village, which had, until then, been a government stronghold. As almost all the district’s officials hail from Qarloq, most local pro-government and Afghan Local Police (ALP) forces are concentrated here to protect them. The other part of Qarloq is under Taleban control. There are occasional exchanges of fire, including with heavy artillery, which mostly affect civilians and damage buildings. Most residents have now fled the district centre.
Furthermore, on 4 August 2016, the Taleban launched an attack on Emam Saheb district, which lies on Tajikistan’s border. This district had remained quiet since the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) recaptured it in their late September offensive. District governor Emamuddin Quraishi warned that if no reinforcements were sent, the district would fall once again. The Afghan press reported that the following day, an Afghan Air Force strike killed dozens of Taleban.
Of the remaining districts, Chahrdara, to the south of Qala-ye Zal, is still “ninety per cent” controlled by insurgents, District Governor Zalmay Faruqi told the author. Khanabad, to the east of Kunduz city, is caught between the Taleban, local militias and the ANSF. On 17 July 2016, four members of a peace jirga were killed in a fight not far from the Khanabad road. For now, of all the districts in Kunduz, only Aliabad in the southeast of the province had not come under an outright attack, although there has been a strong Taleban presence in all areas to the west of the river. Regular Taleban incursions have also taken place on the main road connecting Baghlan and Kunduz via Aliabad (as illustrated by the mass kidnapping on 31 May 2016).
District centre attacks and takeovers are, it seems, no longer newsworthy. They have happened before, and more than once. Dasht-e Archi and Chahrdara districts fell once to the Taleban in June 2015, and again during the Taleban capture of Kunduz city. Qala-ye Zal fell for the first time then (see here and here).
The war in Kunduz did not start with the fall of the city in September 2015, however, nor did it end when its provincial capital was recaptured by government forces. Since 2008, the insurgency has been spreading its roots as divisions within society have deepened. Kunduz is currently the most vulnerable province in the Afghan North (see also AAN’s Kunduz dossier and all other dispatches since then). Since the provincial capital fell last year, Kunduz has seen more Taleban attacks on district centres than any other province in the country.
A stranded population
Life in Kunduz province is a challenge for everyone, with thousands having already been displaced due to the conflict. Before the provincial capital fell to the Taleban, many families moved from the districts to the provincial centre or to neighbouring provinces in the face of growing insecurity. As of July 2015, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre counted “36,600 people newly displaced in Kunduz province since April 2015.” As the events of late September showed, however, the city was no longer a safe place to live. OCHA reported that the escalating conflict in Kunduz led to increased and widespread displacement, with 22,400 more people displaced as of 30 April 2016. The press reported on 8 August 2016 that in Qala-ye Zal alone, over 600 families had been newly displaced.
Those who remain in the districts no longer venture into Kunduz city, the risk of traveling along the district roads is too high. In Chahrdara, where the government only controls part of the district centre, people know that, while the ANSF control the main road between 8 am and 2 pm, the Taleban have freedom of movement at all other times. While the ANSF still control the main roads between most district centres to the provincial capital, the Taleban make regular incursions to set up temporary check-posts, arrest and interrogate passengers and, as recent events show, assassinate travellers and abduct others. The same goes for many areas in and around the city, notably the Kabul-Kunduz and Kunduz-Takhar highways near Kunduz airport (situated a few kilometres outside the city) and Sar Dawra, where there is a large settlement of IDPs.
On 28 May 2016, for example, the Taleban kidnapped the provincial police’s deputy administrative officer, Wahidullah, as he was travelling along the Kunduz-Takhar highway (read short report here). He is still being held captive. The Taleban have said they will exchange him for Qari Salim, one of their main commanders captured in April this year in Dasht-e Archi. On 31 May 2016 at dawn, the Taleban abducted passengers from several buses driving through the Omarkhel area in Aliabad district (from where the provincial governor comes), at the entrance of Kunduz city, kidnapping over 50 passengers and subsequently killing over 20 of them for allegedly being identified as members of the government (read Afghan media reports here and here). On 30 July 2016, two gunmen killed Nasim Khan, the executive manager of Aliabad district, local sources told the author. The Taleban claimed responsibility for the murder.
The atmosphere in Kunduz city is tense. Local shopkeepers and passers-by continue to ply their trade, yet the threat of violence hangs over the city and its 300,000 inhabitants: residents reported feeling observed, being suspicious about neighbours or passengers in a collective taxi disclosing information, fear of being questioned by the National Directorate for Security (NDS) or the Taleban on the way back to their villages.
Several residents told the author that they restrict their and their family members’ movements in the city – praying at home instead of going to the mosque, for instance. The provincial governor’s office building in Kunduz is surprisingly empty most days; it used to have long lines of visitors waiting. Aside from security guards and office staff, the number of daily visitors is around ten people a day. The civil administration’s work has essentially ground to a halt.
A resident of Chahrdara described life as “a kind of death,” and feeling “imprisoned,” for he saw no way out of the current state of insecurity in his area. These feelings were exacerbated as rumours had spread during the month of Ramadan that the Taleban were going to launch another attack on the city after the Eid holidays. As Kunduz residents retreat behind walls of mutual distrust and are cut off from their local government, their relationship with the state is further weakened.
The government’s lost grip on Dasht-e Archi and Chahrdara
On the other hand, Kunduz’s authorities’ reach outside the city has been severely reduced. The Provincial Governor’s Office has limited access to information outside the centre, little capacity to monitor and thus to exert oversight over district administrations. The Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in Kunduz, for example, reported that he could not send his staff to the districts anymore to solve issues or to monitor civil servants’ attendance. Similarly, the Directorate of Education and other departments, while still working, struggled to monitor the work of their departments in the districts.
Provincial Governor Assadullah Omarkhel, a Pashtun from the province and a former head of the Provincial High Peace Council, appointed in February 2016, confirmed this during an informal encounter: “I am supposed to be governing a whole province, but currently I am mostly stranded in the city.”
In Dasht-e Archi and Chahrdara districts, the government’s presence is merely symbolic. Even before the district fell on 20 July 2016, Archi’s district governor was rarely in his district. When the author visited the provincial governor’s office in late July, the district governor had been out of reach for several days. Civil servants stopped showing up for work and withdrew into the last government-held area in Qarloq, where most of the police forces are concentrated. A resident reported that in order to get a tazkera (national ID card), one had to visit the relevant officials in their own homes. The government has all but ceased to function in Archi.
In its place, the Taleban have established quasi-total dominance over the population, exploiting long-standing grievances of the Pashtun majority against a mafia-like Uzbek elite, who hold the important positions in the district. Dasht-e Archi comprises a majority of Pashtuns and minorities of Uzbeks and Turkmen. A group of Uzbeks and Turkmen from the Qarloq area, mainly affiliated to the Jamiat-e Islami and Jombesh parties, monopolised power and resources at the expense of Pashtuns but also members of their own ethnic groups. For years, they controlled decision-making, access to irrigation water, recruitment of the Afghan National Police and the Afghan Local Police programme as well as holding key positions, such as that of district governor or police chief. This created tensions between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots.’
These tensions were exacerbated by widespread discriminatory practices, corruption and client-patron relationships that characterised the local administration. (2) As a result, as the ALP chief put it, “the people reject the government as a whole.” Meanwhile, most regular and ALP policemen have abandoned their posts. According to ALP Chief Mullah Akhtar, they sell their weapons and ammunition to the Taleban shadow district governor, who, he says, has set up a weapons-trading business between Archi and Helmand, (3) the most important battleground for the Taleban in the south of the country. This makes Archi the most fertile breeding and training ground for the Taleban in the Afghan north.
Today, the district is the military operational base for insurgents in Kunduz. Most shadow governors and commanders operating in the north hail from Archi, while foreign fighters under Taleban command use it as a rear-base for their operations elsewhere in the province. A series of government and allied US forces operations have done little to change things, although they have managed to deal a few blows to the local insurgents’ leadership. For example, according to the district governor, a shadow district governor was killed (but quickly replaced) in November 2015, several commanders were arrested during night raids in April 2016, and US Special Forces have carried out a series of drone attacks in Archi since the beginning of the spring.
In Chahrdara district, another insurgent hotbed since 2008, the Taleban have established a fully-functioning parallel administration. They have set up offices in the Nawabad area to the west of the district centre, in concrete buildings and assigned full-time clerks to respond to people’s demands. They use laptops, printers and fingerprint scans, all captured during their temporary takeover of Kunduz. Ironically, Nawabad is where the US Special Forces used to have a base – which the Taleban now use – and where they used to train local ALP units. They reportedly handle cases and issue decisions swiftly, in contrast with the government’s slow, bureaucratic and corrupt administration.
Breakdown of government services
Worsening security has affected the overall provision of government services to the local population, particularly in education and health. Schools have been used as bases by the Taleban as well as by government forces during the fighting, such as Abdul Fatah Shahid High School in Chahrdara, which remained closed for several days; other have been fully destroyed, have closed down or are now completely under Taleban supervision. (4) In Chahrdara and Archi, schools are still open except where there is fighting nearby. There, the Taleban monitor the attendance of teachers, modify the curriculum and preach anti-government messages to students, according to a report by the local German-supported NGO, Mediothek Afghanistan, published in December 2015 also confirmed by the author’s sources. One teacher in Emam Saheb told AAN that the Taleban had asked education department officials to take part in a discussion about girls’ schools. Media sources and Human Rights Watch have also reported that the Taleban have increasingly recruited fighters from among public school pupils and madrasa students (see media report here; and HRW report here).
Health facilities have been similarly targeted, the most notable event being the bombing of the MSF trauma centre in Kunduz city by US airstrikes on 3 October 2015 (see the latest of a series of AAN analysis here). Currently, Kunduz’s regional hospital is overcrowded with patients from all districts flocking to the centre to get emergency healthcare; however it does not have the capacity to treat them all.
Although various NGOs – including the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan and the Norwegian Refugee Council – have managed to keep their operations running in the province, they are struggling to access people in the most insecure districts, where ongoing fighting disrupts the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Most donor programmes, however, such as those run by USAID or the German government’s development agency (GIZ), shut down long ago when security began to deteriorate within the city.
If some level of education and health services is still provided, people face greater risks in accessing them. As a female resident of Archi told the author in May 2016: “People face many barriers in receiving humanitarian assistance because of insecurity. They cannot move from one area to another because the Taleban create problems for them.” (5)
Kunduz’s power (im)balance
Omarkhel’s room for manoeuvre on other urgent matters, such as reconstruction, is fairly limited. Donor and NGO projects have stalled. In an interview with the author on 16 July 2016 he lamented the lack of resources: “We will take anything you can do to help us, even if it’s a single bullet or a single brick.”
The district governors are just as helpless or incapable. Most have been in their positions for many years (the only new face being the governor of Aliabad, Hayatullah Faqiryar). They form an integral part of a system of poor governance and, as such, are perpetuating the very dynamics, which have distanced people from the state and pushed them closer to the insurgents: corruption, patronage and discrimination.
When the author sat with all but one of Kunduz’s district governors in July 2016 to ask about priorities in their districts, they listed government offices that needed building, equipment and stationary that needed to be bought and development projects that needed launching. Accustomed to ever-available and unconditional funding for security, development and governance by the international community in the province (which itself has added to problems), their incentives for addressing the root causes of instability are limited. They are certainly not commanded to do so by the government in Kabul, which is perceived as either turning a blind eye to the problems of people in Kunduz, or willingly fostering instability in the province.
Provincial and district governors are operating in survival mode, as are local policemen, community council members and even civil society and the media in Kunduz. As confirmed by Afghan NGO sources, journalists in Kunduz received money from public authorities in exchange for publishing positive – and sometimes incorrect – reports about the government. Not only this, they have been threatened by security and other officials as well as local strongmen not to report abuses or human rights violations that have occurred during military operations, for instance.
If someone tries to break the cycle of patronage and corruption, they are pushed out of the system. One good example is former provincial governor Omar Safi. He was the first provincial governor to be appointed by President Ashraf Ghani in December 2014 in a gesture signifying Kunduz was to be a priority, and an example of the change in the way provinces were to be run. Safi was continually undermined, however, by local office holders and their patrons in Kabul, including in his efforts to disband militias in the province. His deputy, Hamdullah Daneshi, a Jamiati who has retained his position for 13 years (indicating strong support from Kabul), has been a staunch supporter of militias in Kunduz. As he said in an interview published in June 2015, they prevented the province from falling back into the hands of the Taleban, an opinion shared by his former mujahedin compatriots (see also this AAN analysis). Ghani was eventually forced to drop Omar, also due to political pressure and rumours that Safi had fled (more in this AAN analysis).
Khanabad’s current district governor, Hayatullah Amiri (the son of famous commander Amir Muhammad Chugha) (6), initiated a process of disarmament of militias in 2015. The Afghan National Army began to dismantle illegally armed group checkpoints in the city, and militiamen were called to the centre to lay down their weapons. However, some of these groups’ commanders then pulled connections in the Ministry of Defence in Kabul and the process was stopped. Amiri’s predecessor, Nezamudin Nasher, who served between 2010 and 2012 and who hails from the famous and influential family of the founders of the originally Kunduz-based and now countrywide textile company Spinzar –publicly accused then-provincial governor Engineer Muhammad Omar of corruption. (7) He also ensured that local militia commanders such as Muhammad Omar Pakhsaparan and Mir Alam – the latter controls a large militia network in the province – were no longer able to access the district centre, in order to enhance citizens’ safety. Nasher was targeted in a car bomb attack in Kunduz city in July 2012 and injured. The background of this attack was never publicly clarified, but Nasher fled to Europe. (More background on Kunduz’s militia networks in this AAN dispatch and this AAN report)
A number of these governance problems were highlighted in a government-commissioned fact-finding report published in November 2015, following the Taleban’s temporary takeover of the city. (8) Alongside security issues, it highlighted a number of key governance issues for the government to tackle, including a) neutralising the influence of the ‘grey government’ in Kunduz (ie of ‘powerbrokers’(mostly former Jihadi commanders), who play a crucial role in politics, the security sector and the informal economy); b) ensuring provincial governors have the authority and capacity to respond to people’s expectations; c) resolving historical frictions which have deeply divided society in Kunduz, and d) ensuring the representation of all groups in the appointment of provincial-level officials as well as merit-based recruitment among the pool of qualified Kunduz candidates. (See AAN’s look at the report here). Candidates had even been identified by the government – or more precisely, by President Ashraf Ghani – hence Safi’s appointment. However, he was thwarted by the very structures he was supposed to reform. His successor Omarkhel has been even less able to sidestep the province’s patronage networks, as he is deeply engrained in them himself. (9) As a result, the initiative has been left to the Taleban to shape the course of events in the province.
Military operations without governance reforms
Kunduz’s recent history has shown that successive military offensives (ANSF-led, with or without the support of US Special Forces or militias recruited to swell the ranks of the ANSF) have not resulted in a viable solution to the structural crisis in the province that has been unfolding for the past ten years. This has been exacerbated by the failure to couple them with decisive changes in the distribution of power in the province (as highlighted in this 2013 AAN report, “Local Afghan Power Structures and the International Military Intervention“). The unchallenged patronage networks are one of the deep-rooted drivers of conflict that have bolstered the insurrection since 2008. Safi’s removal from office is a further setback to such efforts.
This time again, despite considerable efforts by the ANSF, the Taleban have only been pushed back temporarily. Although they have not succeeded in repeating their 2015 success, their July 2016 operations in Dasht-e Archi, Chahrdara and Emam Saheb have shown their resilience and ability in not only inflicting losses on the government but also on recapturing lost territory, including district centres. Their hold on extended rural areas is a key feature of that resilience. In the context of this deep and complex crisis, it is unrealistic to expect that the local government alone could tackle what amounts to a state of paralysis in Kunduz.
(1) There are contradicting reports about where the set up of these districts stands. IDLG sources told the author in early July that district governors had been appointed, the location of the district centres decided and borders defined. Sources in the Kunduz provincial government, however, said this was on paper only because the areas of the districts-to-be were inaccessible to the government. Neither did they know anything about the appointment of district governors.
(2) The current district governor of Dasht-e Archi, Nasruddin Saidi, for example, has taken over from his father, late Sheikh Sadruddin, a former jihadi commander linked to Jamiat who was killed in 2013. The new district governor of Aliabad, Hayatullah Faqiryar – mentioned further down in the text – is the son of a former Jamiat commander. Both are young, inexperienced and unable to command the respect of local elders.
(3) This weapons trade is likely part of a much larger system, involving US, Russian-made and other weapons. US weapons that fell to the Taleban during the takeover of Kunduz in 2015 and elsewhere, when disarming or trading with the ALP and possibly other pro-government units, are redistributed among the Taleban with their changing structure (made up of special units and forces, see this AAN analysis). For Russian-made weapons, the main supply route is through Emam Saheb and Badakhshan province. Through these areas, large amounts of weapons and ammunition are supplied to other parts of the country, including by pro-government commanders (see for example this media report). At the same time, it is doubtful whether the Kunduz insurgency would contribute large amounts of weapons to the fronts in Helmand, since the battlegrounds in the northeast, particularly in Kunduz and Baghlan, are big and in need of lots of ammunition and military hardware themselves.
(4) For 2015, UNAMA and UNICEF documented the highest number of such incidents for Kunduz province: military use of 15 schools by pro-government forces affected 6,680 students (3,980 boys and 2,700 girls).
(5) This quote comes from an in-depth interview conducted by ATR consulting under an NGO-commissioned assessment of humanitarian needs in Kunduz province, 2016, in which the author participated.
(6) Amir Muhammad Chugha (sometimes also: Chughay) from Khanabad district was one of the most powerful commanders in the province during the war against the Soviets. He was linked to Sayyaf’s Ittehad-e Islami party (now renamed Dawat-e Islami) and was killed in 1994.
(7) Eng. Omar was assassinated in an unrelated attack in October 2010.
(8) The fact-finding delegation investigated the reasons behind the fall of the city between 11 and 30 October 2015. The report was handed to the National Security Council on 21 November 2015. Only a summary was released to the public.
(9) Omarkhel is the leader of Sayyaf’s Dawat-e Islami party in the northeastern region.