Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The religious policy innovations that Uzbekistan’s President Mirziyoyev has initiated in the name of liberalisation and reform continue the poli­cies of his predecessor in key aspects. Under the motto “enlightenment against ignorance”, state influence over the religious knowledge taught in educational and research institutions has been strengthened. The country’s Islamic heritage is proactively used for representative purposes and held up as an integral part of national culture. The religious policy measures that amount to a “secularisation” of Islam through scientification and musealisation do not reach large sections of society. For the ordinary believer, Islam is not a science but a matter of belief, a system of rules and convictions that guides the way they live. The liberalisation of the media landscape means that religious advice is available in abundance. It often includes propaganda transporting illiberal ideas, but the state intervenes only selectively. The liberalisation of religious policy has resulted in a growing Islamisation of the population. The authoritarian state headed by President Mirziyoyev is thus being consolidated. Repression remains the means of choice should Islamic milieus seriously challenge the secular state.

Vom 22. bis zum 24. August 2023 wird in Johannesburg der 15. Gipfel der BRICS-Staaten (Brasilien, Russland, Indien, China und Südafrika) stattfinden. Mit der nun bestätigten virtuellen Teilnahme des russischen Präsidenten Putin konnten diplo­matische Verwicklungen aufgrund des gegen ihn vom Internationalen Strafgerichtshof erlassenen Haftbefehls vermieden werden. Die Aufmerksamkeit gilt nun wieder der weiteren Entwicklung der BRICS. Im Zuge einer möglichen Erweiterung seiner Mitgliedschaft um bedeutende Rohstoffmächte könnte sich der BRICS-Verbund als Stimme des Globalen Südens konsolidieren und gleichzeitig seine weltpolitische Rolle ausweiten. Doch die Übermacht Chinas innerhalb der BRICS wird von den anderen Mitgliedern kritisch gesehen – man will sich dem weltpolitischen Vormachtstreben Pekings nicht unter­ordnen. Gleichwohl wird sich der Westen mit einem gestärkten Selbstbewusstsein der BRICS-Staaten und deren Vorstellungen von der internatio­nalen Ordnung proaktiv auseinandersetzen müssen.

Novák Katalin, köztársasági elnök Ruandába és Tanzániába tett látogtatást. A térség Afrika egyik legstabilabb és legdinamikusabban fejlődő régiója, amelyből Magyarország is profitálhat. Az elnöki vizitről,

Nagy örömmel osztjuk meg, hogy Kutatóközpontunk vezetője, Prof. Dr. Tarrósy István ettől az évtől kezdődően a Floridai Egyetem CAME (Center for Arts, Migration and Entrepreneurship)

In den vergangenen 10 Jahren haben die drei verbündeten Regierungen Ägyptens, Saudi-Arabiens und der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate (VAE) erheblichen Einfluss auf Entwicklungen im Nahen und Mittleren Osten genommen. Gemeinsames Ziel war es, demokratische Transformation zu verhindern, den Aufstieg des politischen Islam zu stoppen sowie dem regionalen Einfluss Irans und der Türkei entgegenzuwirken. Gemeinsame regionalpolitische Interventionen waren indes wenig erfolgreich. Über­dies treten in den letzten Monaten Interessendivergenzen in den bilateralen Bezie­hungen zwischen diesen autoritär geführten arabischen Staaten zutage. Konflikt­poten­zial wird sowohl in Bezug auf wirtschaftliche als auch auf regional­politische Fragen sichtbar und dürfte zukünftig noch steigen. Deutschland und die Europäische Union (EU) sollten diese Interessendivergenzen der drei Länder als Chance begreifen, um eigene Ziele in der Region zu verfolgen.

Wirtschaftspolitische Herausforderungen der Türkei

Internal cooperation and external enabling have contributed to an eerie peace between the region’s preeminent powers.

Der Putsch in Niger traf die Bundesregierung offenbar unvorbereitet – ähnlich wie frühere Krisen. Tatsächlich steckt der Fehler im System.

Since February 2022, Ukraine has been defending itself against yet another Russian war of aggression. Now that immediate support – military, diplomatic, financial and humanitarian – for Ukraine has improved, the country’s long-term security needs to be addressed. Looking ahead, security commitments should be built on political, economic and military pillars. NATO membership is essential for Ukraine’s security, but it is also in the geostrategic and normative interests of the Alliance, even if it is a risky, long-term and difficult endeavour. At the 2023 summit in Vilnius, NATO rec­ognized that Ukraine’s future is in the Alliance but remained vague about the condi­tions to join. Yet, other agreements announced on the margins of the summit by the G7 and individual states expand the support for Ukraine. Framed as steps to increase Ukraine’s security, these should accompany the transition from current security support to future guarantees.

Against the background of the Russian missile strikes against Ukraine, Germany has launched the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) to strengthen Europe’s air and missile defence. In the short term, it seems there is little likelihood of a Russian missile attack against NATO as Moscow probably lacks both the military means and the incentives. But, in the medium to long term, improving air and missile defence in Europe could curb Russia’s coercive power vis-à-vis NATO and thereby strengthen the cohesion of the alliance. However, for this to happen and for the full potential of the initiative to be realized, several strategic, technical-operational and political issues should be addressed. Otherwise, ESSI could end up contributing to NATO fragmentation at the political and technical level.

Die neue Anklage stelle Ex-Präsident Trump vor erhebliche Probleme, sagt der US-Experte Thimm - vor Gericht und im Wahlkampf. Sollte Trump die Wahl gewinnen, sei eine Verfassungskrise zu befürchten.

For years, the President of Republika Srpska (RS), Milorad Dodik, has been stoking ethnic tensions and promoting his secessionist agenda. Recent legislation passed in RS in late June 2023 constitutes one of the most serious violations yet of the Dayton Peace Agreement and Bosnia and Herzegovina's constitution since 1995. Upon Dodik's instigation, the National Assembly of RS decided not to recognize the decisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Constitutional Court and to circumvent the directives of the High Representative (HR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Christian Schmidt. Crucially, Schmidt can use his Bonn powers to overturn decisions that threaten the constitutional order of the country, and has already done so by declaring the decisions of the National Assembly of RS invalid and threatening penalties. Dodik, on his part, dismissed the HR's decisions as unlawful, posing a serious problem for the EU.

RS is one of the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a majority Bosnian Serb population and ruled by Dodik. In his quest for reunification with Serbia, he often steps on the Serbian government’s toes, especially now that Serbia is aiming to present itself as a constructive player in the dialogue with Kosovo.

Dodik’s attempts to seek ways to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina are nothing new. Since July 2021, RS representatives have boycotted the work of Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutions after former HR Valentin Inzko pushed through legislative changes sanctioning genocide denial. In late 2021, Dodik announced RS's withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina's joint army, supreme judiciary, and tax administration. The implementation of these plans was then put on hold in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to avoid "further complicating Republika Srpska's geopolitical position in complex geopolitical circumstances." 

Why the situation in RS should be taken seriously

The circumstances under which Dodik made his latest decisions differ from those of previous crises. The EU should therefore take the current crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina more seriously, even if it may only appear to be a continuation of RS's years of separatist efforts. So, what is different this time?

First and foremost, the course and consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine have already influenced certain decisions made in RS. Dodik himself has already drawn parallels between the war in relation to RS’s complex geopolitical position. The longer the war in Ukraine continues and the further Russia advances, the more intensively Dodik will try to test the limits of the West vis-à-vis his separatist policy. Methods such as the Bonn powers or U.S. sanctions against Dodik for undermining Bosnia and Herzegovina's constitutional order have so far proved ineffective. With his recent decisions, Dodik has de facto expelled the HR from RS. Since the police are subordinate to the two aforementioned entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the HR has no way of enforcing his decisions in the RS. The European Parliament recently called on the Council to impose sanctions on Dodik. If administered, these could be more effective than the U.S. equivalents, since Bosnia and Herzegovina has much stronger political, security and economic ties with the EU than it does with the U.S. However, the decisive factor here will be how effectively the West can oppose Russian aggression in Ukraine. If the EU in particular can prove itself capable of making unified, coordinated and, above all, swift security policy decisions, then Dodik will be more afraid of possible consequences than he is currently. How the territorial issues in Ukraine are resolved after the war will also be pivotal.

Second, regional security dynamics, particularly the unrest in northern Kosovo that culminated in violent clashes in May 2023, are also pertinent. The current situation in northern Kosovo demonstrates the EU's lack of assertiveness in brokering an effective solution between Belgrade and Pristina, which could further embolden Dodik. The fact that the EU has been engaged in crisis management in the region for years and is still unable to convince Belgrade and Pristina of the benefits of a peaceful solution, suggests Dodik will most likely perceive its powers to be somewhat insignificant. This means that as long as the conflict in northern Kosovo remains unresolved, the danger of it spreading to Bosnia and Herzegovina will persist, if not increase.

Dodik is also aggravating the current situation because his position of power in RS is under threat. To date, crises have been a proven means of increasing his popularity. He only narrowly won the most recent elections in RS against an opposition candidate allegedly supported by Belgrade. For some time, there have been suspicions in the political debates in the Western Balkans that Serbia's President Aleksandar Vučić is unhappy with Dodik, even though he publicly supports him. RS’s separatist policy does not benefit Serbia precisely because Serbia itself is under pressure from the West to move closer to the EU in terms of foreign and security policy, and to finally resolve issues with Kosovo. These matters have become a greater priority for the EU since February 2022, given the transformed geopolitical environment.

The EU has to step up

It is therefore crucial that the EU finally unfurls its "hard power" in RS and against Dodik. HR decisions that cannot be enforced in RS remain a dead letter. Even if joint EU sanctions fail in the Council because of Hungary’s veto – since Hungary maintains good relations with Dodik –, bilateral sanctions should still be imposed with a clear strategic communication about why and how these actions affect RS. Of course, a confrontational EU policy toward Dodik risks further exacerbating the situation and encouraging Dodik to act even more erratically. As all other attempts have thus far failed, a change of tact is required. At the same time, the EU must mediate more effectively in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and seek de-escalation of the situation in northern Kosovo and full implementation of the normalization agreement reached in February and March 2023. It should be made clear that separatism in the Balkans has no future.

The armed groups that have formed in Libya since 2011 have progressively taken over the state. They are undergoing a process of institutionalisation, and their representatives are reaching the top levels of the army, the security apparatus and the civilian government. At the same time, they are exerting massive influence over who gets key appointments and how state resources are distributed. The resulting amalgamation of private interests mixed with military units is likely to shape Libya’s political and security landscapes for years to come. Since mid-2022, relations between leading mili­tary actors have been characterised by pragmatic arrangements. But they continue to harbour considerable potential for conflict as distributive conflicts can quickly lead to armed confrontation. The consolidation of private armies also diminishes the pros­pect of security sector reform. European governments should reconsider how they engage with Libya’s increasingly powerful and repressive militia leaders.

Die seit 2011 in Libyen entstandenen bewaffneten Gruppen haben in den letzten Jahren einen Marsch durch die Institutionen vollzogen. Mittlerweile sind ihre Ver­treter sowohl in Armee und Sicherheitsapparat als auch in zivilen Regierungsämtern auf der Spitzenebene angekommen. Zugleich üben sie massiven Einfluss auf die Besetzung von Schlüsselpositionen und die Verteilung staatlicher Mittel aus. Die daraus erwach­sene enge Verquickung privater Interessen mit militärischen Einheiten dürfte Libyens Politik und Sicherheitssektor auf Jahre hinweg ihren Stempel auf­drücken. Auch wenn die Beziehungen zwischen den führenden militärischen Akteu­ren seit Mitte 2022 von pragmatischen Arrangements geprägt sind, bergen sie weiter­hin beträchtliches Konfliktpotential, da Verteilungskonflikte jederzeit in bewaffnete Konfrontationen umschlagen können. Die Konsolidierung der Privatarmeen bedeutet zudem, dass es kaum noch Perspektiven für eine Reform des Sicherheitssektors gibt. Diese Entwicklung stellt europäische Regierungen vor die Frage, wie sie mit immer mäch­tigeren und repressiveren Milizenführern umgehen sollen.