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What Washington can do to stop starvation.

A nimbler navy can deny China.

Supermarket shelves are emptying, sellers are rationing supplies and prices are rising.

Latest scorecard from the Twenty20 tri-series match between Namibia and South Africa in Windhoek.

C'est l'effroi chez les journalistes de droite quand, à partir des années 1930, de nombreuses femmes entrent dans la profession. Elles y demeurent très minoritaires, mais, hormis les éditoriaux, plus aucun registre ne leur est interdit. Loin d'être cantonnées aux rubriques mode, couture, (…) / Femmes, Presse, France, Histoire, Socialisme, Communisme, Guerre d'Espagne 1936-1939

The arrival of the seventh Prime Minister in Number 10 since the 2016 referendum is an opportunity to try once again to get to grips with British European policy.

In practice, this is not a problem of wrestling Lots of Things, but instead more about trying to work out whether the absence of visible activity is a function of a very tight ship, or of a lack of activity.

Undoubtedly, negotiations on the May 2025 reset agenda in the Common Understanding has progressed well, to the point that several dossiers are largely wrapped up: SPS and ETS are the two big ones. Internal Energy Market talks finally got underway in the early summer too, the last big element to get going.

At the same time, once it became clear that Keir Starmer was stepping down, the EU decided to pause everything, there being little point in making deals with a departing leadership. Moreover, the arrival of a new PM might also offer new opportunities for the EU to secure more concessions, especially if Andy Burnham was really that much more pro-cooperation and wanted to get a quick win.

The evidence of the first couple of months of Burnham suggests that this has not been the case. Indeed, as the tracker below (mildly sarcastically) suggests, Burnham’s time in power has been marked by talking about pretty much anything apart from EU policy.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic148

The ‘regular’ EU-UK summit heralded by the Common Understanding, and already rather uncertain by the time of the May anniversary of the first one, has only been pushed back since, with Burnham’s recent talk of November feeling more aspirational that definite. This is not a government in a rush to press forward on things, despite Burnham’s repeated invocations of the damage of Brexit to the economy.

From what little he has said, the impression is very much one of continuity-Starmer: use the reset process to secure some wins, plus avoid the worst effects of the continual activity of the EU to protect and promote its interests. The language about ‘Made in Europe’ reflects another common thread to Starmer, once the UK had determined the potential impacts on high-profile sectors of the economy and the possible leverage of working together in Europe in the face of – how to put it? – debatable international relations.

However, all of this has been very much off-camera, without much grandstanding by either side, neither of whom really feel any value in kicking up a fuss. Even the failure of SAFE talks was managed away without too much hand-wringing and with efforts to find other ways of building defence procurement cooperation.

But there has been one exception.

Youth mobility has become the poster-child of the reset, and the one with the most conspicuous disagreements.

As a reminder, the two sides have always had different positions with regard to the fundamentals of any scheme, grounded in its purpose, scale and operationalisation.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic127

Since the 2025 summit, those gaps (on caps on numbers, university fees and permitted activities) have not definitively closed down. Instead, there has been a steady drip-feed of briefings by both sides to try to signal intent and (less often) offer possible landing grounds.

The following is a list of all Financial Times stories that include such briefings, the paper being a convenient shared space for negotiators:

• 7 November 2025. ‘EU officials’ flag the need for the scheme to be drawn up as a binding legal instrument, rather than the memoranda of understanding the UK has with other third countries
• 5 December. A leaked EU ‘draft text’ has no cap on numbers, and gives EU students access to UK university fees
• 15 March 2026. ‘UK officials’ offer to give way of fees, in return for a cap and other concessions
• 5 June. ‘UK officials’ reiterate their offer on fees
• 3 July. The ‘Commission’ says the proposed cap is too low, EU nationals need to be exempt from the NHS surcharge and have access to UK fees
• 13 July. ‘EU diplomats’ say the cap offered by the UK is a ‘non-starter’ and repeat points on the surcharge and fees
• 18 August. ‘EU diplomats’ again say the cap offered is too low, but might consider something in the ‘low 100ks’, and say fees is ‘vital’
• 23 August. A leaked UK negotiating brief from ‘UK officials’ says Starmer was willing to concede on fees and up to 100k on the cap, in return for access to Made in Europe or steel tariffs

This procession suggests a number of points that speak to the wider relationship.

Firstly, the UK has moved further than the EU on these points. We might reasonably assume that the EU will get domestic fees, but without any evident quid pro quo on caps or other dossiers. Indeed, when such cross-linkage has been mentioned by the UK, the reply from the EU has been very dismissive. This reflects the underlying asymmetry in the relationship: the UK needs this more than the EU, and the EU knows this.

Secondly, this is as much evidence as we have that Burnham is not going to stray very far at all from Starmer’s positions: The PM was talking again about Made in Europe in his first PMQs this week. Whether that helps or hinders progress on negotiations remains to be seen, but the sense that Brussels was ultimately underwhelmed by Starmer’s translation of rhetoric to action does not look set to be challenged by Burnham any time soon.

Finally, it points to the perils of low-stakes negotiating. None of the items on the table will be of notable macro-economic significance for either side, but instead act as markers of good intent and willingness to try to keep the wheels spinning on the minimal architecture of the Trade & Cooperation Agreement’s free trade area. Part of this might be the anxiety over who will be in power in the UK following the next general election, but more of it is that neither side see their relationship as either particularly important or in need of urgent attention. With plenty of other things to be getting on with, this is something that lacks any strong sense of pressure to wrap things up.

Of course, it’s still early days, but if the last seven PMs have taught us anything, then it’s that their revealed preferences on EU policy are pretty clear, pretty quickly.

The post Not even a new ‘reset’: The minimalist Burnham agenda on the EU? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

2026 ist kein gutes Jahr für das Putin-Regime. Die Front in der Ukraine bewegt sich kaum, ukrainische Drohnen und Raketen treffen Ziele weit im russischen Hinterland, die Wirtschaft schwächelt, und die Stimmung im Land verschlechtert sich. Unter diesen erschwerten Bedingungen muss die Kreml-Administration einen weiteren Sieg der Machtpartei Einiges Russland organisieren, denn im September steht die Wahl zur Staatsduma an. Dabei kann das russische Parlament seine Funktion als Legitimitätsressource in der personalistischen Putin-Diktatur kaum noch erfüllen. An der chronischen Schwäche der regimekonformen Parteien ist dies ebenso abzulesen wie an der Groteske um den Wahlausschluss der Jabloko-Partei.

Benjamin, 31, will Weltraumoffizier werden. Wie sieht seine Nachtschicht aus? Zu Besuch im Weltraumlagezentrum der Bundeswehr.

Letsile Tebogo says his late mother is always with him "in spirit" as he prepares to run in Budapest, the city where she watched him make history for Botswana and Africa.

Télé Sahel a indiqué le 2 septembre qu'un inventaire effectué à la Base 101 de Niamey avait permis de découvrir « un arsenal de guerre d'une quantité disproportionnée », comprenant notamment des centaines de fusils d'assaut, des lance-roquettes, des mitrailleuses, des explosifs et des munitions.

At least 69 people were shot dead in 1960 but no-one has been prosecuted and victims want restitution.

Carlos Queiroz is reappointed as head coach of Ghana's men's national team, two months after he appeared to step down following their exit from the World Cup.

Le capitaine Roger Gabriel a affirmé que des proches de l’ancien président Mohamed Bazoum et des officiers tchadiens étaient liés à la tentative de coup d’État des 28 et 29 août au Niger. Selon lui, des forces spéciales tchadiennes et françaises devaient soutenir les mutins, avec l’appui présumé du Bénin et de la Côte d’Ivoire.

Dauer des Videos : 135'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Length of video : 135'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Prolonged emergencies pose a problem for European law that becomes increasingly visible over time. A state may have compelling reasons for maintaining an emergency regime, but it does not follow that every restriction on rights introduced within that regime remains necessary in the same scope, as applied to the same persons, and under present circumstances.

If the original justification for a restriction is carried forward with each renewal of the regime without independent reassessment, the measure’s initial necessity risks gradually becoming a presumption of its continuing necessity.

Ukraine provides an especially demanding contemporary example of this problem. In July 2026, Ukraine once again extended martial law. As Russia’s armed aggression continues, the grounds for maintaining the emergency regime remain exceptionally strong. Precisely for that reason, the Ukrainian experience makes the distinction particularly clear: between the continued necessity of the emergency regime itself and the narrower question of the fate of particular restrictions operating within it.

Two Objects of Justification

European scholarship has already examined the temporal problem of emergency governance in considerable depth. Alan Greene shows how the duration of emergency powers can blur the boundary between exception and the normal constitutional order. Stéphanie Hennette Vauchez traces the routinisation of emergency instruments and their migration into ordinary governance. Yoomin Won shows how the absence of strict temporal limits and the possibility of repeated renewals can allow derogations to remain in force for extended periods. Stuart Wallace, in turn, draws attention to prolonged derogations under Article 15 ECHR and to the need for procedures for reviewing emergency measures.

What is less clear is how this temporal problem operates at the level of individual restrictions. If the emergency regime itself lawfully continues, should the original justification for each measure automatically continue with it, or does the necessity of the measure require an independent assessment in light of current circumstances?

If one of the central European concerns is that emergency rule may become a durable form of governance, the next question is how to prevent the durability of the regime from becoming the durability of the justification for every measure within it.

This requires a distinction between two objects of assessment. The first is regime-level necessity: why the emergency regime should continue. The second is measure-specific necessity: why this particular restriction, in its present scope and as applied to these persons, remains necessary.

They are connected, but they are not identical.

Article 15 ECHR already provides the basis for such a distinction. There must be a war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation; yet a state may derogate from its Convention obligations only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. Recognition of an emergency therefore does not complete the analysis of the state’s particular response to it.

The case law of the European Court of Human Rights adds a temporal dimension to this distinction. Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom, the Court attached importance to whether the necessity of the relevant emergency measures remained under continuing review. In A. and Others v United Kingdom, recognition of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation did not remove the need for a separate examination of whether the contested measures were strictly required. In Baş v Turkey, the Court again emphasised European supervision of national discretion and the relevance, among other factors, of the circumstances and duration of the emergency.

This is not a new test under Article 15. The proposed distinction simply avoids collapsing two questions that the Convention and the Court’s case law already require to be assessed separately: the continuation of the emergency and the necessity of a particular response to it.

What Time Changes

At the beginning of a serious crisis, the state acts with incomplete information. Threats evolve rapidly, consequences are difficult to predict, and some measures must be adopted before a complete evidential picture is available.

Several years later, the position is different. It is already known how a restriction operates in practice. Some initial predictions may have proved correct; others will not. Public institutions adapt to a prolonged crisis. Less restrictive means of achieving the same objective may emerge. The distribution of the threat itself may also change across territories or categories of persons.

What changes over time is not necessarily the legal conclusion, but the evidential picture on which that conclusion rests. A restriction that was necessary in the first month of a war may remain just as necessary several years later. By then, however, the state will possess information that it did not have at the outset: evidence about the practical operation of the measure, its consequences, possible alternatives, and changes in the threat itself.

This implies neither a presumption that a long-lasting measure is unlawful nor an automatic intensification of judicial scrutiny with each new renewal.

The claim is much narrower. If a restriction remains in force, the reasons for maintaining it must remain connected to current circumstances, rather than only to the circumstances in which it was originally introduced.

When a restriction is introduced, the state explains why it is necessary to respond to the threat. When it remains in force for years, an additional question arises: what current circumstances continue to justify this particular measure, in this scope, and as applied to these persons?

This does not require the state to re-establish the necessity of the entire emergency regime with every renewal. The outcome may remain unchanged. What must be capable of being renewed is not necessarily the measure itself, but the state’s ability to explain why its continued operation remains necessary.

Ukraine as a Contemporary Test

Following the introduction of martial law, Ukraine’s border-crossing rules restricted the departure of various categories of men while providing for statutory exceptions. In August 2025, the government amended those rules to permit male Ukrainian citizens aged 18 to 22 inclusive to cross the border, subject to the applicable exceptions.

For the purposes of the present argument, the political merits or shortcomings of that decision are secondary.

Martial law remained in force. Russia’s armed aggression continued. The general need for emergency regulation had not disappeared. Yet the state altered the category of persons to whom a particular restriction applied, without terminating or weakening the emergency regime as a whole.

This example does not establish that restrictions continuing to apply to other categories of men are unlawful or should be repealed. It shows something different: the duration of an emergency regime and the duration of a particular measure need not follow the same legal trajectory.

The regime may continue while the scope of an individual restriction is reconsidered in light of changed circumstances. A state may have exceptionally strong reasons for maintaining the emergency regime while reaching a different conclusion about the appropriate scope of a particular measure.

Why Is This Measure Still Necessary Now?

It is here that the distinction becomes legally significant for European judicial review. The considerable discretion afforded to national authorities in assessing an emergency threat should not displace independent scrutiny of a particular measure.

Domenjoud v France illustrates this distinction from another angle.

Following the 2015 terrorist attacks, France was operating under a state of emergency. In the run-up to the COP21 climate conference in Paris, the authorities restricted the movement of two environmental activists. The general emergency context was the same, but the individual factual grounds for the measures differed.

In relation to one applicant, the Court considered the information concerning his previous conduct sufficient to substantiate the alleged risk. In relation to the other, there was no comparable individual evidential basis; the Court also found no sufficiently close connection between the measure imposed on him and the threat relied upon by France in the context of its derogation.

Domenjoud therefore demonstrates not a temporal change in a measure, as in the Ukrainian example, but the other side of the same distinction: a general emergency context does not remove the need to establish a sufficient connection between a particular measure, a particular person, and a particular threat.

Two different questions follow:

Does the emergency continue to justify the existence of the exceptional legal regime?

And:

Does the particular restriction remain necessary in its present form?

The second question does not require a court to reassess the first in its entirety. A court may ask the narrower question whether there remains, today, a sufficient connection between the particular measure, its present scope, and the threat on which the state relies.

This does not transfer crisis management to judges. It preserves an independent role for judicial scrutiny of the particular measure.

Temporariness Must Operate Within the Emergency Regime

The European experience of terrorism, the COVID-19 pandemic, and war demonstrates how incomplete the traditional picture of temporariness can be: a crisis begins, exceptional powers are introduced, the crisis ends, and the ordinary legal order returns.

Prolonged emergencies disrupt that sequence.

If temporariness acquires legal significance only once the emergency itself has ended, it offers too little protection in a crisis lasting for years. Temporariness must have legal content within an emergency regime that is still continuing.

That content does not lie in a requirement that measures automatically become less restrictive as time passes, but in preserving the possibility of reviewing their continuing justification. If the factual basis remains, the restriction may remain. If circumstances have changed, the measure may be narrowed, modified, or terminated before the emergency regime itself comes to an end.

In this way, temporariness ceases to be merely a promise of a future return to ordinary law and becomes a legal requirement operating in the present.

For European law, this has wider significance. The longer emergency governance becomes part of legal reality, the more important it is not to allow the duration of the regime itself to become an independent argument for leaving every measure within it unchanged. Otherwise, scrutiny of temporariness will focus only on the fate of the emergency regime as a whole, while individual restrictions may continue on the basis of justifications formed for circumstances that have already changed.

The legal significance of renewal is therefore both important and limited. By renewing an emergency regime, the state confirms the continuing necessity of exceptional governance. But that does not, by itself, determine the fate of every measure operating within it.

To renew the regime is not automatically to renew the justification for every restriction.

In a prolonged emergency, European judicial review must preserve the possibility of asking the narrower question:

Why, precisely, is this measure still necessary today?

The post Beyond Renewal: Why Continuing an Emergency Regime Does Not Automatically Renew the Justification for Every Restriction on Rights appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

As climate disasters frequent across the African continent, governments have been promoting climate-smart innovations, including the development of drought-resistant crops. Drought-resistant and nutritious staples such as millet and sorghum and drought-tolerant maize varieties are some crops helping farmers survive dry seasons. But there has been a decline in the adoption of these drought-tolerant crops on […]

Durée de la vidéo : 90'

Clause de non-responsabilité : L'interprétation des débats facilite la communication mais ne constitue en aucun cas un enregistrement authentifié des débats. Seuls le discours original ou la traduction écrite révisée du discours original peuvent être considérés authentiques.
Source : © Union européenne, 2026 - PE

Des chaînes Telegram russes utilisent de fausses accusations de viol et des images de femmes ukrainiennes pour attirer des millions d'utilisateurs vers des réseaux de propagande pro-guerre.