European Union

Main agenda items, approximate timing, public sessions and press opportunities.

On 16 April 2018, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted Council conclusions on Syria

The Council adopted conclusions on South Sudan.

On 16 April 2018, the Council adopted its position on the regulation modernising EU's trade defence instruments.

On 16 April 2018, the Council adopted conclusions on malicious cyber activities.

On 16 April 2018, the Council adopted conclusions on chemical disarmament and non-proliferation.

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The High-level conference "Clean Energy for all Europeans - The way ahead" takes place on 19 April 2018, in Sofia.

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Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

SEDE will hold an exchange of views on 'Global arms exports trends' with Caroline Cliff, COARM Chair, EEAS, María Villellas Ariño, Research fellow, School for a Culture of Peace, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Jordi Calvo Rufanges, Coordinator & Researcher, Centre Delàs for Peace Studies, Barcelona and Christophe Stiernon, Research fellow, GRIP. The discussion is expected to feed into the next EP resolution on the implementation of the Common Position on arms exports.
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meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Not long ago, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was seen as one of the major sources of tension between London and its partners. Since Brexit was decided however, the UK has hinted that it wishes to maintain a role within CSDP. Brexit does look easier to manage on defence - intergovernmental by nature - than on other issues. But with recent developments (EDF, PESCO), this may no longer be true. Could Brexit end up improving Euro-British cooperation in defence, or increase the divide?
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meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

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The Sofia European Youth Conference takes place in Sofia from 17 to 19 April 2018. It forms a tangible recommendation to the European Commission with regard to the next European Youth Strategy.

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Two weeks away from all this Brexit stuff has been very pleasant, especially now the sun’s come out too.

Naturally, part of me worries that everyone else has had a fortnight off, which is A Bad Thing when running a fixed-timetable negotiation, but there you go.

To ease us all back into things let’s try revisiting the old chestnut of ‘control’, because it’s floating around again and because there continues to be a lack of clear understanding.

Let’s try starting from here: lots of people see the world as a place when being strong means you get to decide how things are. My fancy words don’t count for much if you can punch me in the face, or even just threaten to punch me in the face.

As a model, it’s got a lot going for it: it’s simple, it fits with much of what we see around us and it taps into social expectations/conventions of the role of violence.

This worldview is a key part of the ‘control’ narrative in the Brexit process: others force us to do things against our will, so we must regain our agency to do what we chose.

However, it’s also highly problematic. Most obviously, ‘being strong’ covers a multitude of not-necessarily mutually-compatible things: thus, the US can be the most powerful country in the world, but still be subject to other powers defeating them in combat or to hacks or trade disputes. Likewise, strength is rarely stable, especially in competitive systems: if everyone believes they need to be strong to succeed, then security dilemmas ensue and everyone tries to push everyone else down.

Again, you might feel this is just how things are: the rat race is just a fact of life so we’d better get on with it.

And yet, try looking around you for a moment. You’ll notice that face-punching is the exception, not the norm.* That’s because it is possible to conceive of things in a different, more cooperative way. Yes, we need structures for making decisions and setting out what is and isn’t allowed, but these can be agreed jointly, rather than imposed unilaterally. Control here comes for the ability to be part of that joint decision-making: we each have a voice and a say, at the price that none of us has a say that imposes – by itself – on others.

‘Ah, a wishy-washy liberal: I knew it!”, you cry. “Why can’t we all just get along?” you say, with a sarcastic tone. Maybe making a peace sign while you’re at all.

Well, much as it’d be nice to all get along, we don’t, so this alternative perspective actually invites us to put in place checks and balances, so that there is that collective tying of hands. We lose some control – over what we can impose unilaterally on others – but we gain some – over what we can impose collectively on others (and ourselves).

And this is a key part of the logic on which European integration is built: we take decisions together, to provide a more equitable process and outcome than would otherwise occur. To take the classic example, France wanted the Euro because it would institutionalise French interests in a monetary policy system that previously failed so to do: the Bundesbank set policy for Germany, but that had effects beyond German borders. Likewise, German policy-makers got to make those other states joining the single currency follow the rigours of the German model, which would expand the zone of stability they had created in the post-war period.

(before you say, yes, expectations can sometimes be wrong)

But how does this come back to Brexit?

Much of the debate in the UK on control has been driven by passion and emotion, rather than cold rationality: who wouldn’t want more control, after all?

What has been missing is a questioning of what the purpose of having control might be.

Here we might think about a business engaged in international trade. If it wants to sell to overseas markets, then it has to conform to the standards in place there, as well as any domestic standards. Free trade types will explain how this all incentivises progressive regulatory convergence, as transnational economic operators will press to reduce wasteful variation. As I explained in a podcast some years back, the reason the EU has rules on fruit shape is because that’s less complex than each member state have their own rules.

Of course, some domestic producers will also lobby for different standards, precisely to limit international trade and protect their market share. This is then a non-tariff barrier; much mentioned, little understood. Even if there aren’t quotas or tariffs on products moving across a border, you can still make life difficult for others by requiring them to meet some arbitrary product standard that your domestic producers just happen to be much better placed to provide.

Economic theory tells us that limiting trade might provide some localised benefits, but at a global cost. Think of the US’s trade dispute with China: yes, raising tariffs on selected goods will make them more expensive, and thus attractive to US consumers, but typically that means those consumers are also now paying more for those goods – whatever their source – which hits their bottom-line. Add in the trade-diversion effects – cheap Chinese products flowing into other markets – and the economics not stack up to anything like the political claims.

In the British case, leaving the EU is more subtle in its effects. For many products, a system of mutual recognition operates: if it’s safe to sell in one state, then it’s safe for other states, even if it doesn’t meet the entirety of those other states’ standards. That means many British producers may find that even without changes to UK standards, they suddenly don’t have the access they once did. That’s on top of anything that does change.

And that brings us to the nub of the matter: why should anything change?

This brings us back to that starting point. Leaving the EU means the power to make our own rules, but there’s a difference between actually making changes because we can and simply having the power to do if we choose. Witness the way in which the government wants to use the EU Withdrawal Bill to continue using all of the EU law in operation in the UK until it can decide whether or not to continue using it: the default is continuation, not termination.

Again, many economic operators and sectoral interests want to see continuity, not disruption. And that has led several politicians and commentators to question: is it worth it? If we’re just going to carry on following most of the same rules, but now without that voice and vote, what’s the point?

That’s somewhat to miss the point of the popular debate. The power to divergence, if we so choose, is as important any actual divergence.  It doesn’t matter to most people that the EU has mechanisms for accommodating degrees of disagreement about specific pieces of legislation, because it still feels like an imposition.

However, the liberal nightmare to come in this is that instead of a sense of having to follow EU rules because we have to, there will be situation where the UK chooses to follow EU rules because it wants to: we agree on a lot more than we disagree on. Cue the next round of the long-running debate about what Britain’s relationship with Europe should be.

* If not, my apologies and my commiserations.

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Councils and mise en relations (CMR)
Freedom of establishment
Commercial agents are entitled to the indemnity and compensation provided for even if termination of the agency contract occurs during the trial period

Société des produits Nestlé v Mondelez UK Holdings & Services
Intellectual and industrial property
According to Advocate General Wathelet, EUIPO must re-examine whether the three-dimensional shape of the ‘Kit Kat 4 fingers’ product may be maintained as an EU trade mark

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The informal meeting of EU energy ministers takes place in Sofia on 19 April 2018. The motto of the meeting is “Sustainable Energy Union with a forward-looking climate change policy”.

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Just like I predicted it, Fidesz’s Viktor Orban recorded a landslide victory in last week’s elections, crushing the opposition political parties’ short-lived confidence.

Winning 134 of the 199 seats, Orban guaranteed a super majority in the Hungarian parliament, which would allow him to make any constitutional change he sees necessary.

Upon losing the elections, leaders of the opposition political parties including Áikos Hadházy of the LMP, Gyula Molnár of MSZP, and Gábor Vona of Jobbik have all resigned from their positions.

Emerging pictures of the long queues of people from the polling stations on the day of the elections have had raised hopes of the many that this time the opposition political parties would increase their share of seats in the parliament, hence deny Fidesz a super majority. However except in some districts of Budapest, in small Hungarian towns and in rural parts of the country Orban’s party polled best.

Not only Fidesz’s populist anti-immigration rhetoric, but also the failure of the opposition political parties in forming a united front against Fidesz, as well as Orban’s handling of the economy could explain why more than %49 of the Hungarians have once again opted for Orban.

However what is more striking are the developments that have been taking place post-elections both in Hungary and at the European Union level in relation to the newly elected Hungarian government.

The uncertain future of the opposition  media outlets in Hungary, dilemma of the European Party Groups’ in whether to congratulate Orban on his success and the European Parliament’s draft report on the state of rule of law and democracy in Hungary are some of which I could point to.

Right after the elections Magyar Nemzet, Hungary’s major opposition newspaper and its sister radio station Lánchíd Rádió announced their closure. It is suggested that Orban’s withdrawal of all the government advertising has contributed to this end. And what is more is that a pro-government weekly Figyelo published a list of 200 people who work for NGOs that included as Amnesty International, refugee advocates, and investigative journalists and are described as George Soros’s mercenaries, aiming to topple the government and open the country to immigrants. Both the closure of the opposition media outlets and the use of pro-government newspapers against the opposition point to the state the media has come to in Hungary. Like in any other illiberal democracy, for instance Turkey, media in Hungary no longer functions in the way we know in the Western liberal democracies. It is controlled and utilised as propaganda machines by the ‘democratically elected’ governments to maintain the popularity of their policies among the crowds at the cost of free media.

Since Fidesz is part of the European People’ Party group in the European Parliament, it was only normal for the leader of the EPP, Manfred Weber, and the president of the EPP, Joseph Daul, to congratulate Orban on his electoral success. However others like Bavarian MEP Markus Ferber and Gunnar Hökmark (MEP) from Sweden expressed their concern about the anti-Semitic rhetoric adopted by the leadership of Fidesz during the elections, and quiet rightly demanded Weber and Daul to stand up for the core values of the EU. Some even expressed dismissing the Fidesz MEPs from the EPP. Whereas Udo Bullmann, the newly elected leader of the European Parliament’s Socialist bloc also criticised the EPP for not directly confronting Orban and Philippe Lamberts, co-president of the Greens demanded that the EPP does not prioritise party friendship above fundamental rights and democracy. What is best under these circumstances is that instead of isolating Fidesz, Members of the European Parliament, regardless of their party group, should act like a critical friend to Fidesz and Hungary by constantly reminding them of the core values of the EU. And they should keep the Hungarian government accountable to the European Parliament, using the available legal mechanisms.

In fact in May 2017 the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs was instructed to examine the situation in Hungary after serious concern was raised about the situation in Hungary. Last week Thursday the committee recommended triggering disciplinary proceedings that could result in Hungary losing its voting rights in the European Council. The draft report found that Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s government “time and time again … has undermined the independence of the judiciary, freedom of the press and the fundamental rights of its citizens.” This draft report was not well received by the leadership of Fidesz, denying all the criticisms that have been put forward. The timing of this report is however perfect for there has been a new election, and Fidesz has gained a new term in office, which gives the Hungarian government a new chance to make a fresh start and work on some of the points that have been raised in the report.

Overall there seems to be pressure building on the freedom of media in Hungary. Critical voices seem to be facing a risk of closure or shutdown. However the newly elected government might change its position in the way it treats media and the opposition. It is only healthy that the electoral success of Fidesz is a cause of contention among the party groups of the European Parliament. If the interests of the party groups could be left aside, different mechanism of the European Parliament could be utilised to influence the way things are done in Hungary. Having Fidesz MEPs in the centre-right EPP is an advantage and must be utilised for the greater good of the EU.

As for the next couple of months, the European Parliament’s draft report will go to a vote in committee in June and to the full Parliament in September. If the Parliament approves the proposal, the matter would move to the European Council. Thus I will be keeping an eye on this.

 

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Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

International Space Station. Photo: ESA

Nicolas Rüffin

Science diplomacy has attracted a lot of attention during the last decade. Actors as different as the US State Department, the European Commission, the Royal Society, UNESCO and a great many of other intermediary organizations have adopted the term to rebrand their activities, programs, and agendas. The contexts in which the term science diplomacy emerges are just as diverse as the actors. It almost seems like science has become a panacea for most of the problems in public policymaking. For instance, when looking through the volumes of the journal Science & Diplomacy, we encounter topics like the global challenges, health diplomacy, issues of security and proliferation, international mega-science projects, and trade policies, not to mention regional priorities like the Arctic, Africa, the Middle East, or East Asia.

 

The rise of the concept of science diplomacy

Science diplomacy thus is first and foremost a new umbrella term to characterize the role of science and technology in numerous policy fields that have an international, boundary-spanning, component. As a matter of fact, a number of examples and documents illustrate that considerations regarding science and technology (S&T) have played a role in international policymaking before (e.g. Neureiter & Turekian, 2012). For instance, policy instruments like bilateral science and technology agreements (STAs) have been used at least since the 1950s (Rüffin & Schreiterer, 2017). These STAs formed a global network of legal commitments long before any remarks on a strategic use of science diplomacy emerged.

 

However, the scope and number of S&T related policies have increased over time. For instance, we are witnessing the emergence and differentiation of agencies explicitly dedicated to matters of international science policymaking (Flink & Schreiterer, 2010; Rüffin, 2018). Several countries, including Germany, the UK, Switzerland, and Denmark, have established S&T outposts abroad in order to access new markets, buttress their innovation capacities, and to foster bilateral relationships. In addition, non-state actors like academies or research associations pursue their own objectives in terms of international science policy. They maintain offices overseas, conclude collaboration agreements, and some even establish joint research laboratories (e.g. the French Centre national de la recherche scientifique or the German Max-Planck Society). The idea of science diplomacy, then, provides a new, more strategic and—more or less—coherent framework to integrate existing instruments in international S&T policymaking. Actors use the concept to propel their own agenda regardless of policy field or research area.

 

From my point of view, there are two items on the current research agenda regarding science diplomacy: The aspirations for the meaningful, “optimal” use of the concept (Van Langenhove, 2017) and the scholarly reflection on its role in a broader context.

 

Future directions for science diplomacy

There are several well-known and often cited examples of successful science diplomacy. For instance, physicists were the trailblazers in establishing diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel in the 1950s. The Pugwash conferences provided venues for low-key exchanges between scientists and policymakers from Western and Eastern countries during the Cold War. International research organizations like the European Organization for Nuclear Research, CERN, or the International Space Station, ISS, illustrate the opportunities that emerge if international partners join forces to pursue daring and high-quality big science research.

 

But aside from these famous examples, we know that the systematic implementation of the concept of science diplomacy faces serious challenges. Sometimes, scientists and officials from research organizations even are reluctant to use the term, stating that they would rather prefer to stay “under the radar” of politics. It is true that science diplomacy, as a type of track 2 diplomacy, always constitutes a balancing act between governmental interests and scientific autonomy. A strategic use of science diplomacy must take these concerns into account. Moreover, questions arise from the tension between competition versus collaboration of different actors.

 

In Europe, both the European Commission and a great number of Member States are engaging in science diplomacy, yet the relations between the different players, the division of labor as it where, often remains unclear. Propelling European science diplomacy thus means that the stakeholders must define the domains of (shared) responsibility, explore areas of common interests, and coordinate joint programs where advisable. Hence, scholars should investigate the subjects where science diplomacy can contribute to the peaceful and sustainable coexistence, increased scientific collaboration, and eased tensions between countries across the globe. But they should also continue to examine the limitations of the concept and how it might play into increasingly tough economic competitions and races for innovation. Overall, researchers should be aware that they contribute to the evolution of the concept by introducing new tools, structuring established instruments, and by identifying new applications.

 

Contemplating the nature of science diplomacy

However, it is important to remember that science diplomacy is only one expression of a broader “elusive transformation” of policymaking (Skolnikoff, 1993). We need to put science diplomacy into perspective by drawing connections to other mega-trends in science policy like the turn towards innovation and the increasing importance of the global challenges. This strand of research could include historical studies on the origins of the concept, analyses of coalition building, or in-depth case studies of how foreign affairs and S&T interact.

 

Luckily, the community of researchers engaging with science diplomacy—both in substantial and in reflexive ways—is growing. Already, scientists from many countries are contributing to this endeavor, and within Horizon 2020, there are a number of projects that advance the study and implementation of science diplomacy (e.g. EL-CSID, InsSciDE, and S4D4C).

 

After all, science diplomacy is a moving target and it will be interesting to watch which directions, trajectories and shapes the concept will take in the future.

 

Nicolas Rüffin is Research Fellow of the President’s Project Group at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. He joined the WZB in 2016, after receiving a master’s degree in science studies from the Humboldt-University of Berlin, and a bachelor’s degree in business psychology from the University of Bochum. Before moving to Berlin, he had worked as Programme Manager at Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft, a joint initiative of companies and foundations for the advancement of education, science, and innovation in Germany. His research mainly focuses on issues of international science policy, the politics of intergovernmental big science projects, and science diplomacy.

 

References

Flink, T., & Schreiterer, U. (2010). Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs: towards a typology of national approaches. Science and Public Policy 37(9), 665–677.

Rüffin, N. (2018): Science and Innovation Diplomacy Agencies at the Nexus of Research, Economics, and Politics. EL-CSID Working Papers 10. Brussels: Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

Rüffin, N., & Schreiterer, U. (2017): Science and Technology Agreements in the Toolbox of Science Diplomacy. Effective Instruments or Insignificant Add-ons?. EL-CSID Working Papers 6. Brussels: Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

Skolnikoff, E. B. (1993). The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of International Politics. Princeton, NJ: University Press.

Turekian, VC; Neureiter, NP (2012) Science and Diplomacy: The Past as Prologue. Science & Diplomacy. A Quarterly publication from the AAAS Center for Science Diplomacy. March, 2012; http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/editorial/2012/science-and-diplomacy

Van Langenhove, L. (2017). Tools for an EU Science Diplomacy. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

 

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The next AFET meetings are scheduled to take place on:

Monday, 23 April 2018, 15:00-19:00, room JAN 2Q2, Brussels
Tuesday, 24 April 2018, 09:00-12:30, room JAN 2Q2, Brussels
Tuesday, 24 April 2018, 14:30-18:30, room JAN 2Q2, Brussels

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Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

From January 1, 2019, the Russian Volga will cease providing AN-124 capacity for EU and NATO states under NATO's heavy military air transport program SALIS (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution), which includes 17 European member states and Canada. The loss is sensitive: Under Salis, Antonov and Volga have each had an AN-124 permanently stationed at Leipzig-Halle Airport since March 2006, with additional uplift available at short notice.

Unfortunately, the SALIS Program Office did not succeed in overcoming the Russian withdrawal, despite the long negotiations. The move comes just over a year after the Russian freighter operator announced the end of the near-decade-long Russlan collaboration to market AN-124 capacity with Ukraine’s Antonov. A move thought to be in response to western sanctions on Russian companies. Negotiations conducted by the Salis steering board last week failed to avert the withdrawal. After Volga-Dnepr subsidiary AirBridgeCargo lost about half its 21 landing slots at Schiphol last year, Russia reportedly threatened to ban Dutch carriers from its airspace. Shortly after, KLM struck a deal with ABC over additional slots.

The ending of the Salis contract puts pressure on NATO and the EU, which need access to the world’s largest commercial cargo aircraft. This is a serious loss of capacity: the Ukrainian An-124s of Antonov's air transport industry are only flying 900 flights per year - the largest fleet with two Russian aircraft has been available to SALIS's designers for up to 2300 hours per year.

There is always the possibility that the withdrawal is part of a larger play by Volga-Dnepr president Alexey Isaikin, who is looking to set up a German cargo airline, with AN-124s registered in Germany, at Leipzig. By registering an AN-124 to a German company, the Volga-Dnepr group would no longer be caught in the crossfire of political skirmishes between Russia and elsewhere, which includes problems with Antonov maintenance. And as an EU company, it might get preferential treatment for military shipments over Ukraine’s Antonov. It also adds pressure on Germany, which is keen to develop Leipzig-Halle as a freight airport, to OK the new airline’s AOC and aircraft registration. (Although as one source told The Loadstar, Lufthansa Cargo was unlikely to welcome a new freighter airline on its doorstep, and would “go ape-shit”.)

Tag: SALISVolga-Dnepr