Defence`s Feeds

A security guard and a local government official were killed and three others were wounded when unidentified militants drove a vehicle into a the yard of a local Communist Party office before detonating an explosive device and attacking people with knives in Karakax county in China's Xinjiang

THE UNITED States Department of State issued a warning on 23 December, urging citizens to not travel to Jordan out of fear of a potential terrorist attack targeting U.S. citizens and Westerners, Reuters reported.

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Tag: German ArmyNiagale Bagayoko

In 2016, more than half a million Afghans fled conflict to places of safety inside Afghanistan’s borders. Over a third of the yearly total fled in just one month – October. This mass movement was caused by heavy fighting between government and insurgent forces. At the year’s end, AAN’s Jelena Bjelica looks at the statistics of Afghanistan’s internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The newly displaced: facts and figures

More than 580,000 people – 84,257 families – had been displaced within Afghanistan by mid-December 2016, the United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported. (For background on how IDPs are counted and recorded, statistics, see footnote (1)). More than half of the newly displaced population – 56 percent – were children under 18 years of age. In all but three of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, UNOCHA recorded some level of forced displacement, while all 34 provinces hosted the displaced. Kunduz, Uruzgan, Farah and Helmand produced the highest numbers of displaced people in 2016, while those receiving the most were Helmand, Takhar, Farah, Kunduz, Kandahar. That the same or nearby provinces appear in both lists show that many people seek safety near their homes.

October was the worse month. There were simultaneous assaults by the Taleban on several provincial capitals: on Kunduz city (see AAN reporting here), Farah city in the west, Faryab’s Maymana in the north and Helmand’s Lashkar Gah in the south. Over a third of the yearly total fled in this month alone, with 213,000 people (31,402 families) on the move. (More in-depth information on displacement is available from an interactive UNOCHA ‘dashboard’ (see here).

The northeast

The highest number of displaced persons was recorded in the northeast region (Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz and Baghlan), where over 198,000 people – 28,354 families, fled from conflict. Almost half of them – 93,500 people – fled their home province in October 2016. However, there were other monthly peaks – 30,000 in January and 21,000 in July 2016. Almost three-quarters of all those displaced in the northeast were from Kunduz province (116,000 from Kunduz district and more than 25,000 from Dasht-e Archi district). While most stayed within the same district (eg over 61,000 in Kunduz district), a considerable number moved to other provinces. For example, over 51,000 people displaced from Kunduz moved to Taloqan district in Takhar province and more than 25,000 to Pul-e Kumri district in Baghlan province.

The south

The second highest number of displacements was documented in the southern region (Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, Helmand and Nimroz), where over 164,000 people – 23,867 families (mainly from Helmand and Uruzgan provinces) were on the move. The peak months in the south were August and September, when more than 36,000 and 37,000 people, respectively, were on the move along with March (over 22,000) and October (over 20,000 people). More than a quarter of all those displaced in the south (46,000 individuals) were relocated from Tirinkot district of Uruzgan province (which saw a massive Taleban assault in September. Some remained displaced within the district, but over 22,000 individuals fled to Dand district of Kandahar province. Almost 30,000 people from Nad-e Ali district in Helmand province were displaced, and more than 17,000 of them fled to Lashakar Gah. In the southern region, the conflict seethed throughout the year, resulting in some level of displacement in almost every month of 2016 (the lowest recorded displacement was in June – 2,904 people – possibly related to Ramadan).

The west

The region seeing the third highest number of displacements was the west (Farah, Herat, Ghor and Baghdis). Here. 90,000 people (13,176 families) fled their homes. More than a half of them (around 51,000 people) fled from Farah district alone. While the majority remained displaced within district boundaries, around 11,000 moved to Herat district. However, the district of Farah also received people from the districts of Gullestan (around 2,000 people), Balabuluk (around 3,500 people) and Bakwa (a couple of hundred people). Over 56,000 people ­in the west fled in October 2016.

Annual displacement trends

2016 has been the highest year for IDP numbers ‘on record’, according to UNOCHA. This requires a word of caution; the records on the number of IDPs in the country prior to 2012 are scarce and unreliable. The estimated number of IDPs for the period 2001 to 2009, or earlier periods are patchy, variable and, for some periods, non-existent. A 2015 study by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), which is part of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the leading source of information and analysis on internal displacement worldwide, offers a rough picture on IDP numbers in Afghanistan since 1978. According to the study, “by the mid-1990s more than 400,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) were living in camps near Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat.” Following the Taleban’s rise to power in 1996, another million people were displaced. By 2002, according to IDMC, 1.2 million people had been displaced inside Afghanistan. The data for the period 2002 – 2010 are inconsistent and therefore not quoted.

A new increase in number of IDPs was noticed in early 2010; it coincided with ‘the surge’ in United States troops (an 33,000 extra were sent to Afghanistan) with the aim of defeating, or at least ‘degrading’ the Taleban. However, only after the UNHCR piloted a Population Movement and Tracking (PMT) mechanism “as a tool for live data assessments to enable appropriate tracking of the evolving situation of conflict-induced internal displacement in Afghanistan,” as explained in this UNHCR study in late 2011, have the displacement figures become more reliable. So what we can be certain of saying, is that 2016 saw the highest number of IDPs since 2011.

Between 2012 and 2014, the number of newly displaced persons remained below 200,000 per year (in 2012, 102,715; in 2013, 122,815; in 2014, 196,154). In 2015, the number of IDPs increased sharply with approximately 470,000 individuals on the move. “Between 2012 and 2014 there would be increases in displacement during the traditional summer fighting season,” Danielle Moylan, UNOCHA Public Information Officer told AAN, adding that “that has skewed in the past two years – with sharp increases seen in October, in 2015, due to [fighting and the fall to the Taleban of] Kunduz and, in 2016, due to [fighting in] Kunduz and Farah.” (For more in-depth analysis on Kunduz, see also 2016 AAN’s thematic dossier on insurgency and governance in Afghanistan’s northeast and 2015 AAN thematic dossier on the evolution of insecurity in Kunduz).

In mid-2016, it was already clear that the number of IDPs at the year’s end would have increased. Every week for the first six months of 2016, according to UNAMA, more than 6000 Afghans fled their homes, becoming IDPs. That was ten per cent more than in the first six months of 2015.

Trends noticed in the nature of the conflict, noted by UNAMA (see AAN reporting here). appear to be behind the surge in IDP numbers. In earlier years, the Taleban had been unable to mass fighters and menace urban centres because they were vulnerable to international air power. After international troops drew down to a largely non-combat mission at the end of 2014, the insurgents have been able to change tactics and have moved from using IEDs and assassinations to launching ground offensives. The impact on civilians has been clear. Ground offensives have not only become the largest cause of deaths and injuries in the war, but have also forced greater numbers of people to flee their homes.

The real number of IDPs

IDPs tend to remain relatively close to their homes, moving from rural areas to the provincial capital (if it is safe) or to a neighbouring province (see UNAMA 2014 Civilian casualties report). They often also try to return home as soon as conflict is over. Some manage to flee for relatively short periods. However, hundreds of thousands of Afghans are now living in protracted displacement. In 2015, for example, out of a total 1.17 million IDPs in Afghanistan, an estimated 700,000 individuals had been in displacement since 2008 (see UNOCHA 2015 Strategic Response Plan). Those in prolonged displacement often end up in informal settlements. UNOCHA September 2016 update on IPDs highlighted how living conditions of those in prolonged displacement are often undignified and unhealthy, without access to healthcare, clean water or education for children.

The cumulative estimates, ie those in prolonged displacement, plus those newly displaced show that the number of IDPs grew rapidly as the conflict intensified. At the end of 2010, around 352,000 individuals were living as IDPs. By the end of 2012, that number had increased to 500,000 individuals and by the end of 2015, there were more than 1.17 million IDPS (see IDMC chart for the cumulative estimates of number of people in displacement between 2009 and 2015 available here). In mid-2016, according to UNAMA around 1.2 million Afghans had been displaced within the country’s borders. OCHA warned that some of those had been displaced since 2002.

Those who are newly displaced receive a basic aid package from the UN and/or NGOs (according to a UNOCHA count, 33 organisations are currently providing assistance to IDPs; see here). However, given the shortfall in funding for IDPs and the huge numbers of newly displaced, those who have been displacement for prolonged periods of time may face a reduction in the aid they receive. An increase in the total numbers of IDPs also indicates that those in prolonged displacement will find it more difficult to return home, due to intensified conflict across the country.

Conclusion

2016 was yet another difficult year for many Afghans. As well as the IDPs, more than 600,000 people have been pushed out from Pakistan this year (see AAN latest reporting here). Another 427,000 undocumented refugees and deportees from Iran were also recorded by UNOCHA – although caution needs to be exercised with the Iran numbers as, according to UNOCHA, many of the journeys are circular, ie Afghans cross the border multiple times to seek work and repeatedly get pushed back. UNOCHA says that around 10 per cent of these people are found to be in need of humanitarian assistance. More than quarter of a million Afghans travelled to Europe in 2015 and 2016 and many are now facing deportation or forced return to their country (for example, an estimated half of the 190,000 who had sought asylum in Germany) (see AAN reporting here). Along with the 580,000 newly displaced within Afghanistan, this all adds up to a total of 1.6 million Afghans who have experienced or are now facing some form of displacement in 2016.

The increase in the number of displaced due to conflict, coupled with a shortage in funding (the UN received 82 million USD in pledges against a target of 152 million USD), indicates that displaced Afghans are likely to be extremely vulnerable to poverty. For many displaced, the biggest issue, however, is whether and when they will be able to return home.

Edited by Sari Kouvo and Kate Clark

 

 

(1) For 2016, UNOCHA collected statistics on IDPs by conducting joint assessments (ie different humanitarian agencies jointly assess petitions and make visits) throughout the country. These assessments are logged into a database. In previous years, this was the task of UNHCR.

In 2015, IDMC pointed out that “the figures tend to be underestimates, because they do not include all IDPs living in urban areas, who are often dispersed among economic migrants and the urban poor and so are difficult to identify.” The study also emphasised that figures “also exclude IDPs in inaccessible areas across all regions. Nor is data available on former refugees unable to return to their places of origin with which to determine whether they should be considered IDPs.” See IDMC study available here.

 

 

 

Americas

• Boeing will manufacture and deliver 51 Lot 90 Harpoon weapon systems for Brazil, Egypt and South Korea. Valued at $207 million, the contract was issued by the US Navy, and also includes components and spares for the governments of Japan, Australia, Thailand, India, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, and Taiwan. The anti-ship missile system is utilized by navies and air forces in over 30 countries.

• The first production conforming Textron AirLand Scorpion jet has made its maiden flight. Lasting one hour 42 minutes, the flight saw pilots perform a range of maneuvers, with the company saying that the aircraft “incorporates a number of improvements based on target customer feedback.” While the Scorpion had been seemingly dismissed as a potential offering in the USAF’s upcoming T-X trainer program, company officials said last week that they still haven’t ruled themselves out of the competition, just weeks away from the expected request for proposals (RFP).

• Contracts have been awarded to Lockheed Martin for $1.4 billion worth of Patriot advanced capability production. The foreign military sales deal will see the delivery of 205 missile segment enhancements for the governments of South Korea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates and the United States. The agreement also includes associated ground support equipment for the missiles.

Middle East & North Africa

• Battleground testing of 162 new and upgraded weapons by Russian military forces in Syria has revealed that 10 of these had flaws that had been missed during trials. The Defense Ministry said that it has stopped procurement of these weapons and their manufacturers have been ordered to fix the flaws. Among the systems tested in Syria were Su-30SM and Su-34 fighter jets, Mi-28N and Ka-52 helicopters, and Kalibr cruise missiles.

Europe

• Local Polish firm Mesko will provide the Piorun Man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) to the Polish military, as Warsaw’s beefing up of its air-defense capabilities continues. $220 million has been set aside for the acquisition, which will include a total of 1,300 missiles and 420 missile launchers. Meanwhile, plans are moving forward for Lockheed Martin to produce and deliver Joint Air-To-Surface Standoff Missiles Extended Range (JASSM-ER) for the Polish Air Force’s F-16 fighter jets. Polish F-16s will also be equipped with new AIM-120 (AMRAAM) and AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles.

• Rheinmetall and BAE Systems have both been awarded contracts as part of the Challenger 2 Assessment Phase for the UK government. Each company will receive $28 million in order to conduct technical studies with the Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank to produce digital models to determine appropriate upgrades for the legacy vehicles. In use with the British armed forces since 1998, the Challenger 2 Life Extension Project will upgrade the vehicle with the latest technology to make it available for operations until 2035.

Asia Pacific

• Japanese government and industry are vying for the sale of Mitsubishi-built air defense radar systems to Thailand. Competitive bids are expected to be solicited early next year, as Bangkok looks to upgrade and add to older European and US-built radars. If selected, the sale would mark the first Thai-Japanese military hardware sale. Tokyo is looking to push for stronger ties with Thailand, partly to counter the growing influence of China in southeast Asian, as relations between old ally the US and Thailand have been strained following a military coup in 2014.

• The Pakistan Army will receive four Mi-35 Hind E attack helicopters from Russia in 2017. Islamabad has paid $153 million in the deal, signed in August 2015, bringing to an end a self-imposed Russian ban on military exports to the country. Once wary of potential Indian protests at such a sale, Moscow now plans to sell as many as 20 of Mi-35s to Pakistan over the next few years.

Today’s Video

Pharewell F-4 Phantom II:

Sarajevo and Kabul lie over 4,000 kilometres apart. One feature that connects the two cities, however, is that both were destroyed during civil wars in the last decade of the twentieth century. Earlier this year, when AAN’s co-director Thomas Ruttig visited Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia during a vacation, he came across some haunting images. At the same time, in an Ottoman mosque in Sarajevo as well as a former Sufi monastery near Mostar, he also found a bridge between them. Both regions, the Balkans and ‘Khorasan’, used to be at opposite poles of what was, over many centuries, the ‘Persianate world’ – that vast area that was shaped by both Persian language and culture. An AAN read for the Christmas and New Year holiday season (with input from Obaid Ali on Rumi’s verses and Jelena Bjelica on Balkan history).

At first glance, the Historical Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina looks abandoned. There is a spray-painted wooden fence around it. Weeds grow on its external staircase. The façade of the whitish, modernist, concrete cuboid has been riddled with bullets. No wonder – it is not far from where many civilians were shot dead in Sarajevo’s so-called Sniper Alley during the four-year Serbian siege of the city, between 1992 and 1995. During this time, virtually all of the city’s infrastructure and much of its rich cultural heritage was destroyed.

We almost missed the museum itself, as well as the exhibition about the siege of Sarajevo on the its second floor. And that would have been a shame.

Sarajevo’s National History Museum. All photos in the text: Thomas Ruttig.

Three bicycles: not so distant wars

The Sarajevo museum’s exhibition speaks for itself. It is heart-wrenching in its simplicity, ­with leaflets and faded newspaper cut-outs, some with horrific photos of victims of the war as well as makeshift equipment used by its inhabitants during the siege (when water, electricity, transportation and other services had mostly been cut off and food only sporadically reached the city.) There’s an arrangement of how it would have looked in a small, bombed-out apartment, with laundry drying over a wood fire stove. (1)

There was a photo of a man, who, according to the caption, regularly cycled to visit the grave of a relative in one of the many makeshift graveyards that had to be dug in the besieged city between apartment blocks. It showed him standing in grief in the snow, his bicycle beside him. The original bike featured in the exhibition: the owner had donated it. Many other Sarajevans had also donated to the museum every day items used during the war.

We emerged from the museum in shock, as it had evoked so many flashbacks to Kabul, the city at the eastern end of the Persianate world (more about this below), from where we had just returned. But our thoughts were not only about Kabul. Images of our own, destroyed city of Berlin in World War II also came to mind, from stories told by my parents. Of my grandmother, for example, pushing her bicycle back home through the ruins, with potatoes or turnips in a bag she had bartered against her silver cutlery in the rural outskirts. She did not know when her husband would be back; he was a prisoner of war and worked in a coalmine in Belgium (he did return, but only four years after the war had ended. His fellow miners had treated him as one of theirs and had fed him.) Of my mother, nine years old in the last year of that war, and her mother, in a trek of refugees, cowering in a ditch in a field while low-flying planes fired shots at them. My father, the same age and always hungry in the last year of the war, crawling out of a basement shelter in Berlin in the middle of street-fighting with his grandfather, both with cobbler knives, to a horse dying in the street, in order to snatch a piece of meat. I later grew up in that same street.

After leaving the exhibition, I could not help but think: how could something like this have happened in Europe at the end of the twentieth century? But, as both authors and readers of AAN know, it can and does still happen in many places. It really does not matter whether it is in Sarajevo or in Kabul or Kunduz. It does not matter whether the people who are forced to live in abject conditions due to war (often without the most basic of services), who face the daily threat of being maimed or killed, are from Europe, Asia or elsewhere.

The picture of the bicycle would come back to us once more in Sarajevo, in another exhibition in a small gallery as part of a local festival (2). It was entitled “After Enduring Freedom” and exhibited works of Kabul-based Australian photographer Andrew Quilty. When we found out about it, we knew we did not want to miss it, either.

Andrew Quilty’s photo exhibition in Sarajevo.

This photo of a bicycle was rather unspectacular at first glance: the bike was muddied and leaning against a wall in a village just outside Kunduz. Quilty had taken the photo while he was documenting the US air attack that destroyed a clinic run by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in the city on 3 October 2015, during a two-week Taleban takeover of the city, visualising this event for many people around the world (AAN analysis of this episode here). The bicycle in the photo belonged to an Afghan man named Baynazar Muhammad Nazar, 43, who had worked as a security guard in Kunduz. He was killed on the operating table while undergoing surgery for a bullet wound in his leg that he had sustained during the attack. This attack has not yet been investigated satisfactorily and might still amount to a war crime.

Afterwards, Quilty had returned to Kunduz and Nazar’s family. He described this, and the story of Nazar’s death, in detail for Foreign Policy magazine. It ends with a scene where Nazar’s wife and children visit his grave, and one daughter’s heartbreaking remarks: “Father, we washed your bicycle — please wake up — you can come home now.” (Here is a photo of Nazar still alive, reproduced by Quilty.)

A mosque in Sarajevo

Fortunately, there are many older, more positive features that connect Sarajevo – and Bosnia as part of the western Balkans in general – to the region that now contains Kabul and Kunduz, sometimes referred to as “Khorasan.” (3) These are the Persian language and culture. At one time, and for many centuries, it was so influential throughout that vast stretch of land that University of Chicago historian Marshall Hodgson (in his 1974 book, The Venture of Islam: The expansion of Islam in the Middle Periods) coined the term “Persianate world.” The Persian (Farsi) language, he wrote (4):

(…) served to carry a new overall cultural orientation within Islamdom. … Most of the more local languages of high culture that later emerged among Muslims … depended upon Persian wholly or in part for their prime literary inspiration. We may call all these cultural traditions, carried in Persian or reflecting Persian inspiration, ‘Persianate’ by extension.

Sabaheta Gačanin, author in a Turkish academic magazine, calls the Persian language a “civilisation bridge … lasting to this very day.”

Careva Džamija, the Emperor’s Mosque in Sarajevo.

 

Including to Sarajevo, for example, although there, the language has not been in use in everyday or even literary life for some 150 years. There, on the left bank of the River Miljacka, which divides the city, is Careva Džamija, the Emperor’s Mosque, or Bakrbaba Mosque in Turkish. (It is not far from Latinska ćuprija, the Latin Bridge, where, on 28 June 1914, the Bosnian nationalist student Gavrilo Princip killed Austro-Hungarian heir apparent Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which helped trigger World War I.) In the mosque’s yard lies the türbe (the Turkish word for tomb, which, in Persian, would be turbat and in today’s Dari and Pashto, ziarat) of Hadži Hafiz Halid [Khaled] Effendi Hadžimulić (1915-2011) that has – to my surprise – a Persian-language inscription on its knee-high marble enclosure.

Part of the Persian inscription at Sarajevo’s Emperor Mosque.

 

ای دریغا پیش از این بودیم اجل

تاعذابم کم بدی اندر وجل

 

گوی آنجا خاک می بیختم

زین جهان پاک می بگریختم

 

چون از اینجا واری آنجا روی

در شکر خداوند شاکر شوی

 

The du’a:

رضینا بالله ربا” و بالاسلام دینا” و بمحمد صلی الله علیه و سلم رسولا” نبیا

 

Of Ottomans and Seljuqs: Speaking Persian in the Turkic empire

The mosque used to be in the heart of the city. At the beginning of the four hundred year-long Ottoman rule (1461-1878), this place was known as the At Maidan, or Hippodrome. Sarajevo itself was founded by the Ottomans, and its name derives from the Turkish word saray, as in caravan saray. The language the Ottomans used in much of their official business in those days, however, was Persian.

Persian was used because the Ottomans were the heirs of the Seljuqs. This Turkic tribal coalition from Central Asia had conquered Khorasan in the first half of the eleventh century, where they adopted the local Persian language spoken by a sedentary, partly well-educated Iranian population. (The Persian language is part of a larger family of Iranian languages to which many Afghan languages, such as Pashto, Dari, Balochi, Pashai and the Nuristani languages, also belong.) Thomas Barfield in Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton 2010) writes that the Seljuqs created

… states with dual organizations. Administration was placed in the hands of “men of the pen,” literate Persians speakers familiar with government, while military commands were allocated to “men of the swords,” tribal Turks and slave soldiers.

From there, they exported the practice of employing Persian speakers to other parts of the empire, including to Anatolia, which they conquered on their way westwards and which became known as the Sultanate of Rum (1037-1194). Henceforth they were called the Rum-Seljuqs. According to E J W Gibb, the author of the standard A Literary History of Ottoman Poetry, “Persian was the language of the court, while Persian literature and Persian culture reigned supreme.” Turkish remained the everyday language of the non-Iranian population of their empire, and Arabic the language of Islamic theology and law. The Persianate influence on Turkic intellectual life further increased during the thirteenth century, when, fleeing the Mongol invasion, many scholars, writers and poets from Persia came to the Seljuq empire.

The Ottomans, the Seljuqs’ successors, inherited the Persianate culture. They continued to patronise Persian literature for five and a half centuries, according to Ehsan Yarshater, director of the Centre for Iranian Studies at Columbia University, and extended the use of the Persian language to the areas of the Balkans they started conquering in the mid-fifteenth century. According to Austrian Bert Fragner, a leading Iranist, the Persianate world reached an “optimal state (…) in a rather constant spatial dimension” – namely, from the Balkans to Central Asia and India – from the fourteenth to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 

Ottoman graves in Sarajevo.

Hungarian scholar Iván Szántó has described how this worked in practice in the Ottoman Balkans:

The number of visitors and immigrants from Iran in the Ottoman Empire was considerable; it was also not uncommon to find people of Iranian origin in important positions in the Ottoman administration of Bosnia. In addition to that, Ottoman institutions often had a Persian imprint as a result of continuing contacts between Ottoman Anatolia and Safavid Iran. Recitations in Sufi dervish lodges of the Mevlevi and Bektashi orders, for instance, were often sung in Persian. Many well-educated Bosnians were proficient in the Persian language, as was reported with much admiration by the seventeenth-century Ottoman traveller, Evliya Çelebi (whose own mastery of Persian is testified by an autograph graffiti he left inside the now-destroyed Aladža Mosque of Foča [also in Bosnia]). So high was the prestige of this language that many local intellectuals felt compelled to study and compose Persian poetry or to write commentaries on Persian literature […]. It should be noted, however, that Iranian-born migrants were not necessarily ethnic Persians; more often they were Turkic-speaking Azeris […].

The passion for the Persian language among the Ottoman Turks and their local subjects in the Balkans is also reflected in their names. One of Sarajevo’s most famous historical personalities, the first native Muslim governor of Ottoman Bosnia (between 1521 and his death in 1541), had a Persian name: Gazi Husrev Beg (1480-1541); this is the Turkic spelling of Ghazi Khosraw Beg, Khosraw being the name of many famous ancient Persian emperors. He was the founder of Sarajevo’s most beautiful mosque, which is still named after him, the Gazi Husrev Beg Mosque. Similarly, the local waqf comprises a madrassa, a famous clock tower, an important library and a hospital. Together, they make up the most formidable complex of Ottoman architecture in Bosnia, if not the whole of the Balkans. The name of Husrev/ Khosraw Beg’s mother, a daughter of the Ottoman Caliph Bayezid II (who ruled from 1481 to 1512), was Seljuka. (5)

At the Gazi Husrev Beg mosque, Sarajevo

Rumi in Bosnia

In the Emperor’s Mosque in Sarajevo, on that quiet Ramadan day during our visit, the few worshippers present, as well as the janitor, thought the inscription on Hadži Hadžimulić’s tomb was Arabic. They did not know what it meant. But only one of the four verses was Arabic, a prayer (du’a): “we accept that Allah is our Lord, Islam is our religion and Muhammad (peace be upon him) is his messenger.”

As it turned out, the other three verses were in Persian, from Mawlana Jalaluddin Muhammad (1207-73)’s famous oeuvre, the 25,600 verses Mathnawi-ye Manawi (online here). Mawlana Jalaluddin is one of the most important poets in the Persian language and his Mathnawi, which teaches Sufis the path to God through true love of Him, is one of the most influential book, and not only for Muslims. Pointing to his place of birth in what is today Afghanistan, Jalaluddin is often given the takhallos Balkhi. However, he is also known as “Rumi“ (a reference to his grandfather, who, according to some sources, was called Hussain Rumi and, given this takhallos, might have been from further west, ie Anatolia, which is “Rum” in Arabic), or simply as “Mawlana.” As a young man, Mawlana went to Turkey with his father, who was a preacher, mystic and poet himself, and settled in Konya, then the capital of the Rum-Seljuq Turkish empire. There, he founded the Mawlawi (Turkish: Mevlevi) Sufi order, also known as the so-called Whirling Dervishes. (6)

It was the Sufi orders that, to a large extent, kept the Persian language alive throughout the Balkans for centuries. Apart from the Mawlawi Sufis, there was the Naqshbandiya, also prominent in Afghanistan. Its first members came to the Balkans in the fifteenth century, according to this 1975 study. In 1463, the first Sufi tekije (or lodge), that of Sheikh Musafer, was established in Sarajevo. Following a decline, the order was revitalised in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by murids of its Mujaddedi branch (see this 2008 MA thesis on the subject) – also known from Afghanistan. After the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, many Sufis in Yugoslavia migrated to Turkey. In 1952, the communist regime in Yugoslavia banned Sufi orders, but Sufism continued to be practiced underground. In the late 1990s, a revival followed. The Naqshbandiya is still the largest Sufi order active in today’s Bosnia.

Blagaj: Sufi poets and warrior-dervishes in the Balkans

An Iranian shop-owner whom we encountered in Sarajevo’s bazaar quarter of Bašcaršija, and who fetched his nai and tambourine to sing Rumi verses for us one evening, told us to visit the Sufi tekije (monastery) in Blagaj. This is a small town near the city of Mostar, where the famous Ottoman-era Old Bridge was destroyed during the Bosnian war (1992-95), and rebuilt afterwards. He also mentioned the name of one Fawzi Mostari (or Fevzi Mostarac in Bosnian, born between 1670 and 1677, died 1747), who, he said, had still been writing poetry in “pure Persian.” We found a 2011 bilingual (Bosnian/Persian) version of his major work, Bulbulistan, published by the Cultural Centre of the Iranian Embassy to Bosnia. Bulbulistan means “The Book of Nightingales.” (This bird features prominently in Persian-language literature, not only because of its sweet song, but also because its Persian name, bulbul, rhymes with gul, flower.)

Following the Iranian shopkeeper’s advice, we went to Blagaj, where the local Buna River springs from a cave in a 200 metre-high cliff, which reminded me of the Silk Gorge (Tangi-ye Abrishom) between Kabul and Sarobi. The monastery in Blagaj was built by the Sufis of the Bektashi order around 1470. The lover of bulbuls, Mostari (who was born there), was inspired by the classical Persian literature of Rumi, Saadi, Jami and others that constitute a central part of the Sufi philosophy.

Former sufi monastery of Blagaj.

 

Mostari studied Persian in the Ottoman capital of Istanbul. There he joined the Sufi order of the Mawlawis founded by Rumi/Balkhi and, at its Dar ul-Masnawi (“House of Masnawi”), wrote his own masterpiece, the Bulbulistan, in 1739, according to Džemal Ćehajić, a Bosnian scholar, who contributed a short biography of Mostari to a 2011 reprint of the Bulbulistan funded by Iran.

Both the title and form of Bulbulistan are reminiscent of, and indeed may have been a conscious reference to, Sa’adi’s famous collection, the Gulistan (The Rose Garden), from thirteenth century Iran. Cultural historian Amila Buturovic describes compares Mostari’s work as a “comprehensive, didactic medley of poetry and prose animated by the rich heritage of Persian poetry (…), but with a distinct touch by his Bosnian author” (here, p 29). Gačanin (quoted above) points out that “many authors in Bosnia and Herzegovina wrote poetry and fiction in the Ottoman, Arabic and Persian languages [who] had their models among the Persian classic poets.” But, he adds, Mostari with his Bulbulistan was “the only Bosniak who wrote an independent literary work (…) in Persian.”

In a shrine on the monastery compound in Blagaj, there are two wooden coffins covered with flags, containing the remains of two holy men.(7) In the case of the first, Shaikh Ačik Paša, a Bektashi also known as Muhammad Hindi, his name speaks for itself. He was either from India, or had spent time there. As for his companion, the plaque outside the room where the graves lie, says: Sari Saltuk, also known as Muhammad Bu[k]hari, from the “Turkistan region [of] [K]Horasan (…), one of the bravest Alperen [an old Turkish word for “hero”, similar to Ghazi] dervish” who “left his country with 700 followers” and took part in the Ottoman conquest of Anatolia and Rumelia (today’s Balkan peninsula). He was buried in Blagaj aged 93. It appears that he came all the way to Bosnia from the Holy City of Bukhara, in Khorasan.

The Sufi graves in the Blagaj monastery.

Libraries under fire

Over the last centuries of the existence of the Ottoman empire, which collapsed at the end of World War I, the Persian language had gradually lost its importance there. The Persianate world became a lot smaller. In the Balkans, much of its cultural heritage was destroyed during the wars of the 1990s – as was the case in Afghanistan, at the other end of the Persianate world.

During the 1992-95 siege of the Bosnian capital, with its destruction and tens of thousands killed, the Sarajevo Oriental Institute was also shelled. Its large collection went almost completely up in smoke after Serbian artillery hit it during the night of 17 May 1992, only two months after the war and the siege started. Of its 5,263 works – with handwritten manuscripts in Arabic, Turkish, Persian, Hebrew and alhamijado (Bosnian Slavic in Arabic script), including Qurans and collections of Hadiths, of Sufi and other poetry, covering the eleventh to the early twentieth centuries – as few as 53 manuscripts survived. The former Ottoman provincial archives met the same fate. (More background on the destruction in this article.)

Yet the Persianate legacy, spiritual, written and architectural, can still be found. Another collection of manuscripts survived, sheltered in the stone vaults of the library in Husrev/Khosraw Beg’s sixteenth century madrassa. Sufi Islam is reported to be the main form of Islam practiced in many parts of the Balkans. In Sarajevo, a new tekije was inaugurated in 2013, and Persian is studied in academic circles, still providing a “civilisation bridge.” While much of Afghanistan is increasingly out of reach to visitors due to the deteriorating security situation, anyone travelling to the Balkans can still see its legacy.

 

 

(1) A similarly heart-wrenching rendering of the siege in prose form can be found in Miljenko Jergović, Sarajevo Marlboro, Penguin 1997.

(2) The festival also featured the well-known film ”Frame By Frame“ by Alexandria Bombach & Mo Scarpelli and ”Watani – My Homeland“ by Marcel Mettelsiefen, a German photographer who documented, together with then- Stern reporter and occasional AAN contributor, Christoph Reuter, the German bombing of two oil tankers, also in Kunduz province, in 2009, that killed almost a hundred civilians (more about this here).

(3) Khorasan, originally, refers to the region which is now northeastern Iran, Afghanistan north of the Hindukush mountains and parts of Central Asia, up to the Iaxartes River (Syr Darya), also known as Mawara an-Nahr, or Transoxiana, the Oxus being the historical Greek name for the Amu Darya. The use of the term has frequently been extended to all of Afghanistan and adjacent areas of Pakistan, as they are known today.

(4) Quoted via Wikipedia.

(5) There was also another Ottoman governor of Sarajevo with a Persian-sounding name, Siyavus[h] Pasha, who, in his time, around one and a half centuries after Ghazi Khosraw, endowed a waqf in 1580-81 to erect a large guesthouse (han). This was for the poorer members of Sarajevo’s Jewish community. He was also granted permission for the construction of the city’s first synagogue.

(6) There is a heated controversy about who ‘owns’ Balkhi/Rumi/Mawlana. Turkey (he is buried in Konya) and Iran have jointly – without Afghanistan – applied to register his work as their joint heritage with the UN’s “Memory of the World.”  This sparked outrage in Afghanistan. The governor of Balkh province, Atta Muhammad Nur, urged the Afghan ambassador to the UN to protest against this “imperialistic” step. Atta had already erected a monument in the poet’s honour in his capital Mazar-e Sharif. The city’s recently upgraded airport also carries the poet’s name: Mawlana Jalaluddin Balkhi International Airport.

On the other hand, Balkhi/Rumi’s assumed birthplace in Afghanistan – the khanaqa of his father – lies in a dilapidated state and is poorly protected by a simple fence (a photo in this article).

(7) As so often is the case, there are several locations that claim the authentic grave of the Sufi is theirs (see here, p 50). An Afghan example is the rauza, the Grand Mosque, of Mazar-e Sharif.

 

 

 

 

 

Russian Bulava Submarine-Launched Intercontinetal Ballistic Missile

American Trident II D5 Submarine-Launched Intercontinetal Ballistic Missile

Naval-technology.com will be taking a short break over the holiday season.

The Defense Industry Daily team wishes you all a wonderful Christmas holiday. We’ll be enjoying time with our families and will be back to you on Tuesday, 12/27.

Americas

• Guarantees have been made by Boeing that the new Air Force One will not exceed $4 billion. The assurances were given to Donald Trump by CEO Dennis Muilenburg, during an interview following a “productive” meeting with the president-elect. Also at the meeting was Marillyn Hewson, chief executive of Lockheed Martin; however Hewson did not talk directly to media after the meeting. Speaking on the F-35, of which Lockheed Martin is the lead contractor, Trump called the program “very expensive,” and vowed to bring its costs down. Both defense giants have become recent targets for Trump, who has been looking to get better value for money from defense firms on big ticket Pentagon programs in the run up to his inauguration in January.

• The US Navy has awarded Raytheon a $64.6 million contract to perform technical support services for several of the service’s naval anti-ship weapon systems. Systems included in the work are the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), the SeaRAM, and the Land-based Phalanx Weapon System, and the contract also involves foreign military sales to Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Canada, Britain, South Korea, Portugal, and Greece. Work is expected to be completed by January 2018, and the deal is comprised of options which, if exercised, have the potential to raise the contract value to $398 million.

Middle East & North Africa

• Space Communications purchased a new Amos-17 telecommunications satellite from Boeing, with plans to launch it in 2019. The Israeli firm made the purchase following the loss of an earlier satellite in September, during the accidental explosion of a Space X Falcon rocket, that was due to bring it into orbit. If successfully launched, Amos-17 will expand and strengthen Spacecom’s coverage of growing satellite service markets in Africa, the Middle East and Europe.

Europe

• RQ-11B mini-UAVs used by the Ukrainian military have proved ineffective against Russian-backed insurgents fighting in the eastern Donbass region. Separatists have proved adept at jamming and hacking the drones’ video and data feed, due to the datalink being analog. This has left command channels and data unprotected from interception and suppression by modern means of electronic warfare. As a result, the UAVs have been left far from the front lines, in case they give away Ukrainian positions.

• Russian hackers have also managed to track and target Ukrainian artillery positions, by successfully targeting Android devices with malware. A report into the matter has revealed that between late 2014 through 2016, the malware was able to retrieve communications and some locational data from infected devices, intelligence that would have likely been used to strike against the artillery in support of pro-Russian separatists fighting in eastern Ukraine. The hacking group, known commonly as Fancy Bear or APT 28, is believed by US intelligence officials to work primarily on behalf of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency.

• A 12-month study has been ordered under a bilateral agreement between the French and British government, marking the next interim stage of the joint Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program. It is hoped that the study will then lead to a full-scale demonstrator development program by the end of 2017, which has $1.87 billion earmarked for the production of two full-scale unmanned combat air vehicles. Companies to take part in the preparatory work include BAE Systems, Dassault, Rolls-Royce, Safran, Leonardo and Thales.

Asia Pacific

• The Japanese government has signed off on a 1.4 percent increase in its defense spending to 5.13 trillion yen ($43.66 billion) for the year starting April 1. A record figure, the planned hike comes as Tokyo bolsters its capabilities in order to counter growing Chinese military power in the East China Sea and an escalating North Korean ballistic missile threat. Lawmakers are likely to pass the new bill, with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party controlling parliament.

• A Nirbhay cruise missile had to be destroyed by Indian scientists, following the munition type’s fourth failed test. Often compared to the US Tomahawk missile, the Nirbhay has been plagued with difficulties, with none of the previous testing attempts going according to plan. The most recent test saw the missile successfully launched from its mobile launcher, however it began to veer off course minutes after take off prior to being self-destructed by those monitoring the launch.

Today’s Video

South Korea to mass produce M-SAM air defense system:

Saab concept
(click to view full)

The European nEUROn project joins Britain’s Taranis UCAV, Russia’s MiG SKAT, Boeing’s X-45 Phantom Ray, and the US Navy’s X-47 UCAS-D program as unmanned aircraft projects with fighter-substitution potential.

Multinational projects are often fraught affairs, and Europe’s stealth Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS) had its own close calls. In November 2005, a Forecast International report on the future UAV market saw political trouble coming for the proposed 6-nation nEUROn project, unless the partner nations could get their act together and agree. In the end, the project got rolling with committed funding of EUR 535 million and counting, and the French DGA (Délégation Générale pour l’Armement) procurement agency acting as the program executive. This FOCUS article covers the Neuron program’s 3-fold goals, envisioned platform, program structure and schedule, and ongoing contracts and developments. In the wake a Franco-British joint UCAV development memo, Britain’s Taranis project has been added to this article in a separate coverage stream.

Neuron: The Aircraft

Dassault concept
(click to view full)

As a UCAV, Neuron will be significantly larger and more advanced than other well-known UAV systems like the MQ-1/RQ-1 Predator UAV, with payloads and capabilities that begin to approach manned fighter aircraft. Illustrations, initial builds, and statements by the consortium partners indicate that the Neuron is envisioned as a stealth attack and reconnaissance UCAV in the same class as Northrop-Grumman’s X-47B N-UCAS, and Boeing’s privately-developed X-45 Phantom Ray.

As one can see, the Saab concept, and Dassault’s mock-ups and graphics bear a strong resemblance to Boeing’s X-45C, and indeed to designs like Russia’s MiG-SKAT. This is partly the result of similar design pressures, which emphasize maximum stealth due to the UCAVs’ low situational awareness, and lack of self-defense capabilities. Data from Saab and Alenia indicates that the Neuron demonstrator measures 9-10m long by 12-13m wide, and weighs in at 5 tons, with a maximum speed of Mach 0.8, and 100 minutes of loiter time at 100 km distance. This is roughly the size of a F-16 fighter (15m x 10m, 4.25 tons empty), but smaller than an F-117 Nighthawk (19m x 13m, 7 tons empty), and with less range and loiter than most UCAVs envisage.

nEUROn’s Turbomeca/ Rolls Royce Adour Mk 951 is the latest variant of the non-reheated turbofan engine that has already been selected by the UK, South Africa and Bahrain to power the latest BAE Hawk trainer and light attack aircraft. The Mk 951 offers increased (6,500 vs. 5,845 pounds) thrust and performance, a high-performance Electronic Engine Control Unit (EECU), and extended life with reduced life cycle costs. The Adour engine family is installed in Hawk, Jaguar, and Mitsubishi T-1/F2 aircraft operated by 22 military forces around the world, and has accumulated over 7 million flying hours world-wide.

Dassault concept
(click to view full)

The aircraft will have unmanned autonomous air-to-ground attack capabilities with precision-guided munitions, relying on an advanced stealth airframe design that reduces radar and infrared cross-sections to penetrate undetected. Dassault has said that other payloads, such as reconnaissance devices, will be validated at a later stage.

The UCAV system is also envisioned as working with manned fighters, but the details remain to be seen. The ability to control a nEUROn swarm flight in automatic mode from an advanced fighter like the Dassault Rafale or JAS-39 Gripen remains under consideration, but is far from certain. Readers who play real-time strategy computer games are already familiar with the ability to group drone units and to control the group, but adapting that to real life is somewhat more complex.

Neuron: The Program Program Goals

nEUROn program
click for video

During the 2003 Paris Air Show, French Minister of Defense Michele Alliot-Marie announced a major agreement signed between EADS, Dassault Aviation, and Thales. The agreement covered a joint-venture to “realize a new unmanned military technology that covers all future activity in combat and strategic reconnaissance aeronautics.” EADS currently leads a HALE (High Altitude, Long Endurance) UAV project, and a manned/unmanned maritime surveillance project is also in progress based on work done by Thales, Dassault, and Elbit Systems.

The Neuron UCAV program, meanwhile, is led by the French DGA defense procurement agency. DGA acts as the program executive on behalf of the participating countries, and has entrusted development of the first Neuron UCAV demonstrator to Dassault Aviation and its European partners. These include SAAB (Sweden) in particular, HAI (Greece), Alenia (Italy), EADS-CASA (Spain), and RUAG Aerospace (Switzerland).

As the excellent AFCEA Signal Magazine article “Neuron Gains Altitude” noted in September 2005, the program has three stated goals:

1. The first is to maintain and develop the skills of the participating European aerospace companies’ design offices, which will not see any other new fighter programs before 2030 now that the Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter projects are all complete or well underway.

2. The second goal is to investigate and validate the technologies that will be needed by 2015 to design next-generation combat aircraft.

3. The final aim is to validate an innovative cooperation process by establishing a European industry team responsible for developing next-generation combat aircraft.

Logiduc UCAV design
(click to view full)

Indeed, Dassault’s June 12/05 press kit went out of its way to note that this is not a military program:

“Son objectif n’est pas d’effectuer des missions militaires, mais de demontrer la maturite et l’efficacite de solutions techniques… Le projet nEUROn n’a pas pour objectif de developper de nouvelles armes… Il devra valider certaines technologies en faisant appel a un systeme d’avionique modulaire fiable… ainsi que sur des logiciels de haut niveau. Il est clair qu’a travers des missions de demonstration, l’objectif est de demontrer la validite de technologies de commandement et de controle d’un vehicule sans pilote d’une taille equivalente a celui d’un avion de combat, avec tous les modes de secours necessaires assurant la securite requise.”

Trans: “Our objective is not to execute military missions, but to demonstrate the maturity and effectiveness of key technologies… The nEUROn project is not about developing new weapons… Rather, it will validate certain technologies and demonstrate reliable modular avionics and control systems… similar to modern high level technologies. The goal is to demonstrate the ability to operate a pilotless vehicle with capabilities that approach a manned fighter, with all of the pieces in place to assure safe operations.”

Of course, if the resulting UCAV passes all tests, rapid adaptation of a military variant, or follow-on tests around carrier-based operations, might follow if orders were forthcoming. By May 2013, it had become apparent that France, at least, was waking up to the necessity of this next step.

Industrial Partners

Saab concept
(click to view full)

Chief nEUROn project manager Thierry Prunier comes from Dassault Aviation, and the deputy project managers are Mats Ohlson of Saab and Ermanno Bertolina of Alenia. There is just one link between the executive agency (DGA) and the prime contractor (Dassault), and it will be up to the executive agency to coordinate with the government agencies of the participating countries. It will be up to the prime contractor, meanwhile, to coordinate the work with the other companies.

Work breakdowns among those companies are as follows. Each industrial partner retains design rights for its specific contribution:

Program Budgets & Schedules

Mock-Up: Paris 2005
(click to view full)

According to prime contractor Dassault Aviation, the French government will provide half of the program’s EUR 400 million ($480 million) budget, while the remaining funds will be supplied by the other participating member nations.

More precise reports place France’s share of the development funding at about EUR 185 million. Sweden’s share would be SEK 750 million (EUR 80 million at then-current conversion), of which SEK 600 million (EUR 64 million) would be financed by Saab AB. The Swedish FMV procurement agency will offset Saab’s costs, however, with an equal contribution to future development of the Saab JAS-39 Gripen manned lightweight fighter. The cost of Spain’s participation to the program is estimated at EUR 35.5 million, spread over the 2007-2012 period.

The program’s Feasibility Phase contract kicked off a 4 1/2 year system definition and design phase with related low-observability (stealth) studies.

The 15-month, EUR 405 million Feasibility Phase explored technology roadmaps in stealth, flight control of a rudderless airframe, open modular avionics, and development of internal weapon bays. Wind tunnel testing, radar measurements, technology testing in labs, and off-the-shelf equipment selection helped define the UCAV’s external shape, expected stealth materials, avionics architecture, and engine (the Turbomeca/Rolls Royce Adour Mk951).

The Definition Phase (EUR 130 million) worked to validate the design, “freeze” the shapes of the demonstrator aircraft, and detail its component systems and their interfaces.

nEUROn is currently in the Development and Assembly Phase. The 1st prototype was officially rolled out in January 2012, with a first flight that has slipped from the first half of 2011 to the end of 2012. The 2-year flight test program has now begun in Istres, France, with down-time for full-scale radar signature testing in a French anechoic chamber, followed by 2nd and 3rd-phase flight tests in Sweden and Italy beginning around 2014. The test program is scheduled to involve about 100 sorties, including the launch of a laser-guided bomb. Weapons release was originally scheduled for 2012, but will probably take place in 2014 or later.

Thunder or Echo? Britain’s Taranis UCAV

Taranis

Britain is also working on a stealthy UCAV design powered by an Adour jet engine, and it’s named after the Celtic god of thunder. Taranis began in 2006, with an unveiling in July 2010, taxi trials in April 2013 at Warton, UK, and flight testing that began in August 2013 at Woomera, Australia. The plane has also received radar cross-section measurements. Those remain classified, but the design is very similar to other stealth UCAVs – Boeing’s X-45 in particular.

The project has budgeted GBP 185 million (EUR as of 2006), split between government and an industry team of BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, GE Aviation’s Systems division (formerly Smiths Aerospace), and QinetiQ. Overall, the UK MoD says that 250 firms have been involved.

A 2010 agreement with France appears to have have laid the ground work for Britain to merge its Taranis project and technologies into a wider co-operative Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program, hence its inclusion in the same article. It has its own Contracts section as well, below nEUROn’s.

nEUROn: Contracts & Key Events 2015

Formation flight
(click to view full)

December 15/15: BAE Systems has announced that they have completed the third and final series of flight tests of the Taranis Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV). Its development comes as the UK aims to keep indigenous UAV/UCAV construction capabilities. The test, according to BAE group managing director of programs and support, Nigel Whitehead, “met all test objectives”. The development of the Taranis is part of an Anglo-French contract agreement which aims at developing a joint UCAV, combined with the development of the French Dassault nEUROn, for a joint European UCAV.

2014

July 7/14: Next? Aviation Week covers the French-British FCAS program, whose initial phase will overlap nEUROn’s final testing phase. The question is how to structure the path forward after a weapon drop in Sweden wraps up the European UCAV’s testing. Britain and France may not be in sync, but they way still be able to cooperate, as they prep for a 2-year, EUR 200 million study phase:

Ultimately, the proposal for a four-year demonstration phase – which is expected to top [EUR] 1 billion – could rely on multiple vehicles to serve as technology testbeds. In addition to a demonstrator combining some aspects of Taranis and Neuron, these could include less-costly simulators and manned platforms, such as using a Dassault Falcon [business jet] to test [sensors]…. “The biggest driver is the budget,” the industry official said. “We may even reuse Taranis or nEUROn.”

Sources: Aviation Week, “Neuron Tests Moving To Sweden In 2016”.

June 12/14: French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian visits Dassault Aviation’s Istres site, where he watched a nEUROn test flight.

He also reportedly reaffirmed a commitment to moving the Franco-British FCAS program forward, with the intent to sign a EUR 200+ million deal at Farnborough 2014. Sources: French MdlD, “Deplacement de Jean-Yves Le Drian, ministre de la Defense, a la Direction generale de l’armement Essais en vol a Istres le jeudi 12 juin 2014” | Dassault Aviation, “The French Minister of Defense visited the Dassault Aviation Istres site” | Defense News, “France, UK To Sign Memo Kicking Off Combat Drone Study”.

Formation flight

March 20/14: Testing. Dassault Aviation organizes a formation flight of the nEUROn UCAV with a Rafale fighter and a Falcon 7X business jet, as a next step in ongoing flight tests.

Dassault says that a combat drone flying in formation with manned aircraft is a global first, which is true in narrow terms. American planes under full mechanical control have flown as aerial refueling receivers in unmanned formation tests, with a pilot on hand in case things went sideways. Technically, all Dassault did was remove that safety element, and use a UAV with different capabilities. They also kept the UAV in the lead position at all times, which allows the 2 manned planes to take responsibility for maintaining the formation if necessary. Basic formation flying is simple for humans. It can be tricky for UAVs, who must sense other aircraft and then react correctly in the face of airflow changes caused by aircraft ahead of them. Dassault Aviation, “The Patrol: nEUROn, Rafale, Falcon 7X” (with video) | Dassault Aviation, “The eye of Katsu Tokunaga (with video)”.

2011 – 2013

nEUROn: flight test
(click to view full)

May 31/13: French boost. French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian writes an article for Les Echos. Frustration with France’s high-end UAV options leads him to commit to the nEUROn program, saying that “we will allocate the necessary means.”

He also states his commitment to buy 2 MQ-9 Reaper UAVs from the USA, for delivery before the end of 2013. After so much procrastination, with only 2 Harfang drones operational, and with pressing commitments in Mali and elsewhere, he says that France must take the immediately available choice. Defense Aerospace suggests that the French Air Force finally got their way, after stalling other options. The Americans’ reluctance to allow even key NATO allies like Italy to arm their drones suggests that French MQ-9s will also be unarmed. Ultimately, Le Drian argues for a European partnership that will share expertise and develop a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAV like the Reaper. In an era of limited budgets, an operational nEUROn-type UCAV represents another alternative. Les Echos | Defense-Aerospace.

May 14/13: Certification. Germany has decided to end the RQ-4 Euro Hawk project. Not only would it cost hundreds of millions to attempt EASA certification, but reports indicate that German authorities aren’t confident that they would receive certification at the end of the process. Rather than pay another EUR 600 – 700 million for additional UAVs and equipment, and an equivalent amount to attempt EASA certification, Germany will attempt to find another path.

This is bad news for the nEUROn project, which will face the same certification problems. Read “RQ-4 Euro Hawk UAV: Death by Certification” for full coverage.

May 9/13: Italy. Foolish American intransigence may be about to create a Reaper competitor. Is this an opportunity to give the nEUROn a long-term role? Aviation Week interviews Italy’s national armaments director Gen. Claudio Debertolis, who reveals that Italy asked to arm its MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper UAVs 2 years ago. The USA has refused to cooperate, halting Italian efforts, while allowing the British to arm their Reaper UAVs.

Italy is responsible for wide swathes of territory in Afghanistan, and was the point country for NATO’s campaign against Libya in 2011. Arming their UAVs is a high priority, and Debertolis confirms that Italy is in talks with potential European partners to move forward with a covert “Super MALE” weaponized UAV program. If they don’t develop a new UAV from scratch, the existing nEUROn program could fill this niche. So, too could UAE-owned Piaggio’s P.1HH Hammerhead, derived from a high-end light business transport. A 3rd option would be to just buy Heron UAVs from Israel, which that country has reportedly armed. France’s Harfang is a Heron derivative, and Germany is already operating them as rent-a-drones, so an armed Heron and a conversion kit could offer a quick solution for all concerned.

The question for any of these options, and even for converting existing MQ-1/9 UAVs with American permission, revolves around funding. America may have delayed Italy for so long that it doesn’t have the budget to do anything, even convert its existing UAVs. Aviation Week.

Dec 1/12: Flight. The nEUROn successfully completes its maiden test flight from Dassault Aviation’s facility in Istres, France. The flight had slipped from mid-2011 to mid-2012, to the current date.

Testing will continue in France until 2014, to be followed by further tests in Vidsel, Sweden, before heading to the Perdadesfogu range in Italy for weapon and stealth testing. Dassault Aviation | French DGA [in French] | Usine Nouvelle [in French]

1st flight

Jan 20/12: Rollout! The nEUROn European UCAV technology demonstrator is officially presented to the representatives of the 6 participating countries by Dassault Aviation. Dassault:

“The first engine tests will be performed very soon, aiming at a first flight mid-2012. Afterwards, a complete sequence of test flights will take place during two years in France, Sweden and Italy. These tests will address flight qualities, stealthiness, air-to-ground weapon firing from an internal bay, integration into a C4i environment as well as the [safe] insertion of uninhabited platform in [controlled] airspace.”

At present, software integration is in its final stage, using the “global integration tests” rig in Istres, France. The first ground tests for hydraulics, electrical, fuel, etc. have taken place, with comprehensive engine tests to follow, as noted above. See also French DGA [in French].

nEUROn rollout

July 8/11: Germany. Aviation Week reports on Germany’s high-end UAV plans, beyond its planned 6 RQ-4 Euro-Hawk surveillance and SIGINT drones. The publication states that Germany is looking to buy 4 UAVs for wide-area surveillance, probably more RQ-4 variants, in order to complement NATO’s 6 RQ-4B Block 40 AGS drones. They’re also looking at fielding 16 systems of MALE drones over the next decade, to replace the current Heron UAV lease.

Farther into the future, Germany is reportedly considering UCAVs. The nEUROn program is the most likely beneficiary if Germany goes ahead, with possible competition from American offerings like Boeing’s X-45 Phantom Ray, Northrop Grumman’s X-47B UCAS-D, and/or General Atomics’ jet-powered Predator C Avenger.

July 7/11: At the 2011 Paris Air Show, Dassault Aviation presented enterprise applications using the future Samsung Sur40 tactile table for Microsoft Surface. These include military mission planning, and it will be interesting to see if this technology is used for operational components of the nEUROn system. Dassault Aviation [in French] | Reuters.

July 1/11: Dassault releases photos of nEUROn in final assembly, with all sub-assemblies delivered and the program on schedule. AIN quotes Dassault SVP of UAV/UCAV Programs, Thierry Prunier, as saying that although only one UCAV is being completed for flight test, up to 4 examples of each subassembly have been built.

The non-flying subassemblies are currently being used for “real hardware-in-the-loop” tests at 4 pre-integration rigs: Saint-Cloud, France (flight control) system; 2 in Getafe, Spain (ground control, datalink management); and Linköping, Sweden (avionics). Meanwhile, the Adour Mk951 turbofan engine has been matched to the nozzle, and run for 50 hours under control of the Flight Control System.

Prunier also confirmed to AIN that each industrial partner retains design rights for its specific contribution. That will matter if Britain, Germany, and other nations wish to join. AIN

May 19/11: Sub-contractors. Alenia Aeronautica announces delivery of the nEUROn’s Weapon Bay Doors & Mechanism to the Dassault plant in Istres, France, following successful acceptance checks.

This stealth-maintaining system was designed, built and integrated entirely by Alenia Aeronautica, and includes both the weapon housing doors and their activation and control system. The assembly uses manufacturing techniques that were new to the company, and Alenia Aeronautica has even patented the design for the “seal” around their perimeter.

Jan 25/11: Sub-contractors. Saab AB officially delivers nEUROn front and central fuselage sections to Dassault Aviation, at its Linkoping facility. They will now be transported to Dassault’s site in Istres, France, which is preparing for final assembly.

The rear fuselage section arrived at Istres in mid-January from HAI in Greece, and future deliveries will provide most of the major components needed for assembly. Dassault itself is delivering stealth related parts to Istres from January – March 2011. RUAG’s ordnance release pantograph will arrive from Switzerland by the end of February 2011. March 2011 will see deliveries of the 2 half-wings from EADS-CASA in Spain, and the 2 weapon bay doors from Italy’s Alenia. Saab’s next big delivery is in April 2011, when they will ship the 3 landing gear doors from Linkoping, Sweden.

Final layout, piping, electrical wiring and equipment fitting, and assembly are expected to be finished by last quarter of 2011. The next step after that is ground tests, followed by the first engine run-up by end 2011, and hopefully a maiden flight in mid-2012. Saab/ Dassault release.

2008 – 2010

nEUROn: takeoff concept
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Jan 20/09: Progress report. Dassault Aviation discusses progress to date on the nEUROn program. At present, 85% of the total budget has been awarded to Industry by France’s DGA. All major nEUROn systems underwent design reviews in 2008, and interface design is almost complete, paving the way for more detailed work on the systems and airframe.

That airframe shape is now final. Switzerland’s Ruag carried out 2 specific wind tunnel tests in 2008. The first helped identify the conditions which could affect aerodynamics when the vehicle is near the ground (ground effect), while the second analyzed the consequences of a bird strike on the leading edge of the wing. Results of these tests were very positive, enabling engineers to freeze the final shape of the vehicle.

Industrial work is also proceeding on critical subassemblies. Dassault Aviation’s experimental development center at Argenteuil has produced an inlet demonstrator, while its Biarritz plant is making a complete leading edge section, about 2 m/ 6 feet long. Saab is beginning to make aluminum ribs. Greece’s HAI has assembled a complete engine exhaust nozzle, which is to be mated to a Rolls-Royce Turbomeca Adour jet engine for mechanical and integration tests this month. Dassault release.

Nov 19/08: Sub-contractors. Saab Group announces that production of the unmanned Neuron craft has just begun at Tjust Mekaniska in Sweden, a small company with approximately 50 employees and a turnover of about SEK 50 million. They have been commissioned by Saab to manufacture 8 aluminum ribs making up the frame for the Neuron hull. Peter Svensson from Saab Aerostructures:

“The plan is to have most of the component manufactured parts ready in time for the European 2009 summer holiday, in time for the hull assembly to begin.”

Tjust Mekaniska uses a large German CNC machine that works directly from a 3D drawing program, and mills the outline of the Neuron rib at a speed of 24,000 rpm, using water to cool the operation. The excess aluminium flakes are pressed together and sold for recycling.

Oct 10/08: AVE-C scale demonstrator. As part of tests of new control surfaces, a Dassault AVE-C drone flight tests yaw control using thrust vectoring.

June 30/08: AVE-C scale demonstrator. Dassault’s AVE-C drone (Aeronefs de Validation Experimentale) completes its first fully autonomous demonstration flight near Toul, France. The jet powered UAV performed a completely automated flight sequence: roll from parking spot, runway alignment, takeoff, in-flight maneuvers, landing, braking and rolling back to the parking apron. The flight was watched by representatives of France’s Delegation Generale pour l’Armement (DGA) procurement agency.

The demonstration flight of this scale model demonstrator is one of the development milestones for nEUROn’s key technologies. Defense Update.

Scaled AVE-C flight

2006 – 2007

nEUROn swarm
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June 19/07: Bambino di nEUROn? Alenia Aeronautica, Dassault, and Saab sign an MoU to develop a Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) UAV system. nEUROn program technologies, tools, and partnership models will all be re-used in this program. Full DID coverage. As of 2012, it hasn’t advanced very far.

June 12/07: Project definition order. France’s DGA(Delegation Generale pour l’Armement) defense procurement agency officially notifies the Neuron Strategic Board of a EUR 130 million contract (about $175 million) for the nEUROn project definition phase. The definition phase will last 19 months, and aims to validate the design, “freeze” the shapes of the demonstrator aircraft, and detail its component systems and their interfaces. Ministere de la Defense release.

Definition phase

April 10/07: Sub-contractors. A Saab release says that a Neuron model has been installed on a 1:16 scale in the wind tunnel belonging to the Forces Research Institute (FOI:s) in Stockholm, and adds that testing is now underway to verify the outer shape and design. The testing involves high speed trials and testing at levels up to the speed of sound, in order to verify that the aircraft can be controlled and steered inside the entire flight envelope. The model in the picture looks substantially similar to artists’ conceptions done to date. Saab release

April 10/07: Progress report. At the same time as the high speed testing at FOI, low speed testing is being carried out in France. Indeed, a Dassault release says that “With the positive results gained all along these different tests, nEUROn shapes are validated and almost frozen.” It notes the following milestones:

• Preliminary test in June 2005.
  
• 2 low speed tests at Emmen in Switzerland in 2006 in partnership with RUAG Aerospace.
  
• 3 air intake tests in 2006 and 2007 at S2 ONERA Modane in France.
  
• 1 low speed test in March 2007 at F1 ONERA Fauga in France.

Oct 11/06: Sub-contractors. Safran group subsidiary Turbomeca announces that Dassault Aviation has ordered two Adour Mk 951 engines and associated support, from the RRTMjoint venture between Turbomeca and Rolls Royce. The first Adour Mk 951 will be delivered mid 2008 for ground testing, while the second (spare engine) is scheduled to be delivered at the end of 2010 for the flight test program. The release describes the deliveries as a “rental contract.”

The Adour Mk 951 is the latest variant of the non-reheated turbofan engine that has already been selected by the UK, South Africa and Bahrain to power the latest BAE Hawk trainer and light attack aircraft. The Mk 951 offers increased (6,500 vs. 5,845 pounds) thrust and performance, a high-performance Electronic Engine Control Unit (EECU), and extended life with reduced life cycle costs. The Adour engine family is installed in Hawk, Jaguar, and Mitsubishi T-1/F2 aircraft operated by 22 military forces around the world, and has accumulated over 7 million flying hours to date world-wide.

Sept 12/06: Program Review. The first intermediate synthesis review of the nEUROn program took place on Sept 6-7/06 at Dassault Aviation facilities in Saint-Cloud, France. The results of the initial 6 months of feasibility studies were presented to the program’s executive (France’s DGA), and to representatives from other participating governments (Segredifesa, FMV, DGAM, GDA and Armasuisse).

The session’s focus was on the external shape of the vehicle and systems, which stem from the necessary tradeoffs to fulfill the performance, low observability/ stealth, and independent flyability requirements of the specifications. See Dassault release.

Program review

May 23/06: Study delivered. Dassault Aviation and its partners Alenia, SAAB, EADS CASA, HAI and RUAG delivered yesterday the first nEUROn study to the DGA ahead of schedule. This first step is the preliminary technical definition of the project.

Study

Feb 10/06: Initial development contract. nEUROn program launched with committed funding of EUR 405 million.

Project launch

Taranis / FCAS: Contracts & Key Events 2013 – 2014

Taranis begins testing in Australia; Next-step Anglo-French FCAS program signed, could include Taranis.

FCAS

December 23/16: A 12-month study has been ordered under a bilateral agreement between the French and British government, marking the next interim stage of the joint Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program. It is hoped that the study will then lead to a full-scale demonstrator development program by the end of 2017, which has $1.87 billion earmarked for the production of two full-scale unmanned combat air vehicles. Companies to take part in the preparatory work include BAE Systems, Dassault, Rolls-Royce, Safran, Leonardo and Thales.

Nov 5/14: FCAS. The French DGA and UK MoD have signed the contracts for FCAS. The feasibility phase is GBP 120 / EUR 150 million, but the respective countries are also investing GBP 40 million (UK) and EUR 50 million (France) individually, bringing the overall total to GBP 200 million / EUR 250 million. This work will run until the end of 2016, and is intended to be followed by a demonstrator UCAV program. But which UCAV? This is where it gets interesting:

“The programme will develop and compare 2 national designs and concepts. Those designs will then lead to a joint one which could be used for any potential future UCAS programme.”

Looks like nEURON and Taranis will each have a bit farther to go. Industrial participants will remain Dassault Aviation and BAE Systems (system integrators), Thales and Selex ES (embedded electronics and sensors), and Rolls-Royce Snecma Ltd. (propulsion JV). Sources: French DGA, “La DGA et DE&S lancent les etudes industrielles du futur drone aérien de combat franco-britannique” | UK MoD, “[GBP] 120 million Anglo-French defence contract” | BAE, “Preparing for Future Combat Aerospace” | Rolls Royce, “Rolls-Royce Snecma Ltd. signs contract with UK Ministry of Defence to launch feasibility phase for Future Combat Aircraft” | Selex ES, “Finmeccanica – Selex ES and Thales start work on UK-French Future Combat Air System sensor requirements” | Thales, “Thales and Finmeccanica – Selex ES start work on UK-French Future Combat Air System sensor requirements”.

FCAS contracts

Aug 6/14: Taranis engineering. Aviation Week talks to BAE’s chief aerodynamicist Chris Lee, and he talks about some of the challenges involved in Taranis. Lee’s challenge was to take a design whose stealth optimization compromises controllability and engine airflow, which means speed and maneuverability were compromised for stealth, payload and range. Flow over the basic shape can cause “rapid non-linear changes in pitch and yaw,” and an engine intake designed for radar cross section above all leads to swirling and separated airflow at the engine fan face. Just to make things even more fun, the large rectangular exhaust meant to reduce infrared signature creates airflow issues with the wing control surfaces, which are already somewhat limited due to the craft’s basic design.

These kinds of problems are fairly standard across flying wing UCAV designs, and the industry is still in early days in terms of exploring new solutions. Overall, BAE seems to have done relatively well, with lower than expected drag and a number of design solutions that were innovative enough to be classified. The goal for FCAS will be to take those technologies, address issues that arose in testing, and field a UCAV that can meet stealth requirements with a wider flight envelope for speed and maneuverability. Sources: Aviation Week, “Stealth Helps BAE Hone New Aerodynamic Skills”.

July 29/14: Report. The UK government responds to the Commons Defence committee’s RPAS report (see Additional Readings), and clarifies where Taranis and FCAS fit:

“The Taranis Technology Demonstration Programme (TDP) aims to develop key technologies and systems to inform a future operational Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) acquisition programme. Two phases of Taranis flight trials were carried out in 2013-14, a third phase is planned for 2015 in order to gain further understanding of the radar cross section of the air vehicle during operation. It is unlikely that Taranis itself will be developed directly into an operational UCAV capability. It is primarily a technology demonstrator.

The Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme will subsequently be responsible for the development of a UCAV capability. A two year national FCAS programme has been launched which aims to inform the forthcoming SDSR on the most appropriate force mix of platforms and systems in order to meet the future combat air requirement from 2030. A UCAV along the lines of Taranis is one potential element of this force mix, along with an additional buy of Lightning II, a [Eurofighter] Typhoon life extension or an alternative new-build manned aircraft. This will allow a decision to be made at the next SDSR about whether to commit to a UCAV development programme.”

Sources: UK House of Commons Select Committee on Defense, “Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Air Systems – current and future UK use – Defence Committee: Government Response”.

July 11/14: FCAS. France and Britain sign the Future Combat Air System Demonstration Program (FCAS DP) cooperative agreement at Farnborough 2014. They stick to the originally-discussed GBP 120 million budget (q.v. Jan 31/14), which works out to around EUR 150 million. That comes in at the low end of advance EUR 150 – 200 million reports for the 2-year agreement, which will involve Dassault Aviation, BAE Systems, Thales, Selex, Snecma and Rolls-Royce.

FCAS is no longer a combat demonstrator, however; instead, it has devolved to a study program that will look at technology, integration, and workshare issues. Dassault and BAE will focus on overall integration and design, and Rolls Royce and Safran will collaborate on engine-related technologies. Selex ES and Thales will cooperate to develop the multifunction sensor suite and communication sub-system, including the “PERFECTA” project to develop a digital backbone for the sensor set. British procurement chief Philip Dunne has told reporters the two nations are “working in parallel on protocols concerning data-sharing.” The multinational nEUROn program is scheduled to wrap up around the same time this phase will end, and Taranis will have completed its own testing. One interviewee even threw out the possibility that both nEUROn and Taranis could end up participating in FCAS flight tests.

The question of where FCAS goes from 2016-2020 may become another stumbling block, especially since Britain could have a new government by then, and France is scheduled to have its own elections in early 2017. Still, the only way to move forward is one step at a time, and the technology’s industrial importance could draw nEUROn countries to join the new effort. Sources: GOV.UK, “UK and France strengthen defence co-operation” | Dassault Aviation, “BAE Systems and Dassault Aviation welcome £120m / €150 million FCAS study by UK and French Governments” | Selex ES, “Thales and Finmeccanica – Selex ES team up to address UK-French Unmanned Combat Air Systems sensor requirements” | Snecma, “Snecma (Safran) et Rolls-Royce se felicitent des progres en matiere d’etudes conjointes sur les moteurs d’avions de combat” | Aviation Week, “Neuron Tests Moving To Sweden In 2016” | Defense-Aerospace, “UK, France to Launch 2-Year FCAS Demo Phase” | Defense News, “France, UK To Sign Memo Kicking Off Combat Drone Study”.

FCAS programme arrangement

July 7/14: FCAS. Aviation Week covers the French-British FCAS program, whose initial phase will overlap nEUROn’s final testing phase. The question is how to structure the path forward after a weapon drop in Sweden wraps up the European UCAV’s testing. Britain and France may not be in sync, but they way still be able to cooperate, as they prep for a 2-year, EUR 200 million study phase:

Ultimately, the proposal for a four-year demonstration phase – which is expected to top [EUR] 1 billion – could rely on multiple vehicles to serve as technology testbeds. In addition to a demonstrator combining some aspects of Taranis and Neuron, these could include less-costly simulators and manned platforms, such as using a Dassault Falcon [business jet] to test [sensors]…. “The biggest driver is the budget,” the industry official said. “We may even reuse Taranis or nEUROn.”

Sources: Aviation Week, “Neuron Tests Moving To Sweden In 2016”.

Feb 5/14: The UK MoD and BAE Systems finally discusses Taranis, though details remain very sketchy, and the firm contends that even some exterior design aspects are classified. Of course, telling people that just encourages professionals to download the released pictures and videos, look for photoshopping, and make careful notes about which angles aren’t being shown. We wouldn’t put it past the British to smile and launch a snipe hunt, and this kind of meta is why intelligence is such a crazy-making profession.

What Britain will say is that the total Taranis budget is confirmed to have grown to GBP 185 million, split between the government and industry. They also confirm that taxi tests began in April 2013 at Warton, UK, and that the 1st flight took place on Aug 10/13 for 15 minutes. As noted earlier by local sources (q.v. April 14/13), the flights took place at Australia’s semi-remote Woomera test range, which is owned by BAE. Sources: UK MoD, “First flight trials of Taranis aircraft” | BAE Systems, “Taranis FAQs” and “First flights of UK-built Taranis unmanned aircraft surpass all expectations”.

Jan 31/14: Anglo-French UCAS. Britain and France building on the 2010 Lancaster House treaty with various commitments, including “a statement of intent for a future combat air system, which would launch a 2-year, [GBP] 120 million joint feasibility phase that will see British and French industries working together.” The consensus is that this R&D will involve a stealthy, jet-powered Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle like the British Taranis and European nEUROn programs (q.v. Feb 17/12). Partners include BAE, Dassault, Rolls Royce, Snecma, Safran, Selex, and Thales.

Rolls-Royce and Snecma will continue to explore “propulsion system concepts and technologies” as part of the FCAS Preparation Phase contract. Their release may tout “next generation of UK and French combat aircraft engines,” but the truth is that a UCAV engine is going to focus on very different areas than fighter engines, stressing fuel efficiency and lower heat signature over thrust performance.

The key catch here is commitment beyond the initial 2-year period. Despite efforts of this nature, and continued development of an Anglo-French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, French sources are expressing quiet reservations. These include the difficulty of securing program cooperation with British political counterparts who are already in campaign mode for 2015, and concerns about British austerity measures and their potential effects on joint programs and endeavors. Sources: UK MoD, “UK and France agree closer defence co-operation” BAE Systems, “We welcome the announcement on further UK/ French unmanned air systems (UAS) Technology development” | Dassault, “Dassault Aviation salutes a major step forward for the Future Combat Air System” | Rolls Royce, “Rolls-Royce and Snecma welcome continuation of joint combat engine studies” | Defense Update, “UK, France to Invest £120 million in a Joint UCAV Study” | IHS Jane’s, “France and the UK sign defence co-operation agreements” | The Independent, “Britain to set up controversial drone development partnership with France” | Le Monde, “La defense au coeur du sommet franco-britannique”.

Oct 24/13: Testing. Taranis is flying, albeit without the fanfare accorded to nEUROn’s initial flight. Testing would be taking place at Australia’s Woomera Range, over 300 km north of Adelaide:

“The BAE Systems Taranis unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) demonstrator has made its maiden flight and is currently conducting initial flight trials, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) confirmed to IHS Jane’s on 25 October. “Flight trials are currently ongoing,” an MoD spokesperson told IHS Jane’s.”

Sources: UK Parliament | IHS Jane’s, “Taranis makes maiden flight”.

Aug 10/13: 1st flight. Taranis’ first flight, as pinpointed by subsequent revelations from Britain’s MoD.

1st flight

April 14/13: Testing. Australia’s News Corp. reports that Taranis will conduct its 2013 flight testing at Australia’s Woomera range, but incorrectly characterize the drone as “supersonic.”

Taranis is around the same size as BAE’s sub-sonic Hawk trainers, and is reportedly powered by the same 6,480 pound thrust Adour 951 engine that equips Hawk trainers in Britain and South Africa. An engine with that rating isn’t going to take an armed and loaded full-size UCAV supersonic, nor would there be much advantage in doing so. Like other UCAV projects around the world, Taranis is almost certainly a sub-sonic stealth vehicle. News Corp.

2007 – 2012

Taranis R&D program launched; Lancaster House agreement with France has a UCAV component; Studies agreed.

Taranis IG
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July 25/12: Following a meeting in London, defense ministers from the UK and France agree on a joint EUR 13 million (about $15.7 million) UCAV research study by BAE (Taranis) and Dassault (nEUROn lead). A coming contract will link Rolls-Royce, whose Adour engine powers both Taranis and nEUROn, with France’s Safran in a joint study for future UCAV engine options.

They also confirm that France will buy 1 WK450B Watchkeeper system for operational assessments and trials in 2012 and 2013. What did not happen, is any kind of collaboration announcement on an Anglo-French medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) UAV like BAE & Dassault’s Telemos. Defense News | BAE Systems | Thales Group.

Joint UCAV study

July 9/12: Good news, Bad news. BAE announces that Taranis has gone beyond the stealthy targets set for the program, according to recently completed radar cross section tests at BAE Systems’ Warton site. Engine testing at Rolls Royce was also encouraging, demonstrating Taranis’ reduced infra-red signature. The bad news? The ministry wants more tests now, which will delay flight trials to 2013.

June 29/12: NAVSOP. BAE Systems Advanced Technology Centre discusses research it’s doing into Navigation via Signals of Opportunity (NAVSOP), which could become critical to UCAVs. GPS can be blocked or spoofed, and inertial navigation is imprecise unless it can be re-calibrated once in a while. NAVSOP exploits existing transmissions such as Wi-Fi, TV, radio, mobile phone, Low-Earth-Orbit satellites, and other civilian signals to calculate its position. The wide range it exploits would make it very hard to jam, and would allow it to work even in environments where a GPS signal would fail.

NAVSOP has a number of potential military uses, but it’s ideal for a UCAV that must navigate correctly in the most hostile environments. This may be why BAE’s NAVSOP infographic has a Taranis UCAV at its center.

Feb 17/12: Anglo-French UCAS. Britain & France follow up on their Nov 2/10 cooperation statement with an underwhelming announcement: they’ll commission a study about a next-generation UAV, and France will evaluate Britain’s smaller Watchkeeper MK450B:

“7. Following an analysis of lessons identified, we have decided to prioritise our joint work in the key areas of: command and control; information systems; intelligence, surveillance, targeting and reconnaissance; and precision munitions…

16. Unmanned air systems are crucial to success in the battlefield, as the Libya and Afghanistan campaigns have shown. We have agreed today to take forward our planned cooperation on UAS within a long term strategic partnership framework aimed at building a sovereign capability shared by our two countries… We affirm our common will to undertake in 2013 a joint Future Combat Air System Demonstration Programme that will set up a co-operation of strategic importance for the future of the European Combat Air Sector. This work will provide a framework to mature the relevant technologies and operational concepts for a UCAS operating in a high threat environment. We will begin as soon as 2012 the specification of this demonstrator with a jointly funded contract under the industrial leadership of our national fighter aircraft industries (Dassault-Aviation in France and BAE Systems in the UK).”

Defense-Aerospace later reports that a EUR 10 million study will fund initial specifications, to define the nEUROn demonstrator’s follow-on platform. BAE and Dassault are already collaborating on France’s future medium/ hunter-killer UAV, and “Telemos” is based on BAE’s Mantis. The UCAS would feature the same players, but is likely to place Dassault in more of a lead role. BAE is building Taranis, but the Dassault-led nEUROn project has ambitious goals, and there are substantial advantages to a UCAS platform definition that makes it easy for other European countries to join. UK Prime Minister | Defense Aerospace.

Nov 2/10: UK-France. The “UK-France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation” includes a proviso regarding UCAVs:

“17. In the longer term, we will jointly assess requirements and options for the next generation of Unmanned Combat Air Systems from 2030 onwards. Building on work already started under the direction of the UK-France High Level Working Group, we will develop over the next two years a joint technological and industrial roadmap. This could lead to a decision in 2012 to launch a joint Technology and Operational Demonstration programme from 2013 to 2018.”

It remains to be seen how this will play out. BAE Systems is reportedly in talks with Dassault, but the subject of those talks isn’t yet clear. BAE’s Mantis is arguably a UCAV, in the same class as the MQ-9 Reaper. The joint TOD program in question could refer to the Mantis, but item 16. refers to a MALE (Predator Class) UAV. While the UK is set with its Watchkeeper/Hermes 450B systems, France needs to replace its Harfang systems, and appears to be looking for ordnance capabilities that Watchkeeper doesn’t have. Mantis could fill that role, while item 17. would address the niche filled by the Dassault-led nEUROn and BAE’s Taranis stealth UCAV demonstrator, which was unveiled in July 2010.

If item 17. is about stealth UCAVs, leaving nEUROn to pursue joint development around Taranis isn’t an option for France. A parallel carrier-capable UCAV development program might be a joint option, similar to the USA’s X-47B N-UCAS or General Atomics’ Sea Avenger, but that would strain budgets in both countries. The path of least resistance for a 2013-2018 TOD program is incorporation of the UK into nEUROn, with BAE Systems bringing key Taranis technologies and lessons learned into the development program. Time will tell. See also: Flight International | Reuters | Usine Nouvelle [in French]

UK-France Lancaster House accord

Taranis unveiled
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July 12/10: Taranis. The UK Ministry of Defence and BAE Systems unveil their Taranis stealth UCAV technology demonstrator prototype at Warton, UK. Flight trials are now due in 2011, rather than 2010.

Taranis is a separate UK-only program, but subsequent events may make this milestone meaningful to nEUROn as well. UK MoD| BAE Systems | Flight International.

Taranis unveiled

Nov 22/07: The UK MoD has announced the cutting of the first metal for its new stealth robot bomber, Taranis. Sources: The Register, “First metal cut on BAE’s ‘Taranis’ robot stealth bomber”.

July 25/07: Sub-contractors. Dunlop Aerospace Braking Systems announces that it has been selected to provide wheels, brakes and brake control systems for the Taranis UCAV. Dunlop Aerospace will supply its equipment to BAE Systems in 2008 and the aircraft is scheduled to commence flight trials in 2010. The agreement was reached during the 2007 Le Bourget Paris Air Show. Sources: Dunlop, “Dunlop Aerospace supports the future of military aviation with BAE Systems UAV agreement”.

Dec 7/06: Taranis program launched. The UK MoD awards BAE Systems a 4-year, GBP 124 million program to develop the Taranis stealth UCAV, named after the Celtic god of Thunder. Ground testing is scheduled for in early 2009 at BAE Systems’ Woomera, Australia facility, and they hope for 1st flight trials in 2010. The Taranis TDV will reportedly have 2 payload bays and a combination of optical and radar sensors, but testing is only expected to simulate the steps of weapon release rather than testing actual weapons.

Taranis is said to be jointly funded by government and industry, though nobody’s commenting on proportions, and falls under Britain’s Strategic Unmanned Air Vehicle (Experimental) Programme [SUAV(E)]. BAE will lead with UCAV design, stealth expertise, etc. Rolls Royce is providing the engine (almost certainly Adour), Smiths Aerospace is providing the complete electrical power system and fuel gauging; and QinetiQ is tapped for the communication sub-system, flight safety sub-system, associated antennas, and the UAV’s high level decision-making software.

Britain clearly realizes that they need to stay in the forefront of both UAV and stealth technologies, and Taranis gives them a chance to maintain their human expertise and apply what they’ve learned. The Taranis Technology Demonstration Vehicle (TDV) will try to use off the shelf technologies when possible, building on past programs like HERTI, Mantis, Raven, Corax, etc. On the government side, it builds on past programs like Replica and Nightjar. Sources: UK MoD, “RAF takes next step towards pilotless combat aircraft [VIDEO]” | BAE, “BAE Systems To Lead [GBP] 124 Million UAV Technology Demonstrator Programme” | QinetiQ, “QinetiQ to play strategic role in MODs £124 million ‘Taranis’ UAV technology demonstrator programme | GE, “Smiths Aerospace teams with BAE Systems to develop £124 Million UAV Technology Demonstrator Programme” | Defense Update, “U.K. Launch Project Taranis, UCAV Technology Demonstrator” | Gizmag, “England’s Taranis to be one of the largest UAVs ever”.

Taranis contract

Additional Readings & Sources Background: nEUROn

• Dassault Aviation – nEUROn.

• Alenia Aermacchi – Neuron.

• French Air Force (June 8/11) – Colloque international : en route vers un drone armé

• Ministere de la Défense (Feb 14/06) – The Notification of Neuron. Dead link.

• Defense-Aeropace.com (Feb 10/06) – Contract Launches Euro UCAV Demonstrator. Collects various facts about the program.

• Saab Press Release (Feb 9/06) – Important player in Neuron. Includes some details re: the platform.

• Spanish Government (Dec 30/05) – Agreement with France for a Demonstrator of an Unmanned Combat Aircraft. Translated by Defence-Aerospace.com.

• Saab (Dec 20/05) – Saab welcomes Swedish Neuron decision

• AFCEA Signal Magazine (September 2005) – Neuron Gains Altitude. Excellent article.

Background: Britain’s Taranis et. al.

• BAE Systems – Taranis

• Air Force Technology – Taranis Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) Demonstrator, United Kingdom. The successor to CORAX, and a number of other projects besides.

• UK MoD (April 24/07) – Keynote address by Minister for Defence Equipment and Support, Lord Drayson at the Royal Aeronautical Society Annual Conference

• Blackpool Today (Dec 11/06) – BAE’s secret out as UAVs take off. Includes a 30-second concept video showing Taranis in flight! [Windows Media format]

• The Engineer (Jan 5/06) – Nightjar takes flight. A 6-year program to improve British cutting-edge design and manufacturing knowledge. The stealthy Nightjar testbody was used to test other designs, including things like air induction systems (intake and ducts) performance.

• New Scientist (April 3/04) – Secret UK stealth plane project revealed. Refers to the GBP 20 million Replica project to research stealth aircraft design.

Background: Other UCAVs

• Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, 3rd Joint-Industry Forum (Feb 16/05) – Joint Unmanned Combat Air System and US Military Transformation [7.2 MB, PDF Format]. Excellent report that explains the interest in UCAVs, and the effect of removing the pilot’s limitations on the ability to provide persistent coverage of an area.

• DID – Carrier UCAVs: The Return of UCAS. Northrop Grumman’s X-47B won as the base platform, in this resurrection of the J-UCAS program.

• Air Force Technology – X-47 Pegasus Naval Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV-N), USA

• DID – Funds to Boeing, NGC to Advance UAV Aerial Refueling. Will culminate in flights with an X-47B N-UCAS demonstrator.

• DID – Ride on the Ray: Boeing’s X-45 UCAVs. Which it’s building and testing with its own funds.

• Air Force Technology – X-45 J-UCAV Joint Unmanned Combat Air System, USA Meanwhile, DefenseTech’s “Killer Drone’s Big Brother” covers the X-45C full-size variant, and some of its recent test performance.

• Dassault Aerospace – Logiduc program. The precursor to the Neuron. The Petit Duc (AVE-D) was the first stealth unmanned aircraft to fly in Europe on July 18th 2000. The Grand Duc would become the multinational nEUROn program. The model pictured in the stealth testing chamber is a Logiduc mock-up.

• Saab – SHARC Program [dead link, news items below]. In many ways, SHARC was a precursor to Saab’s work on Neuron, and one of the main reasons it has a leading role alongside Dassault.

• AIN (May 17/13) – China’s ‘Sharp Sword’ UCAV is Spotted Taxiing

• General Atomics (May 3/10) – GA-ASI Introduces Sea Avenger UAS for UCLASS Carrier Operations

• Defense Industry Daily (Jan 24/06) – British CORAX UAV Joins UCAV Trend.

• DefenseTech (Jan 19/06) – UK Stealth Drone Unveiled. CORAX. Interesting comparison to the USA’s DarkStar research project.

• DefenseTech (April 28/05) – Europe’s Killer Drones. Mentions Neuron, and includes nEUROn partner Alenia’s Sky-X UAV, which is more of a test vehicle along the lines of SHARC. It made its first flight in Italy during February 2007.

• Saab (Sept 2/04) – Saab has, for the first time, conducted autonomous take-off and landing of the SHARC technical demonstrator.

• Saab (July 23/02) – Saab’s first successful flight with UAV-demonstrator. Its jet-powered SHARC.

• Saab (Sept 4/2000) – Saab performing tests with unmanned aircraft.

Ballistic computers have been conceived in order to reduce the workload of military personnel involved in operations by automatically providing the required fire data, once the targets have been identified.

A innovative and promising defence-related project on Additive Manufacturing (AM, better known as 3D printing) was launched by the European Defence Agency at the kick-off meeting held on 21 December 2016.

The project’s objective is to assess the areas where AM can have a positive impact on defence capabilities and to demonstrate its feasibility.

The rise of Additive Manufacturing (AM) technologies has created a variety of possibilities and potential benefits for the defence community. The “Additive Manufacturing Feasibility Study & Technology Demonstration” was initiated in the framework of the CapTech Materials & Structures, within the EDA Research & Technology (R&T) domain. Raising awareness and promoting a better understanding of AM’s application and potential in different military contexts will contribute to its timely and effective implementation in defence specific areas.

The first activity carried out under this initiative will be a desktop study to place AM and its potential in a defence context. This work will summarise the state of the art ability of relevant AM technologies, identify existing R&T and manufacturing capabilities in Europe, and determine areas where further R&T activities should be carried out.

The second work strand is a technology demonstration of AM. To this end, a 3D printer will be deployed as part of the EDA Sponsored Airlift Exercise, to be held in Zaragoza (Spain). This represents a significant step in bridging the data gap on 3D printer performance in deployed conditions and will demonstrate the operational utility of these technologies.

At the end of the project, the results will be presented at an exhibition to high-ranking military staff, along with equipment and demonstrators, in order to raise awareness on the possible impact of AM in defence.

The project represents a clear example of how cross-fertilization of ideas from different domains, from R&T to operations, will enhance defence capabilities, especially when supporting deployed missions.

The EDA contractors, the research centre Fundación Prodintec, and the defence industry MBDA France, will work together to support the activities described, and help to create the synergies that will strengthen the links between research activities, industrial development, and the Armed Forces.

The project aims to demonstrate how R&T can contribute to strengthening European cooperation, defence capabilities and European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).

The meeting was attended by EDA staff and consortium, European Commission, FOI (SE), FFI (NO), and ES MoD representatives.

More than half a million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since July 2016, a huge number, on a scale not seen for a decade. United Nations agencies and human rights organisations have blamed fear of harassment and oppression by the Pakistani authorities, or in the case of undocumented refugees, fear of expulsion for the mass returns. Pakistani hostility towards Afghan refugees had already been growing, but has strengthened markedly as friendship between Afghanistan and Pakistan’s old enemy, India, blossomed this year. The Afghan government, reports AAN’s Jelena Bjelica, has also been encouraging Afghans to come home (with reporting from Jalalabad by AAN’s Fazal Muzhary and input from Thomas Ruttig).

The returnee crisis: facts and consequences

By mid-December, more than half a million Afghans had crossed from Pakistan into Afghanistan – all officially called ‘returnees’ even if they were born in Pakistan. According to the UN’s humanitarian coordination agency, UNOCHA, 370,102 were ‘registered’ , ie registered as refugees with the Pakistani authorities and UNHCR, and 244,309 were ‘undocumented’. The majority (96 per cent of the undocumented and 75 per cent of the registered) had been living in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province.

Most – more than 90 per cent ­– of those 614,411 people moved to Afghanistan after July 2016. Between July and early November 2016, UNOCHA reported, it was not uncommon to see as many as 4,000 people – sometimes more – pass through the border crossings at Torkham and Spin Boldak in a single day. Many returned at short notice, after receiving 48-hour and/or a week’s notice to leave the country. Many had been living in Pakistan since the Soviet invasion when millions of Afghan refugees fled the country. The younger ‘returnees’ include those who have never lived in Afghanistan. Some are even the children of those who have never lived in Afghanistan. Many of the returning Afghans now find themselves in a desperate situation in their homeland, with neither jobs or proper housing.

Returns since 2001

Pakistan has been a generous, albeit sometimes reluctant host to Afghan refugees for almost four decades. Since 2001, more than 3.9 million Afghan refugees have returned home from Pakistan. There was a huge push to bring the refugees home by UNHCR, international donors and the Afghan government after the fall of the Taleban ­– it was seen as proof that the new regime was popular and in the first years after the Taleban regime was overthrown, conditions also seemed amenable. That left, according to UNHCR estimates, about 2.6 million Afghans still residing in Pakistan (1.5 million registered and one million unregistered). (1)

In 2007, after the Pakistan authorities started providing Afghans with individualised computerised identity cards called Proof of Registration (PoR), the number of voluntary returns decreased. Although the cards were granted for a limited period (the first POR cards expired in December 2009), they did enable holders to open bank accounts, purchase mobile phone SIM cards and get driving licenses. This improved the lives of many Afghans in Pakistan. Following the second extension of PoR cards from December 2009 to June 2013, in combination with the ‘wait and see’ approach taken by refugees, themselves, during the security transition phase (ie the withdrawal of foreign troops in the period 2010 to 2014) and with insecurity growing in Afghanistan, the number of returns decreased even further (see table below).

Credit: AAN

Caption: Decrease in number of returns after the introduction of PoR cards in 2007.

*Source IOM, UNHCR and OCHA figures. The table shows combined annual figure for assisted returns of registered Afghan refugees and undocumented Afghan returnees, except for the period 2008 to 2011 for which only assisted returns are presented based on the available data.

**From 1 January to mid-December 2016

All that changed at the end of 2014 when, on 16 December 2014, the Pakistani Taleban, Tehrik-e Taleban Pakistan attacked the Army Public School in Peshawar. They killed 145 people, including 132 children. Although the attack was carried out by a Pakistani armed organisation, the authorities said its masterminds were operating from safe havens on the Afghan side of the border (in Nuristan or Kunar) and that Afghan citizens had been among the attackers (see media reporting here and here). The Afghan government rejected these statements. (2) As a result, they became more hostile towards Afghan refugees.

The hostility was manifested in many ways, resulting in both soft and hard pressure. The most obvious soft pressure was changing the PoR cards extensions policy. Since December 2015, the cards have been extended for periods of six months only (to June 2016 and then to December 2016), and then, more recently for just three months (until March 2017). (3) Even these short-term extensions were the result of international pressure on the Pakistani authorities.

At the same time, the Pakistan government’s approach to Afghan refugees has become more violent. Some 52,000 Afghans living in Peshawar returned to Afghanistan in the first three months of that year, following a series of house raids and eviction notices (see AAN reporting) and IOM’s annual report for the number of returns of undocumented Afghans in 2015; these were four times higher than in 2014).

Abuses in 2015 by the Pakistani police were well documented, including in a Human Rights Watch report in which Afghans “described repeated threats, frequent detentions, regular demands for bribes, and occasional violence by Pakistani police in the months since the Peshawar school attack.” Human Rights Watch continued: “The abuse has prompted many Afghans to return to an uncertain fate in Afghanistan; others remained in Pakistan but live in fear. Many of those we interviewed had PoR cards, but this provided little protection against police harassment and abuse.”

Police harassments, threats and extortion in Pakistan continued into 2016 (see this HRW press release from early July 2016). The result was more people crossing the border. UN agencies estimate that while in 2015, on average, 366 individuals returned per day, by August 2016 this number had risen to 476 per day. One cause was an intensification of Islamabad’s harsh policy towards Afghans living in Pakistan, prompted by wider political dynamics. It seems also that Pakistan is targeting Afghan refugees because of anger over Afghanistan’s growing ties with India.

A joint ‘Afghanistan-India front’ against Pakistan?

During President Hamed Karzai’s rule, relations between India and Afghanistan were cordial. When his successor, Ashraf Ghani, took power in 2014, he initially reached out to Pakistan with the hope that its government – especially following the Peshawar massacre – would assist in brokering an end to the Taleban insurgency. Diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to bring the Afghan Taleban to the negotiating table and drop their refusal to directly talk with the Afghan government was built up by the United States and China through the mechanism of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG). But the initiative failed in the turmoil around the leaked demise of Taleban founder Mullah Muhammad Omar and the Taleban’s withdrawal from the July 2015 Murree talks (AAN analysis of this initiative here and here).

In Kabul, this was interpreted as the continuation of Islamabad’s ‘non-constructive’ approach toward Afghanistan and the Taleban. Ghani turned increasingly to India, in order to push his development agenda. Ties have particularly been active since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi first visited Kabul on 25 December 2015 and inaugurated the new parliament building and handed over four Mi-25 attack helicopters to the Afghan air force. Then, on 25 May 2016, Modi invited Ghani to join him for a ceremony in Tehran in which he pledged 500 million USD to help develop Chabahar port in Iran, some 75 kilometres to the west of Pakistan’s Chinese-built port of Gwadar, at the end of the new ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’. Ghani was a witness to this deal which also involves the development of road and rail infrastructure from Chabahar through Iran to Afghanistan. For Afghan traders, and the government in Kabul, if all goes well, the route through Iran will not only shorten ways to the important markets at the Persian-Arabian Gulf, but also significantly lessen land-locked Afghanistan’s decades-long dependence on transit routes through Pakistan. In particular, reliance on the port of Karachi should be diminished. It currently enjoys a near monopolistic position as Afghanistan’s ‘door on the world’. The Afghan hope is that this would also significantly – but by no means fully – diminish Pakistan’s ability to use the bilateral border regime as a means to pressurise Afghanistan.

India’s largess on the aid front has also been noticeable. On 3 June 2016, Ghani and Modi inaugurated the Salma Dam, a hydro-power station in Herat province. Although it had been commissioned during the Karzai period, it was touted by some Afghans as a symbol of growing bilateral ties. Then, on 15 September 2016, Modi pledged one billion US dollars in development aid to Afghanistan at a meeting with Ghani held in New Delhi. Both countries boycotted the summit meeting of the regional organisation SAARC in November 2016, which was held in Pakistan (4) and, ahead of a meeting in Amritsar for the Heart of Asia initiative on 3 December 2016, Modi and Ghani announced a plan to create a joint air corridor to enhance bilateral trade following Pakistan’s reluctance to allow transit rights through its territory. Ahead of the meeting, there were calls in India, as one analyst from the influential daily, The Hindu, put it to “corner Pakistan” as a “state sponsor of terrorism” and blacklist Pakistan-based terrorist groups held responsible for attacks in India. In Amritsar, itself, despite some moderate language from Afghanistan and Pakistan on terrorism (5), President Ghani snubbed Islamabad’s offer of 500 million US dollars of financial assistance, telling Islamabad’s top advisor on foreign affairs, Sartaj Aziz, that Pakistan had better use it to contain extremism at home. In India, there were some triumphal responses to the Amritsar meeting. (6)

For Pakistan, however, unhappiness at the flourishing India-Afghanistan friendship has translated into open hostility towards Afghan refugees and the sharp rise in returns seen in the second half of the year. Returning Afghan refugees traced the upsurge in enmity to the inauguration of the Salma Dam; after that, they said Pakistani police started to insult them, calling them “sons of Hindus” and “nieces of Narendra Modi” (more on this below). The Taleban, who are supported by Pakistan, but also have a constituency among Afghan refugees, also issued two statements on 21 and 29 July 2016 underlining that the Pakistani authorities should not treat the Afghan refugees in a political way and that ordinary Afghan refugees should not become victims of politics. (see here).

Zakhilwal’s campaign

At about the same time, the Afghan government launched, for the first time in recent history, a campaign to encourage its citizens to abandon their refugee life in Pakistan. On 17 July 2016, the Afghan Ministry of Tribal Affairs and its diplomatic mission in Peshawar jointly launched a social media campaign called Khpel Watan, Gul Watan (‘One’s own homeland, a dear (literally flower) homeland’) aimed at encouraging Afghans to return ‘home’. The video message was posted ahead of a tripartite meeting between Pakistan, Afghanistan and UNHCR officials held in Bhurban in Pakistan on 19 July 2016.

The launch of the campaign happened to coincide with a six-month extension of the Proof of Registration cards (until the end of 2016). Despite the extension and possibly because of the campaign, there was a record high of returnees in early August 2016 – 8,500 returnees in 72 hours, according to the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation.

The Afghan government’s spin of the situation was certainly daring. Ghani’s Special Envoy and Ambassador to Pakistan, Omar Zakhelwal, in an interview with Pajhwok, published on 6 August 2016, said that the “newly launched project ‘Khpal Watan Gul Watan’ aimed at encouraging refugees to repatriate had [given] positive results,” and that, “earlier the Afghani [sic] migrants in Pakistan did not feel for the country, but now they had realised that they should live in dignity in their own country.” He added that “as many as 30 million people live in Afghanistan and that the return of two or three million more people would not have such a bad impact on the current situation in the country.” He said Afghanistan has realised its weaknesses which were “economy, transit route and refugees” and that Islamabad had been able to use them as “pressure buttons.” Kabul was working hard in these areas, he said, and would gradually rid itself of dependency on Pakistan. “We have strengthened economic relations with Central Asian states, and signed the Chabahar pact to find access to sea.” In the long term, for example, the influx of largely Pashtun returnees could have an impact on population and voter figures (the refugees abroad, who were able to vote in the first electoral cycle 2004/05, have been unable to do so in the most recent one). There is also speculation that individual politicians might be building a constituency.

Responding to the pressure: the human side of the story

After living for 35 years in the Shabqadar area of Peshawar, Najibullah left, in June 2016 within 20 hours of the police telling him to go. His family members had refugee cards which could have eventually been extended till the end of the year, but they decided to return to Afghanistan and have now settled in Kabul:

I had worked at a printing press in the village of Shabqadar. One day, the police had made a public announcement that Afghan refugees should leave and go to Torkham the following day by 8 o’clock in the morning. The police said that if the Afghans fail to leave for Torkham within the deadline, they would destroy their houses with bulldozers and force them to leave. I got a call from home… I asked around… people told me that it was the truth […] Our Pakistani neighbours wanted us to stay. Some elders from the area and I went to the police and asked the police to give us a more reasonable deadline. The police said they would respect the elders and give us a few more days, but we could not stay beyond the new deadline. After that day, I decided to go to the UNHCR office to register our family for the return to Afghanistan.

A bit apologetically, Najibullah also explained that the lack of resources and property in Afghanistan had been the main reason for his family’s long stay in Pakistan. Najibullah’s family received 350 USD per person and travel expenses to Afghanistan from UNHCR. Recalling his journey back to Afghanistan, Najibullah said the Afghan border forces had behaved well and welcomed his family at Torkham. He also said the Afghan government had promised to distribute plots to landless returnees, but that “no steps have so far been taken in this regard.” The biggest problem for Najibullah is rent. “The rents went up and it is not easy for us to find reasonable houses that we can afford,” he told AAN.

‘Sons of Hindus’

The overall atmosphere in Peshawar in summer 2016 had also fortified Najibullah’s resolve to return to Afghanistan. In his words, the ordinary people of Pakistan have changed and the usual cordial and friendly relationship has been replaced by hatred. “This was the result of the Pakistani government propaganda that Afghanistan is a great supporter of India, and the story that the fighting in Torkham [on 13 June 2016] (7) was not with the Afghan soldiers, but with the Indian soldiers who instigated the fighting against Pakistanis,” Najibullah explained to AAN.

In the past, if the police would see an Afghan they would call him refugee, but they would not call an Afghan refugee ‘the son of a Hindu.’ […] They [now] say Afghans are the servants of the Indian government. The Pakistan government has brainwashed the public and now the public sees Afghan refugees as their worst enemy […] The ordinary people in Pakistan label Afghans as Hindus and friends of Hindus. They say the Afghans have joined hands with the Indians against Pakistan.

Najibullah also pointed out that Afghanistan’s closeness to India was often used as an excuse for extortion and harassment by the Pakistani police. “When people would show the refugee card to the police, they would say there was nothing written on the card and force the men to pay money to them.”

Another man, Gul Khan, who is in his late twenties and also recently returned to Afghanistan was more specific about when the insults started. He told AAN that after the inauguration of the Salma Dam in Herat on 3 June 2016, “the Pakistani police started addressing us as ‘sons of Hindus’,” and added that “even the ordinary Pakistanis would call Afghans ‘nieces of Narendra Modi’.” Gul Khan had lived in Pakistan as an undocumented migrant. He left for Afghanistan after the Pakistani police announced that undocumented refugees had to leave within four days or they would be arrested and deported to Afghanistan. He also reported that, on the way from Peshawar to Torkham, the Pakistani army asked him for bribe:

I paid 6000 rupees (50 USD) at four checkpoints on the road and an additional 1500 rupees (12 USD) to the border police at the Torkham Gate. If I did not give them the money, they would check all my belongings.

Shaista Gul in his forties, who returned to Afghanistan on 1 September 2016 because, he said, of Pakistani police and soldiers’ night raids on Afghan refugees’ houses, also reported that an exacerbation of insults directed at Afghan refugees had made him leave:

One day I was on the bus. The police stopped the bus and asked the driver if there was any Hindu on the bus. The bus driver said there was none, but the policeman took an Afghan man from the bus and said: “This is the Hindu I was looking for!” […] The locals also turned against Afghans after the fighting between Afghan border police and the Pakistani border police at Torkham [on 13 June 2016]. Everywhere in Peshawar, the ordinary people would taunt Afghans for friendship with India.

A plea and many concerns

For many refugees the issue is simple – they want more time to bring their affairs in Pakistan to an end before having to leave. On 31 August 2016, 120 elders from refugee communities in Pakistan came to Kabul for a first-of-its-kind jirga organised by the Afghan government. They pleaded with the president and with the chief executive to intervene at the highest levels of the Pakistani government. They wanted them to mitigate the current push factors which are forcing refugees out and to allow them more time to wrap up their affairs and prepare for return in safety and dignity. An UN official who was at the meeting told AAN that Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah had been willing to talk with the Pakistan government to slow down the pace of return, but the tense relations between him and Ghani at this time did not allow for the “constructive approach” needed to address this issue.

President Ghani, meanwhile, pledged to the tribal elders that he would “ensure that returning Afghans could obtain land and housing, invest in small businesses, send children to school, have access to basic services and settle in any part of the country.” He also presented an exclusive housing project which he said was to be developed in some districts of Nangrahar and Kabul province. The print-out of the housing project, seen by AAN, showed 3D-generated images of a fancy neighbourhood of two-storey buildings, even featuring some modern cars parked on the imagined streets. The project is authored by the governmental Capital Region Independent Development Authority (CRIDA), but on the agency’s website, the betterment of the lives of returnees is not mentioned among its expected outcomes. The Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation website also offers no clues as to what the government is planning on this issue.

This initiative, if it goes ahead, would most probably be implemented under the Afghan government’s land distribution scheme for returnees and IDPs adopted in 2005 by Presidential Decree 104. However, the distribution of land to returnees has one of the poorest of records of any governmental programme. The Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) and other anti-corruption agencies have found that the land distribution programme has been exceptionally corrupt and ineffective. (For in-depth analysis of land distribution scheme for landless returnees and IDPs, see AAN analysis here). There is no sign yet that this has changed.

Another issue for looking after the returnees is insufficient funding. UN agencies’ Flash Appeal in September 2016, a call for additional funding and a warning of the growing humanitarian crisis, resulted in pledges worth 82 million US dollars against the target of 152 million US dollars. The main issue now, however, is absorption capacity and the willingness of the Afghan government to address the needs of this particularly vulnerable population. According to UN officials working on this issue, the government understands the gravity of the situation, but they question its sincerity to act. “They caught on that this is serious and it is massive,” a senior UN official told AAN, “but it could end up in lip service”.

For now, there is a bit of a breathing space. The number of returns of documented refugees diminished in mid-December. From 11 to 17 December, UNHCR reported that no registered refugees from Pakistan had returned, as a ‘winter pause’ in its repatriation programme, through which registered refugees are returning, came into full effect. In the same period, IOM reported just 2,032 undocumented Afghans had returned or were deported from Pakistan, a relatively low number.

Despite the pledges of aid, many of those who have already returned are simply having to fend for themselves. With winter upon them, many of the poorest face a lack of housing, a lack of jobs and a lack of help.

Edited by Kate Clark and Thomas Ruttig

 

 

(1) Between 1979 and 1992, over six million Afghan refugees entered Pakistan and Iran, fleeing the violence of the Soviet invasion and the ensuing civil war, UNHCR data shows. After Soviet forces withdrew from the country in 1989, two million Afghans returned to their homeland. However, beginning in the mid- 1990s, factional violence and later the Taliban’s capture of major areas of the country and widespread drought renewed the exodus. Although the US-led intervention in late 2001 initially caused further displacement, many refugees returned to Afghanistan, in part because of a massive campaign to get them home after the fall of the Taleban and increasingly difficult conditions refugees faced in Pakistan and Iran. See Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Report (SIGAR): “Afghan Refugees and Returnees: Corruption and Lack of Afghan Ministerial Capacity Have Prevented Implementation of a Long-term Refugee Strategy”, August 2015, available here.

(2) The participation of Afghan citizen, however, seems to be not fully confirmed. The information, attributed to Pakistan security sources, was only reported by a few Pakistani outlets, not including the country’s main English-language media (see here).

The alleged mastermind of the Peshawar school attack was confirmed killed by US authorities in a US airstrike on Afghan territory in July 2016. Earlier, there were also arrests of suspects in Afghanistan by the local authorities, after tip-offs by Pakistan (media report here).

(3) At the beginning, the Pakistani government issued Afghan refugees with PoR cards for a period of two years or longer. The first PoR cards issued in 2007 were valid until December 2009. The second extension was until June 2013, the third until December 2015. The PoR cards issuance policy became more ad-hoc and erratic in 2016 when the Pakistan government started extending the cards for only short periods of time – until June 2016, then December 2016 and most recently March 2017. Approximately 1.5 million Afghans are registered in Pakistan and have POR cards.

(4) In July 2016, former US ambassador to Afghanistan (the Afghan-born, Zalmay Khalilzad) in an US Congress hearing had called for sanctions against Pakistan, followed by two US senators moving such a bill in Congress. Parts of Indian and Afghan public opinion supported this (see for example here).

(5) Ghani took a multilateral approach toward combating terrorism at the opening event (part of his speech in English in this video):

We propose an Asian or international regime – whatever is acceptable to our neighbour in Pakistan – to verify cross-frontier activities and terrorist operations.

He also said he did not want to engage in a “blame game.” This was reflected in the Amritsar Declaration (full text here) in which all participants – including Pakistan –expressed their

(…) welcome and support [for] Afghanistan’s initiative in taking the lead in exploring a regional counter-terror strategy [and] strongly call for concerted regional and international cooperation to ensure elimination of terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, including dismantling of terrorist sanctuaries and safe havens in the Heart of Asia region.

The document also names a number of terrorist groups, many of them operating in Pakistan. Pakistan’s top foreign affairs adviser present at the conference, Sartaj Aziz, nevertheless described it as balanced; he also added “that the tradition of blame game should be ended”.

(6) One Indian analyst concluded that the Amritsar conference had:

fulfilled two main objectives of India i.e. isolating Pakistan at the diplomatic level and strengthening the bond with its extended neighbour Afghanistan. After boycotting the SAARC summit meeting in Pakistan, this is the second successful attempt this year by India to isolate Pakistan and corner it on the terrorism issue.

See also this opinion piece.

(7) The Afghan and Pakistani border guards at the Torkham border crossing exchanged fire on 13 June 2016. The incident erupted after the installation of a border gate by Pakistan. A commander of the Afghan Border Police in east General Ayub Hussein Khel told Khaama press that an Afghan policeman lost his life and five others were wounded during the clash, which lasted for several hours. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations, the military’s communications arm, reported that one “Pakistani soldier was injured due to Afghan firing.”

 

 

Raytheon Company has received a contract from the US Navy to produce National Security Agency (NSA) certified next-generation encryption devices to help protect tactical data transmissions.

Orbit International’s Electronics Group has secured a contract to provide MK 119 gun computer system cabinet (GCSC) for the US Navy.

The US Navy's USS Independence (LCS 2) has successfully completed the first selected restricted availability works at Southwest Regional Maintenance Centre (SWRMC) in San Diego, California.

Americas

• The Boeing-Saab T-X trainer offering has made its first successful flight. During the 55 minute flight, the team validated key aspects of the aircraft and demonstrated the performance of the low-risk design. Initial operating capability is planned for 2024 and could potentially replace the USAF’s fleet of T-38 trainers.

• Staff at Northrop Grumman have been getting into the Holiday spirit, with employees volunteering to help the United Service Organizations (USO) assemble more than 1,000 care packages destined for American service members stationed overseas. The drive took place on a November 9 “Salute to the Troops” event at Baltimore Washington International (BWI) airport.

Middle East & North Africa

• Raytheon has been awarded a $53 million foreign military sales contract to provide TOW missiles to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The heavy assault weapon has been integrated on several land platforms by the US Army such as the Stryker, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and ITAS High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle. Work on the deal is expected to be completed by October 2017.

• Raytheon will also supply APG-82(V)1 AESA radars to the Israeli Air Force, to be integrated on their F-15I fleet. The sale marks the first export deal for this variant of radar, designed specifically for the Strike Eagle. Israel has been keen to keep its F-15s in top operational order while it waits for the deliveries of its new F-35Is, and are even considering further procurements of the Strike Eagle. Such a move would be good news for Boeing, as they already have the fighter’s production line increased until at least 2020 due to a recent order from Qatar.

Europe

• Ukrainian manufacturer Antonov has rolled out its first AN-132D military transport plane at its plant in Kiev. The aircraft is an evolution of the classic An-32, featuring Pratt & Whitney Canada PW150 engines and avionics supplied by Honeywell. Saudi Arabia has been a big backer in the project and are looking to procure six of the planes, and aim to eventually manufacture units in a new facility in Riyadh.

• The US State Department has cleared the potential sale of P-8A surveillance aircraft to Norway. Five aircraft and associated systems and support, valued at $1.75 billion, will be provided in a deal aimed at upgrading Norway’s maritime surveillance capabilities. The P-8 will replace Oslo’s current fleet of P-3 Orions.

• Serbia’s plans to purchase Russian air defense systems are believed to be moving ahead, according to their Prime Minister. Aleksandar Vucic announced that a favorable deal to procure Buk-M1 or Buk-M2 systems would be discussed during an official visit to Moscow next week. A plan to buy six MiG-29 fighter jets was also announced.

Asia Pacific

• India is looking overseas to procure some 5,000 sniper rifles with plans to have them manufactured at home. A request for information (RFI) was issued to Blaser Jagdwaffen GmbH of Germany; Steyr Mannlicher of Austria; SIG Sauer of Switzerland; Israel Weapon Industries of Israel; Kalashnikov Concern (Izhevsk Machinebuilding Plant) and KBP Instrument Design Bureau of Russia; Armalite and Barrett Firearms Manufacturing of the United States; and Nexter and PGM Précision of France. However New Delhi may have problems getting such a deal, with an industry official commenting that such numbers are too small an order to receive offsets such as a technology transfer.

Today’s Video

First flight of Boeing-Saab T-X trainer:

TOW family
(click to view full)

Despite modernization that has led to advanced anti-armor weapons like the Javelin and Hellfire fire and forget guided missiles, the wire-guided, operator-controlled BGM-71 TOW missile family remains a mainstay thanks to modernization, specialization, improved sighting systems, and pre-existing compatibility with a wide range of ground vehicles. TOW remains the US Army and Marine Corps’ primary heavy anti-tank/ precision assault weapon deployed on more than 4,000 TOW launch platforms including HMMWV jeeps, the Army’s M1134 Stryker ATGM variant and M2/M3 Bradley IFVs; the Marines’ LAV-AT wheeled APC and SuperCobra attack helicopters; and numerous foreign vehicles. Designation Systems notes that more than 620,000 BGM-71 missiles of all versions had been built for all customers by 2001.

Raytheon Co. in Tucson, AZ was recently awarded a pair of contracts that illustrate its continued production and maintenance work on these missiles.

TOW 2B missile
(click for cutaway)

The first contract involves engineering services for the TOW (Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-Guided) weapon system family of missiles and TOW fire control systems including: ITAS (Improved Target Acquisition System), IBAS (Improved Bradley Acquisition Subsystem), T2SS (TOW 2 Subsystem), and M220 Ground TOW. This is a one-year contract with five one-year options, and a total potential value of $122 million. See release.

The other contract is a $45 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for TOW 2A bunker-buster and TOW 2B top-attack missiles. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ and is expected to be complete by Nov. 30, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on July 15, 2002 by the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-04-C-0061).

Update

December 22/16: Raytheon has been awarded a $53 million foreign military sales contract to provide TOW missiles to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The heavy assault weapon has been integrated on several land platforms by the US Army such as the Stryker, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and ITAS High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle. Work on the deal is expected to be completed by October 2017.

December 12/16: Morocco has been cleared to purchase Raytheon-made TOW 2A Radio Frequency Missiles. Valued at $108 million, the sale includes 1,200 TOW 2A RF missiles and 14 TOW 2A fly-to-buy acceptance missiles. Morocco is regarded as a key US ally in maintaining stability in North Africa, following the increase in jihadist activity across the region.

Romanian AIMS-74 Assault Rifle